Series Minor

XCVII.2

'Verità e bellezza'
Essays in Honour of Raffaele Torella

Edited by
Francesco Sferra and Vincenzo Vergiani

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A Preliminary Note on the Manuscripts of the Tantrālokaviveka

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1. Introduction

This article is a sincere tribute to the dedicated and exemplary scholarship of Professor Raffaele Torella, a fine combination of a philologist and philosopher, who has built a robust scholarship on Utpaladeva (*fl.* ca. 925–975) and Abhinavagupta (*fl.* ca. 975–1025) over several decades.[1] Thus, here I do not have to put forward an argument to justify the need for a critically revised edition of Abhinavagupta's magnum opus, the tantric manual (*paddhati*) *Tantrāloka* (TĀ) along with the only surviving commentary,[2] the

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[1] Torella is responsible for preparing the model edition of the ĪPK *Vṛtti* (see Torella 2002) and the recovery of parts of the long-lost *Vivṛti* (see Torella 2014b); see also Torella 2013 and 2014a.

[2] See Rastogi 1987: 103–104. There certainly was a commentary called *Vivaraṇa* by Subhaṭa Datta available to Jayaratha. Pandey 1963: 261 regards him as the first commentator of the TĀ. Rastogi mentions the possibility of yet another commentary that, according to Pandey (p. 262), was called *Vivṛti*, but is no longer extant. For another example of the 'third step' mentioned by Rastogi, see Sanderson (2007a: 98–99) where it is shown that Jayaratha does not seem to have had access to the *Brahmayāmalatantra* (e.g. in case of TĀV 5.98). See Vasudeva 2004: 273–274 for more details.

Tantrālokaviveka (TĀV) by Jayaratha (*fl.* ca. 1225–1275). However, modern philologists, Sanskritists and Indologists alike, have already noted their concerns. In 1987, highlighting the importance of a critical edition of both the TĀ and the TĀV, Rastogi pointed out:

> Our most urgent task is to have a critically edited text of the *Tantrāloka* and the *Viveka*. In the foregoing pages we visualised its necessity several times. By the time of Jayaratha the text of the *T.A.* was eclipsed by corruptions and he gives ample testimony of his having edited and restored the text (e.g., the *Viveka* on the *T.A.* 23.23, 23.25, 29.265–66 and 37.4–5 etc.). The printed KSTS edition is in dire need of the same type of approach. An effort is to be made to locate as many MSS as possible and to collate and compare them. This may help settle many such problems as we have seen with regard to the difference in readings between Pandey's Ms and the KSTS edition and resulting complications or with regard to several variants given by Jayaratha which are traceable to none of the MSS on which the KSTS edition is based. As a first step, an internal comparative study may be undertaken as we notice variations in the portions referred to or cross referred to. As a second step, citations appearing in the *T.A.* and the *Viveka* may be compared with their original sources wherever available either in print or in MS. This may be done with an historical overview since even some apparently correct readings give rise to historical absurdities (e.g., Bhrātā'pi for Bhartā'pi in the *T.A.* 37.75). As a third step, a track has to be kept of the situations where Jayaratha, though seldom, is at variance with his master. For example the *T.A.* 8.406 says something, but it means something else from Jayaratha's comments.[3]

In 1972 Raniero Gnoli (Torella's teacher) produced the first ever complete scholarly translation of the TĀ (without Jayaratha's commentary) into a modern language, Italian. In the 1999 revised edition he observes:

> Il commento (*viveka*) di Jayaratha è, a suo modo, un capolavoro. Sono trascorsi più di duecento anni dalla morte di Abhinavagupta e il *Tantrāloka* è ormai divenuto un classico, considerato alla stessa stregua delle sacre scritture. I manoscritti si sono moltiplicati e con essi gli errori o le improprie trascrizioni degli scribi. Di un commento precedente, per opera di un certo Subhaṭa, nulla sap-

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[3] Rastogi 1987: 245–246.

piamo. Jayaratha domina perfettamente tutta la letteratura śivaita, menzionando di prima mano la maggior parte degli Āgama citati da Abhinavagupta. Quasi tutte le stanze del testo sono ampliamente giustificate nelle brevi *avataraṇikā* e commentate. Altre sono brevemente parafrasate. Nonostante la sua dottrina, Jayaratha non è immune da errori.[4]

In 2000, in their French translation of the first five *āhnika*s of the *Tantrāloka*, Silburn[5] and Padoux struck a similar note:

> La plupart de ces textes, il est vrai, étaient alors considérés comme perdus, ou étaient inaccessibles. Ce n'est que récemment que certains ont été retrouvés, en manuscrits, au Népal ou dans les bibliothèques d'Europe, que l'on a pu les consulter et commencer à les étudier. Une nouvelle édition du TĀ et de son commentaire, qui serait fort désirable, serait dès lors maintenant possible. Mais elle nécessiterait la consultation de manuscrits au Cachemire, auxquels on ne peut guére accéder aujourd'hui, et elle exigerait une grande érudition et un travail considérable. Il faut donc pour le moment se contenter de l'édition existante, qui n'est d'ailleurs pas mauvaise.[6]

However, things had gradually started to change, and it had gradually become easier worldwide to access the manuscript materials (or to acquire copies thereof), including the ones from Kashmir. Now the challenge was how to make best use of such material, as Goodall and Isaacson remarked in 2011:

> ….but we think that it is high time for an entirely fresh treatment of Abhinavagupta's masterpiece — one which does not rely solely on the KSTS edition, laudable pioneering attempt though it is, but makes use of the plentiful manuscript material that is available, some of which was not at the disposal of the editor and his assistants.[7]

Recently, Goodall and Isaacson have further noted that Alexis Sanderson is already engaged in an effort to produce such an edition:

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[4] Gnoli 1999: LXXXII–LXXXIII.
[5] Lilian Silburn passed away in 1993, but the translation was published only in 2000 by André Padoux.
[6] Silburn and Padoux 2000: 60–61.
[7] Goodall and Isaacson 2011: 130.

> In 2015 Alexis Sanderson retired from the Spalding professorship
> and since then has been able at long last to concentrate exclusive-
> ly on the most celebrated work of this seminal thinker, the vast
> and complex 'Light on the Tantras' (*Tantrāloka*), working on a
> critical edition of the text, with an annotated English translation
> and a detailed commentary.[8]

The crucial importance of critically editing and translating
Sanskrit texts has been recently emphasised also by Hanneder,[9]
who offers many examples of Kashmiri works. As a preliminary
effort towards this endeavour, I have prepared this prefatory
report listing the details of all the manuscripts of the TĀ or TĀV
that I have come across. I have been able to locate 47 manuscripts:
1 from Göttingen, 8 from Berlin, 1 from Delhi, 4 from Jammu, 1
from London, 3 from Lucknow, 6 from Pune, 11 from Srinagar, 1
from Trivandrum, 1 from Ujjain, 1 from Darbhanga and 9 from
Varanasi (7 from the Sayaji Rao Gaekwad Central Library in the
Banaras Hindu University and 2 from the Saraswatī Bhavana
Library in the Sampurnananda Sanskrit University). Amongst
them, as Witzel (1994: 17) mentions, it is possible that the
Göttingen Ms is part of a collection built by Franz Kielhorn, who
was interested in Śāradā Mss from Kashmir. However, this is not
mentioned in Cat. Göttingen 1894. The Lucknow Mss, kept in the
Akhil Bharatiya Sanskrit Parishad, are part of the 2134 Śāradā Mss
donated to this institution by Pandit Vindhyeshwar Nath Razdan
(?–1966).[10] The Pune Mss were originally part of the collection
Georg Bühler created in 1875–1876 and are now preserved in the
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. The Berlin Mss form part
of the collection of Klaus Ludwig Janert kept in the Staats-
bibliothek zu Berlin. The Srinagar Mss are all part of the collec-
tion of the Oriental Research Library, Government of Jammu &
Kashmir.[11] I have come across another set comprised of 8 Mss

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[8] Goodall and Isaacson 2020: XXVIII.

[9] See Hanneder 2017.

[10] Pandit Razdan is reported to have donated 3820 Mss to the Parishad, out of
which 1686 were in Devanāgarī. See Cat. ABSP I 1970: V–VI.

[11] My teacher Pandit Dinanath Yacch (1921–2004), who served in the Jammu
and Kashmir Research and Publication Department from 1945–1976, first as a
copyist and then as head pandit, told me that, when he joined the department,

from Srinagar, 3 from Berlin and 3 from Darbhanga (Bihar), mentioned in different hand-lists or catalogues, that I have not located yet, but they are included in the conspectus siglorum (see the Appendix).

The oldest amongst all witnesses is certainly the one kept in the National Museum of India in New Delhi,[12] the only surviving birch-bark Ms, possibly dated between the 17th–18th c. CE. The condition of this birch-bark Ms is unusually good. Paleographically, it shows some features that could help to establish its date more accurately: the conservative use of *jihvāmūlīya/ upadhmānīya* and *pṛṣṭhamātrā* vowels.[13] The only other Ms that appears to follow this style is Ms No. ORLS 1054.03 from Srinagar.

All other Mss are written on what I have usually referred to as 'country paper,'[14] with the exception of a single, badly damaged palm-leaf Ms belonging to the South Indian transmission, located in Thiruvanantapuram and written in old Malayalam script. Amongst the Mss I have consulted, 34 are written in Śāradā script, 3 in Kashmirian Devanāgarī,[15] 8 in Devanāgarī and 1 in old

they had a collection of 212 Mss that were loaned to the National Archives of India in New Delhi for an exhibition, but were never returned. Witzel (1994: 17 and n. 79) also mentions this: 'Apparently after May 3, 1948, the last entry, and before the date the collection at Delhi was started, with no. 213 on april 27, 1951.' It was mostly Pandit Yacch who prompted the procuring of almost all the Sanskrit Mss that today form the collection of the Oriental Research Library in Srinagar. An unpublished hand-list of this collection was jointly prepared by Śrīkaṇṭha Kaul and Yacch that I have listed here as Cat. CSMS 1989 but the cyclostyled copies made available by the Kashmir Research Department do not bear the name of either of them. This is the same hand-list also mentioned in Witzel 1994: 17 and Sanderson 2007a: 577 (Bibliography). Using the metadata of the IGNCA in New Delhi, I have also prepared a list mostly based on Cat. CSMS 1989, mentioned here as Cat. SORL 1989. Another partial hand-list was prepared by B.K.K. Deambi and published by the University of Kashmir, mentioned as Cat. SMLS 1983. In 2011, a hand-list (bearing no name of a compiler) was published by the Department of Libraries and Research of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir (Srinagar), listed here as Cat. ORLS 2011.

[12] The National Museum of India in New Delhi houses a large collection of uncatalogued Śāradā Mss from Kashmir, but little is known about the history of this collection. I have often heard that it belonged to the Maharaja of Kashmir and was appropriated by the Government of India between 1949–1952.

[13] See Kaul Deambi 2008: 59–65.

[14] See Witzel 1994: 13 ff for paper Mss of Kashmir.

[15] For more on 'Kashmiri Devanāgarī' see Witzel 1994: 19. Also see Stein in Cat. RTL 1894, p. IX, who often notes it as '*navīnā kāśmīrikī lipiḥ.*'

Malayalam.[16] One composite Ms from Jammu (RSRL 623–20 *ka* 2) has some portions written in Śāradā and others in Devanāgarī or Kashmirian Devanāgarī.

Among the 47 Mss listed in the conspectus siglorum, five (B_7, B_{11}, P_4, K_3 and T) contain only the text of the TĀ without the commentary of Jayaratha, while 36 Mss include both works (B_2, B_5, B_6, B_8, B_9, Db_1, D, G, J_2, J_3, J_4, L, Lk_1, Lk_2, Lk_3, P_1, P_2, P_3, P_5, K_2, K_4, K_6, K_7, K_9, K_{10}, K_{11}, K_{12}, K_{14}, U, S_1, S_2, V_1, V_2, V_3, V_5, V_7). This may suggest the possibility of two lines of transmission: one of the TĀ alone, and another of the TĀV. But in the absence of a stemma based on an exhaustive study and collation of all the Mss, this is for now only a hypothesis.

Another set of 6 manuscripts (B_3, J_1, P_6, K_1, V_4, V_6) only contains vv. 3.1–22 from the TĀ, commonly referred to as the *Bimbapratibimbavāda* (BPV).[17] Among the Mss of the BPV, two (J_1 and K_1) include only the text of the TĀ, while the others also include excerpts from the *Viveka* in the form of marginal annotations. None of them contains the complete commentary on vv. 3.1–22.

Unlike in the textual transmission of Pratyabhijñā Mss, where scholars like Ratié[18] and Kawajiri[19] have been able to reconstruct various parts of the *Vivṛti* or *Ṭīkā* on the ĪPK of Utpaladeva through marginal annotations, in the case of the TĀ and the TĀV

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[16] I am not completely sure about the date of this Ms, but experts claim that it may be 300–400 years old.

[17] As noted in Pandey (1963: 75–76), probably the *Bimbapratibimbavāda* may have been understood as a separate work of Abhinavagupta at some point since we know of independent Mss of this work, basically containing just the first 22 or 23 verses from the third *āhnika* of the TĀ. It is also possible that traditional Kashmiri Sanskrit scholars studied this excerpt from the TĀ independently because of its philosophical importance. Janārdana Śāstrī Pāndeya (1997: IX) suggests that Abhinavagupta might have composed this work earlier in life and later added it to the 3rd *āhnika* in a fitting context. As observed by Sanderson (reported in Wezler and Motegi 1998: xxiv–xxv), the practice of studying specific excerpts from the TĀ was not unusual; according to him, this was also the case with the section TĀ 13.3–41b, which contains Abhinava's discussion on Sāṃkhya and is sometimes referred to as the *Sāṃkhyanirṇaya*. To this, one may also add the discussion on the Mīmāṃsaka's notion of *vedyatā* in TĀ 10.19–97, but I have not come across any independent Mss of either the *Sāṃkhyanirṇaya* or the *vedyatā* section. In this regard, the *Bimbapratibimbavāda* seems to be exceptional.

[18] See Ratié 2016.

[19] See Kawajiri 2016.

long and exhaustive marginal annotations seem to be virtually absent in the majority of Mss. However, as emphatically illustrated by Ratié (2018), the importance of marginal annotations should never be underestimated: even in the case of the TĀ and the TĀV, some minor marginal annotations can go a long way in helping to improve the understanding of the text. Many Mss show corrections, etc. or quotations from the commentary supplied in the margins. A few initial folios of K_3, which contains only the TĀ, bear annotations from the *Viveka*. Similarly, the initial folio of K_6 contains marginal annotations. Just to give another very small example, in the case of G, K_{10} and S_2 we find a marginal note on TĀV 3.1: *na hi nirvimarśaḥ prakāśaḥ samasty upapadyate vā* | {from ĪPV 1.5.11:} *samastīti saṃbhavati upapadyate yuktyaghaṭate* + ...*vimarśasya prakāśasya pratyabhijñāyāṃ darśite* ++ *svabhāvam avabhāsasya vimarśaṃ vidur anyathā | prakāśo rtho paroktopi sphatikādijaḍopama iti pūrvo* +++*tarābhābhāyām*. In another important example, $K_2$97r, $Lk_2$1v and $Lk_3$102r record a verse from the *Vākyapadīya* (1.132) on top of the page: *vāgrūpatā ced utkrāmed avabodhasya śāśvatī | na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta sā hi pratyavamarśinī*||, annotating TĀV 3.1: *nanu yadi nāma paropāyasyāpy anuttaram eva rūpaṃ tatpūrveṇaiva gatārthatvāt kimartham idam āhnikāntaram ārabhyata ity āha.*

A peculiar feature shared by Mss B_8, J_4, Lk_1, P_4, K_4, K_6, K_{11}, S_1, and S_2 is the sudden shift after TĀV 11.80 to TĀV 10.60–61, after which either the Ms ends or it makes another sudden leap to TĀV 21.42. In fact, J_4, P_4, K_6 end with TĀV 11.80, and the last folio also reads a short part of the TĀV 10.61 (only J_4 stops at TĀV 10.79). However, in the remaining Mss the text continues with the *avataraṇikā* to TĀV 21.42.

There are a few other Mss that are mentioned in different catalogues of the Oriental Research Library, Government of Jammu & Kashmir, Srinagar, but I was not able to gain access to them. None of them could be physically located:

◊ Acc No. 1563.8,[20] listed under serial No. 1847.2, p. 386 of the Cat. ORLS 2011. According to the entry, it is in Śāradā script, on paper, comprising 5 folios, and measures 19.5 ×13 cm.

[20] In Cat. SMLS 1983 this title is listed under serial No. 796.

◊ Acc No. 1934.6 (BPV),[21] listed under serial No. 2003.2, p. 396 of the Cat. ORLS 2011. It is said to be on paper, in Śāradā script, 6 folios, and to measure 18.5 × 16.2 cm.

◊ Acc No. 2080.38 is only mentioned in the Cat. SORL 1989, but it does not appear in the other two hand-lists.

◊ Acc No. 2539.14 (*Bimbapratibimbavāda*) is mentioned on p. 45 of Cat. SORL 1989, where it is said to be in Śāradā.

The Cat. SMLS 1983, p. 32, also mentions the following:

◊ Serial No. 793 *Bimba (pratibimba)-stotra* (?) in Śāradā, 2 folios, Acc. No. 1586.31

◊ Serial No. 794 *Bimbapratibimbavāda* in Śāradā, 2 folios, Acc. No. 1586.31

◊ Serial No. 795 *Bimbapratibimbavāda* in Śāradā, 9 folios, Acc. No. 1192.06

◊ Serial No. 797 *Bimbapratibimbavāda* in Śāradā, 3 folios, Acc. No. 1740.12

A number of catalogues/hand-lists of the Srinagar ORL collections have emerged in the past few years. However, none of them are exhaustive and fully reliable. It is also possible that some of the items mentioned above from different hand-lists overlap. Only the physical inspection of the Mss will allows us to rectify mistakes and eventually produce a single consolidated list.

In the Cat. Göttingen 1995: 128, the TĀ appears among the 30 Mss listed under the following entry:[22]

◊ Acc No. 4542.20 Cod.Ms.Sanscr.Schr. 200 SuUB Göttingen (*Tantrāloka*)

Another mention is found in the following entry in the Cat. Janert 2016 (p. 13), which lists some 50 titles. No. 4 mentions the *Śivaśa-*

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[21] In Cat. SMLS 1983 this title is listed under serial No. 798.

[22] The other Mss mentioned under this entry are: 1) *Śivasūtravimarśinī* 2) *Śivasūtravārtika* 3) *Śivasutravṛtti* 4) *Spandasaṃdoha* 5) *Spandavṛtti* 6) *Spandavivṛti* 7) *Spandapradīpikā* 8) *Parāprāveśikā* 9) *Paramārthasāra* 10) *Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya* 11) *Stavacintāmaṇi* 12) *Vijñānabhairava* 13) *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* 14) *Mahārthamañjarī* 15) *Parātriṃśikā* 16) *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* 17) *Svacchandoddyotatantra* 18) *Netroddyotatantra* 19) *Pratyabhijñākārikāvṛtti* 20) *Tantrāloka* 21-23) *Śrīrmadbhagavadgītā* 24) *Mahānayaprakāśa* 25) *Saṃvitsphāra* 26) *Śārīrakasāra* 27) *Pañcīkaraṇavārtika* 28) *Tripurīprakaraṇa* 29) *Vedāntasāra* 30) *Viṣṇudharmottara*.

ktivilāsa and *Śivajīvadaśaka* of Sāhib Kaula with notes from the *Tantrāloka* of Abhinavagupta.

◊   Acc No: 6908.4 Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Janert Collection

The Cat. KSSU 1969, p. 113, records the following three Mss:

◊   Raj No. 259(3) Serial No: 2823 *Tantrāloka*, folios: 292, Devanāgarī, 11th and 12th *āhnika*s
◊   Raj No. 162(1) Serial No: 2824 *Tantrālokaviveka*, folios: 528, Devanāgarī, Folios 1 and 291–482 are missing
◊   Raj No. 171(1) Serial No: 2825 *Tantrālokaviveka*, folios: 325, Devanāgarī, Damaged

I am also aware of one uncatalogued Ms from Srinagar (Kashmir) belonging to the private collection of Jenab Manzoor Ahmed Daiko, which I have not been able to access.[23] Rastogi (1987: 246) also mentions a TĀ Ms belonging to K.C. Pandey held in Lucknow, but this too is not accessible.[24]

The *New Catalogus Catalogorum*[25] (NCC) records a Ms of the TĀ (Āhnika 1) on p. 46 of *An alphabetical list of manuscripts purchased upto 1891. Printed at the end of Notices of Sanskrit manuscripts by Haraprasada Shastri, Vol. XI. Calcutta, 1895.*[26] I could not find any

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[23] I could see this Ms personally in the summer of 2008, but I was not allowed either to make a copy or to take notes. It was shown to me for such a brief time that I could not even identify its contents in detail except that it was certainly the TĀ with the TĀV. The Ms was written in Śāradā characters and had rich marginalia (at least on the first few folios); it was bound in a thick leather cover. Jenab Manzoor Ahmed Daiko has created a rich library of almost 5000 manuscripts in Srinagar, but there is no hand-list or catalogue available (for more information about this collection, see here: https://kashmirlife.net/manuscript-man-25/). However, I am also aware that Prof Trilokinath Ganjoo had prepared detailed descriptions of some Mss in Daiko's collection.

[24] Navjivan Rastogi (personal communication) told me that Pandey's collection of books and Mss was donated to the Tagore Library at the University of Lucknow, where some of its items were stolen a few years back; since then, the matter has gone into the hands of external legal authorities, and, unfortunately, no one has been allowed to access the collection. Vrajvallabh Dwivedi mentions that part of Pandey's collection was burnt by some miscreant students of Lucknow University (reported in Rastogi 2013: 12).

[25] See NCC 1974, p. 104.

[26] 'Manuscripts in this list are described in the volumes of the *Descriptive Catalogue of Manuscripts in the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal*, by Haraprasada Shastri' (mentioned on p. II of Cat. List NCC 1984).

information about this Ms. The same page in the NCC also refers to *A Descriptive Catalogue of Manuscripts in Mithila*, published by the Bihar and Orissa Research Society, Patna with no details of the Ms mentioned.[27] I could not locate any mention of a TĀ Ms in the above catalogue, and I am not sure if the Ms No. 3033 from Kameshwar Singh Sanskrit University, Darbhanga, Bihar, that here I mention under No. 9 in the Conspectus Siglorum is the same as the one mentioned in the NCC. Ms No. 3033 is not mentioned in the Cat. KSSU 1969, which however mentions another set of three TĀ Mss, which I could not inspect personally. The NCC also mentions *A hand-list of the manuscripts in the Raja Ram Singh Library, Srinagar.*[28] As stated in the Cat. HSJK 1927 (p. 1), the personal collection of about two thousand Mss belonging to Raja Ram Singh was transferred to the Raghunath Temple Library (Sri Ranbir Sanskrit Research Institute) in Jammu. Therefore, Ms No. 1466 *ka*–5913 preserved in Sri Ranbir Sanskrit Research Institute may be actually the one mentioned in NCC 1974 (p. 104), originally belonging to Raja Ram Singh's collection.

For the following descriptions of the Mss I have mostly depended on either digital copies or photocopies. Only in a few cases have I actually been able to collect the physical descriptions of the Ms in person. Thus, most of the physical descriptions of Mss reproduce the details either as provided in the catalogues or in the meta-data pages attached to the digital copies. Even though I have exhaustively reproduced all the available details about the Mss, nonetheless the descriptions suffer from several limitations. Thus, wherever any particular details are not available in catalogues, etc., I have not supplied them. Although I have visited almost all the manuscript repositories myself, owing to a number of problems (mostly of a bureaucratic nature) it was usually easier to obtain copies of the Mss rather than inspecting them personally. The problems of accessibility to such materials in India (and also outside India) is notorious. As a consequence, in many cases it proved difficult to find out if a certain Ms is written on paper, or determine the kind of paper or its age; whether the Ms is bound

[27] See Cat. List NCC 1984: XVII.
[28] See Cat. List NCC 1984: XXII.

or consists of loose folios; what are its exact dimensions, and so on. Many Mss do not bear folio numbers; some Mss show the original continuous foliation, others bear folio numbers added later separately for each *āhnika,* and yet others bear both.

I have listed the contents of each Ms also specifying where a certain *āhnika* begins or ends. This is also true of composite Mss, where I have at least given the names of the texts other than the TĀ or the TĀV along with their extent. Wherever I had special observations to make, I have listed them in 'Notes,' and if a certain Ms is also listed in published catalogues or unpublished hand-lists, I have noted it in the Bibliography. Wherever such details are unavailable, I have indicated it.

2. *About the editio princeps*

Although in 1911 Chatterji announced that the edition of the TĀ had been undertaken since 1904–1905,[29] the *editio princeps* of the TĀ with the commentary *Viveka* (TĀV) was published in the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies (KSTS)[30] in twelve volumes between the years 1918–1938.[31] The first volume, containing the first two *āhnika*s and published in 1918, was edited by Pandit Mukund Rām Śāstrī (MRS), while the remaining eleven volumes containing *āhnika*s 3 to 37 were edited by Pandit Madhusūdan Kaul Śāstrī (MKS) between 1921 and 1938. Scholars reading the Śaiva literature and Tantric materials in original have wondered why both the prolific editors have remained completely silent about the Mss used for preparing the edition of the TĀV. Unfortunately, this seems to have been common practice not only in a number of cases in the KSTS, but also in many other book series in those days. MKS edited almost forty KSTS volumes, most of which (except of course the TĀV) contain some information about the Mss used. However, many among them do not report

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[29] See Chatterji 1911: 7.
[30] For more on the history of the 'Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies,' see Kaul forthcoming.
[31] KSTS Nos. XXIII, vol. 1 (1918); XXVIII, vol. 2 (1921); XXX, vol. 3 (1921); XXXVI, vol. 4 (1922); XXXV, vol. 5 (1922), XXIX, vol. 6 (1921); XLI, vol. 7 (1924); XLVII, vol. 8 (1926); LIX, vol. 9 (1938); LII, vol. 10 (1933); LVII, vol. 11 (1936), LVIII, vol. 12 (1938).

any variant readings at all,[32] and still others include only extensive annotations and notes but no variants.[33] While MRS did not include any details of the Mss used for the edition of the first volume of the TĀV, one might have expected MKS to fill this lacuna by providing such details in the second or subsequent volumes (those he edited) as he did, for instance, in the case of the ĪPV.[34] Unfortunately, he did not. Here one may also note that in the first volume of the ĪPV edited by MRS, the year of publication is mentioned as 1918. Even though this volume mentions MRS as the editor, its preface (dated 28 March 1919) is written by MKS, who provides the details of the Mss used for the ĪPV edition. The absence of similar information in the second and later volumes of the TĀV, also edited by MKS, has indeed left modern scholars puzzled.[35]

One gets the impression that the learned editors of the KSTS have put an enormous effort into editing and recording parallel readings from the available manuscript material.[36] As also noted

[32] Thus we have: *Laugākṣigṛhyasūtra*, vol. I, KSTS No. XLIX, 1928; ĪPVV, vol. I, LX, 1938; *Deśopadeśa* and *Narmamālā*, KSTS No. 40, 1923; *Vātulanāthasūtra*, KSTS No. 39, 1923; *Netratantra*, vol. II, KSTS No. LXI, 1939; *Ghaṭakarpara* KSTS No. LXVII, 1945.

[33] Thus we have: *Śivadṛṣṭi*, KSTS No. LIV, 1934; ĪPV, vol. II, KSTS No. XXXI–II, 1921; *Devīnāmavilāsa*, KSTS No. LXIII, 1942.

[34] ĪPV, vol. I, KSTS No. 22, pp. I–II, Preface.

[35] There are 11 TĀ and TĀV Mss in the collection of the Oriental Research Library of the Jammu and Kashmir Research and Publication Department. Even though these Mss were not part of the collection when the *editio princeps* was prepared but were acquired much later, some of them might still have been used for its preparation. As I learnt from Dinanath Yacch, in those days the general practice was the one described by Chatterji (1911: 18): 'The moment a Ms., which is considered worthy of publication, is obtained (often as a loan), it is copied out at once, for fear of not being able to get hold of it again. Then, as other Mss. of the same work are obtained, a collation is made of the original copy with these. This process is repeated again and again till a sufficient number of Mss. are collated and a fairly satisfactory text is obtained. It is only then that the work is deemed ready for the press so far as the text only of it is concerned (i.e. to say leaving out notes and introductions etc. which have to be written to make the text intelligible). [...] Thus, it becomes necessary to work simultaneously on a number of works and to take new works in hand even when the old ones are not quite ready.'

[36] Chatterjee edited the first six volumes of the KSTS from 1911 to 1916 with the immense help provided by a team of young Sanskrit pandits working for his department. He acknowledges the assistance of Pandits Mukund Rām Śāstri, Harabhaṭṭa Śāstrī, Maheśvar Nāth Rāzdān, amongst others. While acknowledging the contribution of Harabhaṭṭa Śāstrī (1874–1951), for instance, he writes:

by Rastogi (1987: 161), their endeavour mostly aimed to prepare error-free and readable editions. Nonetheless, almost all KSTS volumes are not totally free from errors and even severe editorial lapses. It is always possible to improve upon an *editio princeps*, and this is also true in the case of the TĀV. An example from the TĀ will show that occasionally the KSTS editors did not take pains to understand the text in the light of the *Viveka*: according to Sanderson, the words *kāla* and *kalā* that occur in TĀ 9.46cd–47ab seem to have been wrongly inverted by the manuscript tradition. But Jayaratha makes it clear in his commentary that he had thought through this problem and proposes an emendation. In TĀV, vol. VI, p. 46, in fact, Jayaratha suggests the reading *kalā*, which he found in certain old manuscripts. This proves that in his time there were still manuscripts that had the correct reading, for otherwise, as he points out, the reading of the *Kiraṇāgama* would be in disagreement with this passage in the TĀ.[37]

A closer look at the variant readings noted by the editors of the TĀV suggests that they might have used four Mss since the sigla used for the anonymous Mss are four Sanskrit consonants: *ka, kha, ga* and *gha*. The highest number of variants are listed from *ka* and *kha*, while those attributed to *ga* and *gha* are comparatively few. Those from Ms *gha* are only five in the first two *āhnika*s.[38] It is clear that the editors have selectively noted the variant readings from (likely) four Mss. The editors' choice to use a negative apparatus turns out to be misleading for later scholars so that the occurrence of as many as several variant readings in the Ms *gha* can easily be overlooked.[39] Likewise, Rastogi (1987: 160) has also noted that the

'[…] I have not allowed a single sentence to be finally written out or printed without carefully going through it and understanding its full meaning and bearing — from Pandit Hara Bhatta Shastrin, who has made a deeper study of the Kashmir Shaiva system and has a wider acquaintance with its literature than the other Pandits of the Department […]' (*Śivasūtra Vimarshinī*, KSTS No. 1, p. II, Preface). See also Kaul forthcoming.

[37] See Kaul 2018: n. 80.

[38] TĀ, KSTS vol. XXIII, containing first two *āhnika*s and edited by Mukund Rām Śāstrī. p. 250 n. 1, p. 285, n 2, p. 289, n. 1, p. 292, n 1 and in second *āhnika* p. 10, n. 1.

[39] Even though Rastogi does seem to suggest that the KSTS editors may have used four Mss, he does not seem to make a note of Ms *gha*. And indeed Ms *gha* is mentioned in K_{ED} vol. I, 1st *āhnika*, pp. 250, 285, 289, 292; 2nd *āhnika*, p. 10. vol. II, pp. 2, 7–11, 13, 21.

KSTS edition used four Mss, but several variants found in Ms *gha* have been overlooked. Upon a closer scrutiny of only the first volume (covering the first two *āhnika*s) of the TĀV, one can observe that MRS provides a greater number of variants than volume two (containing only the third *āhnika*), which is edited by MKS. For example, it is difficult to imagine that there is not a single variant worth reporting between pages 87–131 and 155–242 of volume two. I suspect that probably MKS followed a less exhaustive approach in editing the remaining volumes of the TĀV than MRS, which led to a flawed editorial practice.[40]

On the other hand, we should not judge the quality of the transmission of a certain text simply based on the occurrence or absence of variant readings recorded in the *editio princeps* without properly scrutinizing the original manuscript material. Only the scrutiny of the manuscript tradition can allow us to draw conclusions concerning the patterns of textual transmission of a given text. Thus, what Rastogi (1987: 161) says may not be really helpful if we want to establish the history of textual transmission of the TĀV:

> It appears that the text of the Āhnikas from first to thirteen was more corrupt than the latter ones as the profusion and frequency of foot-notes suggest. Even among the initial Āhnikas the 1st was most defective and the incidence of mistakes has been gradually on the declining scale in the subsequent ones. From 14th onwards footnotes become conspicuous by their absence.

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[40] According to Pandit Yacch, who himself served in the department from 1945–1976, the policy of the department was that the editor of the KSTS ought to be the one who was heading the institute (or the head-pandit or the superintendent). Yacch was skeptical about the editorship of KSTS volumes, saying that it was not always the case that the one whose name appeared as the editor had actually edited the text. According to him, there were already a few volumes prepared under the editorship of Jagadish Chandra Chatterjee (who was the first director of the Research Department), but since he left the department under mysterious circumstances (see Accardi 2018 on this incident), some of editions prepared under Chatterjee's lead were in fact finalised and published by his successor Mukund Rām Śāstrī. Similarly, some volumes prepared under the latter's supervision were later published under the name of Madhusūdan Kaul Śāstrī. It is equally true that other Sanskrit pandits in the department also played an important role in these editing projects, but their names and their efforts have never been given proper recognition.

There is more evidence of the uneven editorial choices made in KSTS. We see MKS providing profuse annotation to his edition of the *Śivadṛṣṭi*, but for other works, such as the *Svacchandatantra*, published in six volumes with Kṣemarāja's commentary *Uddyota*, or the *Netratantroddyota*, very few variant readings are recorded, and no annotation attempted at all. With regard to annotations, however, we should remark that, wherever the editors felt the topics to be abstrusely philosophical, they supplied notes to improve intelligibility. Unfortunately, this is not the case with equally abstruse descriptions of rituals. At the same time, one can clearly see that in many cases such notes, for instance in the two volumes of the ĪPV, are basically nothing but extracts from the ĪPVV.[41]

As mentioned above, it is not completely clear what policy the editors of the KSTS adopted on different occasions. However, it is evident that no uniform method was followed. In some cases, I suspect, the editorial team was probably focusing more on transcribing the Mss from Śāradā into Devanāgarī (itself a cumbersome process) to prepare the press-copies rather than carefully collating the Mss. My own collation of a number of Mss for the edition of a tiny fragment of the TĀV has shown that there are still many improvements to be made to the *editio princeps* of the TĀ and TĀV.[42]

If the oldest available Ms of the TĀV is the Delhi one (NMI 80.1212, probably 17th–18th c.), there is a gap of several hundred years between Jayaratha's time and the writing of the oldest surviving witness. However, the textual transmission in the past 300–400 years itself has not been bad.

Both Rastogi and Sanderson have pointed out the limitations of Jayaratha's commentary, who flourished 250 years after Abhinavagupta. Rastogi points to the textual corruption the TĀ underwent in just a couple of centuries, as Jayaratha himself observes.[43] Thus, we can easily infer what other textual problems the TĀ and the TĀV might have suffered since Jayaratha's time.

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[41] For instance, ĪPV, vol. I, p. 5, n. 6 is from ĪPVV, vol I, p. 18. Also, ĪPV vol. I, P. 11, n. 23 is from ĪPVV, vol. 1, p. 26. Also, ĪPV, vol. I, p. 5, n. 7 is from ĪPVV vol. I, p. 19.

[42] See Kaul 2016.

[43] Rastogi 1987: 108, 142–146, Sanderson 2007b: 96.

Since compared to the complete text of the TĀ and the TĀV, the part of the text I have edited is minuscule, it is impossible to offer any straightforward answers to the questions around the transmission. In this context, a firm answer can only emerge from the collation of the complete text of the TĀ and the TĀV.

Another kind of problem concerns the KSTS in general, i.e. the frequency of printing mistakes and the recourse to modern punctuation marks. While Rastogi has pointed out some printing mistakes in case of the *editio princeps* of the TĀV,[44] in the first volume ever published in the KSTS, Chatterjee himself has referred to the many misleading situations linked to the use of modern punctuation by the editors of KSTS:

> […] the only point which has resulted in failure is that, during my absence in Europe, when I could read only one proof of each form and the final reading was done in my office in Kashmir, a confusion has been made as to the use of the signs of punctuation. The old Sanskrit Mss. never used signs and the old type Pandits are generally unacquainted with their meanings. It will thus be seen that in certain parts of the text a comma has been used where there should have been a semi-colon, where the latter has been substituted by a comma.[45]

While the obvious intention of the editors was to facilitate the reading of such texts for a modern reader, yet in some cases, a thorough reading gradually reveals that the punctuation marks provided by the editors are often misleading. In such cases, it is sometimes helpful to read the text ignoring all the punctuation marks. Such exercise can help the scholar to make more sense of the text in question. Needless to say, the running text (without spaces between words) gives rise to many issues related to sandhi.

It is also observed that the readings of the TĀ quoted in Abhinavagupta's other works also vary often. A few examples of this can be found in the ĪPVV.[46] In this case, if one only takes the example of the third *āhnika* alone, it becomes clear that in his

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[44] Rastogi 1987: 161–163.
[45] The *Śivasūtra Vimarshinī*, KSTS No. 1, p. II, Preface.
[46] Thus the verses 3.29, 3.23, 3.25–34 are quoted in ĪPVV, vol. I, pp. 164–165, 168. TĀ 3.25cd is missing in the quoted text in ĪPVV.

Viveka Jayaratha clearly paraphrases the ĪPVV. This should also prompt us to closely cross-check the Mss of the latter text. This will also prove to be a useful exercise.[47]

3. About other editions and translations

The *editio princeps* was reprinted by R.C. Dwivedi and Navjivan Rastogi in 1987 in eight volumes,[48] the first of which is an analytical study of the structure of the TĀ and TĀV, and the last an index of the verses of the TĀ and those quoted in the TĀV. This edition (or rather, this reprint of the original KSTS edition) mislead many scholars into thinking that the editors had prepared a new revised edition, as the cover page appears to declare. However, the editors make it clear that they have not attempted a critical edition of the text, and what they have done, in fact, is only an 'enlarged reprinted edition.'[49] While the introductory volume by Rastogi was the first remarkable study of the structure of the TĀ and the TĀV, the cover page, with its indication 'edited by,' was certainly misleading. The page numbers in the reprinted version have been altered from the KSTS, and the pagination of all thirty-seven chapters across six volumes is continuous.

As far as later published editions and translations of the TĀ are concerned, I have already mentioned Gnoli's first-ever complete 1972 translation, revised and re-published in 1999.[50] The translation is based on the KSTS edition and does not include the original Sanskrit text. However, in the notes the Italian scholar proposes several important emendations and corrections and offers learned annotations, all of which help improving the current readings and facilitate the understanding of the text. Owing to the scale of his project, Gnoli does not analyze individual themes of the TĀ exhaustively, which is a limitation of this work.

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[47] Compare, e.g., a number of instances from ĪPVV, vol. 1, p. 158 to TĀV 3.7; ĪPVV, vol. 1, p. 159 to TĀV 3.5–6; ĪPVV, vol. 1, p. 160 to TĀV 3.12; ĪPVV, vol. 1, pp. 160–161 and 169 to TĀV 3.15–16.

[48] See Dwivedi and Rastogi 1987.

[49] See Dwivedi *et al.*, vol I (1987: XVI).

[50] See Gnoli 1999.

An edition of the *Bimbapratibimbavāda* alone was prepared by Śrī Janārdana Śāstrī Pāndeya as a part of the *Śaivādvayaviṃśatikā* in 1997.[51] The latter is an anthology of twenty short Śaiva texts. Its first section includes nine shorter works by Abhinavagupta, with the *Bimbapratibimbavāda* on pp. 36–38. This includes only the first 23 verses of the 3rd *āhnika* of the TĀ. Pandeya based his edition on the two Mss of the BPV from BHU. Both Mss also include parts of the commentary from the *Viveka*, but Pandeya has not included them in his edition.

Two Hindi translations of the TĀV were published by Paramahamsa Mishra and Radheshyam Chaturvedi in 1993–2000[52] and 2002,[53] respectively. Both publications, which reproduce the original text from the *editio princeps*, are simple translation projects with no concern for textual problems. Mishra's edition, in eight volumes, is basically a Hindi paraphrase of the Sanskrit text. However, he does often add a few clarifications or makes important remarks. On the other hand, in his five-volume work, Chaturvedi has attempted a more literal translation, which nonetheless does not help much in improving our understanding of the problematic parts of the TĀ or the commentary. There are also instances where the translation does not mirror the readings adopted by the author. The complete absence of a single note or annotation in five volumes speaks for itself. Chaturvedi's translation is far from being critical.

In 2000, a French translation of the first five *āhnika*s of the TĀ was published by Lilian Silburn and André Padoux.[54] This translation is also based on the *editio princeps* and includes notes, references and interpretations based on Jayaratha's commentary. The Sanskrit text is not reproduced. The commentary is not translated, but selected parts are paraphrased wherever the authors deem it necessary. The first, second, fourth and fifth *āhnika*s were translated by Silburn, while the third *āhnika* was translated by Padoux.[55]

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[51] See Pāndeya 1997.

[52] See Miśra 1993–2000. This translation was published in eight volumes between 1993 and 2000: 1st in 2000; 2nd in 1993; 3rd in 1994; 4th in 1996; 5th in 1997; 6th in 1998; 7th in 1999; 8th in 1999.

[53] See Chaturvedi 2002.

[54] See Silburn and Padoux 2000.

[55] Silburn et al. 2000: 61.

In 1971 a doctoral thesis (so far unpublished) was defended at the University of Lucknow by Ira Bajpai,[56] discussing Abhinavagupta's philosophy as expounded in the first three *āhnika*s of the TĀ, along with an English translation without Jayaratha's commentary. This was the first attempt at understanding Abhinavagupta's *pratibimbavāda*, but it ignores textual problems, and the translation is not always appropriate. Sukhamoy Bhattacharya published a Bengali translation of the first twelve *āhnika*s of the TĀ (again without the TĀV) from the Asiatic Society (Calcutta) in 1992.[57] A Marathi translation of the first three *āhnika*s of the TĀV was published by Keshav Ramchandra Joshi from Pune in 2005.[58]

In 2003 John Dupuche published the only complete study of a single *āhnika* of the TĀV (*āhnika* 29) with an English translation and notes,[59] but he completely ignored textual problems. Other translations into English have recently been published, but I have purposely chosen to ignore them here because of their complete lack of scholarly commitment.

4. Description of manuscripts

1. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Janert Collection (5557 Hs. or. 11171 SBB-PK)

Ph. d.	Folios: 21; Śāradā; digital images (country paper); 33 × 26 cm, 26 × 22 cm.
Contents	TĀV 1.1 to 1.127.
Incipit	[line 1] *hābhidhānam	yad vakṣyati, tena svātantryaśaktyaiva yu* (TĀV 1.1, K$_{ED}$ vol. I, p. 6).
Explicit	[line 27] *kaṃcit kvacin niyuṃkte iti niyogasvarūpam iti bhāvanā ca bhāvyaniṣṭho bhāvakavyāpāraḥ bhāvyaṃ svargādiphalam, tan-niṣṭhas ta*[28] *dutpādakaḥ puruṣavyāpāro bhāvanā puruṣo hi bha-vantaṃ svargādikam arthaṃ svavyāpāreṇa bhāvayatīti bhāvanety ucyate* (TĀV 1.127, K$_{ED}$ vol. I, p. 167).
Notes	The Ms is badly damaged on the sides. Not bound. The folios are not numbered.
Bibl.	Cat. Janert 2006: 55.

[56] See Bajpai 1971.
[57] See Bhattacharya 1992.
[58] See Joshi 2005.
[59] See Dupuche 2003.

2. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Janert Collection
(5682 Hs or 11296 SBB-PK)

Ph. d.   Folios: 3; Śāradā; digital images (country paper); 17.5 × 25.5
            cm, 11.5 × 19.5 cm.
Contents   BPV (TĀV 3.1-24) (with fragments from the *Viveka*).
Incipit   (main text begins in) [1r1] *oṃ prakāśamātraṃ yat proktaṃ* (TĀV
            3.1, K$_{ED}$ vol. II, p. 1).
            (commentary on margins begins in) *prakāśamātram iti prā-
            dhāny+t na hi nirvimarśaḥ prakāśaḥ.*
Explicit   [3v4] *mohaḥ śāmyed iti niradiśad darpaṇavidhim* || *24* [5] *iti bi-
            mbapratibimbavādaḥ samāptaḥ* || (TĀV 3.23, K$_{ED}$ vol. II, p. 30).
Notes   Not bound. The folios are numbered. From v. 20 onwards the
            Viveka is completely missing.
Bibl.   Cat. Janert 2006: 85.

3. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Janert Collection
(6052 Hs or 11666 SBB-PK)

Ph. d.   Folios: 148; Devanāgarī; digital images (country paper);
            15.5×38 cm 10 × 26.5 cm.
Contents   TĀV 1.2 to 4.276a.
Incipit   [1r1] *kulam iti +++ttaraṃ katipayakāladārḍhyakāryāmṛtāntara-
            vailakṣaṇyāt utkṛṣṭṃ ca tat* (TĀV 1.1, K$_{ED}$ vol. I, p. 5).
Explicit   [148v14] *na ca atra sarva eva pātraṃ kiṃ tu kaścid eva tīvrata-
            maśaktipātapavitrita ity āha ketakīkusumasaurabhe bhṛśaṃ bhṛṅga
            eva rasiko na makṣikā* (TĀV 4.276a, K$_{ED}$ vol. III, p. 305).
Notes   *Āhnika* 1 ends on 51v14. *Āhnika* 2 ends on 59v2. *Āhnika* 3 ends
            on 104r. *Āhnika* 4 ends on 148v (4.276a). Each folio bears the
            abbreviation *rāma°* on the right lower margin, under which
            the folio number is found.
Bibl.   Cat. Janert 2010: 61.

4. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Janert Collection
(6075 Hs or 11689 SBB-PK)

Ph. d.   Folios: 25; Śāradā; digital images (country paper); 25 × 16.5
            cm 19 × 11.5 cm.
Contents   TĀV 11.87 to 13.70.
Incipit   [v1] *ṣaś ca hṛdā homyo niṣkṛtiḥ śirasā punar ityādy uktam ity
            āśaṅkyāha* || *ata eva ca te mantrāḥ* [2] *śodhakāś citrarūpiṇaḥ si-
            ddhāntavāmadakṣādāṃ citrau śuddhiṃ vitanvate* || (TĀV 11.87,
            K$_{ED}$ vol. VII, p. 69).

Explicit	[r28] *yadi phalet kṛtaṃ tannirodhena prāgvad eva karmaṇām ānupūrvyeṇa phaladānāvasthiteḥ* [29] *atha na phalettajjātyāyuṣpradam api karma na phaled iti tadaiva sarvasya de* (TĀV 13.71 (*avataraṇikā*), K$_{ED}$ vol. VIII, p. 49).
Notes	*Āhnika* 11 ends on 3v. *Āhnika* 12 ends on 5v. *Āhnika* 13 is incomplete. Not numbered.
Bibl.	Cat. Janert 2010: 68.

5. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Janert Collection
(6103 Hs or 11717 SBB-PK)

Ph. d.	Folios: 19; Śāradā; digital images (country paper); 29 × 19 cm, 23.5 × 13.5 cm.
Contents	TĀ 31.132 to 37 (*āhnika* 34 is missing).
Incipit	[r1] *sarveśvarapadaṃ vra*[^{ac}]*bha*[^{pc}]*jet	svastikenātha kartavyaṃ yuktaṃ tasyocyate vidhiḥ nāḍikāḥ* (TĀV 31.132, K$_{ED}$ vol. XII, pp. 284–285).
Explicit	[r13] *iti śrī* [14] *tantrālokaḥ samāptaḥ || kṛtiḥ śrīmacchrīcukhalakasūnorācā*[15]*ryacakravarticūḍhāmaṇeḥ śrīmadbhinavaguptasya || śubham astu ||* [16] *bhadraṃ paśyema pracarema bhadram ||* Below this colophon there is some text written in another hand. These are the two verses from the *Viveka*: [17] *yadacakathad amuṣmiś chrīmadācāryavaryo bahuparikaravṛndaṃ sarvaśā*[18]*stroddhṛtaṃ sat tadatulapariyatnenaiṣya saṃcintya sadbhir hṛdayakam*[19]*alakośe dhāryam āryaiḥ śivāya || yodhīti nikhilāgameṣu pada*[20]*vidyo yogaśāstraśramī yo vākyārthasamanvayī kṛtaratiḥ śrīpratya*[21]*bhijñāmṛte yas tarkāntaraviśrutaśrutabhayā dvaitādvayajñānavi*[22]*t sosmin syād adhikāravān kalakalaprāyaḥ pareṣāṃ ravaḥ ||* (TĀV 37, concluding verses of Jayaratha, K$_{ED}$ vol. XII, p. 428).
Notes	*Āhnika* 31 ends on [1v]. *Āhnika* 32 ends on [3r]. *Āhnika* 33 abruptly ends with the words [26] *saṃvartalakulibhṛgusitadhakākhaḍgipinākibhuja*[27]*gabalikākāḥ dviśchagalāṇḍau śikhiśoṇameṣamīnatri* (TĀ 33.13), and the next folio begins with the text of TĀ 35.7: *pi yo asāvarthaviśeṣagaḥ so api prāgvāsanārūpavimarśiparikalpi*[2]*taḥ na pratyakṣānumānādibāhyamānaprasādajaḥ. Āhnika* 35 ends on [9v]. Although *āhnika* 34 is completely missing, the scribe wrongly reports *āhnika* 35 as 34 in the colophon. Below, the same folio reads: *na kiñcit patitaṃ. Āhnika* 36 ends on the next folio, but the scribe wrongly reports it as 35 in the colophon. *Āhnika* 37 ends on [14]. The folios are not numbered.
Bibl.	Cat. Janert 2010: 76.

6. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Janert Collection
(6388 Hs or 11980 SBB-PK)

Ph. d.	Folios: 371; Śāradā; digital images (country paper); 16 × 23.5 cm; 9.5 × 15 cm.
Contents	TĀV 1.1 to 8.67.
Incipit	[1v1] *śrī parāvāgdevyai namaḥ* [2] *śrī gurave śivāyoṃ namaḥ* || *śrī devyaisi*++++ || *śrī gaṇapataye namaḥ* || *śrīr astu* (TĀV 1.1, K_{ED} vol. I, p. 1).
Explicit	[373v9] *atra ca nīlaniṣadhamālyavadgandhamādanākhyānāṃ caturṇāṃ parvatā*[10] *nāṃ catvāriṃśatsahasrāṇāṃ yojanānām utsedho anyeṣāṃ daśeti* (TĀV 8.67, K_{ED} vol. V, p. 51).
Notes	*Āhnika* 1 is incomplete and ends on 70 (TĀV 1.223). Several folios in between appear to be missing. *Āhnika* 2 begins on 91 (TĀ 2.3) and ends on 102v. *Āhnika* 3 ends on 186r. *Āhnika* 4 ends on 261v. *Āhnika* 5 ends on 302v. *Āhnika* 6 ends on 344v–345r. *Āhnika* 7 ends on 358r. *Āhnika* 8 is incomplete and ends suddenly on 373v9: *atra ca nīlaniṣadhamālyavadgandhamādanākhyānāṃ caturṇāṃ parvatā*[10] *nāṃ catvāriṃśatsahasrāṇāṃ yojanānām utsedho anyeṣāṃ daśeti* (TĀV 8.67).
Bibl.	Cat. Janert 2010: 164.

7. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Janert Collection
(6833 Hs or 12434 SBB-PK)

Ph. d.	Folios: 320; Śāradā; microfilm; 29 × 19 cm; 23 × 14 cm.
Contents	TĀV 1.1 to 11.80 and 21.42 to 26.42.
Incipit	[1r1] *oṃ śrīparamapadaprāpanasamarthagurucaraṇa jayantu nitarām ity om* [2] *oṃ namaḥ śivāya* || *oṃ yasmād īśaṇavitkriyāyaduditā ānandacidbhūmayo* (TĀV 1.1, K_{ED} vol. I, p. 1). An extra line on the top margin of this folio reads: *rapadam āptum athāsmy apūrvaṃ vākkauśalaṃ ca na nidarśayituṃ pravṛttaḥ*	*kiṃ tve* (TĀV 1.1, K_{ED} vol. I, p. 2).
Explicit	*āhnika* 26 suddenly ends in [331r5] *pureti pañcadaśāhnikādau tatraiva vīghraṃ vimalaṃ tatreti bodhātmake* [6] *sthaṇḍile svamityā– – –rādhayiṣitam*	*bodha eva hi pratipha*[7]*litas tathā tathocchalita ity uktaṃ bimbatveneti pratibimbatayeti ca* [8] *etad iti pratibimbabhāvātmatayā darśanam* || || *iti śrītantrā*[9]*lokaḥ* (TĀV 26.42, K_{ED} vol. X, p. 343).
Notes	Folio 36r begins with a different hand. The folios are numbered. *Āhnika* 1 ends on 45r1. *Āhnika* 2 begins on 45r2 and ends on 49v3. *Āhnika* 3 begins on 50r4 and ends on 80r36–37. *Āhnika* 4 begins on 80r39–41 and ends on 119v9–10. *Āhnika* 5 begins on 119v11 and ends on 141v4–5. *Āhnika* 6 begins on

141v5–6 and ends on 168r1–2. *Āhnika* 7 begins on 168r3 and ends on 175v12–13. *Āhnika* 8 begins on 175v14 and ends on 220v13. *Āhnika* 9 begins on 220v14 and ends on 268v14–15. *Āhnika* 10 begins on 268v16 and ends on 305v3–4. *Āhnika* 11 begins on 305v5 and abruptly ends on 3 with the lines [315v9] *dhirohe punaḥ sarvajñānakriyāyoga eva syāt ity āha yāvad dhā-mani* [10] *saṅketanikārakalanojjhite viśrāntaś cinmayaṃ kiṃ kiṃ na vetti ku*[11]*rute na vā ataś cāgamo py evam ity āha ata eva hi vāksiddhau* [12] *varṇānāṃ samupāsyatā* (TĀV 11.80). Here the scribe suddenly continues with the text of TĀV 10.60–61: [315v12] *arthakriyākaraṃ tac cen na dharmaḥ ko nv asau bhavet* [13] *na cedaṃ vedyatvaṃ jñānātmakaṃ saṃvinmātrātirikta-tvenārthād bhāvāṃśadha+* [14] *ta+ātve cās++++++bandhanam ity uktam arthakriyākaram iti sā ++*[15]*rthakriyā samanantaram eva +++++rmaś cen noṣya+e tatranīlādy api* [16] *kaścid dharmaḥ syād ity ukta++++++nv asau bhavet iti mātrāgraha*[17]*++ ca ve-dyatvasya jñānasaṃvitt+++dhikyaṃ dhvanitam adhikaś ca bhāvo* [18] *v+ ++āt taddharmo va na tāvad vedyatvabhāvaḥ tasya hi ve-dyatvaṃ na tu vedya*[19]*tvam eva saḥ ataś ca taddharma eveti yu-ktam uktam vedyatvaṃ bhāvadharma i*[20]*ti nanv atrokta eva – – – – – –* (the text suddenly stops here). This is almost the same change observed in Mss J$_4$, Lk$_1$, P$_4$, K$_4$, K$_6$, K$_{11}$, S$_1$ and S$_2$. In all these cases the scribe suddenly shifts after TĀV 11.80 to TĀV 10.60–61 and then either the Ms ends or makes another shift to TĀV 21.42. In fact, J$_4$ P$_4$ K$_6$ end with TĀV 11.80 and the last folio also reads a short part of TĀV 10.61 (only J$_4$ stops at TĀV 10.79). However, in Lk$_1$, K$_4$ K$_{11}$ S$_1$ S$_2$ the text further continues from TĀV 21.42–*avataraṇikā*. In the present Ms, folio 316r begins with TĀV 21.42–*avataraṇikā*: [316r1] *dīkṣāyām api atidiśati mṛtoddhāroditair eva yathāsaṃbhūti hetu*[2]*bhiḥ jīvat-parokṣadīkṣāpi kāryā nirbījikā tu sā tasyāṃ darbhākṛ* [3]. *Āhnika* 21 ends on 317r4–6. *Āhnika* 22 begins on 317r7 and ends on 319v4–5. *Āhnika* 23 begins on 319v5–6 and ends on 325v24–25. *Āhnika* 24 begins on 325v25–26 and ends on 327v11–12. *Āhnika* 25 begins on 327v12–13 and ends on 328v28–329r1. *Āhnika* 26 begins on 329v2 and ends on 331r5.

Bibl. Cat. Janert 2013: 130.

8. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Janert Collection (7040 Hs or 12641 SBB-PK)

Ph. d. Folios: 45; Śāradā; microfilm; 19.5 × 13.5 cm; 14 × 8.5 cm.
Contents TĀ 3.66 to 4.278.

Incipit   [25v1] *oṃ namaḥ śivāya oṃ namo +rāya* || [2] *ananyāpekṣitā-
          yāsya viśvātmatvaṃ prati prabhoḥ* [3] *tāṃ parāṃ pratibhāṃ devīṃ
          saṅgirante hya anuttarāṃ* (TĀ 3.66, K_{ED} vol. II, p. 74).

Explicit [45v11] *alaṃ vātiprasaṅgena bhūyasātiprapañcite* [12] *yogyo bhi-
          navagupto smin ko pi yāgavidhau budhaḥ* [13] || || || || ||
          [14] *ity anuttarapadapravikāse śāktam aupāyikam adya* [15] *vivi-
          ktam* || (TĀ 4.278, K_{ED} vol. III, p. 307).

Notes   The folios are numbered. *Āhnika* 3 ends on 36r14. *Āhnika* 4
          begins on 36r15 and ends on 45v15. The first folio bears the
          following text from TĀ 3.65abc: [1] *ato nimittaṃ devasya śa-
          ktayaḥ santu tādṛśe* [2] *itthaṃ viśvam idaṃ nāthe bhairaveya
          cidambare* [3] *pratibimbamalaṃ svacchena khalv anyaprasādataḥ*
          (TĀ 3.65ab, K_{ED} vol. II, p. 72). Below the line, the same folio
          reads: *iti śrī bimbapratibimbavādaḥ śubham*. The first 24 folios
          are missing; they certainly contained 3.1–65 (*Pratibimbavāda*)
          as is also clear from the colophon quoted above. I have only
          found two BPV Mss in Janert collection. The one missing in
          this Ms cannot be either 5682 Hs or 11296 SBB-PK of the same
          collection, described above. I could not access the only other
          BPV Mss (6019.12 Hs and 11633 SBB-PK) in this collection.

Bibl.   Cat. Janert 2016: 47.

9. Darbhanga (Bihar)
Kameshwar Singh Sanskrit University (Bihar) (3033)

Ph. d.   Folios: 335; Devanāgarī; digital images (paper); 12.5 × 6 cm.

Contents TĀV 1.1 to [?].

Incipit   [1v1] *oṃ śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ oṃ śrīgurucaraṇakamalamakara-
          ndaṣaṭpadavṛṃdebhyo namaḥ oṃ namo amṛteśvarabhairavāya oṃ
          namo* [2] *vāgdevyai oṃ namo paramagurave* (TĀV 1.1, K_{ED} vol. I,
          p. 1).

Explicit [55v17] *no vāryā tadanyatvād vicitratā* || *upayasyapīty* (sic) *api
          bhinnakramaḥ tena no kāryā tadanyatvād apīti vyākhyeyam etac ca
          prathamāhnika eva* (TĀV 2.6, K_{ED} vol. 1, pp. 6–7)

Notes   The folios are numbered. Alexis Sanderson shared a PDF of
          this Ms with me, but at the time this article was in preparation
          he could not locate the files of the other *āhnika*s, so I had
          access only to the complete *āhnika* 1. Since the Ms has 335
          folios, it certainly contains other *āhnika*s as well.

Bibl.   Not mentioned in Cat. KSSU 1969.

10. Delhi, National Museum of India
(80.1212)

Ph. d.   Folios: 1100 digital images; Śāradā; digital images (birch-bark).

Contents   I received 1110 images of this Ms in three DVDs. The first image in the first DVD begins with TĀV 31.106 and the last (image No. 500) contains TĀV 10.222. Somewhere in the middle of the DVD, image No. 148 contains TĀV 28.88–90. In the second DVD, the first image (No. 501) is TĀV 10.193 and the last (No. 1000) is TĀV 8.184. In middle of this DVD I could also locate parts of TĀV 1 and 3. For instance, image No. 642 contains TĀV 1.154, image No. 651 contains TĀV 3.288, image No. 669 contains TĀV 3.84, and image No. 707 contains TĀV 3.263. The third DVD contains 110 images that roughly cover TĀV 8 and 9. The first image in this DVD (No. 1001) shows TĀV 8.180, and the last (No. 1110) shows TĀV 9.306.

Notes   It is clear from the details listed above that the images of the Ms are not in sequence. Unfortunately, the same is the case with the original Ms. Since it is written on dark birch-bark, and each folio is mounted on thick brown paper, on most folios the number is not visible. There are Latin numerals written on each folio with a pencil (probably, someone's attempt to order the folios in a sequence). Unfortunately, even this sequence is not correct. It is very difficult to say if the Ms is complete. This is the oldest and the only birch-bark Ms of the TĀV available so far. The condition of the birch-bark is unusually good. It can be dated around the 17th–18th centuries. Paleographically, it shows two features that could help dating it more accurately: the conservative use of *jihvāmūlīya/ upadhmānīya* and of *pṛṣṭhamātrā* vowels.

Bibl.   Not catalogued, except in the accession register of the manuscript section of the National Museum of India in New Delhi.

11. Göttingen, Niedersächsische Staats-und Universitätsbibliothek
(COD MS SANSCR VISH 4)

Ph. d.   Folios: 548; paper; Śāradā; digital images (country paper).

Contents   TĀV 1.1 to 6.12.

Incipit   [1v1] *oṃ śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ || oṃ namaḥ śivāya || oṃ śrīgu-ru*[2]*pādukābhyo namaḥ || oṃ yasmād īṣaṇavitkriyā yaduditā hyā*[3] (TĀV 1.1, K$_{ED}$ vol. I, p. 1). On the top margin of the folio 1v the text reads: [1] *oṃ yasmād īṣaṇavitkriyā yaduditās ta-ttatprathāśaktayo yan naivaṃvidhatāṃ kadāpy upagataṃ yadvā*

yad evaṃvidhaṃ [2] *tad dhāma trikatattvam advayamayaṃ māyā-vimohotthitaṃ dvantaṃ svāntaniśāntasaṃsthitam apākuryāt sa-mantān mama 1* [3] *dehe vimukta evāsmi yatprasattīkṣaṇaiḥ kṣa-ṇāt śrīmatkalyāṇarājānaṃ vande taṃ janakaṃ gurum 2* [4] *śivaśāsanāgamarahasyakovidhaiḥ gurubhir gabhīrahṛdayair dayo-dayaiḥ karuṇāruṇaṃ vidacire dṛ*[5]*śaṃ tathā mayi dīnabandhu-bhir amoghabhāṣitaiḥ 3 yathā rahasyasarvasvaṃ mānase me śivodi-tam* [6] *bhavavāsanayā sthānaṃ karkaśe py āśu śiśriye 4.* K$_{ED}$ has attributed this reading to Ms *ga.* The next verse continues on the left margin: *na granthakārapadam āptum athāsmya pūrvaṃ svaṃ kauśalaṃ prathayituṃ vibudhāḥ pravṛtaḥ kintv etad artha-pariśīlanato vikalpaḥ saṃskā*[2]*ravāṃś ca samiyād iti vāñchitaṃ naḥ* ||5||. *Āhnika* 2 begins on 58r. On 60v the text stops mid-way with the *avataraṇikā* of 2.20. However, the next folio starts with the beginning of *Āhnika* 2, which is complete. Hereafter, folios are marked from the beginning. *Āhnika* 3 begins with folio 77 (pages are marked afresh). *Āhnika* 3 ends on 87r. *Āhnika* 4 ends on 159v. *Āhnika* 5 ends on 199r. *Āhnika* 6 begins on 101v and abruptly ends on 102v.

Explicit   [202v22] *prathamaḥ parispanda iti tadabhedavṛttyaiva sarva* (TAV 6.13, K$_{ED}$ vol. IV, p. 12).

Notes   Folio 1r bears the annotation 'Acc Mss 1966.5.' There is some-thing else written with a pencil on this folio, not clearly legi-ble. The first two *Āhnika*s have individual folio numbers, but *Āhnika* 3 begins with folio 1, and the foliation continues until the end of the Ms.

Bibl.   Not mentioned in Cat. Göttingen 1894. The SUB Göttingen online catalogue mentions that under the siglum COD MS SANSCR VISH this collection contains about 250 Mss from Kashmir that mostly relate to Śaiva philosophy, astronomy/astrology and Hindu ritual. They are mostly written in Śāradā and are uncatalogued.

12. Jammu, Sri Ranbir Sanskrit Research Institute (uncatalogued)

Ph. d.   Folios: 78 (?); Śāradā; digital images (country paper).

Contents   BPV (TĀ 3.1–22). This is a composite Ms containing eight works: 1. *Kūṣmāṇḍastotra* (1r–7v) 2. *Mukundamālā* (1r–7v), 3. *Ātmabodha* (1r–7v) 4. *Śivasūtra* (1v–5v) 5. *Stavacintāmaṇi* (66r–81r) 6. *Viśvacitpratibimbavādaḥ* (81v–84r) 7. *Bodhapañcadaśikā* (84v–86r) 8. *Vairāgyaśataka* (1r–26r).

Incipit   [81v1] *oṃ namaḥ śivāya oṃ prakāśamātraṃ* (TĀV 3.1, K$_{ED}$ vol. II, p. 1).

Explicit   [86r10] *iti bimbapratibimbavādaḥ* [11] *samāpt oṃ* (TĀV 3.23, K$_{ED}$ vol. II, p. 30).

Notes   The first folio bears the number 20 and the titles of all the eight works in modern hand-writing. The first four works are numbered individually. The fifth (*Stavacintāmaṇi*) begins from folio 66r. The *Bodhapañcadaśikā* and the *Vairāgyaśataka* are also numbered individually.

Bibl.   Uncatalogued.

13. Jammu, Sri Ranbir Sanskrit Research Institute
(623 [20 *ka* 2])

Ph. d.   Folios: 667; Śāradā/Devanāgarī/Kashmirian Devanāgarī; digital images (country paper).

Contents (i) TĀ 15.194–217b (1v16), 220c–225b (2r1), 339–343a (2r9) (ii) TĀ 10.19–31b, 55c–58b (8). TĀ 29.239c–241b, 243c–247, 241c–243b [1-17]. The *Brahmavidyā* of TĀ 30 [297]–[299]. TĀ 3.66–294b (end) [omitting 121ab, 187c–188b, 188c–196b, placing 190c–196b after 201b and following 196b with 201c, adding after 223d *Siddhayogeśvarīmata* qu. *ad* 3.223cd and TĀ 4.294 qu. ibid., incorporating TĀV (*yad uktam tatra*, etc.) *ad* 224, omitting 227, 239d–240a, 266–267b, incorporating verse quoted in TĀV *ad* 268–270, p. 247,14–15, omitting 272–273, 284ab, incorporating verse quoted in TĀV *ad* 288]. Ends: *iti śrītaṃtrālokaviveke śāṃbhavopāyaṃ tṛtīyam āhnikaṃ samāptam. Bimbapratibimbavādaḥ* (TĀ 3.1–23) with the commentary of Jayaratha. *Bimbapratibimbavādaḥ* continued (TĀ 3.24-65 without *Viveka*).

Notes   This is a composite Ms containing many other works:[60] 1) *Bahurūpagarbhastotra* with the commentary *Viṣamapadasaṅketa* of Anantaśaktipāda, 3r–10r [2–17], Kashmirian Devanāgarī, Incomplete. 2) *Śivapūjā*, 1v1–26v12, Devanāgarī, {Comprising the *Bhairavastotra* of Abhinavagupta (21r–21v), *Harāṣṭaka* of Jagaddhara (24v18–25v6) and the *Karṇapūrastotra* in the *Kusumāñjali* of Jagaddhara (25v6–26v12)} [19–69]. 3) *Śivasahasranāmastotra*, 1v1–10v1, Kashmirian Devanāgarī [71–89]. 4) *Ānandeśvarapūjā* (1r1–1v13) Devanāgarī [90–116]. 5) *Tantravaṭadhānikā*, Śāradā, 1r1–6v12 [122–133]. 6) *Vātūlanāthasūtra* with the *vṛtti* of Anantaśaktipāda 6v13–16v17 [133–153]. 7) A commentary on a verse from a hymn by Abhinavagupta in the Śikhariṇī metre 1r1–2v [154–157]. 8) *Īśvarapratyabhijñā* 3.1.2–3 and on Utpaladeva's *Vivṛti* thereon (ĪPV and ĪPVV); quotes

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[60] I am grateful to Alexis Sanderson for sharing the extensive details of this composite Ms with me via email of 1 July 2015.

the *Spandakārikā*, Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary thereon, and the *Mahārthamañjarī*. The verse is quoted as Abhinavagupta's by Jayaratha *ad* TĀ 8.51 [158–189]. 9) *Samastaśāstrajāta-sārasaṃgraha* 3r1 [190–194]. 10) *Gurupraṇāmavidhiḥ*, Devanā-garī 1r [194–]. 11) A commentary on *Vijñānabhairava* 42 incorporating Śivopādhyāya's 1r–2v14. 12) *Mānasikapūjā* of Śaṅkarācārya 2v15–26 [211]. Unidentified passages. 13) (i) *Tantrāloka* 15.194–217b (1v16), 220c–225b (2r1), 339–343a (2r9) (ii) *Tantrāloka* 10.19–31b, 55c–58b (8) [212–217]. 14) *Śivastotra* [218]–[219]. 15) *Śivakavaca* [220–221]. 16) *Tantrā-loka* 29.239c–241b, 243c–247, 241c–243b [222]–[237]. 17) *Vijñānabhairava* with commentary and some additions, begin-ning with *Vijñānabhairava* 14–16b and skipping many verses [244]. 18) New hand. *Agnikārya* texts for *Ānandeśvarabhairava-mantra* and *Parāśaktimantra*, the latter incomplete. [245]–[254]. 19) New hand. *Paramārcanatriṃśikā*. [258]–[262] Same hand as that of preceding. 20) *Cittasaṃtoṣatriṃśikā* [263]–[268]. 21) *Svātmopalabhiśataka* [268–278]. 22) *Prāṇā-gnihotra* taught by Maheśvara to Kumāra. [281]–[295]. 23) The *Brahmavidyā* of *Tantrāloka* 30 [297]–[299]. 24) Com-mentary on Kṣemarāja, *Netratantroddyota*, Maṅgala [300]. 25) Abhinavagupta, *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikāvimarśinī ad* 1.1.1., vol. 1, pp. 6,3–9,3) [302]. 26) *Dehasthadevatācakrastotra* [304]–[308]. 27) *Mānasikapūjā* of Śaṅkārācārya. [308]–[324]. 28) *Ajapāgāyatrī*, *Śāktaśaiva* [325–331]. 29) *Maṅgalaśloka* of *Netroddyota* [331]. 30) *Parāprāveśikā* [332]–[338]. 31) *Parā-triṃśikāvivaraṇa* [334]–[338]. 32) *Jñānabhūmikākrama* [340]1–[341]. 33) *Tantrāloka* 3.66–294b (end) [omitting 121ab, 187c–188b, 188c–196b, placing 190c–196b after 201b and following 196b with 201c, adding after 223d *Siddha-yogeśvarīmata* qu. *ad* 3.223cd and TĀ 4.294 qu. ibid., incorpo-rating *Viveka* (*yad uktaṃ tatra*, etc.) *ad* 224, omitting 227, 239d–240a, 266–267b, incorporating verse quoted in *Viveka ad* 268–270, p. 247,14–15, omitting 272–273, 284ab, incorpo-rating verse quoted in *Viveka ad* 288]. Ends: *iti śrītaṃtrāloka-viveke śāmbhopāyaṃ tṛtīyam āhnikaṃ samāptam.* [354]–[383]. 34) *Saṃkṣiptasvarajñāna.* [384]–[389]. 35) Śivasvāmī Upā-dhyāya, *Ṣaṭcakranirṇaya.* [394]–[402]. 36) *Bimbapratibimba-vādaḥ* (TĀV 3.1–23) [411]–[423]. *Bimbapratibimbavāda* contin-ued (TĀ 3.24–66 without *Viveka*) [425]–[430]. 37) *Mālinī-ślokavārtika* Complete [432]–[555]. 38) *Ṣaṭcakranirṇaya* [560]–[402]. 39) *Taṃḍustavarāja* [565]–[571]. 40) Vāmana-datta, *Svabodhodayamañjarī* [571]–[574]. 41) Vāmanadatta,

<table>
<tr><td></td><td>*Bodhavilāsa* [574]–[575]. 42) *Yoginīhṛdayadīpikā* (1.37–57) [576]–[593].</td></tr>
<tr><td>Bibl.</td><td>Cat. RSRI 1984: 1154 (mentioned under the title *Mālinīślokavārtika*)</td></tr>
</table>

14. Jammu, Sri Ranbir Sanskrit Research Institute
(1466 *ka* – 5913)

Ph. d. Folios: 608; Kashmirian Devanāgarī; digital images (country paper); 33.2 × 21.16 cm.

Contents TĀV 1.1 to 11 and TĀ 12 to 37.85.

Incipit [1v1] *oṃ śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ* (TĀV 1.1, K$_{ED}$ vol. I, p. 1).

Explicit [606v16] *iti śrīmad abhinavaguptaviracite taṃtrāloke saptatriṃśaṃ āhnikaṃ* 37 || || [17] *samāptaś cāyaṃ tantrālokaḥ* || *kṛtis trinayana*[18]*caraṇacintanalabdhaprasiddhaiḥ śrīmad abhinavaguptasya* [19] *yadaśa kathad amuśmi śrīmadācāryavaryo bahuparikara*[20]*vṛndaṃ sarvaśāstroddhṛtaṃ sat tad atulapariyatnenaikṣya saṃcintya sadbhir hṛdayakamalakośe dhāryamāryaiḥ śivā*[21]*ya yo adhīti nikhilāgameṣu padavidyo yogaśāstrāśra-*[22]*mī yo vākyārthasamanvayī kṛtaratiḥ śrīpratyabhijñāmyate*[607r1] *yas tarkāntaraviśrutaḥ śrutatayā dvaitādvayajñānavit so smi*[2]*n syād adhikāravān kalkalaprāyaṃ pareṣāṃ vacaḥ* || *iti śi*[3]*vam* || (TĀV 37.85 with two concluding verse of Jayaratha, K$_{ED}$ vol. XII, p. 428).

Notes *Āhnika* 1 ends on 72v. *Āhnika* 2 ends on 83r. *Āhnika* 3 ends on 152r. *Āhnika* 4 ends on 217v. *Āhnika* 5 ends on 252r. This is followed by a short extract of the SvTU 1.69 (*oṃ namaḥ tripurasundaryai oṃ haṃsākhyo bindusaṃyuktaḥ ……… mantrarahasyaprakaṭanena* || ||). Thereafter, *Āhnika* 6 begins on 253r and ends on 291r. *Āhnika* 7 ends on 303r. *Āhnika* 8 ends on 363r. *Āhnika* 9 ends on 421v. *Āhnika* 10 ends on 467r. *Āhnika* 11 ends on 483r. From *Āhnika* 12 onwards, all the *āhnika*s include only the *mūla* text without the *Viveka*. *Āhnika* 12 ends on 483v. *Āhnika* 13 ends on 496r. *Āhnika* 14 ends on 497v. *Āhnika* 15 ends on 518v. *Āhnika* 16 ends on 529r. *Āhnika* 17 ends on 533r. *Āhnika* 18 ends on 533v. *Āhnika* 19 ends on 535v. *Āhnika* 20 ends on 536r. Folio 537r suddenly begins with *oṃ svasti śrī bhagavate śivāya oṃ namaḥ* || *dīkṣāyām api atidiśati* (the *avarataṇikā* of the TĀV 21.42cd). The text of *āhnika* 21 before this is missing. The *āhnika* ends on 538r. *Āhnika* 22 begins on 539r along with the *Viveka* and ends on 542r. *Āhnika* 23 begins on 543r along with the *Viveka* and ends on 551r. *Āhnika* 24 along with the *Viveka* begins on 552r and ends on 553v. *Āhnika* 25 along with the *Viveka* ends on 556r. *Āhnika* 26 ends on

561r. *Āhnika* 27 ends on 563r. *Āhnika* 28 ends on 577v. *Āhnika* 29 ends on 587r. *Āhnika* 30 ends on 592r. *Āhnika* 31 ends on 597v. *Āhnika* 32 ends on 599v. *Āhnika* 33 suddenly stops on 600v with TĀ 33.24ab and jumps to *kathito' yaṃ svasvarūpa-praveśaḥ parameṣṭinā,* namely the last two lines of *āhnika* 34. Yet, the colophon records that *āhnika* 33 ends on 602r. Thus, the entire *āhnika* 34 has been skipped. *Āhnika* 35 ends on 602r, but the Ms wrongly records it as *āhnika* 34. *Āhnika* 36 ends on 602v and is wrongly recorded as *āhnika* 35. Even though *āhnika* 37 begins on 602v, on folio 603v the colophon mentions that *āhnika* 36 ends here, but the scribe has in fact split *āhnika* 37 into two. He incudes TĀ 37.1–33 (*ṣaḍardha-sāraṃ sacchāstram upādeyam idaṃ sphuṭam*) under *āhnika* 36 and TĀ 37.33–85 under *āhnika* 37, which ends on 606r. On fol. 608v there is a table of contents. The Ms is bound with a leather cover.

Bibl.   Cat. RSRI 1984: 1064, where the following details are given: size: 33.2 × 21.16 cm. 667 folios, 24–25 lines, 20–24 letters.

15. Jammu, Sri Ranbir Sanskrit Research Institute (4908)

Ph. d.   Folios: 381; Kashmirian Devanāgarī; digital images (country paper).

Contents TĀV 1.1 to 11.80.

Incipit   [1v1] *oṃ śrī gaṇeśāya namaḥ   oṃ +oravi+au+vidhvaṃsavi-cakṣaṇamibhānanaṃ natvātigopyaṃ likhati tantraṃ vaidhīraḥ* [2] *vīrakaḥ oṃ yasmādīṣaṇa* (TĀV 1.1, K$_{ED}$ vol. I, p. 1).

Explicit On folio 158r11 the text suddenly jumps backwards from 11.80 to 10.61ab. [158v9] *mahatvaṃ yasya tasmin parasaṃvi-ddhāmasavidhavartinīty arthaḥ paradhārādhirohe punaḥ sarva-jñānakriyāyoga eva syā*[10]*t ity āha yāvad dhāmani saṅke-tanikārakalanojjhite viśrāntaś cinmaye kiṃ kiṃ na vetti kurute na vā ataś cāgam*[11]*o apy evam ity āha ata eva hi vāksiddhau varṇānāṃ mupapāsyatā* (TĀV 11.80, K$_{ED}$ vol. VII, p. 62). Here the text suddenly shifts back to TĀV 10.79: [158v11] *artha-kriyākaraṃ tac cen na dharmaḥ ko nv asau bhavet na cedaṃ vedya*[12]*tvaṃ jñānātmakaṃ saṃvinmātram eva yato bhāvāṃ-śapṛṣṭhagam ity ata eva tatsaṃvinmātrātiriktatvenārthād bhāvāṃ-śadharmaḥ* [13] *tathātve cāsya kiṃ nibandhanam ity uktam arthakriyākaram iti sā cārthakriyā samanantaram eva darśitadha-rmaś cen neṣyate* [14] *tannīlāty api kaścid dharmaḥ syād ity uktaṃ na cet ko anv asau bhavet iti mātrāgrahaṇena ca vedyatvasya jñā-nasaṃvitter ādhi*[158r1]*kyaṃ dhvanitam adhikaś ca bhāvo vā syāt*

> *taddharmo vā na tāvad vedyatvaṃ bhāvaḥ tasya hi vedyatvaṃ na tv avedyatvam eva saḥ ataś ca* [2] *taddharma eveti yuktam uktam vedyatvaṃ bhāvadharma iti nanv atrokta eva …… ||* The text abruptly ends here (TĀV 10.61, K_{ED} vol. VII, p. 49).

Notes   This sudden shift of the contents from TĀV 11.80 to TĀV 10.60–61 is also found in Mss B_8, Lk_1, P_4, K_4, K_6, K_{11}, S_1 and S_2. Then, either the Ms ends or it makes another sudden shift to TĀV 21.42. In the present case, the Ms ends with TĀV 11.80. *Āhnika* 1 stops abruptly on 47r (TĀV 1.204). *Āhnika* 2 is missing. On folio 48v, *āhnika* 3 begins. The exact content of this Ms is uncertain: it is not clear if *āhnika*s 4 and 5 are complete. *Āhnika* 6 ends on 214v. *Āhnika* 7 ends on 224v, 8 ends on 56v, 9 ends on 908r.

Bibl.   Cat. RTL 1894: 221 (section on Bhakti), where the following details are given: folios: 381; *śreṇayaḥ* 14, *akṣarāṇi* 42, *asamāptaḥ, navīnā kāśmīrikī lipi.* Not mentioned in M. M. Patkar's catalogues.

16. London, School of Oriental and African Studies University of London (44256)

Ph. d.   Folios: 371; Śāradā; digital images (country paper); 12 × 8 cm.
Contents   TĀV 1.1 to 7.71.
Incipit   [1v1] *oṃ śrī gaṇādhipataye namaḥ || oṃ namaḥ paramagurave* [2] *oṃ namo vāgdevyai oṃ namo mṛteśvarabhairavāya ||* (TĀV 1.1, K_{ED} vol. I, p. 1).
Explicit   [372v2] *iti śrīmacchrīmahāmāheśvarācāryavarya śrīmada*[3]*bhinavaguptaviracite tantrālo*[4]*ke viveke cakrodayaprakāśanaṃ nāma saptamam ā*[5]*hnikaṃ samāptam iti śivam ||* [6] *śrī gaṇeśo jayatāt ||* (TĀV 7.71, K_{ED} vol. IV, pp. 57–58).
Notes   *Āhnika* 1 ends on 86r. *Āhnika* 2 ends on 98v. *Āhnika* 3 ends on 181v. *Āhnika* 4 ends on 261r. *Āhnika* 5 ends on 304v. *Āhnika* 6 ends on 355v. *Āhnika* 7 ends on 371r. The abbreviations in the margins of each folio also give the number of the *āhnika*. From the digital images I have access to, it looks like this Ms is written on so-called 'new Kashmiri paper.'
Bibl.   Cat. SOAS 1978: 13, where the following details are given: '*Tantrāloka.* A digest of Kāsmīrī Śaiva theology in Sanskrit verse. Text with Rājānaka Jayaratha's Sanskrit commentary *Prakāśa*, from the beginning of the work to the end of the 7th *āhṇika.* Written in Śāradā script on Kāśmīrī paper, in roughly tooled brown leather cover with flip. 19th c. ff. 371. 12 × 8. MS 44256.'

17. Lucknow, Akhil Bharatiya Sanskrit Parisad
(126E [1537])

Ph. d. Folios: 419 (1–388, 1–3, 1–28); Śāradā; photocopy (country paper); 19.4 × 11.2 cm.

Contents TĀV 5 to 11, 15, 21 to 26.42. *Āhnika*s 11, 15 and 26 are incomplete. Each folio contains 22 lines.

Incipit [1r1] *oṃ śrī gaṇeśāya namaḥ || yo nāma ghoranina*[2]*doccārava-śād bhīṣayaty aśeṣajagat | svasthā*[3]*nadhyānarataḥ sa jayaty aparājito rudraḥ ||* (TĀV 5.1, K$_{ED}$ vol. III, p. 309)

Explicit [27v4] *bimbatveneti pra*[5]*tibimbatayeti ca | etad iti pratibimba-bhā*[6]*vātmatayā darśanam || ||* (TĀV 26.42, K$_{ED}$ vol. X, p. 343)

Notes *Āhnika*s 5 (1r–49v), 6 (50r–105v), 7 (105v-120r), 8 (120r–212r), 9 (212r–301r), 10 (301r–366v), and 11, incomplete. It suddenly ends on 388v with TĀV 11.61: *adhikaś ca bhāvo vā syāt taddharmo vā na tāvad vedyatvaṃ bhāvas tasya hi vedyatvaṃ na tu vedyatvam eva saḥ ataś ca taddharma eveti yuktam uktam vedyatvaṃ bhāvadharmaḥ iti nanv atrokta e*) (but the verses on the previous folio read 11.76, etc.). A similar phenomenon, with some minor variations, is also observed in Mss B$_8$, J$_4$, P$_4$, K$_4$, K$_6$, K$_{11}$, S$_1$ and S$_2$. Then, either the Ms ends with TĀV 11.80 or it continues with TĀV 21.42. In the present case, however, a fragment of *āhnika* 15 in Devanāgarī is found on 388v, from TĀV 15.125a: *nyaprāṇātmā ca*, to TĀV 15.133a: *māśabdavācyaṃ saṃhāraṃ rāti lāti vā tacchīlā rā dāne lā ādāne ity anayoḥ*) in the Devanāgarī script is on 388v. From here onwards, the Ms has new folio numbers. It contains *āhnika* 21 (1v–3r), from TĀV 21.45: *vaty eva parameśvara eva hi guru-śarīrādhiṣṭhānadvārā anugrāhyānanugrhṇāti sa ca acintyama-himeti asakṛd uktam,* until the end of the *āhnika* (TĀV 21.61), followed by *āhnika* 22 (3r–7v), 23 (7v–19r), 24 (19r–21v), 25 (21v–25r), and 26 (25r–27v). *Āhnika* 26 is incomplete; it suddenly ends TĀV 26.42: *etad iti pratibimbabhāvātmatayā darśanam.* On a few initial folios, there are corrections made with a modern pen.

Bibl. Cat. ABSP II 1970: 417.

18. Lucknow, Akhil Bharatiya Sanskrit Parisad
(127E [1644])

Ph. d. Folios: 187; Śāradā; photocopy (country paper); 19.2 × 12.3 cm; each folio contains 22 lines.

Contents TĀV 1.1 to 3.186. This is a composite Ms containing four works: *Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam* [2–34], *Dehasthadevatāstotram* [1-

	2(35–36)], *Siddhamata* [1(37)], *Tantrālokaviveka* [38–335].
Incipit	(On the top of the fol. 1v is written: ‖ *tantrālokaḥ* ‖ *abhina-vaguptācārya tantrāloka vivekaḥ – jayaratha*) [1v1] *oṃ śrī gaṇe-śāya namaḥ* ‖ (TĀV 1.1, K$_{ED}$ vol. I, p. 1).
Explicit	[226r20] *ato atra dīrghatritayaṃ sphuṭaṃ cāndramasaṃ vapuḥ	etac ca pūrvam evopapāditam, iti neha punar ā* (TĀV 3.185cd–186ab, K$_{ED}$ vol. II, p. 181).
Notes	The foliation is confusing. Some folios are sequentially marked with three sets of folio numbers: *āhnika* 1 begins on 38v1 and ends on 100r14; *āhnika* 2 begins on 100r18 and ends on 115(152)v18; *āhnika* 3 begins on 154r1 and ends on 225v. However, the beginning of 3.1 is also found on 153v. The first start on 153v only covers a single folio, while the second on 154r continues until the last folio on 225 (TĀV 3.184: *ato atra dīrghatritayaṃ sphuṭaṃ cāndramasaṃ vapuḥ | etac ca pūrvam evopapāditam, iti neha punar ā*), where the text suddenly stops. Moreover, some folios contain verses that occur earlier in the text, for ex. 225r contains 3.197 and 226r contains 3.184.
Bibl.	Cat. ABSP II 1970: 419.

19. Lucknow, Akhil Bharatiya Sanskrit Parisad (128E [4408])

Ph. d.	Folios: 108 [1–68, 70–109]; Devanāgarī; photocopy (country paper); 23.8 × 14.1 cm.
Contents	TĀV 1.1 to 3.20. Each folio contains 10 lines. According to the catalogue, folio 69 is missing. The Ms abruptly comes to an end with the words *vibhādarśavat pṛthak iti 21 kramā* (TĀ 3.20).
Incipit	[1r1] *oṃ śrī gaṇeśāya namaḥ* ‖ (TĀV 1.1, K$_{ED}$ vol. I, p. 1).
Explicit	[109v7] *yataḥ punas tasmād ādarśād eṣa prativiṃvo bheda-napṛthaktayā na bhāti tato hetoḥ ti*[8]*leṣu tailam iti vad abhivyāpa-vattayā saiṣa ādhāra ucyate atra punar utpannasya mataḥ pra-tivimbasya jñaptā*[9]*vālokādaya upāyā iti tebhyos ya viśeṣaḥ tad āha tatra rūpāyā dīpasṛgsaṃvidaḥ kramāt 20 dīpa*[10]*cakṣuvivo-dhānāṃ kāṭhinyābhāvattaḥ paraṃ sarvataś cāpi nairmalyān na vibhādarśavat pṛthak iti 21 kramā* (TĀV 3.20, K$_{ED}$ vol. II, p. 23).
Notes	*Āhnika* 1 ends on 91r8. The first folio with the text of *āhnika* 2 is missing; the *āhnika* begins on 91v with TĀV 2.3, *anyathā lakṣaṇam upāyam antareṇa kathaṃ siddhyety uktam ity upāyaṃ vinā kutas tena sakṛdupa ananyathā hy anupāyā*[2][2], and ends on 102v8. *Āhnika* 3 begins on 102v9 and ends on 109, with TĀ 3.20: *vibhādarśavat pṛthak iti 21 kramā*.
Bibl.	Cat. ABSP II 1970: 420.

20. Pune, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute
(449–[1875–1876])

Ph. d.   Folios: 468; Śāradā; original (country paper); approx. 25–27
            lines on each folio.

Contents   TĀV 1.1 to 37.85 (*āhnika* 2 is missing).

Incipit   [1r1] (symbol) *svasti* || *oṃ namaḥ śivāya* || *śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ* ||
            namas sarasvatyai || *śrīgurupādukābhyo namaḥ* || *śrīśāradāyai*
            namaḥ || *pūrvagurubhyo namaḥ* || [2] *smād īṣaṇavitkriyā*
            yaducitās ta [3] *yad evaṃvidhaṃ taddhāmatrikatattvam advaya-*
            maya [4] *dehe vimukta evāsmi śrīmatkalyāṇa*[5]*cchivaśāsanāga-*
            marahasya. Then, after a blank space, the following four lines
            appear in the middle of the folio: [6] *śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ yas-*
            mād īṣaṇavitkriyā yaducitās tāstā jagadvyaktayo yasyaivoddhu-
            raśaktivaibhavam idaṃ [7] *sarvaṃ yad evaṃvidham tad dhāma-*
            trikatattvam advayamayaṃ svātantryapūrṇaprathaṃ cittes tāc-
            chivaśāsanāgamarahasyā[8]*cchādana dhvaṃsi me* | 1 *dehe vimuk-*
            ta evāsmi śrīmatkalyāṇavāridheḥ yasya kāruṇyavipruḍbhiḥ sadgu-
            ruṃ [9] *taṃ hṛdi śriye* 2 || *mūrdhanyuttaṃ samiva kṣamāpais sar-*
            vair yasyānuśāsanam hṛdaye bhavasaṃbhārakarkaśe py āśu śiśriye
            3. Then, there is another blank space, and the text resumes
            on 2v1 as follows: *karkaśe py āśu śiśriye* || *na granthakārapadam*
            āptum atha. Āhnika 1 abruptly stops on folio 28r (TĀV 1.217,
            K$_{ED}$ vol. I, p. 241: ([18] *iha savika*[19]*lpajñānātmani śāktopāye*
            yady api nirvikalpāpekṣayā sphuṭe jñānakriye tathāpi mātṛ-
            [20]*daurātmyāt te saṃkucite evātrāpy upadeśādiyatnenāvaśyaṃ*
            bhāvyaṃ yena sarvasya tathā saṅkocavilāpana[21]*paratayā sā*
            śāktī bhūr ujjvalā vikasvarā yad iyam upeyatvenābhīpsitam antaḥ
            pramātraikā[22]*tmyasvabhāvam ābhāsaṃ karoti parapramā-*
            traikātmyarūpatayā sphuratīty arthaḥ nanu śāktasya śāmbha-
            vā[23]*d vikalpāvikalparūpatvena siddho bhedaḥ*). Below, there is
            another line after a blank space that reads (from the
            Vākyapadīya, but unattributed): *vāgrūpatā ced utkrāmad avabo-*
            dhasya śāśvatī na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta sā hi pratyavamarśinī ||
            Thereafter, folio 29v begins with 3.6: ([1]*kānta iti santoṣā-*
            bhimānāt kāntadarśanaṃ vṛttam ata eva sundaram ity anena
            darśavaśonmiṣa[*dā*]^{pc}*hlādātiśayakāritvādya*[2]*pi sūcitam*). *Āhni-*
            ka 2 is missing. The foliation stops after folio 78. Here is the
            sequence of the following *āhnika*s: 3 ends 64r24–25; 4 begins
            64r25–26 and ends [96r]18; 5 begins [96r]19 and ends
            [112r]9; 6 begins [112r]10 and ends [132v]18; 7 begins
            [132v]19 and ends[138v]17–18; 8 begins [138v]19 and ends
            [170v]16; 9   begins [170v]17 and ends [199r]8; 10 begins
            [199r]9 and   ends [220v]5; 11 begins [220v]6 and ends

[330v]20; 12 begins [330v]21 and ends [332r]22; 13 begins [332r]22–23 and ends [358r]13–14; 14 begins [358r]15 and ends [361v]7–8; 15 begins [361v]9 and ends [389v]15–16; 16 begins [389v]16 and ends [401r]21; 17 begins [401r]21–22 and ends [407r] 5; 18 begins [407r]5–6 and ends [408v]6; 19 begins [408v]7 and ends [410r]7; 20 begins [410r]8 and ends [411v]15–16; 21 begins [411v]16–17 and ends [414r]8; 22 begins [414r]8–9 and ends [416v]2; 23 begins [416v]3 and ends [420v]21–22; 24 begins [420v]22 and ends [421v]18; 25 begins [421v]19 and ends [422r]4; 26 begins [422r]4–5 and ends [425r]9; 27 begins [425r]9-10 and ends [427r]11; 28 begins [427r]11–12 and ends[446v]29; 29 begins [446r]1 and ends [463v]19-20; 30 begins [463v]21 and ends [467v]9; 31 begins [467v]9–10 and ends [453v]24–25; 32 begins [453r]1 and ends [457r]1; 33 begins [457r]2 and ends [459v]7; 34 begins [459v]8 and ends [459v]21-22; 35 begins [459v]22 and ends [462r]20; 36 begins [462r]20 and ends [464r]15; 37 begins [464r] 15 and ends [468v] 10–11.

Explicit   [469r1] *cidadvaitamayatām sāmānyām anyais kimiva tad idānīṃ vyavasthitaiḥ || || pade vākye māne nikhilaśivaśāstropani*[2]*ṣadi pratiṣṭhāṃ yatohaṃ yadapi niravadyaṃ jayarathaḥ tahāpy asyā-maṅga kvacana bhuvi nāsti trikadṛṣṭi kramārthe* [3] *vāmattas sapadi kuśalas kaścid aparaḥ || || iti śrītantrālokaviveka*[*ki*]*[ac] paripūrṇaḥ kṛtis śrīrājāṇa*[4]*kamahāmāheśvarajayadrathasya || || vande guruṃ śivaphalārthiṣu kalpavṛkṣaṃ bhedendhanaikadha-hanaṃ hara*[5]*mārgadīpam śambhuṃ jaṭāgrakṛtabhūṣaṇacandra-bimbaṃ śaivodadher vasubhalapradapotametam iti śivam || || (TĀV 37.85, concluding verses of Jayaratha, K[ED] vol. XII, pp. 434–435).*

Notes   This is a composite Ms containing the *Parātriṃśikāvivaraṇa*, the *Tantravaṭadhānikā*, and the TĀV (1). The PTV comprises the first 27 folios and ends in the middle of 27v. The text is complete. [Beginning of the *Parātriṃśikāvivaraṇa*] *oṃ svasti || || śrīgurupādukābhyo namaḥ || || śrīsarasvatyai namo namaḥ || śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ ||* [2] *vimalakalāśrayābhinavasṛṣṭimahā-jananī bharitatanuś ca pañcamukhaguptarucir janakaḥ tadubha* [3] [end of *Parātriṃśikāvivaraṇa*]: [14] *samāptam idaṃ trimśikāvivaraṇam || || kṛtis trinayanacaraṇacintanala-bdhaprasiddhoḥ śrīmadrā*[15]*jānakābhinavaguptasya || || śatair ekonaviṃśatyā trimśikeyaṃ vivecitā sarveṣu trikaśāstreṣu śa-ktīn* [16] *nirdalayiṣyati || || iti śivam || ||* (2). On 27r-28v (even though the folio numbers are not marked) there is the TVDh, which begins on the top of 27r (?): *vicitraṣ kāla evāyaṃ saṃvidāṃ spanda īdṛśaḥ pārthivaprākṛta*(27r2) *māyāśāktam*

aṇḍacatuṣṭayam and ends in (28v3) *eṣābhinavaguptena racitā tantradhānikā hṛdbhūmau yasya* [4] *rūḍhāsau śivakalpāvanīmahaḥ* (?) *bhedābhedakṛto tasya kriyātantram ihoditam svatantrasya mato jñeyaṃ svopāyaṃ* [5] *śrīghrasiddhaye* || || *tṛtīyam āhnikam* || *iti tantradhānikā samāptā* || *kṛtiḥ śrīpratyakṣa*[6]*śiva śrīmadabhinavaguptapādānām* || || Thereafter, the TĀ begins. About this Ms, Georg Bühler notes: 'In conclusion I have to add that the complete MS. of the *Tantrālokaviveka*, No. 449, which comes from Ḍilhī, is probably unique. The MSS. from Kaśmīr are all mutilated, and the Pandita asserted that the commentary on a number of *āhnika*s has been lost' (Cat. Report 1877: 83).

Bibl.   Cat. Report 1877: CXLVIII–CLV. Also, NCC 1974: 104.

21. Pune, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (450–[1875–1876])

Ph. d.   Folios: 315; Kashmirian Devanāgarī; original (country paper).

Contents   TĀV: 1.1 to 10.308.

Incipit   [1v1] *oṃ gaṇeśāya namaḥ* || *oṃ yasmād īṣaṇavitkriyāyaduditā*+ [*ānandacidbhūmayo yasyaivoddhuraśaktivaibhavam idaṃ sarvaṃ*]^{pc} *yad evaṃvidham taddhāma trikatattvam advayamayaṃ* [*svātantryapūrṇaprathaṃ citte stācchivaśāsanāgamarahasyācchādanadhvaṃsi me*]^{pc} *dehe vimukta evāsmi śrīsatkalyāṇa*[*vāridheḥ yasya kāruṇyavipruḍbhis sadgurum taṃ hṛdi śraye mūrdhnyottaṃsa* (note that *°taṃsa* is also the reading attributed to the Ms *ka* in the K$_{ED}$ vol. I, p. 2) *iva kṣmāpaiḥ sarvair yasyānuśāsanam hṛdaye bhavasambhārakarkaśe apyāśu śiśriye*]^{pc} [2] *cchivamāsanāgamarahasya* (the *mā* in *°māsanā°* here may also be the scribal error as the Śāradā *śā*) *karkaśe apyāśu na granthakārapadam āptum athāsmy apūrvaṃ* (TĀV 1.1, K$_{ED}$ vol. I, p. 1).

Explicit   [316v13] *iti śrīman mahāmāheśvarācāryavaryābhinavaguptaviracite tantrālo*[14]*ke viveke tattvabhedaprakāśanaṃ nāma daśamam āhnikam iti śivam* || *10* || (TĀV 10.308, K$_{ED}$ vol. VII, p. 208).

Notes   The sequence of *āhnika*s is as follows: 1 ends on 49v9; 2 begins on 49v10 and ends on 56r2–3; 3 begins on 56r3 and ends on 101v11; 4 begins on 101r1 and ends on 144v11; 5 begins on 145r1 and ends on 167r2–3; 6 begins on 167v1 and ends on 193r1; 7 begins on 193r2 and ends on 201r8–9; 8 begins on 202r1 and ends on 244r2–3; 9 begins on 245r1 and ends on 286v5; 10 begins on 287v1 and ends on 315r13–14.

Bibl.   Cat. Report 1877: XXIX. Also, NCC 1974: 104.

22. Pune, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute
(451–[1875–1876])

Ph. d.   Folios: 89+10; Kashmiri Devanāgarī; original (country paper).

Contents   TĀV 11 to 12; TĀ (without *Viveka*) 13 to 37. *Āhnika* is 34 missing.

Incipit   [1v1] *oṃ śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ svātmamahābhīmaravāmarśana-vaśaśakalitādhvasantānaḥ bhavadurgabhañjanajayotsāho jayatāj jayotsāhaḥ idānīm aparārdhe* (TĀV 11.1, K$_{ED}$ vol. VII, p. 2 [p. 2 of *āhnika* 11]).

Explicit   [89r13] *iti śrīmadācāryā*[14]*bhinavaguptaviracite tantrāloke saptatriṃśam āhnikam || samāptaś cāyaṃ tantrālokaḥ || śubham astu lekhakapāṭhakayoḥ || saṃvat 1932 || || (TĀV 37.85, K$_{ED}$ vol. XII, p. 427).

Notes   The sequence of *āhnika*s is as follows: 11 (with *Viveka*) ends in 16v9; 12 (with *Viveka*) begins in 16r1 and ends in 18r4; 13 begins in 19v1 and ends in 27v1; 14 begins in 27v1–2 and ends in 28r7–8; 15 beings in 28r9 and ends in 43v4; 16 begins in 44v1 and ends in 49v12; 17 begins in 49v12–13 and ends in 51v8–9; 18 begins in 51v9 and ends in 51v14–15; 19 begins in 51v15 and ends in 52v11; 20 begins in 52v12 and ends in 52r5–6; 21 begins in 52r6 and ends in 53r13–14; 22 begins in 53r14 and ends in 54r13; 23 begins in 54r14 and ends in 57v3; 24 begins in 57v3 and ends in 57r2–3; 25 begins in 57r3 and ends in 58v6–7; 26 begins in 58v7 and ends in 59r14–60v1; 27 begins in 60v1 and ends in 61v10–11; 28 begins in 62v1 and ends in 70r8–9; 29 begins in 70r9 and ends in 76r3–4; 30 begins in 76r4–5 and ends in 79r3; 31 begins in 79r3–4 and ends in 83v12; 32 begins in 83r1 and ends in 85v1-2; 33 begins in 85v2 (on 85r, verses 33.24b–32b are missing) and ends in 85r6–7; 34 is completely missing; 35 begins in 85r7–8 and ends in 86r9 (wrongly identified in the colophon as *āhnika* 34); 36 begins in 87v1 and ends in 87v11–12 (wrongly identified in the colophon as 35); 37 begins in 87v12-13 and ends in 89r13-14. This Ms also has ten additional folios: one folio contains a small portion of TĀV 21, while the others include the complete TĀV 22 and 23.

Bibl.   Cat. Report 1877: xxix. Also, NCC 1974: 104.

23. Pune, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute
(452–[1875–1876])

Ph. d.   Folios: 416; Devanāgarī; original (country paper).

Contents   TĀV: 1.1 to 11–80; This is a composite Ms containing: 452 (*Ta-*

     ntrālokaviveka), 485 (*Mahārthamañjarī*) and 481 (*Mahārtha-prakāśa*) all three bound together in a leather cover.

Incipit [1v1] *oṃ svasti prajābhyaḥ* || *śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ oṃ namaḥ śivāya* || *oṃ* [2] *oṃ yasmād īṣaṇavitkriyā* (the first few folios are damaged). (TĀV 1.1, K_{ED} vol. I, p. 1).

Explicit [273r5] *arthakriyākaraṃ tac cen na dharmaḥ ko nv asau* bh[6]*avet na cedaṃ vedyatvaṃ jñānātmakaṃ saṃvinmātram eva* ya[7]*to bhāvāṃśapṛṣṭagam iti ata eva tatsaṃvinmātrātirikta-*[8]*tvenārthād bhāvāṃśadharmaḥ tathātve cāsya kiṃ niba-*[9]*ndhanam* (note that here the scribe uses the Śāradā letter 'ba' instead of the Devanāgarī) *ity uktam arthakriyākaram iti sā cārthakriyā* [10] *samanantaram eva darśita dharmaś cen neṣyate tannīlā*[11]*dy api kaścid dharmaḥ syād ity uktaṃ na cet ko nv asau bhave*[12]*t iti mātrāgrahaṇena ca vedyatvasya jñānasaṃvitte*[13]*r ādhikyaṃ dhvanitam adhikaś ca bhāvo vā syāt taddharmo* [14] *vā na tāvad vedyatvaṃ bhāvaḥ tasya hi vedyatvaṃ na tu vedya-*[15]*tvam eva saḥ ataś ca taddharma eveti yuktam uktam vedya-*[16]*tvaṃ bhāvadharma iti nanv atrokta eva – – – – –* The text suddenly ends here. (TĀV 10.60–61, K_{ED} vol. VII, p. 49).

Notes *Āhnika* 1 ends on 67r1–3, *āhnika* 2 begins on 67r4 and ends in 76r17–19. Thereafter, *Āhnika* 3 begins (in a different hand) with the *Varṇodayakrama* beginning [1r1]*oṃ śrī gaṇeśāya namaḥ* || *oṃ varṇodayo likhyate* [2] *oṃ vimarśo pi taddanuttarā-nandāyāmarśātma.* The foliation starts anew. The *Pratibimbavāda* is completely missing. On 21r the text ends with the words *vaicimtryeṇa parisphuramtyā api parasyāḥ saṃ*[15]*vidaḥ svarūpavipralopo na jāta ity evodyota* (*avataraṇikā* of TĀ 3.110). The next folio begins in another hand with the text *ata āha uditāyāṃ kriyāyāṃ śaktau somasūryāgnidhā*[2]*mani* (TĀV 3.111). However, after six folios, the text of TĀV 3.110 resumes for two more folios. Clearly, the scribe got confused with verse TĀ 3.111, then he realised it when he reached folio 27, so he suddenly stopped. Then, on folio 30v the text continues with TĀV 3.137: [30v1] *na caitad asmadupajñam evety āha uktaṃ ca triśiraḥśā*[2]*stre kalāvyāptyantacarcane. Āhnika* 3 ends on 66r10–11. *Āhnika* 4 begins in 67v1 and ends on 142r10–11. *Āhnika* 5 begins on 1v1 (new foliation) and ends on 34r21-22 (ends in 34r21 *śarīram akiṃcitkaram eva sthānākalpanādirūpā bā*[22]*hyāntar upāyakalpanāpi nirvīryā saty akiṃcitkārye*) (TĀV 5.158). There is no colophon. *Āhnika* 6 begins on 1v1 (new foliation) and ends on 46r14–15; *āhnika* 7 begins on 47r1 and ends on 62v5–6; *āhnika* 8 begins on 62v8 and ends on 134v12; *āhnika* 9 begins on134v13 and ends on 205r5-6; *āhnika* 10 begins on 205r8 and ends on 257v16–17; *āhnika* 11 begins on

257v18 and ends on 273r15−16. On folio 273r the scribe ends *āhnika* 11 with the lines: [273r1] *punaḥ sarvajñānakriyāyoga eva syāt ity āha yāvaddhā*[2] *mani saṃketanikārakalanojjhite viśrāṃtaścinmaye* [3] *kiṃ kiṃ na vetti kurute na vā ataścāgamopy evam i*[4]*ty āha ata eva hi vāksiddhau varṇānāṃ samupāsyatā* (TĀV 11.80). Here the scribe suddenly resumes the text of TĀV 10.60–61: [273r5] *arthakriyākaraṃ tac cen na dharmaḥ ko nv asau bh*[6]*avet na cedaṃ vedyatvaṃ jñānātmakaṃ saṃvinmātram eva ya*[7]*to bhāvāṃśapṛṣṭagam iti ata eva tatsaṃvinmātrātirikta*[8]*tvenārthādbhāvāṃśadharmaḥ tathātve cāsya kiṃ niba-*[9]*ndhanam* (note here the scribe uses the Śāradā letter 'ba' instead of Devanāgarī letter) *ity uktam arthakriyākaram iti sā cārthakriyā* [10] *samanantaram eva darśita dharmaś cen neṣyate tannīlā*[11]*dy api kaścid dharmaḥ syād ity uktaṃ na cet ko nv asau bhave*[12]*t iti mātrāgrahaṇena ca vedyatvasya jñānasaṃvitte*[13]*r ādhikyaṃ dhvanitam adhikaś ca bhāvo vā syāt taddharmo* [14] *vā na tāvad vedyatvaṃ bhāvaḥ tasya hi vedyatvaṃ na tu vedya*[15]*tvam eva saḥ ataś ca taddharma eveti yuktam uktam vedya*[16]*tvaṃ bhāvadharma iti nanv atrokta eva* − − − − − The text suddenly stops here. This is almost the same change found in Mss B_8, J_4, Lk_1, K_4, K_6, K_{11}, S_1 and S_2. In all these cases, the scribe suddenly shifts after TĀV 11.80 to TĀV 10.60–61, and then either the Ms ends or it makes another sudden shift to TĀV 21.42. In fact, J_4, P_4 and K_6 end with TĀV 11.80, and the last folio also contains a short portion of TĀV 10.61 (only J_4 stops at TĀV 10.79). However, in the case of Lk_1, K_4, K_{11}, S_1 and S_2 the text continues with TĀV 21.42 (*avataraṇikā*). Thereafter the text of the *Mahārthamañjarī* (1–36 folios) begins, followed by the *Mahānayaprakāśa* (1–48 folios) and by an unpublished text called *Mantrarāja* commented upon by Śivopādhyāya. The beginning of this reads: *oṃ namaḥ śivāya || oṃ yan meyaṃ yac ca kāryaṃ jagadabhilaṣaṇīyaṃ yaṃ pra*[2]*kāśyaṃ pramātā kartecchuḥ sa prakāśaḥ para iti na hi sad bhāsakā*; it ends suddenly (without a proper colophon) [13]*til śvetagangāvagāhāt pūtasvāntena kāśmīrika vibuddha* [14] *śivasvāmyupāddhyāya nāmnā vyākhāto mantrarājaḥ prakaṭa* [15] *vimalasatsaṃpradāyaḥ parāyāḥ śrī* − − − − − −.

Bibl. Cat. Report 1877: XXIX. Also, NCC 1974: 104.

24. Pune, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute
(453-[1875–1876])

Ph. d. Folios: 172; Devanāgarī; original (country paper).
Contents TĀV 1.1–1.201 (incomplete), 3.201ab to 6.205.

Incipit   [1r1] *śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ oṃ yasmād īṣaṇavitkriyā yaducitā* (the margins of the first folio are damaged, with some loss of text). *Āhnika* 1 ends on folio 35r15–16: [35r15] *rmisvarūpāvabhā-samayyoṃtarasphuṭākāratvena ullikhitāś citrā avāntaranānā-dharmaviṣayāḥ saṃvido yāsāṃ tā evaṃvidhā anubhūta*[16]*yo nu-bhavā no bhaveyuḥ notpadyeran ity arthaḥ | yadi hi sarvadharmā-krāntyā dharmiṇi sarve (th*ᵃᶜ*) anubhavāḥ syuḥ tatparivrāḍityādau ekaikasyāpi.* The text of *āhnika* 1 suddenly stops here (TĀV 1.201, K_ED vol. I, p. 227). The next folio begins from TĀV 3.1, but the top margin of the folio mentions *iti dvitīyamāhnikam || atha tṛtīyam khātmatveti.* However, *āhnika* 2 is missing. *Āhni-ka* 3 beings on 1v1 (new foliation) and ends on 19v5–6; *āhnika* 4 begins [19v6] and ends 87; *āhnika* 5 ends on folio 116; *āhni-ka* 6 ends on folio 141.

Explicit   [16]*nojjvaleti || tad evaṃ varṇapañcāśataḥ pratyekaṃ bhedena svarūpam abhidhāya abhedenāpi abhidadhad eva tadanuṣakta-manujoddeśoddiṣṭaṃ mantrā*[17]*dyabhinnarūpatvam api āsūtra-yati || || itthaṃ nādānuvedhena parāmarśasvabhāvakaḥ || śivo mātāpitṛtvena kartā viśvatra saṃsthitaḥ || || (TĀV 3.201, K_ED vol. II, p. 192).

Notes   There is some confusion about Mss BORI 452 (1875–76) and 453 (1875–1876). Cat. report 1877, p. XXIX, mentions the fol-lowing details of no. 453: with com. I, III–VII, fol. 172, Śāradā. But the Ms I saw lists the contents as TĀV 3.201ab to 6.205 and is in Devanāgarī. Its content is quite uncertain since many folios are mixed up.

Bibl.   Cat. Report 1877: XXIX. Also, NCC 1974: 104.

25. Pune, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (469 [1875–1876])

Ph. d.   Folios: 4; Śāradā; original (country paper).
Contents   BPV 3.1 to 22 (TĀV).
Incipit   [1v1] (main text) *oṃ namaḥ śrī gurave | oṃ prakāśamātraṃ yat proktaṃ* (TĀV 3.1, K_ED vol. II, p. 1) (commentary on top mar-gin) (upper margin of the Ms is damaged) *kalaṃ ja******h yadva**ci*ra*canā* (TĀV 3.65, K_ED vol. II, p. 73). First one and half line on top margin is immediately followed by *prakāśamā-tram iti prādhānyāt,* etc. (TĀV 3.1, K_ED vol. II, p. 2).

Explicit   [4v7] (main text ends in) *iti bimbapratibimbavādaḥ samāptaḥ |* [4v28] (commentary on margins ends in) *śrī tantrāloke bimba-pratibimbavādaḥ saṃpūrṇaḥ || oṃ* (TĀV 3.23, K_ED vol. II, p. 32).

Notes   Pandey (1963: 76) mentions this Ms and notes that it is the BPV section from TĀ 3. This Ms, which is bound together with the *Spandakārikāvṛtti* (Ms no. 514), contains the first 22 verses

of TĀ 3. The *Viveka* is written in the margins.

Bibl. Cat. Report 1877: xxx. Also, NCC 1968: vol. 14, p. 3, col. a.

26. Srinagar, Oriental Research Library
Government of Jammu and Kashmir (969–2)

Ph. d Folios: 5; Śāradā; digital images (country paper); 19 × 14 cm.

Contents BPV (TĀ 3.8–23). This is a composite manuscript containing two titles: *Vijñānabhairava* and *Viśvapratibimbavāda*.

Incipit [52r1] (commentary on top margin): *etad eva prakārāntareṇāpi vyācaṣṭe svasminnityādinā* | [52r5] (main text): *na kṣamataiva yā atyaktasvaprakā*[2]*śasya nairmalyaṃ tadgurūditam* (TĀ 3.8, K_{ED} vol. II, p. 9)

Explicit [54r7] *jam iti dhruvaṃ mohaḥ śāmyed iti ni*[8]*rdiśaddarpaṇavidhim 23* [9] *iti śrītantrāloke tṛtīyāhnike* [10] *bimbapratibimbavādaḥ saṃpūrṇaḥ* || (TĀ 3.23, K_{ED} vol. II, p. 30).

Notes The folios containing the first seven verses of the *Viśvapratibimbavāda* are missing.

Bibl. No mention.

27. Srinagar, Oriental Research Library
Government of Jammu and Kashmir (1012)

Ph. d. Folios: 288; Śāradā; digital images (country paper); 18 × 12.5 cm.

Contents TĀV 1 to 5, beginning of 6.

Incipit [1r1] *oṃ yasmād īśaṇa.* The first 7 lines are marked to be deleted, and the same lines are repeated on top of the page (TĀV 1.1, K_{ED} vol. I, p. 1).

Explicit [36r15] *iti śrītantrālokaviveke pañcamam āhnikam. Āhnika* 6 begins on the same folio, but in the sequence of images I received there is one more folio bearing TĀV 5.158: [36v23] *laṅghanena paro yogī mandabuddhiḥ krameṇa tu* || *para i*[24]*ti tīvraśaktipātāviddhaḥ yogīti paratattvaikyabhāg bhaved i*[25]*ty arthaḥ* || *nanu pūrvaṃ pūrvam uttarasyottarasya vīryam ity u* (TĀV 5.158, K_{ED} vol. III, p. 470).

Notes *Āhnika* 1 ends on 87r. Folios 87v, 88r, 88v contain a few verses from the beginning of the same *āhnika. Āhnika* 2 begins on 89v and ends on 107r. The foliation is altered after 90. *Āhnika* 3 ends on 195v. *Āhnika* 4 ends on 262v. Except the first three, folios are not numbered in *āhnika* 5, which ends on 36r. Thereafter, one more folio contains the beginning of *āhnika* 6.

Bibl. Cat. ORLS 2011: 385, No. 1832.

28. Srinagar, Oriental Research Library
Government of Jammu and Kashmir (1054.03)

Ph. d. Folios: 190; Śāradā; digital images (country paper); 22 × 16.5 cm.

Contents TĀ (without *viveka*) 1.1 to 37.85.

Incipit [1r1] *oṃ namo gurave śrīsarasvatīrūpāya* || *oṃ namo vighna-ha*[*rtre*] [2] *vimalakalāśrayā* (TĀ 1.1, K_{ED} vol. I, p. 3).

Explicit [185v12] *iti śrīmadabhina*[13]*vaguptaviracite tantrāloke ṣa-ṭṭriṃśam āhnikam* || *samāptaś cāyaṃ* [14] *śrītantrālokaḥ* || *kṛtis trinayanacaraṇacintanalabdhaprasiddhes śrīma*[15]*dabhinava-guptasya* || *yad*[*ca*]*katha*[*da*]*muṣmiṃś śrīmadā*[*cā*]^{pc}*ryavaryo bahuparika*[16]*ravṛndaṃ sarvaśāstroddhṛtaṃ sattadatulapariya-tnenaikṣya sañcintya sadbhiḥ* [17] *hṛdayakamalakośe dhāryam āryaiś śivāya* || *yo dhīto nikhilāgameṣu* [18] *padavidyo yogaśās-traśra*[there is a *daṃ* or *saṃ* included here on the right margin]*mīyo vākyārthasamanvayīkṛtaratis śrīpratyabhi*[19]*jñāmate* || *yas tarkāntaraviśrutaśrutabhayā dvaitādvayajñānavit so smin syā*[20]*d adhikāravāv* [*post correctionem* below the last *akṣara* is apparently *nka*] *kalakalaprāyapareṣāṃ nava* [*ravaḥ*]^{pc} || *iti śivam* || | || [186r1]*saṃvat 74 vaiśtati paurṇamāsyāṃ parataḥ pratipadyāṃ śanaiś caravārānvi*[2]*tāyāṃ likhitam mayā bhaṭṭa-kailāsakeneti śubham astu sarvajagatām* || (TĀV 37.85, K_{ED} vol. XII, p. 427).

Notes The sequence of *āhnika*s is as follows: *āhnika* 1 ends on 14r; 2 ends on 15v; 3 ends on 25v; ends on 34r; 5 ends on 39r; 6 ends on 47r; 7 ends on 49r; 8 ends on 63r; 9 ends on 72r; 10 ends on 81r; 11 ends on 84v; 12 ends on 85v; 13 ends on 96r; 14 ends on 97v; 15 ends on 116v; 16 ends on 126v; 17 ends on 130r; 18 ends on 130v; 19 ends on 132r; 20 ends on 132v; 21 ends on 134v; 22 ends on 136r; 23 ends on 139v; 24 ends on 140r; 25 ends on 141r; 26 ends on 143v; 27 ends on 145v; 28 ends on 158v; 29 ends on 168r; 30 ends on 172r; 31 ends on 177r; 32 ends on 179v; 33 ends on 180r; 34 ends on 181v; 35 ends on 182r; 36 ends on 185v. The initial few folios have annotations on top above the text. The margins of the Ms are moth-eaten, but the text is mostly intact. The handwriting is not always very clear. Old Kashmiri paper.

Bibl. No mention.

29. Srinagar, Oriental Research Library,
Government of Jammu and Kashmir (1352)

Ph. d. Folios: 526; Śāradā; digital images (country paper); 18×18 cm.

Contents TĀV 1.1 to 10, 11 (incomplete) and 21.42 to 26.42.

Incipit   [1r1] (main text) *oṃ svasti oṃ namaḥ śivāya śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ oṃ namo gurave* || [2] *oṃ smād īṣaṇa.* The first folio is fully annotated with marginalia that basically reflect someone's attempt to correct the main text. The beginning on the top reads: *oṃ yasmād īṣaṇavitkriyā* (TĀ 1.1, K_{ED} vol. I, p. 1).

Explicit   [509r7] *iti śrītantralokaḥ* [8] *samāptaḥ* || *likhitaṃ ca mayā śrīnārāya++++sudarśanasunayahā*[9]*yyala+++yathādarśaparisa-māptiś cātra* || || [10] *śubham astu sarvajagatāṃ parahitaniratā bhavantu bhūta*[11]*gaṇāḥ deṣāḥ prayānta śāntiṃ sarvatra sukhī bhavantu lokāḥ* [12] *rāja svasti prajā svasti deśa svasti tathaiva ca yajamā*[13]*n gṛhe svasti svasti gobrāhmaṇeṣu ca* || || || [14] *saṃ-vat 15 vaiśtati 10 candre* || || || || || || || || (TĀ 26.42, K_{ED} vol. X, p. 343).

Notes   The sequence of *āhnika*s is as follows: *āhnika* 1 ends on 65r; 2 ends on 74r; 3 ends on 113v; 4 ends on 179v; 5 ends on 223v; 6 ends on 264r; 7 ends on 277r; 8 ends on 345v; 9 ends on 413v; 10 ends on 466r; 11 begins on the same folio and continues until folio 482r, where the text suddenly stops with TĀV 11.80. Folio 482v begins with verse 10.61ab with the *Viveka*, and line 13 suddenly switches to 21.42. This is almost the same change recorded in Mss B_8, J_4, Lk_1, P_4, K_6, K_{11}, S_1 and S_2. In all these cases the scribe shifts after TĀV 11.80 to TĀV 10.60–61, and then either the Ms ends or it makes another sudden shift to TĀV 21.42. In fact, J_4, P_4, K_6 end with TĀV 11.80, and the last folio also reads a short portion of TĀV 10.61 (only J_4 stops at TĀV 10.79). However, in case of Lk_1, K_4, K_{11}, S_1 and S_2 the text continues from TĀV 21.42–*avataraṇikā*. *Āhnika* 21 ends on 485v; 22 ends on 489v; 23 ends on 500r; 24 ends on 502r; 25 ends on 505r; 26 ends abruptly on 409r (TĀV 26.42). The handwriting changes in the mid of folio 50r. The new hand shows thick and straight characters. 50v has a different hand-writing, and beginning with 51v the hand seems to change again. After folio 76r there is yet another hand, with cursive Śāradā characters. On 75v, two numbers are marked: 75 and 50. Evidently, the first 75 folios stop here, and the scribe who started copying the text later wrote the number 50, because the foliation continues with 51, 52, etc. From 92r onwards, the hand changes once again.

Bibl.   Cat. ORLS 2011: 385, No. 1833.

30. Srinagar, Oriental Research Library Government of Jammu and Kashmir (1716)

Ph. d.   Folios: 382; Śāradā; digital images (country paper); 20.4 × 13.9 cm.

Contents   TĀV 1.1 to 11.80 (This is a composite Ms: the first 17 folios con-
tain an incomplete commentary by Nānā Dīkṣita on the
Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī of Prakśānanda Sarasvatī, a.k.a.
Mallikārjuna Yatīndra). The TĀV begins on folio 1v1.

Incipit   Folio 17 is completely blank except a verse written on the
lower left corner of the recto that reads: *bhedābhedavatārthena
tena na bhrāntir īdṛśī || nāhantādiparāmarśabhedād asyānyatā-
tmanaḥ ahaṃ mṛśyatayaivāsya sṛṣṭestijvā ca karmavat ||.*
The next folio begins with the TĀV: 1v1 reads: *oṃ namaḥ sara-
svatyai || oṃ namo gurave || oṃ namaḥ śivāya || [2] oṃ ghora-
vighnoghavidhvaṃsavicakṣaṇamibhānanam nutvā[3]tigopyaṃ
likhati tantraṃ vai sūryarāmakaḥ || oṃ yasmād īṣa[4]ṇavit-
kriyā.……..*on the same page [line 24] the text ends with the
words *dṛg ity uktaṃ, tadubhayeti tadāsyārdhavyākhyamānaṃ
K$_6^{ac}$[vyākhyāsyamānaṃ K$_6^{pc}$] ca tad.* The next page 2v1 begins
again with the beginning of the TĀV [2v1] *oṃ namaḥ śivāya ||
oṃ namas svastyai || oṃ namo gurave || oṃ [2] yasmād īṣaṇa-
vitkriyā* and somewhere in the mid of the page [line 12] the
text stops with the words: *[12] t tat pārameśvaraṃ śrīma-
nmahānandavijṛmbhitam || iha khalu.* Thereafter, the text con-
tinues on the folio which is left unnumbered. *bhayaṃ, tasyā-
male tayor yad yāmalaṃ rūpaṃ sa saṅghatta iti [2] smṛtaḥ* (TĀV
1.1, K$_{ED}$ vol. I, p. 4).

Explicit   *Āhnika* 11 suddenly stops on 392v15 (TĀ 11.80cd, K$_{ED}$ vol. VII,
p. 62), and the text continues with 10.61 until the end of the
page, where the Ms ends. This is almost the same change
recorded in Mss B$_8$, J$_4$, Lk$_1$, P$_4$, K$_4$, K$_{11}$, S$_1$ and S$_2$. In all these
cases the scribe shifts after TĀV 11.80 to TĀV 10.60–61, and
then either the Ms ends or it makes another sudden shift to
TĀV 21.42. In fact, J$_4$, P$_4$ and K$_6$ end in TĀV 11.80, and the last
folio also contains a short portion of TĀV 10.61 (only J$_4$ stops
at TĀV 10.79). However, in the case of Lk$_1$, K$_4$, K$_{11}$, S$_1$ and S$_2$
the text resumes from TĀV 21.42–*avataraṇikā.* [392v22–24]
TĀV 10.61, K$_{ED}$ vol. VII, p. 49 *adhikaś ca bhāvo vāsyā.……..va na
tāvad ve[23]dyatvabhāvaḥ tasya hi vedyatvaṃ na tu vedyatvam
eva saḥ ātaś ca ta[24]ddha...eveti yuktam uktaṃ vedyatvaṃ bhā-
vadharma iti nanv atrokta eva [25] saṃvat 13 śrīśāke 1759 bhāsta-
ti 1 śukre likhitam ||.*

Notes   The folio abbreviations also give the *āhnika* name. Thus, the
first *āhnika* is listed as Vi. Bhe. Pra. (*Vijñānabhedaprakaraṇa*).
The sequence of *āhnika*s is as follows: *āhnika* 1 ends on 56r; 2
ends on 63v; 3 ends on 115r; 4 ends on 164v; 5 ends on 194v;
6 ends on 223r; 7 ends on 233v; 8 ends on 287r; 9 ends on

340r; 10 ends on 380r; 11 stops abruptly on 392v15. The Ms is probably dated 1837 CE (?).

Bibl.   Cat. ORLS 2011: 385, No. 1839.

31. Srinagar, Oriental Research Library Government of Jammu and Kashmir (1792)

Ph. d.   Folios: 544; Śāradā; digital images (country paper); 25 × 16.5 cm.

Contents   TĀV 9.1 to 37.85.

Incipit   [1r1] *tattvakramāvabhāsanavibhāgavibhavo bhujaṅgamā*[2]*bharaṇaḥ bhaktajanajayāvahatāṃ vahati ja*[3]*yāvaho jayati* || (TĀV 9.1, K_{ED} vol. VI, p. 1).

Explicit   Image 509: [8] || *iti śrītantrālokaviveke sapta*[9]*triṃśam āhnikam* || (TĀV 37.85, K_{ED} vol. XII, p. 428). Images 510–514 include the concluding verse of Jayaratha (K_{ED} vol. XII, pp. 428–435). A few folios after this repeat some of the same verses. Some folios contain a portion of the *Śrīrevākhaṇḍa* of the *Nārāyaṇavratakathā*. One folio seems to bear the start of a commentary on the *Siddhāntakaumudī*.

Notes   *Āhnika* 9 ends in image 67 (47r). From 50r, there is a change of hand, and the foliation starts anew. The sequence of *āhnika*s is as follows: *āhnika* 10 ends on image 116 (7r); 11 ends in image 131; 12 ends in image 133; 13 ends in image 188; 14 ends in image 194; 15 ends in image 257; 16 ends in image 292; 17 ends in image 302; 18 ends in image 303; 19 ends in image 308; 20 ends in image 309; 21 ends in image 315; 22 ends in image 321; 23 ends in image 331; 24 ends in image 333; 25 ends in image 337; 26 ends in image 344; 27 ends in image 355; 28 ends in image 410; 29 ends in image 449; 30 ends in image 460; 31 ends in image 479; 32 ends in image 489; 33 ends in image 491; 34 ends in image 493; 35 ends in image 499; 36 ends in image 502; 37 ends in image 509. The Ms is written in different hands, but the text continues uninterrupted. Most folios are not numbered, but some folios are randomly marked with numerals following no strict sequence. The scanned file available to me shows several small fragments towards the end of the Ms.

Bibl.   Cat. ORLS 2011: 385, No. 1834.

32. Srinagar, Oriental Research Library Government of Jammu and Kashmir (2081)

Ph. d.   Folios: 91; Śāradā; digital images (country paper); 22.1 × 16 cm.

Contents TĀV 1.1 to 2.50.

Incipit (main text): [1v1] *oṃ śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ || oṃ namaḥ śivāya sa śivāya* [2] *oṃ yasmād īṣaṇa* (TĀV 1.1, K_{ED} vol. I, p. 1).

(text on the top of the folio): ***mād++vitkriyā ya*******tatta-tprathāśaktayo yatraivaṃvidhatāṃ kadāpy upagataṃ yadvā yad evaṃvidham yaddhāmatrikatattva* (TĀV 1.1, K_{ED} vol. I, p. 1) (the reading here is somewhat parallel to the Ms *kha* used in the K_{ED}).

Explicit [88r9]: *iti śrīmadabhinavaguptācāryaviracite tantrāloka*[10]*vivecane anupāyaprakāśanaṃ nāma dvitīyam āhni*[11]*kam śubham astu sarvajagatām* * * [12] *oṃ tat sat vrahmaṇe namaḥ* * *śubham astu* * (TĀV 2.50, K_{ED} vol. I, p. 42–page number of the second chapter).

Notes The first *āhnika* ends on folio 77r, and the second begins on 77v and ends on 88r.

Bibl. Cat. ORLS 2011: 385, No. 1835.

33. Srinagar, Oriental Research Library
Government of Jammu and Kashmir (2201.01)

Ph. d. Folios: 299; Śāradā; digital images (country paper); 26.4 × 18.7 cm.

Contents TĀV 1 to 4 & TĀ 13 to 37.55 (without *Viveka*).

Incipit [1r1] (main text) *oṃ svasty astu prajābhyaḥ* [ga]*ṇeśāya namaḥ oṃ yasmād eṣaṇa* (TĀV 1.1, K_{ED} vol. I, p. 1). Text on top margin: *oṃ yasmād eṣaṇa.*

Explicit 120v19: *tāruṇyasāgarataraṅgabharān apohya vairāgyapotam adhiruhya dṛḍhaṃ*[20]*havyena yo bhaktirohanam avāpya maheśabhaktiratnair alaṃ dala* (The text ends abruptly here. The pages after this are missing). (TĀV 37.55, K_{ED} vol. XII, p. 412).

Notes *Āhnika* 1 ends on 60r; *āhnika* 2 ends on 68v; *āhnika* 3 ends on 128r; *āhnika* 4 abruptly ends on 178r24: *vaidikyā codanayā sāmānye*[25]*na sarvapuruṣaviṣayatayā vihite api te śuddhyaśuddhī ta*[26]*ttvajñaviṣaye arthād vibodhena bādhite eva na na bādhite bhavata iti* [27] *bhāvaḥ ||* (TĀV 4.231). The next folio is blank, and *āhnika*s 5 to 12 are missing. Thereafter begins 13th *āhnika* in new handwriting, and the page numbers begin from 1. *Āhnika* 13 begins in a new hand, and foliation starts again from 1. *Āhnika*s from 13 onward are without *Viveka*. The beginning reads: [1r1] *oṃ śrī gaṇeśāya namaḥ oṃ śrīguruve sarasvatīrūpāya* [nama]*ḥ oṃ* [2] *athāha kṛtabhājanaṃ.* The sequence of *āhnika*s is as follows: *āhnika* 13 ends on 13v; 14 ends on 15v; 15 ends on 39v; 16 ends on 51v; 17 ends on 56r; 18 ends on 56v; 19 ends on 58v; 20 ends on 49r; 21 ends on

61v; 22 ends on 63v; 23 ends on 66v but it stops with TĀ 23.91. The remaining verses from 23 are missing, and the beginning of the *āhnika* 24 immediately follows and ends on 67v; 25 ends on 68v; 26 ends on 71v. On folio 72r there appears the colophon of *āhnika* 23 left incomplete earlier. The scribe writes a note here in continuation of the text: *itaḥ paraṃ āhnikatrayaṃ asyatra likhitam saptaviṃśam āhnikam idānīṃ likhyate ||*. *Āhnika* 27 ends on 74v; 28 ends on 90v; 29 ends on 101v; 30 ends on 106r; 31 ends on 112r; 32 ends on 114v; 33 ends on 115v. Note that here after TĀ 33.24ab, the verse suddenly shifts to TĀ 34.3 (*kathito' yaṃ svasvarūpapraveśaḥ parameṣṭhinā*). This is followed by the colophon of TĀ 33, but TĀ 34 is entirely missing. Due to this error, *āhnika* 35 is wrongly named 34, and so on. It ends on 117v. *Āhnika* 36 (named 35) ends on 118r. *Āhnika* 37 (named 36) ends on 120v.

Bibl.   Cat. ORLS 2011: 385, No. 1836.

34. Srinagar, Oriental Research Library
Government of Jammu and Kashmir (2404-1)

Ph. d.   Folios: 165; Śāradā; digital images (country paper); 15×28 cm.

Contents   TĀV 4.29 to 5.71; 10.32 to 11.80cd; 21.42 to 26.42; 27 and 28 missing; TĀ 29.1 to 35.6ab, 34 (missing); also contains additional TĀ 20 to 37 (without *Viveka*).

Incipit   [9v1] *mokṣe kiṃ iti nāmāyaṃ janaḥ saṃsārātronmajjatī+++ || mokṣo* [2] *pi vaiṣṇavāder yaḥ svasaṅkalpe na bhāvitaḥ | paraṃ prakṛtisāyujyya* (TĀV 4.29, K$_{ED}$ vol. III, p. 30).

Explicit   [r1] *iti śrīmadabhinavaguptaviracite tantrālo*[2]*ke saptatriṃśam āhnikam 37 samāptaś cāyaṃ tantrālokaḥ ||* [3] *kṛtis trinayanacaraṇacintanalabdhaprasiddeḥ śrīmadabhina*[4]*vaguptasya yadacakathad amuṣmin* [*n*]^{pc} *śrīmadācāryavaryo bahupari*[5]*karavṛndaṃ sarvaśāstroddhṛtaṃ sat tadatulapariyatnena hy asaṃci*[6]*ntya sadbhir hy udayakamalakośe dhāryam āryaiḥ śivāya yo dhītī ni-*[7]*khilāgameṣu yad vidyo yogaśāstrāśramī yo vākyārthasaman-va*[8]*yī kṛtaratiḥ śrīpratyabhijñāmṛte yas tat kāntaraviśrutaḥ śruta-bha*[9]*yād vaitādvayajñānavit so smin syād adhikāravān kalakalaprā*[10]*yaṃ pareṣāṃ vacaḥ iti śivam śubham astu lekha-kapāṭhaka*[11]*yoḥ śubham astu sarvajagatām oṃ tat sat || ||* (TĀV 37.85, K$_{ED}$ vol. XII, p. 427).

Notes   The Ms does not bear folio numbers. In the sequence of the images I have received, the Ms begins with TĀV 4.29 and ends on image 36. On image 32, the text between TĀV 4.258ab–263ab is missing. *Āhnika* 5 begins with a new folia-

tion in image 36 and suddenly ends in the mid of the folio in image 50 (TĀV 5.71). This is followed by a blank folio and another one with TĀV 10.32. *Āhnika* 10 ends in image 66. *Āhnika* 11 begins in image 66 and suddenly ends in image 77 (TĀV 11.80cd). It is followed by TĀ 10.61ab with the *Viveka*, and then the text suddenly shifts to 21.42 on line 20. In all these cases the scribe shifts after TĀV 11.80 to TĀV 10.60–61, and then either the Ms ends or it makes another sudden shift to TĀV 21.42. In fact, J_4, P_4 and K_6 end with TĀV 11.80, and the last folio also contains a short portion of TĀV 10.61 (only J_4 stops at TĀV 10.79). However, in the case of Lk_1, K_4, K_{11}, S_1 and S_2 the text continues from TĀV 21.42–*avataraṇikā*. *Āhnika* 21 ends in image 78; 22 ends in image 81; 23 ends in image 87; 24 ends in image 88; 25 ends in image 90; 26 suddenly ends in image 92 at TĀV 26.42; 27 and 28 are missing. The next folio begins with *āhnika* 29 without the *Viveka* and ends in image 102. *Āhnika* 30 ends in image 106; 31 ends in image 110; 32 ends in image 112. Note that here after TĀ 33.24ab, the text suddenly shifts to TĀ 34.3 (*kathito yaṃ svasvarū-papraveśaḥ parameṣṭhinā*). This is also observed in Ms no. 2201.01 of the Oriental Research Library, Srinagar. However, in the present Ms a correction in the margin reproduces the missing text: *tadyoge ṣoḍaṣādyaṃ syād eva bhāvabhāgī rthar* (sic) *vedyupāyanirapekṣatayaiva nityaṃ svātmānam āviśati garbhi-taviśvarūpam ||*. This is followed by the colophon of TĀ 33, while *āhnika* 34 is completely missing. The Ms continues with *āhnika* 35 (wrongly named 34) until 35.6ab; the next folio begins with TĀ 20.1, which ends on the verso. The folios are numbered from image 114 onwards. *Āhnika* 21 ends on 3v [image 116]; 22 ends on 5r; 23 ends on 8r; 24 ends on 9r; 25 ends on 10r; 26 ends on 12v; 27 ends on 15r; 28 ends on [29r]. A few initial verses of *āhnika* 29 are on 29r. This is followed by three blank folios. The next four folios include the opening text of the *Vijñānabhairava*. Image 145 shows a folio with some text from TĀ 15.505. Then there is a blank folio, and the next begins with *āhnika* 16 that ends in image 154. *Āhnika* 17 ends in image 158. *Āhnika* 18 ends in image 158. *Āhnika* 19 sudden-ly ends in image 160 at TĀ 19.50ab, and the next folio begins with TĀ 35.6d. *Āhnika* 35 (wrongly named 34) ends in image 161; 36 (wrongly named 35) ends in image 162; 37 ends in image 165.

Bibl.   Cat. ORLS 2011: 385, No. 2404–1 is listed under the serial No. 1830.

35. Srinagar, Oriental Research Library
Government of Jammu and Kashmir (2404–2)

Ph. d.	Folios: 184 (77+107); Śāradā; digital images (country paper); 15 × 28 cm.
Contents	TĀV 1.1 to 4.29 (parts of *āhnika*s 3 and 4 are missing).
Incipit	[1v1] (main text) *oṃ śrī gurave paramaśivasvarūpāya namaḥ oṃ śrī*[2]*gaṇeśāya namaḥ oṃ namaḥ sarasvatyai śrīsaṃviddevyai* [3] *namaḥ oṃ yasmād īṣaṇa* (TĀV 1.1, K_{ED} vol. I, p. 1). (text of the commentary on top margin): *yasmād īṣaṇa-vitkriyāyaduditā.*
Explicit	[107v10–12] *nanu prāpte* [*api*]^{pc} *vaiṣṇavādiśāstrāntarodite mo*[11]*kṣe kim iti nāmāyaṃ janaḥ saṃsārān nomajjatī* [12] *tyāśaṅkyāha* || *mokṣopīti* || || (TĀV 4.29, K_{ED} vol. III, p. 30).
Notes	*Āhnika* 1 is numbered individually, while the foliation of *āhnika* 2 starts anew and continues ahead. *Āhnika* 1 ends on 77v. *Āhnika* 2, written in a different hand, ends on 13r. *Āhnika* 3 begins on 13r8. Folia between 92 (*āhnika* 3) and 103 (*āhnika* 4) are missing. *Āhnika* 4 suddenly stops on 107v (TĀV 4.29). As Vasudeva points out (2013: 227), Ms Nos. 2404–1 and 2404–2 have been wrongly listed as ORL 7771/7772.
Bibl.	Cat. ORLS 2011: 385, No. 2404–2 is listed under No. 1830.1.

36. Srinagar, Oriental Research Library
Government of Jammu and Kashmir (2550)

Ph. d.	Folios: 281; Śāradā; digital images (country paper); 21.5 × 15.5 cm.
Contents	TĀV 1.1 to 3.158.
Incipit	[1v on top of the page] *śrīmadādidevyai namaḥ* [1]*oṃ svasti* || *prajābhyaḥ* || *oṃ nama*(*ś śivāya*) || || *oṃ yasmād īṣaṇavitkriyā* (TĀV 1.1, K_{ED} vol. I, p. 1).
Explicit	[279v12-14] *atra cāntaḥ +śabdasya pravṛtto*[13] *nimittaṃ darśa-yati* || || *idaṃ ca +ṣkama*[15]*ntas++mata eva nigadyate* || *icchādyantargatattve* [end of the Ms] (TĀV 3.158, K_{ED} vol. II, p. 159).
Notes	The folios are numbered. *Āhnika* 1 ends on 167v; 2 ends on 189r; 3 ends on 279v.
Bibl.	Cat. ORLS 2011: 385, No. 1829.

37. Trivandrum, Oriental Research Institute and Manuscripts
Library, University of Kerala (22.5442) (K 52.1200)

Ph. d.	Folios: 64; Old Malayalam; digital images (palm leaf).
Contents	TĀ 1.322 to 7.71.

Incipit [1] [...] *kādividhis tatraḥ parvabhedās tadvigeṣāthā vyākhyāvidhiḥ śrutividhir gurupūjāvidhis tv* [...] (TĀ 1.322a, K$_{ED}$ vol. I, p. 297).

Explicit ***********ccayvantarakramāt* | *ity eṣa sūkṣmaparimarśana-śīlanīyaś cakrodayo 'nubhavaśāstradṛśā mayo** || *iti mahāmā***mya-nātmani ca mau******loke cakrodaya prakāśan nāma saptamam āhnikam* || (TĀ 7.71, K$_{ED}$ vol. IV, p. 57). The Ms ends here. However, the digital images show a few small fragments of Ms containing parts of *āhnika*s 3 and 4. The last fragment ends here: *bindur ātmani mūrdhā********** | **************** || ************* *vedayet* | *pūjyaḥ so 'hm************* ||***** *********** | ************ *paśyati* || (TĀ 3.225, K$_{ED}$ vol. II, p. 214).

Notes The Ms is badly damaged, with the edges and parts of the folio surfaces eaten by insects. The sequence of the folios is jumbled up. The digital images are in the following sequence:[61] 1.322–330; 1.309cd–321cd; 7.20cd–33ab; 7.33cd–44cd; 1.295ab–309ab; 1.282b–294cd; 7.47ab–57ab; 7.57cd–69ab; 1.234cd–245cd; 1.246ab–257cd; 1.258ab–270a; 1.270b–281cd; 2.18cd–30a; 2.30b–42cd; 2.43ab–3.3c; 3.3d–15c; 3.15d–27a; 3.27b–40a; 3.40b–52c; 3.52d–64a; 3.64b–76c; 3.76c–87ab; 3.87cd–99c; 3.99d–111a; 3.111b–123a; 3.123b–134ab; 3.134cd–147a; 3.147b–160a; 3.160a–173a; 3.173b–186a; 3.186b–200; 3.188cd to 3.190ab is omitted; 3.201–213c; 3.213cd–226a; 3.226a–237d; 3.237d–249c; 3.249d–261c; 3.261d–274a; 3.274b–286ab; 3.286cd–4.4a; 4.4b–15c; 4.15d–29ab; 4.29c–42ab; 4.42cd–55c; 4.55b–68ab; 4.68cd–81c; 4.81c–93; 4.94–104c; 4.104d–116a; 4.116a–129a; 4.129b–141ab; 6.32–44c; 6.44d–57a; 6.57b–69d; 6.69d–81b; 6.104d–117a; Seems two folios misplaced. 6.117b–128; 5.40c–54a; 5.54b–67a; 5.67b–79b; 5.79b–92a; 5.92b–105c; 5.105d–118a; 5.118b–129a; 5.129b–141a; 5.141b–153d; 5.153d–6.6a; 6.6b–19c; 6.19d–31ab; 6.153d–165c; 6.165d–176a; 6.176b–189a; 6.189b–199ab; 6.199cd–212a; 6.212b–224ab; 6.129ab–141b; 6.141b–153ab; 1.73b–86c; 1.86d–98d; 1.98d–110a; 1.110a–123ab; 1.123cd–135c; 1.135d–150a; 1.150b–163d; 1.163d–177c; 1.177d–191c; 1.191d–203; 6.81d–93c; 6.93d–104ab; 6.246d–7.6c; 7.6d–19ab; 6.224c–235c; 6.235b–246ab; 4.252d–265c; 4.141d–151ab; 5.27b–40a; 5.14c–27b; 4.245b–257; 4.258–270ab; 4.231d–245ab; 4.218b–231ab; 4.205b–217;

4.192b–204;   4.179ab–192a;   4.165d–178;   5.2cd–14ab;
4.270cd–5.2ab;   7.69d–71;   3.124–131;   3.115cd–121;
4.17cd–29ab;   4.32cd–42ab;   4.83ab–92ab;   4.70ab–81ab;
3.161ab–171; 3.176ab–184; 3.227cd–237; 3.214cd–225.

Bibl.   Cat. MLT 1965: 19, serial No. 6539. Also mentioned in NCC
1974: 104.

38. Ujjain, Scindia Oriental Institute
Vikram University (SOI 323 [Acc No: 4681])

Ph. d.   Folios: 357 (48+314); Śāradā; microfilm (paper); size: 24 × 17
cm; lines: 27; *akṣara*: 24.

Contents   TĀV 1.1 to 11.24.

Incipit   [1r1] *oṃ śrī gaṇeśāya namaḥ oṃ namo mahādevyai oṃ yasmād
īśaṇa* [2] (TĀV 1.1, K_{ED} vol. I, p. 1).

Explicit   [313v22] *nya ity anavasthā syād | ity āśaṅkyāha | na cānavasthā
hy evaṃ syād dṛ*[20]*śyatāṃ hi mahātmabhiḥ etad eva darśayati |
yad vedyaṃ kiñcid* [21] *ābhāti tatkṣaye yat prakāśate | tat tattvam
iti nirṇītaṃ ṣaṭtriṃśaṃ hṛdi bhā*[22]*sate | tatkṣa* (TĀV 11.24, K_{ED}
vol. VII, pp. 15–16).

Notes   *Āhnika* 1 ends on 48v (folios 9 and 42-46 are missing). *Āhnika*
2 begins with new foliation on 1r and ends on 7r. *Āhnika* 3
ends on 47r (image 21). *Āhnika* 4 begins on the same folio
and ends on 99r. *Āhnika* 5 begins on 99r and ends on [131r]
(image 104). *Āhnika* 6 begins on on the same folio and ends
on 163v. *Āhnika* 7 begins on 163v (image 137) and ends on
172r. *Āhnika* 8 begins on 172v (image 146) and ends in 221v.
Āhnika 9 begins on 222r and ends on 273r. *Āhnika* 10 begins
on 273r and ends on 311v. *Āhnika* 11 begins on 311v, but the
Ms suddenly stops at TĀV11.24 on folio 314r.

Bibl.   No mention.

39. Varanasi, Sampurnananda Sanskrit University
(26692 – 3044)

Ph. d.   Folios: [326–372, 374–375, 377–416, 418–420]; Devanāgarī;
photocopy (country paper); 13.3 × 7.2 cm.

Contents   TĀV 9.260 to 13.81, 21.43 to 26.42, 31.132–37.83b (in-between
parts of text missing).

Incipit   [326v1] *smin pādādāv adhiṣṭhānātmani sthāne mukhyato vṛtti-
maṃti yena sarveṣāṃ tatraivendriyatvābhimānaḥ | vastutaḥ punaḥ
sakalam evaiṣāṃ śa*[2]*rīram adhiṣṭheyam |* (TĀV 9.260, K_{ED} vol.
VI, p. 210).

Explicit   [420r] *ritatattvataṃtraṃ....* (TĀV 37.83b, K$_{ED}$ vol. XII, p. 425). This is followed by six lines that do not seem to make much sense (blank spaces are reproduced as they appear in the manuscript): *t syāt | jīrṇoddurātvadattasvadhīḥ jayaratha-jayarathākhyau sakalajanasamagraṇādrī amṛtāśaśanāv i*[3]*vā-bdher asmākaṃ malā vyabhus taṃtrāloke subhaṭapādāvi-varaṇaṃ yadarśeya śivaśāstrārtha*[4]*vid abhūt śaivadvai-tajñamiprakaṭitamahānaṃda kalpāṇābhidhamamam abā-dhyāṃs tārajamam adhigatapada*[5] *śete prathayati cala**aṃ jaiminer vākyabodhe nikhila ś cādhirājyaṃ tri-tayam api kathanāṃ* [6] *yantraparyāptim eti davāpta-vidyaḥ kṛtī jayarathākhyaḥ jeṣṭhenayor akā vidyāsthānair aśe*[7]*ṣair api pariśayato bhargame sargaśailai || ||.*

Notes   *Āhnika* 9 ends on 333v. On 349v (*avataraṇikā* of TĀV 10.120), after three and a half lines from the top the text suddenly stops and the page is left blank. However, the text continues on the next page with no interruption. *Āhnika* 10 ends on 369v. *Āhnika* 11 suddenly ends on 382r8 (TĀ 11.80cd), fol-lowed by verse 10.61ab with the *Viveka*, and then on line 12 the text suddenly begins with 21.43ab. This is almost the same change recorded in Mss B$_8$, J$_4$, Lk$_1$, P$_4$, K$_4$, K$_{11}$, S$_1$ and S$_2$. In all these cases the scribe shifts after TĀV 11.80 to TĀV 10.60–61, and then either the Ms ends or it makes another sudden shift to TĀV 21.42. In fact, J$_4$, P$_4$ and K$_6$ end in TĀV 11.80, and the last folio also contains a short portion of TĀV 10.61 (only J$_4$ stops at TĀV 10.79). However, in the case of Lk$_1$, K$_4$, K$_{11}$, S$_1$ and S$_2$ the text resumes from TĀV 21.42–*avataraṇikā*. *Āhnika* 21 ends on 383v1-2; 22 ends on 386r1l; 23 ends on 392r13-14; 24 ends on 393v; 25 ends on 395v13-14. *Āhnika* 26 ends abruptly on 397v with verse 26.42. Thereafter, *āhnika* 12 begins on 398r and ends on 400r. *Āhnika* 13 suddenly stops on 409v4 (TĀ 13.81cd). There is a gap of a few lines, then the text resumes with TĀV 31.132ab. From here to the end of the Ms there are several blank or dotted spaces throughout, there-fore the text after 409v is very lacunose. *Āhnika* 31 ends on 410v. Folio 420v1 ends with 37.83b.

Bibl.   Cat. SSU 2000: 254.

40. Varanasi, Sampurnananda Sanskrit University (82735 (4/151))

Ph. d.   Folios: 497; Śāradā; photocopy (country paper); 10 × 6.6 cm.
Contents   TĀV 1.1 to 11.81 and 21 to 26.42.
Incipit   [1r1] *oṃ svasty astu prajābhyaḥ śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ oṃ* [2] *yasmā-deṣaṇa* (TĀV 1.1, K$_{ED}$ vol. I, p. 1).

Explicit   [116r]: *tve iti ādyena prāthamikena udrekeṇa ucchalattayā mahattvaṃ yasya tasmin parasaṃviddhāmasavidhavartini ity arthaḥ paradhārādhirohe punaḥ sarvajñānakriyāyoga eva syāt ity āha yāvad dhāmani saṅketanikārakalanojjhi.* This is part of 11.78–79. The text continues on the next page with a passage from 10.61: [117r] *adhikaś ca bhāvo vā syāt taddharmo vā na tāvad vedyatvaṃ bhāvas tasya hi vedyatvaṃ na tu vedyatvam eva saḥ ataś ca taddharma eveti yuktam uktam vedyatvaṃ bhāvadharmaḥ iti || nanv atrokta eva.* Even this text stops in the middle of the page. After this, the Ms contains *āhnika*s 21–26. [13v12] *ṣitam bodha eva hi pratiphalitas tathā tathocchalita ity uktam | bimbatveneti* [13] *pratibimbatayeti ca | etad iti pratibimbabhāvātmatayā darśanam || || || [14] itaḥ paraṃ yathaivāvatāritaṃ vivaraṇaṃ tathaivānubhūtam iti kāraṇenādarśī*[15]*bhāvān na likhitam || || (*TĀV 26.42, K$_{ED}$ vol. X, p. 343).

Notes   *Āhnika* 1 ends on 89v. *Āhnika* 2 ends on 100v. *Āhnika* 3 ends on 180v. Folio 181r bears an unidentified text. *Āhnika* 4 begins with new foliation and ends on 61v. *Āhnika* 5 also begins with new foliation and ends on 32v. Here there is an extract from *Svacchandatantroddyota* 1.69ab beginning with [32v5] *oṃ namas tripurasundaryai oṃ haṃsākhyo bindusaṃyuktaḥ ṣaṣṭhasva*[6]*ravibheditaḥ* up to *ity alaṃ mantrarahasyaprakaṭanena.* Then, on the next folio *āhnika* 6 begins with new foliation and ends on 35v. *Āhnika* 7 continues with the same foliation and ends on 45v. *Āhnika* 8 begins with new foliation and ends on 57v. *Āhnika* 9 also begins with new foliation and ends on 70v. From 78r onwards there is a change of hand. *Āhnika* 10 ends on 106v. *Āhnika* 11 suddenly stops on 117r (TĀV 11.81ab). This is almost the same change recorded in Mss B$_8$, J$_4$, Lk$_1$, P$_4$, K$_4$, K$_{11}$, S$_1$ and S$_2$. In all these cases the scribe shifts after TĀV 11.80 to TĀV 10.60–61, and then either the Ms ends or it makes another sudden shift to TĀV 21.42. In fact, J$_4$, P$_4$ and K$_6$ end in TĀV 11.80, and the last folio also contains a short portion of TĀV 10.61 (only J$_4$ stops at TĀV 10.79). However, in the case of Lk$_1$, K$_4$, K$_{11}$, S$_1$ and S$_2$ the text resumes from TĀV 21.42–*avataraṇikā*. Thereafter, the folios are not numbered. The text resumes with TĀV 21.42cd and ends on next folio, where *āhnika* 22 also begins. *Āhnika* 23 ends on 10r; 24 ends on 11r; 25 ends on 12v; 26 ends abruptly on 14v (TĀV 26.42). Some folios contain elaborate marginalia.

Bibl.   No mention.

41. Varanasi, Banaras Hindu University
(139)

Ph. d.   Folios: 39; Śāradā; digital images (paper); 31 × 17.3 cm.
Contents   TĀV 1.1 to 1.40. The text in the Ms abruptly stops with *nanu
              kiṃ nāma pāra* (1.141), which is the beginning of the *avata-
              raṇikā* of 1.141.
Incipit   [1v1] *oṃ svasti prajābhyaḥ śrīgaṇesāya namaḥ oṃ namo gurave* ||
              (TĀV 1.1, K$_{ED}$ vol. I, p. 1).
Explicit   [39v25] *aṃśāṃśikākramād iti āvṛtini*[26]*rhrāsatāratamyama-
              ndātiprāyatvāt nanu kiṃ nāma pāra* (TĀV 1.141, K$_{ED}$ vol. I, p.
              181).
Notes   Not reported.
Bibl.   Cat. BHU 1971: 748 (listed as *Tantrālokasāra*).

42. Varanasi, Banaras Hindu University
(C1114)

Ph. d.   Folios: 59; Śāradā; digital images (paper); 22.9 × 15.9 cm.
Contents   TĀV 3.34ab to 3.270. The first 11 folios are missing. The Ms
              starts from folio 12. It roughly consists of the third *āhnika* of
              the TĀ with the *Viveka*: it starts at 3.34ab and stops at the end
              of the commentary on verse 3.270.
Incipit   [12v1] *kṣaṇe tu pra*[folio damaged] [2]*s tāvat anabhivya* [folio
              damaged] [3]*sau prathame kṣa*[folio damaged] [4] *pratibimba-
              tāmaśnuv*[folio damaged] [5] *bimbasaṃmatasya pratibi*[folio
              damaged] [6] *pratibimbajātīyatvam tatra prati* (TĀV 3.34ab,
              K$_{ED}$ vol. II, p. 43).
Explicit   [70v18] *sphuratīty arthaḥ na hy etat padam adhiśayānasyaitad
              upayoga i*[19]*ti bhāvaḥ yad uktam ayaṃ raso yena manāg avāptaḥ
              svacchandace*[20]*ṣṭānicatasya tasya samādhiyogavratamantramu-
              drājapādi*[21]*caryā viṣavad vibhātīti vakṣyati ca snānavrataṃ
              dehaśu* The text stops here abruptly. (TĀV 3.270, K$_{ED}$ vol. II,
              p. 247).
Notes   Folios 12–17 are badly damaged.
Bibl.   Cat. BHU 1971: 746 (where the work is attributed to Som-
              eśvara).

43. Varanasi, Banaras Hindu University
(C1150)

Ph. d.   Folios: 62; Śāradā; digital images (paper); 36.4 × 31.0 cm.
Contents   TĀV 3.113 to 6.20.
Incipit   [1] *rthaḥ | atha ca sa eva sarvaprāṇinām adha* [°*ṃ adha* V3]^{ac}
              ūrdhvaṃ vibhāgena sūryācandrātmaprāṇāpānapravāharūpatayā-

 py a[2]*vasthitaḥ saiva parā jīvakaleti bhāvaḥ evam apy asau ni-*
ṣkriyeṇa rūpeṇāvatiṣṭhate | kriyāśaktiparyantaṃ [3] *tattadvaici-*
tryātmanā parisphuraṇepi nāsya svarūpāt pracyāvaḥ ity arthaḥ |
(TĀV 3.113, K$_{ED}$ vol. II, p. 120).

Explicit *kṛtya sarvam idaṃ susthitaṃ syāt | jaḍānām eva ca pariṇāmo bha-*
ved iti na cetanatvenāsau yujyate ity anyair bahūktam it[30]*i tata*
evāvadhāryam | ata evāsti[*kya* V$_4$]^{pc}*vāsanā*[*yā* V$_4$]^{pc}*s tādavasthye-*
nānyeṣāṃ darśanāntarasthānām agnihotraṃ juhuyāt na hiṃsyā
(TĀV 6.20, K$_{ED}$ vol. IV, p. 19).

Notes There are corrections on almost all folios.

Bibl. Cat. BHU 1971: 748 (listed as *Tantrālokasāra*).

44. Varanasi, Banaras Hindu University
(C1198)

Ph. d. Folios: 3; Śāradā; digital images (paper); 12.3 × 13.5 cm.

Contents BPV 3.1–23 = *Bimbapratibimbavāda* (TĀV).

Incipit (main text) [5] *oṃ namaḥ śrī gurave oṃ prakāśamātraṃ yat pro-*
ktaṃ…...|| (TĀV 3.1, K$_{ED}$ vol. II, p. 1) (the commentary begins
at the top of the folios) [1] *oṃ antar vibhāti sakalaṃ jagadā-*
tmanīha ||.

Explicit (main text ends on) [8] *iti bimbapratibimbavādaḥ* [9] *samāptaḥ*
| (TĀV 3.23, K$_{ED}$ vol. II, p. 30) (the commentary in the mar-
gins ends in) [14] *śrī tantrāloke viśvapratibimbavādaḥ samāptaḥ*
oṃ śubham || (TĀV 3.23, K$_{ED}$ vol. II, p. 32).

Notes This is a collection of the first 23 verses of TĀ 3. The *Viveka* is
written in the margins. It begins with Abhinavagupta's *maṅ-*
gala, antar vibhāti sakalaṃ jagadātmanīha…..., instead of
Jayaratha's, immediately followed by the commentary on TĀ
3.1, *prakāśamātram iti prādhnyāt | na hi nirvimarśaḥ …...*, skip-
ping the initial part. The folios are not numbered.

Bibl. Cat. BHU 1971: 758.

45. Varanasi, Banaras Hindu University
(C4138)

Ph. d. Folios: 33 1/2; Śāradā; digital images (paper); 21.3 × 17.1 cm.

Contents TĀV 1.1 to 1.140.

Incipit [1r1] *oṃ tat sad oṃ paramabrahmaṇe namaḥ* [2] *oṃ śrīmacchrī-*
svadarśanacaraṇakamalapādvakebhyo namaḥ śubham || [3] *oṃ*
namo vighnahartre gaṇamukhāya siddhikartre || svastiprajābhyaḥ
|| oṃ atha tantrālokaṃ || yasmād eṣaṇa (TĀV 1.1, K$_{ED}$ vol. I, p. 1)

Explicit [34v22] *daśāṃśikākramāt || kaṃcit iti tīvranirhrāsa*[23]*tā-*
vṛtitāratamyam aṃśāṃśikākramāt iti āvṛtini[24]*rhrāsatāratamya*

mandādiprāyatvāt (the text stops here) (TĀV 1.1.140, K$_{ED}$ vol. I, p. 180).

Notes	Not reported.
Bibl.	Cat. BHU 1971: 746.

46. Varanasi, Banaras Hindu University (C4779)

Ph. d.	Folios: 7; Śāradā; digital images (paper); 19.7 × 14.5 cm.
Contents	BPV 3.1–23 (TĀV).
Incipit	(main text) [1r6] *oṃ namaḥ śrī gurave	oṃ prakāśamātraṃ yat proktaṃ...... ||* (TĀV 3.1, K$_{ED}$ vol. II, p. 1) (commentary on the top of the page) [1r1] *oṃ namaḥ śivāya antar vibhāti sakalaṃ jagadātmanīha ||.*
Explicit	(main text ends in) [7r4–5] *iti bimbapratibimbavādaḥ samāptaḥ śubhaṃ bhavatu ||* (TĀV 3.23, K$_{ED}$ vol. II, p. 30) (commentary on margins ends in) [7r1] *iti śrī tantrāloke bimbapratibimba-vādaḥ samāptaḥ |* (TĀV 3.23, K$_{ED}$ vol. II, p. 32).
Notes	This is a collection of the first 23 verses of TĀ 3. The *Viveka*, though not complete, is written in the margins, as seen also in the Varanasi Ms C1198 above. It begins with Abhinavagupta's *maṅgala, antar vibhāti sakalaṃ jagadātmanīha......,* instead of Jayaratha's, immediately followed by the commentary on TĀ 3.1, *prakāśamātram iti prādhnyāt	na hi nirvimarśaḥ .....,* skipping the initial part.
Bibl.	Cat. BHU 1971: 758.

47. Varanasi, Banaras Hindu University (C5019)

Ph. d.	Folios: 16; Devanāgarī; digital images (paper); 35 × 18.5 cm.
Contents	TĀV 1.204 to 3.6ab.
Incipit	[17r1] *evaṃ ca prakarṣeṇa nissaṃskāratayā dhvastāni bāhyā-varaṇani yayā sā praśāntabhedety arthaḥ ata eva śāṃtā cinmā-trarūpety arthaḥ evam api sarvadikṣu bhavā sthāvarajaṅga[2]mā-tmakajagadrūpatvāt citrasvabhāveti yāvat* (TĀV 1.204, K$_{ED}$ vol. I, pp. 229–230).
Explicit	[32v1–2] *keṣu kandādyādhārādiṣu sparśādeḥ saṃbhavān prati-saṃkramati tena ya eva yatra svaccho sti guṇaḥ sa eva tatra prati-saṃkramati ity āśayaḥ na vaitad pratibaddhama mit[2]y ava-dhārayitum atra dṛṣṭāntam āha pracchannarāgiṇī kāntapratibimbi-hasvandaram* (sic) *|| ......* (the text abruptly ends here). (TĀV 3.5–6ab, K$_{ED}$ vol. II, p. 6).
Notes	*Āhnika* 1 ends in image 19. *Āhnika* 2 ends in image 30.
Bibl.	Cat. BHU 1971: 746.

5. Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

*	missing *akṣara*
+	illegible *akṣara*
ABSP	Akhil Bharatiya Sanskrit Parishad, Lucknow
ac	*ante correctionem*
BHU	Sayaji Rao Gaekwad Central Library, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi
Bibl.	Bibliography
BORI	Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune
BPV	*Bimbapratibimbavāda* (sometimes mentioned as *Pratibimbavāda* [PBV])
Cat.	Catalogue
conj.	conjecture
D	Devanāgarī

em.	emendation
ĪPV	*Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī*
ĪPVV	*Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī*
KD	Kashmirian Devanāgarī
K$_{ED}$	Kashmir Edition (KSTS Edition)
KSSU	Kameshwar Singh Sanskrit University, Darbhanga, Bihar
KSTS	Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies
NMI	The National Museum of India, New Delhi
NSUBG	Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
NTU	*Netratantrodyota*
ORIML	Oriental Research Institute and Manuscripts Library, University of Kerala, Thiruvananantapuram
ORLS	Oriental Research Library, Government of Jammu & Kashmir, Srinagar
PBV	*Pratibimbavāda*
pc	*post correctionem*
Ph. d.	Physical description
PTV	*Parātriṃśikāvivaraṇa*
r	*recto*
RSRL	Sri Ranbir Sanskrit Research Library, Jammu
Ś	Śāradā
SBB	Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin
SOAS	School of Oriental and African Studies, London
SOI	Scindia Oriental Institute, Vikram University, Ujjain
SSV	Sampurnananda Sanskrit Visvavidyalaya, Varanasi
SvT	*Svacchandatantra*
SvTU	*Svacchandatantrodyota*
TĀ	*Tantrāloka*
TĀV	*Tantrālokaviveka*
TVDh	*Tantravaṭadhānikā*
v	*verso*

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Report 1877	Bühler, Georg (1877), *A Detailed Report on a Tour in Search of Sanskrit MSS made in Kaśmir, Rajputana and Central India*, Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Extra Number 34a, Bombay.
RSRI 1984	*Descriptive Catalogue Sanskrit of Manuscripts in the Shri Ranbir Sanskrit Research Institute*, Jammu (Kashmir), vol. 3 / compiled by M. M. Patkar in collaboration with the staff of the Shri Ranbir Sanskrit Research Institute, Jammu. 1984.
RTL 1894	Stein, Mark Aurel (1894), *Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Raghunath Temple Library of His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir*. Bombay: Nirnaya-Sagara Press; London: Luzac; Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz.
SMLS 1983	Deambi, B.K.K. (1983), *Hand-list of the Sanskrit manuscripts in the Sanskrit Manuscript Library*, Research and Publications Department, Hazratbal, Srinagar / editor: B.K.K. Deambi under the supervision of the Director, Centre of Central Asian Studies, University of Kashmir. Srinagar : Centre of Central Asian Studies, University of Kashmir.
SOAS 1978	Dogra, Ramesh Chander (1978). *Handlist of the manuscripts in South Asian languages in the Library,* Manuscripts in South Asian languages, The Library, School of Oriental and African Studies.
SORL 1989	Kaul, Śrīkaṇṭha and Yach, Dīnanāth (eds.), *A Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts*, The Research and Publication Department, Government of Jammu & Kashmir. (This hand-list was prepared by me accessing the information from the website of Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, New Delhi and since all the details of this hand-list are actually based on Cat. CSMS 1989 above, I have mentioned Śrīkaṇṭha Kaul and Dīnanāth Yach to be the editors.)
SSU 2000	*A Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts, Acquired for and Deposited in the Government Sanskrit College Library, Saraswatī Bhavana, Banaras during the years 1791–1950*, Volume VI, Part I, Tantra Manuscripts, 2000, Sampurnananda Sanskrit University, Varanasi.
NCC 1968	V. Raghavan (ed.), *New Catalogus Catalogorum. An Alphabetical Register of Sanskrit and Allied Works and Authors. Revised Edition (a). Vol. 1.* Madras: University of Madras 1968. Or. ed. 1949, with a preface by C. Kunhan Raja. A revised edition of that first volume of the NCC with an addition of more than 100 pages.

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© Image of Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi Ms No. C4779
Bimbapratibimbavāda (*Tantrālokaviveka* 3.1–23)

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Bimbapratibimbavāda (*Tantrālokaviveka* 3.1–22)

Appendix

1. Conspectus Siglorum of the Mss of the *Tantrālokaviveka*

	Place	My Sigla	Identifier	Extent	Script
1	Berlin	B_2	SBB 5557 Hs or 11171 SBB-PK	TĀV 1.1-1.127	Ś
2	Berlin	B_3	SBB 5682 Hs or 11296 SBB-PK	BPV 3.1-24 (TĀV)	Ś
3	Berlin	B_5	SBB 6052 Hs or 11666 SBB-PK	TĀV 1.2-4.276a	D
4	Berlin	B_6	SBB 6075 Hs or 11689 SBB-PK	TĀV 11.87-13.70	Ś
5	Berlin	B_7	SBB 6103 Hs or 11717 SBB-PK	TĀ 31.132-37[1]	Ś
6	Berlin	B_8	SBB 6388 Hs or 11980 SBB-PK	TĀV 1.1-8.67	Ś
7	Berlin	B_9	SBB 6833 Hs or 12434 SBB-PK	TĀV 1.1-11.80 & 21.42-26.42	Ś
8	Berlin	B_{11}	SBB 7040 Hs or 12641 SBB-PK	TĀ 3.66-4.278	Ś
9	Darbhanga	Db_1	KSSU 3033	TĀV 1.1-[?][2]	D
10	Delhi	D	NMI 80.1212	TĀV[3]	Ś
11	Göttingen	G	NSUBG COD MS SANSCR VISH 4	TĀV 1.1-6.12	Ś
12	Jammu	J_1	RSRL uncatalogued	BPV (TĀ 3.1-22)	Ś
13	Jammu	J_2	RSRL 623 - 20 ka 2	TĀV[4]	KD/D/Ś[5]

[1] The 34th *āhnika* is missing.

[2] Alexis Sanderson very kindly shared this Ms with me; at the time this article was in preparation he could not locate the files of other *āhnikas*. So I have had access only to the first complete *āhnika*.

[3] The present state that the Ms is in, it is difficult to carefully outline its contents.

[4] This composite MS contains 15.194–217b, 220c–225b, 339–343a; 10.19–31b; 55c–58b; 29.239c–241b, 243c–247, 241c–243b;3.66–294b;3.1–23 with *Viveka*; 3.24–65 without *Viveka*.

14	Jammu	J_3	RSRL 1466 ka (5913)	TĀV 1.1-11 & TĀ 12-37.85	KD
15	Jammu	J_4	RSRL 4908	TĀV 1.1-11.80	KD
16	London	L	SOAS 44256	TĀV 1.1-7.71	Ś
17	Lucknow	Lk_1	ABSP 126E (1537)	TĀV 5-11, 15, 21-26.42[6]	Ś
18	Lucknow	Lk_2	ABSP 127E (1644)	TĀV 1.1-3.186	Ś
19	Lucknow	Lk_3	ABSP 128E (4408)	TĀV 1.1-3.20	D
20	Pune	P_1	BORI 449 (1875-76)	TĀV 1.1-37.85[7]	Ś
21	Pune	P_2	BORI 450 (1875-76)	TĀV 1.1-10.308	KD
22	Pune	P_3	BORI 451 (1875-76)	TĀV 11-12 & TĀ 13-37[8]	KD
23	Pune	P_4	BORI 452 (1875-76)	TĀ 1.1-11.80	D
24	Pune	P_5	BORI 453 (1875-76)	TĀV 1.1-1.201, 3.201-6.205	D
25	Pune	P_6	BORI 469 (1875-76)	BPV 3.1-22 (TĀV)	Ś
26	Srinagar	K_1	ORLS 969-2	BPV 3.8-23 (TĀ)	Ś
27	Srinagar	K_2	ORLS 1012	TĀV 1-5, 6 (beginning)	Ś
28	Srinagar	K_3	ORLS 1054.03	TĀ 1.1-37.85	Ś
29	Srinagar	K_4	ORLS 1352	TĀV 1.1-10, 11 & 21.42-26.42	Ś

[5] Since this is a composite Ms containing many other works, some parts are written in Śaradā, others in Devanāgarī and yet others in Kashmirian Devanāgarī.

[6] The 11th, 15th and the last *āhnikas* are incomplete.
[7] The 2nd *āhnika* is completely missing.
[8] The 34th *āhnika* is completely missing.

30	Srinagar	K$_6$	ORLS 1716	TĀV 1.1-11.80	Ś
31	Srinagar	K$_7$	ORLS 1792	TĀV 9.1-37.85	Ś
32	Srinagar	K$_9$	ORLS 2081	TĀV 1.1-2.50	Ś
33	Srinagar	K$_{10}$	ORLS 2201.01	TĀV 1-4, TĀ 13-37.55	Ś
34	Srinagar	K$_{11}$	ORLS 2404-1	TĀV[9]	Ś
35	Srinagar	K$_{12}$	ORLS 2404-2	TĀV 1.1-4.29[10]	Ś
36	Srinagar	K$_{14}$	ORLS 2550	TĀV 1.1-3.158	Ś
37	Trivandrum	T	ORIML 22.5442	TĀ 1.322-7.71	M
38	Ujjain	U	SOI 323 (Acc No: 4681)	TĀV 1.1-11.24	Ś
39	Varanasi	S$_1$	SSV 26692-3044	TĀV 9.260-13.81, 21.43 to 26.42[11]	D
40	Varanasi	S$_2$	SSV 82735 (4/151)	TĀV 1.1-11.81, 21-26.42	Ś
41	Varanasi	V$_1$	BHU C139	TĀV 1.1-1.40	Ś
42	Varanasi	V$_2$	BHU C1114	TĀV 3.34ab-3.270	Ś
43	Varanasi	V$_3$	BHU C1150	TĀV 3.113-6.20	Ś
44	Varanasi	V$_4$	BHU C1198	BPV 3.1-23 (TĀV)	Ś
45	Varanasi	V$_5$	BHU C4138	TĀV 1.1-1.140	Ś
46	Varanasi	V$_6$	BHU C4779	BPV 3.1-23 (TĀV)	Ś
47	Varanasi	V$_7$	BHU C5019	TĀV 1.204-3.6ab	D

[9] TĀV 4.29 to 5.71; 10.32 to 11.80cd; 21.42 to 26.42; 27 and 28 missing; TĀ 29.1 to 35.6ab, 34 (missing); Also contains additional TĀ 20 to 37 (without *Viveka*).

[10] Parts of 3rd and 4th *āhnikas* are missing. ORLS 2404-1 and ORLS 2404-2 is a single codex.

[11] Also has 31.132–137.83b (in-between parts of text missing).

2. The Mss of the *Tantrālokaviveka* or the *Bimbapratibimbavāda* not located or not studied

1	Berlin	B[1]	SBB 4542.20 Cod.Ms.Sanscr.Schr. 200 SuUB Göttingen	- - -	D
2	Berlin	B[4]	SBB 6019.12 HS or 11633 SBB-PK	- - -	Ś
3	Berlin	B[10]	SBB 6908.4 Hs or	- - -	- - -
4	Darbhanga	Db[2]	KSSU Raj No. 259(3) Serial No. 2823[12]	TĀ	D
5	Darbhanga	Db[3]	KSSU Raj No. 162(1) Serial No. 2824	TĀV	D
6	Darbhanga	Db[4]	KSSU Raj No. 171(1) Serial No. 2825	TĀV	D
7	Srinagar	K[5]	ORL 1563.8[13]	- - -	Ś
8	Srinagar	K[8]	ORL 2080.38[14]	- - -	- - -
9	Srinagar	K[13]	ORL 2539.14[15]	BPV	Ś
10	Srinagar	K[15]	ORL 1586.31[16]	BPV	Ś
11	Srinagar	K[16]	ORL 1586.31[17]	BPV	Ś

[12] All three Darbhanga Mss are listed in Cat. KSSU 1969, p. 113; (No. 259(3) has 292 folia; Raj No. 162(1) has 528 folia (folia 1, 291–482 missing); Raj No. 171(1) has 325 folia).

[13] Listed under serial No. 1847.2 mentioned on page 386 of Cat. ORLS 2011.

[14] Listed in Cat. SORL 1989.

[15] Listed in p. 45 of Cat. SORL 1989.

[16] Listed under serial No. 793 with the title *Bimba(pratibimba)-stotra* (?) (2 folia) in Cat. SMLS 1983.

[17] Listed under serial No. 794 with the title *Bimbapratibimba-vāda* (2 folia) in Cat. SMLS 1983.

12	Srinagar	$K_{[17]}$	ORL 1192.06[18]	BPV	Ś
13	Srinagar	$K_{[18]}$	ORL 1740.12[19]	BPV	Ś
14	Srinagar	$K_{[19]}$	ORL 1934.6[20]	BPV	Ś

[18] Listed under serial No. 795 with the title *Bimbapratibimba-vāda* (9 folia) in Cat. SMLS 1983.

[19] Listed under serial No. 797 with the title *Bimbapratibimbavāda* (3 folia) in Cat. SMLS 1983.

[20] Listed under serial No. 2003.2 on page 396 of Cat. ORLS 2011 with the title *Bimbapratibimbavāda*. There it is mentioned to be written on paper in Śāradā script having 6 folia with the dimensions 18.5*16.2. In Cat. SMLS 1983 this title is listed under serial No. 798.

A Report on the Newly Found Manuscript of the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti[1]

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1. Introduction

As Ratié (2017, 2018) reported, we discovered the longest fragment of the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti* (hereafter *Vivṛti*), namely the *Vivṛti* relative to ĪPK 1.8.10–2.3.8. This fragment survived in the margin of the following manuscripts:

◊   J11: *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī*, Jammu: Sri Ranbir Sanskrit Research Institute, Raghunath Mandir, No. 5077 [paper, Nāgarī script, complete].

◊   S12: *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī*, Srinagar: Oriental Research Library, No. 2403 [paper, Śāradā script, complete].

As Ratié (2021: 47–49) observed, J11, in Nāgarī, seems a transcript of S12, in Śāradā, because these two manuscripts share not only some lacunae and scribal errors but also the *Vivṛti* fragments, especially the long fragment mentioned above; and J11 does not contain any *Vivṛti* fragments that are not found in S12. However, there are also some reasons to go against the hypothesis that the marginal annotations in J11 were directly copied from S12. In particular, it is difficult to explain why J11 stopped in the midst of the *Vivṛti ad* ĪPK 2.1.3–4, in spite of the fact that the passage missing in J11 is readable in S12. It is also possible that the manuscript copied by the scribe of J11 was not S12, but some other witness.

In the following, I would like to report about a newly found manuscript of the *Vivṛti*, which may be one of the manuscripts sources used by the scribe of J11.

2. The discovery of the Vivṛti manuscript in Ujjain

After Torella's discovery of a manuscript of the *Vivṛti*,[2] we have not found any other manuscripts of the *Vivṛti*, but gathered some fragments only in the margin of manuscripts of Pratyabhijñā works.[3] Thanks to Chetan Pandey, a huge number of Kashmiri manuscripts have been digitized. These include not only manuscripts preserved in the libraries or institutes that scholars have not examined yet, but also others misplaced or uncatalogued in the libraries and so on. His effort allowed us to discover the *Vivṛti* fragments in the margin of the manuscripts S12 and J11. In addition, scholars have continued to look for manuscripts of the *Vivṛti*, so far without success. This reminds us that almost all the manuscripts of the *Vivṛti* were lost, and the *Vivṛti* was transmitted only in the margin of manuscripts, or in the memory of pandits.

However, I have recently discovered a bundle that contains a manuscript of the *Vivṛti*. It is preserved in the Scindia Oriental Research Institute, Ujjain:[4]

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[2] See Torella 1988, 2007a, etc.

[3] See Ratié 2016a, 2016b, etc. and Kawajiri 2016a, etc.

[4] When I consulted this manuscript in 2016, I could not identify the second part as the *Vivṛti*. Later, the discovery of the long *Vivṛti* fragment in S12 and J11 allowed me to confirm the identification.

U   Ujjain: Scindia Oriental Research Institute, No. 4591, '*Pra-tyabhijñāvṛtti*' (erroneously ascribed to Abhinavagupta, according to the library catalogue). Paper, Śāradā script. 52 folios. The written lines run parallel to the wider side of the folios.

In fact, this is a composite manuscript containing two works: Utpaladeva's ĪPK with his own *Vṛtti* in the first part (fols. 1–8), and the *Vivṛti* in the second part (fols. 10–49). This witness bears the text of the *Vivṛti* not in the margin of the manuscript, but as the main text. It has no colophon.

3. The contents of the manuscript
3.1 The first part: ĪPK and ĪPKV

The first part (fols. 1–8) contains the text of ĪPK 1.1.1–1.8.6 together with the *Vṛtti*. However, the text of ĪPK 1.5.2–1.5.10 is missing in the first part, since fol. 4v ends with the beginning of ĪPK 1.5.2, and fol. 5r begins in the midst of ĪPK 1.5.10.[5] Some of the edges are damaged and repaired with different bits of paper. In the top margin and the bottom margin of fol. 1r, a later hand records the title *pratyabhijñāvṛttiḥ* in Nāgarī in blue ink, and the manuscript number 4591, respectively (see fig. 1).

Among the eight folios of the first part, fol. 1r is distinguished from the others (fols. 1v–8v) because its hand is different. Fol. 1v is pasted on the reverse side of fol. 1r. It is very likely that both the reverse side of fol. 1r and that of the pasted fol. 1v were originally blank because no text can be seen through underneath. Moreover, the paper of 1r is different from that of 1v–8v. In the top margin of fol. 1r, the following is written: *śrī gaṇeśāya namaḥ ||*. This suggests the beginning of the manuscript. The main text starts with the following words, before the initial verse of the ĪPK: *oṃ namaḥ sarasvatyai || oṃ namaḥ śivāya ||*.

On fol. 1r, the text of the *Vṛtti* is written in smaller character, while, in fols. 1v–8v, the text of the ĪPK and the *Vṛtti* are not differ-

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[5] See U fol. 4v: [...] *eva satāṃ yuktaḥ* 32 *prāg i,* and U fol. 5r: +*sanam | asty eva na vinā tasmād icchāmarśaḥ pravartate ||* 41 [...]. Cf. ĪPK 1.5.2: *prāg ivārtho 'prakāśaḥ syāt prakāśātmatayā vinā | na ca prakāśo bhinnaḥ syād ātmārthasya prakāśatā ||,* and ĪPK 1.5.10: *svāminaś cātmasaṃsthasya bhāvajātasya bhāsanam | asty eva na vinā tasmād icchāmarśaḥ pravartate ||.*

entiated. In addition, the last sentence on fol. 1r is not complete and ends in the middle of the last line as follows (see fig. 1): ??+++?? *tatrāpi* {??????} *pratyakṣāj jñānam ātmasaṃve*. Its continuation is found on the first line of fol. 1v (see fig. 2). It reads: *dyaṃ {ta}∨<para>trāpi kriyayaiva prasidhyatīti* […][6] This means that the first part of this bundle (fols. 1–8) is made of two different manuscripts: fol. 1r, in particular, was taken from another manuscript in order to supply the initial part of the ĪPK, which is not found in fols. 1v–8v.

It is also to be noted that fol. 8v is different from others, although fols. 1v–8r and fol. 8v are probably by the same hand (see fig. 3). Fol. 8v has 15 lines and about 70 characters per line, while fols. 1v–8r have on average 11 lines per page and 37 characters per line. It is not clear why the scribe wrote the text in smaller characters on fol. 8v. At the end of fol. 8v, the manuscript reads: […] *kāryakāraṇādibhedāśrayā nārthakriyā | pramā*++. This is the midst of the *Vṛtti ad* ĪPK 1.8.6.[7]

3.2 *The second part: the Vivṛti*

The second part (fols. 10–49) contains the text of the *Vivṛti ad* ĪPK 2.2.1–2.3.8. It has on average 11 lines per page and 40 characters per line. It should be noted that fol. 49 was wrongly inserted between fol. 8 and fol. 10, as if it were fol. 9. In other words, fol. 9 is missing.

The text breaks off at precisely the same point as it does in S12 and J11.[8] On fol. 49v, the manuscript ends as follows: […] *sarvajñānaviṣayonmukhatvena svātmani ||*.

The *Vivṛti* fragments are interspersed with the text of the ĪPK with the *Vṛtti*. On fol. 10r, the text of the *Vivṛti* begins as follows (see fig. 4): *sya kāraṇatvaṃ na sidhyatīty ucyeta | kṣaṇabhaṅge* […] This is the midst of the *Vivṛti ad* ĪPK 2.2.1.

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[6] See ĪPKV 1.1.5: *jīvatāṃ kriyā kāyaparispandaparyantībhūtāny atrāpi pratyakṣā, jñānam ātmavedyaṃ paratrāpi kriyayaiva prasidhyatīti* […]. In U, the text of the *Vṛtti ad* ĪPK 1.1.5 starts with the expression *tatrāpi pratyakṣāj jñānam*. For detailed information on this sentence, see Torella 2002: 4, n. 35.

[7] See ĪPKV 1.8.6: […] *antaś ca sarveṣām eva nīlasukhādyābhāsānāṃ sadā sattve 'pi pramātṛmātrarūpatvāt kāryakāraṇādibhedāśrayā nārthakriyā, pramātur bhede 'pi bauddhacākṣuṣatvādibhedenābhāsabhedād ābhāsāśritārthakāritāpi bhidyate rūpādīnām ||*.

[8] J11 fol. 242r, S12 fol. 240v: […] *sarvajñānaviṣayonmukhatvena svātmani ||*.

There are a few corrections and annotations in the margin. For example, in the bottom margin of fol. 34r, a few sentences skipped in the main text are added.[9] It is worth noting that, in the top margin of fol. 34v, the expression *ito 'nantaraṃ ṭīkā* is found. These annotations are probably made by a different hand, because the Śāradā handwriting, for example, of the letters *na* and *va*, in the margin is different from that in the main text. If this is right, this part may have been written by another scribe who knew the *Vivṛti.*

While the text of the *Vivṛti* ends at the same point, namely the *Vivṛti ad* ĪPK 2.3.8, as in S12 and J11, it does not begin at the same point. On fol. 10r, the text of the *Vivṛti* contained in this bundle starts in the midst of the *Vivṛti ad* ĪPK 2.2.1, as shown above.[10] The important point to notice is that, on the top margin of the fol. 10r, there is an expression *oṃ namaś śambhave* by the same hand as the main text. This implies that the scribe of the part of the *Vivṛti* probably considers fol. 10 as the first folio. However, as I will observe in the following, this entire bundle contains a few folios containing the *Vivṛti* pertaining to ĪPK 1.8.10–2.1.3. It appears that the scribe did not know the whole text of the *Vivṛti* contained in this bundle.

3.3 Foliation

The folios of the entire bundle are numbered continuously in the left-hand margin of the verso of each folio, though some of edges are damaged. But it does not mean that the person who put together this manuscript gave folio numbers on each folio. Two manuscripts that form the bundle had in fact been numbered separately.

In this connection, it is noteworthy that, with reference to the part of the ĪPK with the *Vṛtti*, the folio numbers 2–3, 5, and 8, without abbreviated titles, are given on the paper used to repair the edges of the manuscripts, while the folio numbers 1, 4, 6 and 7, followed by the abbreviated titles, are written on the same paper as the main text.[11] This suggests that the person who assembled the

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[9] The text of the *Vṛtti ad* ĪPK 2.3.4–5, lost in the main text, is supplied there.
[10] U fol. 10r: *sya kāraṇatvaṃ na sidhyatīty ucyeta | kṣaṇabhaṅge* […].
[11] On fol. 6, the folio number 7 is deleted and corrected to 6, followed by the

bundle did not notice the absence of a folio covering ĪPK 1.5.2–1.5.10. Had there been a folio between fol. 4 and fol. 5, it would have covered that section.

Regarding the part that contains the *Vivṛti*, the folio numbers are given, but the abbreviations are not found. The *Vivṛti* begins on fol. 10r. The last folio number I can read is 47, but there are two more folios to be regarded as fol. 48 and fol. 49.[12] As stated above, fol. 49 was wrongly inserted between fol. 8 and fol. 10.

3.4 Additional folios

We have seen that there are 8 folios for the ĪPK with the *Vṛtti*, and 40 folios for the *Vivṛti*. There are four more folios to be examined. Three of them (hereafter fol. extra 1–3),[13] containing the text of the *Vivṛti*, are added to the end of this bundle, and one of them (hereafter fol. extra 4), containing the ĪPK with the *Vṛtti*, is inserted after the folio numbered 47.

3.4.1 Additional folios: Vivṛti

As for the last three folios at the end of this bundle, it is likely that they were originally part of the *Vivṛti* manuscript, because they are written on the same sort of paper and by the same hand as the *Vivṛti* portion.

They contain the *Vivṛti ad* ĪPK 1.8.10–2.1.3. The text contained in these three folios begins at the same point as in S12 and J11. The important point to note is that there U indicates the lacunae in the scribe's exemplar (see fig. 5).[14] On fol. extra 1r, the manuscript reads: +++++ *prakāśate tata eva sad iti kathā++d arthatālakṣaṇa*

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abbreviations *pra* and *vṛ*. Interestingly, on fols. 1, 4, and 7, the abbreviations *pratya* and *vṛ* are given.

[12] With reference to fol. 48, I could read the folio number 8 without 4.

[13] Note that the three additional folios were not in order when I photographed the manuscript in 2016. With the help of S12 and J11, I rearranged them here.

[14] Both J11 and S12 do not indicate the lacunae, but Ratié (2017: 177, n. 62) conjectures that the beginning of the sentence is missing. U confirms her conjecture. See J11 fol. 202v, S12 fol. 201v: *prakāśate tata eva sad iti kathā++++d arthatālakṣaṇa...*, and U fol. extra 1r: +++++ *prakāśate tata eva sad iti kathā++d arthatālakṣaṇa* […].

[…]. At the end of the three extra folios, one reads as follow (see fig. 6): U fol. extra 3v: …*upādhibhūtasyānubhavaḥ* |. The text of the *Vivṛti* in the three extra folios breaks off at exactly the same point as the *Vivṛti ad* ĪPK 2.1.3 in J11 (see fig. 7).[15]

The edges of the three extra folios are damaged, but fol. extra 3 is numbered 3 without the abbreviated titles in the left-hand margin (see fig. 6). We could regard f. extra 1 as the first folio of the manuscript of the *Vivṛti*, even though, on fol. extra 1r, there is no sign of the beginning of the manuscript. Judging from the format of this *Vivṛti* manuscript, with 11 lines per page and 40 characters per line, and the text of the *Vivṛti* preserved in S12, we can suppose that there were approximately 5 folios bearing the *Vivṛti ad* ĪPK 2.1.3–2.2.1. In fact, 6 folios to be numbered 4–9 are missing. These missing folios might have contained the lost parts, in S12 and J11, of the *Vivṛti ad* ĪPK 2.1.5–7.

At any rate, it is very likely that this manuscript of the *Vivṛti* originally contained the text of the *Vivṛti ad* ĪPK 1.8.10–2.3.8, like S12 and J11.

3.4.2 Additional folios: ĪPK and ĪPKV

Fol. extra 4 is wrongly inserted after the folio numbered 47. It is numbered 4 in the left-hand margin, even though there is a folio numbered 4 in the part of the ĪPK with the *Vṛtti*. The paper used for fol. extra 4 is evidently different from that for fols. 1v–8v. In addition, on fol. extra 4v, the folio number 4 is followed by the abbreviations *pra* and *vṛ*, while, on fol. 4v, the folio number 4 is accompanied by the abbreviations *pratya* and *vṛ*. Thus, it is clear that fol. extra 4 is not part of the manuscript that contains fols. 1v–8v.

It may appear to be part of the manuscript which contains fol. 1r, because it seems by the same hand. However, this is unlikely, for, it has 15 lines per folio, whereas fol. 1r has 11 lines. Moreover, in the top margin of fol. extra 4v, a later hand records, in blue ink, the title *pratyabhijñāvṛttiḥ* in Nāgarī (see fig. 8).

This folio starts in the midst of ĪPK 1.4.2 and ends in the midst of ĪPKV 1.5.8.[16] It is not certain that the person who assembled the

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[15] See J11 fol. 205r, bottom margin: [...] *upādhibhūtasyānubhavaḥ* ||.
[16] U fols. extra 4r–4v: *ṇāthākhilātmanā* || 25 || *smṛtiśaktyā* ……|| 39 || *pūrvāvabhāsāntaḥsthita evā*.

bundle intended to supply the missing part, namely ĪPK 1.5.2–10, in the first part of this bundle. This folio suggests that this bundle was made of three or four different manuscripts.

4. *The relationship of U with S12 and J11*

It is obvious that the *Vivṛti* in U is closely related with S12 and J11. As we have seen, the text of the *Vivṛti* in U corresponds to that on ĪPK 1.8.10–2.3.8 in S12 and J11. All of them share some lacunae, and they do not include a portion of the *Vivṛti ad* ĪPK 2.2.6. In addition, it should be noted that the scribes record, at the place where the text of the *Vivṛti ad* ĪPK 2.2.6 breaks off, that a folio is missing.[17] This suggests that, in front of the scribes of S12 and J11 as well as the *Vivṛti* in U, there was a manuscript in which the text of the *Vivṛti* was written as the main text, not in the margin.

Compared with S12, U and J11 both lack the *Vivṛti ad* ĪPK 2.1.3–4.[18] As mentioned above, at the place where the *Vivṛti ad* ĪPK 2.1.3 in J11 breaks off, the text of the *Vivṛti* in the extra folios of U does. Given that this correspondence is not an accidental result, it is possible that J11 skipped just one folio when it copied the *Vivṛti* from U whose folios had not been lost yet. This is a mere conjecture, but it is interesting to note that the *Vivṛti ad* ĪPK 2.1.3–4, which is lost in J11, is approximately equivalent in length to that to be contained in each folio of the *Vivṛti* in U. It is also possible that one folio which covers the *Vivṛti* lost in J11 was missing from the manuscript before the scribe of J11.

It may be thought that the *Vivṛti* in U was extracted from the annotations in S12, for, as far as I can tell, the text is identical with the one found in S12. However, this is unlikely for the following reasons. First, as we have seen, U alone indicates lacunae in the scribe's exemplar at the beginning of the *Vivṛti ad* ĪPK 1.8.10. Second, at the place where the text of the *Vivṛti ad* ĪPK 2.2.6 breaks off, U indicates a missing folio with the expression *itaḥ patram patitam*, whereas S12 and J11 read *ekaṃ patraṃ patitam* (see

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[17] See J11 fol. 220v, left bottom margin, and S12 fol. 218r, top margin: *ekaṃ patram patitam* ||; U fol. 20v: *itaḥ patraṃ patitam* ||.

[18] For the text of the *Vivṛti* on it, see Ratié 2021: 351–353.

figs. 9a, 9b, 9c).[19] Third, U has a reading it does not share with S12:

> U fol. 34r, l. 10: [...] *sa*∨*<na> ca | kāñcana iti | ghaṭābhāsaś caitra iti ca | bālyādi* [...]
> S12 fol. 232r, right margin: [...] *na ca | kāñcana iti | ghaṭābhāsaś caitra iti ca bālyādi* [...]

These words are from the *Vṛtti ad* ĪPK 2.3.4–5. S12 reads *na ca*, whereas U originally read *sa ca*, but the word *na* instead of *sa* in *sa ca* is written above the line by a later hand (see figs. 10a, 10b).[20]

Finally, in U the punctuation of the *Vivṛti ad* ĪPK 2.3.8 is different from that in S12. U and S12 read (see figs. 11a, 11b, 11c, 11d):

> U fol. 49v, ll. 4–5: [...] *svāpādyabhāve pi prājña*(49v/5)*syāpi* ∧</> *pratipatter* ∧<|> *ekendriyaviṣaye pi hy arthe* [...]
> S12 fol. 241r, bottom margin: [...] *svāpādyabhāve pi prājñasyāpi | pratipatteḥ* {*ekendri*}
> S12 fol. 241v, top margin: *ekendriyaviṣaye pi hy arthe* [...]

S12 stops the sentence after *pratipatteḥ* by deleting the beginning of the next sentence.[21] On the other hand, U continues the sentence. In U, a single *daṇḍa* is inserted below the line, but probably by a later hand. Accordingly, it is improbable that the *Vivṛti* in U was copied from the annotations in S12.

5. Concluding remarks

The bundle preserved in Ujjain is made of more than three different manuscripts and contains a manuscript of the *Vivṛti*. It is very likely that the manuscript of the *Vivṛti* contained in it originally had the text of the commentary on ĪPK 1.8.10–2.3.8, just like S12 and J11. In it, some folios are missing. Though the *Vivṛti* in U is

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[19] See J11 fol. 220v, left bottom margin, and S12 fol. 218r, top margin: *ekaṃ patram patitam* ||; U fol. 20v: *itaḥ patraṃ patitaṃ* ||.

[20] See also J11 fol. 233v, left margin: ... *na ca | kāñcana iti | ghaṭābhāsaś caitra iti ca vālyādis* [...].

[21] J11 accords with S12. See J11 fol. 242r, right upper margin: [...] *svāpādya-bhāve pi prājñasyāpi | pratipatteḥ* || {*ekendri*}, and J11 fol. 242r, right lower margin: *ekendriyaviṣaye pi hy arthe* | [...].

closely related with S12 and J11, it was not extracted from the annotations in S12. It is also possible that it is one of the sources which the scribe of J11 consulted, with reference to the *Vivṛti ad* ĪPK 1.8.10–2.3.8.

Unfortunately, the newly-found manuscript in Ujjain does not provide new fragments of the *Vivṛti*, but it suggests that some *Vivṛti* manuscripts have certainly survived. The *Vivṛti* was transmitted not only in the margin of the manuscripts, or the memory of pandits, but also in the form of an independent manuscript.

Conventions

?	illegible *akṣara*(s) or part of an *akṣara* due, e.g., to blurring
+	lacunae in the manuscript
<>	contain added *akṣara*(s) in the manuscript (the position is indicated in the margin)
[]	contain unclear *akṣara*(s) or part of an *akṣara* that is unclear due, e.g., to blurring
{}	contain *akṣara*(s) deleted in the manuscript
∨	sign of insertion added above the line
∧	sign of insertion added below the line

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ĪPK   See Torella 2002.

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ĪPKV   See Torella 2002.

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ĪPV   *The Īśvarapratyabhijñā of Utpaladeva, with Commentary by Abhinavagupta.* Ed. Mukunda Rām Shastri. 2 vols. Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies 22, 33, Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1918, 1921.

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S12   Srinagar: Oriental Research Library, No. 2403 [paper, Śāradā script].

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Figure 1: U fol. 1r

Figure 2: U fol. 1v

Figure 3: U fol. 8v

Figure 4: U fol. 10r

Figure 5: U fol. extra 1v

Figure 6: U fol. extra 3v (detail of margin)

Figure 7: J11 fol. 205r (detail of margin)

Figure 8: U fol. extra 4v

Figure 9a: U fol. 20v (detail)

Figure 9b: S12 fol. 218r, top margin (detail of margin)

Figure 9c: J11 fol. 220v, left margin (detail of margin)

Figure 10a: U fol. 34r (detail)

Figure 10b: S12 fol. 232r, right margin (detail of margin)

Figure 11a: U fol. 49v, l.4 (detail)

Figure 11b: U. fol. 49v, l.5 (detail)

Figure 11c: S12 fol. 241r, bottom margin (detail of margin)

Figure 11d: S12 fol. 241v, top margin (detail of margin)

A Phenomenology of Dreams in Theravāda Buddhism: An Annotated Translation of the Tenth Chapter of the Sārasaṅgaha by Siddhattha Thera

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1. Introduction[1]

My intent in writing this article is to pay tribute to Professor Raffaele Torella, who was my Sanskrit teacher at La Sapienza, University of Rome. It is also fitting that I undertook my PhD on the *Sārasaṅgaha* under Prof. Torella's supervision. One of his habits, very instructive for his students, is the pleasure he takes in telling anecdotes, which exhibited his original and courageous point of view, from which I learned a lot. Moreover, as is the case for those who know him, Prof. Torella is first of all a great humanist and, in addition to Indian culture and his grammatical and philosophical interests, he has never neglected his love for art. One day, we took the subway together, and knowing that I would soon go to a conference in Krakow, he started to explain to me what artwork I could see there. In particular he told me about the

new interpretation of a painting by Dosso Dossi in the Warsaw castle: 'Jupiter painter of butterflies.' This allegorical picture shows Jupiter painting some butterflies and Mercury signalling to Virtue not to disturb Jupiter. The new interpretation suggests that Jupiter in his creative act of painting was dreaming, and a new allegorical character is found: Aurora.[2] The canvas thus representing a defence of the dream sphere. We spoke about the importance of this dimension, which is in keeping with Prof. Torella's fascination with the dreamlike dimension. So, for this reason and for the universal importance of this theme, here I present an annotated translation and improved edition of the tenth chapter of the *Sārasaṅgaha* (Ss), which deals with the topic of dreams.

2. *The explanation of dreams in the Sārasaṅgaha*

Why do we dream? Where do dreams come from? When does a dream occur? Can dreams have moral consequences? These questions received considerable attention in many religious traditions and in general in the history of the humanity long before Sigmund Freud and his study on the interpretation of dreams. Dreams have always been felt to be a mirror of reality, an indecipherable code that refers to an 'other' dimension. However, for the Theravāda Buddhist tradition there is a lack of satisfactory secondary literature concerning the analysis of dreams,[3] despite there being much material dealing with this topic in canonical literature[4] and the Tenth chapter of the *Sārasaṅgaha* presented here being but one of them.

[2] As discussed by Paoli 2013.

[3] Aung and Rhys David (1910: 46–53) made an interesting summary of the discussion on dreams in the Theravāda tradition, which also quotes the Ss (see p. 48 n. 1). A brief paper that concentrates on the analysis of dreams in Theravāda Buddhism is Ramaiah and Rao 1988, but several other articles study different aspect of dreams, as for example Agostini 2009, which attempts to make a taxonomy of dreams presented in early Buddhism and compare it with Herofilus's dream theory, and Tan 2016, who undertakes a comparison of the unconscious as understood by Freud and early Buddhism. More frequently, this topic forms part of a larger discussion of the interpretation of dreams in Buddhism in general, a recent example being Young 1999.

[4] In the Pali Canon many references to dreams are connected with mindfulness. For example, in A III 251,11–23 it is said that the one who falls asleep with mindfulness (*sati*) and clear comprehension (*sampajāna*) has some benefits,

The *Sārasaṅgaha,* or 'Compendium of the Essence,' is a 12th to 13th-c. Sinhalese Pali text composed of forty chapters[5] that deals with several topics. The subjects covered in the *Sārasaṅgaha* are those that play a prominent role in early Buddhist literature, such as meditative practices, the aspiration to become a Buddha, explanations of *nibbāna,* and so on. Ample space is also given to less common subjects, such as atmospheric phenomena, a theory on foods, sexual gender, etc. The peculiarity of this text is that it is made up almost entirely of passages collected from other texts, directly reused or paraphrased, with their sources only occasionally identified.[6]

In this chapter on dreams, which is preceded by a brief chapter concerning sleep, Siddhattha Thera, the author of the text, offers several explanations about dreams primarily drawn from commentarial and sub-commentarial texts: the *Sammohavinodanī* (Vibh-a, the commentary on the *Vibhaṅga* of the *Abhidhammapiṭaka*), the *Manorathapūraṇī* (Mp, the commentary on the *Aṅguttaranikāya* and its *ṭīkā* (Mp-ṭ), the *Samantapāsādikā* (Sp, the com-

including not having bad dreams (*na pāpakaṃ supinaṃ passati*), a benefit that also belongs to one who possesses loving-kindness (the same formula occurs in Vin I 295, V 205; cf. A IV 150, V 342). Another central theme is the moral dimension of dreams. In the *Vinaya* (III 111), for example, the Buddha formulates the rule that the intentional emission of semen, except during a dream, is an offence requiring a formal meeting of the community of monks (*sañcetanikā sukkavissaṭṭhi aññatra supinantā saṅghādiseso;* cf. also Vin I 294). The *Milindapañha* (298–301) underlines another essential aspect of the Buddhist view, namely, the fact that there is no soul that is able to leave the body during dreaming. Nāgasena, the monk who is questioned by King Milinda in this text, states that it is the images that reach the mind in dreaming, not a mind-soul that goes out, and that images are part of the prophetic or premonitory dreams (*pubbanimitta*). The *Milindapañha* discusses the nature of premonitory dreams in detail, an aspect that is also dealt with in the Pali Canon, such as the five premonitory dreams that the Bodhisatta had before he became the Buddha through awakening, or when the Buddha's mother, queen Māyā, dreams of a white elephant entering her right side, which symbolizes the conception of the *bodhisatta.* Both these important passages are quoted in the chapter translated here. Interestingly, the interpretation of dreams is considered to be a wrong form of livelihood according to D I 9.

[5] Here I conventionally use the term 'chapter' to refer to the division found in the critical edition, but a more appropriate term might be 'section' or 'portion of the text.' In some cases the text was divided into thirty-nine 'chapters' (see Neri 2015: 338 n. 11).

[6] For more information on the *Sārasaṅgaha,* see Neri 2015, and for a discussion of the texts quoted by it, see pp. 339–344.

mentary on the *Vinayapiṭaka*) and its *ṭīkā* (Sp-ṭ), as well as the *Aṅguttaranikāya* (A) and the *Milindapañha* (Mil).

For the sake of clarity, I have divided the translation of this chapter into paragraphs. A summary of the chapter is as follows: wakefulness and dreaming are the result of a mental process belonging to the mind-door (*manodvārika*), independent of the other senses (§ 1). There are four causes of dreams: agitation of elements (*dhātukkhobha*), a previous experience (*anubhūtapubba*), the disposition of the gods (*devatopasaṃhāra*), and a premonition (*pubbanimitta*), and these causes produce different dreams that have a different degree of reality (§§ 2.1, 2.2 and 6) and can condition much of our life. Only *arahat*s and Buddhas are free from this derangement present in the dream (§ 2.2). It is possible to identify the phase in which we dream, in the so-called 'drowsiness of the monkey' (*kapimiddha*) (§ 3.2), in which the sleep is easily interrupted, and it is easy to emerge from the mental continuum (*bhavaṅga*), a state in which there are no dreams (§ 3.1). An important part of the chapter seems to be a moral analysis of the nature of dreaming and its effects. In fact, an action accomplished in a dream can produce a result (*vipāka*), either wholesome (*kusala*), unwholesome (*akusala*), or indeterminate (*avyākata*). However, although dreams produce a result, it is ineffective (*abbohārika*), because the intention present within the dream is very weak (§ 4). The chapter concludes with a description of the symbols and meanings of the premonitory dreams that occurred to the Buddha before his awakening (§ 7).

In short, this chapter collects the salient material that the author believed was necessary to understand dreams, making this text a manual or a brief guide to the analysis of how Theravāda Buddhism represents the phenomenology of dreams. This is the character of the *Sārasaṅgaha* as a whole.

The edition of the Pali text of the tenth chapter of the *Sārasaṅgaha* presented here is based on the PTS edition by Sasaki 1992 (Ee). However, since Sasaki's edition contains quite a few errors and records very few variant readings, I improved the Pali text through several means. First, I used two Sinhalese manuscripts housed in the Colombo National Museum, Sri Lanka, and the Sinhalese script edition of the *Sārasaṅgaha* by Y. Somananda (Colombo,

Vidyasagara Press, 1898). The Colombo National Museum manuscripts are (1) 89 A25; no date; folio *gṛ* verso line 3 to folio *gḹ* recto line 3; designated C¹ in the current edition; and (2) Q11; no date; folio *gi* verso line 2 to folio *gu* verso line 8; designated C² in the current edition. Somananda's edition is designated Ce. Second, I relied on the readings of the European PTS (Ee) and Burmese Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyana electronic (Be^VRI) editions of the texts quoted by Siddhattha in this chapter of the *Sārasaṅgaha*. Whenever the present edition differs from Sasaki's. there are notes indicating the changes. Many quotes that were not recognized by Sasaki have been identified.

In the Pali edition, the passages from other texts quoted in the *Sārasaṅgaha* are bracketed by quotation marks at the beginning and end of the quote, with the references presented in a footnote marked at the end of the quote. Minor variations of *sandhi* and orthography have been excluded from the critical apparatus. The original page numbers of the Sasaki edition are presented in square brackets [000], while the section numbers adopted in the translation are presented in curly brackets {000} to facilitate a comparison of the translation with the Pali text.

The translation is accompanied by explanatory notes and references to the readings followed in the translation. Here texts being quoted are indicated in square brackets before the quoted passage. The references are to the European editions (Ee), unless the only editions available are the Asian editions. References to the other editions consulted are listed in the edition of the Pali text. Finally, I have benefited from Ñāṇamoli's (1996) translation of the *Sammohavinodanī*, the commentary on the *Vibhaṅga*, which the *Sārasaṅgaha* frequently quotes.

[78] 10. Supinavibhāvanaṃ

{1} *Supinassa ca dīpanan* ti[7] etthāyaṃ vibhāvanā. Sattānaṃ gamanā-di-iriyāpathakappanaṃ kāyakammavacīkammapaṭṭhapanaṃ kusalākusaladhammasamādānaṃ[8] lokiyalokuttarasamādhisamāpa-

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[7] C¹ C² *supiṇassa dīpaṇan ti*; the variation of *n/ṇ* in these and other words is common throughout the Sinhalese manuscripts C¹ C² and will not be further noted.

[8] C¹ -*samādāpanaṃ*, C² *kusalākusalasamādānaṃ.*

nnaṃ[9] tato vuṭṭhānaṃ cutupapatti[10] cā' ti "sabbam p'etaṃ[11] kusa-lākusaladhammapaṭijānanādi[12]cavana[13]pariyosānakiccaṃ[14] mano-dvārikacitten'eva hoti na pañcadvārikena,"[15] tathā niddokkama-ṇapaṭibujjhanasupinadassanānī.[16]

Tathā hi[17] "niddāyantassa[18] mahāvaṭṭiṃ jāletvā dīpe cakkhu-samīpaṃ[19] upanīte paṭhamaṃ cakkhudvārika-āvajjanaṃ[20] bha-vaṅgaṃ na āvaṭṭeti, manodvārikam eva āvaṭṭeti. Atha javanaṃ jav-itvā bhavaṅgaṃ otarati. Dutiyavāre cakkhudvārika-āvajjanaṃ bhavaṅgaṃ āvaṭṭeti. Tato cakkhuviññāṇādīni[21] javanapariyo-sānāni[22] pavattanti, tadanantaraṃ[23] bhavaṅgaṃ pavattati. Tatiya-vāre manodvārika-āvajjanena bhavaṅge āvaṭṭite manodvārikaja-vanaṃ javati. Tena cittena[24] kiṃ ayaṃ imasmiṃ ṭhāne āloko ti jānāti."[25] Sotādisu saddādimhi[26] upanīte pi es'eva nayo. "Evaṃ manodvārikajavanen'eva paṭibujjhati, na pañcadvārikena. Supi-naṃ pi ten'eva passati, na pañcadvārikena.

{2.1} Tañ ca pan'etaṃ supinaṃ[27] passanto catūhi kāraṇehi pas-sati: dhātukkhobhato vā anubhūtapubbato vā devatopasaṃhārato vā pubbanimittato vā"[28] ti. Tattha pittādidhātukkhobhato nānā-vidhaṃ supinaṃ passati.[29] "Passanto ca[30] pabbatā[31] patanto viya

[9] C¹ C² Ce *-samāpajjanaṃ,* Ee w.r. *-samāpannanaṃ* for *-samāpannaṃ.*

[10] C² *cutuppattiṃ.*

[11] Ce, Vibh-a Ee Be^VRI *pi h'etaṃ.*

[12] Ce, Vibh-a Ee Be^VRI *-paṭivijānanādi-.*

[13] C¹, Vibh-a Be^VRI w.r. *-vacana-.*

[14] Ce, Vibh-a Be^VRI *-pariyosānaṃ kiccaṃ.*

[15] Vibh-a Ee 405,32–34, Be^VRI 388,16–17.

[16] C¹ C² *niddokkaṇaṇaṃ paṭibujjhanatāsupinadassanānī* (C² *-dassanāni*).

[17] C² omits *hi.*

[18] Vibh-a Ee Be^VRI, Mp-ṭ Be^VRI *niddāyantassa hi.*

[19] Vibh-a Ee Be^VRI *cakkhusamīpe.*

[20] Vibh-a Ee Be^VRI *cakkhudvārikaṃ āvajjanaṃ.*

[21] C¹ *-viññādīni.*

[22] C¹ C² *-pariyosānādīni.*

[23] So C¹ C² Ce, Vibh-a Ee Be^VRI, Mp-ṭ Be^VRI; Ss Ee *tadantaraṃ.*

[24] Vibh-a Be^VRI *cittena ñatvā.*

[25] Vibh-a Ee 406,14–23, Be^VRI 383; Mp-ṭ Be^VRI III 69.

[26] C¹ *saddādīni,* C² *sotānidīsu saddādīni.*

[27] C¹ *sasupiṇaṃ.*

[28] Vibh-a Ee 407,3-8, Be^VRI 383.

[29] *tattha ... passati* Vibh-a Be^VRI *tattha pittādīnaṃ khobhakaraṇapaccayayogena khubhitadhātuko 'dhātukkhobhato' supinaṃ passati.*

[30] Vibh-a Ee Be^VRI *passanto ca nānāvidhaṃ supinaṃ passati.*

[31] So Vibh-a Ee Be^VRI; Ss Ee *pabbato.*

ākāsena gacchanto viya vāḷamigahatthicorādīhi anubandho[32] viya
hoti. Anubhūtapubbato passanto pubbe anubhūtapubbaṃ āram-
maṇaṃ passati. Devatopasaṃhārato passantassa devatā atthakā-
matāya vā anatthakāmatāya[33] vā nānāvidhāni ārammaṇāni upa-
saṃharanti. So tāsaṃ[34] anubhāvena tāni ārammaṇāni passati.
Pubbanimittato[35] passanto puññāpuññavasena uppajjitukāmassa
atthassa vā anatthassa vā pubbanimittabhūtaṃ supinaṃ passati.
Bodhisattamātā viya puttapaṭilābhanimittaṃ, Bodhisatto viya
pañca mahāsupine, Kosalarājā viya soḷasa supine ti.[36]

{2.2} Tattha yaṃ dhātukkhobhato anubhūtapubbato ca supi-
naṃ[37] passati na[38] taṃ saccaṃ hoti. Yaṃ devatopasaṃhārato pas-
sati taṃ saccaṃ vā hoti alikaṃ vā. Kuddhā[39] [79] hi devatā upāye-
na vināsetukāmā viparītam pi katvā dassenti. Tatr'idaṃ vatthu:
Rohane[40] kira Nāgamahāvihāre Mahāthero bhikkhusaṅghaṃ ana-
paloketvā va ekaṃ nāgarukkhaṃ chindāpesi. Rukkhe adhivatthā
devatā therassa kuddhā paṭhamam eva naṃ palobhetvā pacchā
'ito te sattadivasamatthake[41] upaṭṭhāko rājā marissatī' ti supine
ārocesi. Thero taṃ kathaṃ āharitvā rājorodhānaṃ ācikkhi.[42] Tā
ekappahāren'eva mahāviravaṃ viraviṃsu.[43] Rājā 'kiṃ etan' ti puc-
chi. Tā 'evaṃ therena vuttan' ti ārocayiṃsu. Rājā divase gaṇāpetvā
sattāhe vītivatte[44] therassa hatthapāde chindāpesi.

Yaṃ pana pubbanimittato[45] passati, taṃ ekantasaccam eva hoti.

Etesaṃ catunnaṃ mūlakāraṇānaṃ saṃsaggabhedato pi supi-
nabhedo hoti yeva.

Tañ ca pan'etaṃ catubbidhaṃ pi[46] supinaṃ sekhaputhujjanā

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[32] Vibh-a Ee Be^VRI *anubaddho.*
[33] Vibh-a Ee Be^VRI *atthakāmatāya vā atthāya vā anatthāya.*
[34] Vibh-a Ee Be^VRI *tāsaṃ devatānaṃ.*
[35] C¹ C² *pubbanimittato vā.*
[36] C¹ *supine pi ti.*
[37] Ee w.r. *suppinaṃ.*
[38] C¹ C² omit *na.*
[39] C¹ C² *kuddhādi hi.*
[40] C¹, Vibh-a Ee Be^VRI *rohaṇe.*
[41] C¹ *sattame divasamatthake,* C² *sattame divase matthake.*
[42] So Vibh-a Ee Be^VRI; Ss Ee *acikkhi.*
[43] C² *mahāravaṃ raviṃsu.*
[44] Vibh-a Ee Be^VRI *vītivatte kujjhitvā.*
[45] C² *buddhanimittato.*
[46] Vibh-a Ee omits *pi.*

va[47] passanti, appahīṇavipallāsattā.[48]"[49]

{3.1} "Kiṃ pan'etaṃ[50] passanto sutto passati, paṭibuddho, udāhu neva-sutto-na-paṭibuddho ti.[51] Kiṃ c'ettha yadi tāva sutto passati. Abhidhammavirodho āpajjati. Bhavaṅgacittena hi supati. Taṃ[52] rūpanimittādi-ārammaṇaṃ rāgādisampayuttaṃ vā na hoti. Supinaṃ passantassa ca īdisāni nimittāni[53] uppajjissanti.[54] Atha paṭibuddho passati Vinayavirodho āpajjati. Yaṃ hi paṭibuddho passati taṃ sabbohārikacittena passati. Sabbohārikacittena ca kate[55] vītikkame anāpatti nāma n'atthi. Supinaṃ passantena pana kate vītikkame ekantaṃ anāpatti eva. Atha neva-sutto-na-paṭibuddho passati, na koci[56] nāma passati.

{3.2} Evaṃ ca[57] sati supinassa abhāvo[58] āpajjati. Na abhāvo. Kasmā. Yasmā kapimiddhapareto passati. Vuttaṃ h'etaṃ. 'Kapimiddhapareto kho mahārāja supinaṃ passatī'[59] ti. Kapimiddhapareto ti makkaṭaniddāya sutto.[60] Yathā hi makkaṭassa[61] niddā lahuparivattā hoti evaṃ yā niddā punappunaṃ[62] kusalādicittavokiṇṇattā lahuparivattā. Yassā[63] pavattiyaṃ punappunaṃ[64] bhavaṅgato uttaraṇaṃ hoti, tāya sutto[65] supinaṃ passati.

{4} Tenāyaṃ supino kusalo pi hoti, akusalo pi, avyākato pi. Tattha supinantena[66] cetiyavandanadhammasavana[67]dhammadesanādīni karontassa kusalo, pāṇātipatādīni [80] karontassa akusa-

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[47] C¹ *sekhaputhujjanā pi va*, C² *sekhaputhujjanā pi.*[48] Ce *appahiṇa-*.
[49] Vibh-a Ee 407,10–408,4, Be[VRI] 384.
[50] Mp Be[VRI] *panetaṃ*; Vibh-a Ee Be[VRI] *taṃ*.
[51] C² omits *ti*.
[52] Vibh-a Be[VRI] *tañ ca*.
[53] Mp Ee Be[VRI], Vibh-a Ee Be[VRI] *cittāni*.
[54] Mp Ee Be[VRI], Vibh-a Ee Be[VRI] *upajjanti*.
[55] Mp Be[VRI] *kate'pi*.
[56] Mp Ee Be[VRI] omit *koci*, Vibh-a Ee Be[VRI] *supinaṃ*.
[57] Vibh-a Be[VRI] *evañ hi*.
[58] Mp Ee, Vibh-a Ee Be[VRI] *abhāvo va*, Mp Be[VRI] *abhāvo ca*.
[59] Cf. Mil 300,24–25 *mahārāja kapimiddhapareto supinaṃ passati*.
[60] Mp Ee Be[VRI], Vibh-a Ee Be[VRI] *yutto*.
[61] C¹ C² *makkaṭakassa*.
[62] C², Mp Ee *punappuna*.
[63] So Mp Ee Be[VRI], Vibh-a Ee Be[VRI]; Ss Ce Ee *yassa*.
[64] C², Mp Ee *punappuna*.
[65] Mp Ee Be[VRI], Vibh-a Ee Be[VRI] *yutto*.
[66] So C¹ C² Ce Ee *supinantena*; Mp Ee Be[VRI], Vibh-a Ee Be[VRI] *supinante*.
[67] Mp Be[VRI], Vibh-a Be[VRI] *-dhammassavana-*.

lo, dvīhi antehi mutto āvajjanatadārammanakkhaṇe[68] avyākato ti veditabbo."[69] "Svayaṃ[70] dubbalavatthukattā[71] cetanāya paṭisandhiṃ ākaḍḍhituṃ asamattho. Pavatte pana aññehi kusalākusalehi upatthambhito vipākaṃ deti. Kiñcāpi vipākaṃ deti, atha kho avisaye uppannattā abbohārikā va supinantacetanā.[72]

{5} So pan'esa supino[73] divā tāva diṭṭho na sameti. Tathā paṭhamayāmamajjhimayāme[74] pacchimayāme ca. Balavapaccūse pana asitapītakhāyitasāyite[75] sammā pariṇāmaṃ gate kāyasmiṃ ojāya patiṭṭhitāya aruṇe uggacchamāne diṭṭhasupino sameti. Iṭṭhanimittaṃ supinaṃ passanto iṭṭhaṃ paṭilabhati. Aniṭṭhanimittaṃ passanto aniṭṭhaṃ"[76] paṭilabhati. Idaṃ pana[77] Vibhaṅgaṭṭhakathāyañ ca[78] Aṅguttara-Pañcake Mahāsupinasuttavaṇṇanāyañ ca Vinayaṭṭhakathāya.[79]

{6} "Tattha *ekantasaccam eva hotī* ti phalassa saccabhāvato vuttaṃ. Dassanaṃ pana vipallatthaṃ eva. Ten'eva pana[80] pahīṇavipallāsā pubbanimittabhūtaṃ pi[81] na passanti."[82] "Asekhā na passanti pahīṇavipallāsā[83]"[84] ti "vacanato catunnam pi kāraṇānaṃ vipallāsā eva mūlakāraṇan ti daṭṭhabbaṃ. *Tan* ti[85] supinakāle pavattaṃ[86] bhavaṅgacittaṃ.[87] *Rūpanimittādi-ārammaṇan* ti kammanimittagatinimittato aññaṃ rūpanimittādi-ārammaṇaṃ na hoti. *Īdisānī* ti paccakkhato anubhūtapubbaparikappitarūpādi-

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[68] C¹ C² *ārammaṇatadārammaṇakkhaṇe.*
[69] Mp Ee III 317,7-318,14, Be^VRI III 72; Vibh-a Ee 408,5–27, Be^VRI 385.
[70] C¹ C² *sayam.*
[71] C² *-katā.*
[72] C¹ C² *-cetanā va.*
[73] Mp Ee *supine kālavasena hi*, Mp Be^VRI *kālavasena pi.*
[74] Mp Ee *majjhimayāmesu*, Mp Be^VRI *paṭhamayāme majjhimayāme.*
[75] C², Mp Ee Be^VRI *asitapītakhāyite.*
[76] Mp Ee III 318,3-14, Be^VRI III 72.
[77] C¹ C² omit *pana.*
[78] C¹ C² omit *ca.*
[79] C¹ C² add *paṭhamasaṅghādisesavaṇṇanāya ca vuttan ti veditabbaṃ.*
[80] Mp-ṭ Be^VRI omits *pana.*
[81] C¹ C² *pubbabhūtanimittabhūtam pi*, Mp-ṭ Be^VRI *pi supinaṃ.*
[82] Mp-ṭ Be^VRI III 66.
[83] Mp Ee Be^VRI, Vibh-a Ee Be^VRI *pahīṇavipallāsattā.*
[84] Mp Ee III 317,6, Be^VRI III 66; Vibh-a Ee 408,4–5, Be^VRI 384.
[85] C¹ C² omit *ti.*
[86] C¹ C² *pattaṃ.*
[87] C¹ *bhavaṅgakāle diṭṭhaṃ cittaṃ*, C² *bhavaṅgakāle cittaṃ.*

ārammaṇāni[88] [89] rāgādisampayuttāni ca.[90] *Sabbohārikacittenā* ti pakaticittena. *Dvihi antehi mutto* ti kusalākusalasaṅkhātehi dvīhi antehi mutto. *Āvajjanatadārammaṇakkhaṇe* ti idaṃ yāva tadālambanuppatti[91] tāva pavattacittavāraṃ[92] sandhāya vuttaṃ."[93] "Yadi pi supinante vibhūtaṃ hutvā upaṭṭhite rūpādivatthumhi tadārammaṇaṃ vuttaṃ, tathā pi supinante upaṭṭhitanimittassa parikappavasena gahetabbaṃ.[94]"[95] Tāya "dubbalabhāvato *dubbalavatthukattā* ti[96] vuttaṃ."[97] "*Supinantacetanā*[98] ti manodvārikajavanavasena pavattā supinantacetanā."[99] Ayaṃ tattha ṭīkā. *Bodhisattamātā viya puttapaṭilābhanimittan*[100] ti idaṃ Mahāmāyādeviṃ[101] sandhāya kathitaṃ. Taṃ Jātakanidānato gahetabbaṃ. *Kosalarājā viya soḷasa supine* ti idaṃ Mahāsupinajātakaṭṭhakathāya gahetabbaṃ.

Bodhisatto viya pañca mahāsupine ti etthāyaṃ vibhāvanā. Taṃ pana pañcamahāsupinadassanaṃ carimabhavikānaṃ[102] mahābodhisattānaṃ yeva hoti na aññesaṃ.

{7} [81] "Amhākaṃ[103] pana bodhisatto[104] te pañca mahāsupine passanto yeva 'buddho bhavissāmī' ti cātuddasiyaṃ pakkhassa rattivibhāyanakāle passi."[105] Ke[106] pana te pañca mahāsupinā ti. Mahāpurisassa "ayaṃ mahāpaṭhavī mahāsayanaṃ ahosi. Himavā pabbatarājā bimbohanaṃ ahosi, puratthimasamudde vāmahattho ohito ahosi, pacchimasamudde dakkhiṇahattho ohito ahosi,

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[88] So Mp-ṭ Be[VRI]; Ss Ee w.r. -*arammaṇāni*.
[89] Mp-ṭ Be[VRI] -*ārammaṇāni ceva*.
[90] C[1] C[2] omit *ca*.
[91] So C[1] C[2] Ce Ee; Mp-ṭ Be[VRI] *tadārammaṇuppatti*.
[92] Ce *cittācāraṃ*.
[93] Mp-ṭ Be[VRI] III 66.
[94] C[2], Mp-ṭ Be[VRI] *ga hetabbatāya*.
[95] Mp-ṭ Be[VRI] III 66.
[96] C[1] C[2] omit *ti*.
[97] Mp-ṭ Be[VRI] III 67.
[98] C[2] *supinante cetanā*.
[99] Mp-ṭ Be[VRI] III 67.
[100] C[2] *puttaṃ paṭi-*.
[101] So C[1] C[2] Ce, Mp Ee Be[VRI]; Ss Ee w.r. *Mahāmāyadeviṃ*.
[102] Mp Ee Be[VRI] omit *carimabhavikānānaṃ*.
[103] Ee w.r. *amhakaṃ*.
[104] *Amhākaṃ pana … bhavissāmī ti*: Mp Ee Be[VRI] *Amhākaṃ pana bodhisatto kadā ime supine passī ti. Sve buddho bhavissāmī ti.*
[105] Mp Ee III 318,18-20, Be[VRI] III 73.
[106] C[1] C[2] *te*.

dakkhiṇasumudde ubho pādā ohitā ahesuṃ.[107] Ayaṃ paṭhamo mahāsupino pātur ahosi.[108]"[109] So anuttarāya sammāsaṃbodhiyā pubbanimittaṃ.

"Puna ca paraṃ dabbhatiṇasaṅkhātā tiriyā nāma tiṇajāti naṅgulamattena[110] rattadaṇḍena nābhito uggantvā[111] passantassa passantass'eva[112] vidatthimattaṃ ratanamattaṃ vyāmamattaṃ yaṭṭhimattaṃ gāvutamattaṃ aḍḍhayojanamattaṃ yojanamattan ti evaṃ uggantvā uggantvā[113] anekayojanasahassaṃ nabhaṃ āhacca ṭhitā ahosi. Ayaṃ dutiyo mahāsupino pātur ahosi."[114] So ariyassa aṭṭhaṅgikassa maggassa devamanussesu suppakāsitabhāvassa pubbanimittaṃ.[115]

"Puna ca paraṃ setā kimī[116] kaṇhasīsā pādehi[117] ussakkitvā yāva jāṇumaṇḍalaṃ paṭicchādesuṃ. Ayaṃ tatiyo mahāsupino pātur ahosi."[118] So bahunnaṃ odātavasanānaṃ Bhagavantaṃ upasaṃkamitvā saraṇāgamanassa pubbanimittaṃ.

"Puna ca paraṃ cattāro vaṇṇasakuṇā[119] catūhi disāhi[120] āgantvā pādamūle nipatitvā sabbasetā sampajjiṃsu.[121] Ayaṃ catuttho mahāsupino pātur ahosi."[122] So khattiyādinaṃ catunnaṃ vaṇṇānaṃ Tathāgatappavedite dhammavinaye agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajitvā anuttaravimuttisacchikiriyāya pubbanimittaṃ.

"Puna ca[123] paraṃ Bodhisatto mahato mīḷhapabbatassa uparū-

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[107] *puratthimasamudde … ahesuṃ*: A Ee Be^VRI *puratthime samudde vāmo hattho ohito ahosi, pacchime samudde dakkhiṇo hattho ohito ahosi, dakkhiṇe samudde ubho pādā ohitā ahesuṃ.*

[108] A Ee Be^VRI *tathāgatassa bhikkhave arahato sammāsambuddhassa pubb'eva sambodhā anabhisambuddhassa bodhisattass'eva sato ayaṃ paṭhamo mahāsupino pāturahosi.*

[109] A Ee III 240,21-25, Be^VRI II 220.

[110] So Ee Ce, Sp-ṭ Be^VRI *naṅgula-*, C¹ *bhiṅgula* or *hiṅgula-*(?), C² *aṅgula-*.

[111] Sp-ṭ Be^VRI *uggantvā tassa.*

[112] C¹ C², Sp-ṭ Be^VRI omit the second *passantassa.*

[113] Sp-ṭ Be^VRI omits the second *uggantvā.*

[114] Sp-ṭ Be^VRI II 269.

[115] C¹ *pubbaṃ nimittaṃ.*

[116] So C¹, Sp-ṭ Be^VRI; Ss C² Ce Ee *kimi.*

[117] C² *allapādehi.*

[118] Sp-ṭ Be^VRI II 269.

[119] Sp-ṭ Be^VRI *sakuṇā nānāvaṇṇā.*

[120] C¹ C² *catuddisāhi.*

[121] C¹ C² *sampaṭicchiṃsu.*

[122] Sp-ṭ Be^VRI II 269.

[123] C¹ omits *ca.*

pari caṅkamati alippamāno[124] mīḷhena. Ayaṃ pañcamo mahā-supino pātur ahosi."[125] So catunnaṃ paccayānaṃ lābhitāya tesu ca[126] anupalittabhāvassa pubbanimittaṃ.

"Api ca yaṃ so[127] cakkavāḷamahāpaṭhaviṃ[128] sirisayanabhūtaṃ addasa, taṃ buddhabhāvassa pubbanimittaṃ. Yaṃ[129] Himavanta-pabbatarājaṃ[130] bimbohanaṃ addasa, taṃ sabbaññutañāṇabimbohanassa pubbanimittaṃ. Yaṃ cattāro hatthapāde samuddassa uparūpari bhāgena gantvā[131] cakkavāḷamatthake ṭhite addasa, taṃ dhammacakkassa [82] pavattīyabhāve[132] pubbanimittaṃ. Yaṃ attānaṃ uttānakaṃ nipannaṃ addasa, taṃ tīsu bhavesu avakujjā-naṃ sattānaṃ uttānamukhabhāvassa pubbanimittaṃ. Yaṃ[133] akkhī nimīletvā[134] passanto[135] viya ahosi, taṃ dibbacakkhupaṭilā-bhassa pubbanimittaṃ. Yaṃ yāva bhavaggā ekālokaṃ ahosi, taṃ anāvaraṇañāṇassa pubbanimittaṃ. Sesaṃ vuttanayam eva[136].[137]

Iti taṃ taṃ visesādhigamanimittabhūte pañca mahāsupine disvā mahāsatto,[138]"[139] "vuṭṭhāya[140] pallaṅkaṃ ābhūjitvā nisinno cintesi 'sace mayā Kapilavatthupure[141] ime supinā diṭṭhā assu, pitumahārājassa katheyyaṃ. Sace pana me mātā jīveyya tassā katheyyaṃ. Imasmiṃ kho pana ṭhāne imesaṃ paṭiggāhako nāma n'atthi. Aham eva paṭigaṇhissāmī' ti. Tato idaṃ imassa pubba-nimittaṃ idaṃ imassā ti sayam eva supine[142] paṭigaṇhitvā vib-

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[124] C[1] C[2] *alimpamāno*.
[125] Sp-ṭ Be[VRI] II 269.
[126] C[1] C[2] omit *ca*.
[127] Mp Ee Be[VRI] *tasmā yaṃ so*.
[128] C[2] *cakkavāḷaṃ mahāpaṭhaviṃ*.
[129] C[1] C[2] omit *yaṃ*.
[130] C[1], Mp Ee, Sp-ṭ Be[VRI] *himavantaṃ pabbatarājaṃ*.
[131] Mp Ee Be[VRI] omit *samuddassa uparūpari bhāgena gantvā*.
[132] C[1] C[2] *pavattiya-*, Mp Ee Be[VRI], Sp-ṭ Be[VRI] *appaṭivattiya bhāve*.
[133] C[2] omits *yaṃ*.
[134] So Ce Ee, C[1] C[2] *akkhinī nimmīletvā* (C[1] *akkhinī* reading uncertain); Mp Ee Be[VRI], Sp-ṭ Be[VRI] *akkhīni ummīletvā*.
[135] So Mp Ee Be[VRI], Sp-ṭ Be[VRI]; Ss C[1] C[2] Ce Ee *passato*.
[136] Mp Ee Be[VRI] *sesaṃ pāḷivasen'eva veditabban ti*.
[137] Mp Ee Be[VRI] end the quotation here.
[138] Sp-ṭ Be[VRI] *mahāsupine passi*.
[139] Mp Ee III 320,7-18, Be[VRI] III 74; Sp-ṭ Be[VRI] II 269.
[140] C[1] *uṭṭhāya*.
[141] Mp Ee Be[VRI] *kapilavatthunagare*.
[142] C[2] *supinaṃ*.

hātāya rattiyā[143] Uruvelagāme Sujātāya dinnaṃ pāyāsaṃ paribhuñjitvā bodhimaṇḍaṃ ārūyha sambodhiṃ[144] patvā anukkamena Jetavane viharanto attano makulabuddhakāle diṭṭhamahāsupine[145] vitthāretuṃ bhikkhū āmantetvā."[146] "Tathāgatassa bhikkhave arahato sammāsambuddhassa pubbe va sambodhā[147] anabhisambuddhassa bodhisattass'eva me[148] sato[149] pañca mahāsupinā pātur ahesun"[150] ti ādinā Aṅguttaranikāye Mahāsupinasuttaṃ[151] kathesī ti.

Idam ettha supinavibhāvanaṃ.

[78] The Exposition of Dream(s)

[1. The Role of the Mind-Door in Falling Asleep and Waking up]
Concerning *the explanation of dream*(s),[152] here is the exposition. For beings adopting the posture of going, and so on, the setting forth of bodily action or verbal action, undertaking wholesome and unwholesome states (*dhamma*), attaining mundane and supramundane concentration (*samādhi*), the emerging from that [concentration] and the passing away and reappearance [is explained as follow] [Vibh-a 405,32–34] '[for[153]] all these functions (*kicca*)[154] beginning with the recognition of wholesome and unwholesome states and ending (*pariyosāna*) with passing away are only through thought (*citta*) [connected with] the mind-door, not

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[143] Mp Ee Be^VRI omit *vibhātāya rattiyā.*

[144] Mp Be^VRI *bodhiṃ.*

[145] Mp Ee Be^VRI *diṭṭhe pañca.*

[146] Mp Ee III 318,21–319,5, Be^VRI III 72.

[147] C² *pubbe sambodhāya.*

[148] C¹ C², A Ee Be^VRI omit *me.*

[149] C¹ C² omit *sato.*

[150] A Ee III 240,16-18, Be^VRI II 221.

[151] C¹ Ce -*suttantaṃ.*

[152] The phrase 'explanation of dream(s)' is taken from the *mātikā,* or table of content, at the beginning of the text (Ss Ee 1).

[153] I follow the Vibh-a Ee edition which includes *hi.*

[154] Frequently translated as 'function or activity,' it is also a technical term concerning the function of consciousness (*viññāṇakicca*); see Nyanatiloka s.v. *kicca.*

with the five [other] doors,'[155] thus also [are] the visions of dreams [when] one is falling asleep and waking up.[156]

Thus, [Vibh-a 406,14–23] 'when a lamp, the wick having being lit, is brought in the vicinity of the eye of one sleeping, the eye-door advertence (*āvajjana*)[157] does not interrupt the mental continuum (*bhavaṅga*)[158] first, only the mind-door (*manodvārika*) [advertence] interrupts it. Then the impulse (*javana*),[159] having

[155] The 'five doors' (*dvāra*) are: the eyes, ears, nose, tongue and body; the sixth door is the mind (see DP s.v. *dvāra*). For further explanation, see Bodhi (2000: 129–130).

[156] This passage is probably a paraphrase of Vibh 307,25–308,10, which uses the same technical vocabulary to explain that a man is unable to discriminate using only the five doors, called here five consciousnesses (*pañca viññāṇā*).

[157] The meaning of *āvajjana* is 'turning one's mind to, giving one's attention to' (DP s.v.), but it commonly means 'meditation.' In other contexts, particularly in the Abhidhamma and the *Visuddhimagga*, it is a technical term that indicates 'advertence of the mind towards the object,' that is, a cognitive action of the mind that comes into contact with forms. It is considered the first stage of the process of consciousness (*viññāṇakicca*); see Nyanatiloka s.v. *āvajjana*. Bodhi (2000: 123) translates this word as 'adverting' and defines it as 'function of the turning to the object.'

[158] The word *bhavaṅga* is difficult to translate. Bodhi (2000: 122–123) claims: 'The word *bhavaṅga* means factor (*aṅga*) of existence (*bhava*), that is, the indispensable condition of existence. *Bhavaṅga* is the function of consciousness by which the continuity of individual is preserved through the duration of any single existence, from conception to death.' Nyanatiloka (s.v. *bhavaṅga-sota* and *bhavaṅga-citta*) takes the compounds *bhavaṅgasota* and *bhavaṅgacitta* as 'undercurrent forming the condition of being, or existence' or 'subconsciousness.' Gethin (1994) provides many useful insights into this term, especially in Abhidhamma texts and the *Visuddhimagga*. In particular, Gethin (1994: 15) states: 'Consciousness is said to be in its *bhavaṅga* mode whenever no active consciousness process is occurring; in other words, *bhavaṅga* is the passive, inactive state of the mind when resting in itself. Ordinary waking consciousness is to be understood as the mind continually and very rapidly emerging from and lapsing back into *bhavaṅga* in response to various sense stimuli coming in through the five sense-doors and giving rise to sense-door consciousness processes; these will be interspersed with mind door processes of various sorts. In contrast, the dream state is understood as essentially confined to mind-door processes occurring in what the texts, following the *Milindapañha*, call "monkey sleep" (*kapi-niddā, kapi-middha, makkaṭaniddā*). In deep sleep, the mind rests in inactivity and does not emerge from *bhavaṅga*.' Cf. also Bodhi (2000: 122–123).

[159] This word *javana* refers to the impulses, which manifest themselves during the process of consciousness (*viññāṇakicca*). They arise from the fruition of an object and it is in the moment in which they emerge that *kamma* is produced, since consciousness directs these impulses in a moral sense. For the different classifications of these impulses, see Nyanatiloka s.v. *javana*. Aung and Rhys David

impelled, enters (in) the mental continuum. In a second moment, the eye-door advertence interrupts the mental continuum. From that, the eye consciousness, and so on, which have impulse as their end, occur. Immediately the mental continuum occurs. In the third moment, when the mental continuum is interrupted by the mind-door stimulation, the mind-door impulse impels. With that thought (*citta*) he knows: "why is this light in this place?".' This method is the same when sounds, and so on, are near the ears, and so on [Vibh-a 407,3–8] 'Thus he awakes through mind-door impulse only, not through the five [other] doors.

[2.1. The Four Causes of Dreams]
And seeing this dream, he sees it by means of four causes: from an agitation of elements (*dhātukkhobha*), or from a previous experience (*anubhūtapubba*), or from the disposition of the deities (*devatopasaṃhāra*), or from a premonition (*pubbanimitta*).'

In the case where he sees various dream(s) from the agitation of elements, such as bile, and so on, [Vibh-a 407,10–408,4] 'He sees as if falling from a mountain,[160] as if going in the sky, as if pursued by a beast of prey, an elephant, a thief, and so on. Seeing [dreams] from a previous experience, he sees an object (*ārammaṇa*)[161] previously experienced in the past. For one seeing from the disposition of the deities, the deities provide various objects out of the desire for his benefit or desire for his loss. He sees those objects through their disposition. Seeing as a premonition, he sees a dream that is a premonition of benefit or loss that seeks to arise because of merit or demerit, as the Bodhisatta's mother [saw] the sign of the conception of [her] son,[162] as the Bodhisatta [saw] the

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(1910: 29) translate this word as 'apperception' and define the apperceptive state, the moment in which an object is apperceived or properly cognized. Bodhi (2000: 124) states that the literal meaning of this word is 'running swiftly' and explains how this process is important from an ethical point of view.

[160] I follow Vibh-a Ee and Be^VRI in reading *pabbatā* instead of *pabbato* of Ss Ee.

[161] The term *ārammaṇa* means 'basis, starting point,' but it is used to refer to the object of meditation or sense object. In particular, it indicates six categories of objects: visible objects, sounds, smells, tastes, impressions of the body and mental objects. The latter, mental objects, may be present, past, future, real or imaginary. These objects are the basis of sensory perception; see Nyanatiloka s.v. *ārammaṇa*.

[162] Tradition has it that the mother of the Buddha, Queen Māyā, at the moment of the Bodhisatta's conception, dreamed of a white elephant holding a

five great dreams,[163] as the king of Kosala (saw) the sixteen dreams.[164]

[2.2. The Veracity of Dreams]
In the case of the dream he sees from agitation of elements and previous experience, it is not true. The [dream] he sees from the disposition of the deities could be true or false. For angry deities [79] desiring to destroy [him] through [some] means cause [him] to see a changed reality (*viparīta*). In this case, there is this story (*vatthu*): In Rohaṇa, in the great Monastery of the Nāga, a senior Thera had a *nāga* tree cut down without the permission of the community of monk. Angry at him, the deity who lived in the tree, having first lured him, afterwards informed him in a dream "At the end of seven days from now, the king who supports you will die." The Thera, having accepted that story, told it to the king's harem. All together they let out a great cry. The king asked: "What is this?" They informed [him]: "It was said by the Thera." The king, having counted the days, when seven days had passed, he had the Thera's hands and feet cut off.

But what he sees from a premonition is absolutely true. The breaking of dreams comes about only from breaking of connection with these four root causes. However, only those in training (*sekha*)[165] and ordinary people (*puthujjana*) see these four types of dream(s) on account of derangement (*vipallāsa*)[166] not being abandoned.'

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white lotus in his trunk entering her right side; see Malalasekera s.v. *Māyā*, *Mahāmāyā*.

[163] These five great dreams are explained later in this chapter; see also A III 240.

[164] These sixteen dreams of King Pasenadi of Kosala are presented in the *Jātaka* (Ja I 334–345). Here it is said that the king had these peculiar dreams (e.g. four black bulls that disappear without fighting, a bush that flourishes and bears fruit, a chariot that does not proceed because it is drawn by a weak calf, etc.), became frightened, and rushed to the Buddha to ask what they each meant.

[165] A *sekha* is who is in training, who stands in contrast to an *asekha*, namely an *arahat*, who has nothing further to learn. For a definition of *sekha*, see A I 231; cf. also S V 14, 175. Concerning the difference between *sekha* and *asekha*, see Bodhi (1995: 1166 fn. 21).

[166] *Vipallāsa* means 'reversal, change (esp. in a bad sense) … derangement, corruption, distortion' (PED s.v.). In this context the one who dreams is tricked by the false reality present in the dreams, which does not occur for the *arahat*

[3.1. The Phases in Which One Dreams]
[Mp III 317,7–318,14; Vibh-a 408,5–27] 'But seeing this, does he see [it] asleep or awake or neither asleep and awake? How is it here? If he sees [it] asleep, it is contrary to the Abhidhamma, for he sleeps with thought associated with the mental continuum.[167] [And] that is not the object (*ārammaṇa*) of the visual sign (*rūpa-nimitta*), and so on, nor is it connected with lust, and so on. But such signs will arise for the one seeing a dream.

Or [the view] that he sees [it] awake, is contrary to the Vinaya. For what he sees awake, he sees with thought that is ineffective (*sabbohārika*).[168] And when a transgression is made with a thought that is ineffective, there is no non-offence (*anāpatti*). But when a transgression is made by one seeing a dream, it is certainly a non-offence. Or [the view] that he sees [it] neither asleep nor awake, [then] no one sees.

[3.2. The Drowsiness of the Monkey]
Thus is the case, the non-existence of the dream occurs (*āpajjati*). [But] there is non-existence. Why? Since he sees [it] overcome by the 'monkey drowsiness' (*kapimiddha*). For it is said: "Great king, overcome by monkey drowsiness he sees a dream."[169] **Overcome by monkey drowsiness** means he is asleep with the sleep of a monkey (*makkaṭaniddā*). For as the sleep of a monkey is easily interrupted, so he sees a dream when asleep with that sleep which is easily interrupted on account of being mixed up again and again with thought that is wholesome, and so on, [and] in which[170] the emergence from the mental continuum happens again and again.

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because he does not dream. Aung and Rhys Davids (1910: 50) translate *cittavipallāsa* as 'hallucination.'

[167] *Bhavaṅgacittena* means thought (*citta*) that is connected with the *bhavaṅga* or mental continuum. This same topic is present in the *Milindapañha*, in particular it is explained that in this condition *citta* cannot generate mental processes, such as dreams; see also Mil 299,14–22.

[168] The CPD takes *sabbohārika* (s.v.) to mean 'negligible, ineffective' and *ohārika* (s.v.) in the compound (*sabbohārikacitta*) in this context to mean 'bringing (into the presence or experience of somebody).' The Mp-ṭ (Be^VRI III 67), which the Ss quotes below, glosses *sabbohārikacitta* with *pakaticitta*, 'natural or primary thought.'

[169] This is reference to Mil 300,24–25.

[170] Here I follow Mp Ee Be^VRI and Vibh-a Ee Be^VRI in reading *yassā* instead of *yassa* of Ss Ce Ee.

[4. Wholesome and Unwholesome Dreams]
Therefore, this dream is wholesome (*kusala*), unwholesome (*akusala*) or indeterminate (*avyākata*). Herein, it is to be understood that it is wholesome in the case of one worshipping a shrine (*cetiya*), hearing the Dhamma, teaching the Dhamma, and so on, while dreaming; [80] unwholesome in the case of one taking life, and so on; [and] freed from the two extremes, it is indeterminate in the moment when there is advertence (*āvajjana*) and taking the same object (*tad-ārammaṇa*).'[171] [Mp III 318,3–14] 'On account of a weak basis (*vatthuka*) [the dream] is not able itself to bring about rebirth linking (*paṭisandhi*) by means of intention. But in the cycle of rebirth (*pavatta*), supported by some wholesome and unwholesome [actions] it gives the fruit (*vipāka*).[172] Although it gives fruit, yet on account of arising (*uppanna*) with reference to a non-object (*avisaya*), the intention present in the dream is ineffective (*abbohārika*).

[5. Variety of Dreams]
This dream is not seen to be the same through the night, so in the first watch, in the middle watch and in the last watch. Early in the morning when what has been eaten, drunk, chewed, tasted has been digested [and] the essence has been fixed in the body, when the sun is rising, one can dream the same thing. Seeing a dream with pleasant image, he obtains pleasure; seeing an unpleasant image, he obtains the unpleasant.'

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[171] Bodhi (2000: 124) sais that this word literally means 'having that object' and denotes the function of taking as object the object that had been apprehended by *javana*.' Gethin (1994: 18) offers another clarification: 'At the conclusion of such a sense-door process and also at the conclusion of a *kāmāvacara* mind-door process, the mind, having reached the end of the active *javana* stage, may pass on to a stage of the consciousness process known as *tad-ārammaṇa* or "taking the same object" ... This brings us directly to the notion of *bhavaṅga*, for *tad-ārammaṇa* is understood as something of a transitional stage between the truly active mode of mind and its resting in inactivity.'

[172] The fruit mentioned is the fruit of the *kamma*. Gethin (1994: 16) explains: 'In technical terms this switching between the passive and active modes of consciousness corresponds to a switching between states of mind that are the results (*vipāka*) of previous *kamma* (that is, previous active states of consciousness) and the states of consciousness that are actively wholesome (*kusala*) and unwholesome (*akusala*) and constitute *kamma* on the mental level, motivating acts of speech and body, and which are thus themselves productive of results.'

It is to be understood that, this [all of the above] is said in the commentary on the *Vibhaṅga*, in the commentary on the *Mahā-supinasutta* in the Division of fives in the *Aṅguttara[nikāya]*, in the commentary on the *Vinaya*, and in the commentary on the first *Saṅghādisesa* rule, and so on.

[6. Commentary on §§ 2.2 and 3.1 Above]
[Mp-ṭ Be^{VRI} III 66] 'Here "[in the above passage the statement] it **is absolutely true** is said because of the true nature of the fruit. But the seeing is only deranged. Therefore, those whose derangement is abandoned do not see the premonition." From the word(s) [Mp III 317,6; Vibh-a 408,4–5] "the one not in training (*asekha*) does not see [dreams] on account of the derangement being abandoned," it can be seen that derangement is the root cause of the four causes [of dreams]. [The word] **that** refers to the thought associated with the mental continuum (*bhavaṅgacitta*) set in motion at the time of the dream. **The object of the visual sign, and so on** [means] it is not another object of the visual sign, and so on, on account of the sign of *kamma* and the sign of rebirth state. **Such** [means] the objects of form, and so on, experienced and previously determined personally (*paccakkhato*) and connected with lust, and so on. **With thought that is ineffective** [means] with natural thought (*pakaticitta*).' [Mp-ṭ Be^{VRI} III 66] '**Freed from the two extremes** [means] freed from the two extremes determined as wholesome and unwholesome. **In the moment when there is advertence and taking the same object** [means] as far as there is the origin of the same support,[173] that far this is said with reference to the time thought is set in motion. If the same object is spoken of on the basis of form, and so on, that is present, having become clear in the dream then, it is to be interpreted by the power of the assumption (*parikappa*) of the sign present in the dream.' With that [Mp-ṭ Be^{VRI} III 67] 'it is said, on account of being weak, **on account of a weak basis**.' [Mp-ṭ Be^{VRI} III 67] '**The intention present in the dream** [means] the intention present in the dream set in motion by the power of the impulse of the mind-

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[173] 'Support' (*ālambana-*) of Ss C1 C2 Ce Ee against *ārammaṇa-*, 'object,' of Mp-ṭ Be^{VRI}.

door.' This is according to the sub-commentary (*ṭīkā*). **As the Bodhisatta's mother [saw] the sign of conception of [her] son**, this is said with reference to great Queen Māyā. It is to be understood according to the *Jātakanidāna*. **As the king of Kosala [saw] sixteen dreams**, this is to be understood according to the commentary of the *Mahāsupinajātaka*. **As the Bodhisatta [saw] the five great dreams**, this is the explanation here. The seeing of the five great dreams only occurs for the great Bodhisattas in their last life, not for others.

[7. The Five Great Dreams of a Bodhisatta]
[81] [Mp III 318,18–20] 'Our Bodhisatta, seeing these five great dreams, saw at the time when the night was bright, on the fourteenth of the [bright] fortnight: "I will become a Buddha (awakened)." What were these five great dreams?' For the great man [A III 240,21–25] 'this great earth was his great bed; the Himalayas, the king of mountains, was his pillow; his left hand was in the eastern ocean; his right hand was in the western ocean; his two feet were in the southern ocean. This was the first great dream to appear [to him].' It was the premonition for [his] supreme perfect awakening.

[Sp-ṭ Be^VRI II 269] 'Again *tiriyā* grass, reckoned as Dabba grass (*dabbatiṇa*),[174] come out from his navel by means of a red stick the measure of a tail. While he looked on, it kept coming out the measure of twelve fingers breadth (*vidatthi*), then twice that (*ratana*),[175] the measure of the outstretched hands (*vyāma*),[176] a pole (*yaṭṭhi*),[177] a quarter *yojana*,[178] half *yojana*, (full) *yojana*, (and) remained having reached up to the sky many thousands of *yojana*. This was the second great dream to appear [to him].' It was the premonition of the noble Eightfold Path being well declared among gods and men.

[174] *Dabbatiṇa* is a woody grass or creeper, see PED s.v. *tiriyā*.
[175] Technically a *ratana* is a unit of length, probably from elbow to fingertip; see PED s.v. *ratana* 2.
[176] *Vyāma* or *byāma* is a fathom in measure, where both hands are extended to their full length; see PED s.v.
[177] *Yaṭṭhi* means stick or pole, and is a measure of length corresponding to seven *ratana*s; see PED s.v.
[178] A *yojana* is approximately seven miles according to PED s.v.; cf. MW s.v.

[Sp-ṭ Be^VRI II 269] 'Again, white worms with black heads, crept up from [his] feet to the knee [and] covered them. This was the third great dream to appear [to him].' It was the premonition of many white clothed [laymen] approaching the Blessed One and taking refuge [in him].

[Sp-ṭ Be^VRI II 269] 'Again, four birds of various colours (*vaṇṇa-sakuṇā*) arriving from the four directions fell at his feet and became completely white. This was the fourth great dream to appear [to him].' It was the premonition of the four castes (*vaṇṇa*) of warriors, etc., having gone forth from house life to homelessness in the Dhamma and Vinaya taught by the Tathāgata for direct realization of the supreme liberation.

[Sp-ṭ Be^VRI II 269] 'Again, the Bodhisatta paced up and down on a great mountain of dung without being contaminated by the dung. This was the fifth great dream to appear [to him].' It was a premonition of being uncontaminated in obtaining the four requisites.[179]

[Mp III 320,7–18; Sp-ṭ Be^VRI II 269] 'And also, that he saw the sphere of the great earth had become [his] royal bed, was a premonition of [his] Buddhahood. That he saw the Himalayas, the king of mountains, as [his] pillow, was a premonition of knowledge of omniscience, being his pillow. That he saw [his] four limbs (lit. hands and feet) placed at the head of the sphere, having gone on top of the ocean, was a premonition of the setting in motion of the wheel[180] of the Dhamma. [82] That he saw himself lying on his back, that was a premonition of his facing upwards while beings face downwards in the three states of existence. That having closed his eyes, it was as if he was seeing, that was a premonition of him obtaining the divine eye (*dibbacakkhu*).[181] That to the limit of existence was one world [for him], was a premonition of [his] unobstructed knowledge. The remainder is as has been said.

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[179] The four requisites are the four basic requisites necessary for life as a monk: robes, a bowl for collecting food, a place to live in and medicine.

[180] The image indicates that the Dhamma will spread, and it compares two images of the wheel (*cakka*): that of the sphere (or wheel) of existence (*cakka-vāḷa*) and that of the wheel of the Dhamma (*dhammacakka*).

[181] The divine eye is one of the six kinds of higher knowledge (*abhiññā*) and of triple knowledge *(tevijjā)*. In particular, with the divine eye the Buddha sees and knows the birth and the disappearance of all beings.

The great being having thus seen each of the five great dreams which were signs of a superior realization,' [Mp III 318,21–319,5] 'having emerged [from sleep] he sat down, folding his legs cross-wise, and thought: if these dreams were seen by me in the city of Kapilavatthu, I would tell my father the great king. But if my mother were living, I would tell her. But in this place, there is no one to receive them. I alone will receive [them]. Then he received the dreams by himself [understanding] the premonition of each. At dawn, he ate the rice-milk given by Sujātā[182] in the village of Uruvelā, and having mounted the awakening seat (*bodhimaṇḍa*), he attained complete awakening. In due course, living in the Jetavana, he addressed the monks in order to elaborate the great dreams he had seen at the time when his awakening was in bud, relaying the *Mahāsupinasutta* [which is found] in the *Aṅguttara-nikāya*,' beginning with [A III 240,16–18] 'Monks, before the complete awakening of the Tathāgata, the Arahat, the completely awakened One, when I was still an unawakened *bodhisatta*, five great dreams appeared to me.'

This is the explanation of dream(s).

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[182] Living in a village near Uruvelā, she promised to the deity of the banyan tree (*Ficus bengalensis* or *indica*) that she would bring him some rice and milk if she had a son. When her wish was fulfilled, she sent her servant to prepare the offerings under the tree. Finding the Buddha there who had just reached the awakening, the servant mistook him for the tree deity. Later Sujātā herself went to the tree and offered food to the Buddha. See Malalasekera s.v. Sujātā.

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With the Eye of a Scholar and the Insight of a Physician: Gangadhar Ray Kaviraj and the Carakasaṃhitā *

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1. Introduction

Professor Torella's classes often included fascinating stories about Indian libraries, manuscripts, and meetings with Pandits. As a tri-

bute to Raffaele Torella, I present a study on Gangadhar Ray Kaviraj's philological work on the *Carakasaṃhitā*, the oldest Ayurvedic text.[1] Gangadhar Ray (1798–1885) was the editor of the first printed edition of (part of) the *Carakasaṃhitā*, which appeared in 1868 in Calcutta and seemingly became the basis of several successive editions of the text. Gangadhar was a Kaviraj, as specialists of Āyurveda were and are still called in Bengal. He was famous for his medical ability especially in pulse diagnostics and for being a polymath who authored Sanskrit works and commentaries on ancient texts of the Sanskritic culture. His popularity can be inferred from the number of invariably laudatory articles about him, which depict him as a follower of Śaiva Tantrism and a fervent supporter of traditionalist Hindu views averse to the changes that at his time were occurring in Āyurveda.[2] His edition of the *Carakasaṃhitā* and commentary on it, the *Jalpakalpataru*, can be counted among the important achievements of his scholarly life. This essay analyses and reflects on Gangadhar's philological activity concerning the *Carakasaṃhitā*, especially as regards his edition of the text, which also represents a piece of traditional scholarship from 19th century South Asia. It is not going to be, I am afraid, in any way a gripping story because, in the absence of documentary evidence, we will mainly be analysing the text of the *Carakasaṃhitā* transmitted in manuscripts and printed books associated with Gangadhar's name. Nevertheless, I hope that some fascination will come from exploring what variants can reveal about philological practice centred on the transmission of Sanskrit texts, exploring the context made up of texts — in Ganeri's words the 'intertextual context'[3] — that actors involved in this transmission

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[1] Based on previous studies and available information, Jan Meulenbeld concluded that Caraka redacted the version of the *Carakasaṃhitā* that goes under his name 'not much earlier than about 100 B.C.' and not 'later than about A.D. 150-200' (Meulenbeld HIML, IA: 114).

[2] A description of his personality and relevant bibliographical references are provided in Pecchia 2022, § 2.2.

[3] The expression 'intertextual context' is used by Jonardon Ganeri when he elaborates on Quentin Skinner's methodology for the study of intellectual cultures (Ganeri 2008: 554). Skinner presupposes contextualizing a text in order to understand 'the nature of the illocutionary intervention the document embodies' (*ibid.*, p. 553).

inhabited, and reflecting on the larger topic of philology[4] in co-lonial South Asia as a chapter of Indian intellectual history.

2. How to study Gangadhar's philological practice

2.1 Remarks on the documents

In both pre-modern and modern South Asia, information on the philological practices followed when establishing and interpreting Sanskrit texts is notoriously scarce. Even more generally true, the record regarding intellectuals of Sanskritic culture is — to use Sheldon Pollock's words — 'a virtual blank.'[5] Nothing like Sugi's collation notes to the Koryŏ Buddhist Canon[6] is available to historians of philology in South Asia, who have to look for evidence elsewhere, in particular in the available texts themselves. The interpretative framework provided for texts in commentarial works, which is so typical of South Asian culture, can offer further important insights into commentators' philological attitudes. Indeed, an understanding of Gangadhar's philological activity can be gained through an examination of the *Jalpakalpataru* (hence-forth JKT), his lengthy commentary on the *Carakasaṃhitā* (here-after CaS). Moreover, the intertextual context that emerges by comparing different versions of a specific text can reveal contours of the philological practice behind a particular text version. How-ever, in the case of Gangadhar's edition of the CaS, identifying terms of comparison for a reconstruction of this kind of intertex-tual context is not as straightforward as one might assume or wish.

2.1.1 Gangadhar's printed editions of the Carakasaṃhitā

As regards the printed editions of the CaS, three such are linked to Gangadhar's name.[7] All of them comprise the CaS and his com-

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[4] Following the definition provided by Sheldon Pollock (2009: 934 and 949), the term philology and related expressions are here used to indicate practices employed in 'making sense of texts.' Further considerations on the history of philology are presented in Pollock 2015.

[5] Pollock 2008: 537.

[6] They are analysed in Buswell 2004.

[7] For transcriptions of the title pages and other details, see Pecchia 2022, Appendix I and § 2.1, which is summarized in the present paragraph.

mentary on it, the JKT. The first edition, which corresponds to the first appearance of the CaS in print, was published in *saṃvat* 1925 (1868/69) by the Samvada Jnanaratnakara Press, based in Calcutta (hereafter C$_{SJ}$). It seems that this edition remained incomplete. Between *saṃvat* 1935 and 1937 (1878–1880) Gangadhar's son, Dharanidhar Ray, republished (or perhaps to some extent continued to publish) both the CaS and the JKT at the Pramada Bhanjana Press in Saidabad (hereafter S$_{PBh}$). Starting from 1908, Tryambakeshvar Ray, Gangadhar's grandson, published another edition in Saidabad and Calcutta at the Kanika Press and the Siddheshvar Machine Press, respectively. This edition, however, is a version of the text revised by three former students of Gangadhar, namely Dwarak Nath Sen, Rajendra Narayan Sen, and Yogindra Nath Sen. As such, it is not relevant to our investigation.

Neither the Samvada Jnanaratnakara Press edition nor the Pramada Bhanjana Press edition available at the British Library (where I consulted them) contains the complete text of the CaS and JKT; therefore, neither can be considered the *editio princeps* of the entire CaS. However, as usual at the time for voluminous works, both editions were published serially in fascicles. Therefore, the incompleteness of both editions may reflect the incompleteness of the total number of fascicles preserved at the British Library rather than the actual extent of the published texts. As regards the section of the CaS called Vimānasthāna, from which the data analysed below are taken, it first appears in the S$_{PBh}$ edition, in a fascicle published in *saṃvat* 1935.[8] This date probably corresponds to 1879, because the June 1879 issue of the *Records in the Bengal Library* refers to the publication of fascicles that seem to cover the chapter preceding the Vimānasthāna, namely the Nidānasthāna.[9] As things now stand, it can be assumed that the Saidabad publication of the

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[8] See Pecchia 2022, Appendix I.3.

[9] *Records in the Bengal Library. Catalogues of Books received…*, Vol. 1879-1881, 30th June 1879 [under Sanskrita Books — Non-Educational], p. 56, No. 12: 'Charak Sanhita; or, Digest of Charak. Vol. I. No. 3 — Sanskrita — Edited by Kaviraj Gangadhara Kaviratna — Printed and published at the Pramad Bhanjana Press, Saidabad, Berhampore — Printed by Ramnath Siddhanta, and published by Dharanidhara Raya, Kaviraj — April 14th — pp. 40 — Size 4vo. — First edition — No. of copies 300 — 0 8 0 (Rs. As. P.) — A system of Hindu medicine, with notes and the editor's commentary, called the Jalpa Kalpa-taru. This part contains the origin and cause of leprosy, lunacy, and gout.'

Vimānasthāna by the Pramada Bhanjana Press faithfully reproduces Gangadhar's edition of the text, either as the first printed version or as a reproduction of a previous printed version by the Samvada Jnanaratnakara Press in Calcutta. This assumption entails another assumption, namely that the staff of the second publishing house did not insert changes, whether intentional or not, into the S[PBh] edition — changes that in the absence of documentary evidence remain invisible.[10] It is with these caveats in mind that we treat the Vimānasthāna in S[PBh] as the first printed version of Gangadhar's edition of the section.

2.1.2 Manuscripts

The witnesses that chronologically precede Gangadhar's edition of the Vimānasthāna are in principle all fifty-three manuscripts that, to date, contain this text.[11] An analysis of the manuscripts and the collated variants[12] has shown that, first, Gangadhar himself partially copied the manuscript held at Varanasi, Sarasvati Bhavan Library, catalogue No. 108824 (hereafter V2); more particularly, he copied the Nidānasthāna and Vimānasthāna, as stated in his respective colophons to both, and completed the task in 1839 (a description of the manuscript is provided in Appendix II below). Second, the text of V2 mainly agrees with the text of a group of manuscripts preserved in repositories located in the north-eastern region of South Asia.[13] Third, there are manuscripts belonging to a period later than the 1868 or 1879 printed editions. Since their texts do not seem to show the influence of any different earlier version of the CaS, their readings appear to have no added rele-

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[10] The imponderability — in the absence of documentary evidence — of the publishers' interventions in edited texts is a well-known issue in book history. I have examined such a case in connection with the printed edition of Dharma-kīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* together with Manorathanandin's commentary (Pecchia 2015: 90–92).

[11] A complete list of these manuscripts and a short overview of their provenance is provided in Pecchia 2009; see also Pecchia 2010: 136–137.

[12] The data, which are not yet publicly available, were collected within the framework of the FWF projects 'Philosophy and Medicine in Early Classical India' (see above, note *).

[13] This fact is reflected in the *stemma codicum* of CaS, Vimāna 8, represented in Maas 2010: 65.

vance beyond the sources that Gangadhar possibly used for his edition.

The first point, namely that one of the manuscripts was partially copied by Gangadhar, is especially relevant to our study. It shows that printed editions are not the only witnesses of Gangadhar's editorial activity devoted to the CaS. Manuscript V2 indeed opens up the question of the scope of the phrase 'Gangadhar's edition of the CaS.' As observed elsewhere,[14] since the Vimānasthāna attested in V2 is not an apograph, or derivative copy, of any extant witness and was written in 1839 (thus long before the printed publication of Gangadhar's CaS), it should be considered Gangadhar's first edition of part of the CaS. The second point, namely that the text of V2 mainly agrees with a specific group of manuscripts, shows that Gangadhar's CaS was by and large the version that circulated in the region where he lived, and he did not use or even know other versions. The third point, namely the existence of manuscripts that were copied later than C_{SJ} or S_{PBh} editions, exemplifies the well-known fluid boundaries between the production of manuscripts and that of printed books especially soon after the diffusion of print technology,[15] which in South Asia occurred starting in the late 18th c. and continuing on into the 19th century. Among these late manuscripts, the copy kept in Varanasi, Sarasvati Bhavan Library, catalogue No. 108685 (= V3), in Bengali script, agrees even in minute details with Gangadhar's first edition, namely V2, and seems to closely follow the CaS as recorded in the JKT. It was copied in 1875/1876, thus after the first Calcutta edition, but before the Saidabad edition. The undated manuscript from Mysore, Oriental Research Institute 902 (= My), in Kannada script, presents readings that are only attested in printed editions, Gangadhar's edition being the oldest one among them. It seems safe to say that My readings directly or indirectly derive from Gangadhar's printed editions. Therefore, we do not need to take them into account when assessing Gangadhar's philology. The case of V3 is more complex, but its relationship with

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[14] Pecchia 2022: 115.

[15] Curt Bühler (1960) examines reasons for and modalities of the overlapping production of manuscript books and printed books in Europe even two centuries after the advent of print.

V2 and Gangadhar's printed editions is beyond the scope of the present study.

2.2 Remarks on the methodology

One way to assess the modalities of Gangadhar's philological practice is to analyse innovations in his edition of the CaS. In view of the features of the documents described so far, and considering that in this paper we focus on the Vimānasthāna, we will examine readings attested in V2 and S$_{PBh}$ or in one of the two, but lacking in all other witnesses that chronologically precede them. Since both V2 and S$_{PBh}$ are Gangadhar's editions, we also need to discern commonalities and differences between the two text versions. Therefore, the data relevant to our analysis are grouped into two lists, which are shown in Appendix I, with List A displaying agreements in innovation[16] between V2 and S$_{PBh}$, and List B displaying innovations in S$_{PBh}$.

Innovations in V2 and S$_{PBh}$ can in principle be considered 'Gangadhar's innovations,' and, as such, readings that convey information about his understanding of the text and his philological activity. As a heuristic tool, the label 'Gangadhar's innovations' can be applied during the analysis of variant readings in his editions. However, such innovations do not necessarily attach to him personally, inasmuch as they may reflect not only (a) Gangadhar's personal reading of the text, but also (b) written sources that were accessible to him and are no longer available, or (c) an oral tradition in which Gangadhar was a living link and that is not attested otherwise. Moreover, innovations in the S$_{PBh}$ printed edition may for their part display (d) interventions of the publisher or persons linked to him, which is an important, if totally undocumented, additional source.

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[16] As explained in Pecchia 2010 'agreements in innovation characterize a specific constellation of manuscripts by being present in them and at the same time lacking in all the other manuscripts' (p. 128). The concept of 'agreement in innovation' is thus similar to 'conjunctive error,' but I prefer not to use the latter expression because it involves the problematic notion of error. In speaking of 'agreement in innovation' I aimed at focusing on variant readings 'from the perspective of any point of the textual tradition' (Pecchia 2010: n. 33), with no reference to diachronic features that the word 'innovation' might suggest.

As observed many years ago by Rocher, the question of oral transmission *versus* written transmission in South Asia is quite complex, the factors at work being 'different for different branches of the extensive literary legacy of classical India.'[17] In the case of Āyurveda, aspects of traditional education and the related transmission of texts[18] make it probable that the impact of oral sources on a text's transmission was as determinant as the impact of personal interpretation. In the case of V2, which Gangadhar at least partially wrote himself, it is safe to assume that innovations indicate his own understanding of the text, but it is hardly possible to discern whether they reflect Gangadhar's individual wording of the text or, rather, that of oral or written text versions that he inherited within the framework of his education.

Gangadhar's personal interpretations of the text may be more clearly visible in his JKT, a commentary, that is, a genre that traditionally offered legitimate space for expressing one's own understanding and knowledge of a text. In view of this, the test of Gangadhar's reading of the CaS requires first comparing his edition with his commentary, and secondly both of them with other attested versions of the CaS. A sample that is presented below (see '*On the reading piṇḍena*' below) will show how 'the personal' may in fact be a reflection of 'the traditional.' With regard to the S$_{PBh}$ text, we need to further specify that Gangadhar edited it much later than V2; therefore, 'the personal' corresponds to Gangadhar's understanding of the text after his life-long engagement with it, which was made even more intense by his composition of a vast commentary on it.

The variants that are here analysed are taken from two segments[19] of CaS, Vimānasthāna chapter 8 (henceforth Vimāna 8); reference is made to the numeration of paragraphs according to Trikamji's 1941 edition. The variants are grouped into two distinct

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[17] Rocher 1994: 3f.

[18] See, for example, Scharfe 2002: 258–262 (and more generally chapters 2, 12, and 14–15), and Cerulli 2018.

[19] Here the term 'segment' is adopted in the meaning suggested by Jean-Michel Adam and discussed in Bretelle-Establet and Schmitt 2018. Adam refers to segments as 'textual blocks that result from the cutting of discursive material and can be immediately perceived through vision and reading' (Bretelle-Establet and Schmitt 2018: 7).

lists in Appendix I: List A includes all agreements in innovation between V2 and S$_{PBh}$ that are found in Vimāna 8.1–15, while List B shows all innovations from Vimāna 8.25–66 that are found in S$_{PBh}$. The first segment, made up of approximately 900 words, is about choosing a medical career and medical education; it explains the rules and attitudes of a teacher of Āyurveda, the ritual initiation of a student of Āyurveda, and forms of debate, all of which are aspects of the medical practice and, as such, of medical education.[20] The second segment consists of approximately 1,665 words and delivers a compact treatment of the *vādamārga*, or 'Course of Debate' (in Satischandra Vidyabhushan's translation),[21] where the forty-four technical terms (*pada*s) concerning the procedures of a formal debate (*vāda*) are explained.[22]

Both List A and List B include variants in manuscripts and early printed editions. The variants are documented in an extremely simplified way. Manuscripts are grouped in four families, while printed books are referred to by mentioning the oldest among them to display the variant in question. Individual manuscripts and printed books are mentioned when their readings cannot in any way be grouped with those of other witnesses. This additional set of information serves the purpose of placing Gangadhar's editions in the larger picture of the text's transmission, one that includes the transition from the handwritten production of books to the printing of them. Since, as observed above, manuscript My depends on Gangadhar's printed edition, its readings may sometimes agree in innovation with the Saidabad edition. The relationship between V3 and the Saidabad edition needs further investigation.[23]

[20] On these topics, see Roth's pioneering article of 1872, Scharfe 2002: 258–259 and 286–287, Preisendanz 2007, and Wujastyk 2012, chapters 2–3.

[21] Vidyabhushan 1921: 31.

[22] In his *A History of Indian Logic* (Calcutta 1921), Vidyabhushan offered an English translation of the whole section (pp. 31–35) and an assessment of its place in the history of Indian philosophy. For a critical analysis of the section and Vidyabhushan's assessment of it, see Preisendanz 2013 (in particular, pp. 69–73, 76–78, and 122), where *pada*s is rendered as 'relevant points or topics' and *vāda* as 'disputation' (*ibid.*: 73–74). In Pecchia 2021 text divisions in the *vādamārga* section are examined in connection with the history of the text's transmission.

[23] It is especially noteworthy that manuscript V3 sometimes agrees with S$_{PBh}$ only, e.g. List B, items 2 and 5.

3. What variants reveal

We can now turn to the analysis of the data in Appendix I in order to focus on innovations in Gangadhar's editions. They are referred to by using A or B for the respective lists and a numeral that indicates the pertinent entry in the list. The record shows innovations that consist in:

(a) simplification of expression (A.6, 9; B.8, 23, 27, 35, 36)
(b) addition of words (A.2, 4; B.29, 30, 38, 40)
(c) specific lexical choices (A.1, 3.ii, 8; B.4, 13, 14, 37, 42, 43)
(d) grammatical changes (A.5, 7.i–ii; B.39, 41)
(e) interpretative semantic choices (A.3, 10), here including the textual sequence (B.1 to 3, 5, and 23)

In general, these readings seemingly aim to provide the text with a suitable style and to facilitate a comprehension of the assumed meaning through clarification and simplification of certain expressions. Innovations of type (**d**) and (**e**) represent a more significant interpretative act and, unlike the other types of readings, generate a different meaning of the passage in question. A simplification of the text is obtained by eliminating a connecting word, namely *ca* in A.6, 9 and B.35, and *tatra* in B.27, or a structuring element as *iti* in B.36 (type **a**). Furthermore, single words that were presumably considered redundant have been eliminated (e.g. in B.8, where S$_{PBh}$ reads *santy upāyāḥ* instead of *santi siddhyupāyāḥ*). Among the readings of type (**b**), the additions in B.29-30 seem to reflect the editor's wish to bring clarity to the structure of the text. Semantic clarity by contrast motivated readings of type (**c**), as in the case of B.14, where *vikārāṇām* added to *sādhyānām* in V2 was changed into *vyādhīnām* in S$_{PBh}$. Individual lexical choices such as *avagamya* vs. *adhigamya* (A.1) and °*dākṣiṇyopapannam* vs. °*prādakṣiṇyopapannam* (A.3.ii) may reflect the editor's expectations about the text or simply his taste. The same may be true of the list of beings to whom one should pay homage, which Gangadhar must have considered incomplete because V2 additionally has the term *ṛṣi* (A.2, type **b**). The reading *atyantam* vs. *atyartham* (A.8) may reflect expectations of the editor's times or derive from an individual interpretation of the *akṣara* '*rtha*' (possibly blurred in the available exemplar). All cases in List B in principle indicate similar types of changes, but the agency may be different.

For, in being at variance with readings in V2, innovations in S$_{PBh}$ such as *upamānam* vs. *aupamyam* (B.4), *sambhave* vs. *sadbhāve* (B.13) or *maryādā* vs. *mārga* (B.43) may indicate how not only an older Gangadhar but also the publisher adopted the text.

A special type of interpretative choice concerns the sequence of some text segments, which in S$_{PBh}$, is sometimes in agreement with V2, but at odds with the sequence in previous attested versions (see B.1-3 and 23 and the footnotes thereon). This difference by no means always consists in the mere transposition of text from one place to another. In the case of B.23, the transposed text exhibits further changes: V2 and S$_{PBh}$ agree on an altered text sequence and on the innovation *ca* vs. *ceti*, which precedes the passage. However, they notably differ as regards the rest of the text because they respectively read *etāni hy antareṇa na prakṛto* and *naitāni vinā prakṛtaḥ*. As regards the passage in B.5,[24] as noted by Prets, the manuscript witnesses have the explanation of *dṛṣṭānta* ('generally acknowledged matters') between the segments on *uttara* and *siddhānta* ('reply' and 'fixed position,' Vimāna 8.36–37). By contrast, S$_{PBh}$ has it between the segments on *hetu* and *upanaya* ('statement of proof' and 'application', Vimāna 8.33 and 35).[25] The position of the segment on *dṛṣṭānta* between the segments on *hetu* and *upanaya* recalls the position of *udāharaṇa* ('exemplification') in the *Nyāyasūtra* and *Nyāyabhāṣya*,[26] and may hint at an editorial attempt to have this sequence of topics in the CaS agreeing with the classical Nyāya order.

Another case in point concerns the order of textual segments that illustrate epistemological technical terms. The sequence of *śabda*, *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *aitihya*, and *aupamya* (i.e. verbal testimony, sense perception, inference, oral tradition, and analogy), which corresponds to Vimāna 8.38–42 in Trikamji's edition,[27] is attested in V2, V3, and the manuscript from Cambridge, Trinity

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[24] For a translation of the technical terms in this section of CaS, Vimāna 8, see Preisendanz 2013: 80–84.

[25] Prets 2010: 68–70 and 74–76.

[26] See Prets 2010: 75 and Preisendanz 2013: 86–90.

[27] For a discussion of these topics in CaS, Vimāna 8 and their relationship to the Nyāya tradition, see in particular Kang 2007 and Preisendanz 2013: 81–82, 106–123.

College Library, R 15.85 (= Ca), in Bengali script.[28] However, all other manuscripts of the CaS record these segments according to another order, namely *śabda, pratyakṣa, aupamya, aitihya*, and *anumāna*, which is peculiar of the CaS and is not attested in any other classical *śāstra*s.[29] It is thus plausible that Gangadhar along with the editors of Ca and V3 wished to harmonize epistemological contents of the CaS with the ancient Indian philosophical discourse, especially as represented by the classical Nyāya tradition. Indeed, except for *śabda*, a sequence of terms similar to that in Ca, V2 and V3 is found in Vimāna 8.33, where the causes (*hetu*) that constitute the sources of knowledge are listed. This list echoes *Nyāyasūtra* I.1.3, where the means of valid cognition are '*pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ*.' Gangadhar's S_{PBh} seems to reinforce the resemblance between the CaS and the *Nyāyasūtra* by changing *aupamya* to *upamāna* (see List B.4).

3.1 Numerals

A peculiarity that characterizes most of the early printed editions in South Asia is the text layout, with text division as one of the important tools adopted by printer-publishers. Numerals that mark textual divisions within the main body of the text do appear in Indic manuscripts from early periods,[30] but they are conspicuously absent in the manuscripts bearing the CaS. Therefore, it is all the more notable that V2 as well as V3, Ca and My display sequential numerals in the section on *vādamārga*. The oldest manuscript is definitely Ca because, according to the catalogue, it was written 'about the year 1780.'[31] It should also be noted that

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[28] At the end of the passage concerning *anumāna*, the manuscripts V2, V3, and My read *grahaṇenety*. Ca instead reads *grahaṇenendriyāṇīty*, in agreement with the rest of the manuscript evidence.

[29] Preisendanz 2013: 82.

[30] Kazuo Kano showed copies of folios that bear examples of numerals in the main body of the text during his workshop 'From Kashmir to Tibet: A set of proto-Śāradā palm leaves and two works on the *Ratnagotravibhāga*,' held at the IKGA (Austrian Academy of Sciences), Vienna, 21 April 2015. The folios, which are datable to between the 11th and 13th c., display commentaries on Sajjana's works (see Kano 2016: 217f.).

[31] This is recorded in Aufrecht 1869: 21–24. It is on paper and consists of 124 folios. It is in Bengali script. The text extends from the beginning of CaS Sūtrasthāna to Vimānasthāna 8.74.

since Ca is in Bengali script, it was very likely produced in the same region as V2 and V3. Considering that, in general, the numbering of textual divisions makes the text more easily accessible to readers, a concern for clarity[32] may have prompted Gangadhar to adopt numerals in the *vādamārga* section reproduced in V2, after the examples offered by manuscript books (of which Ca is one such) and printed books that circulated in Bengal in his time. With regard to his printed edition of the CaS, which includes the JKT, numerals are not limited to the *vādamārga* section, but run throughout the entire book, with each page displaying short segments of the two texts one after the other and closed by a sequential numeral. It should be noted that this massive text segmentation and numeration may not be due to Gangadhar himself but to the publisher.

4. An instance of cautious philology

CaS Vimāna 8.15 illustrates a debate among expert physicians — a professional debate, that is. The final part of this segment reads as follows in Trikamji's edition:

> *aśrutam api ca kaṃcid arthaṃ śrotraviṣayam āpādayati, yac cācāryaḥ śi-ṣyāya śuśrūṣave prasannaḥ krameṇopadiśati guhyābhimatam arthajātaṃ tat paraspareṇa saha jalpan piṇḍena vijigīṣur āha saṃharṣāt* (CaS, Vimāna 8.15)

> Also, it [i.e. a professional debate] enables one to listen to certain subject matter not heard/learnt before — even the sort of matters regarded as secret that a well-disposed teacher gradually explains to a student desirous to learn; in one's excitement, one who is desirous of victory articulates [them] in a nutshell while disputing with another.

This passage contains some important indications about how Ayurvedic knowledge was transmitted. As Gangadhar explains in

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[32] Here as elsewhere I use the term 'clarity' following Dionísio's remarks about the introduction of text divisions such as chapters made by the 15th-c. humanist Alfonso de Cartagena in his translations of Latin texts into Castilian. Text divisions are here auxiliary devices connected with 'the rhetorical ideal of *claritas*' (Dionísio 2005: 94).

his commentary, *aśrutam* means *gurumukhād aśrutam*,[33] 'what was not heard/learnt from the mouth of the teacher' — which refers to content specifically taught by a teacher and to the oral nature of its transmission. The following sentence (*yac cācāryaḥ*, etc.) illustrates the special value of those not-yet-learnt teachings. The conjuction *ca* here announces a specification and adds emphasis to what is going to be said.[34] Far from ordinary content, such teachings reveal secret matters (*guhyābhimatam*), which in modern terms we might call a teacher's 'know-how' and 'intellectual property.'[35] As the text suggests, such content was imparted to students within a teaching setting and was not supposed to be shared with the rest of the community. In fact, it was only taught to special students by teachers who were favourably disposed to them, who had adequate pedagogical skills, and who could explain the special matter at hand step by step (*krameṇa*). Thus what was transmitted corresponded to a special expertise that a physician inherited from his teacher and that, to go beyond the text's actual words, probably represented a distinct trademark, as it were, both within the Ayurvedic community and when competing for patients. Driven by the desire to win a debate, a debater might even briefly reveal secret matters of the kind that one slowly imbibes while sitting in front of the teacher. That the competitor of the 'one who is desirous of victory' (*vijigīṣur*) may have been another physician engaged in debate is supported by some manuscripts which add *bhiṣag* (see List A.10).[36] Other modern translations, though, regard the 'one who is desirous of victory' as a teacher.[37] However, this insertion of a scene with teachers and disciples would shift the focus away from what I believe to be more

[33] JKT III: 1556.12.

[34] For this reason, I have rendered *ca* with an emphatic 'even.'

[35] Vidyabhusan's rendering 'precious mystic doctrines' (1921: 29) seems to suggest a religious dimension of these Ayurvedic teachings. The context of the passage, however, does not support this type of interpretation, which might rather reflect an early 20th-c. tendency to detect religious features in non-religious knowledge systems of South Asia.

[36] This is the interpretation reflected in Dasgupta HIPh II: 378, Frauwallner 1984: 68, and Scharfe 2002: 287, n. 63.

[37] Kang 2003: 49–54 (where a survey of previous translations is provided together with parallels to *Nyāyasūtra* IV.2.47–48), Nicholson 2010: 81, and Wujastyk 2012: 107.

likely a specific debate setting involving one's peers wherein the pact between teacher and student no longer applies. Specialized knowledge received through a teacher's instruction comes with the proviso of its non-shareability outside the circle of students. It is this knowledge that gives the professional an advantage over his colleagues in a professional context. The passage shows how the professional setting and the educational one stand in stark contrast to one another as regards the management of knowledge: one's own special knowledge should not be shared, but it might be the best card to play in a debate, which, as part of the broader professional context, spurs the wish to make one's own specific competence public. Whether driven by excitement (*saṃharṣāt*) or, as attested in other witnesses, a sense of rivalry (*saṃgharṣāt*), a debater might play that card and inadvertently give the other debater the opportunity to learn something that normally would not be shared.[38]

5. On the reading piṇḍena

The way in which one might end up revealing things that should not be shared is described in different ways in the textual witnesses, from *piṇḍena* ('in a nutshell') to *paṇḍena, paṇḍitena, apaṇḍitena*, and *vitaṃḍena* (List A.10). To say something 'in a nutshell'[39] is quite adequate for debate purposes, where new subject matter can hardly be expounded in full. In the present case, of course, it should not be explained at all. Indeed, most manuscript and printed books of CaS Vimāna 8 present *piṇḍena*, which is also confirmed in Cakrapāṇidatta's *Āyurvedadīpikā* (end of the 11th c.),[40] the explanation there being *sāroddhāreṇa*, 'by extracting the essence.'[41]

Gangadhar's editions read *paṇḍena*, which is an instrumental from *paṇḍa*, 'eunuch.'[42] This reading can be dismissed as a mean-

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[38] Those who consider the 'one who is desirous of victory' to be a teacher (see previous note), and not a physician-debater, provide quite different interpretations.

[39] Nicholson 2010: 81, n. 38, renders *piṇḍena* with 'in full.' However, *piṇḍa* does not seem to be attested in this meaning.

[40] Meulenbeld HIML, IIA: 93.

[41] *Āyurvedadīpikā*, p. 264b, ll. 4–5: *jalpan piṇḍeneti | piṇḍeneti sāroddhāreṇa |*.

[42] As explained by Wezler (1998, in particular p. 268), the similarity between *paṇḍita* and *paṇḍa* is only apparent because their etymologies are different. My

ingless misspelling that was then reproduced in print. However, the JKT, too, displays *paṇḍena* and adds an explanation of it:

> **yac cā***rthaṃ* **paṇḍena** *svapāṇḍityaprakāśanena* **vijigīṣur** *vijetum icchur* **āha** (JKT III: 1556.12)[43]

> **One who is desirous of victory**, one who wishes to win, **eruditely**, [i.e.] making one's learning public, **articulates even that** subject matter.

The compound *svapāṇḍityaprakāśanena* suggests that Gangadhar understood *paṇḍena* as related to *paṇḍā* ('learning') and *paṇḍita* ('learned' or 'learned person'),[44] and so to *paṇḍitena*, 'eruditely'; hence, my translation 'eruditely' for *paṇḍena*. The copyist of V3 took *paṇḍena* so seriously that he corrected *piṇḍena* to *paṇḍena*, and Trikamji's edition presents Gangadhar's variant in a footnote on *piṇḍena*. It cannot be excluded that *paṇḍena* was understood as *paṇḍitena* in 19th-c. Bengal, but it may well be the case that *paṇḍena* was repeated simply because Gangadhar provided a comment on it, that is, on the weight of his authority. In fact, Gangadhar's comment *svapāṇḍityaprakāśanena* seems to presuppose the reading *paṇḍitena*, which is indeed attested in manuscripts from Bengal. It is therefore quite likely that Gangadhar's explanation was common in his region.

As shown by the Pune manuscript, here called P1,[45] an editor corrected what is now illegible text to *apaṇḍitena*, interpreting the passage as '… one who is desirous of victory *foolishly* says…' This reading was seemingly an attempt to improve on *paṇḍitena*, which a reader could find problematic in the context that the passage describes. The sequence of *akṣara*s that form *jalpan paṇḍitena* might have supported this alternative interpretation because '*n*' in *jalpan* could be written in three different ways, namely with or

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[43] Boldface highlights quotations from the CaS.

[44] Detailed explanations of the origin, usage, and connotations of *paṇḍita* across centuries are provided in Aklujkar 2001.

[45] Manuscript Pune, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 555 of 1875–76, from Bühler 1877, p. xxxvi. Main details: 489 folios (488 acc. to catalogue, but 489 acc. to library record and 483 acc. to Bühler), complete, Śāradā script, paper, dated 1688.

without *virāma* (*ja-lpa-n** or *ja-lpa-nᵃ*), or in a ligature combining '*n*' and '*pa*' (*ja-lpa-npa*). It is easy to imagine that in the first two cases the *akṣara* for '*n*' (be it *n** or *nᵃ*) was interpreted as '*na*'[46] and '*a*' was ascribed to the following word, forming *apaṇḍitena*.

The reading *vitaṃḍena*[47] conjures up *vitaṇḍā* ('captious argumentation'). It has all the markings of an educated guess of an editor who, in view of the general context and the preceding *jalpan*, could have recollected a subsequent segment of the CaS where debate is said to be of two types, namely *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* ('disputation and captious argumentation'),[48] or a passage from the *Nyāyasūtra* where *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* are referred to as determining and protecting what is real.[49] In any event, the reading *vitaṃḍena*, probably meant in the sense 'with a captious argument', cannot derive from the feminine noun *vitaṇḍā*. The meaning of the masculine *vitaṇḍa* (a sort of lock or bolt) can obviously not be extended into any metaphorical usage in the context of the sentence. Considering the different scripts in which the text was copied and possible alternative interpretations of *akṣara*s owing to the copyist's knowledge of specific writing systems, *vitaṃḍena* is only apparently distant from *piṇḍena*. In fact, it may have resulted from an attempt to interpret a sequence such as *pipaṃḍena*, which includes *pi* from *piṇḍena* and *pa* from *paṇḍena*, with *pi* being a correction of the immediately following *pa*.

The readings *piṇḍena*, *paṇḍitena*, and *apaṇḍitena* ('in a nutshell,' 'eruditely,' and 'foolishly') are in principle all acceptable. However, *piṇḍena* matches the context quite well and, moreover, is also a *lectio difficilior*, in being, in this passage, a far more unexpected word than *paṇḍita* and, arguably, far less familiar in its

[46] In the case of '*n*' with *virāma*, the latter could have been dropped, blurred, or even considered an error.

[47] This is the diplomatic transcription of the reading as it appears in the manuscripts.

[48] CaS Vimāna 8.28: *tatra vādo nāma* […] *dvividhaḥ saṃgraheṇa — jalpaḥ vitaṇḍā ca —* 'Of these, debate is […] in sum twofold: disputation and captious argumentation.'

[49] *Nyāyasūtra* IV 2.50: *tattvādhyavasāyasaṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ jalpavitaṇḍe.* Sung Yong Kang suggests the interpretation 'protecting the determination of the truth' ('Beschützen der Feststellung der Wahrheit,' Kang 2003: 36). This implies taking °*adhyavasāyasaṃrakṣaṇa*° as a genitive *tatpuruṣa* rather than a *dvandva*, as other interpreters (whom I follow) do.

metaphorical usage. Though well-known from the ritual context with the meaning of 'ball' (normally made of rice or other edible substances), the metaphorical extension of *piṇḍa* to other subject matters was typical of Buddhist Sanskrit. The compound *piṇḍārtha*, for example, formed titles of works that provided the essential meaning of other works by summarizing their texts (e.g. *Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha*), and was a technical term of a commentarial practice described in Vasubandhu's *Vyākhyāyukti*.[50] The disappearance of Buddhist institutions in South Asia and the related loss of familiarity with Buddhist texts may have led to the obsolescence of *piṇḍa*'s metaphorical meaning.

Therefore, it would be hard to prove that *paṇḍitena* became corrupted to *paṇḍena*, which an editor emended to *piṇḍena*. By contrast, especially in a passage whose syntax is not as neutral and straightforward as the rest of the paragraph, the reading *paṇḍena* may have prompted an editor to associate the word with *paṇḍā* and emend the text to *paṇḍitena*, whose meaning is intuitively suitable to the context, but, after careful reading, problematic — as confirmed by the alternative *apaṇḍitena*.

If all this is true, *paṇḍitena*, *apaṇḍitena*, and *vitaṃḍena* are all evidence supporting the appearance of a corrupt reading *paṇḍena* from *piṇḍena*, Gangadhar's V2 being the only manuscript witness that attests the corruption. This reveals two important aspects of Gangadhar's philological activity, namely his clear distinction between text and interpretation of the *Carakasaṃhitā*, and his cautious (one might also say, respectful) philological approach to the received text. The results are the preservation of the reading *paṇḍena* attested in his witness(es) of the text and the formulation of a meaningful interpretation of it that likely reflected a traditional understanding of the passage handed down to him through education. This understanding was probably typical of the eastern part of South Asia since it is attested in a Calcutta manuscript (Library of Calcutta, Sanskrit College 23) and in a Varanasi manuscript (Sarasvati Bhavan Library, 44842).

These considerations have consequences for our assessment of Gangadhar's V2 as a witness of the CaS. Even though it is a quite

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[50] For some remarks, see Kano 2016: 234f. with n. 93 and, on Vasubandhu's *Vyākhyāyukti*, Verhagen 2005: 574f. and 580f.

recent manuscript (Gangadhar wrote parts of it in 1839), it might at least partially reflect the testimony of a no longer extant exemplar, and thus represent the case of a *recentior non deterior* witness, namely a manuscript that offers recent testimony to the text, but not necessarily worse such than that attested in older witnesses.[51] V2's readings, then, might prove helpful in reconstructing a stage of the transmission prior to the stage attested in representative manuscripts of the family to which V2 belongs, such as the manuscript Varanasi, Sarasvati Bhavan 44842 (= V1), dated 1699/1700 (*saṃvat* 1756, *śaka* 1621). At any rate, Gangadhar's editions of the CaS and the JKT demonstrate the importance of the work of 19th-c. Indian scholars in transmitting the testimony of old manuscripts and the inherited ancient tradition, both being integral parts of the conditions in which they performed their scholarly activity.

Another fact that emerges from the present analysis is the divergence between the text of the CaS in Gangadhar's editions and that reflected in Cakrapāṇidatta's *Āyurvedadīpikā*. Hoernle observed this divergence long ago, notably as regards the sequence of chapters in the Cikitsāsthāna.[52] Our minor case shows that, while reflecting on a reading such as *paṇḍena,* Gangadhar along with editors from the end of the 17th c. did not resort to a meaningful commentarial explanation such as Cakrapāṇidatta's, which could have prompted them to emend the text to *piṇḍena.* The reason for this is arguably that they simply did not have access to the *Āyurvedadīpikā* — which raises the question of the status and actual circulation of Cakrapāṇidatta's commentary within the dynamics of the migration of Ayurvedic knowledge over the centuries.[53]

6. *Contextualizing: the intertextual landscape*

Our remarks on Gangadhar's philological work have so far focused on data deriving from his editions of the CaS and the other witnesses of the text. The segments analysed above are a drop in the ocean

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[51] On this topic, see Pasquali 1952, chapter four, 'Recentiores, non deteriores. Collazioni umanistiche ed editiones principes.'

[52] Hoernle 1908: 1000–1001.

[53] Elsewhere I have written about the advantages of adopting the metaphor of migration when speaking of the transmission of texts (Pecchia 2021: 52–54).

when compared with the length of the CaS and the JKT. Nevertheless, the intertextual context[54] of the CaS, namely the different versions of it transmitted in the extant manuscripts, makes it possible to identify Gangadhar's innovations and to consider stylistic variations and peculiarities that may derive from his original view of the text. Another component of the intertextual landscape of Gangadhar's philological activity consists in the text witnesses to which he had access. Our analysis of the readings *paṇḍena* and *paṇḍitena* suggests that Gangadhar gave his imprimatur to two types of readings, which belong to two different moments in the history of a branch of the transmission (rather than two different branches of it) mostly attested in manuscripts from Bengal. This implies that Gangadhar's philology doubtless represents Ayurvedic knowledge as transmitted within the Bengali tradition. Furthermore, Gangadhar made a distinction between the latitude allowed by the edition and that by the commentary: while he suspended his judgment on a specific reading of the CaS transmitted by the textual tradition available to him in manuscript form, he explained the same reading by deploying the orally and written transmitted tradition and integrating it with personal interpretation.

A further component of the intertextual context that we are reconstructing here can be identified by looking at the wider context of Gangadhar's philological activity concerning the CaS, namely his interpretative work on the text. His interpretation is chiefly displayed in the JKT, whose testimony — as we have seen above ('An instance of cautious philology') — can significantly modify the impression given by Gangadhar's edited texts. The JKT was printed together with the CaS in C_{SJ} and S_{PBh}, which appeared when he was in his seventies and eighties respectively. We can assume that these editions reflected his final interpretation of the text as expounded in the JKT, whose composition, at least to some extent, arguably ran parallel to his editorial work. His previous edition, V2, which was instead made when he was in his forties, may reflect the text as transmitted in manuscript(s) available to him more than his personal interpretation of it. Besides the JKT, Gangadhar provided a succinct explanation of the contents of the

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[54] Concerning this expression, see n. 3 above.

CaS in the *Mṛtyuñjayasaṃhitā*.[55] As observed by Prets, the *Mṛtyuñja-yasaṃhitā* agrees with V2, and not with S$_{PBh}$, with regard to the place of *dṛṣṭānta* in the *vādamārga* section.[56] If confirmed by further research, the correspondence between V2 and the *Mṛtyuñja-yasaṃhitā* would represent the first stage of a trajectory in Gangadhar's philological activity, which culminated in the composition of a vast commentary and its printed publication together with the edition of the CaS itself. Assuming that disagreements between V2 and S$_{PBh}$ do not derive from the publisher's intervention in the text (an assumption that, given the above-noted absence of documentary evidence, remains unsubstantiated), the two lists displayed in Appendix I provide a first set of data concerning the impact of Gangadhar's interpretation on his edition of the CaS in two distinct stages of his engagement with the text.

In order to contextualize Gangadhar's editions of and commentary on the CaS, another important factor is Indian philosophical *śāstra*s. His philosophical digressions evidently impressed the compiler of the *Records in the Bengal Library*, who added the following remark to the publication data of Gangadhar's CaS and JKT:

> The exposition of these elementary principles and vital powers is in consonance with the doctrines of the Sankhya, Nyaya, and other old Hindu Philosophical systems which the commentator has done much to elucidate.[57]

The contents of Indian philosophical *śāstra*s also flowed into Gangadhar's composition of other Sanskrit works, among which there is a commentary on Udayana's *Nyāyakusumañjalī* (10th c.),[58]

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[55] According to the information provided in Prets 2010: 76, n. 55, a manuscript of the *Mṛtyuñjayasaṃhitā* is kept in Kolkata, Sanskrit College, Ayurveda handlist, Ms. no. 153. The *Mṛtyuñjayasaṃhitā* is mentioned by Prabhakar Chatterjee among Gangadhar's Ayurvedic books (1958: 31), but not by Rita Chattopadhyay who, however, lists an *Āyurvedasaṃgraha* and an *Āyurvedasaṃgrahavyākhyā* (2012: 272–273).

[56] Prets 2010: 76.

[57] *Records in the Bengal Library. Catalogues of Books received during the Quarter ending .... Vol. 1879–1881,* 31st December 1879, No. 35.

[58] Chatterjee 1958: 31. Chattopadhyay mentions a '*Bhāṣya on Nyāya*' (2012: 278, item 56).

showing the wide traditional background on which his scholarly eye rested. For now, given the scanty information we have on microhistorical aspects of Āyurveda practice in 19th-c. Bengal, we cannot say whether his familiarity with the Indian philosophical tradition was typical of the Ayurvedic culture of his time (or a regional form of it), or whether Gangadhar was a notable exception in the field. For now, it is also difficult to say whether Gangadhar was atypical in making epistemological vocabulary in Vimānasthāna 8 conform to Nyāya terminology, or whether he did so within a broader trend to align non-medical components of the CaS with classical Nyāya. Interestingly enough, a connection between epistemological contents of the CaS and the beginnings of classical Nyāya is pointed out by the Bengali scholar Satis Chandra Vidyabhusan (1870–1920). In his *History of Indian Logic* (1921) he equated *ānvīkṣikī* with the Nyāyaśāstra and held that Medhātithi Gautama formulated the principles of *ānvīkṣikī*.[59] He then argued as follows:

> The *Carakasaṃhitā* gives a summary of the principal doctrines of Ānvīkṣikī possibly as propounded by Medhātithi Gautama. […] But while Caraka accepted them in their crude forms, Akṣapāda pruned them thoroughly before they were assimilated in the Nyāya-sūtra. (Vidyabhusan 1921: 25–26)

Vidyabhusan's view, which was sharply criticized by Surendranath Dasgupta in his *History of Indian Philosophy* (1932),[60] may have been influenced by an interpretative trend that was already circulating in the Bengali intellectual milieu where Vidyabhusan received his education. In any case, Gangadhar's and Vidyabhusan's views are concrete examples of the important role of Nyāya philosophy in 19th-century intellectual history of Bengal (a role that was criticized, for example, by Vivekananda)[61] or in a centre of learning such as Banaras, in continuation of a long-standing tradition whose contours are becoming more and more clear.[62]

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[59] Vidyabhusan 1921: 17–21. Preisendanz 2013 offers a detailed analysis of Vidyabhusan's view.

[60] Dasgupta HIPh II: 392–394.

[61] See a passage from a speech that Vivekananda held in Madras as quoted in Ganeri 1996: 3.

[62] Dodson 2002 (especially pp. 280–287) describes Nyāya as the starting point of reference in Ballantyne's composition of his *Synopsis of Science*; see also the

7. On a final note

In order to contextualize Gangadhar's work concerning the CaS within a landscape made of texts, a 'contextual archive' can be reconstructed which testifies to the amalgam of śāstric knowledge, more particularly medical and philosophical knowledge, deployed by Gangadhar in his philological activity. However, for him the CaS was not only a piece of Sanskrit literature, but also a fundamental source of the medical knowledge on which his professional practice was based. In view of this, his edition and commentary reflect not only his scholarly approach to the text, but also the revealing traces of his own insight as a physician when technical medical questions are at issue. Furthermore, Gangadhar's professional 'liaison' with the CaS triggers a chain of questions of broader significance. This chain starts by asking why Gangadhar — a prominent physician in colonial Bengal — decided to edit the CaS, why he chose to compose a commentary on it and to do it in Sanskrit; what else he chose — paraphrasing Sheldon Pollock — when he chose Sanskrit for talking about Āyurveda in his social and political environment;[63] and what his edition and commentary meant for the Ayurvedic community.[64] The history of the printed publication of the CaS provides evidence of an interest in, and renewed attention towards Āyurveda not only as medical science, but also as part of the cultural heritage, and a cultural identifier, of colonial India. Indeed, Gangadhar's CaS and Madhusudan Gupta's edition of the *Suśrutasaṃhitā* (1835–1836) represent the starting point of a philological drive that targeted traditional works of Āyurveda, with Indian physicians, scholars, and publishers making a sustained effort to edit, translate, comment, and print such works.[65] This helped to revive the study of the CaS — which, to judge by the extant manuscripts, was quite neglected in several regions of South Asia — and to reshape and strengthen the awareness of Indian physicians and scholars regarding this aspect of their cultural heritage. Ayurvedic texts indeed became a relevant part of the Sanskritic cul-

studies conducted by Samuel Wright, with his most recent article from 2021.
[63] Pollock 1998: 7, where the author refers to a 'language-for-literature.'
[64] Partial answers to these questions are given in Pecchia 2022.
[65] Pecchia 2022, §§ 3.4–5 and 4.

ture that some Indian intellectual circles wanted to revive.[66] During the colonial period, except for a few scholars, especially Indologists, who began to study ancient Ayurvedic texts in the 19th c. and acknowledged their antiquity and systematicity,[67] there was a widespread lack of attention to Āyurveda on the part of European institutions, scholars, and missionaries. The British authorities in fact dismissed Āyurveda as an inferior healing method,[68] and the missionaries, too, showed scarce interest in it (while their concern for indigenous science in other cases complemented or replaced the absence of such a lack of attention by the colonial rule).[69] The legacy of such a lack of attention may partly be the reason why the activity of a scholar-physician like Gangadhar has neither been investigated in detail (for example, there is no accurate record yet of Gangadhar's works, which are mostly in manuscript form)[70] nor evaluated in connection with the social history of Āyurveda and the intellectual history of colonial India at large. An additional explanation may be seen in what Brian Hatcher called 'the legacy of colonial attitudes about the pandit,'[71] which can reasonably be extended to the kavirajes.

It is arguably a result of both legacies that the limits imposed by the paucity of archive documents have scarcely been challenged when exploring intellectual practices and ideologies of pandits (or kavirajes). Therefore, in offering what may otherwise soon

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[66] See, for example, Panikkar 1986: 430.

[67] In commenting on W. Ward's *Account of the Writings, Religion, and Manners of the Hindoos* (Serampore Mission Press 1811), Sivasundaram observes that 'Ward's views … demonstrate that in engaging with existent science, these Baptist missionaries hoped to recover the truths of what they saw as ancient wisdom, which were consistent with the biblical narrative' (Sivasundaram 2007: 132).

[68] On this, see, e.g., Arnold 1993: 54–58.

[69] Evidence of the complementary role of missionaries in recovering scientific knowledge developed by the Sanskritic culture is for example provided by Sivasundaram, who shows that the 'style of science practised at Serampore operated outside the traditional framework of colonial science' (Sivasundaram 2007: 111).

[70] The overview presented in Chattopadhyay 2012 is a helpful tool, although based on limited research. A few details have been added in Pecchia 2022, Appendix II, n. 62.

[71] Hatcher 2005: 701.

become irretrievable information, the identification of different sources — such as the texts themselves that scholars produced (from editions of texts to original compositions) and what I have called a contextual archive — also sheds light on the narrative in which our work is embedded. If Gangadhar's philology is taken as an emblematic case, it becomes evident that this narrative hardly features anyone who did not actively interact with individuals and structures belonging to the colonial culture; in fact, it mainly focuses on the so-called encounter between India and the West.[72] Furthermore, this narrative is largely dependent on boundaries within Western scholarly institutions. This makes it difficult for specialists of modern South Asia to appreciate the well-established vocabularies of knowledge about Sanskritic culture in 19th- and 20th-c. multilingual South Asian societies. But these vocabularies provide access to a range of sources in Sanskrit that can illuminate important actors of 19th-c. Indian intellectual history, as Gangadhar Ray Kaviraj definitely was, given his scholarly and medical work, and his legacy in the history of Āyurveda. If a 'synchronic multiperspectivism'[73] is crucial to a non-biased investigation of Indian intellectual activities and developments in the colonial period, it also offers a fresh opportunity to view intellectual practices without the lens of European history and its storytelling about those practices. Investigating the features of Gangadhar's philological work on the CaS thus turns into an exercise in investigating our own assumptions about philology as a practice and a discipline, and exploring the field beyond the limits posed by these assumptions.

Appendix I
Gangadhar's innovations in Carakasaṃhitā
Vimānasthāna 8.1–15 and 25–66

Examples of Gangadhar's innovations are here shown in two lists. List A comprises all agreements in innovation between V2 and S in Vim. 8.1–15. List B displays the innovations in S for Vim. 8.25–66.

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[72] See Mukharji's insightful remarks on the idea of 'encounter' in the case of India and the West (2011: 8–9).

[73] For the use of this expression in a discussion of research methods, see Brentjes 2015: 121.

Trikamji's 1941 edition of the *Carakasaṃhitā* is here adopted as a reference text. The sigla and abbreviations used to refer to manuscripts and printed editions are shown in *General Abbreviations.*

Each entry in the lists consists of a passage quoted from Trikamji's edition and the record of relevant variants in that passage. The quoted passage is followed by a number in square brackets that identifies the paragraph according to the numbering in Trikamji's edition. Words set in italics serve to provide clarity in the recording of complex variants as they indicate readings with variants in the quoted passage.

Two sets of records follow in subsequent new lines, presenting readings for which variants are found in, respectively, manuscripts and printed editions. Witnesses whose readings agree with Trikamji's edition are recorded immediately after the closing square bracket that follows the lemmatized reading. In the second set of records, Trikamji's edition is implicitly included among the witnesses after the square bracket. In List A, manuscripts V2 and V3 are always indicated. The record of variants is extremely simplified and only serves to situate Gangadhar's philological work.

General abbreviations

A	all other witnesses except those mentioned within the same entry
ac	*ante correctionem* (before correction)
etc.	one or more printed editions chronologically following the mentioned edition and most likely relying on the latter
om.	omitted
pc	*post correctionem* (after correction)
^2pc	*post correctionem* by a second hand

Sigla of manuscripts

Sigla K Q R and S indicate the families into which the witnesses are grouped.[74] One of these sigla followed by the sign $^{\#}$ refers to some manuscripts only, and not the entire family.

Alw (K)	Alwar, RORI 2498
Ab (S)	Ahmedabad, B.J. Institute of Learning and Research 758

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[74] For a stemma of the witnesses of CaS, Vimāna 8, see Maas 2010: 65.

Ap1 (Q)	Alipur, Bhogilal Leherchand Institute of Indology 5283
Ap2 (Q)	Alipur, Bhogilal Leherchand Institute of Indology 5527
B1 (R)	Bikaner, RORI 1566
B2 (R)	Bikaner, Anup Sanskrit Library, 124
B3 (Q)	Bikaner, Anup Sanskrit Library, 125
B4 (R)	Bikaner, Anup Sanskrit Library, 134
B5 (R)	Bikaner, Anup Sanskrit Library, 135
B6 (R)	Bikaner, Anup Sanskrit Library, 136
Ba1 (S)	Baroda, OI 12489
Ba2 (S)	Baroda, OI 25034
Bo (R)	Bombay, Asiatic Society 172
C1 (Q)	Calcutta, National Library RDS 101
C2 (Q)	Calcutta, Library of Calcutta, Sanskrit College 23
C3 (Q)	Calcutta, Library of Calcutta, Sanskrit College 24
C4 (Q)	Calcutta, Asiatic Society G 4474/3
C5 (Q)	Calcutta, Asiatic Society G 2503/1
C6 (K)	Calcutta, Asiatic Society G 4391
Ca (Q)	Cambridge, Trinity College Library R 15.85
Ch (K)	Chandigarh, Lal Chand Research Library 2315
Ib1 (S)	Ilāhābad, G. Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha 25398
Ib2 (S)	Ilāhābad, G. Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha 8783/87
Ib3 (R)	Ilāhābad, G. Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha 37089
J1 (K)	Jammu, Raghunath Temple Library 3266
J2 (K)	Jammu, Raghunath Temple Library 3209
J3 (K)	Jammu, Raghunath Temple Library 3330
Jn1 (R)	Jamnagar, Gujarat Ayurved University Library GAS 103
Jn2 (R)	Jamnagar, Gujarat Ayurved University Library GAS 118
Jn3 (R)	Jamnagar, Gujarat Ayurved University Library GAS 96/2
Jp1 (K)	Jaipur, MSMS Museum 2068
Jp2 (R)	Jaipur, MSMS Museum 2069
Jp3 (R)	Jaipur, MSMS Museum 2561
K (R)	Koṭa, RORI 1563
Km (S)	Kathmandu, NGMPP E-40553
L1 (R)	London, IOL Skt. ms. 335
L2 (R)	London, IOL Skt. ms. 881
L3 (R)	London, IOL Skt. ms. 1445b
My (Q)	Mysore, ORI 902
P1 (K)	Pune, BORI 555 of 1875–76
P2 (K)	Pune, BORI 534 of 1892–95
P3 (Q)	Pune, BORI 925 of 1891–95
P4 (S)	Pune, Ānandāśrama 1546
T1 (R)	Tübingen, UB I.458
T2 (S)	Tübingen, UB I.459
T3 (R)	Tübingen, UB I.460 + I.474

U (K)   Udaipur, RORI 1474
V1 (Q)   Varanasi, Sarasvati Bhavan 44842
V2 (Q)   Varanasi, Sarasvati Bhavan 108824
V3 (Q)   Varanasi, Sarasvati Bhavan 108685
V4 (R)   Varanasi, BHU C3688
V5a (Q)   Varanasi, Sarasvati Bhavan 44870
V5b (Q)   Varanasi, Sarasvati Bhavan 44870

Sigla of printed editions

C1[P]   Jivananda Vidyasagara Bhattacaryya, Kolkata, 1877
C2[P]   Jivananda Vidyasagara Bhattacaryya, Kolkata, 1896
C4[P]   Harinatha Visharada, Kolkata, 1892-1919
C7[P]   Yogindra Nath Sen, Kolkata, 1922
S[PBh]   Gangadhar Ray Kaviraj, Saidabad, 1878/1879

List A. Agreements in innovation between V2 and S (CaS Vimānasthāna 8.1–15)

1   atas tatprasādāt kṛtsnaṃ śāstram *adhigamya* [5]
     adhigamya] A; avagamya V2 V3
     adhigamya] A; avagamya S[PBh] etc.

2   *devarṣigo*brāhmaṇaguruvṛddhasiddhācāryebhyo namaskṛtya [7]
     devarṣigo] V2 V3; goveda Bo; devago A
     devarṣigo] S[PBh] etc.; devago C1[P] etc.

3   *anahaṅkṛtaṃ* … śīlaśaucācārānurāgadākṣya*prādakṣiṇyopapannam*
     adhyayanābhikāmam [8]
     (i) *anahaṅkṛtaṃ*] A V2 (*pc*); anaṅkṛtaṃ V2 (*ac*) V3; anahaṃkṛtiṃ Ap1
     Alw Ch Jp1
     anahaṅkṛtaṃ] A; alaṃkṛtaṃ S[PBh] C2[P] etc.; anahaṅkṛtiṃ C1[P] etc.
     (ii) *-prādakṣiṇyopapannam*] A; dākṣiṇyopapannam V2 V3
     -prādakṣiṇyopapannam] A; dākṣiṇyopapannam S[PBh] etc.

4   śaśini kalyāṇe *kalyāṇe ca karaṇe* maitre muhūrte [9]
     kalyāṇe ca karaṇe] V2 V3; karaṇe Ca T1 (²*pc*);[75] *om.* A
     kalyāṇe ca karaṇe] S[PBh] etc.; *om.* C1 etc.

5   *abhimantrayamāṇaḥ* pūrvaṃ svāheti [11]
     abhimantrayamāṇaḥ] A; abhimantrāyamāṇaḥ V2 V3

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[75] On corrections in T1, see Pecchia 2010: 154f.

abhimantrayamāṇaḥ] A; abhimantrāyamāṇaḥ $C2^p$ etc.; abhimantrā-
yamāṇaṃ S_{PBh} (with a typo)

6 -kāriṇānasūyakena *cābhyanujñātena* pravicaritavyam [13]
  cābhyanujñātena] Ca My $T1(^2pc)$; abhyanujñātena V2 V3; na cānabhyu-
  pajñātena P1; na cānabhyanujñātena A; *om.* Ap1 Jp3 V1
  cābhyanujñātena] A; na cānabhyanujñātena $C1^p$ etc.; abhyanujñātena
  S_{PBh} etc.

7 na kvacit praṇidhātavyāny *anyatrāturād āturopakārārthād āturagateṣv*
  anyeṣu vā bhāveṣu [13]
  (i) *anyatrāturād āturopakārārthād*] V2 V3; anyatrāturād āturopakā-
  rārtham A (with three further variants); anyatrāturopakārārthād K Ca
  My V1
  anyatrāturād āturopakārārthād] S_{PBh} etc.; anyatrāturopakārārthāt $C1^p$
  etc.; anyatrāturopakārārthā Bo1
  (ii) *āturagateṣv*] A; vāturagateṣv V2 V3 My; nāturagateṣv Ca C5; ānta-
  reṣv P1
  āturagateṣv] $C1^p$ etc.; vāturagateṣu S_{PBh} etc.; nāturagateṣu $C3^p$ etc.

8 *atyartham* udvijanty aneke [13]
  atyartham] A; atyantam V2 V3
  atyartham] A; atyantam S_{PBh}

9 ācāryo yathoktaiś *cādhyāpana*phalair yogam *āpnoty* [14]
  cādhyāpana-] K Ca B1; cādhyāyana P1 B3 C1; cādhyayana A; adhyāpa-
  na V2 V3
  cādhyāpana-] A; adhyāpana S_{PBh}

10 tat paraspareṇa saha jalpan *piṇḍena vijigīṣur* āha saṃharṣāt [15]
  piṇḍena] A V3(ac); piṇḍeṣu L2; piṇḍena bhiṣak* Ap1 B3; paṇḍena V2
  V3(pc); paṇḍitena bhiṣak* V1 C2 C4; apaṇḍitena P1(pc) [the *ante cor-
  rectionem* text is illegible]; apaṇḍitena bhiṣak* J1 J3; vitaṃḍena B1 B2
  B5 Bo
  piṇḍena] A; paṇḍena S_{PBh} etc.

List B. Innovations in S_{PBh} only (CaS Vimānasthāna 8.25–66)

1 uktvā tūṣṇīm āsīta [25]
  uktvā tūṣṇīm āsīta] *uktvā* A; *tūṣṇīm āsīta* transposed in a previous pas-
  sage, after *asmābhir vaktum*
  uktvā tūṣṇīm āsīta] S_{PBh} etc.; uktvā $C1^p$ etc., *tūṣṇīm āsīta* transposed in
  a previous passage, after *asmābhir vaktum*[76]

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[76] All manuscripts and the printed editions that follow $C1^p$ read *iti* before *tū-
ṣṇīm āsīta.*

2 dṛṣṭāntaḥ—*yathākāśam iti* [31]
yathākāśam iti] V3; yathā ākāśaṃ tac ca nityam My; yathā cākṛtakam ākāśaṃ tac ca nityam V2; yathākṛtakam ākāśaṃ tac ca nityam iti Q; akṛtakam ākāśaṃ tac ca nityam K R Ca; akṛtakam ākāśaṃ tac ca nityam iti S
yathākāśam iti] S$_{PBh}$ etc.; akṛtakam ākāśaṃ tac ca nityam C1^P etc.; ya akṛtakam ākāśaṃ tac ca nityam C3^P; dṛṣṭāntākāśaṃ tac ca nityam B04$^{P\,77}$

3 dṛṣṭāntaḥ—yathā ghaṭa iti, upanayaḥ—yathā ghaṭa aindriyakaḥ sa cānityaḥ [32]
dṛṣṭāntaḥ … sa cānityaḥ] dṛṣṭānto yathā ghaṭa iti, upanayo yathā ghaṭa *aindriyakaḥ* V3;
dṛṣṭānto yathā ghaṭa *aindriyakaḥ* sa cānityaḥ | upanayo yathā ghaṭa *aindriyakas* V2; dṛṣṭānto ghaṭaś *caindriyakaḥ* sa cānityaḥ | upanayo yathā ghaṭas *caindriyakas* R$^\#$ S$^\#$;
dṛṣṭānto ghaṭaś *caindriyakaḥ* sa cānityaḥ | iti upanayo yathā ghaṭas Q$^\#$;
dṛṣṭānto ghaṭaś *caindriyakaḥ* sa cānityaḥ | upanayo yathā ghaṭas A;
dṛṣṭānto ghaṭaḥ *aindriyakaḥ* sa cānitya upanayo yathā ghaṭas K;
dṛṣṭāntaḥ … sa cānityaḥ] S$_{PBh}$ etc.; dṛṣṭānto yathā ghaṭa *aindriyakaḥ* sa cānityaḥ, upanayo yathā ghaṭas C2^P etc.; dṛṣṭānto ghaṭaḥ, *aindriyakaḥ* sa cānityaḥ, upanayo yathā ghaṭas C1^P etc.

4 atha hetuḥ … *aupamyam iti* [33]
aupamyam iti] A
aupamyam iti] A; upamānam iti S$_{PBh}$ etc.

5 *atha dṛṣṭāntaḥ … iti* [34]
atha dṛṣṭāntaḥ… iti] V3; *transposed after § 36, which is the segment on* uttaram A
atha dṛṣṭāntaḥ… iti] S$_{PBh}$, etc.; *transposed after § 36, which is the segment on* uttaram C1^P etc.

6 *yo* varṇyaṃ varṇayati [34]
yo] A
yo] C1^P etc.; tenaiva yad S$_{PBh}$ etc.

7 pṛthivī [34]
pṛthivī] A
pṛthivī] A; pṛthivīty S$_{PBh}$

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[77] The phrase *tac ca nityam*, which does not appear in S$_{PBh}$, first appears as transposed after the subsequent sentence, namely *upanayaḥ — yathā cākṛtakam ākāśam*, in Yogīndra Nath Sen's edition (Kolkata 1922) and Trikamji's 1933 edition.

8 santi siddhyupāyāḥ [37]
   santi siddhyupāyāḥ] A; santy upāyāḥ V3
   santi siddhyupāyāḥ] A; santy upāyāḥ S_{PBh}

9 sādhyānām iti [37]
   sādhyānām iti] A; sādhyānām vyādhīnām iti V2 V3
   sādhyānām iti] A; sādhyānām vyādhīnām S_{PBh}

10 atra ṣaḍ indriyāṇy anyatra tantre [37]
    atra ṣaḍ indriyāṇy anyatra tantre] atrānyatra ṣaḍ indriyāṇi V2 V3; atra
    ṣaḍ indriyāṇi Ca; anyatra yathānyatra ṣaḍ indriyāṇi L2; yathātrānyatra
    ṣaḍ indriyāṇi Q S; yathānyatrānyatra ṣaḍ indriyāṇi K[#] R; yathānyatra
    ṣaḍ indriyāṇi K[#]
    atra ṣaḍ indriyāṇy anyatra tantre] atrānyatra ṣaḍ indriyāṇi tantre S_{PBh},
    etc.; yathānyatrānyatra ṣaḍ indriyāṇi C1^p etc.; yathānyatra ṣaḍ
    indriyāṇi C2^p etc.

11 -pretyabhāvā *bhavanti* [37]
    bhavanti] A
    bhavanti] A; syuḥ S_{PBh} etc.

12 *tribhir* hetubhir [38]
    tribhir] A
    tribhir] A; ebhir S_{PBh}

13 sadbhāve [38]
    sadbhāve] A; sambhave V3; sambhāve Ca L2
    sadbhāve] A; sambhave S_{PBh}

14 sādhyānām vyādhīnām [38]
    sādhyānām vyādhīnām] sādhyānām vikārāṇām V2 V3; sādhyānāṃ A
    sādhyānām vyādhīnām] S_{PBh} etc.; sādhyānāṃ C1^p etc.

15 yady akālamṛtyur [44]
    akālamṛtyur] A; akālakālamṛtyur Ch
    akālamṛtyur] A; akālakāmutyur S_{PBh}

16 auṣadham asmin [45]
    asmin] A; tasmin My V3
    asmin] A; tasmin S_{PBh} etc.

17 bheṣajaṃ ceti [47]
    ceti] iti A; *om.* V2 V3
    ceti] C7^p etc.; ca S_{PBh} etc.; iti C1^p etc.

18 aparasyārthasya [48]
   aparasyārthasya] A; aparasya Ca
   aparasyārthasya] A; aparasya cārthasya S$_{PBh}$ etc.

19 sa tasya saṃbhavaḥ [49]
   sa tasya saṃbhavaḥ] A
   sa tasya saṃbhavaḥ] A; tasya saṃbhavaḥ sa S$_{PBh}$

20 dhātavo [49]
   dhātavo] A
   dhātavo] A; dhātavo hi S$_{PBh}$ etc.

21 anuyogo nāma *sa* yat [52]
   sa] *om.* A
   sa] S$_{PBh}$ etc.; *om.* C1^p etc.

22 -vacana*prativacana*- [52]
   prativacana] A; *om.* Ca My
   prativacana] A; prativacanaṃ S$_{PBh}$; *om.* C1^p etc.

23 *etāni hy antareṇa na prakṛto* 'rthaḥ praṇaśyet [54]
   etāni hy antareṇa na prakṛto] V2 V3; etāni hy antareṇa prakṛto Ca;[78]
   etāni hy antareṇa prakṛto 'py A[79]
   etāni hy antareṇa na prakṛto] C7^p etc.; etāni hy antareṇa prakṛto 'py C1^p
   etc.;[80] naitāni vinā prakṛto S$_{PBh}$ etc.

24 anyad *vā yat kiṃcid aprati*saṃbaddhārtham [54]
   vā yat kiṃcid aprati] vā punar aprati S; vāprati A[81]
   vā yat kiṃcid aprati] S$_{PBh}$ etc.; vāprati C4^p etc.; vā prati C1^p etc.

25 punar*uktadoṣatvād* adhikam [54]
   uktadoṣatvād] uktadoṣād A; uktatvād My
   uktadoṣatvād] Bo8 etc.; uktatvād S$_{PBh}$ etc.; doṣatvād C4^p etc.; ukta-
   doṣād C1^p etc.

26 tatra *pūrvaṃ* dṛṣṭāntasiddhāntāv [54]
   pūrvaṃ] My; *om.* A
   pūrvaṃ] S$_{PBh}$, etc.; *om.* C1^p, etc.

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[78] The segment *etāni … praṇaśyet* is transposed at the end of the second fol-
lowing sentence, after *tac ca nyūnam.*

[79] See n. 77.

[80] See n. 77.

[81] Because of the *scriptio continua*, the readings *vāprati* and *vā prati* cannot be
distinguished.

27 *tatra* svasamayaviparītam [54]
   tatra] A
   tatra] A; *om.* S_{PBh}

28 yathā khalv asminn arthe tv anyūnam [55]
   yathā … tv anyūnam] yathā … arthe anyūnam A; yathānyūnam K;
   anyūnam Ch
   yathā … tv anyūnam] S_{PBh} etc.; yathānyūnam C1^P etc.

29 kiṃ nu bhavān [56]
   kiṃ nu bhavān] kin na bhavān My; bhavān A; bhagavān B3 V3
   kiṃ nu bhavān] S_{PBh} etc.; bhavān C1^P etc.

30 *tatra sat* kāsaḥ [56]
   tatra sat] sat A; san S R^#; san hi Ca
   tatra sat] S_{PBh} etc.; san hi C4^P etc.; sat C1^P

31 kāsas *te* [56]
   te] A; *om.* My
   te] A; *om.* S_{PBh} etc.

32 nitya iti. *paro* [57]
   paro] pakṣe paro Q S; pakṣe K R
   paro] S_{PBh} etc.; pakṣe paro C2^P etc.; pakṣe C1^P etc.

33 sa eva hetur *iti* [57]
   iti] bhavati V2 V3; *om.* A
   iti] S_{PBh} etc.; *om.* C1^P etc.

34 saṃśaye paro *brūyāt* [57]
   brūyāt] A
   brūyāt] A; brūvīti S_{PBh}

35 tasya *cāpagamān* [60]
   cāpagamān] K S; punar apagamān Q R
   cāpagamān] A; apagamān S_{PBh} etc.

36 ātmā nityaś *ceti* [60]
   ceti] A; iti Ca B3 L2; śarīraś ceti Ch P1; śarīrāś ceti K^#
   ceti] C4^P etc.; ca S_{PBh} etc.; śarīrāc ceti C1^P etc.

37 *pūrva*parigṛhītāṃ pratijñām [61]
   pūrva] A; pūrvaṃ V2 V3 Q^#
   pūrva] A; prāk S_{PBh} etc.

38 *yat* parityajati [61]
   yat] *om.* A
   yat] S$_{PBh}$ etc.; *om.* A

39 prakṛtihetau *vācye* [63]
   vācye] A; vākya S$^{\#}$; vākye B3
   vācye] A; vaktavye S$_{PBh}$ etc.

40 *yad* vikṛtahetum [63]
   yad] My; *om.* A
   yad] S$_{PBh}$ etc.; C1^{p} etc.

41 ahetuḥ [65]
   ahetuḥ] My; ahetavo A
   ahetuḥ] S$_{PBh}$ etc.; ahetavo C1^{p} etc.

42 anarthakam [65]
   anarthakam] My; apārthakam A
   anarthakam] S$_{PBh}$ etc.; apārthakam C1^{p} etc.

43 vāda*mārga*padāni [66]
   -mārga-] A; maryādā My
   -mārga-] C1^{p} etc.; maryādā S$_{PBh}$ etc.

Appendix II
A description of the manuscript Varanasi,
Sarasvati Bhavan Library, 108824 (= V2)

Catalogue entry

A Descriptive Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts Acquired and
Deposited in the Sampurnanand Sanskrit University (Sarasvatī-
Bhavana) Library…, Vol. 12,2, Jaina…, No. 108824 (p. 98) [B
1049] [IGNCA reel No. SL A2275]
   Accession No. 107465
   Further identificatory information found on the ms.: mu° saṃ°
21866

General characteristics

Paper, Bengali script, 330 folios, 49.78×9.14 cm, 6–10 lines to a
page, 75–80 *akṣara*s per line.

The ms. contains a complete text of the CaS and an index, which covers four folios. The number of folios according to count is 330. According to the catalogue, there are 326 + 3 folios. A folio of different size and paper is inserted after fol. 76; on the top left: 7312 and some unidentified *akṣara*s. Foliation is continuous; it appears in the centre of each of the left corner margins. From folio 97 to 196 numerals are mostly enclosed in brackets.

In some parts of the ms. there are six to eight lines of text on a folio side, in other parts nine to ten lines. There are approximately 75–80 *akṣara*s per line, but sometimes up to 90 *akṣara*s. String holes occasionally appear. The devotional element *śrīḥ* appears from fol. 255 to the end, in the centre of the right margin.

The ms. is in Bengali script and was written by at least three copyists.

Palaeographical features

The Bengali script is clear and regular, but far from being homogeneous. Especially from fol. 97 to fol. 210 the writing style is quite formal, with *akṣara*s written in a very regular shape and with generous strokes in the elements above or below the central square of the *akṣara*. Except for the part containing the Nidānasthāna and Vimānasthāna, the visarga is often similar to the ligature *ñca*, but without the element on the right side.

Single and double *daṇḍa*s are used throughout the ms. At the end of thematic sections, a circle within brackets appears between pairs of double *daṇḍa*s: ||⁽°⁾||, or ||⁽°⁾⁾||. Other elements that structure the text are numbers of sections and small strokes or other signs on the upper line of *akṣara*s for the separation of word-units.

Corrections and glosses

They occur frequently in the margins. Glosses are often within brackets. Corrections mostly end with the number of the line in which they should be inserted; a v-like sign with a dot in the middle shows the pertinent text to be changed; the same sign, but upside down, appears when a correction should be inserted in the third or fourth line from the bottom. The text of the correction is often preceded by a sign resembling the numeral 2, which visually links to

the insertion mark in the main writing area of the folio. Strokes on top of contiguous *akṣara*s typically indicate cancellation.

Beginning and end of texts; colophon

Beginning:

(1r) *oṃ bhūr bhuvaḥ svastatam avitur vareṇyaṃ bhargo devasya dhīmahi | dhiyo yo naḥ prajā dayādo[ṃ]<m*> || ° || rahasyabhedo yā cakrā ca naiṣṭuryyaṃ ca na cittatā | krodho niḥsadyatā dyūtam etan miśrasya dūṣaṇam* ||* (1v) *oṃ namaḥ śivāya || athāto dīrghañ jīvitīyam adhyāyaṃ vyākhyāsyāma iti ha smāha bhagavān ātreyaḥ ||*

End:

yad ihāsti tad anyatra yan nehāsti na tat kvacit || iti || agniveśakṛte tantre carakapratisaṃskṛte | siddhisthānaṃ svasiddhyarthaṃ samāsena samāpitam* || siddhisthāne uttarabastisiddhir dvādaśo 'dhyāyaḥ ||(°)*|| iti carakasaṃhitā samāptā || ¤ || ¤ ||* (325v3 f.)

On fol. 326r, a different text begins: *oṃ śrīkānikāyai namaḥ || viśuddham asṛtañ ceva śālmalīkṣārakaṃ tamā|*. The text extends for four lines; it ends as follows: *samānabhāga || hi.ādicūna ||*

Colophon:

> *durlabhyā saṃhitā ceyaṃ gauḍadeśe 'tiyatnataḥ |*
> *durlabhya likhitā 'smābhir na deyā yasya kasyacit[a] ||*
> *deyā vidyāvate ceyaṃ yena vidhvaṃsyate na ca |*
> *na cāpi hrīyate*[82] *nītvā likhituṃ cādriyeta ca || ¤ || ¤ || ¤ || ¤ ||*
> (325v5)

The concluding sentences of the Sūtra, Nidāna and Siddhi chapters begin with the phrase *agniveśakṛte tantre carakapratisaṃskṛte*. The end of the Śārīra chapter reads: *ity ācāryyacarakamuniviracitāyāṃ saṃhitāyāṃ śārīrasthānakaṃ caturthaṃ samāptaṃ* (154r,2). The other *sthāna*s end with a short formulation, e.g. *iti cikitsitasthānaṃ ṣaṣṭaṃ samāptam** (292v,6 f.). Further information is added in the Nidāna chapter: *dvitīyan tu nidānasya sthānam etat samanvitaṃ ||°|| nidānasthānam ekapiṇḍena ślokaśatānipañca | aṅkenāpi ślokāḥ 500 ||*

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[82] Conj. *hīyate*

nidānasthāne 'pasmārādi nidānam aṣṭamo 'dhyāyaḥ ||$^{(\circ)}$|| *gotrāṅgago-tragotrāmeśāke 'svayajikhāgnime | gaṅgādharo 'likhat sthānaṃ nidā-nasya tu cārakaḥ* ||$^{(\circ))}$|| (103v,1f.); and in the Vimāna chapter: *samāptaṃ vimānasthānaṃ granthasaṃṅkhyā* || *1300* || *rāmaśve-takaronmite 'hani maghau māse śakābde punaḥ khāṅgādrikṣitime smaraṇagurupadaṃ sthānaṃ vimānasya tu | mattantre pratisaṃskṛte 'tra carakeṇaivāgniveśasya vai saṅkhyāvān* sukṛtī lilekha subhiṣak* śrīyuktagaṅgādharaḥ* || ¤ || ¤ || ¤ || (130v,4f.).[83]

In the case of the Vimāna chapter, the concluding sentence of each *adhyāya*s contains the formula *agniveśakṛte tantre carakaprati-saṃskṛte vimānasthāne*, then followed either by a phrase such as *rasavimānaṃ nāma prathamo dhyāyaḥ* || (105v,8; end of the first *adhyāya*), or *janapadoddhvaṃsanīyaṃ nāma vimānaṃ tṛtīyo 'dhyāyaḥ* || (110r,7, end of the third *adhyāya*).

Date

According to the colophon in Vimāna, the ms. was completed on *rāmaśvetakaronmite 'hani maghau māse śakābde punaḥ khāṅgā-drikṣitime* — 'in the day number *rāma-śvetakara* (i.e., 3-1),[84] in the month of Māgha, in the year *kha-aṅga-adri-kṣiti* (i.e., 0-6-7-1) of the Śaka era,' namely 2 February 1839.

Information on titles, people, and places

Authors and work titles are identified as: 'Tantra of Agniveśa, redacted by Caraka'; according to Śārīra, 'Saṃhitā composed by the *ācārya* Carakamuni'; on the flyleaf: Carakasaṃhitā.

The copyist of the Nidāna and Vimāna chapters identifies him-self as Gangādhara, who can be identified with Gangadhar Ray Kaviraj.

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[83] See Pecchia 2022: 115.

[84] I take °*unmite* in the sense of 'measuring' and accordingly translate it as 'number.' Camillo A. Formigatti has informed me that °*mite* and other synonyms are found in colophons of 19th c. lithographs, however with reference to the year rather than the day of the month, as in our case; for further details, see Formigatti 2021. My thanks to him for his help in understanding *śvetakara* as 'the white-rayed one,' namely the moon. To convert the date from the Śaka era into the Gregorian calendar I have used the 'Calendar Converter' at: http://legacy-www.math.harvard.edu/computing/javascript/Calendar/ index.html.

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Details about relevant manuscripts and printed editions of the *Carakasaṃhitā* are provided in Appendix I. For the sake of convenience, abbreviations repeatedly mentioned in the article are also briefly referred to here.

Abbreviations

CaS   see *Carakasaṃhitā*

C_{SJ} printed edition of the *Carakasaṃhitā* and the *Jalpakalpataru* published in Calcutta by the Samvada Jnanaratnakara Press, 1868/69

JKT   *Jalpakalpataru*

ms.   manuscript

S_{PBh} printed edition of the *Carakasaṃhitā* and the *Jalpakalpataru* published in Saidabad by the Pramada Bhañjana Press, 1878–1880

Vimāna   Vimānasthāna, the third book of the *Carakasaṃhitā*

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On *prahasann iva*. *Bhagavadgītā 2.10* in the Light of Traditional Commentaries[*]

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This paper concerning the interpretation of *prahasann iva* in *Bhagavadgītā* (hereafter BhG) 2.10 is construed mainly on primary sources and specifically on various commentaries on the BhG.

It is a fact that several of the BhG's commentators have somehow 'underestimated' the first section of the text, from BhG 1.1 up to the end of the contextual *incipit*, that is BhG 2.10, which precedes the beginning of Kṛṣṇa's teaching (v. 2.11). Śaṅkara himself — who first commented upon the BhG[1] — after a short general introduction dealing with the main purpose of the text, skips over the first *adhyāya* and the first ten verses of the second one, and

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[1] Actually, there were several pre-Śaṅkara commentaries on the BhG, but Śaṅkara's is the earliest existing one (Saha 2017: 259–261).

begins his *bhāṣya ad* BhG 2.11. Other interpreters, too, such as Rāmanuja and Madhva, followed Śaṅkara leaving the opening verses without any commentary.

To be sure, v. 2.10 represents the *trait d'union* between the first part of the text from 1.1. to 2.9 and the teaching itself, which begins at 2.11 and ends at 18.66, the BhG's well-known *caramaśloka*. Verse 2.10 is part of a passage connecting the condition of the distressed human being, represented by Arjuna, with Kṛṣṇa's instruction that dispels the darkness of delusion and anguish. In this regard, Arjuna's surrender to Kṛṣṇa as his disciple is the pivotal point, since from 2.7 onward the poem embodies the unhindered flow of the *guru*'s grace in the form of liberating teaching.

Although Kṛṣṇa's teaching (*upadeśa*) of BhG begins at 2.11, all previous verses serve to contextualize it, placing it within an anomalous setting, i.e. a battlefield where two armies are about to fight. In particular, while the first chapter concentrates on the causes of Arjuna's grief, in the first verses of the second Arjuna's anguish and delusion assume a new form. Although in 2.7 Arjuna pleads Kṛṣṇa to instruct him, in 2.8 he states that nothing can remove his grief, neither on earth nor in the heavens. 2.9 then shows that Arjuna decides to withdraw from the battle and finally remains silent. 2.10 highlights once more Arjuna's tragic situation: in between the two armies, he is completely overwhelmed by despondency. At this very moment, nearly smiling or laughing (*prahasann iva*), Kṛṣṇa begins his teaching.

Convinced that *prahasann iva* hides much more than what appears on the surface, I will try to provide some answers as to what the expression really means. What is its inner meaning (*gūḍhārtha*) according to the commentarial tradition? Is it smile or is it laughter? Is it a compassionate smile, a graceful laugh? Or a hint of laugh as mockery? Is Kṛṣṇa making fun of Arjuna with a sardonic sneer? Or is he doing something else?

In his *Bibliography* of the *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* (1995: 1464–1466) Potter quotes many other Sanskrit commentaries, but I have limited myself to twenty-five of them.[2] I focus mainly on

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[2] The more detailed commentaries are carefully analyzed while others more superficially. All works are in Sanskrit except the 13th-c. Marāṭhī gloss *Jñāneśvarī* by Jñāneśvar.

their introductions and their understanding of the second chapter, especially verses from 2.6 to 2.11. Some of the summaries proposed by the commentators are useful in contextualizing 2.10 since they describe in more detail why Kṛṣṇa smiles or laughs. My aim is to map the various interpretations of *prahasann iva* and on such basis discern and highlight some hermeneutic patterns. In order to accomplish this task, I analyse the following texts, commentaries, sub-commentaries and glosses, listed hereafter in chronological order: Śaṅkara's (7th–8th c.) *Gītābhāṣya* or *Advaitabhāṣya*; Bhāskara's (8th c.) *Bhagavadāśayānusaraṇa*; Abhinavagupta's (1014) *Gītārthasaṃgraha*; Yāmuna Muni's (10th c.) *Gītārthasaṃgraha*; Rāmānuja's (traditional dates 1017–1137) *Gītābhāṣya* or *Viśiṣṭādvaita Bhāṣya*; Anubhūtisvarūpācārya's (1270) *Gītābhāṣya-ṭippaṇa*; Madhva/Ānanda Tīrtha's (1198–1277 or 1238–1317) double commentary, namely the *Gītābhāṣya* and the *Bhagavadgītā-tātparyanirṇaya*; Jñāneśvar's (13th c.) *Jñāneśvarī*; Śaṅkarānanda Sarasvatī's (1290) *Tātparyabodhinī*; Śrīdhara Svāmin's (13th–14th c.) *Subodhinī*; Vedānta Deśika/Veṅkaṭanātha's (1268–1369) double gloss, the *Tātparyacandrikā* on Rāmānuja's *Gītābhāṣya* and the *Gītārthasaṃgraharakṣā* on Yāmuna Muni's *Gītārthasaṃgraha*; Hanumat's (before 13th–14th c.; see Saha 2017: 266) *Paiśāca Bhāṣya*; Ānanda Giri's (14th c.) *Gītābhāṣyavivecana*; Jaya Tīrtha's (1340–1388) *Prameyadīpikā*; Daivajña Paṇḍita Sūrya's (1440) *Paramārthaprapā*; Sadānanda Yogīndra's (1500) *Bhāvaprakāśa*; Keśavakaśmīrī Bhaṭṭācārya's (or Bhaṭṭa, 1510) *Tattvaprakāśikā*; Vallabha's (1479–1531) *Tattvadīpikā*; Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's (16th c.) *Gūḍhārthadīpikā*; Rāghavendra's (1640) *Arthasaṃgraha*; Ānandavardhana's (17th c.) *Jñānakarmasamuccayavyākhyā*; Śrīveṅkaṭanātha's (17th c.) *Brahmānandagiri*; Nīlakaṇṭha Caturdhara's (or Sūri, second half of the 17th c.) *Bhāvadīpa*; Viśvanātha Cakravartī Ṭhākura's (1626–1708?) *Sārārthavarṣiṇīṭīkā*; Dhanapati Sūri's (18th c.) *Bhāṣyotkarṣadīpikā*; Bāladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa's (18th c., 1700–1793?) *Gītābhūṣaṇa*; Vaṃśīdhara Miśra's (19th–20th c.) *Vaṃśī* and Śrībellaṅkoṇḍa Rāmarāya Kavi's (1875–1914) *Bhāṣyārkaprakāśa*.

Although a plain chronological order may help us in determining how analogies and differences developed with regard to the interpretation of *prahasann iva*, in order to present them within their axiological perspectives, they are grouped according to their philosophical affiliations (Saha 2017: 259): Advaita, Kashmirian-

Śaiva-Bhedābheda, Jñāneśvar's gloss in Marāṭhī, and Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita, Dvaitādvaita, Śuddhādvaita and Acintyabhedābheda.[3]

1. *Advaita*

There are several BhG commentators of Advaita Vedānta orientation: some are independent interpreters and some sub-commentators of Śaṅkara's commentary. In the following sections I examine thirteen of them. The glosses to Śaṅkara's commentary come first, followed by the independent commentaries.

1.1 *Śaṅkara*

It is well known that Śaṅkara fixed the text of the BhG *vulgata* in 700 verses. In his *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya* (hereafter BhGBh), apart from a short introduction concerning the intrinsic purport of the BhG, Śaṅkara does not comment on the first chapter nor on the first ten verses of the second. He opens his *bhāṣya* commenting directly upon BhG 2.11. He argues that the portion of the BhG from 1.2[4] to 2.9[5] is meant to identify the root of the defects intrinsic to the seed of becoming, i.e. anguish (*śoka*), delusion (*moha*), etc. Arjuna is overwhelmed by both, because — out of affection for his kinsfolk who are gathered on the opposite side of the battlefield — he is tormented by the erroneous idea 'I am their own! They are mine!' (*aham eteṣāṃ mamaite*). In Arjuna, this condition causes a turmoil of feelings such as anguish and delusion (2.4).[6]

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[3] Chronologically, the sub-commentaries will be treated immediately after the major commentaries they gloss.

[4] Although easily available in many sources, hereafter I shall quote the relevant verses of the BhG discussed in detail, in order to better follow the commentaries. BhG 1.2: *dṛṣṭvā tu pāṇḍavānīkaṃ vyūḍhaṃ duryodhanas tadā | ācāryam upasaṅgamya rājā vacanam abravīt ||*.

[5] BhG 2.9: *evam uktvā hṛṣīkeśaṃ guḍākeśaḥ paraṃtapa | na yotsya iti govindam uktvā tūṣṇīṃ babhūva ha ||*.

[6] BhG2 pp. 39–40, BhG3 pp. 31–32 and BhG6 pp. 73–74: *atra ca dṛṣṭvā tu pāṇḍavānīkam ity ārabhya yāvan na yotsya iti govindam uktvā tūṣṇīṃ babhūva ha ityetadantaḥ prāṇināṃ śokamohādisaṃsārabījabhūtadoṣodbhavakāraṇapradarśanārthatvena vyākhyeyo granthaḥ | tathā hi — arjunena rājyaguruputramitrasuhṛtsvajanasaṃbandhibāndhaveṣu aham eteṣāṃ mamaite ity evaṃ bhrāntipratyayanimittasnehavicchedādinimittau ātmanaḥ śokamohau pradarśitau | kathaṃ bhīṣmam ahaṃ saṃkhye ityādinā |*.

These feelings are so perturbing as to subjugate Arjuna's discriminating intellect; this is why he thinks of abandoning his duty as a warrior and setting out on a life of alms, as renunciants do.

Common people follow their own duties and constantly long to gain and enjoy the results thereof. Due to the increasing and decreasing of merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*), the unceasing becoming (*saṃsāra*) — characterized by auspicious and inauspicious births, full of pleasure and pain respectively — flows unobstructed. It is precisely for this reason that anguish and delusion are the seeds of becoming. In order to uproot them, there is nothing but the knowledge of the self, preceded by the total renunciation of actions. Śaṅkara points out that this *upadeśa* begins from 2.11 and is meant to benefit all human beings. Precisely in order to accomplish such a task, Arjuna serves as the instrumental model (*nimitta*). Here is the opening of the elaborate commentary *ad* 2.11 (BhG2 pp. 40–41, BhG3 pp. 32–33, BhG6 p. 74):

śokamohābhyāṃ hy abhibhūtavivekavijñānaḥ svata eva kṣatradharme yuddhe pravṛtto 'pi tasmād yuddhād upararāma | paradharmaṃ ca bhikṣājīvanādikaṃ kartuṃ pravavṛte | tathā ca sarvaprāṇināṃ śoka-mohādidoṣāviṣṭacetasāṃ svabhāvata eva svadharmaparityāgaḥ pratiṣi-ddhasevā ca syāt | svadharme pravṛttānām api teṣāṃ vāṅmanaḥkā-yādīnāṃ pravṛttiḥ phalābhisaṃdhipūrvikaiva sāhaṃkārā ca bhavati | tatraivaṃ sati dharmādharmopacayād iṣṭāniṣṭajanmasukhaduḥkhādi-prāptilakṣaṇaḥ saṃsāro 'nuparato bhavati | ity ataḥ saṃsārabījabhūtau śokamohau | tayoś ca sarvakarmasaṃnyāsapūrvakād ātmajñānān nānyato nivṛttir iti tadupadidikṣuḥ sarvalokānugrahārtham arjunaṃ nimittīkṛtya āha bhagavān vāsudevaḥ — aśocyān ityādi |

Indeed, although he [Arjuna] — whose discriminating intellect is subdued by anguish and delusion — is by himself ready for war, which is the duty of a warrior, [he] withdrew from the battle and began [to develop the wish of] following another's duty, that is a [roaming] life of alms. Hence, the abandonment of one's own duty and the undertaking of something prohibited naturally happens to all living beings whose souls are pervaded by anguish and delusion. Even for those who are committed in word, mind and body to their own duty, an active engagement occurs presupposing an aspiration for the fruits [of that action], and with a sense of egotism as well. Under these circumstances, due to the accretion of merits and demerits, the becoming — characterized by the gaining of pleasure and pain, [respectively] in desirable and non-

desirable births — is not interrupted. Ergo, anguish and delusion are the seeds of becoming, and their withdrawal does not take place without the knowledge of the self preceded by the renunciation of all actions. Thus, eager to teach this, having used Arjuna as a means for the benefit of all worlds, the glorious Vāsudeva said 'Those who are not to be mourned …' (2.11, *aśocyān*).

A lengthy argument against the combination of action and knowledge then begins (BhG2 p. 41, BhG3 pp. 33–40, BhG6 p. 74). At the end of the commentary (BhG 1 p. 79), Śaṅkara calls Arjuna *mūḍhaḥ*, which literally means 'deluded,' i.e. someone who, being the victim of delusion, is obscured and bewildered, although the term often refers to someone foolish, stupid, ignorant.

According to Śaṅkara, 'those who are not to be mourned' (*aśocya*) are Bhīṣma, Droṇa, and the other heroes arrayed on the opposite side. They are *aśocya* for two reasons: from the point of view of *dharma*, their conduct is irreprehensible; from the absolute point of view, they are ultimately nothing but *ātman*, the immortal self, hence eternal. Therefore, there is no point in mourning for them, but still Arjuna does so because he is confused, although he thinks he is saying words that are usually pronounced by sages.[7] Śaṅkara then paraphrases Kṛṣṇa's words to Arjuna as follows:

> *tad etan mauḍhyaṃ pāṇḍityaṃ ca viruddham ātmani darśayasy unmatta iva ity abhiprāyaḥ |*

> The sense is that, like a madman, you show in yourself both foolishness and wisdom, which are [mutually] opposed.

Indeed, in contrast with Arjuna's behaviour, true sages, the knowers of the self, neither grieve for the departed nor for the living. Moreover, this wisdom is a kind of intelligence whose content is the self, as stated in the *śruti*: '*tasmād brāmaṇaḥ pāṇḍityaṃ nirvidya bālyena tiṣṭhāset*' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 3.5.1). Looking at things from the absolute point of view, it is disclosed that Arjuna is

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[7] BhG2 p. 46, BhG3 pp. 43–44 and BhG6 p. 79: *na śocyā aśocyā bhīṣmadroṇādayaḥ | sadvṛttatvāt paramārthasvarūpeṇa ca nityatvāt, tān aśocyān anvaśoco 'nu śocitavān asi te mriyante mannimittam, ahaṃ tair vinābhūtaḥ kiṃ kariṣyāmi rājyasukhādinā iti | tvaṃ prajñāvādān prajñāvatāṃ buddhimatāṃ vādāṃś ca vacanāni ca bhāṣase |.*

mourning for those who are eternal, i.e. for those who are not to be mourned: that is why Kṛṣṇa considers him a fool.[8]

1.1.1 Ānanda Giri

Ānanda Giri (14th c.) seems somewhat later than Anubhūtisvarūpācārya and is surely indebted to him.[9] Ānanda Giri composed the *Gītābhāṣyavivecana*, a detailed gloss on the BhGBh. In his reading of Śaṅkara's introduction, Ānanda Giri glosses the opening verses and clarifies up various points. At the opening of the gloss on BhGBh *ad* 2.1, he explains that the first chapter and a section of the second are already clear, and the main theme of the BhG is the double 'firm point of view' (*niṣṭhā*), the interior adherence which represents the goal (*sādhya*) as well as the method (*sādhana*) of final realization.

Apart from a scholastic explanation, the gloss *ad* 2.10 does not say anything noteworthy.[10] Nonetheless, a few words are utilized to gloss *prahasann iva*: *upāhasaṃ kurvann iva tadāśvāsārtham* '"almost laughing," [i.e.] being sarcastic in order to make him believe [in himself].'

Śaṅkara's commentary on 2.11 is quite detailed, and consequently Ānanda Giri's gloss is even longer. In its *incipit* Ānanda Giri says that BhG 1.1 is an independent verse, the function of which is to connect linking the BhG with the rest of the *Mahābhārata*'s narration. Then, from 1.2 to 2.9 there is another substantial section meant to show that anguish and delusion — the seeds of becoming — are brought about by ignorance of the self, and therefore must be removed. Ānanda Giri adds that BhG 2.10 represents a useful transition to the rest of the poem, which essentially begins with 2.11, and is exclusively dedicated to teaching correct knowledge so as to dispel becoming, along with its cause.[11]

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[8] BhG2 p. 46, BhG3 pp. 44–45 and BhG6 p. 79: *yasmād gatāsūn gataprāṇān mṛtān, agatāsūn agataprāṇān jīvataś ca nānuśocanti paṇḍitā ātmajñāḥ | paṇḍā ātmaviṣayā buddhir yeṣāṃ te hi paṇḍitāḥ, pāṇḍityaṃ nirvidya iti śruteḥ | paramārthatas tu tān nityān aśocyān anuśocasi, ato mūḍho 'si ity abhiprāyaḥ || 2.11 ||.*

[9] For more information, see Mahadevan 2003: 320–322.

[10] See BhG2 pp. 38–39, BhG3 p. 31 and BhG6 p. 71.

[11] BhG2 p. 40, BhG3 p. 33 and BhG6 p. 74: *arjunasyānyeṣāṃ ca śokamohayoḥ saṃsārabījatvam upapāditam upasaṃharati — ity ata iti | tad evaṃ prathamādhyāyasya*

In the rest of his interpretation, Ānanda Giri does not add anything to Śaṅkara's commentary. The remarkable point which he touches upon is the independent status of 2.10, considered a sort of bridge between the causes of the disease — anguish, delusion, and ignorance — and their antidote, namely the knowledge of the self.

1.1.2 Daivajña Paṇḍita Sūrya

The *Paramārthaprapā* is a sub-commentary on Śaṅkara's BhGBh, written by Daivajña Paṇḍita Sūrya (ca. 1440). While it is not easy to determine with certainty the date of this gloss, there is nonetheless a relationship between the *Paramārthaprapā* and Sadānanda Yogīndra's (15th c., see 1.5) *Bhāvaprakāśa*. This might suggest an indebtedness of the latter to the former. In addition, the same themes are also dealt with by Śāṅkarānanda (BhG4 p. 55).

In the introduction to the *Paramārthaprapā* (BhG4 pp. 12–13), Paṇḍita Sūrya — like Sadānanda — presents a kind of correspondence between the initial verses of the BhG and the Advaita Vedānta's four preliminary requirements (*sādhanacatuṣṭaya*): 'discrimination between permanent and impermanent entities' (*nityānityavastuviveka* 1.26c, 1.38c), 'detachment from the enjoyments of the here-world and the otherworld' (*ihāmutraphalabhogavirāga* 1.35c), 'trust in the words of the *guru* and of the deity' (*gurudaivatavākyaviśvāsa* 2.7c); in addition — according to the text — Arjuna's longing for release.[12] Furthermore, verses 1.32a, 1.35a, 2.5b clarify more thoroughly that detachment has already arisen in Arjuna, hence he is eligible for the knowledge which Kṛṣṇa is about to offer.[13]

In the *Paramārthaprapā ad* BhG 2.10, Paṇḍita Sūrya states:

athārjunaṃ viṣādena na yotsya iti niścitya tūṣṇībhūtaṃ bhagavān āha — tam uvāceti | hṛṣīkeśa āśayajñaḥ kṛṣṇas tam arjunaṃ prati praha-

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dvitīyādhyāyaikadeśasahitasya ātmajñānotthanirvartanīyaśokamohākhyasaṃsārabīja-pradarśanaparatvaṃ darśayitvā vakṣyamāṇasandarbhasya sahetukasaṃsāranirvartaka-samyagjñānopadeśe tātparyaṃ darśayati — tayoś ceti |.

[12] For a survey of the *sādhanacatuṣṭaya*, see the *locus classicus*, i.e. *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya ad* 1.1.1 (pp. 36–37).

[13] Paṇḍita Sūrya quotes from the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (6.14.2, *ācāryavān puruṣo veda*) 'The man with a teacher knows!' while commenting upon BhG 2.7 (BhG4 p. 67) where Arjuna requests Kṛṣṇa to accept him a disciple.

sann iva prahāsagarbham iva vacanam uvāca | nanu viṣādāvasare hāsānupakrame 'pi katham uktaṃ prahasann iveti, tatrocyate | viṣādotpatter akāraṇatvād yato dīnānāthavadhe eva viṣādotpatter darśanāt | prakṛte tu bhīṣmadroṇakarṇaduryodhanādyāḥ śauryeṇa śakram apy agaṇayantaḥ kṣātradharmam anusṛtya pravṛttā na tu mūrkhatvena teṣu kathaṃ kṛpāpātratvam | [...]

Hereafter, the glorious lord spoke to Arjuna who, having decided — due to anguish — 'I will not fight!' (2.9), remained silent. The lord of the sense faculties, who knows the inner purports [of living beings], as though he were laughing, spoke these words to Arjuna, as if they were filled with mockery. [Doubt:] Although on that occasion of grief no laugh happened, then how does he say 'as if he were laughing'? [Reply:] On this [issue] it must be pointed out that [for Arjuna] the arousal of anguish is not justified, because it is seen that anguish arises only when afflicted people or orphans are killed. On the contrary, in the case under examination, Bhīṣma, Droṇa, Karṇa, Duryodhana and others, who do not reckon even Śakra [= Indra] as a hero, engage themselves [in fighting] following the martial duty, and [clearly] not because of stupidity! Then, how can they be considered as reservoirs of compassion? [...]

ato yadviṣādakāraṇam uktaṃ tat pratāraṇamātraṃ karma naiṣkarmyamārgabahirbhūtam ity āśayena īṣaddhāsyamukho bhūtvā provācety arthaḥ || 2.10 ||

Therefore, the said cause of anguish is an act of mere deception, which has no place along the liberating path of non-action. For this reason, [Kṛṣṇa] spoke with a slightly smiling face: this is the meaning.

1.1.3 Śrīveṅkaṭanātha

Another important gloss on the BhGBh is the *Brahmānandagiri* (BhG6), written by a certain Śrīveṅkaṭanātha (17th c.). Unlike the Viśiṣṭādvaita author, this Veṅkaṭanātha is an elder contemporary of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (16th–17th c.). As a matter of fact, the *Brahmānandagiri* quotes and criticises the *Gūḍhārthadīpikā* (hereafter GAD) on several occasions.[14] Śrīveṅkaṭanātha was probably a disciple of Nṛsimhāśrama (16th–17th c.), and the teacher of

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[14] For example, having quoted the *Gūḍhārthadīpikā verbatim*, Śrīveṅkaṭanātha expresses some perplexities on its reading of v. 2.8 (*etac cintyam*; BhG6 p. 69).

Dharmarāja Adhvarin (17th–18th c.), the author of the well-known primer *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (Pellegrini 2018: 589–599).

In the gloss on 2.7 (BhG6 p. 69), Śrīveṅkaṭanātha writes that in the world, namely in ordinary conversation, whoever asks for instruction without a sincere desire is ignored by the interlocutor, because he/she is not really eager to listen attentively to his/her words. On the contrary, Arjuna is definitely anguished, so he asks with the proper feeling and a sincere desire to know: he is a true disciple, and this is the reason why he is not ignored. Hence, Kṛṣṇa's duty as a teacher is to teach, and, with the use of several tools, to make his disciple understand things properly.

At the end of the gloss on 2.7 (BhG6 p. 69), Śrīveṅkaṭanātha points out that in saying *gurūn hatvā* (2.5) Arjuna perceives himself as a disciple of Bhīṣma and Droṇa too. Then, why does Kṛṣṇa accept him as disciple? In fact, there seems to be a difference in Arjuna's approach to Kṛṣṇa in 2.7 (*tvāṃ prapannam*), where he totally surrenders (*prapatti*) to Kṛṣṇa and completely commits himself to him to be instructed: Arjuna has formally taken refuge in the lord (*śaraṇāgatam*). Such an act of total surrender occurs only when there is no other way out.[15]

Śrīveṅkaṭanātha's commentary on 2.10 (BhG6 p. 73) is quite elaborate. The anguish tormenting Arjuna is not like the uneasiness commonly experienced in everyday life, which sooner or later fades away. Arjuna's is a different kind of anguish, deeper and stronger. In order to show this, the text uses the present active participle form *viṣādantam*. Had such a despondency occurred during the battle, it could have been solved at the right moment. On the contrary, it occurs when the two armies are facing each other, and the heroes — weapons in hand — are about to fight. This is why Arjuna's anguish becomes an enormous problem.[16] Nevertheless,

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[15] See also Śrīveṅkaṭanātha *ad* 2.8 (BhG6 p. 69): *śaraṇāgatir api ananyaśaraṇatvādhyavasayāyapūrvikā tvam eva śaraṇam iti tvadutpattiḥ, na tv anyasmiñ charaṇe sthite 'pi tvam api śaraṇam ity evaṃlakṣaṇatvād upasadanarūpety āha — yad vastu mama śokam apanudet tan na paśyāmīty ananyaśaratvoktiḥ |.*

[16] BhG6 p. 73: *evaṃvidho 'pi śoko yadi svasenāmadhyasthitikāla eva syāt tadā sāvakāśaṃ samādhātuṃ śakyata, na tv evaṃ, kintu svabalān nirgatya yuyutsuḥ parakīyaśūramukhe sthitvā svayaṃ dhanur udyamya pravṛtte śastrasaṃpāte yadā bandhūn avaikṣata, tadānīm utpannaḥ, tato mahat kaṣṭaṃ jātam ity abhipretyāha — senayor ubhayor madhya iti |.*

despite the difficulty of the situation the text introduces a certain
levity with the expression *prahasann iva*,[17] meaning 'uttering a sen-
tence of mockery':

> *arjunasya paitṛṣv asevatayā taṃ prati bhagavataḥ sarvadāpi parihāso-*
> *ktaya eva bhavantīti tadā saṅkaṭe 'pi tannirācikīrṣur bhagavān pari-*
> *hāsarītyaiva idaṃ vakṣyamāṇam aśocyān ityādikam atigambhīrārtham*
> *aśeṣavedāntasārabhūtaṃ vacanam uvāca | tatra ca vinodaphalakatvena*
> *loke parihāsaḥ prasiddhaḥ, ayaṃ tv arjunasya tattvajñānotpādanapha-*
> *laka iti prasiddhaparihāsavailakṣaṇyadyotanārthaḥ prahasann ivetī-*
> *vakāraḥ | sarvadhīprerakasya jñānotpādanaṃ hāsamātreṇaiva sukaram*
> *iti hṛṣīkeśapadenoktam |*

[Moreover,] since Arjuna is not rendering a true service to his
forefathers, at every step there are some enunciations of mockery
by the glorious lord to Arjuna. Thus, even during [such] a crisis,
the glorious lord — desirous of dispelling it — indeed in a mock-
ing mood pronounced these words — beginning with *aśocyān*
(2.11) — whose meaning is very profound, and which are the very
essence of the whole Vedānta [= Upaniṣads]. Furthermore, on this
issue, in the world it is well known that mockery results in amusing
pleasure, but for Arjuna this [very circumstance] results in gener-
ating the knowledge of reality. Hence, in the expression *prahasann
iva* the word *iva* [is used] to highlight its difference from ordinary
mockery. Through the word Hṛṣīkeśa ('the controller of sensorial
faculties') what is conveyed is that for the one who stimulates every
cognition[18] it is easy to generate knowledge with a simple laugh.[19]

Then, Śrīveṅkaṭanātha's interpretation of 2.11 (BhG6 pp. 81–82)
begins with a relevant contextualization, as a further explanation
of *prahasann iva*:

> *tad evaṃ mohasāgaranimagnasyārjunasya ātmatattvajñānād anya-*
> *troddhāraṇopāyam apaśyan prahasann iva iti pūrvaślokam arjunā-*
> *pahāsaṃ viśadayann eva taduktānuvādapūrvakam ātmatattvajñānam*
> *avatārayan — śrībhagavān uvāca |*

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[17] BhG6 p. 73: *evaṃ saty api bhagavato 'rjunasaṅkaṭanirāse 'nāyāsaṃ darśayati —
prahasann iveti |*.

[18] On this issue, see Śaṅkara's commentaries — *pādabhāṣya* and *vākyabhāṣya*
— on *Kena Upaniṣad* 1.1.1–2 (ed. pp. 17–21).

[19] The last passage of 2.10 is irrelevant for the issue at stake.

Henceforth Kṛṣṇa, not seeing any other means for the emancipation of Arjuna — who was deeply immersed in a sea of illusion — than the knowledge of the reality of the self, extended the mockery directed towards him, expressed through the *prahasann iva* of the preceding verse, and revealed such knowledge of the reality of the self preceded by the [aforementioned] repetition of what has been uttered by him, 'the glorious lord said.'

All in all, Śrīveṅkaṭanātha interprets *prahasann iva* as an expression of cheerful derision and mockery. While in everyday life a mocking mood merely produces scorn, here in the *śāstra* its result is utmost knowledge. Therefore, *iva* is used to mark the difference between secular feelings and the *śāstrīya* context. In addition, this teaching technique of the *bhagavat*, through mockery or smiles, jokes and mirth is most effective. Indeed, it is meant to show that Kṛṣṇa is the almighty inner controller by highlighting the ease with which he is able to bring about such a liberating gnosis.

Then, Śrīveṅkaṭanātha asks himself a sensible question: how is it possible that Kṛṣṇa bestows an instruction in such an atmosphere of war-convulsion? More than this: how can Arjuna benefit from the teaching of such a doctrine? Indeed, it is very difficult to obtain a concrete result without considering the appropriate place and proper circumstances. Śrīveṅkaṭanātha replies saying that thanks to the superb and inconceivable characteristics of the *bhagavat*, spatial and temporal circumstances are for him ultimately insignificant.[20]

Śrīveṅkaṭanātha analyses 2.11 viewing it as a summary of the entire teaching of the BhG (BhG6 p. 81). He calls it *bījaśloka* 'germinal verse' or 'seed-verse,' and says that whatever was spoken by Arjuna in the first chapter is resumed in the first word of the verse — *aśocyān*. The second term, *anvaśocaḥ*, sums up what has been said from the beginning of the second chapter to verse 2.4. The second part of 2.11 is said to encapsulate the knowledge of the

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[20] BhG6 p. 81: *atra hṛṣīkeśa uvācety uktvāpi punar bhagavān uvāceti vadatā sañjayena deśakālādyanapekṣatvarūpaṃ bhagavanmāhātmyaṃ darśitam | atha vyavasthitān dṛṣṭvā dhārtarāṣṭrān kapidhvajaḥ | pravṛtte śastrasampāte dhanur udyamya pāṇḍava ity evaṃvidhāvasthāyāṃ kathaṃ śrīkṛṣṇena jñānam upadeṣṭuṃ pravṛttam? kathaṃ vārjunasya tathāvidhopadeśāj jñānalābhaḥ? deśakālau vinā sarvatra kāryānudayād iti na śaṅkanīyam, acintyādbhūtamahāmahimaśālini bhagavati deśakālayor akiñcitkaratvād iti |.*

reality of the non-dual self, which is presented throughout the entire BhG.[21] All in all, the purport of the text is to dispel grief and illusion, in conformity with several passages of the *śruti*.[22]

> *ato bīje vṛkṣasvarūpasyeva kṛtsnagītārthasya atrāntarbhāvād bījaśloko 'yam iti gītānyāsarahasyam* |

> Therefore, just as the entire shape of a tree is [hidden] in a seed, since the meaning of the entire *Bhagavadgītā* is included here [in 2.11], this is the 'seed-verse': this is the secret behind the *Bhagavadgītā*.

Śrīveṅkaṭanātha also explains the single terms of the verse. According to him, although Arjuna seems to speak wise words, he is not wise at all. As evidenced by 2.7b (*pṛcchāmi tvāṃ dharmasammūḍhacetāḥ*) and 2.7d (*śiṣyas te 'haṃ śādhi māṃ tvāṃ prapannam*), he is not behaving like a wise man; he is not even respecting the boundaries of a disciple (*śiṣyamaryādā*), since he decides to leave the battle independently (*na yotsye*, BhG 2.9c), without resorting to his teacher. Hence, all Arjuna's mixed feelings and behavior — foolishness and wisdom, discipleship and independence — are mutually opposed and contradictory: this is the cause of the mocking laugh (*tathā ca mauḍhyaṃ prājñatvaṃ punaḥ śiṣyatvaṃ svātantryaṃ cety etatparasparaviruddhaṃ tvayi dṛśyata ity apahāsakāraṇoktiḥ*).[23]

1.1.4 Dhanapati Sūri

The next author is Dhanapati Sūri, a well-trained scholar who lived between the second half of the 18th and the first half of the 19th c. He wrote the *Bhāṣyotkarṣadīpikā*, a lengthy gloss on Śaṅka-

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[21] BhG6 p. 81: *atrādyapādena prathamādhyāyagatārjunoktānuvādaḥ | dvitīyapādena tu kathaṃ bhīṣmam aha ityādidvitīyādhyāyagatataduktānuvādaḥ | uttarārdhena ca tatra ko mohaḥ kaḥ śoka ekatvam anupaśyataḥ tarati śokam ātmavid ityādiśrutiprasiddhasarvaśokamohanivartakabhāvasya kṛtsnagītāpratipādyasyādvitīyātmatattvajñānasya nirdeśa iti* |.

[22] Like *Īśa Upaniṣad* 7: *tatra ko mohaḥ kaḥ śoka ekatvam anupaśyataḥ* 'What delusion, what sorrow can there be, for the one who sees the oneness,' and *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 7.1.3: *tarati śokam ātmavit* 'The knower of the self goes beyond sorrow.'

[23] According to Śrīveṅkaṭanātha, from 2.11 to 2.31 the BhG removes the despondency of those who are not worthy of despondency. Then, from 2.31 to 2.38 the words of false wisdom are removed (BhG6 p. 81).

ra's BhGBh,[24] where he quotes Madhūsudana Sarasvatī's (see 1.6) GAD several times and criticizes him whenever he deviates from Śaṅkara's readings (Saha 2014: 291–295; Pellegrini forthc.).[25] In the gloss on 2.10 (BhG2 p. 38, BhG4 p. 71) Dhanapati says:

> *etad anantaraṃ bhagavān kiṃ kṛtavān ity ata āha — tam iti | taṃ sena- yor ubhayor madhye viṣīdantaṃ śokamohāv aṅgīkurvantam arjunaṃ hṛṣīkeśo bhagavān vāsudevaḥ prahasann iva madājñāvaśavartini tvayy ahaṃ prasanno 'smīti prakaṭayann ivedaṃ vakṣyamāṇaṃ vaco vacanam uvāca | anucitācaraṇaprakāśanena lajjāmbudhau majjayann iveti kecit | mūḍho 'py ayam amūḍhavad vadatīti prahasann ivety anye |*

> After that what did the glorious lord do? Then [the text] says: *tam.* To him, to Arjuna who was dismayed in between the two armies, while he was [passively] accepting anguish and delusion, Hṛṣīkeśa, the glorious lord, Vāsudeva, as though smiling, [that means] almost revealing 'I am happy for you, who are under the control of my authority!' uttered these words, i.e. the speech which is about to be expressed. Some say: 'Like plunging him into the sea of shame by exhibiting [his] inappropriate conduct.'[26] Others [assert]: 'As though smiling "Although he is a fool, he speaks as if he were not one."'[27]

Here Dhanapati seems to say that Kṛṣṇa's hint of laughter is due to the fact that Arjuna, steeped in anguish and delusion, feels totally defenseless, so this is the moment when he truly surrenders to the lord, who recognizes Arjuna's interior attitude and his final eligibility for BhG's instruction.

Finally, on 2.11 (BhG2 p. 39, BhG4 pp. 74–75) Dhanapati criticizes Madhusūdana's position again concerning Arjuna's twofold delusion. His contention is that Śaṅkara has exposed everything so clearly and correctly that it is totally useless to suggest any other interpretative option.[28]

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[24] He defends Śaṅkara's BhGBh against opponents deprived of logic. See the *Bhāṣyotkarṣadīpikā* (vv. 7–8; BhG2 pp. 5–6, BhG4 p. 10) and the gloss *ad* 2.1 (BhG2 p. 31, BhG4 p. 56).

[25] On Dhanapati Sūri, see Pellegrini forthc.

[26] See the GAD *ad* BhG 2.10 (see 1.7).

[27] Nīlakaṇṭha *ad* 2.10 (BhG6 p. 73; see 1.7).

[28] Dhanapati also says that Madhusūdana's interpretation contradicts BhG 3.3 (*loke 'smin dvividhā niṣṭhā purā proktā mayānagha | jñāyogena sāṃkhyānāṃ karmayogena yoginām ||*), and in the rest of the gloss *ad* 2.11 explains how, without adding anything relevant.

1.1.5 *Śrībellaṅkoṇḍa Rāmarāya Kavi*

Śrībellaṅkoṇḍa Rāmarāya Kavi is the author of the *Bhāṣyārkaprakā-śa*, a subcommentary on the BhGBh, composed — as he says open-ly (BhG3 p. 4) — to establish once and for all the supremacy of Śaṅkara's interpretation of the BhG, freeing it from all the alleged defects detected by the most remarkable among its rivals' com-mentaries, specifically Rāmānuja's *Gītābhāṣya* (see 4.2) and its sub-commentary, Vedānta Deśika's (see 4.2.1) *Tātparyacandrikā*.

In the gloss *ad* BhG 1.1, Rāmarāya Kavi points out that (BhG3 p. 4) the first *śloka* is 2.11 and the *maṅgalaśloka* of the text is *bhagavān uvāca* before 2.11 (BhG3 p. 15). Consequently, Rāmarāya says (BhG3 p. 31) that 2.10 concludes the introductory portion. Then he briefly glosses 2.10: according to him Kṛṣṇa's laugh is like a mocking sneer, because Arjuna is talking nonsense like a fool. This of course reverberates on the words of Kṛṣṇa in 2.11, *prajñā-vāṃś ca bhāṣase*:

> *he bhārata dhṛtarāṣṭra! ubhayoḥ senayoḥ madhye viṣīdantaṃ tam arju-naṃ prati hṛṣīkeśaḥ prahasann iva, arjunasyonmādapralāpatulyavaca-naśravaṇāt kṛṣṇasya hāsa iti bhāvaḥ, idam aśocyān ity ārabhya mā śucaḥ ity antaṃ gītāśāstrarūpaṃ vacaḥ uvāca || 10 ||*

> O descendant of Bharata, o Dhṛtarāṣṭra! To that Arjuna, who was lamenting in between the two armies, Hṛṣīkeśa, almost laughing — his hint of laughter follows the hearing of Arjuna's words, simi-lar to the prattling of a fool: that is the meaning — uttered these words in the form of the instruction of the *Bhagavadgītā*, begin-ning with *aśocyān* (2.11), and ending with *mā śucaḥ* (18.66).[29]

Nonetheless, Rāmarāya Kavi's position is somewhat ambiguous as he uses the word *hāsa*, which could mean either 'laugh' or 'smile.' A clarification can be found in the gloss on 2.11 (BhG3 pp. 43–44), where Rāmarāya Kavi quotes Rāmānuja and Vedānta Deśika, refut-ing the latter, according to whom the anguished words of Arjuna are the object of Kṛṣṇa's mockery. According to the *Bhāṣyārka-prakāśa*, Arjuna is immersed in a sea of sorrow and consequently has surrendered to the feet of Kṛṣṇa as a disciple. Thus it is quite

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[29] BhG 18.66: *sarvadharmān parityājya māṃ ekaṃ śaraṇaṃ vraja | ahaṃ tvaṃ sa-rvapāpebhyo mokṣayiṣyāmi mā śucaḥ ||*.

unlikely that he is the object of Kṛṣṇa's derision and mockery (*mahati śokasāgare nimagne svacaraṇaṃ śaraṇaṃ prapanne pārthe bhagavataḥ kṛṣṇasya parihāsodbhāvodayāsaṅgatyāt*). Therefore, even for Rāmarāya Kavi (BhG3 p. 44) it is not out of place to connect verse 2.10 to 2.11, as pointed out by Vedānta Deśika, according to whom the meaning of *prahasann iva* is explained in 2.11.

1.2 Śrīdhara Svāmin

Śrīdhara Svāmin is an *advaitin* (13th–14th c.) who tried to harmonize knowledge and devotion, as can be seen in his commentary on the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa.* He also wrote a gloss on the BhG entitled *Subodhinī.*

On 2.10, Śrīdhara writes: *prahasann iveti prasannamukhaḥ sann ity arthaḥ* (BhG4 p. 74) 'the meaning of *prahasann iva* is having a happy face.' The compound *prasannamukhaḥ*, where the adjective *prasanna* can be translated as 'happy, cheerful, showing favour,' evidences Kṛṣṇa's loving disposition toward his interlocutor (Vireśwarānanda 1991: 32–33).

In the introduction to 2.11 (BhG4 p. 74), Śrīdhara adds: 'Arjuna's anguish comes from the lack of discrimination between the body and the self, therefore the glorious lord shows how to discriminate between these two domains' (*dehātmanor avivekād asyaivaṃ śoko bhavatīti tadvivekapradarśanārthaṃ śrībhagavān uvāca*). Then he begins the teaching.

Śrīdhara also presents a short scheme of the verses of the BhG. From verse 1.28,[30] the BhG highlights that the object of Arjuna's anguish are his kinsfolk. Then, though admonished by Kṛṣṇa in 2.2, Arjuna keeps speaking like a discriminating sage.[31]

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[30] BhG 2.9: *dṛṣṭvemān svajanān kṛṣṇa yuyutsuṃ samupasthitam | sīdanti mama gātrāṇi mukhaṃ ca pariśuṣyati ||.*

[31] BhG4 p. 74: *śokasyāviṣayībhūtān eva bandhūn tvam anvaśoco 'nuśocitavān asi dṛṣṭvemān svajanān kṛṣṇa ityādinā | tatra kutas tvā kaśmalam idaṃ viṣame samupasthitam ity ādinā mayā bodhito 'pi punaś ca prajñāvatāṃ paṇḍitānāṃ vādān śabdān kathaṃ bhīṣmam ahaṃ saṅkhye ity ādīn kevalaṃ bhāṣase, na tu paṇḍito 'si, yataḥ gatāsūn gataprāṇān bandhūn agatāsūṃś ca jīvato 'pi, bandhuhīnā ete kathaṃ jīviṣyantīti nānuśocanti paṇḍitā vivekinaḥ || 11 ||.*

1.3 Śaṅkarānanda Sarasvatī

Śaṅkarānanda Sarasvatī (end 13th–early 14th c.) wrote a clear gloss on the BhG, the *Tātparyabodhinī*, which closely follows and carefully broadens Śaṅkara's commentary.[32] The *incipit* of Śaṅkarānanda's gloss to the second chapter (*ad* 2.1; BhG4 pp. 55–56) suggests a connection between verses 2.1–10 with Upaniṣadic procedures to approach a master in order to be instructed.

Thanks to the discrimination between real and unreal, the sharp detachment arisen out of such a discrimination, and the will to achieve release, a *brāhmaṇa* who has abandoned every action and longs only for liberation becomes eligible to investigate into the Absolute, as stated by *Brahmasūtra* 1.1.1: *athāto brahmajijñāsa*. Preceded by a reverent approach to a teacher established in *brahman* and well-versed in the textual lore (see *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* 1.2.12), this investigation proceeds in three steps, as stated by the *śruti* (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 2.4.5, 4.5.6): *ātmā vā re draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ*. Hence, the second chapter begins by showing that Arjuna — who discriminates between real and unreal and longs for the supreme goal — has already (since BhG 2.7) surrendered to the lord. Moreover, it is meant to convey the instruction concerning the knowledge of the self and the non-self revealed to Arjuna.[33]

According to the *śruti* passage '*so 'haṃ bhagavaḥ śocāmi taṃ mā bhagavāñ chokasya pāraṃ tārayatu*' (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 7.1.3), once a person who longs for release has taken refuge in the lord, then the master, having granted him fearlessness, should instruct him. In order to develop this message, Kṛṣṇa teaches Arjuna from 2.1 onward.[34]

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[32] For more information, see Mahadevan 2003: 178–181.

[33] BhG4 p. 55: *sadasadvivekena tajjanitatīvravairāgyeṇa mumukṣayā ca saṃnyāsta-sarvakarmaṇo mokṣaikakāmasya brāhmaṇasya sadasadvivekavairāgyādisādhana-saṃpatsiddher brāhmaṇatvasiddheś ca sāphalyāya athāto brahmajijñāsā iti, ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyaḥ iti tadvijñānārthaṃ sa gurum evābhigacched ityādiśrutyukta-prakāreṇa sadguruṃ śrotriyaṃ brahmaniṣṭham upasadya brahmavicāraḥ kartavya itīmam arthaṃ sūcayituṃ sadasadvivekino 'rjunasya paramārthāpekṣiṇaḥ śiṣyas te 'haṃ śādhi māṃ tvāṃ prapannam itīśvarapratipattiṃ tasmā īśvareṇa kṛtam ātmānātmajñā-nopadeśaprakāraṃ ca pratipādayituṃ dvitīyo 'dhyāya ārabhyate |.*

[34] BhG4 p. 55: *tatrādau so 'haṃ bhagavaḥ śocāmi taṃ mā bhagavāñ śokasya pāraṃ tārayatu iti śravaṇāt saṃsāraduḥkhena śocantaṃ svaśaraṇaṃ gataṃ mumukṣum abha-*

Although Śaṅkarānanda glosses 2.10 in a cursory way, the typical Advaita nuance of his interpretation deserves a full quotation (BhG4 p. 71):

he bhārata, senayor ubhayor madhye viṣīdantaṃ madīyā ete mriyanta iti śocantaṃ etān hatvā taddoṣeṇāhaṃ nirayaṃ yāsyāmīty ātmani niṣkriye nirvikāre kartṛtvādidharmaśūnya evānādyavidyayānātmataddharmān adhyasyāhaṃ kartā, bhokteti viparītabhāvena muhyantaṃ tam arjunaṃ dṛṣṭvā paramakṛpāluḥ śrībhagavān tatra ko mohaḥ kaḥ śoka ekatvam anupaśyata ityādiśrutiprasiddhabrahmātmaikatvajñānena vinā nāyaṃ dvaitabhramapravartakena bhedaśāstreṇa bodhyamānaḥ śokasāgaraṃ bhramamūlakaṃ tartuṃ śaknotīti matvā padārthadvayaśodhanapūrvakaṃ tajjñānam upadidikṣuḥ sann ādau tvaṃpadārthaśodhanam avatārayituṃ tadīyavṛttaṃ bhavān paṇḍita iti mama buddhir eva vā tava pāṇḍityam iti prahasann iva vacanam idam uvāca ||

O descendant of Bharata, thus at the mercy of grief in between the two armies, [Arjuna] in this way anguished [thought] 'These [people] of mine will be killed' [and] 'Because of the sin of killing them I will go to hell.' Having Arjuna superimposed due to beginningless ignorance non-self and its characteristics on the inactive self — which is unchanging, free from properties like agency, etc. [such as] 'I am the agent, I am the enjoyer' — after Kṛṣṇa saw him lamenting, the greatly merciful lord thought in this way with an opposite feeling: 'Without the knowledge of the identity of the self and *brahman* — well-known *śruti*-passages such as "What bewilderment, what sorrow can there be, regarding the self of he who sees this oneness" (*Īśa Upaniṣad* 7) — being instructed in a differentiating discipline that reiterates the perceptual illusion of duality, he will never overcome the ocean of grief the root of which lies in illusion.' Therefore, [the lord] uttered such a speech desirous of teaching the knowledge of that [identity] preceded by an analytical clarification on the meaning of the words ['Thou' (*tvam*) and 'That' (*tat*)],[35] so as to reveal at the beginning the analytical clarification of the meaning of the word 'Thou,' as if he were laughing at his [= Arjuna's] behavior [through ironic expressions such as] 'You are a sage!' or 'I think that you indeed possess wisdom.'

yavacanapūrvakam abhimukhīkṛtya gurus tattvaṃ bodhayed iti sūcayituṃ tathā śocitum arjunaṃ vivekavacanair bhagavān bodhayām āseti vaktuṃ dhṛtarāṣṭraṃ prati sañjaya uvāca — tam |.

[35] *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.8.7 ff.: *tat tvam asi.*

The formal *upadeśa* begins with 2.11 (BhG4 p. 73). Paraphrasing Śaṅkara analytically, Śāṅkarānanda considers and logically explains the reason for Arjuna's inappropriate anxiety, anguish, and delusion. In addition, Kṛṣṇa concludes that true wisdom is seeing *brahman* always and everywhere (*sadā sarvatra brahma-darśanaṃ pāṇḍityam*), 'but Arjuna is without such a characteristic, so he is a fool, not a wise man' (BhG4 p. 73: *ata uktalakṣaṇābhāvāt tvaṃ mūḍha eva na tu paṇḍita iti*).

1.4 Hanumat

The *Paiśācabhāṣya* (or *Hanumadbhāṣya*) is a less known but remarkable commentary by Hanumat (a.k.a. Añjaneya or Piśāca). Hanumat's exact date is unknown (see Saha 2017: 264), but he is mentioned by Vedānta Deśika (13th–14th c.) in his *Tātparyacāndrikā* (see 4.2.1), a sub-commentary on Rāmānuja's *Gītābhāṣya* (see 4.2).

Before glossing 2.10, Hanumat clearly comments upon the other parts of the BhG, and elucidates the passage I am focusing on almost in the same way as Śrīdhara (BhG6 p. 72):

> *śrīnārāyaṇaḥ prasannavadanaḥ sann ubhayoḥ senayor madhye viṣīdan-taṃ viṣādaṃ kurvantam arjunam pratīdaṃ vakṣyamāṇaṃ vaco vākyam uvāca.*

> The glorious Nārāyaṇa, with a smiling face — in between the two armies — uttered these words, this discourse which is going to be pronounced to Arjuna who was grieving, who was expressing grief.

Hanumat notes that BhG 1.2[36] to 2.9 is meant to prove that becoming is characterized by anguish and delusion and is rooted in ignorance.[37]

Under 2.11 (BhG6 p. 81) Hanumat exposes his comments quite scholastically. He says that Bhīṣma and other generals are not to be mourned for two reasons: first, they have always been righteous

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[36] BhG 1.2: *dṛṣṭvā tu pāṇḍavānīkaṃ vyūḍhaṃ duryodhanas tadā | ācāryam upa-saṅgamya rājā vacanam abravīt ||*.

[37] BhG6 p. 72: *atra ca dṛṣṭvā tu pāṇḍavānīkam ity ārabhya na yotsya iti govindam uktvā tūṣṇīṃ babhūva ha ity evamanto granthaḥ prāṇināṃ śokamohabahulaḥ saṃsāro 'vidyāmūla iti pradarśanārthatvena vyākhyeyaḥ |*.

and live in conformity with *dharma*, so that their posthumous destinies will be bright; second, their true nature is identical with the supreme self (*aśocyā na śocyā bhīṣmādayaḥ, dhārmikatvāt, vastutaś ca paramātmasvarūpatvāt*).

According to Hanumat (BhG6 p. 81), the word *prajñā* means 'knowledge of the supreme self,' and the words uttered by Arjuna are meant to awaken it (*prajñā paramātmajñānaṃ tannimittāṃś ca vādān vacanānīha bhāṣase*). The *paṇḍita*s neither mourn for the dead nor for the living. Consequently, the true meaning of the word *paṇḍita* is 'knower of the supreme aim' (*paramārthavid*). This is why Kṛṣṇa says: 'O Arjuna, you are a fool, where is your supreme wisdom?' (*mūḍhas tvaṃ prajñā paramā kutas te*).

1.5 Sadānanda Yogīndra

The *Bhāvaprakāśa* is a versified gloss in *anuṣṭubh* meter composed by Sadānanda Yogīndra (15th c.), the author of the popular Advaita primer *Vedāntasāra*.[38] As Sadānanda himself says at the beginning of the *Bhāvaprakāśa*, he substantially follows Śaṅkara's BhGBh (vv. 9–10: 33–39; BhG4 pp. 7–8).

In the *Bhāvaprakāśa* Sadānanda divides the BhG into three sections on the basis of 'Thou art That' (*tat tvam asi*; see n. 37): the first six chapters present an exegesis of the word *tvam*, the second of the word *tat*, and the last group elucidates the identity of the two (vv. 42–43). Before commenting upon 2.11, in the subsequent verses (vv. 44–79) Sadānanda proposes a sort of synthesis of the eighteen chapters of the poem.

In the commentary on 2.7 (BhG4 p. 66), Sadānanda underlines that *saṃsāra* is an ocean of defects (*doṣavāridhi*, v. 1), and therefore he lists the preliminary vedāntic requirements, beginning with the discrimination between real and unreal. Each portion of the following verses 1.31c, 1.32a, 1.32c, 1.35c, 1.38a, 1.46d, 2.5b offers details on the qualifications needed for the vedāntic teaching, together with the reverent approach one must have toward the teacher (*nityānityavastuviveka, ihāmutraphalavirāga*,[39]

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[38] For more information, see Mahadevan 2003: 207–211.
[39] In vv. 6–7 of the gloss *ad* BhG 2.8 (BhG4 p. 68), Sadānanda confirms that Arjuna is endowed with 'detachment from the enjoyments of the here-world and the after-world' (*ihāmutraphalavirāga*).

śama, dama, nirlobha, titikṣā, gurūpasadana, vv. 3–7; see n. 9). Thus, Arjuna becomes an ideal pupil, a perfect reservoir of a teaching which dispels doubts concerning the *summum bonum* (v. 12).

The brief gloss on 2.10 is worth quoting (BhG4 p. 71):

> *evam apy arjune yuddham upekṣitavatīśvaraḥ | naivopekṣitavān ittham andhaṃ pratyāha sañjayaḥ || 1 || āgatya senayor madhye yuddhodyoge-na cārjunam | prāpnuvantaṃ viṣādaṃ ca saṃmohaṃ yuddharodhakam || 2 || tacceṣṭāyā hy anaucityaṃ hasanena prakāśayan | antaryāmī tam āheśo lajjābdhau majjayann iva || 3 || vakṣyamāṇam idaṃ cāti-gambhīraṃ sāravad vacaḥ || 4 ||*

> Thus, even though Arjuna has disregarded war, the lord surely did not overlook it. In this way Sañjaya replied to the blind [king] (1). And, having arrived in between the two armies for the war-enter-prise, showing with a laugh at Arjuna — who was the victim of anguish and delusion, which prevents him from [entering into] the battle — (2) the inappropriateness of his behaviour, the lord, the interior controller, as if he were plunging him [= Arjuna] in a sea of shame, uttered (3) these very deep and essential words, which are about to be revealed (4).

Finally, commenting on 2.11 (BhG4 p. 74) Sadānanda informs us that Arjuna is the victim of two types of delusion (v. 1). The first type depends upon the superimposition of the threefold body[40] on the pure and unchanging self. This raises the wrong ideas con-cerning the phenomenal universe and the illusory notion about the self being the body, etc. (vv. 2–3): all living beings are prey to this first kind of delusion. The second type is that Arjuna per-ceives the performance of his *svadharma* as a warrior as leading to injustice (v. 4). Following Śaṅkara, later on Sadānanda states that, when wisdom and foolishness occur in the same receptacle, it is an extraordinary event. Furthermore, Sadānanda puts this question in Arjuna's mouth: 'Why do even sages feel anguish on separating from their friends?' (v. 14). Kṛṣṇa immediately replies:

> *maivaṃ dhīmattvam etad bhoḥ prahāsāyaiva kalpate | ye paṇḍitā guroḥ śrutvā vedāntaviṣayaṃ padam || 15 || brahmaikyaṃ yuktibhir matvā*

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[40] Here the three bodies are the gross or physical body (*sthūlaśarīra*), the sub-tle body (*sūkṣmaśarīra*) and the causal body (*kāraṇaśarīra*).

nididhyāsya nirantaram | sākṣātkṛtātmatattvās te naṣṭāvidyāmalā budhāḥ || 16 ||

O [Arjuna], it is not like that! That is not intelligence, [rather] it is definitely [something] fit for derision. [On the contrary,] the wise ones, having heard from their teacher the word whose content is Vedānta (15) and reflecting with [solid] reasonings on the oneness of *brahman,* and meditating upon it for a long time, these sages — once the filth of ignorance has been annihilated — realize the reality of the self (16).

Following 2.11, the final verses maintain that sages neither grieve for nor are deluded by, respectively, the separation from or association with the living or dead, be they friends or relatives, or whoever (vv. 17–18). Sadānanda also offers an analogy:

yathā svapne mṛto bandhur jīvan vā śocyatāṃ gataḥ | na tannimittako moho jāgare ’py anuvartate || 19 || evam ajñānajabhrāntyā kalpitā bandhavo mṛtāḥ | jīvanto vā na te bodhe śokamohapradāḥ satām || 20 ||

Just as a companion — dead or alive — in a dream becomes an object of sorrow, but the delusion generated from this does not follow when one wakes up (19), in the same way, dead or alive companions — conceived [thus] by an illusion arisen from ignorance — do not provoke anguish and delusion in the sages that have awaken to reality (20).

Thus, the beginning of Kṛṣṇa's teaching exhorts Arjuna to behave as a sage, namely, a knower of the self, capable of discriminating between impermanent bodies and permanent self, thus abandoning the anguish caused by an epistemic blindness and establishing himself in the firmness of self's reality (v. 22).

Sadānanda seems to interpret *prahasann iva* as a laugh of derision, without considering the value of *iva.* In any case, Kṛṣṇa's intent is not just for the sake of mockery. On the contrary, while laughing at Arjuna, and consequently making him feel shame, he teaches him how to contrast his cry of weakness with the antidote of a laughter of strength and Arjuna's inertia with Kṛṣṇa's active laughter.

1.6 Madhusūdana Sarasvatī

One of the brightest stars in the galaxy of Advaita Vedānta is Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (16th c., Pellegrini 2015). He composed

the *Gūḍhārthadīpikā* (GAD), a detailed gloss on the BhG, which usually follows Śaṅkara, but here and there dissents with him (Pellegrini forthc.). A relevant issue to be taken into account while reading the GAD is the Vaiṣṇava — or better kṛṣṇaite — background of the *kevalādvaitin* Madhusūdana. The verses are widely commented on in a lucid style and plain language, far from the complex technicalities of Madhusūdana's other works.

At the beginning of GAD (GAD p. 7, BhG2 p. 8, BhG4 p. 5), after several introductory verses, Madhusūdana says that the main purpose of the BhG is found in 2.11, a verse concerned with dispelling impurities — such as anguish and delusion — through the performance of one's own duty, which leads to the accomplishment of life's goal. Like the dialogue between Janaka and Yājñavalkya in the Upaniṣads, the dialogue between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna in the BhG is dedicated to extolling knowledge. But what is happening to Arjuna, who is known to be a valorous man? How does it happen that his intellect is subdued by anguish and delusion due to his affection for masters and companions? Indeed, he wants to abandon the battlefield — the duty of a warrior — in order to follow another's duty — that is, a wandering life of alms: this is why he sinks deep into confusion. But, having secured Kṛṣṇa's supreme teaching, all anguish and doubt will be ultimately dispelled, and Arjuna will thus revert to his own duty and becomes fulfilled. The idea is that Arjuna, as the lord's pupil, is the model of every eligible person.[41]

As done by Daivajña Paṇḍita Sūrya (see 1.1.2) and Sadānanda Yogīndra (see 1.5), while commenting on BhG 2.6 Madhusūdana also highlights the Vedāntic requirements as expressed in the BhG. He shows that some peculiarities of the person eligible for the teaching are presented in the previous part of the text. Under 1.31cd[42] Madhusūdana recollects the passage on acquisitions (*yoga*) and their conservation (*kṣema*)[43] and equates the destiny of a warrior slain in battle with that of a wandering ascetic, who aims

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[41] Unlike Śaṅkara, Madhusūdana comments upon the entire first chapter and the opening ten verses of the second.

[42] BhG 1.31cd: *na ca śreyo 'nupaśyāmi hatvā svajanam āhave |*.

[43] See BhG 9.22: *ananyāś cintayanto māṃ ye janāḥ paryupāsate | teṣāṃ nityābhiyuktānāṃ yogakṣemaṃ vahāmy aham ||*.

at attaining the *summum bonum* as established by several passages of the *śruti* such as 'The good is one thing, the gratifying is quite another' (*Kaṭha Upaniṣad* 1.2.1). Whatever differs from this goal is not the *summum bonum*: here Madhusūdana sees the discrimination between permanent and impermanent (*nityānityavastuviveka*). BhG 1.32ab[44] conveys the detachment from this-world results and those of the otherworld, and 1.35[45] underlines this point. Then, 1.44[46] teaches that the self is beyond the gross body. BhG 1.32c[47] refers to mental control (*śama*), and 1.32d[48] to sensory control (*dama*). Verse 1.38[49] conveys the absence of greed (*nirlobhatā*), and 1.46[50] the virtue of forbearance (*titikṣā*). In synthesis, BhG's first chapter is dedicated to the means of renunciation, and — on the basis of 2.5[51] — the second treats the life of wandering renunciants.

In the gloss on 2.7 (GAD pp. 50–52, BhG2 p. 36, BhG4 pp. 65–66), Madhusūdana continues to connect BhG verses with the steps leading a pupil to approach an authoritative teacher and attain the Vedāntic teaching. Eligible for such an instruction is he who is aware of the defects of the phenomenal experience and totally rejects it. Then, as Arjuna does with Kṛṣṇa, such a man reverently approaches a teacher according to the rule.

In 2.7, Arjuna's desire to approach Kṛṣṇa as a teacher arises because of the crisis taking place in him, when he sees Bhīṣma and the other heroes. So, having highlighted Arjuna's aspiration for a life of alms, as described by the *śruti* passage '… *vyutthāyātha bhikṣācaryaṃ caranti*' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 3.5.1), and resorting to the stratagem of his despondency, with the word *kārpaṇya*

[44] BhG 1.32ab: *na kāṅkṣe vijayaṃ kṛṣṇa na ca rājyaṃ sukhāni ca |*.
[45] BhG 1.35: *etān na hantum icchāmi ghnato 'pi madhusūdana | api trailokyarājyasya hetoḥ kiṃ nu mahīkṛte ||*.
[46] BhG 1.44: *utsannakuladharmāṇāṃ manuṣyāṇāṃ janārdana | narake 'niyataṃ vāso bhavatīty anuśuśruma ||*.
[47] BhG 1.32c: *kiṃ no rājyena govinda […]*.
[48] BhG 1.32d: *kiṃ bhogair jīvitena vā ||*.
[49] BhG 1.38: *yady apy ete na paśyanti lobhopahatacetasaḥ | kulakṣayakṛtaṃ doṣaṃ mitradrohe ca pātakam ||*.
[50] BhG 1.46: *yadi mām apratīkāram aśastraṃ śastrapāṇayaḥ | dhārtarāṣṭrā raṇe hanyus tan me kṣemataraṃ bhavet ||*.
[51] BhG 2.5: *gurūn ahatvā hi mahānubhāvān śreyo bhoktuṃ bhaikṣyam apīha loke | hatvārthakāmāṃs tu gurūn ihaiva bhuñjīya bhogān rudhirapradigdhān ||*.

'compassion' the text discloses his reverent approach to the teacher.[52]

Probably borrowing his considerations from Keśava Kaśmīrī Bhaṭṭācārya (see 6.1), Madhusūdana focuses on the meaning of the word *kārpaṇya*. In everyday life, a 'miser' (*kṛpaṇa*) is someone who does not tolerate even the slightest loss of money or goods. On the other hand, the *śruti* states: '*yo vā etad akṣaram gārgy aviditvā asmāl lokāt praiti sa kṛpaṇaḥ*' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 1.4.15, 3.8.10).[53] A miser is whoever does not know the self and has not attained the supreme goal. The abstract form of the word *kṛpaṇa* is *kārpaṇya*, which is nothing but the superimposition of the non-self on the self. Due to this superimposition, a defect such as the stubborn attachment characterized by the sense of mine has obscured the *kṣatriya* nature of Arjuna.[54]

GAD *ad* 2.8 (pp. 54–55; BhG2 pp. 37–38, BhG4 p. 68) shows that, once Arjuna has surrendered himself, he takes refuge in Kṛṣṇa, who alone is capable of removing anguish and delusion, just like Nārada did with the sage Sanatkumāra in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 7.1.3.[55] After this, Madhusūdana focuses on the nature of the two kingdoms, that of this world and that of the otherworld,

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[52] GAD (pp. 50–52; BhG2 p. 36, BhG4 pp. 65–66): *gurūpasadanam idānīṃ pratipādyate samadhigatasaṃsāradoṣajātasyātitarāṃ nirviṇṇasya vidhivad gurum upasannasyaiva vidyāgrahaṇe 'dhikārāt | tad evaṃ bhīṣmādisaṃkaṭavaśāt | vyutthāyātha bhikṣācaryaṃ carantīti śrutisiddhabhikṣācarye 'rjunasyābhilāṣaṃ pradarśya vidhivad gurūpasattim api tatsaṅkaṭavyājenaiva darśayati kārpaṇyeti | yaḥ svalpām api vittakṣatiṃ na kṣamate sa kṛpaṇa iti loke prasiddhaḥ | tadvidhatvād akhilo 'nātmavid aprāptapuruṣārthatayā kṛpaṇo bhavati | yo vā etad akṣaram gārgy aviditvā asmāl lokāt praiti sa kṛpaṇa iti śruteḥ | tasya bhāvaḥ kārpaṇyam anātmādhyāsavattvaṃ tannimitto 'smin janmany eta eva madīyās teṣu hateṣu kiṃ jīvitenety abhiniveśarūpo mamatālakṣaṇo doṣas tenopahatas tiraskṛtaḥ svabhāvaḥ kṣātro yuddhodyogalakṣaṇo yasya sa tathā |.*

[53] Bāladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa (see 8.2) reuses several parts of the GAD in his own commentary.

[54] The rest of the gloss focuses on a sort of analysis of the interior troubles of Arjuna: 'What is justice? To kill enemies or protect them? Is it right to protect the earth, or is it right to live in the forest?' But, Arjuna by himself is unable to find a solution and therefore asks Kṛṣṇa to reveal what is best. Then, the text offers some other considerations accompanied by Upaniṣadic quotations such as *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* 1.2.12 and *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 3.1.

[55] The same was done by Śaṅkarānanda's *Tātparyabodhinī* (BhG4 p. 66) and later by Bāladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa's *Gītābhūṣaṇa*.

and — as it is said in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 8.1.6[56] — he points out that both are impermanent. Hence, what follows is an inferential formula based on a positive invariable concomitance (*anvaya-vyāpti*):[57] 'Whatever is produced is impermanent' (*yat kṛtakaṃ tad anityam*). Madhusūdana adds that, besides inference, direct perception also proves that objects of this world are subject to destruction. More than this, all the enjoyments of this world, as well as of the otherworld, are ultimately unable to remove anguish.

In the gloss on 2.9 (GAD pp. 55–56, BhG2 p. 38, BhG4 p. 69), Madhusūdana simply contextualizes the verse and provides a para-etymological derivation of the term *govinda*, who is Kṛṣṇa, Hṛṣīkeśa, the one who triggers all sensorial faculties (*sarvendriyapravartaka*), the inner controller (*āntaryāmin*). Addressing Kṛṣṇa with these two epithets, the BhG suggests that he is the omniscient almighty, so it is very easy for him to remove Arjuna's delusion (*govindahṛṣīkeśapadābhyāṃ sarvajñatvasarvaśaktitvasūcakābhyāṃ bhagavatas tanmohāpanodanam anāyāsasādhyam iti sūcitam*): this of course justifies a smile or a laugh.

Madhusūdana's reading of 2.10 is worth quoting at length (GAD pp. 56–57, BhG2 pp. 38–39, BhG4 pp. 70–71):

[…] *senayor ubhayor madhye yuddhodyamenāgatya tadvirodhinaṃ viṣādaṃ mohaṃ prāpnuvantaṃ tam arjunaṃ prahasann ivānucitācāraṇaprakāśanena lajjāmbudhau majjayann iva hṛṣīkeśaḥ sarvāntaryāmī bhagavān idaṃ vakṣyamāṇam aśocyān ityādi vacaḥ paramagambhīrārtham anucitācaraṇaprakāśakam uktavān na tūpekṣitavān ity arthaḥ | anucitācaraṇaprakāśanena lajjotpādanaṃ prahāsaḥ | lajjā ca duḥkhātmiketi dveṣaviṣaya eva sa mukhyaḥ | arjunasya tu bhagavatkṛpāviṣayatvād anucitācaraṇaprakāśanasya ca vivekotpattihetutvād ekadalābhāvena gauṇa evāyaṃ prahāsa iti kathayitum ivaśabdaḥ | lajjām utpādayitum iva vivekam utpādayitum arjunasyānucitācaraṇaṃ bhagavatā prakāśyate | lajjotpattis tu nāntarīyakatayāstu māstu veti na vivakṣiteti bhāvaḥ | yadi hi yuddhārambhāt prāg gṛhe eva sthito yuddham upekṣeta tadā nānucitaṃ kuryāt | mahatā saṃrambheṇa tu yu-*

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[56] *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 8.1.6: 'So, in the way that here the condition acquired through action is exhausted, likewise the world up there, gained through merits, is exhausted' (*tad yatheha karmajito lokaḥ kṣīyata evam evāmutra puṇyajito lokaḥ kṣīyata iti śruteḥ*).

[57] See Pellegrini 2018: 289–290.

ddhabhūmāv āgatya tadupekṣaṇam atīvānucitam iti kathayituṃ senayor
ity ādiviśeṣaṇam | etac cāśocyān ityādau spaṣṭaṃ bhaviṣyati || 10 ||

To him, who — having reached the position in between the two armies for war-engagement — experiences anguish and a delusion which is opposed to that [war], Hṛṣīkeśa — the glorious lord and interior controller — almost laughing, as though plunging him into a sea of shame by exhibiting [his] inappropriate conduct,[58] uttered to [that] Arjuna those words starting with *aśocyān* (BhG 2.11) which are about to be expressed, whose meaning is utterly profound, and which throw light on [his] inappropriate conduct, but do not disregard it. By displaying an inappropriate conduct, derision generates shame, and such shame is substantiated by sorrow. And the content of its primary [meaning] is repulsion. Nevertheless, since Arjuna is the reservoir of the grace of the glorious lord, and since throwing light on his inappropriate behavior is done with the aim of triggering discrimination in him, such derision is only metaphoric due to the lack of one of these [constitutive] elements [i.e. the arousal of shame]. In order to express this, there is the word *iva*. As if it were giving rise to shame, the lord displays Arjuna's inappropriate conduct in order to produce discrimination. On the other hand, the meaning is that the lord intents to express [such an option]: is shame arising as the immediate consequence [of the laugh] or not? Indeed, if [Arjuna] had disregarded the war by staying at home before the beginning of the battle, then he would have done nothing inappropriate. But having reached the battlefield with great enthusiasm, his avoidance of the war is definitely inappropriate (2.10).

Here *prahasann iva* is interpreted as 'almost laughing.' Indeed, although Kṛṣṇa does not manifest a full-fledged laugh, his expression is meant to teach that what Arjuna is doing and thinking is inappropriate for several reasons. Such a hint of laughter is meant to generate a counter-feeling, leading Arjuna to recognize that his reaction is out of place. This mood of laughter is induced when someone acts contrary to his/her *svadharma* (see Rigopoulos *infra* 1.3), so he/she is the object of mockery due to his/her inappropriate behaviour. But this is not a criticism for the sake of criticism. On the contrary, the real purport of the *bhagavat* is highlighted by

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[58] See also Viśvanātha Cakravartī Ṭhākura's *Sārārthavarṣiṇīṭīkā* 2.7.1 and Bāladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa's *Gītābhūṣaṇa* 2.7.2.

iva, which suggests that his derision is aimed at triggering Arjuna's discrimination.

In the first part of GAD *ad* 2.11 (p. 57; BhG2 p. 39, BhG4 p. 72), Madhusūdana returns to the gloss on 2.10 and writes:

> *tatrārjunasya yuddhākhye svadharme svato jātāpi pravṛttir dvidhena mohena tannimittena śokena ca pratibaddheti* |

> Although it has arisen by nature, Arjuna's inclination towards his own duty — called war — is obstructed by two kinds of delusion, and by the anguish caused by them.[59]

Thus, this twofold delusion of Arjuna should be removed. The first delusion is the superimposition of self that is free from any relation whatsoever with the phenomenal properties on the ultimately false phenomenal world. This superimposition is common to all living beings and takes place because of lack of discrimination due to a threefold limiting condition, constituted by two bodies (gross and subtle) and their respective cause, that is, the causal body, which is the same ignorance of the self. The realization of the pure self removes this first form of delusion.[60] The second delusion is specific and depends on the defect of compassion which afflicts Arjuna, who sees a form of injustice in the violence of war. This delusion is erased by understanding that, although full of violence, war is the warrior's own duty (*dharma*), so it cannot be injustice (*adharma*).[61] Hence, Madhusūdana concludes that, once the cause of anguish has withdrawn, anguish necessarily comes to an end:[62] there is no need of any further means.

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[59] This viewpoint was already developed by Sadānanda (see 1.5) *ad* BhG 2.11 (v. 1, BhG4 p. 74).

[60] Here I paraphrase GAD (p. 57; BhG2 p. 39, BhG4 pp. 72–73): *tatrātmani svaprakāśaparamānandarūpe sarvasaṃsāradharmāsaṃsargiṇi sthūlasūkṣmaśarīra-dvayatatkāraṇāvidyākhyopādhitrayāvivekena mithyābhūtasyāpi saṃsārasya satyatvā-tmadharmatvādipratibhāsarūpa ekaḥ sarvaprāṇisādhāraṇaḥ* |.

[61] Here I also paraphrase the following passage of GAD (p. 57; BhG2 p. 39, BhG4 p. 72): *aparas tu yuddhākhye svadharme hiṃsādibāhulyenādharmatvaprati-bhāsarūpo 'rjunasyaiva karuṇādidoṣanibandhano 'sādhāraṇaḥ | evam upādhitrayavive-kena śuddhātmasvarūpabodhaḥ prathamasya nirvartakaḥ | dvitīyasya tu hiṃsādimattve 'pi yuddhasya svadharmatvenādharmatvābhāvabodho 'sādhāraṇaḥ* |.

[62] A common rule states that effects cannot persist without their causes. See the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.2.1-2, 4.1.3 and 5.2.18 (ed. pp. 37–38, 147, 184) along with the *Yogasūtra* 2.25 (ed. pp. 23, 96).

The final sections of the GAD *ad* 2.11 (pp. 58–59; BhG2 pp. 41–44, BhG4 p. 73) focus on the perception of the *paṇḍita*s, whose knowledge of the reality of the self is generated by reflection (*vicāra*): they do not care about the dead or the living, whereas Arjuna's perception is completely different from theirs. For these *paṇḍita*s the phenomenal world disappears during *samādhi* and thus there is no trace of masters, friends, companions, relatives or whoever else. And although, once they emerge from *samādhi*,[63] the world reappears, the *paṇḍita*s have ascertained it as being illusory and false (*vyutthānasamaye tatpratibhāse 'pi mṛṣatvena niścayāt*). In the classical example of the rope mistaken for a snake, once the illusion of the snake is dissolved, fear and trembling are no longer justified.

Madhusūdana proposes another classical example: when the normal sense of taste is subdued by hepatitis, even molasses taste bitter owing to an excess of bile. But once the person is cured, despite this invalid perception he/she will not search for molasses when craving for something bitter because the ascertainment of sweetness is definitely stronger. Hence, since the illusion consisting in mourning for those who should not be mourned is due to the ignorance of the nature of the self, once this ignorance is dispelled through knowledge, such an illusion can no longer persist.

1.7 Nīlakaṇṭha Caturdhara

Nīlakaṇṭha Caturdhara (second half of the 17th c.) was a non-dualist who wrote the *Bhāratabhāvadīpa* (or *Bhāvadīpa*), a commentary on the entire *Mahābhārata*, which obviously covers also the BhG.[64] This work is characterized by a formalized expression typical of the period in which Nīlakaṇṭha lived, completely dominated by the *navyanyāya* style and meta-idiom. Indeed, he presents more or less the same arguments of his predecessors but expressing them in a formalized style.

[63] On the different perspectives concerning the conditions of *samādhi* and *vyutthāna*, see *Yogasūtra* 3.37 with commentaries (ed. pp. 41, 156).
[64] Saha (2017: 264) refers to Nīlakaṇṭha as Nīlakaṇṭha Sūri, who lived in Maharashtra in the 16th c. He was the son of Govinda Sūri, a Marāṭhī-speaking brahmin, whose family had established itself in the modern district of Ahmadnagar in Maharashtra (Gode 1942: 146–161).

While commenting on 2.1–3 (BhG6 p. 64), Nīlakaṇṭha says that the words of Arjuna in 1.37 (*svajanaṃ hi kathaṃ hatvā sukhinaḥ syām mādhava*) are not due to a compassion characterized by the desire to eradicate others' sorrows (*na tu dayayā paraduḥkhaprahā-ṇecchārūpayā*), but out of affection for master, fathers, companions, friend, relatives, etc. This is a kind of delusion, which reaches its peak in 2.6 (*yān eva hatvā na jijīviṣāmaḥ*).

Nīlakaṇṭha's interpretation of 2.10 (BhG6 p. 73) is not detailed:

> *mūḍho 'py ayam amūḍhavad vadatīti prahasann iva | idaṃ vakṣya-māṇam |*

> This is about to be expressed [in v. 2.11], that 'Even though he is a fool, he is speaking as if he were not one,' [that is the reason for] *prahasann iva*.

In the gloss on 2.11 (BhG6 pp. 82–83), Nīlakaṇṭha exemplifies a sort of formalization through a couple of inferences. Arjuna is the victim of two types of delusion: 1) the idea that the self dies with the death of the body, and 2) the idea that his own duty — war — constitutes *adharma*.[65] The lord aims to uproot the first type of delusion with twenty *śloka*s — beginning with BhG 2.11 —, substantially analogous to the aphorisms on the science of the absolute (*brahmavidyā*).[66] The idea is that only a limiting condition such as the body is subject to death, so that when Arjuna is pained for Bhīṣma, etc., he is completely wrong. This is why even though he utters wise words — as in 1.42c (*patanti pitaro hy eṣām*) and 1.44c (*narake niyataṃ vāsaḥ*) — he acts like a fool. The *probans* for this is given in 2.11cd: *gatāsūn agatāsūn ca nānuśocanti paṇḍitāḥ*. From this we deduce that what is truly desired is the vital breath, and not the body.[67] Therefore, inferentially speaking: 'the self is different

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[65] This same twofold delusion is also explained by Sadānanda Yogīndra (see 1.5, *ad* BhG 2.11 v. 1; BhG4 p. 74) and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (see 1.6) in GAD *ad* 2.11 (p. 57; BhG4 p. 72, BhG2 p. 39).

[66] He corroborates his position through a passage of the *śruti* 'It is indeed this [body] that perishes deprived of the individual self; the individual self does not perish!' (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.11.3, *jīvāpetaṃ vā va kiledaṃ mriyate, na jīvo mriyate*).

[67] As stated in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 7.15.1: 'Breath is indeed the father, it is the mother, it is the master!' (*prāṇo ha pitā prāṇo mātā prāṇa ācāryaḥ*).

from the body because it is sentient, unlike a pot; [and] the body is not sentient, because it can be experienced, like a pot' (*tasmād ātmā dehād anyaḥ, cetanatvāt, vyatirekeṇa ghaṭavat | deho na cetanaḥ, dṛśyatvāt, ghaṭavat |*).[68]

> *yadi dehaś cetanaḥ syāt mṛte 'pi tatra caitanyam upalabhyeta, tasmād dehanāśenātmanāśaṃ manvāno mūrkha evāsīty arthaḥ |*

> The meaning is: if the body were sentient, once dead there would still be consciousness;[69] thus, if you consider that with the destruction of the body even the self is destroyed, you are a fool.

In closing, Nīlakaṇṭha says that this is a typical explanation of logicians (*tārkikavyākhyāna*). It is a fact that Arjuna is saying something that wise, learned people would never say.

1.8 Vaṃśīdhara Miśra

We have very scanty information on Vaṃśīdhara Miśra, who wrote the *Vaṃśī*, a gloss of Advaita inspiration on the BhG, which explains *prahasann iva* under 2.10 (BhG7 pp. 33–34):

> *prahasann iva prahasan prakṛṣṭahāsaṃ kurvan jano yathā prasanna- mukho bhavati tathā prasannamukhaḥ sann ity arthaḥ | hṛṣīkeśatvena sarvāntaryāmitayā bhaktavatsalatayā ca bhagavataḥ svasakalabhakta- samuddhāraphalakaparamārthatattvaprakāśanasya svacikīrṣitasyaiva arjunasya śokamoharūpaṃ nimittam āśritya ayam iṣṭo 'vasaraḥ saṃ- prāpta iti bhagavataś cetasi saṃjātā, tasya mukhacandre 'pi prādura- bhūd ity āśayaḥ |*

> This is the meaning [of *prahasann iva*]: [Hṛṣīkeśa], by laughing, produced a strong laugh like a common man, he became happy-faced, [that is] displays a happy face. The glorious lord — who wished to illustrate the supreme principle whose fruit is the rescue

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[68] Here two inferences are presented. The first is meant to prove that the self is sentient, and gives a negative (*vyatireka*) instance (*dṛṣṭānta*): the self is different from a pot, because it is sentient, whereas the property of the 'negative instance' (*vipakṣa*) is opposite to that of the *probandum* (*sādhya*). The second inference has a positive instance (*sapakṣa*), where in both the *sapakṣa* and the *sādhya* the same *dharma* inheres, namely, the property of being the object of empirical experience (*dṛśyatva*, lit. 'visibility'), gained through the means of knowledge. See Pellegrini 2018: 289–290.

[69] From a *naiyāyika* perspective, this is a hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*), whereas from the perspective of those who accept it as a different means of knowledge, it is a postulation (*arthāpatti*). See Pellegrini 2018: 293–294, 297–299.

of all his devotees — is the impeller of the sense faculties, the inner controller of all and the beloved of devotees. Having recourse to the anguish and delusion of Arjuna as a pretext, in the lord's consciousness [the thought] 'the right occasion has arrived' arose, and it manifested itself even in his moon-face. This is the purport.

Kṛṣṇa's joyful laughter is due to the fact that Arjuna's anguish is the pretext for the lord's intervention, which will lead his devotee to the supreme goal. Hence, a slight smile rises on his face like the moon.

In the gloss on 2.11 (BhG7 pp. 34–35), Vaṃśīdhara divides the BhG in various sections: from 1.1 to 2.10 there is the introduction, which is useful for showing to all living beings that the cause of all defects (anguish, delusion, etc.), i.e. the seed of becoming, is ignorance. From 2.11 to 18.66 there is the principal section of the text (*aṅgī granthaḥ*), where Arjuna is instructed on the *adhyātmaśāstra*.

2. *Kashmirian Śaiva-Bhedābheda commentaries*

In this section I shall deal briefly with some of the commentators of the Śaiva Kashmirian traditions,[70] as well as the *aupādhika-bhedābhedavādin* Bhāskara. The reason for including Bhāskara in this group is because he usually[71] commented upon the Kashmirian recension of the BhG (hereafter BhGk).

What is remarkable in the BhGk (Piano 2017: 98–99; Kato 2016: 1109) is a clearer reading of 2.12b (*vulgata* 2.11b) on *prajñāvan nābhibhāṣase* 'you do not speak as a wise man,' instead of the *vulgata*'s problematic reading *prajñāvādāṃś ca bhāṣase*. In particular, Kato 2016 proposes a survey of traditional interpretations of 2.11b and the scholars' understanding of it, arriving at the conclusion that the BhGk's reading (*prajñāvan nābhibhāṣase*) is more plausible, even though *abhibhāṣase* is comparatively rarer than *bhāṣase*.

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[70] According to Saha (2017: 274), Vasugupta (9th c.), the commentator of the *Śivasūtra*s, also wrote the *Vāsavīṭīkā*, a commentary on the BhG that seems to be available only in manuscript form.

[71] I say 'usually' because in some parts of his commentary Bhāskara also seems to follow the *vulgata* or, as pointed out by Kato (2014: 1145–1146), perhaps an earlier version of the Kashmirian recension, followed by Rāmakaṇṭha and Abhinavagupta.

2.1 Bhāskara

In addition to a commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*, Bhāskara (8th c.; Saha 2017: 272–273) also wrote the *Bhagavadāśayānusaraṇa* on the BhG. This seems to be the oldest commentary after Śaṅkara's BhGBh. The *Bhagavadāśayānusaraṇa* was edited by Subhadropādhyaya (1965) and studied by van Buitenen (1965) and Kato (2014: 1144–1145), according to whom the text in its present form is very corrupt.

Bhāskara's commentary on 2.10 is terse and ignores the particle *iva* and the preverb *pra-* (BhG5 p. 41).

> *tam arjunaṃ senayor madhye yathoktena prakāreṇa sīdamānaṃ yuddhaṃ prati tyaktotsāhaṃ hṛṣīkeśo hasann idaṃ vakṣyamāṇaṃ vākyam āha |*

> To that Arjuna, seated in the said way in between the two armies, who had abandoned enthusiasm toward war, Hṛṣīkeśa, laughing, uttered this sentence which is about to be expressed.

Despite the scanty gloss, the last sentence of Bhāskara's commentary adds a remarkable consideration: 'Great souls usually smile before speaking' (*mahātmānaḥ kila smitapūrvābhibhāṣiṇo bhavanti*).

The idea that Kṛṣṇa, like all *mahātman*s, smiles before speaking, indicates a shared characteristic, herein expressed by a *tadguṇasaṃvijñānabahuvrīhi* compound where the first member is a past participle (from root √*smi*). Moreover, the next verse of the BhGk seems to hint at a *double entendre* given that in place of 2.11 of the *vulgata* it reads:

> *tvaṃ mānuṣeṇopahatāntarātmā*
>   *viṣādamohābhibhavād visaṃjñaḥ |*
> *kṛpāgṛhītaḥ samavekṣya bandhūn*
>   *abhiprapannān mukham antakasya ||*

> You — whose soul is troubled by human compassion, due to overwhelming anguish and delusion — are without discernment. You have been seized by tenderness having seen [your] companions approaching the jaws of death.[72]

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[72] See Zaehner 1969: 125: 'Vanquished by dejection and delusion, devoid of wit, your inmost self has been upset by what is [all too] human; pity has seized upon you because you see your kinsmen enter into the jaws of death'; and Gnoli

The information provided by this verse, added to BhGk 2.12 (= *vulgata* 2.11, *prajñāvādāṃś ca bhāṣase*), sketches a clear picture of what Kṛṣṇa is saying to Arjuna, i.e. that he is obnubilated and lacks *viveka*, being concerned with what should not concern him. Yet the lord's hint of laughter is not meant to ridicule Arjuna. It rather shows Kṛṣṇa's surprise, because at that crucial time Arjuna is unrecognizable. His intellect, consciousness and discriminating faculty are obstructed, have somehow collapsed: this is the reason for the lord's mockery.[73]

2.2 Abhinavagupta

The commentary on the BhGk of the famous Kashmirian philosopher Abhinavagupta (10th–11th c.) is called *Gītārthasaṃgraha*. He points out that the BhG's first chapter is just an introduction to the rest of the poem (BhG2 p. 8). According to him, the enmity between Pāṇḍavas and Kauravas should be symbolically interpreted as a perpetual conflict between knowledge and ignorance: each tries to subdue the other. Abhinavagupta adds that there are two types of people who are ineligible to receive the teaching: 1) the ignorant, who do not even have a speck of knowledge (*anutpannavidyāleśāvakaśa*), and 2) the wise, who have totally eradicated ignorance (*nirmūlitasamastāvidyāprapañca*). Any instruction given to these two categories is fruitless. The best candidates for the instruction leading to liberation are the doubtful ones.

While glossing 2.5–6 (BhG2 pp. 35–36, 39), Abhinavagupta anticipates that the phrase 'in between the two armies' suggests that Arjuna is overcome by doubt but has not yet decided to withdraw from the war. This is why Arjuna begs for instruction and — being doubtful — is eligible for it. Finding himself in between the two armies he is exactly in between knowledge and ignorance; therefore, unable to decide, he is instructed later on by the lord.[74]

(1976: 57): 'Tu sei turbato, dentro di te, dalla tua stessa umanità e istupidito dall'offuscamento ed avvilimento che ti sopraffanno. Tu sei pervaso dalla compassione, vedendo i tuoi parenti entrare nelle fauci della morte.'

[73] BhG5 p. 42: *visaṃjño vyavahitadivyajñānaḥ saṃvṛtta iti | itaś copahāsakāraṇam | saṃjñānaṃ saṃjñā viśiṣṭā buddhiḥ | vigatā vyavahitā vā saṃjñā asyeti visaṃjñaḥ | upahatāntarātmā |.*

[74] See also Marjanovic 2002: 25–44 and Gnoli 1976: 56–57.

2.3 Ānandavardhana

In his commentary on the BhG entitled *Jñānakarmasamuccaya* or *Ānandavardhinī*, Ānandavardhana follows the BhGk. Saha (2017: 274) thinks that the author of the *Jñānakarmasamuccaya* is the same as the rhetorician Ānandavardhana (9th c., author of the *Dhvanyāloka*), even though Belvalkar (1941: 5) had already pointed out that the Ānandavardhana of the *Jñānakarmasamuccaya* quotes from Abhinavagupta (Belvalkar 1941: 3). He was probably a 17th c. commentator. On 2.10 he writes (BhG1 p. 27):

> *taṃ pārtham ubhayoḥ senayor madhye proktaprakāreṇa sīdamānaṃ śokābhibhūtaṃ yuddhaṃ prati tyaktotsāhaṃ prahasann iva vikṛta-ceṣṭādarśanād upahasann iva hṛṣīkāṇām indriyāṇām īśaḥ prerayitā paramātmasvarūpaś caturātmā bhagavān | dehāhaṃbhāvanāvirbhūta-mithyājñānanivṛtter saṃbhava iti tattvopadeśapūrvaṃ svakarmaṇi pra-vartayiṣur (sic for pravivartayiṣur) dehadehinoḥ saṃyogaviyoga-svarūpam uddiśann uvācety arthaḥ ||*

> To the son of Pṛthā, who in the said way sat in between the two armies overwhelmed by anguish, with the enthusiasm for war lost, the lord who is the compeller of the sense-organs and of all faculties, the glorious of the nature of the supreme self with its four states, with a hint of laughter, [that is] nearly mocking him by observing his modified gestures, spoke, desirous of leading him again to his own [fighting] occupation by showing him how the body and its owner are associated and separated from one another, according to the teaching 'The removal of the false notion that arises from the idea of "I" [superimposed] on the body is possible.' This is the meaning.

Here *prahasann iva* seems to mean 'nearly mocking.'

3. Jñāneśvar

Beside the Sanskrit commentarial traditions, there are countless vernacular glosses on the BhG. Although my analysis is based on the Sanskrit sources, I deal here with a single outstanding exception, an enormously important Marāṭhī gloss, namely the *Jñāne-śvarī* or *Bhāvārthadīpikā* composed (probably in 1290) by Jñāne-śvar (or Jñānadev, traditional dates 1275–1296), the founder of the Vārkarī Panth consisting in a synthesis of Advaita Vedānta tenets, Śaiva Nātha traditions, and Kṛṣṇa *bhakti*.

Commenting on Arjuna's refusal to fight, *Jñāneśvarī* 1.83 ends with these words: 'Lord Krishna was astonished to see him in such a condition' (Kripananda 1989: 17). Jñāneśvar devotes seven verses (84–90) to the interpretation of BhG 2.10, focusing on *prahasann iva* in 88–90. Here is the translation of Swami Kripananda (1989: 17–18):

> He said to Himself, what is he thinking of? Arjuna is quite ignorant. What can be done? (84). How can he be brought back to his senses? How can he be made to take heart? Just as an exorcist considers how to cast out an evil spirit, (85) or just as a physician who finds someone suffering from a dangerous illness, as the crisis approaches, instantly prescribes a magic remedy like nectar, (86) similarly, between the two armies, Krishna reflected on how Arjuna could cast off his infatuation (87). Having decided what to do, He began to speak in an angry tone, just as a mother's love is often concealed in her anger (88). The potency of nectar is hidden in the bitter taste of medicine. Even though it is not outwardly visible, it is revealed by the effectiveness of the medicine (89). In the same way, Krishna spoke to Arjuna with words which, though seemingly bitter, were actually very sweet (90).

Kṛṣṇa's apparently harsh behavior, his angry tone and bitter words are understood to be like a medicine, i.e., the medium of his grace (*prasāda*) which flows through unusual paths, as the BhG itself will state later (18.37ab):

> *yat tad agre viṣam iva pariṇāme 'mṛtopamam |*

> That [joy] which is at the beginning like poison, but then transforms [itself] into nectar […]

4. *Viśiṣṭādvaita*

Other important commentators of the BhG are found among the followers of the Vedānta *viśiṣṭādvaita*, which traditionally developed from Nāthamuni (9th c.) and Īśvaramuni (9th c.), through Yāmuna Muni (10th c.), Rāmānuja (11th c.), Veṅkaṭanātha (13th–14th c.) and other important authors and interpreters. The theistic Vaiṣṇava *viśiṣṭādvaitin*s — along with Bhāskara — were the earliest direct adversaries of Śaṅkara's interpretation of the BhG.

4.1 Yāmuna Muni

The first Viśiṣṭādvaita reading of the BhG is the *Gītārthasaṃgraha* of Yāmuna Muni (10th c.), also known as Āḷavantār, 'the victorious,' who is held to be the predecessor of Rāmānuja in the line of the school (Saha 2017: 265–266). In thirty-two stanzas, he exposes the essence of the BhG, which is Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa, the supreme *brahman*. He divides the eighteen chapters of the text thematically into three groups of six chapters, each dedicated to a particular kind of *yoga*: *karmayoga, bhaktiyoga,* and *jñānayoga.* Due to the extreme conciseness of his work, Yāmuna does not touch on the subject under examination, but hints at it marginally in stanza 5 (BhG6 p. 24):

asthānasnehakāruṇyadharmādharmadhiyākulam |
pārthaṃ prapannam uddiśya śāstrāvataraṇaṃ kṛtam ||

The opening of the textual teaching has been done by addressing Pārtha who — having totally surrendered [to the lord] — is troubled by misplaced affection and pity, as well as by the [thought of what is] *dharma* and [what is] *adharma.*

4.1.1 Veṅkaṭanātha

The *Gītārthasaṃgraharakṣā* by Veṅkaṭanātha (a.k.a. Vedānta Deśika, 13th–14th c.) is often indispensable for understanding the terse wording of the *Gītārthasaṃgraha.* Veṅkaṭanātha (BhG6 p. 24) says that in the first four stanzas of his work Yāmuna Muni refers to the meaning of the entire BhG and to the purport of each of its three groups of six chapters. From v. 5 to v. 23, Yāmuna briefly explains the meaning of each chapter of the BhG. While glossing on v. 5, Veṅkaṭanātha adds relevant information. Although Vyāsa — the traditional author of the BhG — separated the first chapter from the second, there is a connection between the principal teaching, concerned with the removal of Arjuna's anguish, and the opening section, describing how the hero's despondency had arisen. Following this pattern, under v. 5 Veṅkaṭanātha summarizes the first chapter along with the opening section of the second. It is precisely to point this out that Rāmānuja's commentary on BhG 2.9 (BhG6 p. 71) quotes and elucidates this passage of the *Gītārthasaṃgraha.* While Veṅkaṭanātha does not say anything specific

about *prahasann iva*, nonetheless he explicitly affirms that, since Arjuna has surrendered to the lord, he is to be taken as a model of the eligibility for the teaching, and quotes the passage *asya moho na śāmyatīti matvā* 'Having thought "his delusion does not come to an end!"' Thus, says Veṅkaṭanātha, vv. 2.10 to 2.12 are to be understood as the true beginning of the teaching.

4.2 Rāmānuja

Rāmānuja commented upon the *Brahmasūtra* with the *Śrībhāṣya* and on the BhG with the *Gītābhāṣya* (or *Viśiṣṭādvaitabhāṣya*), and is therefore known as the *bhāṣyakāra* of Viśiṣṭādvaita. Due to his pivotal position in Viśiṣṭādvaita, his commentary on the BhG is highly esteemed. There are two main hermeneutic tools for investigating Rāmānuja's commentary on the BhG: one earlier, namely, Yāmuna Muni's *Gītārthasaṃgraha*, and one later, i.e. the lucid sub-commentary *Tātparyacāndrikā* by Veṅkaṭanātha (Raghavachar 1990: XI).

Like Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja observes that Kṛṣṇa is not simply addressing Arjuna but all living beings who long for release. The central theme is devotion to the supreme Kṛṣṇa-Nārāyaṇa, since in Viśiṣṭādvaita *bhakti* is considered the utmost way for realizing the divine. Devotion is said to develop through knowledge and action. These main themes are briefly anticipated in Rāmānuja's introduction to the poem and find an analytical focus in specific places of his commentary (Raghavachar 1990: XII-XIII).

Like Yāmuna, Rāmānuja divides the BhG into three groups of six chapters each. The first six chapters, according to Rāmānuja, deal with the method the individual self must follow to vanquish bondages. The ascent consists in the intellectual comprehension of the nature of the self, the adherence to *karmayoga*, and then to *jñānayoga*. The second group of six chapters focuses on the *bhaktiyoga* and its object, namely the supreme lord and its nature, attributes, and glories. The third develops a theoretical clarification of the paths of *karman*, *jñāna*, and *bhakti*, and also investigates the status of *prakṛti*, *puruṣa*, and *puruṣottama*, highlighting the absolute supremacy of the latter (Raghavachar 1990: XIV).

In the introduction Rāmānuja says that the nature of the *bhagavat* and the supreme *puruṣārtha* are achievable through *bhaktiyoga*, accompanied by a combination of *karma* and *jñāna* (BhG6 p. 6).

He then briefly comments upon the first chapter, in order to summarize the scene of the battlefield (BhG 1.25–1.47). The theme of the first chapter extends to the opening ten verses of the second. Within the *Mahābhārata*-frame (6.25–42), this portion represents the epic and dramatic core of the BhG (Ježić 1979: 628–638). While in the beginning of the first chapter, the text lists the names of the most illustrious warriors of the two armies on the Kurukṣetra battlefield, in the second part the focus is on Arjuna's turmoil of emotions. The rest of the BhG is devoted to solving his distress.[75] On *prahasann iva* Rāmānuja says (BhG6 p. 71):

tam evaṃ dehātmanor yāthātmyājñānanimittaśokāviṣṭaṃ dehātiriktā-
tmajñānanimittaṃ ca dharmaṃ [76] *bhāṣamāṇaṃ parasparaviruddha-*
guṇānvitam ubhayoḥ senayor yuddhāya udyuktayor madhye akasmān
nirudyogaṃ pārtham ālokya paramapuruṣaḥ prahasann iva idam uvāca
| [pārthaṃ prahasann iva] parihāsavākyaṃ vadann iva ātmapa-
ramātmayāthātmyatatprāptyupāyabhūtakarmayogabhaktiyogagocaraṃ
na tv evāhaṃ jātu nāsam ity ārabhya ahaṃ tvā sarvapāpebhyo
mokṣayiṣyāmi mā śuca ityetadantam uvāca ity arthaḥ |

Having thus seen him, the descendant of Pṛthā, between the two armies ready for battle, all of a sudden discouraged, pervaded by an anguish due to the ignorance of the real nature of the body and the self, while he [= Kṛṣṇa] was about to put forward the truth of the knowledge of the self as distinct from the body, [which are concepts] mutually opposed to one another; [to him] — with a hint of laughter — the supreme person said this. [Almost laughing at Pārtha, that is] as though pronouncing a mocking sentence, he revealed to him — beginning with 'Never indeed was I not …' (2.12), and ending with 'I will free you from all sins, do not worry!' (18.66) — the contents of the path of actions and the path of devotion that are the means to obtain that [goal], which concerns the

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[75] Glossing the compound *dharmakṣetre* (BhG 1.1), Vedānta Deśika states that the field of *dharma* is the sacred soil of an immense war-sacrifice (BhG6 p. 25).

[76] Here is a textual problem. I prefer the reading *dharmam* (Ādidevānanda 1993: 59–60) rather than *dharmādharmau* (BhG6 p. 71). But, commenting on BhG 2.11 (BhG6 p. 79), the text refers to Arjuna's sorrows because he will kill his friends and relatives, and his consequent speech on *dharma* and *adharma* is generated by the knowledge of the self as different from the body. In the gloss *ad* 2.11, the word *bhāṣaṇam* is not constructed only with *dharmam*, as in the reading I prefer *ad* 2.1, but we find it attached to a *dvandva* compound with *dharma* and *adharma*, as presented by BhG6 (p. 71).

real nature of the [individual] self and of the supreme self. This is the meaning.

Here, Rāmānuja reads *prahasan* as a mocking laugh mitigated by the semantic force of *iva*. In Rāmānuja's commentary on 2.11 (BhG6 p. 79), a few points just mentioned in 2.10 are clarified, but nothing more is said on our issue. Rāmānuja focuses on the sources of Arjuna's anguish: quoting BhG 1.42cd,[77] he adds that Arjuna cries for those who are not to be mourned. This mistake is due to his identification of the self with the body, which is also what triggers Arjuna's apparently wise words. On the contrary, Rāmānuja points out that those who know the true status of the body and self do not suffer any anguish whatsoever on similar occasions (*dehātmasvabhāvajñānavatāṃ nātra kiñcic chokanimittam asti*).

4.2.1 Veṅkaṭanātha

In addition to the *Gītārthasaṃgraharakṣā* on Yāmuna Muni's *Gītārthasaṃgraha* (see 4.1 and 4.1.1), Veṅkaṭanātha (traditional dates 1268–1369) also composed the *Tātparyacandrikā*, a sub-commentary on Rāmānuja's *Gītābhāṣya*, which glosses the latter's introduction at length, mentioning Śaṅkara several times in order to refute him. Under 2.1 (BhG6 p. 62) it says that the first chapter of the BhG focuses on Arjuna's anguish and delusion, while the second is devoted to the teaching capable of uprooting them, namely the instruction on *brahman* and *ātman.*

On BhG 2.2 (BhG6 p. 62), Veṅkaṭanātha concentrates on Arjuna's misplaced delusion, which leads to the refusal of fighting (v. 2.8). It is this delusion which should be taken into consideration, and not the persons for whom Arjuna is distressed.

On 2.6–8 (BhG6 p. 68), Veṅkaṭanātha points out that a war is usually fought with the aim of defending one's beloved. But in the *Mahābhārata* conflict the enemy is one's kith and kin. This inevitably generates confusion, diminishing the ability to reach decisions due to the feelings of affection and compassion for one's relatives and friends. Only Kṛṣṇa can solve the problem and dispel all doubts by revealing the *summum bonum* (*śreyas*; see *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* 1.2.1 and 1.7).

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[77] BhG 1.42cd: *patanti pitaro hy eṣāṃ luptapiṇḍodakakriyāḥ* |.

On 2.9 (BhG6 p. 72), Veṅkaṭanātha asks himself: if the first chapter is centered upon Arjuna's despondency brought about by misplaced affection, then why is the textual teaching entirely focused on the *yoga*s of action, knowledge and devotion, about which no question has been asked?[78] It is not at all appropriate to offer such an instruction, given that what the *bhagavat* will reveal requires ascending degrees of secrecy (*cāyaṃ guhyaguhyataraguhyatamaprakāro 'rthaḥ sahasopadeṣṭum ayuktaḥ*). This becomes evident in subsequent passages of the text itself (2.18[79] and 2.37[80]), where the lord emphasizes that Arjuna must engage in battle.

To this objection (BhG6 p. 72), Veṅkaṭanātha replies by reverting once again to BhG 2.7. He argues that, although the expression 'what is best' (*yac chreyaḥ*) is quite indeterminate, Arjuna is by now a *bhakta* consecrated to his *guru*-god Kṛṣṇa and thus it must be inferred that he has the desire to know *brahman*. This the reason why the lord offers him his sublime teaching concerning the ultimate goal. Even the imperative form 'fight' (*yudhyasva*) must be understood as a means to achieve the *summum bonum*. For this reason, it is correct to undertake the teaching.

Veṅkaṭanātha then proceeds to comments upon Rāmānuja's *bhāṣya ad* 2.10:

> *parihāsayogyatvāya tam iti parāmṛṣṭam āha — evam ityādinā | […] adharmādiḥ parājayādir vā yuddhanivṛtteḥ samyagdhetur atra nāsti, ahetukopakrāntatyāge tu parihāsyatvam iti bhāvaḥ |*

> To [highlight] the suitability for mockery [the pronoun] *tam* is recalled, and [Rāmānuja, consequently] says *evam*, etc. […] In such case there is no good reason — such as injustice or defeat — to withdraw from the war. On the other hand, becoming an object of mockery [is something that] happens when an undertaken enterprise is abandoned without reason. This is the idea.

> […] *yadvā dhīram arjunaṃ hṛṣīkeśatayā svayaṃ prakṣobhya prahasann iva jagadupakārāya śāstram uvāceti sambandhaviśeṣāt samanantaravākyaparyālocanayā ca parihāsārthatvaucityāt prahāsasya pārthakarmakatvam uktam |*

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[78] To corroborate his hypothetical question, Veṅkaṭanātha (BhG6 p. 72) quotes *Mānavadharmaśāstra* 2.110: 'No unasked issue should be revealed to anyone […]' (*nāpṛṣṭaḥ kasyacid brūyāt*).

[79] BhG 2.18d: *tasmād yudhyasva bhārata ||*.

[80] BhG 2.37d: *yuddhāya kṛtaniścayaḥ ||*.

On the other hand, since he [= Kṛṣṇa] is the lord of the sense faculties, having agitated the valiant Arjuna, with a hint of laughter he revealed to him the text so as to benefit the whole universe. Thus, due to a specific relationship and by means of the structure of the immediately following sentence, and since mockery is legitimate when amusement is its purpose, [then] the property of being the grammatical object of Pārtha [= Arjuna] has been expressed.

[…] *ataḥ prahasann iva ity anena phalitaṃ sarasatvaṃ sugrahatvaṃ nikhilanigamāntagahvaranilīnasya mahato 'rthajātasyānāyāsabhāṣaṇam, idaṃśabdasya vakṣyamāṇasamastabhagavadvākyaviṣayatvam, iṅgitenāpi vivakṣitasūcanaṃ ca darśayati — parihāsetyādinā |*

[…] Therefore, the freshness and the easy understandability resulting from the [expression] *prahasann iva* is [the prelude to] an effortless speech whose majestic meaning is hidden in the cave of the conclusion of all sapiential texts [= the Vedānta/*Upaniṣad*s]. The object of the word *idam* are the sentences of the glorious lord that are about to be uttered. Moreover, by means of what is indicated, he [= Rāmānuja] alludes to what is meant by [the expression] 'mocking [sentence].'

aśocyān iti ślokasyāpi upadeśārthāvadhānāpādanārthaparihāsacchāyatayā śāstrāvataraṇamātratvena sākṣācchāstratvābhāvāt na tv evāham ity ārabhya ity uktam |

Indeed, since the verse *aśocyān* (2.11) also bears a shadow of mockery, its purport is to draw attention to the meaning of the teaching. Simply introducing the text from 'Never, indeed, I was not …' (*na tv evāham*, BhG 2.12) does not display the nature of a direct [benefic] instruction. This is what has been said [by Rāmānuja].

yadvātra aśocyān iti ślokaḥ prahasann ivety asya viṣayo na tv evāham ityādikam idaṃśabdārthaḥ |

In other words, here the verse *aśocyān* (2.11) is the content of *prahasann iva*, and *na tv evāham* (2.12) is the meaning of the word *idam*.

No further mention is made of *prahasann iva* (see 9). Under 2.11, Veṅkaṭanātha focuses on grammatical and lexical issues.

5. *Dvaita*

The Dvaita school of Vedānta emerged between the 13th and 14th c. thanks to the works of Madhva or Ānanda Tīrtha's (1198–1277

or 1238–1317; see Sharma 1981: 77–79), who composed two different commentaries on the BhG: the independent *Gītābhāṣya* and the *Bhagavadgītātātparyanirṇaya*, inserted within the monumental *Mahābhāratatātparyanirṇaya*. However, nowhere does he dwell on the phrase *prahasann iva* (see BhG6 p. 80). After Madhva comes an early stage of development of the dualistic writings, culminating in the 'standardization of Dvaita thought' (Sharma 1981: 235) under the multifarious genius of Jaya Tīrtha.

5.1 Jaya Tīrtha

Jaya Tīrtha (1365–1388; Sharma 1981: 245) is an eclectic author who won the title *ṭīkācārya* within the Dvaita textual tradition for his *Nyāyasudhā*, a monumental and highly sophisticated sub-commentary on Madhva's *magnum opus Anuvyākhyāna*. He also wrote the *Prameyadīpikā*, a sub-commentary on Madhva's *Gītābhāṣya*.[81]

Since Madhva's commentary on the BhG begins with 2.11, Jaya Tīrtha's gloss also begins with that verse. Commenting on 2.11 (BhG6 p. 80), Jaya Tīrtha says that Madhva condensed the verses from 1.1 to 2.11 in the *incipit* of his commentary because there their meaning is crystal-clear. Still, a *pūrvapakṣin* raises a relevant question: as neither *dharma* nor any principle (*tattva*) is dealt with in that part of the text (BhG 1.1–2.11), why is it inserted in the body of the BhG? The *Prameyadīpikā* replies that the BhG is keen to present the context in which Kṛṣṇa offered his teaching to Arjuna.

Arjuna's delusion and attachment, his affection toward masters, companions, and relatives, takes the form of this false conception:

> *mamaite, aham eteṣāṃ, ete ca mannimittaṃ naṅkṣyanti, katham etair vināhaṃ bhaveyam? pāpaṃ ca me bhaviṣyati, jayaś ca sandigdhaḥ*

> They are mine! I am their own! They will die because of me! How could I live without them? I will be afflicted by sin, in addiction victory is doubtful!

Being caught in the net of these feelings, Arjuna becomes a victim of despondency. Such despondency is interpreted as a weakness of

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[81] Jaya Tīrtha also wrote a sub-commentary on the *Bhagavadgītātātparyanirṇaya*, the *Nyāyadīpikā*, which I was unable to access. See Saha 2017: 269–270.

the mind coming from the anguish generated by bewilderment: its consequence is the oblivion of any acts (*viṣādo nāma mohani-mittāc chokād yanmanodaurbalyam, yasmin sati sarvavyāpāroparamo bhavati*).

Jaya Tīrtha raises another plausible doubt, which takes into account 2.10: why is it that Arjuna's bewilderment occurs just when the battle is about to begin? Indeed, the hero was all along aware that in the Kauravas' army there were many of his masters, friends and relatives. And he surely knew that the war would cause enormous losses. Verse 2.10 is inserted to answer these questions.[82] To this Jaya Tīrtha replies that it is well-known that, when one recollects a great offence, the original rage reappears. In the case of a sensitive person like Arjuna such rage ultimately tends to soften, leaving place to the affection for one's relations, out of which delusion develops. Nevertheless, as Arjuna is ultimately a sage, it must be considered that his imprisonment in the net of delusion is indeed minimal.[83]

5.2 *Rāghavendra*

Rāghavendra (c. 1640) composed the *Arthasaṃgraha*. It is not a very remarkable gloss, but has a few words on *prahasann iva* (BhG4 p. 71):

> *prahasann iveti parihāsakaravākyoktiddyotakahāsasya sūcanāyevaśa-bdaḥ |*

The word *iva* in *prahasann iva* suggests a laugh, revealing the expressions in [Arjuna's] sentences that are objects of mockery.

On 2.11 (BhG4 p. 75), it is worth quoting the interpretation of *ca* in *gatāsūn agatāsūn ca*. Rāghavendra argues that it should be read as *iva*:

> *gatāsūn āsannavināśān agatāsūn ivety upamārthaś cakāraḥ |*

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[82] BhG6 p. 80: *nanv idānīm eva kuto 'rjunasya mohasamutpattiḥ? na hy ete bāndhavādaya iti prāṅ nājñāsīt, yena yuddhāya mahāntam udyogam akārṣīd ity āha senayor iti |.*

[83] BhG6 p. 80: *mahāpakārasmaraṇenānuvartamāno 'pi kopo mṛdumanasāṃ bāndhavādiṣv antakāle nivartate, snehaś cotpadyate, tato moho iti prasiddham eveti bhā-vaḥ | arjunasya jñānitvān mohajālasaṃvṛtatvam īṣad eveti mantavyam |.*

The [use of] *ca* implies comparison [as expressed by] *iva*. Therefore, dead persons are just like those who are not dead.

6. Dvaitādvaita

The Dvaitādvaita ('duality and non-duality' or 'duality in non-duality') or Bhedābheda ('difference and non-difference' or 'difference in non-difference') school of Vedānta had the Vaiṣṇava Nimbārka (12th–13th c.) as its chief exponent. He did not write any commentary on the BhG. Its Dvaitādvaita interpretation was developed by Keśava Kaśmīrī Bhaṭṭācārya.

6.1 Keśava Kaśmīrī Bhaṭṭācārya

Keśava Kaśmīrī Bhaṭṭācārya (a.k.a. Bhaṭṭa, c. 1510) is the author of the *Tattvaprakāśikā* on the BhG. He did not follow the *vulgata* version but another text with 745 verses, which also differs from the BhGk (Saha 2017: 270). He states (BhG4 p. 3) that from 2.11 onward the teachings of the *bhagavat* are meant to dispel Arjuna's anguish and delusion and, in order to learn about the hero's despondency, the first chapter is essential.[84]

While commenting on 2.7 (BhG4 p. 65), the *Tattvaprakāśikā* focuses on the meaning of the word *kārpaṇya*, quoting a passage from *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (1.4.15, 3.8.10),[85] which is most likely the source of Madhusūdana's (see 1.6) analogous considerations. Indeed, in the *śāstra*, *kṛpaṇa* is someone who does not know his/her own nature, nor the qualities of the supreme being who is defined by the word 'imperishable' (*akṣara*).[86] On the contrary, in ordinary experience *kṛpaṇa* is someone who is unable to tolerate even the least loss of money or goods (*loke tu svalpam api dravyavyayaṃ kartum akṣamaḥ kṛpaṇaḥ*). The corresponding abstract property is *kārpaṇya*. Due to this kind of weakeness/compassion, Arjuna's

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[84] BhG4 p. 3: *tatra tāvad aśocyān anvaśocyas tvam ity ārabhyārjunasya śokamohāpanodānāya bhagavadupadeśaṃ varṇayitum arjunasya sahetukaśokadarśanāya prathamādhyāyārambhaḥ |.*

[85] *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (1.4.15, 3.8.10): *yo vā etad akṣaram aviditvā gārgy asmāl lokāt praiti sa kṛpaṇa |* 'The *kṛpaṇa* is he who indeed departs from this world without having known that imperishable!'

[86] BhG4 p. 65: *pūrvapratipāditākṣaraśabdavācyasūryacandravāyuvahnīndrādisarvajaganniyatṛparamātmasvarūpaguṇādijñānahīnaḥ kṛpaṇa ity ucyate śāstre |.*

discrimination is obscured, and he becomes incapable of finding any reason to fight and kill his own people. Thus, with his intellect darkened by delusion and confusion about his own duty, Arjuna begs for instruction from the omniscient lord who is completely free from defects.[87]

In the opening lines of the *Tattvaprakāśikā ad* 2.10 (BhG4 p. 70) we find an original insertion. It seems that 2.10 is caused by a thought of Dhṛtarāṣṭra: 'If Arjuna leaves the fight, my sons will live happily.' Thus, Sañjaya points out to Dhṛtarāṣṭra that it is totally improper for a king born in the heroic lineage of Bharata to think in such a way.[88] Then, Keśava Kaśmīrī quotes the expression *prahasann iva*, merely mentioning that Arjuna was anguished between the two armies ready to fight, so the glorious lord, almost laughing, spoke to him. Then he observes:

> *pāṇḍuputrasya kṣatriyasammatasya naitad yuktam iti lajjānimittaṃ kopam utpādayituṃ prahasann ivety uktam | arjunaṃ nimittīkṛtya sarvasenāsaṃhārārthaṃ pravṛttasya gurutvenāṅgīkṛtya hitopadeṣṭur bhagavataḥ svadharme pravarttayitum udyatasya prahāso nocitaḥ, kintu tadvidhābuddhikauśalyagarvāpanayanena tattvajñānādhikāritāsampādanāya tathā vacanam itīvaśabdābhiprāyaḥ ||*

> But this does not fit with the son of Pāṇḍu [Arjuna], who is celebrated as a [great] warrior. The expression *prahasann iva* has been said in order to generate rage [in him], caused by shame. It is not proper to use Arjuna as a means for mockery, because the glorious lord — who is ready to destroy all [enemies'] armies — being a *guru* and having accepted [him as his disciple], is a beneficial instructor ready to make him turn again toward his own duty. Nonetheless, such a speech is intended to make [him] eligible for the knowledge of reality by eliminating the pride by means of the force of such an understanding. This is the purport of the word *iva*.

Here is a clear statement by Keśava Kaśmīrī that Kṛṣṇa's smile/ laugh is not really meant to mock Arjuna, because that would be

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[87] BhG4 p. 65: *ata eva dharme sammūḍhaṃ ceto yasya so 'haṃ tvāṃ svabhāvato 'pāstasamastadoṣaṃ sarvajñaṃ pṛcchāmi |.*

[88] BhG4 p. 70: *evaṃ yuddhatyāgāya kṛtavyavasāye 'rjune mama putrāṇāṃ sukhaṃ jīvanaṃ siddham iti cetanācetananiyantari durjanavināśāyāvatīrṇe bhagavaty adhiṣṭhātari sati nāśāsanīyam iti dhṛtarāṣṭrāya sūcayituṃ sañjaya āha — tam iti | he bhārata! mahāvīrasya bharatasya vaṃśe jātasya tava yuddhoparatau putrasnehena harṣo nocita iti bhāvaḥ |.*

incongruous. Indeed, he has just accepted him as a disciple, and it is utterly out of place for the *guru* to laugh at the pupil. This is the function of the particle *iva* after the present participle.

The gloss on 2.11 (BhG4 p. 72) opens with a series of quotations from the *śruti* and the *smṛti* throwing some light on the knowledge whose subjects are the nature and qualities of the supreme *brahman,* denoted by the words Nārāyaṇa, Hari, Vāsudeva, the unchanging being whose nature is both different and non-different from everything, the all-pervasive self of all. This knowledge removes all bewilderment, anguish, and delusion.

Finally, the gloss adds that Arjuna's sorrows are summarized by verse 1.31,[89] where our hero states that without Bhīṣma, Droṇa and the other teachers, friends, and relatives, there is no point in living or gaining the kingdom. The *Tattvaprakāśikā* defines this sorrowful despondency of Arjuna's as foolishness. Nevertheless, the words he utters in verses 1.36,[90] 1.44[91] and 2.5[92] disclose a wisdom of sorts, as the expression *prajñāvādāṃś ca bhāṣase* indicates. However, as the simultaneous occurrence of opposing properties like foolishness and wisdom in a single individual is unlikely, Arjuna's arguments as well as his superficial wisdom are ultimately useless. This is the reason that prompts the lord to intervene.

7. Śuddhādvaita

Another Vaiṣṇava interpretation of Vedānta is developed by the Śuddhādvaita devotional school. The main author of this school was Vallabha (late 15th c.–early 16th c.), who did not comment upon the BhG, although he treated it in an independent work, the *Tattvārthadīpikā* (or *Tattvadīpanibandha*) with his own gloss *Prakāśa.* In the first part of the work — called *śāstrārtha* — Vallabha deals with the meaning of the main issues of the BhG. In the 16th c., some successors of Vallabha such as Viṭṭhalanātha glossed the

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[89] BhG 1.31: *nimittāni ca paśyāmi viparītāni keśava | na ca śreyo 'nupaśyāmi hatvā svajanam āhave ||*.

[90] BhG 1.36: *nihatya dhārtarāṣṭrān naḥ kā prītiḥ syāj janārdana | pāpam evāśrayed asmān hatvaitān ātatāyinaḥ ||*.

[91] BhG 1.44: *utsannakuladharmāṇāṃ manuṣyāṇāṃ janārdana | narake niyataṃ vāso bhavatīty anuśuśruma ||*.

[92] BhG 2.5: *gurūn ahatvā hi mahānubhāvān śreyo bhoktuṃ bhaikṣyam apīha loke | hatvārthakāmāṃs tu gurūn ihaiva bhuñjīya bhogān rudhirapradigdhān || 5 ||*.

BhG or parts of it in works like the *Gītārthavivaraṇa* with the *Gītāta-tparya*, the *Nyāsādeśa* on BhG 18.66, and the *Gītāhetunirṇaya* (Saha 2017: 271).

7.1 Vallabha

The fifth grandson in Vallabha's lineage was another Vallabha (early 17th c.), who composed the *Tattvadīpikā*, an independent gloss on the BhG in mixed prose and verse (Saha 2017: 272).

The gloss on 2.10 (BhG6 p. 73) is as brief as it is useful. Having refused to fight, Arjuna sits, silent, on the floor of the chariot. The *Tattvadīpikā* asks:

> *tataḥ kiṃ jātam iti tam uvāceti | aho asyātmatattvājñānataḥ klaibyaṃ kīdṛk? iti prahasan dharmiṣṭhatvād asyaitad apy ucitam iti bhāvenety uktam |*

> After that what happened? [The lord] 'said to him.' This has been said with this idea [in mind]: 'Alas, how great is such cowardice due to the ignorance of the reality of the self?' Here laughing in this way also becomes adequate, since he [= Arjuna] is greatly virtuous.

Vallabha comments on 2.11 in eight and a half verses, and then a passage in prose begins (BhG6 p. 82). His main focus is on *sāṃkhyayoga* as intended in the BhG. The prose passage highlights that Arjuna's anguish is due to lack of discrimination concerning the self, which determines a confusion about his own duty. Arjuna is concerned with what should not be an object of concern, confusing the imperishable self with the body which is *prakṛti*, i.e. the non-self. In order to remove this epistemic distortion, from 2.11 onwards Kṛṣṇa teaches him 'discriminative knowledge' (*sāṃkhyabuddhi*).

8. Acintyabhedābheda

The last section of this survey of the commentarial literature is devoted to the Acintyabhedābheda Vedānta, intimately linked with the *gauḍīyavaiṣṇava* tradition and philosophically indebted to Madhva and Rāmānuja. It is commonly held that the initiator of this theology was the Bengali saint Caitanya Mahāprabhu (1486–1534). Several authors of this school composed independent treatises. Here I deal with two commentaries on the BhG.

8.1 Viśvanātha Cakravartī Ṭhākura

The first *gauḍīyavaiṣṇava* gloss on the BhG is the *Sārārthavarṣiṇī-ṭīkā* by Viśvanātha Cakravartī Ṭhākura (1626–1708?), a Bengali author active in Nadia. At the end of the commentary on 2.7, Viśvanātha says that Kṛṣṇa seems to scold Arjuna:

> *nanu madvācas tvaṃ paṇḍitamānitvena khaṇḍayasi cet, kathaṃ brūyām? tatrāha śiṣyas te 'ham asmi | nātaḥ paraṃ vṛthā khaṇḍayāmīti bhāvaḥ ||*

> 'If you, considering yourself a sage, keep on refuting my words, then why should I speak?' At this point [Arjuna] says 'I am your disciple! From now on, I shall no more vainly rejects [your words].' This is the idea.

Then, under 2.10:

> *aho tavāpy etāvān khalv aviveka* [93] *iti sakhyabhāvena taṃ prahasan anaucityaprakāśena lajjāmbudhau nimajjayan iveti tadānīṃ śiṣyabhāvaṃ prāpte tasmin hāsyam anucitam ity adharoṣṭhanikuñcanena hāsyam āvṛṇvaṃś cety arthaḥ |*

> [Kṛṣṇa] then mocked him in a friendly mood: 'Alas, indeed such a lack of discrimination has indeed taken hold of you!' Thus the lord plunged him in a sea of shame by revealing the inappropriateness [of his behavior]. [Anyhow], on this occasion his laughing at [Arjuna], who had reached the condition of disciple, is inappropriate. Therefore, the meaning [of *prahasann iva*] is 'curling the lower lip and hiding the laughter.'

Here, Viśvanātha denies that Kṛṣṇa is laughing at Arjuna out of scorn after accepting him as disciple, since the master cannot laugh at the disciple. So, we find the idea of a gentle mockery, not for the sake of derision but caused by Arjuna's inappropriate behavior. On the contrary, the smile is somewhat repressed and shows Kṛṣṇa's love for Arjuna, as the following passage seems to confirm:

> *hṛṣīkeśa iti pūrvaṃ premāivārjunavāṅniyamyo 'pi* [94] *sāmpratam arjuna-hitakāritvāt premṇaivārjunamanoniyantāpi bhavatīti bhāvaḥ | senayor*

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[93] Where GRETIL reads *aho tvāpy etāvān khalv aviveka*, I partially follow Bāladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa (see 8.2) who reads *aho tavāpīdṛg vivekaḥ*.

[94] In the construction *premāivārjunavāṅniyamyo 'pi* I see a textual problem. The sense must be that before the intervention of Kṛṣṇa-Hṛṣīkeśa — as the con-

*ubhayor madhye ity arjunasya viṣādo bhagavatā prabodhaś ca ubhā-
bhyāṃ senābhyāṃ sāmānyato dṛṣṭa eveti bhāvaḥ* || 10 ||

Even though by [resorting to the epithet] 'Hṛṣīkeśa' words, it is
now [Kṛṣṇa] who, out of love, controls Arjuna's mind being his
benefactor: this is the idea. Indeed, 'in between the two armies,'
the glorious lord has equally witnessed — together with the two
armies — Arjuna's anguish and awakening. This is the meaning.

8.2 *Bāladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa*

Bāladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1700–1793?), a later follower of Caitanya,
wrote the *Gītābhūṣaṇa*, a commentary on the BhG.

His analysis corresponds to that of Viśvanātha Cakravartī's
Sārārthavarṣiṇīṭīkā, but it is slightly more detailed. For example,
Bāladeva's gloss on 2.7 quotes some passages from the *śruti*[95] and
emphasizes the need to become the disciple of a master.
Moreover, the gloss interprets the word *kārpaṇya* as 'the ignorance
of *brahman*' (*abrahmavittva*): this is the problem that afflicts Arjuna
and prevents him from accomplishing his duty.[96] His interpreta-
tion of 2.10 is indebted to Viśvanātha:

*vyaṅgyam arthaṃ prakāśayann āha — tam uvāceti taṃ viṣīdantam arju-
naṃ prati hṛṣīkeśo bhagavān aśocyān ityādikam atigambhīrārthaṃ vaca-
nam uvāca | aho tavāpīdṛg viveka iti sakhyabhāvena prahasan | anau-
cityabhāṣitvena trapāsindhau nimajjayann ity arthaḥ | iveti tadaiva
śiṣyatāṃ prāpte tasmin hāsānaucityād īṣadadharollāsaṃ kurvann ity*

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troller of the sense faculties along with the mind — Arjuna was under control of
the affection for his kinsfolk. Now, at the beginning of *gītopadeśa*, his mind is
under the control of Kṛṣṇa. Nevertheless, the syntax is problematic: the nomina-
tive singular masculine of the gerundive *niyamya* must be read with the nomina-
tive masculine *premaiva* [= *premā eva*]. The result could be 'it is love indeed to be
restrained/controlled in the words of Arjuna.' But the focus of the first sentence
should be on the direct agency of love, and not as the subject of the passive
gerundive-construction. Therefore, I see three ways to solve the problem: to
emend the sentence as 1) *premṇāivārjunavāṅniyamyo 'pi*; or 2) *premāivārju-
navāṅniyantāpi*; or 3) to give an active meaning to the gerundive, as I did for the
sake of clarity.

[95] See *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 3.8.10, *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.14.2, and
Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 1.2.12.

[96] The *Gītābhūṣaṇa ad* BhG 2.8 is quite close to Viśvanātha's gloss, but besides
adding some Upaniṣadic quotations (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 7.1.3, 8.1.6) it is also
more analytical.

arthaḥ | arjunasya viṣādo bhagavatā tasyopadeśaś ca sarvasākṣika iti bodhayituṃ senayor ubhayor ity etat || 10 ||

Revealing the meaning to be suggested 'He said to him,' the glorious lord, smiling with a friendly mood, uttered this deeply meaningful verse — *aśocyān* (2.11) — to Arjuna who was in anguish: 'Alas, is this your discrimination …?', because he had spoken in an inappropriate way being immersed in a sea of doubt. This is the meaning. [The word] *iva* [means that,] since in that moment he [= Arjuna] has become a disciple, then a [mocking] laugh was improper. This is why the meaning is 'with the lower lip trembling a bit.' In order to point out that Arjuna's anguish and the [consequent] teaching of the glorious lord can be directly experienced by everyone, [the verse states] this: 'Between the two armies.'

Here, Bāladeva remarks that the *prahāsa* is a kind and sympathetic smile, which is appropriate for a *guru* who is about to offer an instruction to his confused disciple.

9. *General evaluation*

In all the passages analysed above, I have mostly used primary sources, concentrating less on the BhG *tout court* than on its commentarial tradition. Here I attempt to briefly summarise this tradition, beginning with Śaṅkara and continuing with the major commentaries and sub-commentaries available until the 20th c., focusing on the construction *prahasann iva*. Of course, there are several other commentaries that I was not able to consult.

As shown by Rigopoulos in his essay (*infra*), there are many ways to translate *prahasann iva*. This multiplicity of interpretative possibilities is also attested in the commentaries. For this reason, I have translated the expression in different ways, attempting to detect the hermeneutic nuances given by different commentators, who usually insert *prahasann iva* in a broader perspective, within the BhG itself as well as from a general Vedāntic or soteriological standpoint. What clearly emerges from the glosses is that the expression is found in a crucial narrative position in the *Mahābhārata* between the epic and the philosophical/theological frames (Ježić 1979), which in the BhG correspond to the introduction of the text and the beginning of Kṛṣṇa's teaching, respectively. This broader perspective inevitably involves a consideration: every author interprets *prahasann iva* according to his own

axiological position. Indeed, the construction is usually interpreted in these ways: 'as though smiling'/'nearly'/'almost laughing,' while the *prahāsa* is variously seen either as mockery, scorn and derision, or as benevolence, mercy, amusement, joke, grace, and happiness. It also seems that commentators modify the root √*has* playing with different preverbs, i.e. *pra-*, *pari-*, *apa-* (as for Śrīveṅkaṭanātha) and *upa-* (as for Ānanda Giri). However, the meanings are all quite close.[97]

Kṛṣṇa's *prahāsa* should be interpreted as a further proof of the ambiguous or, better, polyvalent and enigmatic character of the *bhagavat*, as Matilal (2002: 91) states:

> Kṛṣṇa is an enigma in the *Mahābhārata*. He represents the most confusing kind of moral enigma not only in the epic, but also in the whole of the Hindu ideal of *dharma*. In the icons, he is represented as the Dark Lord, an attractive appearance with a face bearing an enigmatic, mysterious and mischievous smile, the smile, very much unlike the famous smile found in the icons of the Buddha. The Buddha's smile, in striking contrast with that of Kṛṣṇa, is straightforward, it radiates with compassion, calmness and peace, it strikes confidence in the minds of the viewers. The ethical doctrine of Kṛṣṇa by contrast is different, sometimes it appears to be just the opposite.
> Kṛṣṇa is a riddle, a paradox. If anything, he appears to be a devious diplomat.

Although I disagree with Matilal's idea that the Buddha's smile is in 'striking contrast' with Kṛṣṇa's smile, my concern here is another. Significantly, what is also crucial for commentators in their reading of *prahasann iva* is the particle *iva*, which in certain readings highlights, reinforces and emphasizes the meaning of the participle, while in others mitigates, smooths or even opposes it. In this regard, especially telling are the interpretations of Keśava Kaśmīrī Bhaṭṭācārya (see 6.1) and Madhusūdana (see 1.6). In addition, it is remarkable that some commentators do not mention or interpret *prahasann iva* (Rājānaka Rāmakaṇṭha, Yāmuna Muni, Anubhutisvarūpa, Madhva, Jaya Tīrtha, Puruṣottama),

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[97] See Rigopoulos (*infra* § 1.3), where several among the semantic nuances given by different preverbs manifest different expressions used in theatrical performances, on theone hand, and are referred to devotional concepts like *bhakti*, *prasāda* and *līlā*, on the other.

while others do not mention the word *iva*, and still others simply paraphrase the expression (Hanumat).

It seems to me that none of the glosses can claim to fully represent or exhaust the richness of BhG's *prahasann iva*. A shared view is that Arjuna is deeply troubled by anguish, delusion, and sorrow, because on the other side of the battlefield he sees masters, companions and relatives. This turmoil of feelings is brought about by the deep confusion occurring in him. He behaves like a fool or a madman who has lost himself and as a consequence becomes deeply anguished and hopeless: this is why he becomes the receptacle for benevolence in the form of BhG's teaching. Following verses 2.7–8 Arjuna clearly declares his helplessness and the need to be instructed on the supreme good (*śreyas*), while in 2.9 the utmost confusion pervades his mind and, lost in that mood, he sits silent, unable to react. His anguish is key to the eligibility for the teaching. Such eligibility is confirmed by the BhG itself, where from 2.11 to 18.66 Kṛṣṇa instructs Arjuna on *śreyas*.

Almost all commentators link Kṛṣṇa's smile/laughter to verse 2.11, as Veṅkaṭanātha affirms more clearly than others (see 4.2.1): 'The verse *aśocyān* (2.11) is the content of *prahasann iva*.' Recalling what Bhāskara says (see 2.1: 'Great souls usually smile before speaking'), Kṛṣṇa can be seen as the prototype of the *paṇḍita*s mentioned in vese 2.11, a word uniformly interpreted by commentators as 'wise men,' i.e. knowers of the self. In 2.11 ff. we have a confirmation of the ambiguity of Kṛṣṇa's smile/laughter, since what is presented is a problematic issue to begin with, when it is said that wise ones mourn neither over the destruction of the body, for it is unavoidable, nor over the destruction of the self, because it is impossible as it is imperishable. Thus, grief over the liability of death is unreasonable from both the empirical and the absolute points of view: this is the essential instruction.

The interpretation of *prahasann iva* as pure mockery is not favored by our authors. Rather, several of them interpret the lord's hint of laughter as a sign of the lord's benevolence, spontaneously arising on the occasion of an infantile prank or the childish speaking of meaningless words.[98] Arjuna is sick, and his disease

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[98] This is also a typical theme in the *Upaniṣad*s, for instance in the dialogue between Sanatkumāra and Nārada in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 7.1 ff.

causes him to cry; Kṛṣṇa, as a supreme doctor, replies with the remedy of his hint of laughter. In other words, the inappropriate inaction of Arjuna causes the teaching-action of Kṛṣṇa. The *prahāsa* takes place after Arjuna's surrendering to the lord (*īśvara-pratipatti*) at 2.7, when he declares himself to be Kṛṣṇa's disciple, and all commentators seem to agree that a disciple cannot really be laughed at or mocked by his master.

It is not easy to systematize the commentarial readings of *prahasann iva* according to their axiology. For example, although the *advaitin* Rāmarāya Kavi (see 1.1.5) mentions only mockery as Veṅkaṭanātha's final interpretation (see 4.2.1), my impression is that the more detailed hermeneutic effort comes precisely from the *Tātparyacandrikā*, Veṅkaṭanātha's sub-commentary on Rāmā-nuja's *Gītābhāṣya*, where he sketches four interpretative keys:

1. Mockery: whoever abandons without reason an act already undertaken becomes an object of derision;
2. A seeming mockery in view of a superior end: Arjuna is mortally anguished, and Kṛṣṇa, though smiling, reveals the BhG for his benefit and the benefit of the whole universe, so the expression indicates a graceful smile;
3. Derision and mockery are impossible, because Arjuna has surrendered himself to Kṛṣṇa: *prahasann iva* introduces an effortless and wise speech, replete with the meanings hidden in the Upaniṣads;
4. BhG 2.10 must be understood in the light of 2.11, which also implies a shade of mirth along with a shade of derision: both are needed in order to shake Arjuna out of his confusion and prepare him to assimilate the instruction.

These four readings sketched by Vedānta Deśika seem to summarize the major hermeneutic options accepted by the many interpreters of the BhG. I agree with Ānanda Giri that 2.10 represents a sort of independent verse within the text,[99] specifically useful as

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[99] The same idea of independence expressed in BhG 2.10 seems to be followed by Hanumat (see 1.4) in a counter-factual way. Moreover, Vaṃśīdhara (see 1.8) says that BhG 1.1–2.10 is the introduction to the story. In Veṅkaṭanātha's *Gītārthasaṃgraharakṣā*, BhG 2.10–12 is the true beginning of the *upadeśa*.

a link to the rest of the teaching, since it stands as a sort of transition between the epic/dramatic section and the philosophical section.

In conclusion, I can offer a tentative subdivision of the BhG's commentators on *prahasann iva*. First, there is one macro-group formed by *advaita* authors, i.e. both the Advaita Vedānta exponents (along with Jñāneśvar) and the Kashmirian interpreters (§§ 1 to 3). With some nuances, they tend to interpret *prahasann iva* as the expression of Kṛṣṇa's benevolent attitude toward his disciple. His benevolent wisdom and his will to teach are displayed by his slight, gentle smile meant to trigger discrimination and knowledge.

The second macro-group is roughly represented by the so-called Vaiṣṇava school of Vedānta (§§ 4 to 8), which is much more variegated: it oscillates between apparently harsher mockery, scorn and derision meant to shake Arjuna by plunging him into a sea of shame in order to trigger his metanoia and, on the other hand, a more positive, compassionate attitude detected in Kṛṣṇa's laugher/smile, closer to the interpretation of the majority of the *advatin*s. The gloss of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (1.6), an *advatin* profoundly devoted to Kṛṣṇa, illustrates the convergence of these two apparently opposite but in fact complementary perspectives. From Madhusūdana's hermeneutics it appears that mockery is a teaching tool to ignite Arjuna's discrimination, leading him to the liberating knowledge.

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BhG2   *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā with the Commentaries Śrīmat-Śāṅkarabhāṣya with Ānandagiri; Nīlakaṇṭhī; Bhāṣyotkarṣadīpikā of Dhanapati; Śrīdharī; Gītārthasaṅgraha of Abhinavaguptāchārya; and Gūḍhārthadīpikā of Madhu-sūdana Sarasvatī with Gūḍhārtha-tattvāloka of Śrī-dharma-datta-śarmā (Bachchā-śarmā).* Edited by Wāsudev Laxmaṇ Shāstrī Paṇśīkar. Bombay 1936: "Nirṇaya Sâgar" Press.

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BhG3   *Śrīśaṅkarabhagavatpāda's Śrīmadbhagavadgītābhāṣyam, with Commentaries of Śrīmadanubhūtisvarūpācārya, Śrīmadānandagiri and Śrī Bellaṅkoṇḍa Rāmarāya Kavi.* Volume 1, Chapter 1-9. Critically Edited with notes etc. by Dr. Maṇi Drāviḍa. Vārāṇasī 2015: Śrīdakṣiṇāmūrti Maṭha Prakāśan.

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BhG4   *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā tattvaprakāśiketyādyaṣṭaṭīkopetā.* Volume 1. Critically Edited by Shastri Jivaram Lallurama. Delhi 2001: Parimal Publications [1st ed. Bombay 1917].

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BhG5   Bhāskara, *Śrīmadbhagavadgītābhāṣyam.* Edited by Subhadra Jha. Vārāṇasī 1965: Vārāṇaseya Saṅskṛta Viśvavidyālaya.

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BhG6   *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā śāṅkarabhāṣyādyekadaśaṭīkopetā.* Volume 1. Edited by Shastri Ganjanana Shambhu Sadhale. Delhi 2000: Parimal Publications [1st ed. Bombay 1859].

BhGBh   See BhG2, BhG3 and BhG6.

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GAD   Sarasvatī, Madhusūdana, *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā Madhusūdanīsaṃskṛta-hindīvyākhyopetā.* Hindīvyākhyākāra Svāmī Śrī Sanātanadeva, Ṭippaṇī evaṃ bhumikā lekhaka, Vārāṇasī 2005: Caukhamba Saṃskṛta Saṃsthāna [1st ed. 1962].

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Qualche riflessione sui diversi tipi di ṣaḍaṅgayoga

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1. Ṣaḍaṅga con āsana

È cosa ben nota che, accanto alla definizione «classica» dello yoga come *aṣṭāṅga* riportata in *Yogasūtra* 2.29 se ne conosce un'altra, documentata anch'essa da molte fonti, che descrive uno yoga *ṣaḍaṅga*. I due tipi di yoga sono di norma alternativi, ma non mancano autori, testi e tradizioni che li accettano entrambi[1]. A questo proposito giova ricordare un passo della ricca letteratura dei Purāṇa[2], che ricorre nello *Śivapurāṇa* e che presenta senza soluzione di continuità entrambe le definizioni di yoga (a otto e a sei *aṅga*)[3]:

> *aṣṭāṅgo vā ṣaḍaṅgo vā sarvayogaḥ samāsataḥ |*
> *yamaś ca niyamaś ca svastikādyaṃ tathāsanam ||*
> *prāṇāyāmaḥ pratyāhāro dhāraṇā dhyānam eva ca |*
> *samādhir iti yogāṅgāny aṣṭāv uktāni sūribhiḥ ||*

[1] Per alcuni riferimenti, si veda Sferra 2000: 13-14.

[2] Si veda Piano 2016, ove i testi presentati sono in parte sintetizzati e in parte tradotti.

[3] *Śivapurāṇa* 7, Vāyavīyasaṃhitā 2.37.14-16 (ed. fol. 594b); trad. ingl. p. 2071; si veda anche Piano 2016: 16.

āsanaṃ prāṇasaṃrodhaḥ pratyāhāro 'tha dhāraṇā |
dhyānaṃ samādhir yogasya ṣaḍaṅgāni samāsataḥ ||

Un'identica presentazione «sintetica» dello *ṣaḍaṅgayoga* si trova, con piccole varianti formali (per esempio, *vadanti* in luogo di *bhavanti*), nello *Skandapurāṇa*[4], oltre che nella *Dhyānabindūpaniṣad*[5], nello *Yogamārtaṇḍa*[6], nel *Kiraṇa tantra*[7] e nel *Gorakṣaśataka*[8]:

āsanaṃ prāṇasaṃrodhaḥ pratyāhāraś ca dhāraṇā |
dhyānaṃ samādhir etāni yogāṅgāni bhavanti (o *vadanti*) *ṣaṭ ||*

Appare evidente, in questa enunciazione sintetica, l'assenza di *yama* e *niyama*, che porta automaticamente il numero degli *aṅga* da otto a sei e che è solitamente spiegata considerando che i due *aṅga* non menzionati siano dati per scontati, specialmente in un contesto tantrico[9].

I testi che accettano questi *aṅga* e che presentano *āsana* all'inizio della lista rientrano in quella che Günter Grönbold ha definito «*Āsana*-Class». Lo studioso tedesco è stato il primo, infatti, che, in un breve studio del 1983[10], tentando di classificare le fonti che insegnano lo *ṣaḍaṅgayoga* nell'induismo, ha suddiviso queste ultime in due sottogruppi, chiamandoli appunto *Āsana*-Class e *Tarka*-Class. Tra le altre cose, all'inizio del suo lavoro egli ha fatto notare che diverse opere in sanscrito ripartiscono lo yoga in un numero di *aṅga* diverso da otto e da sei[11].

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[4] *Skandapurāṇa* 4.4.41.59; secondo il medesimo testo un altro *ṣaḍaṅgayoga* consiste nel rendere omaggio a sei *liṅga* di Kāśī o anche nel visitare sei luoghi santi della medesima città (strofe 174 e segg.); cfr. Tagare 1996: 459, 469-470. Qui, nella rinnovata atmosfera dominata dall'idea della *tīrthayātrā* lo yoga a sei *aṅga* diventa un *kāśīyoga*, un itinerario di pellegrinaggio nella città santa, su cui si veda Piano 2017: 231-240.

[5] Si veda *Dhyānabindūpaniṣad* 41 (ed. p. 196).

[6] *Yogamārtaṇḍa* 2 (ed. p. 56); diversamente la *Siddhasiddhāntapaddhati* 2.32 enuncia l'*aṣṭāṅgayoga* «classico».

[7] Yogapāda 1.3. Si vedano anche Bhatt 1982: XXV-XVII, e Sferra 2000: 13.

[8] *Gorakṣaśataka* 7, in Briggs 1973: 285.

[9] Si veda, ad esempio, Pensa 1969: 524-525.

[10] Il saggio del 1983, originariamente pubblicato in tedesco (*Indo-Iranian Journal* 25: 181-190), è stato tradotto in inglese e stampato nuovamente insieme ad altri tre articoli dello stesso autore in un volumetto che ha visto la luce a Santa Fe (NM) nel 1996.

[11] Su questo punto, si veda anche Mallinson e Singleton 2017: 8-11.

2. *Ṣaḍaṅga con tarka*

La scomparsa dall'elenco anche di *āsana* accade, ad esempio, in un testo originariamente piuttosto breve, che è stato successivamente ampliato fino a epoca molto recente, anche se risulta difficile stabilirne una cronologia sicura: si tratta della *Maitryupaniṣad*, che non è stata commentata da Śaṅkara. Nata forse, nella sua prima versione, insieme con la *Praśna-*, la *Māṇḍūkya-* e la *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* attorno all'epoca in cui fu composta la *Bhagavadgītā*[12], la *Maitryupaniṣad*, suddivisa in sette *prapāṭhaka* o «letture», è stata studiata da J.A.B. van Buitenen[13] nelle sue varie recensioni. Il supposto testo originario è stato tradotto in italiano da Carlo Della Casa[14]; la traduzione di questo studioso, di conseguenza, non riporta il passo che qui ci interessa e che citiamo dall'edizione con traduzione francese di Anne-Marie Esnoul (si tratta del passo iniziale di 6.18):

> *tathā tatprayogakalpaḥ prāṇāyāmaḥ pratyāhāro dhyānaṃ dhāraṇā tarkaḥ samādhiḥ ṣaḍaṅga ity ucyate yogaḥ |*[15]

All'interno del testo si trova poi qualche ulteriore indicazione che può aiutare il lettore a comprendere meglio che cosa si debba intendere con la parola *tarka*. Si legge, per esempio, in *Maitryupaniṣad* 6.20, che «esiste una *dhāraṇā* [un esercizio di concentrazione] superiore […]: mediante la pressione della punta della lingua al palato, raffrenando la voce, la mente e il respiro (*vāṅmanaḥprāṇanirodhanād*), il saggio contempla il *brahman* per riflessione (*brahma tarkeṇa paśyati*)»[16].

Si tratta qui di uno *ṣaḍaṅga* diverso, che omette anche *āsana*, inserendo poi *tarka*, una parola che, non diversamente dai suoi

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[12] Si veda Esnoul 1952: 3.

[13] Si veda van Buitenen 1962.

[14] Della Casa 1988: 365-374; ivi mancano, ovviamente, i versetti 6.18-32 (in particolare, il versetto 18), che sono quelli che ci interessano qui e che si possono consultare nella traduzione italiana di Filippani-Ronconi 1968: in part. 405-406.

[15] Esnoul 1952: 16 (del testo sanscrito); si veda anche la traduzione italiana di Filippani-Ronconi (1968: 405-406), ove *tarka* è reso con «riflessione».

[16] Cfr. Filippani-Ronconi 1968: 406. Il passo, che dice chiaramente che il praticante «vede» (*paśyati*) il Brahman per mezzo della «riflessione» (*tarkena*), contiene, a mio avviso, una chiara allusione allo *yogipratyakṣa*, cioè a quella «visione» particolare degli yogin che è epistemologicamente assimilabile a una delle tipo-

sinonimi *ūha* e *vīkṣaṇa*[17], vuol dire «esame», «riflessione», «comprensione» e ha in più anche il significato di «ragionamento astratto» o «logico», mentre *vīkṣaṇa* indica piuttosto il fatto di «prendere in considerazione» e «analizzare». Occorre ancora aggiungere, per cercare di fare chiarezza, che il commentatore Rāmatīrtha (inizio XVII sec.) spiega *tarka* come «l'esame compiuto per vedere se la mente è ben concentrata sull'oggetto, per individuare gli ostacoli al raggiungimento della concentrazione, che sono causati da poteri inferiori generati attraverso *dhyāna* e *dhāraṇā*, o ancora che esso è il *savikalpasamādhi* (la concentrazione dotata di costruzioni mentali)»[18].

Con riferimento, in particolare, al *Mataṅgapārameśvarāgama* N.R. Bhatt afferma che il praticante, dopo aver controllato il movimento del soffio vitale mediante il *prāṇāyāma*, dopo aver fissato la mente in un sol punto (per esempio, l'ombelico) e «dopo aver determinato grazie all'esame (*tarka*) ciò che si deve ammettere e ciò che si deve rifiutare, scarta uno dopo l'altro i *tattva* partendo dal *pṛthivītattva* e, identificandosi con i *tattva* via via più elevati, raggiunge lo *śivatattva* ed è allora che si realizza la perfetta concentrazione che è il fatto di dissolvere il proprio spirito in Śiva»[19].

Su questa linea — e prescindendo da qualsiasi considerazione di carattere cronologico — si collocano, pur con varianti nell'ordine delle parole, molti altri testi, fra cui, oltre al già citato *Mataṅgapārameśvarāgama*[20], il *Rauravāgama*[21], la *Viṣṇusaṃhitā*[22] e l'*Amṛtanādopaniṣad*[23].

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logie della «percezione diretta». Si veda anche Sferra 2000: 12, n. 3: «In *Maitryupaniṣad* 6.20 si illustra un tipo di *dhāraṇā* superiore, nella quale lo yogin "vede" il Brahman per mezzo del *tarka* (*tarkeṇa*), che è spiegato da Rāmatīrtha come *niścitarūpeṇa jñānena*, dopo aver pressato la punta della lingua sul palato e dopo aver arrestato la mente, la parola e il respiro. Egli si identifica col Brahman e diventa *nirātman*, senza limiti o, in altre parole, libero» (trad. dall'inglese a cura di chi scrive).

[17] Si veda *Mṛgendrāgama*, Yogapāda 3 (ed. p. 357). In questo testo, però, si enuncia uno yoga *aṣṭāṅga* anomalo, che omette *yama*, *niyama* e *āsana*, inserisce *vīkṣaṇa* e *japa* e considera infine lo yoga stesso come ottavo *aṅga*.

[18] Sferra 2000: 12, n. 3 (trad. dall'inglese a cura di chi scrive).

[19] Bhatt 1982: XXVII (trad. dal francese a cura di chi scrive).

[20] *Mataṅgapārameśvarāgama*, Yogapāda 1.6 (ed. p. 248).

[21] *Rauravāgama*, Vidyāpāda 7.5.

[22] *Viṣṇusaṃhitā* 30.57 e segg.

[23] *Amṛtanādopaniṣad* st. 6 (ed. p. 14); trad. it., p. 46; cfr. anche Varenne 1988: 123-124.

Si noti che anche il *Mālinīvijayottaratantra*, tenuto in grandissima considerazione da Abhinavagupta, che lo parafrasa frequentemente nel *Tantrāloka*, propone a uno yoga a sei *aṅga*[24], fra i quali *tarka* (retto ragionamento o pensiero) «rappresenta il punto culminante dell'arte yoghica»[25]. La preminenza del *tarka* (o *sattarka*) e la spiegazione del suo significato ricorre in altre opere di Abhinavagupta, o a lui attribuite, tra cui ad esempio il quarto capitolo del *Tantrasāra*, dedicato alla spiegazione dei mezzi potenziati (*śāktopāya*), e il quarto capitolo del *Tantroccaya*. È evidente che qui *tarka* coincide con la ripetizione di formule che, consolidando la propria convinzione di essere Śiva, serve «ad eliminare l'impressione della dualità e a nient'altro»[26]. Si tratta quindi della ripetizione interiore di frasi che ricordano nella sostanza i *mahāvākya* upaniṣadici e che esprimono il risultato di un ragionamento corretto, corroborato eventualmente dalla scrittura (*āgama*) e dalla riflessione logica (*yukti*), piuttosto che l'esercizio di un ragionamento vero e proprio: «Non sono insenziente, poiché la mia natura è unicamente coscienza», «Le azioni non sono per me un legame; al contrario, poiché sono libero, esse sono semplicemente l'espressione del mio "Potere di azione"», «In me non c'è macchia: è [unicamente] il gioco che consiste nel nascondimento della mia vera natura», «Non sono spinto ad agire da altri: non esiste alcuno fuori di me, poiché la mia vera natura non è altro che la coscienza perfettamente piena»[27].

3. *Ṣaḍaṅga* con *smaraṇa/smṛti/anusmṛti* (*sati/anussati*)

Alla classificazione proposta da Grönbold si può aggiungere un ulteriore gruppo, costituito dai testi che nella lista degli *aṅga* non presentano né *āsana* né *tarka*, ma che hanno piuttosto *smaraṇa* o *anusmṛti* e che, per richiamarci alla tassonomia proposta, potremmo chiamare *Anusmṛti*-Class. A questa terza classe se ne potrebbe volendo aggiungere anche una quarta, su cui non ci dilunghiamo in questa sede, perché meriterebbe una trattazione a sé, che in

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[24] Si veda Vasudeva 2004, in particolare le pp. 367-436.
[25] Gnoli 1999: LV. Si veda anche *Tantrāloka* 4.15-16, 86-96 (trad. pp. 84, 92-93).
[26] Gnoli 1990: 100.
[27] *Tantroccaya* 4, ed. pp. 166-167.

luogo di *tarka* o *anusmṛti* o in aggiunta a *tarka* prevede la presenza di *japa* e che potremmo chiamare *Japa*-Class. A questo sottogruppo appartengono testi che prevedono sei *aṅga*, come lo *Śivadharmottara*[28], e testi che presentano un numero diverso di *aṅga*, come la *Jayākhyasaṃhitā*[29] e il *Mṛgendrāgama*[30].

La lista che presenta *anusmṛti* in effetti si riscontra quasi unicamente nelle fonti tantriche buddhiste[31] e ciò giustifica il fatto che non sia stata presa in esame da Grönbold in uno studio dedicato all'induismo. Esiste però un brano del *Vāyupurāṇa*, che varrà la pena prendere in considerazione e che può essere utilmente messo in parallelo con le fonti buddhiste. Qui, il Dio Vāyu in persona, nell'illustrare ai *ṛṣi* lo yoga di Śiva Maheśvara (*māheśvarayoga*), chiamato anche *pāśupatayoga*, afferma che lo yoga — verosimilmente da considerarsi esso stesso come sesto *aṅga* — consiste in cinque *dharma*:

prāṇāyāmas tathā dhyānaṃ pratyāhāro 'tha dhāraṇā |
smaraṇañ caiva yoge 'smin pañca dharmāḥ prakīrtitāḥ ||[32]

In questo passo, fra i cinque *dharma* non figura *āsana* e fa la sua comparsa *smaraṇa*, che, come ho già avuto modo di osservare[33], considero come sinonimo, non solo di *smṛti*, ma anche di *anusmṛti*, la «meditazione di consapevolezza» del *Visuddhimagga* di Buddhaghosa[34] e l'«applicazione mnemonica» dello *ṣaḍaṅgayoga* dei testi tantrici buddhisti[35].

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[28] Si veda Magnone 2004: 125-127, 2005: 585-586.
[29] Paṭala 33. Si veda Rastelli 1999: 323-366.
[30] Yogapada 1.3.
[31] Per un'introduzione allo *ṣaḍaṅgayoga* nelle fonti tantriche buddhiste, si veda Sferra 2000: 11-50.
[32] *Vāyupurāṇa* 10.71 (ed. fol. 19a); cfr. Tagare 1987: 91; Piano 2016: 64-65.
[33] Piano 2016: 133, n. 132.
[34] Comba 2008: specialmente alle pp. 286 e segg.; secondo Buddhaghosa (op. cit., luogo citato, n. 3) «la consapevolezza è essa stessa meditazione di consapevolezza» (*sati yeva anussati*), dove *anu* indica la «ripetuta applicazione». Buddhaghosa non è l'unica fonte che attesti l'importanza di *anusmṛti* anche nel buddhismo theravāda, come del resto è attestato nei glossari di terminologia buddhista, quale, per esempio, quello di Acharya 2002: 97-98; si veda anche l'*Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* di Ācariya Anuruddha, ed. p. 399. Vi sono infine anche maestri moderni che tendono a interpretare con «consapevolezza» (*sadā samanaskatā*) anche la parola *smṛti* in *Yogasūtra* 1.20 (si veda a tal proposito Maharaj 2013: 58 e segg.).
[35] Si veda Gnoli e Orofino 1994: 209; si veda anche l'Introduzione (p. 92) di R. Gnoli, che considera il passo del *Samājottaratantra* «l'esposizione più antica e

Questo accostamento non deve far dimenticare, naturalmente, che il valore esatto da attribuire ai termini *anussati* e *anusmṛti* nei testi buddhisti dovrà essere compreso di volta in volta in base al contesto specifico e al periodo di composizione delle opere. Non c'è dubbio, infatti, che *anussati* nei testi buddhisti antichi è anzitutto consapevolezza legata ad un supporto specifico e non sinonimo di consapevolezza in quanto tale (*sati*), mentre nei testi tantrici buddhisti *anusmṛti* è primariamente la consapevolezza applicata al ricordo di determinati segni/immagini, che appaiono allo yogin durante la prima fase dello yoga.

Il *Vāyupurāṇa* tratta del *prāṇāyāma*, dei suoi quattro scopi (*śānti, praśānti, dīpti* e *prasāda*) e della postura adatta alla sua pratica; illustra poi il *pratyāhāra*, la *dhāraṇā* e il *dhyāna*, la «meditazione profonda», sempre in relazione al controllo del respiro, concludendo l'*adhyāya* 11 con una serie di consigli pratici e terapeutici. L'*adhyāya* 12 è dedicato all'illustrazione dei «cattivi presagi» (*upasarga*), delle *pañcabhūtadhāraṇā* (escludendo l'elemento «acqua» e includendo il *manas*), delle caratteristiche di Maheśvara, che sono sei (ancora *ṣaḍaṅga: sarvajñatā, tṛpti, anādibodha, svatantratā, nityam aluptaśakti* e *anantaśakti*[36]) e dell'*aiśvarya*, che garantisce l'identità col Brahman. Il successivo capitolo descrive in dettaglio i «poteri sovrumani» acquisibili con la pratica dello yoga, grazie ai quali il praticante consegue il *mokṣa*, chiamato *apavarga* e definito come *susūkṣmaṃ paramaṃ padam*. Dopo aver descritto le caratteristiche del Puruṣa/Brahman e le inesorabili leggi del *karman* e del *saṃsāra* (*adhyāya* 14), che l'uomo è invitato a superare mediante la pratica dello yoga, nella consapevolezza vedāntica dell'identità dell'*ātman* col respiro e col cibo (*adhyāya* 15), il testo parla di purezza esteriore e interiore e di corretto comportamento (cap. 16); vi sono anche enunciati (strofe 17-18), con molte varianti rispetto all'enunciazione «classica», gli *yama* (*asteya, brāhmacarya, alobha, tyāga*), chiamati «voti» (*vrata*) del mendicante religioso (*bhikṣu*), e i *niyama* (*ahiṃsā, paramārthitā, akrodha, guruśuśrūṣā, śauca, āhāralāghava, svādhyāya*). Dopo aver evidenziato

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autorevole di questo yoga sestuplice nelle scritture buddhiste». Il *Samājottaratantra* (o semplicemente *Samājottara*) corrisponde al diciottesimo capitolo del *Guhyasamājatantra* e fu redatto verosimilmente nella seconda metà del IX secolo.

[36] Cfr. *Vāyupurāṇa* 1.12.31 (ed. fol. 21a).

l'importanza della meditazione profonda (*adhyāya* 17) e descritto i riti di espiazione per gli asceti (*yati, adhyāya* 18) e i segni funesti (*ariṣṭa*), la sezione dedicata al *pāśupatayoga* consacra l'ultimo *adhyāya* alla descrizione e alla pronuncia dell'*oṃkāra,* concludendo che «colui che insegna la contemplazione raggiunge la sede suprema» (*yas tu vedayate dhyānaṃ sa paraṃ prāpnuyāt padam*[37]). Anche questo testo è fortemente vedāntico, ma il rigoroso nondualismo vi è, per così dire, «contaminato» dalla nuova atmosfera della *bhakti.*

Da questa breve analisi si possono trarre alcune osservazioni conclusive:

a. Sembra anzitutto che, nel contesto delle fonti di *haṭhayoga,* a partire dal suo supposto fondatore Gorakṣanātha/Gorakhnāth, si prediliga una formulazione dello *ṣaḍaṅgayoga* comprensiva di *āsana,* un aspetto della pratica ampiamente descritto anche nelle opere successive e specialmente dedicate allo *haṭhayoga* che non enunciano la serie degli *aṅga*[38].

b. La formulazione dello *ṣaḍaṅgayoga* comprensiva, invece, di *tarka* risulta largamente scelta in un contesto vedāntico e nella tradizione del cosiddetto śivaismo kashmiro.

c. Lo *ṣaḍaṅga* con *smaraṇa/smṛti/anusmṛti* (*sati/anussati*) è un'enunciazione anomala, rappresentata dai cinque *dharma* del *māheśvarayoga,* o *pāśupatayoga* descritto dal dio-narratore Vāyu nel *Vāyupurāṇa*[39], la cui peculiarità trova riscontro in fonti buddhiste tantriche e non.

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[37] Cfr. *Haṭhayogapradīpikā* di Svātmārāma; trad. it. Spera 1990. In quest'opera si dedica un grande spazio alla descrizione degli *āsana,* oltre che del *prāṇāyāma*; cfr. anche Repetto 1990 e Fossati 1994.

[38] Una traduzione italiana di questa sezione del *Vāyupurāṇa* (1.10.63-1.20.35) si trova in Piano 2016: 63-104 (in particolare a p. 65 e n. 132 p. 133 vi ho tradotto *smaraṇa* con «presenza cosciente»).

[39] Cfr. *Vāyupurāṇa* 1.20.35cd (ed. fol. 25b).

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Transition and Transformation: On the Roles of Parks and Gardens in Early India

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In the last few years I have devoted some articles to the literary representations of gardens and parks in ancient India, taking into consideration, in particular, the *aśokavanikā*s of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, passages of Aśvaghoṣa and Kālidāsa, and the halting places of the Buddha as presented in the Pāḷi Canon.[1] In the course of these studies I have come to the idea that the gardens and parks as depicted in ancient Indian literature, appearing as interstitial areas, as something lying in-between or alongside other entities of more settled significance, were conceived of as places open to many possibilities of use and interpretation, and specifically as places of transition, transformation and change, or as the favoured spaces in which writers could locate some sort of transgression. Here I will address some aspects of the issue more thor-

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[1] See Bibliography for fuller information on these articles. The primary sources substantiating many of my remarks in the present paper are referred to and quoted extensively in those essays, and I will not repeat all the data here, but I will mainly refer to those articles themselves.

oughly. In conclusion, I will try to trace out some connection between my remarks and some contemporary theories on spatiality.[2]

Although the vocabulary of the primary sources hardly makes clear distinctions, we need to take into account the fact that the realities involved generally differ according to location, presumable size, and, at least partly, original purpose; thus I will generally use the English word 'garden' with reference to the spaces with trees and flowers beautifying buildings such as royal palaces, and the word 'park' for the sites which, according to the sources, generally appear to be located outside — and apparently right on the outskirts — of the ancient Indian cities.

In the Pāḷi Canon we repeatedly encounter a similar scene: the Buddha halts and preaches in places located near or just outside towns and villages, and mostly in some kind of grove. Of these places, some are apparently entirely natural sites, but others are in some respects domesticated areas, designated by some kind of proper name, and often belonging to an individual or group of individuals, as evidenced by the place names themselves or by other indications in the texts. As I have sought to argue elsewhere,[3] the latter cannot all simply be considered 'parks,' in the sense of pieces of land intended from the outset — only or primarily — for amusement and leisure, these being the purposes of the parks we encounter in *kāvya* literature, where such places (as well as 'gardens') are closely connected with the pleasures of love. The famous *migadāya* of Isipatana, and, in fact, the various other *migadāya*s mentioned by the Pāḷi Canon may well have been, primarily, reserves for breeding animals, and the many *ambavana*s, among which the one belonging to the celebrated courtesan Ambapālī, were presumably primarily luxuriant orchards. Moreover, as we know, the Buddha is said to have been born in the Lumbinivana, a *sālavana* ('wood of *sāla* trees'), between the towns of Kapilavatthu and Devadaha, owned by the citizens of both towns,[4] and to have died in another *sālavana* outside Kusinārā,

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[2] A source of inspiration for the present paper has been Katharine T. von Stackelberg's book on the Roman gardens (von Stackelberg 2017).

[3] Pieruccini 2018a, 2018b.

[4] These are the details given by the *Nidānakathā*, p. 52.

called Upavattana and belonging to the local ruling clan of the Mallas.[5] As the wood of the *sāla* trees has since ancient times been of great economic value in India, the *sālavana*s may well have been groves serving an immediate utilitarian purpose rather than 'parks.' In any case, all these places share the same basic characteristics of the leisure parks, providing sensual and especially erotic enjoyment, celebrated by the *kāvya* poets: all of them are spaces outside towns, intermediate spaces which belong neither to the town itself nor to the forest that lies beyond.[6]

Quite often, the location of some of the Buddha's sermons appears to be a redactional intervention. The compilers of the Buddhist Canons clearly felt the need to set each and every speech of the Buddha in some specific site, and this is achieved by mentioning a place name according to a certain set of practical indications and conventions — or at least so it seems. Well-known locations are thus endlessly replicated.[7] However, this does not significantly change the issue; the fact remains that the redactors of the texts felt that such places on the fringe of a town were appropriate settings for the Buddha to deliver his message. Moreover, in these parks, as we can call them for the sake of simplicity, besides the halting and preaching of the Buddha, the Pāḷi Canon also records the presence of *śramaṇa*s of different persuasion, with whom exchanges of opinions take place.

From a practical (historical?) point of view, we obviously have to consider that these parks could offer safety and peace, besides a useful proximity to towns where alms could be collected by the Buddha and his monks, and from where lay people could easily make their way to visit the Awakened one and gather to listen to his sermons, as a famous passage explicitly declares through words attributed to king Bimbisāra, who wonders what might be the ideal features of the place where the Buddha should reside.[8] But, from

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[5] In the *Mahāparinibbānasuttanta*, *passim, upavattanaṃ mallānaṃ sālavanaṃ* and variants. See Pieruccini 2018a: 70–71.

[6] A parallel may be traced with the protected areas devoted to the breeding of animals and the production of various goods that the *Arthaśāstra* defines as *vana*s; the places that the Pāḷi Canon calls *migadāya*s may well have been of the same sort. See in particular Pieruccini 2018b.

[7] Schopen 2004.

[8] *Vinaya Piṭaka, Mahāvagga* I.22.16.

a conceptual point of view, there is more to it than this. The human settlements, cities and villages, are the places of business and political power, while the forest, as Brahmanical literature such as the Epics insist on proclaiming, belongs to wild animals, frightening beings and uncivilized tribes, and, as far as religion is concerned, is already occupied by *ṛṣi*s and *vānaprastha*s, with their hermitages where the smoke of Vedic sacrifices rises up to the sky. Located in between these two worlds, the parks figure as interstitial areas — as half-empty spaces, prone to be filled with new significances and traditions. For this reason, they acquire prominence as places of transformation, where new doctrines can be announced and evolve, and entirely new ideas about human life can develop.

Moreover, Buddhism appears to have been very active in achieving permanent occupation of such places, thus transforming them again in terms of meaning and purpose. In fact, the first Buddhist monasteries are said to have arisen exactly in sites of this kind, particularly famous cases being the Veḷuvana, the 'Bamboo Grove' of Rājagaha, donated to the Buddha by King Bimbisāra, and the Jetavana of Sāvatthī, the 'Jeta's Grove,' where Jeta is the name of the prince who originally owned the land that the *seṭṭhi* — banker — Anāthapiṇḍika acquired for the Buddha.[9]

On a more definite symbolic level, we may add further elements to the picture. As already mentioned, besides his sermons, the most salient episodes in the Buddha's life occur in places of this type. We encounter a *sālavana* at the beginning and end of his mortal life, and of course he achieves his *bodhi* under a tree not far from the village of Uruvelā — the place later known as Bodh Gayā.[10] In these choices many elements appear to conflate — in other words, those places *were not* entirely empty. Queen Māyā gave birth there in the posture of a *yakṣī*, grasping the branch of a tree, and the Buddha himself, while meditating under a tree, may well have figured as the counterpart of a *yakṣa* of vegetation.

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[9] As a consequence, in some cases or texts of the Pāḷi Canon it can be difficult to decide whether the term *ārāma* should be translated as 'park' or 'monastery.' Cf. e.g. Horner 1957: XLIX.

[10] For discussions on the sanctity of Bodh Gayā before Śākyamuni's times, see in particular DeCaroli 2004: 105–120, and Sayers 2012.

According to the *Nidānakathā*, when the young Sujātā offers him her plate of milk rice, this is exactly what she thinks — that he is the *devatā* of a *nigrodha* tree, for whom the homage of food was originally meant and who has exceptionally manifested himself.[11] Somehow, these events occur in places which are, or better until that time had been solely, under the arcane power of the spirits of vegetation. Obviously, this is a vast theme, that we can only briefly recall here, but we can certainly state that Buddhist lore occupied spaces where popular, non-Vedic faith could already sense the presence of divinity, a presence that Buddhism incorporated, superseded and substituted.

The intermediate quality and transformative power of the park/garden was later also enhanced by Buddhism in a different, but extremely significant way. This happened with the conception of the Sukhāvatī, 'the Blissful,' that is the paradise of the Buddha Amitābha, as presented by Mahāyāna texts such as the two versions of the *Sukhāvatīvyūhasūtra*.[12] The Sukhāvatī is an entire 'world' (*lokadhātu*) conceived as a majestic garden (let us use this term here), where people are reborn as *bodhisattva*s soon to attain liberation, to become Buddhas — what greater transformation could be predicted for any living being? Set between earth and *nirvāṇa*, this is the liminal place leading to the supreme step, the ultimate transitional vision.

Of course, the ideal representation of 'paradise' as a kind of garden is common to many cultures. It may basically be considered to have its roots in the attractiveness of earthly gardens, thus allowing earth — man's creations — and heaven — man's projected fantasies — to reciprocally mirror each other. In the wide range, or perhaps network, of constructions stemming from this conception in the different cultures, India presents her own version. In the Indian tradition, the idea that paradise can be a garden has the most ancient formulation in connection with Indra and his heavenly resort inhabited by alluring *apsaras*es, whose embraces are the desired reward. As we have said, in *kāvya* in particular parks and gardens are generally associated with amorous

[11] *Nidānakathā*, pp. 68–70.
[12] Shorter *Sukhāvatīvyūhasūtra* 3–7; Longer *Sukhāvatīvyūhasūtra* 16–23, etc. Cf. Pieruccini 2014: 22–26.

encounters, for which they provide appropriately sensual and secluded scenery (see below). But Indra's paradise, too, at least according to the post-Vedic idea of *saṃsāra*, is a transitional place, from where one is reborn on earth after his merits are exhausted.[13] In the Sukhāvatī, the scenario is de-eroticized, and the pleasures granted by Indra's loving nymphs are substituted, for the inhabitants of this magnificent place, with total and virtually automatic satisfaction of every practical and spiritual need. Nevertheless, this happens in a landscape strongly appealing to the senses in its grandiosely synesthetic beauty.

And yet, Sukhāvatī's beauty is not the charm of a 'natural' garden. *Kāvya* poetry teems with the beauty of plants and flowers that belong to the 'real' vegetation of South Asia, even though, besides the frequent difficulty in identifying them precisely in botanical terms, in the Indian context some of them are attributed specific cultural or mythical or poetical significance to which the poets often allude only in a cryptical manner. By contrast, Sukhāvatī's allure is the result of a fabulous reworking of nature, because the shining trees, the marvellous lotuses and sparkling ponds are said to consist of precious metals and jewels; the winds stir celestial music, and flowers and precious things rain from the sky. Now, such imagery is far from being an original invention of these Mahāyāna texts, although in the descriptions of the *Sukhāvatīvyūha-sūtra*s we find it exploited to the greatest extent and brought to its extreme dazzling magnificence, as well as developed with specifically Buddhist language and details. In fact, such elements as the golden and bejewelled lotuses and trees, the ponds with precious stairways and sand, and other features of similar import, evoking sumptuousness and the immunity of vegetation from the vicissitudes of seasons and time, are recurrent in ancient Indian descriptions of 'gardens' seen to be endowed with some fabulous, supernatural quality. And the texts often associate the places thus conceived with the idea of a journey, or some passage. We encounter imagery of this kind, for example, in the *Rāmāyaṇa* for the *aśoka-vanikā* of Laṅkā where, after her abduction by Rāvaṇa, Sītā is held captive in a kind of suspended time; in the *Meghadūta*, when the

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[13] See e.g. *Saundarananda* 9.31, etc.

cloud is invited to enter mythological Alakā and the garden of the *yakṣa*'s house, that is where the text leaves the 'real' Indian landscape traversed so far by the cloud to move to another dimension; and in the description of Indra's paradise in Aśvaghoṣa's *Saundarananda* to which Nanda is flown to by the Buddha — of course not surprisingly, but it is important to stress that this is probably the first well developed literary description of this place.[14] Thus, the earthly garden, the obvious model for such fantasies, is manipulated and reconstructed to evoke transition — and at the same time bring the audience — to another level of reality.

In the classical Sanskrit court-plays such as Kālidāsa's *Mālavikāgnimitra* and *Vikramorvaśīya,* and Harṣa's *Ratnāvalī* and *Priyadarśikā*, sections of the plots are staged in a garden evidently belonging to a royal palace, and frequented by kings, queens and their retinue. As we know, these plays basically revolve around the new love story of a king with a beautiful maiden (or an *apsaras* in the case of the *Vikramorvaśīya*), a love story which has initially to be kept secret and protected from the jealousy of the chief queen or queens. With due variants, the garden with its luxuriant and sense-arousing scenery is typically the place where the two see or spy on each other, fall in love or grow in their feelings, express their longing conveniently overheard by other characters, and have secret meetings. In much the same way, also in the *Svapnavāsavadatta* the palace garden is the place where the male and female protagonists express their intimate thoughts, some privacy can be kept, but words revealing the true love feelings are significantly overheard. In this connection, Daud Ali insightfully observed:

> Daily life within the royal establishment, with its minutely calibrated protocols, was highly 'public' in nature. Daily movement was open to the more or less constant scrutiny of interested parties or their agents. [...] In this context, the garden formed a relatively 'neutral' and 'open,' space, yet one which was protected and intimate as well. It thus formed a place, at once secluded and 'interior,' but unmarked and public, where the games of pre-marital or post-marital courtship could take place. It formed the ideal setting for the illicit or quasi-licit romances which formed the subject of

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[14] Cf. *Rāmāyaṇa* 5.12–13, *passim*; *Meghadūta* 73–74; *Saundarananda* 10.19–26. For more detailed references and comments, see Pieruccini 2014, 2015, 2016.

numerous plays and poems in Sanskrit literature. [...] The garden
functioned as a sort of 'outside' place at once beyond the scrutiny
of the court yet comfortably within the safety of its confines.[15]

Thus, according to Ali, the role of the gardens that we see embedded in Sanskrit plays reflects the actual circumstances of the life in those ancient courtly precincts. He is most probably right, but, as the same scholar briefly remarks,[16] we may equally well regard the recurrence of this kind of setting for the various love stages and encounters as a literary *topos*, perpetuated by authors as a way to 'move the plot forward,' positioning the characters, when needed, in aptly private and sensual surroundings — besides offering the poets the possibility to display their art in some elaborate stanzas exalting the beauty of nature. In both cases we are, once more, confronted with an interstitial place, a space in-between that by its very nature appears open to possibilities that other 'ins' and 'outs' cannot offer.

Considering again specifically out-of-the-town parks, here too Sanskrit authors locate events that, for different reasons, cannot, or should not, take place indoors, or under the public eye. The setting in a park outside Kapilavāstu of the unsuccessful seduction of the future Buddha by a host of splendid courtesans, as recounted in the Fourth Canto of the *Buddhacarita*, basically reflects the erotic qualities of the garden/park;[17] nevertheless, at least from the point of view of the Buddhist Aśvaghoṣa, the entire episode may be said to evoke a deviation, a possibility of transgression. But in this context, especially the *Mṛcchakaṭikā* presents a very significant picture, setting the crucial events of the play in a park, and more generally around the trip to a park. In the well-known plot of this famous work, the courtesan Vasantasenā is supposed to meet her lover Cārudatta, to spend a pleasant day with him, in a park outside Ujjayinī belonging to Saṃsthānaka, the wicked brother-in-law of the king.[18] But, for a mistake of carriages, the two

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[15] Ali 2003: 237.
[16] Ali 2003: 237.
[17] See Pieruccini 2014.
[18] An analysis of the material aspect of this park is proposed in Voegeli 2013: 35–39. We may remark here that these out-of-the town parks generally figure as open to every kind of visitor, like the one in the *Mṛcchakaṭikā* and the 'parks' con-

lovers fail to meet, and in the park Saṃsthānaka, rejected by Vasantasenā, attempts to strangle the beautiful courtesan, who is later found alive by another character, a gambler turned Buddhist monk who has come to the park to wash his robes. Thus, the half-secluded reality of the park is used to build up a setting not only for a desired love encounter, but also for murder.

It is possible to link the characteristics of parks and gardens as presented by ancient Indian literary sources and highlighted in the present pages with some relevant contemporary theories on spatiality: in particular, the Foucauldian concept of heterotopia and the notion of Thirdspace as elaborated by Edward W. Soja.

   Michel Foucault propounded the concept of heterotopia, lit. 'other-place-ness,' in a lecture held in 1967 and published as an article only many years later, in 1984, and, since 1986, in various English translations.[19] In this essay, consisting of a few dense and somewhat only exploratory pages, Foucault declares his interest in certain sites 'that have the curious property of being in relation with all the other sites, but in such a way as to suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations that they happen to designate, mirror, or reflect.'[20] Among these sites, he mentions utopias, which 'present society itself in a perfected form, or else society turned upside down, but in any case [...] are fundamentally unreal spaces,'[21] and quickly goes on defining his main subject:

> There are also, probably in every culture, in every civilization, real places — places that do exist and that are formed in the very founding of society — which are something like counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted. Places of this kind are outside of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their location in reality. Because these places are absolutely differ-

nected with the Buddha, even though they are said to belong to specific individuals.

   [19] For a history of this text and its various translations, see Dehaene and De Cauter 2008: 13–14. The article is quoted here in the translation from French by Jay Miskowiec.

   [20] Foucault 1986: 24.

   [21] Foucault 1986: 24.

ent from all the sites that they reflect and speak about, I shall call them, by way of contrast to utopias, heterotopias.[22]

In the pages that follow, he also mentions the garden as a form of heterotopia, recalling in particular the examples of ancient Persia and the fact that they were meant to be condensed representations of the entire world. As for the gardens and parks of ancient India, it seems to me that a fundamentally heterotopic quality they show consists in the fact that the texts appear to locate their visitors in a kind of middle- or no-ground, in a space open to new possibilities. But other qualities become clear in relation to a general division which Foucault introduces to classify such places. In facts, he envisages two main kinds of heterotopias: *heterotopias of crisis*, which he defines as 'privileged or sacred or forbidden places, reserved for individuals who are, in relation to society and to the human environment in which they live, in a state of crisis: adolescents, menstruating women, pregnant women, the elderly, etc.';[23] and *heterotopias of deviation*: 'those in which individuals whose behavior is deviant in relation to the required means or norm are placed' — and among these he mentions 'rest homes and psychiatric hospitals, and of course prisons.'[24] Extending or, better, differently applying these categories, we may certainly say that the 'parks' of the Buddhist tradition represent both heterotopias of crisis, and heterotopias of deviation: stressing, in the first case, the (voluntary) removal from society of people deeply engaged in spiritual quest, and thus at a turning point in their life, and in the second case their deviance from the general Brahmanical social norms and the so far officially accepted religious practices. There Buddhism creates a type of community which at the same time replicates and subverts the rules of ordinary society, and this is in perfect accordance with the general definition of heterotopias quoted above. Moreover, the definition 'heterotopias of deviation' may be readily applied, albeit again with a twist of its original meaning, to gardens of the royal palace and the parks where authors set some complicated love stories, or some transgressive

[22] Foucault 1986: 24.
[23] Foucault 1986: 24.
[24] Foucault 1986: 25.

or even unacceptable acts — events that for different reasons require a location somehow beyond norms and control, and are thus made to occur in a kind of conceptually 'other' place.

The theory of Thirdspace was elaborated by Edward W. Soja in a seminal book first published in 1996. Here, in a sort of dialogue with the writings of Henri Lefebvre and through a re-reading of some of his basic concepts, besides taking into account Foucault himself and a number of contemporary thinkers engaged in post-colonial, gender and feminist studies, Soja proposes to overcome the various forms of dualistic thought by constantly adding 'an-Other.' Thus he builds a 'trialectics' of spatiality where the third element is the terrain for new forms of awareness about space, open to different and constantly evolving points of observation. Soja thus sets the stage in his introductory pages:

> [...] the mainstream spatial or geographical imagination has, for at least the past century, revolved primarily around a dual mode of thinking about space; one, which I have described as a Firstspace perspective and epistemology, fixed mainly on the concrete mate-riality of spatial forms, on things that can be empirically mapped; and the second, as Secondspace, conceived in ideas about space, in thoughtful re-presentations of human spatiality in mental or cognitive forms. [...] I have chosen to call this new awareness Thirdspace and to initiate its evolving definition by describing it as a product of a 'thirding' of the spatial imagination, the creation of another mode of thinking about space that draws upon the mate-rial and mental spaces of the traditional dualism but extends well beyond them in scope, substance, and meaning. Simultaneously real and imagined and more (both and also...), the exploration of Thirdspace can be described and inscribed in journeys to 'real-and-imagined' (or perhaps 'realandimagined'?) places.[25]

Briefly speaking, we may say that, according to Soja, Firstspace is physical space, as materially perceived, Secondspace is how it is mentally conceived, felt, or planned, while Thirdspace encom-passes and goes beyond the two insofar as it also represents the world of experience, the way spaces are *lived*. His definition runs thus:

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[25] Soja 2017: 10.

[...] a knowable and unknowable, real and imagined lifeworld of experiences, emotional events, and political choices that is existentially shaped by the generative and problematic interplay between centers and peripheries, the abstract and concrete, the impassioned spaces of the conceptual and the lived, marked out materially and metaphorically in spatial praxis, the transformation of (spatial) knowledge into (spatial) action in the field of unevenly developed (spatial) power.[26]

Might it prove relevant to associate Soja's triad with the documentation on ancient Indian parks and gardens that we have investigated here?[27] For our knowledge of these ancient places, which have totally disappeared in their materiality, we can rely only on how they are represented in literature, and, to a lesser extent, in the visual arts,[28] and thus conceptualized by intermediate actors. The mythical or legendary resonances of plants and flowers which are commonly embedded in the poets' descriptions offer hints as to what such environments could emotionally or intellectually be felt to represent, even if only, in the case of *kāvya*, by a refined élite of connoisseurs. A Thirdspace perspective would stress, however, precisely the factors of encounter, evolution, transformation. The aspects open to such an approach are, in fact, the liminality, the in-

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[26] Soja 2017: 31.

[27] See von Stackelberg 2017: 52–53.

[28] A couple of reliefs depicting gardens are particularly worth mentioning. A panel on the northern pillar of the east *toraṇa* (end of 1st c. CE-beginning of 1st c. CE) of the Great Stūpa of Sanchi shows a beautiful image of couples in a highly apparelled garden or park; the panel immediately underneath most probably presented a similar scene, but it is now badly damaged. See the still fundamental Marshall-Foucher-Majumdar 1983, vol. 1: 122, 228–229, vol. 2, Plate 64c and comment; here it is suggested that the image may depict Indra's paradise. A section of a coping frieze from Mathura containing a very interesting representation of an enclosed garden or, again, park is owned by the National Museums of Scotland, Edinburgh (accession number A.1975.265; proposed date, 2nd or 3rd c. CE); to my knowledge, it has been published in an advertisement of Spink & Son in *Artibus Asiae* 35.3 (1973), in Quintanilla 2007, fig. 184 (see pp. 146–147; here the suggested date is instead 50-20 BCE), and in Ali 2003, fig. 1, where the image is reversed. I wish to express my gratitude to Dr Friederike Voigt, Senior Curator of the National Museums of Scotland, for providing me with precious information on this piece. Moreover, as for literature, an incursion into Secondspace in terms of ideal planning could also be represented by a survey of the technical indications of the *Śilpaśāstra*s. For a reading of the relevant passages of the *Mānasollāsa* (early 12th c.), see Ali 2012.

betweenness of such places, which leaves them eminently open to a multiplicity of social interactions and meanings. The importance of being in or adopting a liminal position is repeatedly emphasized in Soja's pages; in fact, it is a crucial point of his discourse, because of the wide range of possibilities such a position can unlock. And, by highlighting the dynamic potentialities of places like parks and gardens, the ancient Indian authors seem themselves to have built up some kind of proto-Thirdspace narrative.

Finally, it is also worth considering that the parks frequented by the Buddha and his monks, and other *śramaṇa*s, can be seen as a sort of third space (concrete, without capital letters), enlarging with another and very decisive element the widely-recognised and studied dichotomy, or better interaction, between forest and town, or, as Sontheimer put it, between the *vana* and the *kṣetra*.[29]

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[29] See Sontheimer 1987; cf. also Pieruccini 2018a: 68; Pieruccini 2018b.

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Some Hitherto Unknown Fragments of Utpaladeva's Vivṛti (IV): On Non-being and Imperceptible Demons*

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The following pages contain a brief presentation and annotated translation of a fragment of Utpaladeva's *Vivṛti* on his own *Īśvara-pratyabhijñā* treatise;[1] the Sanskrit fragment is given as an appendix. I have described elsewhere in detail the recent discoveries

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[1] Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925–975) first wrote verses (the ĪPK, extant) along with a short prose explanation (the *Vṛtti*, also extant) before composing the *Vivṛti*, a detailed commentary on both the verses and *Vṛtti*. Abhinavagupta (fl. c. 975–1025) has authored two commentaries on the treatise that have both come down to us: the ĪPV (a synthetic explanation of the ĪPK) and the ĪPVV (a very long commentary on the *Vivṛti*).

that have unexpectedly enriched our knowledge of Utpaladeva's *magnum opus*.[2] Suffice it to mention here that the *Vivṛti* was long thought to be entirely lost, with the exception of an important fragment preserved in a very lacunose *codex unicus* now kept at the National Archives of India (Delhi), which was remarkably edited and translated by Raffaele Torella.[3] The fragments subsequently found were not discovered in any additional *Vivṛti* manuscript: they were spotted in marginal annotations belonging to manuscripts of other texts of the Pratyabhijñā corpus. These numerous annotations are often limited to the quotation of a few words or sentences, but they sometimes extend to entire chapters, as is the case of what is now by far the lengthiest known *Vivṛti* fragment, the study of which is underway.[4] Yet shorter fragments are also worthy of our attention.[5] This is the case of the *Vivṛti* on ĪPK 1.7.10–11, which is preserved in the margins of the two ĪPVV manuscripts just mentioned, but parts of which are also quoted in marginal annotations of ĪPV and *Vṛtti* manuscripts.

1. The context of the fragment: a discussion on contradiction and non-being[6]

The fragment occurs in a chapter of the treatise where Utpaladeva examines the relation of contradiction or cancellation (*bādhya-bādhakabhāva*) through which we realize, after thinking 'this is silver' about something glittering just seen on the ground, that in fact what we saw was nothing but mother-of-pearl: the cognition

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[2] See in particular Ratié 2017a and 2021: 1–80.

[3] See Torella 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d and 2012.

[4] The first of three thus far entirely unknown *Vivṛti* chapters that I recently found copied in the margins of two manuscripts of Abhinavagupta's ĪPVV is now published (Ratié 2021). Raffaele Torella has kindly agreed to study the second chapter; I am currently working on the third one.

[5] See Ratié 2016a, 2016b and 2016c for studies devoted to other relatively brief fragments.

[6] On non-being and negation in Indian philosophical literature, and for further bibliographical references, see Kellner 1997 and 2006. On *abhāva* in the Pratyabhijñā treatise, see Torella 2007a, which provides an edition and translation of the *Vivṛti* on ĪPK 1.3.7, and Ratié 2010a, which contains a translation and analysis of Abhinavagupta's ĪPV on ĪPK 1.7.6–13. The translations offered below of Utpaladeva's ĪPK and *Vṛtti* are, as usual, greatly indebted to Torella 2002.

'this is mother-of-pearl' contradicts or cancels (*bādhaka*) the previous cognition. According to the Śaiva nondualists, this process constitutes the foundation of all worldly transactions insofar as it is the very basis of our understanding of what is real or unreal, true or false, yet it could never occur without the existence of a unique substratum of these cognitions — that is, a unitary, enduring subject or Self (*ātman*). The latter's existence is denied by the Buddhists, and according to Utpaladeva, given that Dharmakīrti's followers hold that cognitions are purely momentary, irreducibly different from each other and thus strictly 'confined to themselves,' they must concede that in their perspective, the ability of cognitions to contradict each other (and therefore to enter in a relationship with each other) remains inexplicable.[7]

Utpaladeva's Buddhist opponent replies by claiming that in fact his system is perfectly capable of accounting for this relation of contradiction, because our awareness of the invalidity of the cognition 'this is silver' is really nothing but our awareness of the validity of the cognition 'this is mother-of-pearl': as soon as we realize that the object seen is mother-of-pearl, we know that we were wrong in thinking that it was silver, and this is the case because whenever we determine something seen as being X, our judgement, which takes the form of an 'exclusion of what is other' (*anyāpoha*), amounts to stating that *we are not perceiving non-X*. And according to Utpaladeva's Buddhist adversary, this process is similar to what happens when we become aware of an absence: when we realize that there is no pot on the ground, we are not grasping a distinct entity that would be the pot's non-being (because non-being is by definition nothing and thus cannot constitute an object of perception), nor are we just becoming aware of an absence of perception of the pot (because an absence of perception, being an absence of knowledge, can teach us nothing): in fact the thought 'there is no pot on the ground' is only an alternative way

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[7] ĪPK 1.7.6: *bādhyabādhakabhāvo 'pi svātmaniṣṭhāvirodhinām | jñānānām udiyād ekapramātṛpariniṣṭhiteḥ ||* 'Even the relation of contradiction between cognitions that [can]not contradict each other [since they are] self-confined must arise from the fact that [they] rest on a unique knowing subject.' See Ratié 2010a: 427–432 for Abhinavagupta's explanations.

of expressing the thought 'there is a bare ground here.'[8] And just as our awareness of the pot's absence is nothing but our cognition of the bare ground, in the same way, we do not have to assume the existence of a unitary conscious subject to account for the fact that our cognitions may be contradicted by subsequent cognitions: the cognition of X's absence is nothing but the cognition of Y's presence, and similarly, the awareness of the validity of the cognition 'this is silver-of-pearl' is nothing but the awareness of the invalidity of the cognition 'this is silver.'[9]

According to Utpaladeva, however, the Buddhist's explanation is insufficient: it may account for the fact that *the bare ground is not a pot*, but not for the fact that *there is no pot on the bare ground*. For we must distinguish (and so do the Buddhists)[10] two kinds of non-being: the non-being of X as something identical with Y (*tādātmyābhāva*) — that is to say, the fact that X *is not* Y, or the otherness of X with respect to Y; and the non-being of X as something distinct from Y (*vyatirekābhāva*) — i.e., the fact that X, which is other than Y, *is not present in* Y.[11] Of these two kinds of non-being — i.e., otherness and absence —, the first can indeed be explained

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[8] See e.g. NBṬ, p. 102: *tasmāt sa eva ghaṭaviviktapradeśas tadālambhanaṃ ca jñānaṃ dṛśyānupalambhaniścayahetutvāt dṛśyānupalambha ucyate.* 'Therefore it is the place that is bare of pot (*ghaṭaviviktapradeśa*) and the cognition having this [place] as its object that [we] call the "non-perception of [the pot as] a perceptible [entity]," because [the bare place and its cognition] are the reasons for ascertaining that [we] do not perceive [the pot whereas it would be] perceptible [if it were present].'

[9] ĪPK 1.7.7: *viviktabhūtalajñānaṃ ghaṭābhāvamitir yathā | tathā cec chuktikājñānaṃ rūpyajñānāpramātvavit ||* 'If [the Buddhist were to reply the following:] "The cognition of the bare ground is the awareness of the pot's non-being, just as the cognition of mother-of-pearl is aware of the invalidity of the cognition of silver"...'

[10] See below, n. 12.

[11] See ĪPV, vol. I, p. 297: *iha bhūtalaṃ na ghaṭa iti tādātmyenābhāvo vyavahartavyaḥ kadācit, kadācid vyatirekeṇeha bhūtale ghaṭo neti.* 'In this [world], sometimes [we] may talk about the non-being [of X] as [something] identical [with Y, in which case we say for instance:] "here the ground is not a pot'; and sometimes [we may talk about the non-being of X] as [something] distinct [from Y, in which case we say for instance:] 'on this ground there is no pot.'" For practical reasons — one might almost say: for the sake of *vyavahāra* —, in what follows I have translated *vyavahṛ-* as 'to talk,' but of course the verb and its derivatives have a wider semantic spectrum and refer to our ordinary way of dealing (linguistically and otherwise) with things and other subjects.

as the result of a mere determination of the object: if I know that what I see is a piece of ground, I know that what I see is not a pot. But according to the Buddhists themselves, we know that there is no pot in a certain place not only because we know that the place in question is not a pot, but also because we realize that if the pot were present there, it would necessarily be perceived, as all the conditions required for its perception are fulfilled.[12] And indeed, Utpaladeva claims that in the Buddhist perspective, it is impossible to know from the mere perception of the bare ground that there is no pot, because if we accept the Buddhist system, we must consider that *the ground is always bare*:[13] if, as Dharmakīrti claims, things are self-confined, singular and momentary events, the relations between things being mere conceptual constructs,[14] no ground can ever be seen to bear a pot (which would suppose a relation between them) and as a result, we should be aware of the pot's absence whenever we perceive the ground. Apprehending absence entails a form of synthesis that is acknowledged by the Buddhists themselves when they concede that our awareness of the pot's absence results from our understanding that if the pot were perceived, it would be 'combined into a single cognition' (*ekajñānasaṃsargin*) with something else (such as the ground) that

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[12] On this Buddhist distinction, see e.g. NBṬ, p. 207: *sakale vastuny avastuni ca parasparaparihāravirodhaḥ. vastuny eva katipaye sahānavasthānavirodhaḥ. tasmād bhinnavyāpārau bhinnaviṣayau ca.* 'The contradiction [consisting in the] mutual exclusion (*parasparaparihāra*) [of two entities X and Y] applies to everything, whether it is a real entity or not; [whereas] the contradiction [consisting in] the fact that there is no co-existence [of two entities X and Y] (*sahānavasthāna*) only applies to certain real entities [that may be perceived]; so [these two types of contradiction] work in different ways and bear on different objects.'

[13] ĪPK 1.7.9: *viviktaṃ bhūtalaṃ śaśvad bhāvānāṃ svātmaniṣṭhiteḥ | tat kathaṃ jātu tajjñānaṃ bhinnasyābhāvasādhanam ||* '[In the Buddhist perspective,] the ground is always bare, for entities are self-confined; so how could the cognition of this [bare ground] sometimes be the means of establishing the non-being of [something] distinct [from the ground]?'

[14] See e.g. SP 5: *tau ca bhāvau tadanyaś ca sarve te svātmani sthitāḥ | ity amiśrāḥ svayaṃ bhāvās tān miśrayati kalpanā ||* 'And the two entities [that are allegedly related], as well as [their relation, which is supposedly] distinct from [them], are all confined to themselves; therefore entities are unmixed in and of themselves: it is conceptual elaboration that mixes them.' Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 383: *svātmaniṣṭhataiva paramārthato viviktatvam.* '[The Buddhist talks about the bare ground, but] being bare, in reality, is nothing but being self-confined.'

we are actually perceiving;[15] but Dharmakīrti cannot both claim that things remain unmixed (*amiśra*) and that we can actually embrace them in a single perceptive act.

2. On non-being in the Pratyabhijñā system (ĪPK 1.7.10) — or how the Śaivas claim to be more Buddhist than the Buddhists

So the Śaiva nondualists undermine the Buddhists' contention that the pot's absence is known through the mere awareness of the bare ground. And they are not the only ones — nor the first — to do so: the Naiyāyika Jayanta for instance criticizes the very notion of a 'bare' ground in the Buddhist perspective.[16] But Brahmanical philosophers attack the Buddhist theory of non-being so as to defend the idea of some sort of positive existence of non-being (at least as a specific object of knowledge), whereas Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, just as their Buddhist counterparts, refuse to ascribe any independent existence to non-being, and the Śaivas are ostentatiously happy to accept the core of the Buddhist defini-tion of non-being. For them, what is at stake is certainly not estab-

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[15] See e.g. NBṬ, pp. 101–102, which concludes: *tasmād ekajñānasaṃsargiṇi dṛśyamāne saty ekasminn itarat samagradarśanasāmagrīkaṃ yadi bhaved dṛśyam eva bhaved iti sambhāvitaṃ dṛśyatvam āropyate.* 'Therefore when [we] see one of [two things that are capable of] being combined in one single cognition (*ekajñāna-saṃsargin*), [we] surimpose the perceptibility [of the other thing] that [we are merely] imagining as a possibility [in the following form]: 'if the other [thing] were present, it would necessarily be perceptible, [since] all the conditions of its perception are present.' On *ekajñānasaṃsarga*, see e.g. Kellner 2007: 51–52.

[16] See NM, vol. I, p. 155: *nanu ghaṭaviviktabhūtalopalambhabhāve ghaṭānupalam-bha ity uktam. tad ayuktam; keyaṃ ghaṭaviviktatā. sā bhūpradeśād abhinnā bhinnā vā. abhede bhūpradeśāviśeṣād ghaṭasannidhāne 'pi ghaṭo nāstīti pratipattir jāyeta. bhede 'pi nāmni vivādaḥ syāt.* '[The Buddhist] says: "But the pot's non-perception [occurs] when one perceives the ground [being] bare of the pot!" [And] this [claim of his] is illegitimate; [for] what is this [property of] being bare of the pot? Is it distinct or not from the area of the ground? If it is not distinct [from it], since nothing distinguishes [this property] from the area of the ground, the under-standing that there is no pot should arise even when the pot is present [as soon as one perceives the ground]; but if it is distinct [from it], the dispute is [mere-ly] a matter of words [since the Buddhist then acknowledges as we do that non-being is an object of knowledge *per se*].' Note that the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas use a very similar argument when targeting the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka's definition of non-being (which is in many ways akin to the Buddhists'): see Taber 2001: 81, n. 42.

lishing non-being as a category of being or even as a distinct type of object of knowledge: the Śaivas, just as the Buddhists, are eager to avoid reifying non-being in any way. They refuse to concede any ontological depth to naught, so that they accept, with Dharmottara, that 'what [we] call non-perception is [not the perception of a non-being, but] a real entity (*vastu*) and its cognition.'[17] But Utpaladeva playfully presents himself as more faithful to the Buddhists' principles than the Buddhists themselves: he adopts without any reservation the Buddhist contention that apprehending something's absence is merely apprehending something else's presence, yet he shows that his Dharmakīrtian opponents have not seen all the consequences of their own thesis and are incapable of defending it adequately.[18] Thus ĪPK 1.7.10 points out that — according to the Buddhists' own thesis —, the reason why we know that there is no pot on the ground is not, as Dharmottara and others claim, that we perceive the bare (*vivikta*) ground, but rather, that we perceive on this bare ground *something else* (a mass of light, or even, for someone who cannot see, some tactile shape that is warm, soft, etc.), and we determine this other entity as being a non-pot. Ironically, Utpaladeva may have borrowed the gist of his criticism from the Buddhists themselves: thus Śāntarakṣita explains that when we see a moonless sky, rather than perceiving the moon's absence in an empty space, we simply grasp the positive 'mass of light or darkness' in the sky.[19] Utpaladeva in turn uses this reasoning to show that when talking about the ground's bareness (as Dharmottara does), the Buddhists must

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[17] NBṬ, p. 102: ... *vastv anupalambha ucyate tajjñānaṃ ca.* Cf. for instance ĪPV, vol. I, p. 301: *iha bhāva eva bhāvāntarasyābhāva iti vyavahartavya ity ayaṃ tāvad aparityājyaḥ prātītikaḥ panthāḥ.* 'In this regard, to begin with, [we] must not abandon this way of understanding [non-being] — [namely:] it is the being [of one entity] that may be talked about as the non-being of another entity.'

[18] Cf. ĪPV, vol. I, p. 300: ... *cirantanair aparidṛṣṭaṃ tatsiddhiprakāraṃ darśayati.* '[In verse 1.7.10, Utpaladeva] shows how to establish this [non-being of X as being different from Y] in a way that was not entirely seen (*aparidṛṣṭa*) by the [Buddhist] elders (*cirantana*).'

[19] See TS[K] 1688/TS[Ś] 1687: *prakāśatamaso rāśes tam eva vyoma manyate | pratipattā yato 'nyasya na sattvaṃ na ca darśanam ||* '[When one understands that the sky is moonless, in fact] there is no existence or perception of anything besides the mass of light or darkness, which is precisely what an agent of ordinary experience (*pratipattṛ*) considers [to be] the [empty] sky.'

have in mind its emptiness, whereas they themselves acknowledge that there is no such thing as a genuine emptiness.

Similarly, as pointed out by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, the Buddhists maintain that when we are aware of hearing nothing, this is because we are in fact aware of other cognitions pertaining to organs other than the auditory one: according to them, we know that we are not hearing anything because we know that we are engaged in seeing (or touching, etc.) something.[20] Abhinavagupta, on the other hand, points out that being aware of not feeling anything palpable is in fact grasping air; in other words, the cognition of an absence of tactile form must arise from the cognition of the presence of another tactile form, rather than from a cognition belonging to some other sense organ. In the same way, Abhinavagupta specifies that not seeing anything visible is in fact grasping light, and not hearing anything is hearing one's own breath, or even — when no breath at all is to be heard — the subtle 'internal echo' (*antarnāda*) that animates all living beings.[21]

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[20] TS^K 1689/TS^Ś 1688: *sarvaśabdaviveko 'pi kāryādṛṣṭeḥ pratīyate | sā ca siddhānta-to 'nyeṣāṃ vijñānānāṃ svavedanāt ||* 'Even the absence of any sound is understood from the non-perception of its effect, [i.e., the auditory cognition,] and this [non-perception] is ultimately established through the self-awareness of other cognitions.' Kamalaśīla explains (TSP^K, vol. I, p. 481/TSP^Ś, p. 586): *sarvaśabdavi-veko 'pi śrotrajñānasya kāryasyānupalabdhyā gamyate, sā cānupalabdhir anyeṣāṃ cakṣurādijñānānāṃ saṃvedanāt siddhety asty evātrāpy ekopalambho 'nyavijñānasaṃve-danalakṣaṇaḥ.* 'Even the absence of any sound is understood through the non-perception of [its] effect, [namely,] the auditory cognition; and this non-percep-tion is established from the awareness of other cognitions such as the visual one – so even in this case, there is indeed one [positive] perception that consists in the awareness of another cognition.'

[21] ĪPV, vol. I, p. 303: *āntaraprāṇaspandanajanitasūkṣmaśabdākarṇanāc ca śrotrādisākalyaṃ saṃbhāvayamānas tam eva śabdam ekajñānasaṃsargiṇaṃ śṛṇvañ chabdāntaraṃ niṣedhayati nehānyaḥ śabda iti. tatsūkṣmaśabdābhāvam* api sūkṣma-tamāntarnādāvahitaśrotro vedayate, rasagandhasparśābhāvo 'pi dantodakarasaṃ tri-puṭikāgandhaṃ kāyīyaṃ ca sparśaṃ saṃvedayamānenaiva saṃvedyaḥ.* [*tatsūkṣma-śabdābhāvam* corr. : *tat sūkṣmaśabdābhāvam* ĪPV Ed.] 'And [somebody] imagining as a possibility (*saṃbhāvayamāna*) all the [conditions required for the perception of a specific sound] – for instance, the auditory organ – because [he] hears a sub-tle sound produced by the vibration of the internal breath, [upon] hearing [only] this very sound that [may be] combined into a single cognition [with ano-ther sound but is not] (*ekajñānasaṃsargin*), negates [the existence of] another sound [by thinking] "there is no other sound here." [This person] is also aware of this subtle sound's absence when his auditory organ is applied to the internal echo that is the most subtle [of sounds]. He may also be aware of the absence of

The idea, it seems, was already stated in a part of Utpaladeva's *Vivṛti* on ĪPK 1.7.11 that is not preserved in the margins consulted for the present edition, as can be seen from Abhinavagupta's commentary thereon, which clearly echoes – but to point out its deficiencies all the better — the Buddhist explanation as it is found in the TS and TSP.[22]

So according to the Śaivas, the Buddhists rightly consider that the apprehension of emptiness always boils down to the perception of some positive entity; but they do not understand the depth of their own thesis, and they end up contradicting it: claiming that we perceive empty places or bare grounds amounts to assuming the possibility for us of perceiving the void — that is, it is nothing but the acknowledgement that non-being is a perceptible substance. Thus betraying their own principle, the Buddhists end up making a *thing* of non-being, just as their Brahmanical opponents. Utpaladeva therefore presents himself as more Buddhist than the Buddhists inasmuch as only he actually reduces absence to otherness; he borrows from the Buddhist conceptual arsenal so as to describe a Śaiva universe that is absolutely full (*pūrṇa, paripūrṇa*), devoid of any crack or slit — literally, 'dense' (*ghana*) with the consciouness or bliss that is reality.[23]

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a taste, smell or tactile form when he is only aware of the taste of saliva, the nose's [internal] smell or the body's tactile form.'

[22] Compare TS[K] 1689/TS[S] 1688 and its explanation in TSP[K], vol. I, p. 481/TSP[S], p. 586 (quoted above, fn. 21) with ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 396: *tad* evāha yuktam tu ityādinā. anena śabdarasagandhānām abhāvo 'pi samagrasāmagrīkatve 'pi siddhe jñānātmakakāryābhāvena samarthitaḥ, tajjñānābhāvaś ca tatsvasaṃvedanābhāvena, antarnādakāyasparśadantodakarasatripuṭikāgandhasaṃvedanena tu kāmaṃ bāhyaśabdādinirāso bhavet...* [*tad conj. : *tata* S12, J11, ĪPVV Ed.] "This is what [Utpaladeva] states with [the passage] beginning with 'But it is right...' With this [he shows that] the absence of sound, taste and smell too is demonstrated thanks to the absence of their effect — which is a [perceptual] cognition — when it is established that all the [required] conditions [for this cognition] are present; and the absence of this cognition [is established merely] through the absence of self-awareness of that cognition. But surely, this negation of the external sound, [tactile form, taste and smell] can occur [respectively] through the cognition of internal echo, the tactile sensation belonging to the body, the taste of saliva and the nose's [internal] smell [rather than through experiences related to other sense organs]."

[23] On the Śaiva nondualists' contention that the universe is absolutely full, see Ratié 2010a: 463–464.

3. On an unattributed Śaiva quotation on non-being in Abhinavagupta's commentary

Utpaladeva, just as Dharmakīrti's followers, considers that non-being is nothing but non-being — that is, nothing; and if we are nonetheless able to act and talk *as if non-being were indeed something*, it is merely because then, in fact we are still talking about being. In the Śaiva idealistic system that presents being as the act through which consciousness manifests itself to itself,[24] non-being is just one of the ways in which consciousness appears. It has no existence of its own: it only is as a manifestation of the pure being that is consciousness. Thus when Utpaladeva's *Vivṛti* makes clear that a Buddhist, as a staunch 'upholder of the thesis that non-being is [in fact] nothing but the form of a specific existing thing' (*niyatapadārtharūpamātrābhāvavādin*), can only accept the Śaiva's explanation of how we become aware of the pot's absence on the ground, Abhinavagupta adds:

> As for us, who hold that reality is [nothing but] phenomena, we acknowledge that non-being is entirely bare (*vivikta*) of being! [This is] what has been said in 'Even non-being, inasmuch as it is being cognized, has consciousness as its essence, [i.e.], is nothing but the Lord.'[25]

The quotation is also given without attribution by Jayaratha while commenting on a verse of the TĀ. According to the latter,

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[24] According to Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, consciousness, far from being an entity or a static substance, is a pure dynamism that — contrary to insentient things — is not frozen in a permanent essence that would define and delimit it: rather than *being* things, it is what *makes things be* (*bhāvayati*, *Vṛtti* on ĪPK 2.4.20, p. 61) by freely manifesting itself in things' manifold forms. Being (*sattā*) is thus defined as the activity of consciousness, or rather as its 'agency in being' (*bhavanakartṛtā*, ĪPV, vol. II, p. 257). Thus any entity is nothing but consciousness making itself be — i.e, manifesting itself — in this or that form (see Ratié 2010b: 369–378).

[25] ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 387: *vayaṃ tv ābhāsavastuvādino 'bhāvaṃ viviktam eva bhāvād upagacchāmaḥ. yad uktam abhāvo 'pi budhyamāno bodhātmabhūta īśvara eveti.* This translation of the compound *bodhātmabhūta* is quite different from what may be deemed its most natural meaning, namely, '*is* the essence of(/that is) consciousness.' But obviously this is not how those who quote this sentence understand it (see e.g. Jayaratha's gloss below and Utpaladeva's paraphrase in the ŚDV).

Even the unreality (*avastutā*) of [objective] entities solely belongs to the wonder [that constitutes the essence of consciousness], for even this thought: 'this is not real,' is not similar to an [insentient] wall.[26]

Jayaratha, after pointing out in his introduction to the verse that it is meant to show how Śiva is the essence of all beings, but also of their non-being,[27] adds the following:

Even the cognition that takes the form 'there is no pot here' is different from an insentient thing such as a wall, because it has consciousness as its nature; for this very reason, even the non-being of [something] such as a pot, inasmuch as it is being cognized, has as its nature nothing but Śiva, whose essence is a consciousness that is an undivided mass (*ekaghana*) of ultimate bliss — this is the meaning [of this verse]. This is what has been said in 'Even non-being, inasmuch as it is cognized, has consciousness as its essence, [i.e.,] is nothing but the Lord.'[28]

Interestingly, Utpaladeva himself, in his commentary on Somānanda's ŚD, makes a statement very similar to this quotation:

Even non-being, inasmuch as it is cognized,[29] has consciousness as its sole essence, and because it has as its essence this [consciousness, which is all-encompassing,] it has as its form the [whole] universe. Therefore there is nothing in the universe that would consist in non-being [in the sense that] it would not consist in Śiva — ever.[30]

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[26] TĀ 1.53: *avastutāpi bhāvānaṃ camatkāraikagocarā | yat kuḍyasadṛśī neyaṃ dhīr avastv etad ity api ||*.

[27] TĀV, vol. I, p. 91: *evaṃ ca na kevalaṃ nīlāder jñeyasya bhāvasya prakāśamānatvāt prakāśātmakaḥ śivas tattvaṃ yāvat tadabhāvasyāpīty āha*. 'And thus Śiva, whose essence is the manifesting consciousness (*prakāśa*), is not only the reality (*tattva*) of any entity [that may constitute] an object of knowledge — [i.e.] the blue for instance — because [this object] is manifest; he is also [the reality] of the non-being of this [entity]. [This is what Abhinavagupta] says [in the following verse].'

[28] Ibid.: *yato nāsty atra ghaṭa ity evaṃrūpāpi buddhir bodhasvabhāvatvāt kuḍyādijaḍapadārthavilakṣaṇā ata eva ghaṭādyabhāvo 'pi budhyamānatvāt* paramānandaikaghanabodhātmakaśivasvabhāva eva ity arthaḥ. tad āhuḥ: abhāvo 'pi** budhyamāno*** bodhātmabhūta īśvara eva.* [**budhyamānatvāt* corr. : *buddhyamānatvāt* TĀV Ed. ***abhāvo 'pi* conj. : *abodho 'pi* TĀV Ed. ****budhyamāno* corr. : *buddhyamāno* TĀV Ed.]

[29] Here the passive participle is *jñāyamāna* instead of *budhyamāna*.

[30] ŚDV, p. 160: *abhāvo 'pi jñāyamāno bodhātmaiva tadātmakatvāc ca viśvarūpa eva. tasmān nāsty abhāvātmakam aśivarūpaṃ kvacid api viśvamadhye.*

But there is more: Abhinavagupta's disciple, Kṣemarāja, also mentions this quotation in his commentary on Utpaladeva's devotional poems.[31] There, after explaining a verse according to which not even 'the tiniest particle of non-being' can be found, either inside or outside Śiva's all-encompassing consciousness,[32] Kṣemarāja adds:

> For it has been explained in the *Pratyabhijñā* [treatise]: 'Even non-being, inasmuch as it is cognized, only has as its essence consciousness,' etc.[33]

It is very striking that Kṣemarāja explicitly attributes it to Utpaladeva's treatise; and given that the quotation can be found neither in the verses nor in the *Vṛtti*, it is highly probable that it originally belonged to Utpaladeva's *Vivṛti*. Admittedly, it is not found in the fragment edited and translated below, but this is not surprising, given that Abhinavagupta takes the trouble of quoting it precisely while explaining the *Vivṛti* on this verse: the quotation must have belonged to a part of Utpaladeva's work remote enough for Abhinavagupta to feel the need of reminding his readers of a point already made much earlier in the treatise. And this most probably occurred while Utpaladeva commented on ĪPK 1.1.2 in his *Vivṛti*, as can be seen from Abhinavagupta's commentary thereon;[34] there Utpaladeva must have stated (and probably

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[31] These poems were later compiled in what is now known as the ŚSĀ.

[32] ŚSĀ 12.13: *bhavato 'ntaracāri bhāvajātam prabhuvan mukhyatayaiva pūjitaṃ tat | bhavato bahir apy abhāvamātrā katham īśāna bhavet samarcyate vā ||* 'The totality of [objective] entities, which exists inside You, is worshipped as the highest [reality], as the Lord; o Lord, [whether inside or] even outside You, how could there be even the tiniest particle of non-being — or how [could anything] be worshipped [then]?' On the end of the verse, see ŚSĀV, p. 85: *anena bhedavādinām arcanānupapattiḥ sūcitā.* 'With this, [what is] hinted at is the impossibility of worshipping for the upholders of duality.'

[33] ŚSĀVivṛti, p. 85: *abhāvo 'pi budhyamāno* bodhātmaivetyādi hi pratyabhijñāyāṃ nirṇītam eva.* [*budhyamāno corr. : *buddhyamāno* ŚSĀVivṛti Ed.]

[34] See ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 43: *abhāvo 'pi yas tuccho na kiñcid ity evaṃ kasyāpi saṃmataḥ, so 'pi yāvad evam iti na cakāsti, tāvad bhāvād anyat sa ity etad eva kuto bhaved iti. budhyamānaś cet, tasyāpi maheśvara eva svātmā; athābudhyamāno 'sāv abhāvaḥ, tarhi na kaścid asāv iti kasyāsau tadānīṃ svātmā prasajyate. evaṃ nīlāder apy abudhyamānasya kaḥ svātmeti budhyamānapadam. etad uktam bhavati: yadā codyaṃ kriyate nīlatadabhāvāder api svātmā maheśvaraḥ prasajyata iti, tadā budhyamānatvasyāṅgīkāra eva uttaram anyathā nirāśrayaṃ codyam iti.*

even explained) the words quoted by Abhinavagupta, Kṣemarāja and Jayaratha.

4. The problem of invisible demons (ĪPK 1.7.11)

In ĪPK 1.7.10, Utpaladeva has successfully reduced non-being understood as absence to non-being understood as otherness (when we think that a pot is absent somewhere, it is only because we are aware that the pot is not what we actually perceive in that place). But this is a problem as regards entities the presence of which cannot be detected because they are imperceptible by nature, such as demons (*piśāca*).[35] If we are entitled to say about just anything that happens not to be a ray of light that it is absent from the ground where we see a ray of light, we should also be able to deny that an imperceptible demon dwells there on the mere grounds that the demon, just as a pot, is by definition different from a ray of light — and denying in such a way the possibility of any existence beyond perceptibility seems perfectly unwarranted: how could we know, in fact, whether something that cannot be perceived is actually there or not? Dharmakīrti answers this objection by specifying that *only something perceptible may be considered absent*,[36] whereas a doubt must necessarily remain as regards imperceptible entities.[37] ĪPK 1.7.11 makes clear that in this respect,

[35] Although Dharmakīrti himself gives no example of objects that are inaccessible to the senses, the *piśāca* becomes in later Buddhist philosophical literature a standard example of entity that is imperceptible by nature (and not just due to its remoteness in time and space). See for instance Tillemans 1995: 131 and Kellner 1999: 193, n. 2.

[36] See HB, p. 26, where someone objects the following: *yady ekaparicchedād evānyavyavacchedaḥ sidhyati, sarvasyānyasyāviśeṣeṇa tatrābhāvasiddhir bhavet...* 'If, from the mere determination of one [thing X], one [can] establish the exclusion of anything other [than X], with respect to X one should establish the non-being of everything else, without any distinction.' Dharmakīrti replies (p. 22): *aviśiṣṭayogyatārūpayor ekajñānasaṃsarginoḥ parasparāpekṣam evānyatvam ihābhipretam.* 'In this [case,] being other [only] means [being other] with respect to two [entities] whose nature has the same capacity [to produce a perception when present and] which may be combined in a single cognition.' He concludes (p. 27): *tasmād yathoktād evānupalambhāt kvacit kadācit kasyacid abhāvasiddhiḥ.* 'Therefore, from non-perception as [we] have described [it], one [only] establishes the non-being of a certain [thing] in a certain place [and] at a certain time.'

[37] NB 2.47–48: *viprakṛṣṭaviṣayā punar anupalabdhiḥ pratyakṣānumānanivṛttilakṣaṇā saṃśayahetuḥ, pramāṇanivṛttāv apy arthābhāvāsiddher api.* 'On the other

Utpaladeva is in complete agreement with Dharmakīrti: although when perceiving light on the ground, we can safely assert that light is not a demon, we cannot decide whether there is an imperceptible demon in that place or not.

In his *Vivṛti*, however, Utpaladeva remarks that in fact, we can legitimately negate the existence of the demon on the area of the ground that we are watching and where we can see a ray of light — but only as long as we are contemplating the hypothesis that the demon might be the thing on the ground that happens to be a ray of light.

Utpaladeva's reasoning here once again rests on the principles of his Buddhist opponents, according to whom any negation of X supposes first the act of imagining X as a possibility (*sambhāvanā*). Thus in the case of the pot's existence on the ground, according to Dharmottara, when denying the presence of any pot on the ground, we must first imagine that a perceptible pot might exist there before ascertaining the absence of the pot on the grounds that it would be perceived if it were present;[38] and similarly, we can only negate the identity of a pot seen on the ground with an imperceptible demon if we first assume that the demon is the perceived pot, and then determine, on the grounds that we do not perceive it, that the demon is not the pot.[39]

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hand, non-perception is a doubtful reason [if it] has an object that is inaccessible (*viprakṛṣṭa*) [to the senses and if it] is characterized by an absence of perception and inference [of this object], because [in that case] the object's non-being is not established, even though there is no means of knowledge [regarding this object].'

[38] See NBṬ, p. 119: *kevalam ekajñānasaṃsargiṇi dṛśyamāne ghaṭo yadi bhaved dṛśya eva bhaved iti dṛśyaḥ sambhāvitaḥ.* 'It is just that a perceptible [pot] is imagined as a possibility in the form 'if a pot existed in [this area of the ground] that [I am] currently seeing [and that] may be combined [with the pot] in a single cognition, [the pot] would necessarily be perceptible.'

[39] NBṬ, pp. 132-133 : *vastuno 'py adṛśyasya piśācāder yadi dṛśyaghaṭātmakatva-niṣedhaḥ kriyate dṛśyātmakatvam abhyupagamya kartavyaḥ, yady ayaṃ ghaṭo dṛśyamānaḥ piśācātmā bhavet piśāco dṛṣṭo bhavet, na ca dṛṣṭaḥ, tasmān na piśāca iti. dṛśyātmatvābhyupagamapūrvako dṛśyamāne ghaṭādau vastuni vastuno 'vastuno vā dṛśyasyādṛśyasya ca tādātmyapratiṣedhaḥ.* 'If [we] negate the identity of [something] such as a demon – which, although real, is imperceptible — with a perceptible pot, [this negation] can [only] be performed by first assuming [that the demon] is perceptible [in the following way]: "if this pot, which [I] am perceiving, were a demon, the demon would be perceived, and it is not perceived; therefore [the pot] is no demon." Negating the identity of something — whether real or unreal, perceptible or imperceptible — with a real thing such as a pot that

Utpaladeva explains that when we thus deny the demon's identity with the light on the ground, we do negate the existence of the demon on the ground — at least inasmuch as the demon may be the light; but once we have thus determined that the light is no demon, we cannot imagine as a possibility that the demon may be anything else perceptible in the light (since nothing else is to be perceived there), and as a consequence, we are left with no choice but to suspend our judgment as to whether any imperceptible demon is present on the ground.

Although the *Vivṛti* on this verse is far from being entirely preserved in this fragment, the passage is of interest, first of all because of what it shows of the writing habits of Indian authors commenting on their own works: in this passage, Utpaladeva offers no less than three different interpretations of a word that he himself uses in his *Vṛtti* —[40] an example among others[41] of the creative ways in which a Medieval author could use the terseness of both his verses and short prose explanation to convey at once more than one meaning (and a reminder that without the missing passages of the *Vivṛti*, Utpaladeva's often deceitfully simple *Vṛtti* remains difficult to interpret).

Another important aspect of the *Vivṛti* on this verse is that it throws light on the way in which the Śaivas understand the demon's imperceptibility: when they engage in a discussion as to whether we may legitimately determine the presence of an imperceptible demon in a given spot, they certainly admit the demon's alleged imperceptibility, but they always consider the demon's imperceptibility to be merely relative.[42] For in an idealistic system according to which, as Abhinavagupta likes to put it, reality is phe-

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[we] are perceiving supposes that [we] first assume its consisting in [something] perceptible.'

[40] See below and Abhinavagupta's explanation, quoted n. 69.

[41] This practice had already been noticed by R. Torella. See Torella 2002: xlii: 'In the *Ṭīkā...*, we find multiple interpretations of the same verse, all considered equally possible but evidently being the outcome of further reflections.'

[42] As pointed out in Kellner 1999: 195, n. 5, so do Utpaladeva's Buddhist opponents, according to whom 'even a demon is perceived by [other entities] of his kind' (*piśāco 'pi sajātīyair upalabhyate*, DhP, p. 105) or by yogins (see e.g. SAD, p. 146: *so 'pi hi kasyacit puṃso yogyādeḥ svajātīyasya vā piśācāntarasya bhavaty evendriyajñānagocaraḥ...* 'For even the [demon] is necessarily within the range of sensory cognitions for an extraordinary man such as a *yogin* or for [someone] of his kind, [i.e.,] another demon').

nomena (*ābhāsavastuvāda*),[43] nothing — not even a demon — can be absolutely imperceptible, since whatever is not manifest to anybody amounts to naught — and again, naught, by definition, has no existence whatsoever. An absolutely imperceptible entity is, in the Śaiva nondualistic perspective, so absurd that it may not even be *imagined*, given that a consciousness picturing it up would by the same token make it manifest, if only as an imaginary entity.[44] It is therefore no surprise that in his commentary on verse 1.7.11, Abhinavagupta specifies that any existing demon must be seen at least by an omniscient;[45] and we now know that by doing so, he merely takes his cue from Utpaladeva, since the latter had already explicitly stated in the *Vivṛti* that although the demon's existence remains a matter of doubt for ordinary perceiving subjects, this limitation does not affect the consciousness of those endowed with extraordinary perceptual powers, who are capable of grasping the atomic particles constituting the demon even when they are mixed with those of other entities. In the Śaivas' perspective, an omniscient may thus do what remains impossible for ordinary subjects and determine not only that the light or area of the ground is no demon, but also that there is no demon in the light or area of the ground. Admittedly, the demon is said to have the ability to occupy the same space as light inasmuch as his particles may reside between the particles of light — but as pointed out in the *Vivṛti*, this does not mean that the light and demon could not be distinguished by somebody capable of seeing both: such a person, upon seeing that the room liable to be occupied by a demon within the light contains either other particles of light, or particles of some other entity imperceptible to humans, has the ability to deny the demon's existence in the area in question.

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[43] Cf. e.g. ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 387, quoted above, n. 25 (but there are many other occurrences in Abhinavagupta's works).

[44] See Ratié 2017b: 448–450.

[45] See for instance ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 392: *yady api madhye na kiñcid ālokyate, tathāpi rūpādayas tathā tatra paramāṇutayā sthitā yathā ta evāsmadādibhir na dṛśyante, sarvajñena tu dṛśyanta eva.* 'Even if nothing is seen in [a given object], nonetheless, the visual form and so on [of a present but imperceptible entity] are present in the form of atoms, in such a way that they are not perceived by us, [human subjects,] and other [limited subjects]; yet they are necessarily (*eva*) perceived by an omniscient.'

5. A fragment of Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti on 1.7.10–11: annotated translation

Vivṛti[?]

However, it is because [we] see [something] such as [a mass of] light located on the ground that [we] may [perform] the negation [of this thing] as consisting in [something] whose nature is non-light, such as a pot. This is what is stated [in the next verse beginning with the words] 'Nonetheless, [on this ground there is a mass] of light…':

ĪPK 1.7.10

Nonetheless, on this [ground] there is a mass of light, or, for [someone] blind, a tactile form that is soft, warm, etc.; [it is] the cognition [of this entity] in its own [form that] may establish that this [entity] is not a pot.

Vṛtti

Once one has experienced in some places [something that is for instance] a mass of light, or — if it is dark — a tactile form that is soft, warm, etc., [and] consists in the non-being of the visual or tactile form of a pot, it is legitimate to say 'here there is an [object] such as light, which is an absence of pot; there is no pot.'[46]

Vivṛti

Upon perceiving somewhere a [piece of] ground that [they] have already seen [and that happens to be] covered with another object such as a large stone, [people] say, on the sole basis of direct perception, [not only that 'there is a stone here,' but] also (*api*) that 'there is no pot — which is a compact [object][47] — here'; [and

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[46] On the translations of this sentence offered so far, and in particular on the interpretations of the compound *ālokādiḥ* (given as *ālokādi* in Torella 2002: 35), see Torella 2002, Preface and p. 144, and Bronkhorst 1996: 606–607. The translation given here is slightly different: it seems to me that given the well-attested reading *ālokādiḥ*, and most of all, the way Utpaladeva himself explains the compound below (and quotes it along with *ghaṭābhāvo 'trāsti ghaṭo nāstīti*), it should be read as part of the *iti* clause.

[47] In other words, a pot, being literally 'without intervals' (*nirantara*), cannot exist in this specific spot because it cannot be located in the space already occupied by the stone. Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 387: **nirantara** *iti śilopari saṃnihite 'pi ghaṭe*

they say such a thing] whereas [they] do not see [that piece of ground being] bare.[48] In that [case, our awareness of] the pot's absence is nothing but [our awareness of] the [stone]'s presence[49] — [an awareness that takes the form:] 'this large stone itself *is* a non-pot.' Exactly in the same way, in all [cases, what we] talk about as an absence of pot must necessarily be [an existing object] that is different from the pot — light for instance:[50] why have recourse[51] to the place's bareness [in order to explain our awareness that there is no pot there], whereas [this bareness] is not [even] possible?[52] This is what is stated in the *Vṛtti*, [beginning with the words] '[Once one has experienced] in some places [something that is for instance a mass of] light...'

[Even when ... for someone blind, ...].[53] This 'cognition [of this

bhūbhāge tadabhāva iti yā pratītiḥ, sā śilāpratītir eva. '[The word] "compact" [is used to convey the following:] even if a pot is present on top of the stone, there a [pot]'s absence on the ground [itself, where the stone is; and our] awareness of this is nothing but the awareness of the stone['s presence].'

[48] Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 387: *... **kvacid** iti kevalabhūtalasaṃvit ghaṭābhāvaniścayanāṅgaṃ na bhavatīti iti yāvat.* 'The implicit idea [expressed with the sentence beginning with] "[Upon perceiving] somewhere..." is that [contrary to what the Buddhist holds,] the awareness of the bare ground is not instrumental in determining the pot's absence.'

[49] According to ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 387 (***tadbhāva** iti śilāyā bhavanaṃ*).

[50] Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 387: ***ādi**grahaṇād vāyvādiḥ, tamo 'pi keṣāṃcid rūpam eva. tathā hy ābhidharmikāḥ, rūpaṃ dvidhā* viṃśatidheti.* [*dvidhā conj. : *tadā* ĪPVV Ed.] 'Due to [Utpaladeva's] use of [the word] "for instance," [one must understand also things] such as air; [and] even darkness is a visual form according to some; thus the Ābhidkarmikas [claim] that "visual form is twofold, twentyfold."' This is a reference to *Abhidharmakośa* 1.10 (*rūpaṃ dvidhā viṃśatidhā*), on which Vasubandhu comments by giving a list of twenty visual forms that includes darkness (*andhakāra*, see *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* I, p. 8). In other words, according to Abhinavagupta, even the Buddhists who consider darkness a visual form endowed with a positive existence should acknowledge that the thought 'there is no pot here' is actually nothing but an expression of the existence of this specific visual form.

[51] As the Buddhist opponent does.

[52] This is an allusion to the criticism of the Buddhists' position in ĪPK 1.7.9 (on which see above, § 1).

[53] From Abhinavagupta's commentary it is obvious that a sentence is lacking here. The missing passage must have included the quotation and explanation of words from the *Vṛtti* and was structured by the correlation *yatrāpi... tatrāpi* (cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 387: ***yatrāp**ītyādi **tatrāp**ītyuttareṇa saṃbadhyate, avāntare tu vṛttigranthaḥ paṭhito vyākhyātaś ca*), and contained the words *andhasya* and *apratighāti-* (ibid.). The gist of this missing sentence was probably the same as that found in the corresponding passage of Abhinavagupta's ĪPV (vol. I, p. 302) with the same

entity] in its own [form],'[54] by enabling [us] to talk about its own object, which is particularized as the visual form that is the object 'light' or by the tactile form 'soft,' etc., [and] which is distinct from the pot's visual or tactile forms, also enables [us] to talk about the pot's absence.[55] Therefore it is best for [the Buddhist,] who holds that non-being is [in fact] nothing but the form of a specific existing thing (*padārtha*),[56] to correctly explain [our awareness of the pot's absence on the ground] as [we do]; whereas it is not legitimate [for him to explain our awareness of this absence by saying][57] that the area [of the ground] is by its own nature bare of any real entity such as a pot that would be distinct from it. This is what [the *Vṛtti*] says with [the words] 'here there is an [object] such as light, which is an absence of pot; there is no

correlation: *yatrāpi nāsti cakṣurvyāpāro netranimīlanasantamasādau, tatrāpi bhūtale ghaṭocitakaṭhinasparśaviviktaṃ mṛdum uṣṇaṃ śītam anuṣṇāśītaṃ vā gṛhṇaṃs tam evātra ghaṭābhāva iti vyavaharati vāyusparśasya sarvagasyāvaśyambhāvāt.* "Even when there is no activity of the visual organ – for instance when the [subject's] eyes are closed, or in darkness, etc. —, [the subject], while perceiving on the ground [something] soft — [i.e.] distinct from the hard tactile form that is appropriate for a pot —, warm, cold, or neither hot nor cold, expresses this very [tactile form by saying] '[there is] an absence of pot here'; because [in that place] there must be [at least] the tactile form of air, which is present everywhere."

[54] Cf. ĪPV, vol. I, p. 302: *tasyālokacayasya sparśasya vā yat svajñānam anyaghaṭādiviviktena svena rūpeṇa jñānam...* 'The *svajñāna*, [that is to say,] the cognition (*jñāna*) in its own (*sva*) form — which is distinct from anything else, such as a pot — of the mass of light or tactile form...'

[55] Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 387: *tasya yat sparśajñānaṃ tad ghaṭābhāvaṃ **vyavahārayatī**ti saṃbandhaḥ.* 'The [sentence's] structure is [the following]: the [blind subject]'s cognition of a tactile form is what enables [him] to talk about the pot's absence.'

[56] The translation rests on a conjecture that might be wrong; anyway I assume that here Utpaladeva has in mind Dhamarkīrti's contention that our awareness of something's absence is in fact nothing but our awareness of something else's presence. See e.g. PV, *Parārthānumānapariccheda* 273b: *tadviśiṣṭopalambho 'tas tasyāpy anupalambhanam* ‖ 'Therefore the non-perception of this [perceptible object] is [nothing but] the perception of [an object that is] distinct from it' (see Kellner 2007: 48) — a principle often mentioned by Abhinavagupta (see e.g. ĪPV, vol. I, p. 189: *anupalambho 'py anyopalambharūpaḥ...*). See also HB, p. 27: *tadanyaṃ pratipadyamāna eva tadabhāvaṃ pratipadyate.* 'It is precisely by apprehending [Y], which is other than X, that one apprehends the non-being of X.'

[57] Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 387: **yukte**ti* *vyatiriktābhāvasiddhaya iti bhāvaḥ.* [**yukteti* corr. : *yukta iti* ĪPVV Ed.] '"[It is not] legitimate" — the implicit meaning is: for the establishment of the non-being [of X] as [something] distinct [from Y].'

pot.' For it is the same object that is determined [by saying] 'there is a light here' and 'there is no non-light here': [both expressions] denote the same [reality]. And because [at a specific moment we are looking to] use (*upayuj-*) a pot, which is non-light,[58] it is this same [light] that [we] call [the pot's absence] at that time (*samprati*);[59] but [it is] not the case that just because [we think] 'this specific area [of the ground] exists,' [the thought] 'a pot, which is distinct [from this area], does not exist here' should occur — because even if there were a pot [there], the area would remain the same [as if there were no pot on it]! Besides, when [we try to] establish the existence of a real thing, however [we] may reach [our practical] understanding (*pratīti*),[60] [this understanding] merely makes manifest [our] perception of [something] such as light [as being also] the cognition of the pot's absence, which has as its object the pot's absence; but [it does not make manifest in this way our] perception of the area [of the ground], according to the reasoning [already][61] stated.[62]

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[58] Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 387: *upayujyata iti vyavahārāya.* '"[We are looking to] use [it]," so as to [accomplish our] ordinary activities.'

[59] In other words, the perception of the same entity in a given spot may lead to the understanding of the absence of many different things according to the changing nature of what we hope to find so as to fulfill our practical needs. See ĪPVV, vol. II, pp. 387–388: *saṃpratīty anyadā paṭopayogādau sa evāloka ucyate paṭo nāstītyādinā vyavahāryeṇa rūpāntareṇa.* '[What Utpaladeva means with] "at that time" [is the following]: in some other circumstance, such as when [we are looking] to use (*upayoga*) a cloth, the same light is expressed in another form that may be formulated for instance as "there is no cloth [here]."' Kellner 2001 contends that the idea according to which our awareness of X's absence is the result of a disappointed expectation (because we were hoping to use X's efficacy to fulfill our practical needs) has been wrongly acribed to Dharmakīrtian authors by modern historians, whereas in fact these Buddhist authors themselves never expressed such an idea. At any rate, from Utpaladeva's *Vivṛti* and Abhinavagupta's commentary thereon, it seems clear that 10th- and 11th-c. Śaiva authors already understood the Buddhist *anupalabdhi* as a disappointed expectation in the strong sense defined (and ruled out) in Kellner 2001: 509–510, n. 13.

[60] According to ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 388: *na ca nyāyamātram etat, api tu pratītir apy atra sākṣiṇīty āha vastusthitīti.* 'And this is not just an abstract principle (*nyāya*); rather, [our practical] understanding too attests to this — this is what [Utpaladeva] says with [the sentence beginning with "Besides, when [we try and] establish the existence of a real thing…"'

[61] That is, in ĪPK 1.7.9 (see above, § 1).

[62] Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 388: *āvirbhāvayatīti niścāyayati, bhūtalam eva hi nāpekṣate tadā, api tu taduparivartinaṃ paṭāvakāśamayaṃ deśam*.* [**paṭāvakāśamayaṃ deśam*

[63]And the consequence that [upon seeing light on the ground we may] talk about the absence of [something] such as a pot [inasmuch as this thing] does not consist in light does not apply to that which, [being] imperceptible [and] distinct [from the light and ground, may] reside within [them. This consequence does not ensue in such a case] because it is not correct to negate [this imperceptible entity,] whether in the ground or in the light. [This is what] is stated [in the following verse beginning with] 'A demon, [although it is not light], may exist...'

Ga (ĪPVV Ed, n. 2) : *paṭākāśamayaṃ deśam* ĪPVV Ed. : *paṭākāśasahaṃ deśaḥ* S12, J11.] '[It] "makes [our perception of something such as light] manifest" [in this way, i.e.,] it makes [us] determine [this perception in this way]. For then[, when one is looking to use e.g. a cloth,] one does not require the ground itself, but rather, a place above it that consists in a [possible] locus for the cloth.'

[63] There appears to be something amiss in the following sentence as it is preserved in the manuscript margins, and the emendation and translation are merely tentative; but the gist is obvious from the *Vṛtti* on the next verse and from Abhinavagupta's commentaries. Utpaladeva wants to reduce all non-being, including absence, to a form of otherness (we know that the pot is absent on the ground because *the pot is not the light* which is seen on the ground), but an opponent might argue that this is problematic in the case of entities that are imperceptible, since we may legitimately state that *they are not the light* seen on the ground, but we cannot check whether they are present or absent *within* the light (since their bodies may reside in other material entities without being perceived) – and yet, from Utpaladeva's reasoning it seems that we should consider them absent as soon as we perceive something that is not a demon, such as light. See ĪPV, vol. I, p. 304: *nanv evam adṛśyasyāpi piśācāder niṣedhavyavahāro vyatirekeṇāpi prāpnoti, sa hy ālokapuñjo yathā ghaṭād anyas tadvat piśācāder api; tad etad āśaṅkya āha.* '"But [if it is] so, it becomes possible to state the negation of a demon for instance even as something distinct [from the mass of light], although [this demon] is imperceptible; for just as the mass of light is other than a pot, [it is] other than a demon or [anything else of the sort]!" Having anticipated this [objection], [Utpaladeva] states [the following verse].' Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 388: *nanv asmin pakṣe tādātmyābhāva evaiko vyavahāryo na vyatiriktābhāvaḥ; tataś cāloko ghaṭābhāva iti kṛtvā pradeśe tanniścayākṣipto yathā ghaṭābhāvavyavahāras tadvat piśācābhāvavyavahāro 'pi bhaved ālokasyaiva piśācābhāvarūpatvād ityāśaṅkya sūtraṃ.* '[– Objection:] "But in this theory [of yours,] what may be stated is merely the non-being [of X] as [something] identical [with Y] (*tādātmyābhāva*), not the non-being [of X] as [something] distinct [from Y] (*vyatiriktābhāva*); and so with respect to the fact that light is the pot's non-being, just as [we may] talk about the pot's non-being on the [mere] basis of the determination of [light] in a [given] place, [we may] also talk about a demon's non-being [on the same basis], since the same light [also] consists in the demon's non-being." Having anticipated [this objection, Utpaladeva states the following] verse.'

ĪPK 1.7.11

A demon, although it is not light, might exist within the light, just as [it might exist] inside the ground, [since it is] imperceptible – it cannot be entirely negated.

Vṛtti

And in the [same] way [as in our opponents' system],[64] from the fact that light is other than the demon, there does not follow that [we may] negate the demon [as something existing] in that [light].[65] For this [demon] is imperceptible, [and] just as he may be enclosed within the earth although he is other [than it, he may] also [be enclosed] within the light [although he is other than it]. Therefore, in our doctrine as well as in our opponents', inasmuch as this [demon] is imperceptible, there [can] be no demonstration of [its] non-being.

Vivṛti

[An object] such as a pot [can] indeed be negated as [something that could be] identical with the light [when we see a mass of light on the ground,] because [in such a case we] have no perception [of the pot where the light is, whereas the pot would be] perceptible [there if it were present]; similarly (*iva*), a demon too [can be negated as something identical with the light], just as [it may be negated] as [something] identical with the area [of the ground where the light is]. However, there [can] be no negation of the demon as something distinct [from these things and] that [might] reside whether within [the light] or within the area [of the ground] — this is [what the *Vṛtti*] says with [the words] 'And in the [same] way [as in our opponents' system, from the fact that] light [is other than the demon]...' In the [*Vṛtti*] too, [one] reason[66] why

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[64] According to ĪPVV, vol. II, pp. 388–389: ***evam*** *iti vyatirekeṇābhāvavyavahāra-prasaṅgo yaḥ śaṅkyate piśācasya so 'smatpakṣe 'pi nāvataratīti*. '"And in the [same] way" [means]: in our perspective as well, the feared consequence that [then we may] talk about the demon's non-being as [something] distinct [from the light or ground] does not ensue.'

[65] In fact Utpaladeva's own *Vivṛti* provides several possible interpretations for the word *tatra* (see below); the translation here rests on the first of them.

[66] Utpaladeva is about to specify a second reason — namely, the demon's imperceptibility.

there does not ensue any negation of the demon [as something residing in them] is stated, [and it is] precisely the fact that [the demon] is other [than them]; and this [fact][67] is [already] stated in the verse [itself] by indicating that [the demon] may be contained 'within' [the light]. [The expression] 'in that' (*tatra*) [making this point clear in the *Vṛtti* must be understood] with respect to the fact that [the demon may] reside [in that light];[68] alternatively, 'in that' [may mean] 'in that area [of the ground].' Or again, [one may also take this] to mean that the demon may be negated as consisting in a demon that would [happen to] be [identical with] light, but that it cannot be negated 'in that,' [that is to say,] in that light that is other [than him].[69]

Besides, the negation of the demon [as something existing] in that area [of the ground] can [only] occur [as long as] one imagines as a possibility (*sambhāvanā*) that [the demon], although distinct from the area [of the ground], is none other than the light;[70] but [this negation] is no [longer possible] once it [has been acertained to be] other than the light. For from then on, there is no perception of any other existing thing (*padārtha*) that

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[67] Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 389: **tac ce**ty anyatvaṃ saptamyantaṃ yad vṛttāv uktam antarlīnatāpakṣe. '"And this" [means] the fact of being other [than them,] a fact that is mentioned in the *Vṛtti* with a locative ending [in "although it is other," *anyatve 'pi*], in the hypothesis according to which [the demon] resides [inside the light/ground].'

[68] Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 389: **tatra**ti vyākhyāta āloke 'ntarlīnapiśāco na niṣeddhuṃ śaṅkyo 'dṛśyatvād iti uktam. 'It has been explained [in the *Vṛtti*] that there is no reason to fear that a demon residing "in that" — [that is to say,] in the light [just] described — may be negated, because it is imperceptible.'

[69] In other words, Utpaladeva himself is suggesting to read the word *tatra* as meaning either 'in the light,' or 'in the area of the ground,' or 'in that which is other [than the demon].' Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 389: *ālokapradeśayor ādhāratvam ādhāratānāntarīyakavyatirekatātparyaṃ ceti tridhā* **tatra**śabdo vyākhyātaḥ. '[Utpaladeva] explains the word *tatra* [in the *Vṛtti*, i.e. "in that,"] in three ways: [according to him, it expresses] the fact[s] that (1) the light and (2) the area [of the ground may be] the [demon's] containers, as well as (3) the general meaning that [that which is] closely connected with [something else] as its container is [nonetheless] distinct [from that thing].'

[70] Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 390: ... **pradeśād** ity ālokatādātmyena hi pradeśe niṣidhyeta. '[Utpaladeva says: "Besides... although distinct] from the area," for [the demon] may be negated [as something existing] in that area [only] inasmuch as [it might first be considered] identical with the light.'

would be distinct from the light [while residing in it],[71] [and] of which the [demon could be thought to be] made, [so that one could] imagine as a possibility [that the demon, being identical with this thing, may be] perceptible in the light. Alternatively, [one might say that the demon] is negated [as existing] in that area [only as something that would be] identical [with the area]; this is [what the *Vṛtti*] says [with the words]: 'For this [demon] is imperceptible, [and just as he may be enclosed within the earth] although it is other [than it]...' [...].[72]

[And it is not just the fact that the demon is other than the light or ground, but] also [its] imperceptibility, that is stated [here] as a reason for the impossibility of negating the [demon]'s existence [inasmuch as it is] distinct from the light and [ground].[73] To explain: for someone to whom even [an entity] such as a demon — whose sight is beyond the senses [of ordinary people] — is visible, even a demon that is distinct from the light must be some existing thing (*padārtha*) that is visible [as] e.g. consisting of atoms; [and] from the sight of this [perceptible thing], this [subject] may perform the negation of the demon in some [specific places such as the light or area of the ground].[74] For this [subject who sees beyond the ordinary range of the senses] may negate the demon [inasmuch as he] sees that the room [that could be occupied by]

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[71] According to ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 390: *iyat tūcyetāpi pradeśa āloko 'sti yat tad eva piśāco nāstīti, āloke tu kim anyad asti yat piśāco 'pi nāstīti syāt. tenātra vaca-nāvakāśamātram api nāstīti manyate, etad eva ghaṭayati **tadā hī**ti.* 'Admittedly, this much may still be said: that which is the light [existing] in that area is not a demon; but what else is there within the light, of which one might [say] that it is not the demon either? Therefore [Utpaladeva] considers that there is no possibility whatsoever of saying this, [and] this is what he explains in [the passage beginning with] "For from then on..."'

[72] I cannot make sense of the next few (lacunose) words.

[73] Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 390: ***adṛśyatvam apī**ti naiva kevalam anyatvaṃ piśāca-niṣedhāyoge hetur api tv adṛśyatāsahitam.* '[With the passage beginning with] "[also [its] imperceptibility," [Utpaladeva explains that] it is certainly not just the fact that [the demon] is other [than the light or ground] that is the reason for the impossibility of negating the demon: rather, this [first reason] is accompanied by [the second reason constituted by] imperceptibility.'

[74] Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 390: ***kvacid** ity āloke pradeśe vāsāv atīndriyadarśī piśācaṃ niṣedhet.* '"In some [specific places]" [means that] this [subject] who sees beyond the [ordinary range of] the senses may negate the demon [as something existing] in the light or in the area [of the ground].'

the demon [between the particles of light] is obstructed by some other object [that is also imperceptible to us but may be seen by that subject], or that it is only full of [the particles belonging to] the specific [entity that is the] light.[75] For even though two [entities] such as the demon and light do not hinder [each other, so that they may occupy the same space], there does not follow [from this] that they may become each other, as a result of which one could not know that a specific [entity] such as light is not a demon. Thus [a subject] who sees everything, even upon seeing a demon, can see [it] as occupying the very room [constituted by] the form of the particles of light [that it has] pushed away; for this very reason, it is not right to object this either.[76] [...][77]

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[75] Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 390: *sa hī*ti piśācāder atīndriyadarśī piśācasya yo 'vakāśaḥ saṃbhāvyate bhūtalālokāntarālaprāyas taṃ vyatiriktātmadikkālādibhiḥ* piśācarūpa-tvāsahiṣṇubhir ālokaviśeṣarūpair **eva vā** paramāṇubhir vyāptaṃ paśyaṃs tān ātmādīn piśācābhāvatayā vyavaharan piśācaṃ niṣeddhuṃ śaknoti. [**taṃ vyatiriktātmadikkālādi-bhiḥ* conj. : *tad vyatiriktair ātmadikkālādibhiḥ* J11, S12, ĪPVV Ed.] '"For this" [means:] for this [subject] who sees beyond [the ordinary range of] the senses [and may thus see something] such as a demon. [This subject,] upon seeing that the room that he imagines to be possibly the demon's — [a room] that amounts to the space between [particles] (*antarāla*) inside the ground or light — is pervaded by atoms that, while having a different nature, place and time, cannot consist in the demon, or that constitute nothing but the specific [entity that is the] light, talks about these natures, etc. as the demon's nonbeing, [and by so doing, he] is able to negate the demon.'

[76] The objection that Utpaladeva has in mind seems to be the following: since the nature of a demon is such that it may occupy the same locus as some other material entity such as light, even a person capable of perceiving atomic particles that remain imperceptible to us, upon seeing light in a particular spot of the ground, would not be able to determine whether (s)he sees particles belonging to light or to a demon. According to Utpaladeva, the objection does not hold because such a person can by definition distinguish the respective natures of light and a demon, and when seeing a demon residing within the light, such a subject must be able to see it as distinct from the light's particles. Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 390: **ata eve**ti. yataḥ piśācaḥ sarvajñasyāpi bhāsamāna ālokāvayavānām ālokapa-ramāṇūnāṃ yad rūpaṃ tad evāvakāśo deśas tam utsṛjya parihṛtya bhāsata itare-tarānāmiśrarūpatvād bhāvānāṃ, tato hetor idam api nāśaṅkanīyam. '"For this very reason" [means the following]: since the demon, while being manifest for an omniscient too, is manifest [as] having pushed away the room, [i.e.] the place that is the form of the particles — i.e. the atoms — of light, because the forms of [objective] entities do not mix with each other; for this reason, this too cannot be objected.'

[77] From Abhinavagupta's commentary (which goes on for six additional pages), it is obvious that an important part of the *Vivṛti* on this verse is missing here. I have not translated the last lacunose sentence of the fragment.

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Appendix *

A Fragment of *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti* on ĪPK 1.7.10–11

Vivṛti[?]

bhūtalagatālokāder eva darśanād anālokasvarūpaghaṭādirūpatā-   1
niṣedhaḥ punaḥ syād ity āha kintv āloketi:

* In the following edition I have standardized the spelling of Sanskrit words. Such corrections concern in particular dental consonants (*cittra → citra, satva → sattva*, etc.); nasals (*svātaṃtryam → svātantryam*, etc.); v/b (*vījam → bījam*). I also standardize sandhi, particularly regarding sibilants (*bhedas syāt → bhedaḥ syāt*, etc.; *avabhāsas śūnya° → avabhāsaḥ śūnya°*, etc.; *vastunas ṣaṇṇāṃ → vastunaḥ ṣaṇṇām*, etc.) and vowels (*arthe iti → artha iti*, etc.). I do not use any special mark to distinguish *upadhmānīya*s and *jihvāmūlīya*s (which occur e.g. in S12), but I use *avagraha*s (not found in the consulted manuscripts). Sandhi is also standardized in all quotations from the ĪPV and ĪPVV editions, where sandhi rules are arbitrarily applied. The first apparatus indicates the marginal sources for a specific sentence or segment thereof. The second apparatus is critical. It is followed by notes that explain some editorial choices, discuss the ĪPVV readings or add details regarding the manuscripts and their marginalia. The dots marking lacunae or illegible characters in the manuscripts are represented with asterisks. Lacunae that are not indicated in the manuscripts are represented with three asterisks within parentheses (* * *).

1 *bhūtalagatālokāder* … 2 *āloketi*] S3 (f. 68b, left margin), S15 (f. 77a, left margin), S10 (f. 77b, top margin), JR (f. 138b, right margin), S19 (f. 22a, left margin and interlinear space), Kawajiri forthcom.

1 *bhūtalagatālokāder eva*] S3, S10 : *bhūtalagatālokād eva* S15, JR : *pradeśagatālokāder* S19, Kawajiri forthcom. | *anālokasvarūpaghaṭādirūpatāniṣedhaḥ*] S3, S10, S15, JR : *anālokātmaghaṭādirūpatāniṣedhaḥ* S19, Kawajiri forthcom.   2 *āha … āloketi*] S3, S10, S15, JR : *āha kintv ityādi* S19, Kawajiri forthcom.

1 *bhūtalagatālokāder* … 2 *āloketi*] There is no hard evidence that this is indeed the *Vivṛti*'s introduction to verse 1.7.10, since Abhinavagupta does not quote from it (which is not surprising: he seldom quotes from Utpaladeva's own *avataraṇikā*s). This introduction is, however, found in the margins of manuscripts that are all known to bear *Vivṛti* fragments, and most of these manuscripts happen to give in part the fragment below. Admittedly, the *Vṛtti* manuscript studied by Y. Kawajiri provides no other *Vivṛti* quotation for verses 1.7.10–11; on the other hand, the author of the annotations in that manuscript seems to have been particularly keen on quoting the *Vivṛti*'s *avataraṇikā*s, and often gives no more than them. It therefore seems very probable (although not altogether certain) that this sentence does belong to the *Vivṛti*. | *anālokasvarūpaghaṭādirūpatāniṣedhaḥ*] Kawajiri forthcoming understands this as the compound *anālokātmaghaṭādirūpatā* separated from the word *niṣedhaḥ*.

ĪPK 1.7.10

3 kiṃtv ālokacayo 'ndhasya sparśo voṣṇādiko mṛduḥ |
tatrāsti sādhayet tasya svajñānam aghaṭātmatām ||

Vṛtti

5 pradeśeṣv ālokapūraṃ santamase mṛdum uṣṇādikaṃ sparśaṃ vā
ghaṭarūpasparśābhāvātmakam anubhūyālokādir ghaṭābhāvo 'trā-
7 sti ghaṭo nāstīti vyavahartuṃ yuktam.

Vivṛti

8 **kvacid** bhūtalaṃ dṛṣṭapūrvaṃ mahāśilādikārthāntarāvāritam upa-
labhya kevalam adṛṣṭvaiva pratyakṣād eva vyavaharanty api nātra
10 **nirantaro** ghaṭa iti. tatra yathā mahāśilaivāghaṭarūpeti **tadbhāva**
eva ghaṭābhāvaḥ, tathaiva sarvatrālok**ādir** avaśyambhāvī ghaṭavi-
12 lakṣaṇo ghaṭābhāvatayā vyavahriyatām. kiṃ pradeśakevalatayānu-
papadyamānayā. tad āha vṛttau yathā pradeśeṣv āloketi.

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5 *pradeśeṣv … **7** yuktam*] S19 (f. 22a, main text), S12 (f. 188b, top margin, preceded by *tad āha vṛttikāraḥ yathā vṛttiḥ*), S3 (f. 68b, bottom and right margins, preceded by *tad āha vṛttikāraḥ yathā vṛttiḥ*, followed by *iti vṛttiḥ*), JR (f. 128b, bottom margin, preceded by *tad āha vṛttikāraḥ yathā vṛttiḥ*, followed by *iti vṛttiḥ*), D2 (f. 183a, top margin, preceded by *atra vṛttiḥ*), SOAS (f. 170a, left margin, preceded by *atra vṛttiḥ*), S10 (f. 77b, top margin, followed by *vṛttiḥ*). **8** *kvacid … **12** pradeśakevalatayānupapadyamānayā*] S12 (f. 188b, top margin), S3 (f. 68b, bottom margin), S15 (f. 77b, top margin), D2 (f. 183a, top margin, followed by *iti bhāvaḥ*), SOAS (f. 170a, bottom margin, followed by *iti bhāvaḥ*), S10 (f. 77b, bottom margin), JR (f. 138b, bottom margin), ĪPV, vol. I, p. 301, n. 144 (preceded by *na tu śuddhabhutalajñānam*; followed by *iti bhāvaḥ*). **13** *tad … āloketi*] S12 (f. 188b, top margin), S3 (f. 68b, bottom margin), S15 (f. 77b, top margin), S10 (f. 77b, bottom margin).

5 *ālokapūraṃ*] S12, S3, S15, JR, D2, SOAS, Vṛtti Ed. : *ālokaprasaraṃ* S19, S10. | *santamase*] S12, S3, S15, JR, D2, SOAS, S10, Vṛtti Ed. : *santamasaṃ* S19. | *sparśaṃ*] S12, S3, S15, JR, D2, SOAS, S10, Vṛtti Ed. : *sparśā* S19. **6** *ghaṭarūpasparśābhāvātmakam*] S3, S15, JR, D2, SOAS, S10, Vṛtti Ed. : *ghaṭaṃ rūpasparśābhāvātmakam* S12. | *anubhūyālokādir*] S12, S3, S15, JR, D2, SOAS, S19, S10 : *anubhūyālokādi* Vṛtti Ed. **7** *yuktam*] S3, S15, JR, D2, SOAS, S19, S10, Vṛtti Ed. : *yaktam* S12. **8** *bhūtalaṃ dṛṣṭapūrvaṃ*] S12, S3, D2, SOAS, S10, JR², ĪPV n. 144 : *bhūtaladṛṣṭapūrvaṃ* S15. **13** *tad āha vṛttau yathā pradeśeṣv āloketi*] S10 : *tad āha vṛttikāraḥ, yathā vṛttiḥ* (followed by the full text of the Vṛtti, followed by *iti vṛttiḥ*) S12, S3, S15, JR.

13 *tad āha vṛttau yathā pradeśeṣv āloketi*] It seems unlikely that Utpaladeva quoted the entire *Vṛtti* in his *Vivṛti*. More probably, he simply gave the first words as he often does. Besides, according to ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 387 (quoted above, n. 54), after this point, and between the words *yatrāpi* and *tatrāpi* (which belong to a lacuna that I could not fill so far, see next note), the *Vṛtti* is 'quoted and explained' (*vṛttigranthaḥ paṭhito vyākhātaś ca*). I assume that Abhinavagupta means that in the fol-

(***) svajñānam iti tat svaviṣayam ālokaviṣayarūpaviśeṣaṃ mṛdvā-
disparśaviśeṣaṃ vā ghaṭarūpasparśavilakṣaṇaṃ vyavahārayad **gha-**
ṭābhāvam api **vyavahārayati**. iti **niyata**padārtharūpamātrābhāva-
vādino varam evaṃ vaktuṃ nyāyyaṃ na tu pradeśasya bhinna-
ghaṭādivastuviviktatā svarūpatayā **yuktā**, tad āhālokādir ghaṭā-
bhāvo 'trāsti ghaṭo nāstīti. ya eva hy artho niyata āloko 'trāstīti sa
evānāloko 'tra nāstīty abhedanirdeśaḥ, anālokaś ca ghaṭa **upayu-**
jyata iti **samprati** sa evoktaḥ, na punar niyatapradeśo 'yam astīty
eva syād bhinno 'tra ghaṭo nāstīti, ghaṭasattāyām api pradeśasya tā-
davasthyāt. **vastusthiti**vyavasthāpane 'pi ca yathā pratītir anuga-
myate tathāpi ghaṭābhāvaviṣayaṃ ghaṭābhāvapratyayam ālokādi-
darśanam ev**āvirbhāvayati**, na tu pradeśadarśanam uktanyāyena.

14
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lowing part of sentence, now missing, Utpaladeva went on explaining further
words from the *Vṛtti* (which makes it all the more unlikely that he had first quo-
ted the text in its entirety).

14 *svajñānam* … **16** *vyavahārayati*] S12 (f. 188b, top margin; preceded by *ṭīkā*), S3
(f. 68b, right margin, preceded by *athāsyā ṭīkā* [sic]), S15 (f. 77b, top margin, pre-
ceded by *athāsyā ṭīkā* [sic]), JR (f. 139a, top margin, preceded by *athāsyā ṭīkā*
[sic]), S10 (f. 77b, bottom margin). **16** *iti* … **22** *nāstīti*] S12 (f. 188b, top margin),
S3 (f. 68b, right margin), S15 (f. 77b, top and right margins), S10 (f. 77b, bottom
and right margins), JR (f. 139a, top margin). **22** *ghaṭasattāyām* … **25** *uktanyāye-*
na] S12 (f. 188b, right margin, followed by *iti pratyabhijñāṭīkāyām*), S3 (f. 68b,
right and top margins, followed by *iti pratyabhijñāṭīkāyām*), S15 (f. 77b, right mar-
gin, followed by *iti pratyabhijñāṭīkāyām*), S10 (f. 77b, right margin, followed by *iti*
ṭīkāyām), JR (f. 139a, top margin, followed by *iti pratyabhijñāṭīkāyām*).

14 *mṛdvādisparśaviśeṣaṃ*] S12, S3, S10, JR : om. S15. **15** *ghaṭarūpasparśavi-*
lakṣaṇam] S3, S15, S10 : *ghadharūpasparśavilakṣaṇam* S12. *vyavahārayad*] conj. : *vya-*
vahārayan S12, S3, S15, S10, JR. **16** *niyatapadārtharūpamātrābhāvavādino*] conj. :
niyatapadārtharūpamātrabhāvavādino S12, S3, S15, S10, JR. **18** *āhālokādir*] S12,
S3, JR : *āhālokādi* S15, S10. | *'trāsti ghaṭo nāstīti*] S12, S3, S15, JR : *'trāstītyādi* S10 p.c.
: *'stītyādi* S10 a.c. **19** *eva*] S3, S15?, S10, JR : *evaṃ* S12. | *āloko*] S12, S3, S10, JR :
āloka S15. | *evānāloko*] S12, S3, S15, JR : *eva hy anāloko* S10. **25** *uktanyāyena*] S3,
S15, S10, JR : *aktanyāyena* S12.

14 (***)] ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 387, mentions several *pratīka*s not found in what follows
(*yatrāpi, tatrāpi, andhasya, anupalabhya, apratighāti*): although no mark indicates it
in the margins where the fragment is preserved, there must be a lacuna before
svajñānam iti. **15** *vyavahārayad*] The conjecture seems necessary despite the
manuscripts' unanimity, since surely here Utpaladeva is following the structure
of the verse, and as pointed out in ĪPV, vol. I, pp. 302–303, the subject of the sen-
tence is the neuter *svajñānam*. **18** *yuktā*] The corresponding *pratīka* in ĪPVV,
vol. II, p. 387, edited as **yukta** *iti*, should be corrected into **yukte***ti*.

26 na c**ānālokarūpasya** ghaṭādyabhāvavyavahāraprasaṅgo ’**ntarlīna-**
sya tasyādṛśyasya vyatiriktasya bhūtala ivāloke ’pi niṣeddhum anyā-
28 yyatvād ity āha piśācaḥ syād iti.

ĪPK 1.7.11

piśācaḥ syād anāloko ’py ālokābhyantare yathā |
30 adṛśyo bhūtalasyāntar na niṣedhyaḥ sa sarvathā ||

Vṛtti

31 na caivam ālokasya piśācānyatvāt tatra piśācaniṣedhaprasaṅgaḥ, sa
hy adṛśyo ’nyatve ’pi yathā bhūgolakasyāntaranivāryas tathāloka-
33 syāntare, tatas tasyānyamata ivāsmanmate ’pi nādṛśyatvād abhāva-
siddhiḥ.

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26 *ghaṭādyabhāvavyavahāraprasaṅgo* … **28** *iti*] S12 (f. 189a, top margin), J11 (f. 189b, top margin).   **31** *na* … **33** *abhāvasiddhiḥ*] S19 (f. 22b, main text), S12 (f. 189a, top margin), J11 (f. 189b, right margin, preceded by *piśācaḥ syād iti vṛttiḥ*), D2 (f. 185b, top margin, followed by *piśāca ity atra vṛttiḥ*), SOAS (f. 172a, top margin, preceded by *atra vṛttiḥ*), S10 (f. 77b, top margin, followed by *|| vṛttiḥ ||*).

26 *na* … *ghaṭādyabhāvavyavahāraprasaṅgo*] conj. : *ghaṭādyabhāvavyavahārasaṅge* S12 p.c., J11 : *ghaṭādyabhāvavyavahārasaṅge* S12 a.c. ’*ntarlīnasya*] S12 : ’*ntalīnasya* J11.   **27** *tasyādṛśyasya*] conj. : *tasya dṛśyasya* S12, J11. | *ivāloke ’pi*] conj. : *evāloke ’pi* S12 p.c., J11 p.c. : *evāloko ’pi* S12 a.c., J11 a.c.   **28** *āha piśācaḥ syād iti*] conj. : *āha || 78 piśācaḥ syād iti* S12 : *āha ||73||* J11.   **31** *piśācānyatvāt*] S12, J11, S19, S10, Vṛtti Ed. : *piśācānyatvābhāvāt* D2, SOAS. | *tatra*] S12, J11, D2, SOAS, S19, Vṛtti Ed. : *tatrāpi* S10.   **32** *bhūgolakasyāntaranivāryas*] S19, S10 : *bhūgolasyāntaranivāryas* D2, SOAS : *bhūgolakasyāpy āntaranivāryas* S12, J11 : *mṛdgolakasyāpy antaranivāryas* Vṛtti Ed. | *tathālokasyāntare*] S12, D2, S19, S10, Vṛtti Ed. : *tathālokasyāntaraṃ* J11. **33** *tasyānyamata ivāsmanmate*] D2, SOAS, S19, S10, Vṛtti Ed. : *tasyānyāsatatonāsmanmate* S12, J11. | *nādṛśyatvād abhāvasiddhiḥ*] S12, S11, D2, SOAS, Vṛtti Ed. : *nādṛśyatvābhāvasiddhiḥ* S19.

26 *na cānālokarūpasya ghaṭādyabhāvavyavahāraprasaṅgo*] The emendation is conjectural, but I cannot see how to avoid correcting the text. From *antarlīnasya* onwards, Utpaladeva provides the reason for refuting a consequence just mentioned as an objection (ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 389: *śaṅkāniṣedhe tu hetur* **antarlīnasya***tyādi*), but the very statement that in fact this consequence does not ensue for an imperceptible entity is missing, as is the compound *anālokarūpasya* quoted by Abhinavagupta immediately before he comments on *antarlīnasya* (ibid.): **anālokarūpasya***ti piśācasvabhāvatvād ālokasya śaṅkyate ’yaṃ prasaṅga iti tātparyam.* In the latter sentence, *piśācasvabhāvatvād* should probably be emended as well (into *piśācāsvabhāvatvād*? Cf. *ālokasya piśācānyatvāt* at the beginning of the *Vṛtti*).   **28** *ity āha piśācaḥ syād iti*] The verse number given in J11 is the right one (this is indeed the 73d *kārikā* from the beginning of the work if one sets aside the introductory stanza).

Vivṛti

ālokāvyatirekeṇa ghaṭādir iva piśāco 'pi niṣidhyata eva dṛśyānupa-   35
lambhād yathā pradeśaikarūpatayā, vyatirekeṇa punar antarlīna-
tayā pradeśa ivātrāpi piśācasyāniṣedhaḥ, tad āha na caivam āloka-   37
syeti. anyatvam evātrāpi piśācaniṣedhaprasaṅgābhāve hetur uktaḥ,
tac ca sūtre 'bhyantarādhāryatvanirdeśenoktam. **tatre**ty antarlīna-   39
tāpekṣayā, **athavā** tatreti pradeśe. yadi vālokapiśācātmatayā niṣe-
dhyeta, na tu tatrāloke 'nyasmin piśāco niṣedhya ity arthaḥ.   41
pradeśād anyasyāpi cālokānanyatvasaṃbhāvanayā niṣedhaḥ piśā-
casya pradeśe śakyo na tv ālokād anyatve 'pi. **tadā hy** ālokavyati-   43
riktāparapadārthadarśanaṃ nāsti yanmayo 'sau dṛśyaḥ saṃbhāvi-
ta āloke. **pradeśe vā**bhinno niṣidhyate, tad āha sa hy adṛśyo 'nya-   45
tve 'pīti. ālokādidarśanasthāpana ***** †siddheva.

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35 *ālokāvyatirekeṇa … **40** pradeśe*] S12 (f. 189a, top and left margins, preceded by *ṭī*, followed by the words *yadi vāloka°* later crossed out), J11 (f. 189b, right margin, preceded by *ṭī*).   **40** *yadi … **41** arthaḥ*] S12 (f. 189a, left margin, marked with 1, as the corresponding *pratīka* in the main text); J11 (f. 189b, bottom margin, marked with 1 in Śāradā script, as the corresponding *pratīka* in the main text). **42** *pradeśād … **43** 'pi*] S12 (f. 189a, left margin, marked with 2, as the corresponding *pratīka* in the main text), J11 (f. 190a, top margin, marked with 2 in Śāradā, as the corresponding *pratīka* in the main text).   **43** *tadā … **50** kuryāt*] S12 (f. 189a, left margin, marked with 3, as the corresponding *pratīka* in the main text; the passage is followed by the crossed-out words ***sa hi taṃ piśācāvakāśam arthāntarāvi°***, which belong to the beginning of the next sentence, given in full in the bottom margin), J11 (f. 190a, top margin, marked with a 3 in Śāradā, as the corresponding *pratīka* in the main text).

37 *pradeśa ivātrāpi*] conj. : *pradeśe tavātrāpi* S12 : *pradeśa te vātrāpi* J11.   **39** *'bhyantarādhāryatvanirdeśenoktam*] conj. : *abhyantarādhānatvanirdeśenoktam* S12, J11. **41** *tatrāloke*] S12 : *taṃtrāloke* (!) J11.   **42** *cālokānanyatvasaṃbhāvanayā*] corr. : *cā kānanyatvasaṃbhāvanayā* S12, J11.   **44** *yanmayo'sau*] conj. : *yan mayāsau* S12, J11. **46** *ālokādidarśanasthāpana*] conj. : *ālokā**rśanasthāpana* S12, J11. [*****] S12 : **** J11.

35 *ālokāvyatirekeṇa*] One might assume a gap before this point since several *pratīka*s not found in the fragment appear in ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 388 (*sarvathā, na ca, evam*). These, however, do not belong to the *Vivṛti* but to the verse (*sarvathā*) and *Vṛtti* (*na ca, evam*).   **39** *'bhyantarādhāryatvanirdeśenoktam*] Cf. the repeated mentions in Abhinavagupta's commentaries of the fact that light or the place may be a container for the *piśāca* (see e.g. ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 389: *ālokapradeśayor ādhāratvam…*), and the notion of *ādhāryādhārabhāva* (mentioned e.g. in ĪPV, vol. I, p. 301).   **42** *cālokānanyatvasaṃbhāvanayā*] Both manuscripts indicate the missing *akṣara* with a space, instead of a dot or dash, as they usually do.   **46** *ālokādi-darśanasthāpana*] The lacuna is indicated by a short line rather than by dots/dashes as is usually the case in S12 and J11.

47 **adṛśyatvam apy** asyālokādivyatiriktasya sattāniṣedhāyoge hetutve-
noktam. **yasya hy** atīndriyadarśanaḥ piśācādir api dṛśyas tasyā-
49 lokātiriktapiśāco 'pi paramāṇvātmādiḥ padārthaḥ kaścid dṛśyaḥ
syād **yad**darśanāt **kvacit** piśācasy**āsau** niṣedhaṃ kuryāt. **sa hi** taṃ
51 piśācāvakāśam arthāntaraviruddham ālokaviśeṣamayam **eva vā**
paśyan piśācaṃ niṣedhet. **na hy** apratighayor api piśācālokādika-
53 yor anyonyātmatāpattir yenālokādiviśeṣam apiśācatayā na jānīyāt.
piśācam api hi paśyan sarvadarśī, samutsṛṣṭālokāvayavarūpā-
55 vakāśam eva paśyed **ata eva**itad api vaktuṃ na yujyate. yathā yadi
na sānyonyavilakṣaṇatvād āloko ghaṭarūpo na syāt tāvatā tv ālokād
57 bhinnos yatra pradeśe ki
(***)

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50 *sa … **52** niṣedhet*] S12 (f. 189a, bottom margin, followed by the crossed-out words *na hy apratighayo°*, i.e., the beginning of the next sentence, which is given in full in the top margin of f. 189b), J11 (f. 190a, left margin, marked with 1 in Śāradā, as the corresponding *pratīka* in the main text).   **52** *na … **55** yujyate*] S12 (f. 189b, top margin, marked with 1, as the corresponding *pratīka* in the main text), J11 (f. 190a, left margin, marked with 2 in Śāradā, as the corresponding *pratīka* in the main text).   **55** *yathā … **57** ki*] S12 (f. 189b, top margin, marked with 2, as the corresponding *pratīka* in the main text), J11 (f. 190a, left margin, marked with 3 in Śāradā, as the corresponding *pratīka* in the main text).

47 *adṛśyatvam apy*] corr. : *dṛśyatvam apy* S12, J11. | *asyālokādivyatiriktasya*] J11 : *asya lokādivyatiriktasya* S12.   **48** *atīndriyadarśanaḥ piśācādir*] corr. : *atīndriyadarśano piśācādhir* J11 : *atīndriyadarśinaḥ piśācādir* S12.   **50** *kvacit*] corr. : *kaścit* S12, J11. | *piśācasyāsau*] conj. : *piśācasyādau* S12, J11.   **51** *arthāntaraviruddham*] conj. : *arthāntaraviruddhaḥ* S12, J11.   **52** *na hy apratighayor api*] S12 : *na hi pratighayor api* J11.   **53** *apiśācatayā na jānīyāt*] S12 : *api piśācatayā na jānīyāt* J11.   **54** *sarvadarśī*] S12 : *mavadarśī* J11.

47 *adṛśyatvam apy*] Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 390: *adṛśyatvam apīti naiva kevalam anyatvam piśācaniṣedhāyoge hetur api tv adṛśyatāsahitam.*   **48** *yasya hy*] Both S12 and J11 bear this reading, and ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 390, which has *tasya hīti*, should be corrected into *yasya hīti* (cf. the correlative *tasya* in the sequel of the *Vivṛti* sentence).   **50** *kvacit*] Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 390: **kvacid** *ity āloke pradeśe vā...* | *piśācasyāsau*] Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 390: **asāv** *atīndriyadarśī piśācaṃ niṣedhet.*

Prahasann iva.
On Kṛṣṇa's Hint of Laughter
in Bhagavadgītā 2.10

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> When shall I see your lotus face
> With its always smiling dawn-red lips,
> Joyously swelling the charming flute song
> Which is sweetly accompanied by half
> closed eyes that widen and dance?
> (*Kṛṣṇakarṇāmṛta* 1.44)[1]

> To every single Arjuna, with heavy heart and empty hand,
> Afraid to fight the battle of life on to victory,
> You feel He has come for you, to you.
> You see Him, silently looking around!
> The searchlight eye full circle swings!
> How lucky, you are there!
> He smiles; He wins you by that smile!
> You scarce can take your eyes from off that face,
> So alluring, so divine!
> (Excerpt of a poem by Narayan Kasturi, 1958)

1. Introduction

The expression *prahasann iva* is frequent in the *Mahābhārata* (MBh) occurring 84 times in its 18 books, especially in the Droṇaparvan, the 7th book (28 times). In the 6th book of the

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[1] Wilson 1975: 110.

Bhīṣmaparvan, besides the *Bhagavadgītā* (BhG) occurrence (MBh 6.24.10b = BhG 2.10b),[2] it appears 8 more times.[3] It is worth noticing that the cognate expression *hasann iva* is also common — 34 occurrences — again mostly in the Droṇaparvan (12 times) while in the Bhīṣmaparvan it occurs 4 times. All in all, there are a total of 118 occurrences of *prahasann iva + hasann iva* in the MBh (40 in the Droṇaparvan, followed by 13 in the Bhīṣmaparvan, 10 in the Karṇaparvan, 9 in the Śalyaparvan, etc.). Even in Vālmīki's *Rāmāyaṇa* (Rm) *prahasann iva* occurs 12 times whereas the cognate *hasann iva* occurs only once.[4]

1.1 Translations of prahasann iva

The English renderings[5] of *prahasann iva* in BhG 2.10b have been varied, ranging from a preference for smile or a semblance of a smile (especially in the early period and up to the 1970s) to a preference for laughter or a hint of laughter (starting with J. A. B. van Buitenen's seminal translation in the early 1980s).[6] Here follow

[2] The Sanskrit text of BhG 2.10 is the same in the vulgate edition, the Kashmirian recension, and the critical edition. For the critical edition of the BhG, see Belvalkar 1945.

[3] The complete list of the 84 loci of *prahasann iva* in the MBh is as follows: 1.127.5d, 1.141.1b, 1.147.21c, 1.151.7b, 1.151.14d, 1.152.15d, 1.181.2b, 1.206.16c, 1.211.16b, 2.54.11b, 3.38.36b, 3.38.39b, 3.40.17f, 3.40.21b, 3.77.11b, 3.97.5d, 3.186.116b, 3.294.9d, 4.13.5c, 4.23.22d, 4.52.23b, 4.53.14b, 5.7.9b, 5.73.1b, 5.89.23d, 5.179.1b, 6.24.10b, 6.41.16d, 6.43.21d, 6.54.15d, 6.75.39f, 6.79.36b, 6.79.48e, 6.107.2d, 6.115.34b, 7.21.10d, 7.37.13b, 7.47.26b, 7.57.46b, 7.77.29c, 7.82.14d, 7.82.20d, 7.90.28d, 7.91.32b, 7.91.35d, 7.91.43d, 7.96.13d, 7.99.16b, 7.102.98c, 7.103.4b, 7.111.3b, 7.114.50f, 7.130.29b, 7.137.18d, 7.137.26d, 7.141.7b, 7.142.6d, 7.142.16d, 7.144.16d, 7.146.28d, 7.148.39d, 7.169.20d, 7.173.48b, 8.9.26d, 8.33.14d, 8.34.16d, 8.40.85b, 8.50.2b, 9.27.51d, 9.30.15f, 12.3.29b, 12.24.8d, 12.125.18d, 12.142.41b, 12.151.10b, 12.310.27b, 13.141.74d, 14.19.46d, 14.54.17b, 14.73.6b, 14.83.8b, 14.93.39c, 16.8.49d, 18.1.11b; see the electronic text of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute's critical edition, available at http://bombay.indology.info/mahabharata/welcome.html.

[4] *prahasann iva*: 1.38.3b, 1.51.12d, 2.85.3b, 3.27.28f, 4.8.19d, 4.10.26d, 5.11.18d, 6.95.21c, 7.4.11b, 7.17.3d, 7.60.13b, 7.80.3d; *hasann iva*: 2.63.9d; see the electronic text of the Baroda critical edition, available at https://sanskritdocuments.org/mirrors/ramayana/valmiki.htm.

[5] For a comparison of select English translations of the BhG, see Larson 1981: 513–541. For a survey of BhG translations in Indian and non-Indian languages, see Callewaert and Hemraj 1982.

[6] With reference to Italian translations of the BhG, it is worthwhile noting the rendering of *prahasann iva* by contemporary indologists Raniero Gnoli, Marcello

some examples in chronological order: Charles Wilkins (1875) translates 'smiling,'[7] Kāshināth Trimbak Telang (1882) 'with a slight smile,'[8] Alladi Mahadeva Sastry (1897) 'as if smiling,'[9] Sir Edwin Arnold (1900) 'with tender smile,'[10] Lionel D. Barnett (1905) 'with seeming smile,'[11] Annie Besant and Bhagavân Dâs (1905) 'smiling,'[12] Swami Swarupananda (1909) 'as if smiling,'[13] W. Douglas P. Hill (1928) 'as one smiling,'[14] Sri Aurobindo (1938) 'smiling as it were,'[15] Franklin Edgerton (1944) 'with a semblance of a smile,'[16] Swami Nikhilananda (1944) 'smiling,'[17] Swami Prabhavananda and Christopher Isherwood (1944) 'smiling,'[18] Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1948) 'smiling as it were,'[19] Swami Vireswarananda (1948) 'as if smiling,'[20] Nataraja Guru (1961) 'with a semblance of smiling,'[21] Juan Mascaró (1962) 'smiled,'[22] Swami Chidbhavananda (1965) 'smiling, as it were,'[23] Robert Charles Zaehner (1966) 'faintly smiling,'[24] A. C. Bhaktivedanta

Meli, Stefano Piano and Tiziana Pontillo: Gnoli and Pontillo both translate 'sorridendo'; Meli translates 'che pareva sorridere'; Piano translates 'quasi sorridendo.' See Gnoli 1987: 51; Pontillo 1996: 19; Meli 1999: 9; Piano 1994: 100. Raniero Gnoli also translated into Italian the Kashmirian recension of the BhG, together with Abhinavagupta's commentary: Gnoli 1976. Herein, his translation of *prahasann iva* is the same, i.e. 'sorridendo.' All current Italian translations of the BhG that I was able to consult follow along these lines: see for instance Raphael, 'apparendo sorridente' (Raphael 2006: 51); Ramana, 'sorridendo' (Ramana 1996: 28).

[7] Wilkins 1785: 35.
[8] Telang 1908: 43.
[9] Mahadeva Sastry 1977: 22.
[10] Arnold 1900.
[11] Barnett 1928: 88.
[12] Besant and Bhagavân Dâs 1905: 28.
[13] Swami Swarupananda 1967: 34.
[14] Hill 1953: 84.
[15] Sri Aurobindo (tr.) available at https://www.auro-ebooks.com/bhagavad-gita.
[16] Edgerton 1964: 10.
[17] Swami Nikhilananda 1944: 71.
[18] Swami Prabhavananda and Isherwood 1958: 36.
[19] Radhakrishnan 1963: 102.
[20] Swami Vireswarananda 1948: 33.
[21] Nataraja Guru 1961: 116.
[22] Mascaró 1978: 49.
[23] Swami Chidbhavananda 1972: 127.
[24] Zaehner 1973: 124.

Swami Prabhupāda (1968) 'smiling,'[25] Eliot Deutsch (1968) 'smiling as it were,'[26] Swami Venkatesananda (1972) 'as if smiling,'[27] Kees W. Bolle (1979) 'seemed to smile,'[28] Swami Sivananda (1979) 'as if smiling,'[29] Johannes Adrianus Bernardus van Buitenen (1981) 'with a hint of laughter,'[30] Robert N. Minor (1982) 'with a semblance of a laugh'/'faint smile,'[31] Winthrop Sargeant (1984) 'beginning to laugh, so to speak,'[32] Eknath Easwaran (1985) 'smiled,'[33] Barbara Stoler Miller (1986) 'mocking him gently,'[34] Swami Chinmayananda (2000), 'as if smiling,'[35] Stephen Mitchell (2000) 'smiled,'[36] Lars Martin Fosse (2007) 'with a hint of derision,'[37] Angelika Malinar (2007) 'almost bursting out in laughter,'[38] Graham Schweig (2007) 'as if about to laugh,'[39] Alex Cherniak (2008) 'almost laughing,'[40] Swami B. V. Tripurari (2010), 'smiling,'[41] Georg Feuerstein and Brenda Feuerstein (2011) 'laughingly, as it were,'[42] Gavin Flood and

[25] Swami Prabhupāda 1976: 21.

[26] Deutsch 1968: 37.

[27] Swami Venkatesananda 1984: 109.

[28] Bolle 1979: 21.

[29] Swami Sivananda 1996: 9.

[30] van Buitenen 1981: 75.

[31] Minor 1982: 33.

[32] Sargeant 2009: 95.

[33] Easwaran 2007: 89.

[34] Stoler Miller 1986: 31.

[35] Swami Chinmayananda 2000: 63; available at https://factmuseum.com/pdf/upaveda/Holy-Geeta-by-Swami-Chinmayananda.pdf.

[36] Mitchell 2000: 47.

[37] Fosse 2007: 13.

[38] Malinar 2007: 64.

[39] Schweig 2007: 45.

[40] Cherniak 2008: 183.

[41] Swami B. V. Tripurari 2010: 40.

[42] Feuerstein and Feuerstein 2014: 95. On the 'important qualifying remark' that Hṛṣīkeśa imparted his teaching 'laughingly, as it were,' the authors note (2014: 105, n. 36): 'We could understand this easily in the sense that he was benignly mocking Arjuna. In order to create a mind of clarity (*sattva*) in a student, the teacher first has to dynamize a lethargic mind by introducing the quality of *rajas* into it. The progression, then, is *tamas* → *rajas* → *sattva*. Ultimately, of course, all three primary-qualities (*guṇa*) must be transcended in order to bring about spiritual liberation. From the highest perspective, even *sattva*, the principle of lucidity, represents a limitation.'

Charles Martin (2013) 'while laughing at him, as it were,'[43] Swami Mukundananda (2014) 'smilingly.'[44]

In the MBh the present active participle *prahasan*[45] (masculine nominative singular of *prahasant*) fulfils a quasi-adverbial function.[46] It is derived from √*has* — meaning 'to laugh'/'smile' as well as 'to deride'/'mock' — with the addition of preverb *pra* whose primary meaning is 'forward,' 'onward,' 'forth,' 'fore,' often used pleonastically.[47] Monier-Williams' dictionary translates *pra* + √*has* as 'to burst into laughter,' 'to laugh with,' 'to laugh at, mock, deride, ridicule,'[48] and Apte's dictionary translates it as 'to laugh, smile,' 'to deride, ridicule, mock,' and 'to brighten up, look splendid, cheer up.'[49]

In dramaturgy, the term *prahasana* identifies one of ten types of play (*nāṭya*) in which the comic sentiment predominates and in

[43] Flood and Martin 2013: 13.

[44] Swami Mukundananda 2014, available at https://www.holy-bhagavad-gita.org.

[45] The doubling of *n* in *prahasann iva* is due to a rule of external sandhi, which takes place when the nasal *n* occurs as a final after a short vowel before any initial vowel. In Sanskrit, present participles are normally reserved for actions which are contemporaneous with those of the main verb, as in this case. They function as verbal adjectives and must agree in case, number, and gender with the noun they modify. On the present participle, see Goldman and Sutherland Goldman 2002: 255–272.

[46] As in BhG 2.10b, present participles appear most frequently at the beginning of even *pāda*s. Among them, *prahasan* is one of the most popular; see Sellmer 2015: 198.

[47] See Whitney 1987: 396; Goldman and Sutherland Goldman 2002: 150. Among the many examples of prefix *pra* meaning 'forward'/'forth' I may mention the nouns *prajā*, 'procreation'/'propagation,' *pravṛtti*, 'moving onwards'/'coming forth,' *prakāśa*, 'light'/'manifestation'/'expansion,' and *prajñā*, 'wisdom'/'intelligence.' Along these lines, an insightful comparison between the nouns *śānti* and *praśānti* is proposed by the contemporary guru Sathya Sai Baba (1926–2011): 'Swami once asked His students: "What is the difference between Shanti and Prashanti?" Understandably none could answer, following which Bhagavan Baba Himself gave the answer. He said: "Shanti is the peace and tranquillity you experience when you go within and commune with God. When you then move around the world uplifted by that internal bliss, you would radiate nothing but Pure Love, which would touch everyone you come across. That fragrance of Love you radiate into the outer world is called Prashanti. Obviously, there can be no Prashanti without Shanti' (http://media.radiosai.org/journals/vol_09/01FEB11/03-musings02.htm).

[48] Monier-Williams 1988: 700.

[49] Apte 1986: 1121.

which the object of laughter is characterized by the improper conduct of someone who is criticized and put to shame.[50] Along these lines, the Monier-Williams' dictionary translates the noun *prahāsa* as 'loud laughter,' *pra* being understood to mean 'loud.'[51] It should be noted that the prefix *pra* — corresponding to Greek προ — has a variety of possible denotations, not always predictable, among which noticeable are the meanings of 'eminence'/'excellence' or 'superiority,' as for instance in the words *pradyumna* ('the preeminently mighty one'), *pravīra* ('hero'), *pramā* ('true knowledge') and *pramāṇa* ('a means to acquire true knowledge'). As a prefix to adjectives, *pra* means 'excessively,' 'very,' 'much,' whereas in nouns of relationship it means 'great-.'[52]

As it happens in almost half of the *pāda*s in the MBh, the participle *prahasan* is followed by the indeclinable particle *iva* — 'like,' 'as it were'/'as if,' 'in a certain manner'/'a little,' 'nearly'/'almost' — which always follows the word to which it refers and which in such participial usages is not easy to render. With reference to *iva* in Vedic prose, Joel Brereton noted long ago that '... with verbs and verbal expressions, *iva* affirms that the action is true but that its realization or its extent is uncertain.'[53]

In view of the above, I think that the most appropriate renderings of *prahasann iva* are the ones which translate *prahasan* as 'laughing' rather than 'smiling,' though to be sure the action of laughing is mitigated by the presence of the *iva* particle and *prahasann iva* might be understood as meaning 'to smile before laughing.'[54] My favored translation of this formulaic diction is van Buitenen's 'with a hint of laughter,' followed by Malinar's 'almost bursting out in laughter.' The full verse of BhG 2.10 may thus be rendered as follows:

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[50] See Rossella 2009: 117–33. For an overview of India's comic tradition, see Siegel 1989. On humor in South Asian religions, see the collection of articles in Raj and Dempsey 2010.

[51] Monier-Williams 1988: 700.

[52] Ibid., 652; Apte 1986: 1052.

[53] Brereton 1982: 446. On *iva* clauses, see Hale.

[54] Nataraja Guru (1961: 118) notes: 'The term *iva* (as if) applied to the smile of Krishna is a peculiarity of the lingua mystica familiar in the Upanishads ... by which the edge is, as it were, taken off the actuality of the description, tending to make it more perceptual and thus more in keeping with a contemplative text.'

Saṃjaya[55] said: (*saṃjaya uvāca*)
To him [= Arjuna] spoke Hṛṣīkeśa[56] (*tam uvāca hṛṣīkeśaḥ*)
With a hint of laughter, son of Bharata,[57] (*prahasann iva bhārata*)
In between the two armies (*senayor ubhayor madhye*)
As he was despondent, this speech: (*viṣīdantam idaṃ vacaḥ*)

1.2 Prahasann iva in Context

BhG 2.10 is a solemn moment in the poem given that it is at this crucial juncture that lord Kṛṣṇa starts uttering his salvific teaching (*upadeśa*) to the hero Arjuna who, in his dejection, has finally surrendered himself to him. Significantly Śaṅkara (7th–8th c.), the founder of non-dual (*advaita*) Vedānta, starts his seminal commentary (*bhāṣya*) to the BhG from this point, considering the first chapter and the first nine verses of the second as preparatory, setting the scene to the incipit and unfolding of Kṛṣṇa's *upadeśa*. In Śaṅkara's own words:

> Now the portion from 1.2 to 2.9 should be interpreted as showing whence arose those evils of grief (*śoka*), delusion (*moha*), etc., which in sentient creatures cause the misery of *saṃsāra*.... Grief and delusion are thus the cause of *saṃsāra*. And seeing that their cessation could not be brought about except by Self-knowledge added to renunciation of all works, Lord Vāsudeva wished to teach that knowledge for the benefit of the whole world through Arjuna and began His teaching with 2.11.[58]

From both a poetical and religious point of view, Kṛṣṇa's hint of laughter at 2.10 is to be regarded as the pivotal *trait d'union*, being

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[55] Dhṛtarāṣṭra's charioteer and bard, son of Gavalgaṇa, to whom he narrates the events of the great battle. He is the 'eyes' of the blind king Dhṛtarāṣṭra, having been granted divine vision by sage Vyāsa.

[56] An epithet of Kṛṣṇa meaning 'he whose hair is splendid'/'the bristling haired one' (*hṛṣī-keśa*) as well as 'lord of the sense-organs' (*hṛṣīka-īśa*); see 1.15a, 1.21a, 1.24a, 2.9a, 2.10a, 11.36a, 18.1c. For an overview of Kṛṣṇa's names and epithets in the BhG, see Bhargava 1979: 93–96. On the other hand, Arjuna is referred to as 'the thick-haired one' (*guḍā-keśa*); see 1.24b, 2.9b, 10.20a.

[57] Dhṛtarāṣṭra, the blind king of the Kurus, husband of Gāndhārī and father of Duryodhana and of 99 other sons, i.e. the Kauravas. He was born blind as a result of his mother, Ambikā, closing her eyes during intercourse with his father, Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana Vyāsa.

[58] Mahadeva Sastry 1977: 22–23.

what immediately precedes his revelatory speech. In order to fully appreciate its import and function we need to contextualize it within the BhG and the epic's framework.[59] As Alf Hiltebeitel has noted, 'one always has to watch these smiles.'[60] In commenting upon the *Mahābhārata* play of the English theatre and film director Peter Brook (b. 1925), first staged in 1985, Hiltebeitel pointedly observed:

> Also, Kṛṣṇa, you know, schemes with a smile. But this was missing in the Brook version. Kṛṣṇa is supposed to set the stage for some kind of catastrophe with the most subtle grin. That's one of the things that you can't miss if you know what the iconography looks like. That's a statement about seeing what Kṛṣṇa's up to in a bhakti kind of mode. But Peter Brook doesn't develop this subtlety, his player doesn't have this Kṛṣṇa smile. Rather, he looks like he's a figure who's going through one long weary scene of dire disaster, and the *Mahābhārata* is not really like that. I thought that this was a failure.[61]

Besides the BhG episode there are several other places in the MBh where Kṛṣṇa either smiles or laughs — as for instance when he responds with an enigmatic smile to Gāndhārī's curse in the Strīparvan — and it would be most rewarding to examine all these occurrences in a systematic, comparative fashion, be they conveyed through the phrase *prahasann iva/ hasann iva* or in a different way. To my knowledge, this is a study which so far no one has ever undertaken.

While Saṃjaya reports to Dhṛtarāṣṭra that on the Kuru field the war between the two armies of Pāṇḍavas and Kauravas is about to begin, with the tumultuous din that made heaven and earth resound (1.19), the course of events is given an unexpected turn when Arjuna,[62] the great hero of the Pāṇḍavas, having seen (1.20)

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[59] For a fine introduction to the BhG, see Davis 2015. See also Rigopoulos 2010: CLXXIII–CXCII, 1500–1504. For an excellent contextualization of the BhG within the MBh, see Malinar 2007. For an overview on Kṛṣṇa in the BhG, see Minor 2007: 77–94. On Kṛṣṇa's central place within the MBh, see Hiltebeitel 1979: 65–107. See also Hiltebeitel 2007: 23–76.

[60] Even though here he is referring to Śiva's smile, not Kṛṣṇa's; see Hiltebeitel 1984: 19.

[61] Rosen 1992: 54.

[62] For an overview on Arjuna in the MBh, see Katz 1989.

Dhṛtarāṣṭra's sons arrayed in battle order with their bows risen, asks his charioteer Kṛṣṇa — whom he calls *acyuta*, 'imperishable' — to halt the chariot in between the two armies so that he may have a closer look at those who have marched up eager to fight (1.21–23). Arjuna feels the urge to intently look at the Kauravas, and it is precisely this act of seeing that determines a change in the hero's attitude.

According to political treatises, 'standing in between' (*madhya-stha*) two armies exemplifies a neutrality of weakness, as is here Arjuna's case given his emotional involvement. By contrast, Kṛṣṇa is wholly detached and uninvolved (*udāsīna*; see BhG 9.9c), and his neutrality is a neutrality of strength.[63] Theologically, Kṛṣṇa is the witness (*sākṣin*), i.e. the pure *ātman*; he is the charioteer of the 'chariot' of the individual soul (*jīva*). Arjuna's equidistant position between the two fighting parties symbolizes the sole point from where it will be possible for him to achieve a condition of objectivity and equanimity (*samatva*).[64] Such middle position represents a space of freedom in which time is temporarily suspended, and from this privileged vantage point Arjuna will be able to exercise discriminative inquiry and detachment (*vairāgya*).[65] Indeed, it is the place where his transformation will be effectively brought about thanks to Kṛṣṇa's teachings.

Having complied with Arjuna's request of positioning the chariot in between the two armies, Hṛṣīkeśa asks him to behold the assembled Kurus (1.25) — Bhīṣma, Droṇa, and all the kings — and symptomatically the following verses focus upon what the hero sees and its consequences. As in other places in the MBh, here the act of seeing is most powerful and is equated with knowing.[66] Now Arjuna does not behold enemies on the Kaurava's side

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[63] See Emeneau 1968: 276–277.

[64] 'Equanimity is yoga,' as per Kṛṣṇa's solemn definition in BhG 2.48d: *samatvaṃ yoga ucyate*. The wise considers pain and pleasure as being the same (*samaduḥkhasukha*; see BhG 2.15c, 14.24a). There are twenty-five occurrences of *sama/samatva/samatā* in the BhG, which proves its relevance: 1.4b, 2.15c, 2.38a, 2.48c, 2.48d, 4.22c, 5.18d, 5.19c, 6.8d, 6.9d, 6.13a, 6.29d, 6.32b, 9.29a, 10.5a, 12.4b, 12.13d, 12.18a, 12.18d, 13.9c, 13.27a, 13.28a, 14.24a, 14.24b, 18.54c.

[65] The term *vairāgya* is found at BhG 6.35d, 13.8a, and 18.52d; see also the cognate terms *asaṅga* at 15.3d and *tyāga* at 16.2b and 18.1 ff.

[66] Within the Bhīṣmaparvan itself, see 6.1.33, 6.19.3, 6.21.1, 6.41.6.

but rather what he calls *bandhu*s, i.e. relatives: fathers, grandfathers, teachers, uncles, brothers, sons, grandsons, companions, fathers-in-law, and friends (1.26-27). In particular, Arjuna is anguished at the idea of having to fight against his revered teachers Bhīṣma and Droṇa.[67]

As a consequence, Saṃjaya tells us that Arjuna is immediately filled with utmost pity (1.28a, *kṛpayā parayāviṣṭaḥ*).[68] Seeing his own folks (*dṛṣṭvaimān svajanān*) arranged in battle-order against him, eager to fight, he is emotionally and physically overwhelmed and breaks down: his limbs sink down, his mouth dries up, he trembles and has goose-bumps, his *gāṇḍīva* bow falls from his hand, he feels his skin burning, he gets dizzy, and his mind wanders astray (1.29–30). Moreover, Arjuna is said to see inauspicious signs (*nimittāni ca paśyāmi viparītāni*)[69] which are both a warning and an opportunity to prevent what he perceives as an impending catastrophe, since he sees nothing good in killing his kinsfolk (1.31).[70]

Refusing to fulfill his own duty (*svadharma*) as a warrior, i.e. his *kṣatriyadharma*, Arjuna declares that he desires neither victory nor the kingdom.[71] In his speech (1.28–46) he puts forward reasons for peace which to the reader of the MBh are familiar, having been voiced in the preceding Udyogaparvan which is dominated by the conflict between *kuladharma* and *kṣatriyadharma*, the duty pertaining to the family/clan and the one pertaining to the warrior class. Arjuna's argument is as follows (1.32cd–33ab):

[67] Master-archer and teacher of the military art, Droṇa himself was especially fond of Arjuna whom he considered his best pupil.

[68] In *Nāṭyaśāstra* 6.62, one of the reasons for the arising of the sentiment of compassion (*karuṇarasa*) is the viewing of the killing of one's beloved.

[69] In the Bhīṣmaparvan, even the sage Vyāsa makes an appeal to stop the battle after the enumeration of adverse omens (6.2.16ff., 6.4.43). But Dhṛtarāṣṭra considers Vyāsa's words to be futile, viewing war as a matter of fate (6.4.44–46).

[70] Arjuna's refusal to fight is motivated by the prevalence of the lower *guṇa*s of *rajas* and *tamas*: the thought of the painful consequences (*śoka*) of having to fight against his *ācārya*s and *bandhu*s (which is due to *rajas*) and his confusion (*moha*) about *dharma* (which is due to *tamas*).

[71] In MBh 5.131.36 and 5.133.3, Vidurā's son questions the value of a warrior's *svadharma* by putting forward views which are quite similar to Arjuna's. Just like BhG 1.32d, both verses end with the refrain: 'What is the use of enjoyments or life?' (*kiṃ bhogair jīvitena vā*).

> Of what use to us were kingdoms, Govinda,[72]
> Of what use enjoyments or life?
> For whose sake we desire
> Kingdom, enjoyments, and happiness,
> They are drawn up here in battle,
> Giving up life and wealth.[73]

Contrary to his cousin Duryodhana, the chief of the Kauravas, Arjuna rejects *kṣatriyadharma* and regards his clan's prosperity as the paramount value. For him, the purpose of war can only be the welfare of the family. Wishing to be loyal to it, the very idea of fighting against his *bandhu*s is something he instinctively repudiates (1.35):

> Them I do not wish to slay,
> Even though they slay (me), O slayer of Madhu,[74]
> Even for three-world-rulership's
> Sake; how much less for the sake of the earth![75]

Arjuna ponders over the evil[76] of killing one's kith and kin and states that the destruction of the family is a crime that must be prevented, even if the others do not see it, their intelligence being overpowered by greed (1.36–39). His words may be regarded as an anticipation of the mourning for the dead and are a last, desperate attempt to avoid the conflict. In his passionate defense of *kuladharma* over *kṣatriyadharma*, Arjuna proceeds to describe the vicious circle which the destruction of family members entails, considering the inevitable disruption of the larger network of social relations defined by the endogamous rules of marriage, which in turn determines lawlessness (*adharma*) and the collapse of the entire society through pernicious caste-admixture (*varṇa-saṃkara*).[77] With the destruction of caste, the inexorable destiny of each and all is said to be none other than hell (1.40–44):

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[72] An epithet of Kṛṣṇa meaning 'tender of cattle.'
[73] Edgerton 1964: 6.
[74] An epithet of Kṛṣṇa meaning 'destroyer of [the demon] Madhu.'
[75] Edgerton 1964: 7.
[76] On evil/sin (*pāpa*) in the BhG, see Hudson 1996: 65–84.
[77] On these issues, see Chapple 2001: 23–31.

Upon the destruction of the family, perish
The immemorial holy laws of the family;
When the laws have perished, the whole family
Lawlessness overwhelms also.
Because of the prevalence of lawlessness, Kṛṣṇa,
The women of the family are corrupted;
When the women are corrupted, O Vṛṣṇi-clansman,[78]
Mixture of caste ensues.
Mixture (of caste) leads to naught but hell
For the destroyers of the family and for the family;
For their ancestors fall (to hell),
Because the rites of (giving) food and water are interrupted.
By these sins of family-destroyers,
(Sins) which produce caste-mixture,
The caste laws are destroyed,
And the eternal family laws.
When the family laws are destroyed,
Janārdana,[79] then for men
Dwelling in hell certainly
Ensues: so we have heard (from the Holy Word).[80]

Arjuna wants to have nothing to do with the impending war — which he regards as a major sin (*mahat pāpam*) motivated by the greed for the joys of kingship (*rājyasukhalobha*) — and is rather willing to be slain in battle by Dhṛtarāṣṭra's men, without opposing any resistance (*apratīkāra*) and unarmed (*aśastra*). Indeed, he views suicidal surrender as more beneficial (*kṣematara*) than being involved in the family slaughter (1.45–46). Saṃjaya ends chapter 1 by depicting Arjuna as sinking down in the box of his chariot, letting his bow and arrows fall, 'his heart smitten with grief' (1.47, *śokasaṃvignamānasa*).

At the beginning of chapter 2 Saṃjaya repeats what he had said at 1.28a, i.e. that Arjuna is overwhelmed by pity (2.1a, *kṛpayāviṣṭam*), his eyes being blurred with tears.[81] At this point, Kṛṣṇa

[78] The name of a Yādava people and their ancestor, connected with the Āndhakas and Bhojas. Kṛṣṇa as well as other figures such as Sātyaki and Kṛtavarman belong to this clan.

[79] Another name of Kṛṣṇa, meaning 'people-agitator.'

[80] Edgerton 1964: 7–8.

[81] On the religious significance and function of crying, see Hawley and Patton 2005.

offers a first, brief reply (2.2–3) in which he upholds *kṣatriyadharma* and underlines how Arjuna's faintheartedness is offensive to the noble, excludes him from the heavenly world which awaits all heroes, and causes disgrace.[82] Kṛṣṇa intimates him to stop being a eunuch (*klība*), which does not befit him: he must shake off his miserable weakness of heart and get up. His reproach to Arjuna of being a eunuch, a symbol of impotence and cowardice,[83] is common in the epic being addressed to weak heroes who are unable or reluctant to fulfill their *kṣatriya* duties.[84] It must be remembered that Arjuna had spent the thirteenth and last year of his exile disguised as a eunuch at the court of Virāṭa, the king of the Matsyas,[85] and thus Kṛṣṇa's reproach may also be insinuating that he had learnt to play his role so well that he was still behaving as a eunuch, subtly accusing him to have in fact turned into one.[86] Kṛṣṇa wants to hurt Arjuna's pride so as to trigger a manly reaction in him, given that in a warrior society the first commandment in order to maintain social status is to avoid shame by behaving bravely.

In 2.4–8, Arjuna repeats his main argument saying that he cannot fight against the great heroes Bhīṣma and Droṇa whom he reveres as teachers worthy of worship. The importance of his words is signaled by the fact that in verses 5–8 the meter changes from *śloka* to *triṣṭubh*.[87] Arjuna argues that rather than eating food

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[82] Long ago Jacobi (1918: 325) noted that Kṛṣṇa's reply lists topics which are used elsewhere in the MBh when a warrior refuses to fight and gives the example of Arjuna's reply to Uttara in 4.36.17–23. Other examples are Kṛṣṇa's reply to Bhīma joining the peace party (5.73) and Vidurā's speech to her son (5.131–134).

[83] On the fruitlessness and bad reputation of the *klība*, see *Mānavadharmaśāstra* (MDh) 2.158, 4.211.

[84] See Vidurā's speech to her son (5.131.5–7). See also MBh 2.34.21, 2.38.24, 5.73.17. A hero is required to be a man (*puruṣo bhava*; see MBh 5.167.6, 5.167.13–15).

[85] The story is told in the Virāṭaparvan, the fourth book of the MBh. Dressed as a woman, Arjuna presents himself as the eunuch Bṛhannalā and disguises himself as a dance teacher in the king's harem. On this episode and Arjuna's incongruous, grotesque appearance as an androgynous clown, see Shulman 1985: 256–276.

[86] On these issues, see Hejib and Young 1980: 235–244. See also Malinar 2007: 38–42.

[87] In chapter 2 of the BhG the meter changes from *śloka* to *triṣṭubh* in three other places, which again is meant to highlight their importance: at 2.20, 2.29,

besmeared with blood, i.e. gaining victory by slaying his masters and relatives, he prefers to eat alms-food in this world. Again he puts forward an argument for peace, his reference to living from alms pointing to the fact that he prefers ascetic renunciation to killing his own dear ones. By embracing a life of renunciation, he thinks he may be able to escape the conflict between contradictory *dharma*s. He is thus ready to relinquish all territorial claims and social status, and to live in the realm of another king.[88] He reiterates that neither a kingdom nor the earth is worth fighting for at the cost of killing his *bandhu*s, and once again refuses to follow *kṣatriyadharma*.

Finally, recognizing that his own being is afflicted with the weakness of pity (*kārpaṇyadoṣa*) and that his mind is confused as to what is right (*dharma*), Arjuna turns to Kṛṣṇa as his ultimate resort, desperately seeking his help.[89] Arjuna asks Kṛṣṇa to tell him decidedly what is better,[90] what he ought to do at this critical juncture. Decisive is the close of verse 2.7d, in which he falls at Kṛṣṇa's feet accepting him as his supreme *guru*.[91] He solemnly declares that he is his disciple, and asks him to offer his liberating teaching to him: 'I am Thy pupil, teach me: I surrender to Thee' (*śiṣyas te 'haṃ śādhi māṃ tvāṃ prapannam*).

and 2.70. Each of the four lines of the *triṣṭubh* verse is made up of eleven syllables whereas the *śloka* has eight syllables.

[88] This is the same solution that Saṃjaya, acting as Duryodhana's ambassador, recommends to Yudhiṣṭhira in the Udyogaparvan: 'I think it is better to live on alms in the kingdom of the Andhaka-Vṛṣṇis' (*bhaikṣācaryam andhakavṛṣṇirājye śreyo manye*; 5.27.2). On the other hand, in a speech to Yudhiṣṭhira Kṛṣṇa states that victory or death is the 'alms' a *kṣatriya* lives on; see 5.71.3–4.

[89] The Kashmirian recension of BhG 2.11 especially emphasizes the issue of *kārpaṇyadoṣa*.

[90] The BhG author seems to have in mind *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* 2.1 where Yama, the god of death, instructs the Brahmin boy Naciketas thus: 'The good (*śreyas*) is one thing, the gratifying (*preyas*) is quite another; their goals are different, both bind a man. Good things await him who picks the good; by choosing the gratifying, one misses one's goal'; Olivelle 1998: 235. Besides 2.7c, the term *śreyas* is found in BhG 1.31c, 2.5b, 2.31c, 3.2d, 3.11d, 3.35c, 5.1c, 5.2b, 12.12a, 16.22c.

[91] Kṛṣṇa claims authority as supreme teacher both at the beginning of chapter 3, where he declares to have taught the doctrines of *jñānayoga* and *karmayoga* long ago (3.3), as well as at the beginning of chapter 4, where he proclaims himself to be the original teacher of yoga (4.3). On the guru's foundational role in Indian culture, see Steinmann 1986; Rigopoulos 2009.

Arjuna does not see what else could possibly dispel his grief (*śoka*) which dries up his senses, even if he was to attain on this earth unrivalled, prosperous kingship and even sovereignty over the gods. For him, *kuladharma* stands above and beyond *kṣatriya-dharma* given that he sees his duty as a warrior as harboring demerit, not merit. His conflict over *dharma* is reinforced by the anticipation of the sorrow that the death of his *bandhu*s will cause to him and wants to avoid it. The hero's tragedy, which makes him utterly despondent and incapable of action, is that he is both intellectually and emotionally dumbfounded by the whole situation.

At 2.9, Saṃjaya reports Arjuna's last words to Govinda: 'I will not fight' (*na yotsya iti*), after which he became silent (*tūṣṇīṃ babhūva*). The fact that Arjuna, who is the son of the war-god Indra and the main warrior-hero among the Pāṇḍavas, categorically states that he will not fight, is in itself emblematic of an ironic — and tragic — reversal of roles.[92]

From 2.11, Kṛṣṇa patiently begins[93] to impart his *upadeśa* to Arjuna pointing out that he is grieving for those he shouldn't grieve for (*aśocyān anvaśocas tvam*), since the wise (*paṇḍitāḥ*) don't grieve for neither the dead nor the living. And yet, Kṛṣṇa seems to acknowledge the fact that Arjuna has spoken 'words of wisdom' (*prajñāvādān*). I think one needs to understand this statement — which has always been an interpretative crux — as being ironic. Indeed, Kṛṣṇa's subtle irony at this solemn juncture is in perfect keeping with his hint of laughter at 2.10b. The idea is that with his words Arjuna only mimics a true sage, since he is just the parody of one who is endowed with real wisdom (*prajñā*). Therefore, I think that the expression *prajñāvādān ca bhāṣase* of 2.11b should be understood as meaning 'you claim to speak words of wisdom.'[94]

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[92] On these issues, see Minnema 2013: 51–62, 101–114, 241–254, 307–344.

[93] As Sathya Sai Baba remarked during a speech he held in Prasanthi Nilayam on January 14, 1965: 'Krishna did not remove the delusion of Arjuna by His resolve, in a trice, as He doubtless could have done; He made him go through all the steps of hearing [= *śravaṇa*], reflection [= *manana*] and concentration [= *nididhyāsana*] by himself. The patient must take the medicine, not the doctor; the doctor only prescribes and persuades. One thing too must be said. The aspiring disciple must have an inkling already of the Truth; or else, he cannot master the secret. The telegram is sent in the Morse Code; so the man who sends as well as the man who receives must be aware of the code' (Sathya Sai Baba 2009: 12–13).

[94] Along these lines, Edgerton points out that in MBh 2.61.38 the expression

In his first teaching to his devout *śiṣya*, Kṛṣṇa develops four major themes. First of all, he addresses the hero's sorrow and emotional crisis by imparting a speech of consolation (2.11–30) that teaches the immortality of the 'owner of the body' (*dehin*, *śarīrin*), i.e. the Self, vis-à-vis the mortality of the body.[95] At 2.20, he solemnly declares that only the body can be killed, not the embodied Self which is beyond birth and death.[96] Therefore Arjuna has nothing to worry about — as repeatedly underlined by the formula *na śocitum arhasi* (see 2.25d–27d, 30d) — and must learn to cultivate an equal attitude with respect to happiness and suffering.[97] Death is only an occasion for 'changing old clothes,' i.e. for transmigrating into a new body.[98]

Kṛṣṇa then addresses the hero's conflict over tradition, emphatically endorsing *kṣatriyadharma* given that Arjuna's *svadharma*, his own duty as a warrior, overrules *kuladharma*: therefore, he tells him that he must fight since refusing to do so is a sin.[99] The *kṣatriya* must engage in battle at all costs, without caring about winning or losing, i.e. indifferent to its consequences since the consequences of war are no criteria for establishing its validity. Kṛṣṇa points out that he should consider himself lucky since there is nothing better for a warrior than a legitimate, righteous battle.

prajñāvādikaḥ means 'talking as (pretending to be) wise'; Edgerton 1964: 92. Significantly, the Kashmir recension of the BhG reports the variant *prajñāvān nābhibhāṣase*, 'you don't speak as a sage.' For an overview, see Kato 2014: 1144–1150; Kato 2016: 1106–1112. See also Piano 1994: 100–101, n. 11b.

[95] It draws on the style of funeral orations. These verses are included in the *Viṣṇusmṛti* (19.24) as words of consolation which should be addressed to mourners. For the recurrent and parallel passages in the BhG and other Sanskrit texts, see Haas 1949: 560–562. For other speeches of consolation in the MBh, see 11.2.3 ff. On the hour of death, see Edgerton 1926–27: 219–249.

[96] On the parallelism between BhG 2.20 and *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* 2.18, see Rocher 1963: 45–58.

[97] At 2.38, Kṛṣṇa reiterates that Arjuna must not be attached to the outcome of the battle: 'Holding pleasure and pain alike, gain and loss, victory and defeat, gird thyself for battle: thus you shall not bring anything bad on yourself.'

[98] See also MBh 11.3.6. This idea is probably derived from *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.4.5. Death is not to be understood as non-being (*asat*) but as a mere change in appearance given that what truly is (*sat*) cannot vanish into non-being.

[99] In contrast to other parts of the MBh, Kṛṣṇa does not view fighting against one's relatives as an emergency situation, a calamity that allows the application of *āpaddharma*, i.e. special rules in times of distress.

Herein, Kṛṣṇa's *kṣatriya* ethos is the same as that which is upheld by his opponent Duryodhana, for whom 'the warrior has been created for fighting' (*yuddhāya kṣatriyaḥ sṛṣṭaḥ*; see 5.158.11–12). The code of honor does not allow for any regrets, afterthoughts or doubts since a *kṣatriya* must engage in fight and never submit to anybody.[100] The idea is that a fighting warrior will always win: both victory and defeat will lead him to Indra's heaven (2.31–37).

Furthermore, Kṛṣṇa criticizes the old ritualistic worldview of *karman* of the followers of the Vedas and argues that solely discriminative knowledge purged of all personal interests is the precondition for right action. He thus redefines *karman* as per the famous doctrine of disinterested action (*niṣkāma karman*, 2.47):

> On action alone be thy interest,[101]
> Never on its fruits;
> Let not the fruits of action be thy motive,
> Nor be thy attachment to inaction.[102]

Action must be carried out at the best of one's capacities and yet it must not be judged by its results. Most importantly, one must relinquish all desires attached to it: only in this way one may free himself from the bondage of *karman*, i.e. interrupt the ongoing production of karmic retribution. One must always consider the intentions that trigger action and exercise self-control. In order to do this the intellect (*buddhi*), the highest faculty that allows to control the lower faculties such as ego-consciousness (*ahaṃkāra*) and possessiveness, must be purified through the practice of *yoga* (*buddhiyoga*), poignantly defined as equanimity (*samatva*), so as to leave the realm of 'acquisition and conservation' (*yogakṣema*) behind oneself and abandon all attachment (2.38–53).

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[100] As Duryodhana states in MBh 5.125.15–19: 'He [= the warrior] must stand erect; never must he submit. Manliness means steadfastness! Even if he feels like falling apart, he should never here on earth bow to anybody!' In the Śāntiparvan, Bhīṣma gives the same advice to Yudhiṣṭhira (12.131.9). In the epic even women formulate the rules of manliness: for instance, Pṛthā/Kuntī to her son Yudhiṣṭhira and Vidurā to her son Vidura (5.132.36–38).

[101] Here Kṛṣṇa makes it clear that Arjuna's entitlement (*adhikāra*) is only to the ordained act.

[102] Edgerton 1964: 14.

Kṛṣṇa brings chapter 2 to a close by answering Arjuna's question regarding the characteristics of a man whose insight is firm (*sthitaprajña*, 2.54–72). Herein, he offers a lesson on yogic meditation which shows how perfect detachment from sense-objects results in clarity (*prasāda*) and peace, in a contemplative withdrawal from the world which culminates in liberation, i.e. *brahmanirvāṇa*, 'the vanishing away that is Brahman.'[103] Noteworthy is that Kṛṣṇa for the first time in the poem proposes himself as the privileged object of concentration, the 'highest goal' (*matpara*) to whom the practitioner must surrender himself (2.61, my translation):

> Them [= the senses] all restraining,
> Let him sit disciplined, intent upon Me as the highest goal;
> Only when his senses are under control,
> Is his wisdom secure.

To be sure, this is the fundamental teaching of the BhG, the most thorough presentation of which is found in chapter 18.54 ff. Although several scholars consider this reference to Kṛṣṇa's divinity to be out of context, a later interpolation inserted when the theistic layers of the text were added,[104] I think this need not be the case. In fact, 2.61 is consonant with 2.7d which is the decisive καιρός that occasions Kṛṣṇa's *upadeśa*, i.e. the momentous time when Arjuna surrenders himself to him, falling at his feet and taking 'refuge' (*śaraṇāgati*) in him as his guru, which implies that he has accepted him as his beloved lord. The hero's surrender (*prapatti*),[105] his leap of faith (*śraddhā*),[106] is a silent, heartfelt prayer

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[103] Other possible translations of this compound which is synonymous of *mokṣa* ('liberation'/'release') are 'the extinction in Brahman' or even 'the inexpressible [state] of Brahman.' Besides 2.72d, *brahmanirvāṇa* is found in BhG 5.24c, 5.25a, and 5.26c. The term *nirvāṇa* is indicative of Buddhist influence.

[104] See for instance Malinar 2007: 77.

[105] Besides 2.7d, the verb *pra* + √*pad* occurs in BhG 4.11a, 7.14c, 7.15b, 7.19b, 7.20b, 15.4c. On the crucial notion of *prapatti* in Śrīvaiṣṇavism, see Lester 1966: 266–282; Raman 2007. The *prapanna* goes through six stages, the final one being *kārpaṇya* or *ākiṃcanya* which is the perfection of *prapatti*; see Piantelli 1996: 109–110.

[106] *Śraddhā* can be understood to mean 'putting one's heart in someone/something,' *śrad* being probably cognate to Latin *credo* and *cor/cordis*; see Monier-

for help that he addresses to his eternal charioteer (*sanātana-sārathi*) as his last resort: it expresses the human need for god, which manifests itself in all its imperativeness at the time of existential crises and impending death.[107]

This paradigmatic *guru-śiṣya* relationship is the foundational presupposition of the BhG's dialogue, its 'secret' (*rahasya*) being pure love (*bhakti*).[108] As the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* solemnly proclaims in its closing verse (6.23): 'Only in a man who has the deepest love for God, and who shows the same love towards his teacher as towards God, do these points declared by the Noble One shine forth.'[109] If Arjuna's act of surrender to the divine master had not preliminarily taken place, Kṛṣṇa's teaching could have never been uttered.[110] The hero's ripeness to receive Kṛṣṇa's *upadeśa* is demonstrated by his *prapatti*. According to Rāmānuja (traditionally believed to have flourished 1017–1137), the great master of Śrī-vaiṣṇavism and the leading theologian of Viśiṣṭādvaita or 'qualified non-dualism,' the *prapanna* who has surrendered himself to the deity is the one worthy of divine favor (*prasāda*). In its culminating, sixth stage known as *kārpaṇya* ('poorness of spirit') or *ākiṃcanya* ('nullity'), *prapatti* is characterized by a condition of total vulnerability: one then 'belongs' to the deity, his/her ego being shattered. The idea is that when one reaches such κένωσις or complete self-emptying, god intervenes filling him/her with his *prasāda*. It is noteworthy that the term *prasāda*— derived from *pra*

Williams 1988: 1095. As Kṛṣṇa teaches to Arjuna in BhG 17.3cd: 'Man here is made up of faith; As a man's faith is, just so he is.' The term also recurs in BhG 3.31c, 4.39a, 6.37a, 6.47c, 7.21b, 7.21c, 7.22a, 9.23b, 12.2c, 17.2a, 17.3b, 17.13c, 17.17a, 17.28a, and 18.71a. On *śraddhā*, see Hara 1964: 132–145.

[107] On the various forms of Hindu prayer, see Piantelli 1998: 34–89.

[108] On the term *bhakti*, see Hara 1964: 124–132. For an overview of *bhakti* theology and its nine characteristics, see Rigopoulos 2005: 191–211. On Kṛṣṇa *bhakti*, see Holdrege 2005.

[109] Olivelle 1998: 265.

[110] As Sathya Sai Baba (2010: 14) points out in his commentary to this crucial passage of the BhG: 'From that moment, Krishna became the guru and Arjuna the disciple. Arjuna prayed for that status and got it. Until Arjuna accepted this attitude of a learner, his heart was filled with egotism and weakness. The hero had become a zero. He had taken a position the very opposite of that taken up by Krishna. The reason for all this, if you study the situation carefully, is nothing but "egotism". Love is the viewpoint of Krishna and delusion (*bhrama*) the viewpoint of Arjuna.'

+ √*sad*, 'to become clear/tranquil,' 'to become satisfied/pleased/ glad' — though usually translated as favor/grace also means good humor and smile.[111]

Having said this, it must be remembered that within the framework of a theology of grace the very possibility of Arjuna's seeking refuge at Kṛṣṇa's feet originates from god's overwhelming love (*preman*).[112] His initiative is thought to precede and predetermine all human endeavor, suspending/vanquishing the law of *karman* itself. The sublime paradox of *bhakti* lies precisely in this: love is activated/instilled within man by the beloved and man, in turn, is called to reciprocate it, i.e. donate it to the beloved. But how is it possible to donate something that does not belong to us, since man received it as a gift of grace in the first place? The answer lies in the recognition that there is only love and such love is no 'thing' but the very nature/essence of god. Love is therefore to be understood as the foundation of all creatures and of all that exists, it being the alpha and the omega, the way and the goal. There is but one circularity of love, with no beginning nor end, an eternal dynamism of love, and this is precisely what the dialogue between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna is all about, its presupposition and its telos.

Even before the BhG episode, there are other instances in the MBh which reveal Arjuna's devotional pose towards Kṛṣṇa. Thus when Arjuna approaches the latter in order to ask him to be his ally in the war against the Kauravas he stands bowing at the foot of Kṛṣṇa's bed — as Govinda was sleeping — with folded hands (*kṛtāñjali*; 5.7.7), an attitude which contrasts with that of Duryodhana who, having come there for the same purpose of asking Kṛṣṇa to ally himself with him against the Pāṇḍavas, comfortably seats himself on a choice seat near Kṛṣṇa's head. When Kṛṣṇa leaves them the option of selecting either the strong army of the Yādavas or himself alone and non-combatant, Duryodhana chooses the army, i.e. quantity, whereas Arjuna chooses him, i.e. quality. And by choosing Kṛṣṇa, who will then act as his charioteer,

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[111] Thus the compound *prasannamukha* means 'with a pleased countenance'/ 'smiling.' See Monier-Williams 1988: 696–697; Apte 1986: 1115. Within the BhG, *prasāda* is found at 2.64d, 2.65a, 17.16a, 18.37d, 18.56c, 18.58b, 18.62c, 18.75a. On grace in Hinduism, see Martin 2013.

[112] See Hara 2007: 81–106.

Arjuna is definitely chosen by him.[113] As Piantelli writes, Arjuna's choice is 'the measure of the exceptional preciousness of Vāsudeva's word, of the unlimited power of the divine and of the risk that anyone who approaches such power with uncompromising dedication must face.'[114]

The BhG aims to establish the legitimate rule of the ideal king who is none other than the god-obeying king, i.e. Arjuna, given that god, i.e. Kṛṣṇa, is the sole, eternal sovereign of the cosmos. It rejects the claims of those evil rulers who, like Duryodhana, make themselves absolute monarchs and affirm a god-like status for themselves. Within the BhG, the religious dimension of *bhakti* is inextricably intertwined with the political dimension of kingship. In the end, Arjuna must fight as a devoted *bhakta* for the cause of the one and only god, Kṛṣṇa, and for the welfare of the world that Kṛṣṇa himself has manifested through his will. Although keeping to his yogic detachment, Kṛṣṇa shows interest in the world and his devoted king must act as his collaborator in the ongoing endeavor of maintaining its welfare (*lokasaṃgraha*). As Angelika Malinar states:

> Kṛṣṇa's position is unique in that he is in command of the creative powers like a yogin, protects the created cosmos like a king, and surpasses all cosmic levels and established realms of liberation in that the 'knowing devotee' reaches not just identity with the elements of creation and liberation of the self, but the eternity in

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[113] With Kṛṣṇa on Arjuna's side, victory is assured. As Saṃjaya solemnly states in the last verse of BhG 18.78:

Where is Kṛṣṇa the Lord of Discipline,
And where is the Bowman, the son of Pṛthā,
There fortune, victory, prosperity,
And statecraft are firmly fixed, I ween.
(Edgerton 1964: 91)

[114] Piantelli 1996: 191 (my translation). For an analysis of this episode, see Hiltebeitel 1990: 102–113. Arjuna's choice calls to mind the words of *Psalm* 20.7: 'Some [trust] in chariots and some in horses: but we will remember the name of the Lord our God'; http://www.lambfold.org.uk/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/kjvbible.pdf. Along these lines, in the Christian tradition saint Roberto Bellarmino (1542–1621) wrote: 'With Christ, our leader and king, it is not anymore in chariots and horses that we place our faith but in the devoutly invoked name of God'; Ravasi 2006: 105 (my translation).

which Kṛṣṇa exists. This state of being can be reached only by those who are devoted to him ....[115]

1.3 Interpretations of prahasann iva

Given such context, I now come back to Hṛṣīkeśa's hint of laughter.[116] From the outset, it must be noted that at this crucial juncture the poet who wrote our text plays on some fundamental oppositions which at the same time complement each other making up an indissoluble whole, since the relation between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna is one of intimate reciprocity and mutual dependence.[117] Kṛṣṇa is not only the model for Arjuna, who is the ideal king and man, but his necessary companion since in the theology of the BhG god and king/devotee, religion and politics, *mokṣa* and kingship are never conceived as separate. Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa, symptomatically 'the white/silvery one' and 'the black/dark one,' are none other than the incarnations of Nara, literally 'man,' and Nārāyaṇa, literally 'resting on the waters'/'resting place of men,' revered as one being in two persons.[118] Arjuna's cry and sad situa-

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[115] Malinar 2007: 135. Although Kṛṣṇa transcends the cosmos he also encompasses it and is keen to preserve it. As Kṛṣṇa cares for the world's welfare, in the same way Arjuna and his *bhakta*s must care for it. Kṛṣṇa unifies the conflicting values of social responsibility and world renunciation, blending in himself the characteristics of both the king and the ascetic.

[116] For an insightful excursus of the typology of laughter, see Tagliapietra 2012: 1–13 (http://www.fillide.it/19-articoli/151-andrea-tagliapietra-tipologia-del-riso). See also Berger 1997; Apte 1985. On laughter in Greek and Roman antiquity, see Halliwell 2008; Beard 2014. On laughter in the Bible and in early Christianity, see Achtemeier - Society of Biblical Literature 2003: 717; Mazzucco 2007; Stroumsa 2006. See also Scarsato 2017; Ventura 2014. A saying falsely attributed to Saint Augustine of Hippo (354–430) but actually of Medieval origin (*Patrologia Latina* XL, 1290) concisely states: *Dominum numquam risisse sed flevisse legimus*, 'We read that the Lord never laughed but cried.'

[117] See Hiltebeitel 1990: 1–26. Their association is already mentioned in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, dating back to the 4th c. BCE: *sūtra* 4.3.98 addresses the issue of how those who possess *bhakti* towards Vāsudeva and Arjuna should be called. Arjuna is the son of Pṛthā/Kuntī and thus Kṛṣṇa's cousin, as she is Kṛṣṇa's aunt. By abduction (*haraṇa*), Arjuna marries Subhadrā, Kṛṣṇa's sister, and the couple has a son, Abhimanyu. When in the Mausalaparvan Kṛṣṇa dies by means of a hunter's arrow piercing his heel — the sole part of his body which is vulnerable, as in Achilles' story — Arjuna instantly loses his strength, a premonitory sign that he is nearing his end.

[118] The sons of Dharma and Ahiṃsā, they are an ancient pair of warriors and

tion is skillfully contrasted with Kṛṣṇa's laughter and otherworldly serenity.[119] The hero represents man who in his despondency can only take refuge at his lord's feet as his *śiṣya*, vis-à-vis the laughing/smiling god who stands in front of him as his authoritative *guru*.[120] As god and man, Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna are regarded as unbeatable and represent the perfect relationship, being supportive and respectful of one another.[121]

Significantly, whereas Arjuna is lost in silence, Kṛṣṇa opens his mouth in a laughter/smile which is the prelude to his nectarine words of grace (*kṛpā, anugraha*), his liberating teaching. His *prahasann iva* is the bridge between silence and the word:[122] it triggers Arjuna's transformation by interrupting his dejection, i.e. who he *thinks* he is, and leading him to a new understanding of himself, i.e. who he *truly* is. Thanks to the lord's *upadeśa*, the hero will overcome his paralysis and will be prepared to act, having acquired resoluteness. As artfully staged in the BhG through these series of oppositions, Arjuna will emerge as the ideal king precisely because as a *bhakta* he is made to represent the ideal human being who, having surrendered to the sovereign of all creatures, will be granted his share of Kṛṣṇa's transcendent state.

Apparently Kṛṣṇa — who is as much a *kṣatriya* prince as he is the ultimate godhead, descended on earth as an *avatāra* for the pro-

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seers (*ṛṣi*) who undertook asceticism at the Himālayan site of Badrīnāth. On the indissoluble couple of Nara and Nārāyaṇa, see Biardeau 1991: 75–108.

[119] On the interplay of these opposite motifs in Indian literature, see Bloomfield 1916: 54–89. On laughing and crying, see Plessner 1970.

[120] Such opposition is reminiscent of the iconographic contrast between the two philosophers Democritus of Abdera (c. 460–370 BCE) and Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 535–475 BCE), the first being represented as laughing and the latter being represented as weeping. In his *De tranquillitate animi*, the Stoic philosopher Seneca (4 BCE–65 CE) sides with Democritus affirming that 'laughing down life' (15.2) is the way through which humans can effectively distance themselves from the world and achieve cheerfulness (*euthymia*). Democritus' laughter is interpreted as revelatory of his serene wisdom, of his indifference towards the world and the vanity of human endeavors; see Ghisu 2006: 135–142.

[121] As Sathya Sai Baba (2015: 65) remarked at the close of a speech he held in Nellore on July 25, 1958: 'Nara (man) and Narayana (God) are the two wires, the positive and the negative, which combine to bring electricity through. Nara will cooperate with Narayana and become the vehicle of divine power, if he has acquired the two qualities, *sathya* (truth) and *prema* (love).'

[122] On the dialectical opposition (*Gegensatz*) between silence and the word, see Zucal 1999: 89–109.

tection of the good and the reestablishment of *dharma* (BhG 4.8) — exhibits what is the typical reaction of a warrior when someone fails to fulfill his martial duty. This is confirmed by the high frequency of the stock expressions *prahasann iva/ hasann iva* in the epic, though not all such occurrences are intended to be derisory. Just to mention one example, when at 5.7.9b Duryodhana approaches Kṛṣṇa for asking him to be his ally in the war against the Pāṇḍavas, he introduces his speech by a hint of laughter which he does not intend to be in any way sarcastic or offensive.

In Indian literature, the mood of laughter (*hāsyarasa*) is said to be induced when a character acts contrary to his *svadharma*: his behavior is laughable precisely because of its inappropriateness (*anaucitya*), as in Arjuna's case. In the world of the epic, such a misdemeanor is invariably regarded as shameful and therefore laughable[123] and conducive to disgrace (*akīrti*) and loss of social esteem, as Kṛṣṇa himself had already made apparent by derogatorily calling Arjuna a eunuch at 2.3 and as he further points out to him at 2.34–36:

> Disgrace, too, will creatures
> Speak of thee, without end;
> And for one that has been esteemed, disgrace
> Is worse than death.
> That thou hast abstained from battle thru fear
> The (warriors) of great chariots will think of thee;
> And of whom thou wast highly regarded,

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[123] On these issues, see Tschannerl 1992: 101–112. The laughter of Homeric heroes was also aggressive, charged with sarcasm. In ancient Greece the warriors' laughter was personified as a god, Γέλως, and the Spartans had erected a sanctuary to him which stood side by side to the ones dedicated to the personification of terror and the personification of death. On the warriors' laughter, see Tritle 2015: 117–134. In Hinduism, the warrior goddess Kālī laughs on the battlefield: her solitary laughter when everyone has been killed and everything has been destroyed makes her the embodiment of terror. For an introduction to Kālī, see McDaniel 2009: 587–604. One is also reminded of the transgressive laughter (*hasita*) of the adepts of the ancient movement of the Pāśupatas, in imitation of the 'laud laughter' (*aṭṭahāsa*) of their chosen deity Rudra ('Roarer,' 'Howler'), the wild and terrible form of Śiva; see *Pāśupatasūtra* 1.8. With his ghastly laughter, Rudra-Śiva breaks the shell of Brahmā's egg (*brahmāṇḍa*), i.e. transcends the limits of our finite universe; see *Kālabhairavāṣṭaka* 7. On the Pāśupatas' practice of courting dishonor, see Lorenzen 1972: 185–192; Ingalls 1962: 281–298.

Thou shalt come to be held lightly.
And many sayings that should not be said
Thy ill-wishers will say of thee,
Speaking ill of thy capacity:
What, pray, is more grievous than that?[124]

Undoubtedly, what a warrior fears most is to be laughed at due to his supposed weakness.[125] Strength and manliness (*balapauruṣa*) are the sole values that count within a *kṣatriya* milieu, and Arjuna's crisis and last-minute appeals for peace cannot be deemed acceptable.

Thus at a prima facie level, the hint of laughter of Arjuna's charioteer appears to be mocking and derisory, a warrior's typical reaction towards another warrior's lack of courage. It might be argued that Kṛṣṇa's derisive laugh/smile has a pedagogical function, being intended to put Arjuna to shame so as to induce in him a reaction capable of triggering discriminative knowledge. Along these lines, Swami Swarupananda writes:

> *Smiling* — to drown Arjuna in the ocean of shame. Krishna's smile at Arjuna's sorrow is like the lightning that plays over the black monsoon cloud. The rain bursts forth, and the thirsty earth is saturated. It is the smile of the coming illumination.[126]

And yet at a more subtle level, Kṛṣṇa's hint of laughter is the expression of his pure mirth and of something superhuman, being the sign of his divinity. His laughter/smile conveys a sense of joyful levity and relief, of unburdening and liberation. It indicates his benevolent sovereignty and transcendent detachment,[127] above and beyond saṃsāric circumstances though being constantly engaged in the protection of the good and the welfare of the world.

After all, laughing as well as smiling are constitutively ambivalent and ambiguous actions being as it were suspended at the

[124] Edgerton 1964: 12–13.
[125] See for instance Yudhiṣṭhira's predicament in MBh 5.70.75.
[126] Swami Swarupananda 1967: 34.
[127] Kṛṣṇa's hint of laughter may be compared to the enigmatic smile of many statues of deities of ancient Greece which reflect their detachment and Olympian serenity.

fringe of reality: they 'stand in between' and are akin to a dream experience. The *iva* particle of our text, in its nuance of indefiniteness, reinforces the liminal character of Kṛṣṇa's hint of laughter, which is at the same time human and divine. The Austrian ethologist Konrad Lorenz (1903–1989) noted long ago that laughter is a case of redirected activity, i.e. the transformation of an originally threatening movement — as for most animals is the opening of the mouth and the showing of the teeth, signaling the intention to bite — in a reassuring, peaceful gesture.[128]

My contention is that *prahasann iva* is constitutively polysemic and that both understandings should be acknowledged, i.e. the hint of laughter as mock and the hint of laughter as mirth, given that Kṛṣṇa is *both* a prince, i.e. a warrior, *and* the supreme godhead. The poet of the BhG is deliberately playing with such polysemy, which reflects Kṛṣṇa's unfathomable personality within the epic.[129] Though these understandings are mutually exclusive if taken in isolation, an almost imperceptible and yet decisive movement from one to the other may be inferred: the hint of laughter as ridicule of Kṛṣṇa the prince gives way to the sweetest expression of blissful grace of Kṛṣṇa the godhead, resort of all *bhakta*s.

Moreover, I am persuaded that given Arjuna's surrender to Govinda as his *guru* and lord at the close of 2.7, *prahasann iva* rather than as an 'ordinary' mocking laugh/smile must be understood *in the first place* as a laugh/smile of pure grace and complacency on the latter's part. Kṛṣṇa rejoices at Arjuna having finally sought refuge at his feet and promptly responds to his utter despondency through his benevolent gaze. The *upasarga*s *pra* which primarily mean 'forward' of *pra-pannam* (2.7d) and *pra-hasann* (2.10b) subtly respond to one another, the former inevitably attracting the latter. The past passive participle *prapanna* (*pra* + √*pad*) literally means 'to throw one's self down [at a per-

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[128] See Lorenz 1966: 172–173, 269, 284–287. And yet baring one's teeth is not always a threat: in primates showing the teeth, especially if they are held together, is usually a sign of submission and the human smile may have evolved from that. In any given culture, the variety of smiles is due to the simple fact that there are many different ways and reasons for smiling; see http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20170407-why-all-smiles-are-not-the-same.

[129] On Kṛṣṇa's enigmatic personality within the MBh, see Matilal 2002: 91–108.

son's feet],' 'to go forwards,' 'to resort to,'[130] and it is precisely Arjuna's act of surrendering at Kṛṣṇa's feet, of moving forwards and resorting to him, that attracts the lord's positive response, i.e. his hint of laughter/smile towards him.

Though Arjuna's last words at 2.9 that he will not fight (*na yot-sye*) evidence the hero's deluded stubbornness and inevitably attract Kṛṣṇa's irony — because of the patent contradiction between his discipleship on the one hand and his claimed independence on the other — such hint of sarcasm is nonetheless secondary with respect to the lord's all-forgiving hint of laughter/smile, given the new, transformative context of the sacred *guru-śiṣya* relation which has just been established. Kṛṣṇa's standing in front of Arjuna with a hint of laughter expresses the fullness of god's *prasāda* towards his *bhakta*. It is not a cynical laughter filled with contempt, since Govinda does not laugh *at* or *against* Arjuna. His is not a condescending or nasty grimace but rather a cheerful laughter of sympathy and encouragement,[131] which welcomes the Pāṇḍava hero as his dear pupil and devotee: Govinda laughs/smiles *for* Arjuna, embracing him in the warmth of his love.[132] Along these lines, Douglas Brooks observes:

> Krishna's reply begins with the 'hint of a smile,' ... the signal of grace descending (*shakti-pata*), and promises a radical transformation and awakening. This descent of grace comes from the highest, self-luminating reality and is refined in the awareness of the seeker who opens to its presence in her or his own thoughts (*vikalpa*).[133]

[130] Monier-Williams 1988: 682.

[131] As Swami B. V. Tripurari (2010: 40–41) observes: 'Kṛṣṇa smiles to encourage Arjuna. As Kṛṣṇa prepared to speak grave topics, he sought to make light of the situation that so overwhelmed Arjuna. The preceptor similarly makes light of the task at hand in the beginning by allowing us to believe that perfection is almost within our grasp, when in fact it may be lifetimes away... Viśvanātha Cakravartī comments that because Arjuna has at this point become Kṛṣṇa's disciple, Kṛṣṇa merely smiles and refrains from chiding him as he did earlier.'

[132] In his commentary to BhG 2.10, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1963: 102) writes: 'The smile indicates that he [= Kṛṣṇa] saw through Arjuna's attempt at rationalization or what is now known as wishful thinking. The attitude of the saviour God who knows all the sins and sorrows of suffering humanity is one of tender pity and wistful understanding.'

[133] Brooks 2008: 47.

Swami Chidbhavananda's commentary is also worth quoting:

> Significant is the smile beaming on the lips of Hrishikesa. As the dawn is the harbinger of day-break, the Lord's smile forecasts the *yoga* and the spiritual enlightenment that are to come on Arjuna. It was *Preyas* [= the gratifying] that he had been receiving till now. What he is going to receive forthwith is *Sreyas* [= the good], the sovereign remedy for all the evils of the mundane existence. It is the inviolable means for the attainment of Beatitude. There is nothing greater than *Sreyas* for man to seek. Existence finds fulfillment in It. Arjuna is going to be initiated into It. Hence this divine smile on the lips of the Lord.[134]

As noted, Kṛṣṇa's hint of laughter is the connecting point between the hero's distressed silence and the lord's word of grace, the pivotal moment which immediately precedes the deliverance of the divine teaching. The smile of the *guru* towards his disciple(s) marking the effusion of his *upadeśa* — be it through silence or through the medium of speech — has a long-standing tradition in Indian religions: one is reminded of the Buddha and of Bodhisattvas such as Avalokiteśvara and, within the Hindu milieu, of the figure of Śiva Dakṣiṇāmūrti, who is said to convey the truth of Vedānta through his eloquent silence.[135] Just to offer one example, I here quote two beautiful verses taken from the *Dakṣiṇāmūrti-stotra* attributed to Śaṅkara:

> I have contemplated Him, the One who is rich of inexhaustible
>   compassion,
> The Primeval Teacher seated at the root of the Banyan tree,
> Who through His silence adorned of His gentle smile
> Vanquishes the darkness of ignorance for the multitude of the
>   great seers.
> ....

[134] Swami Chidbhavananda 1972: 127–128.
[135] On the Śiva Dakṣiṇāmūrti icon and its resemblance to the iconography of the enlightened Buddha, see Geetha 2012: 74–85; Gail 2008: 457–462; Bakker 2001: 41–53. On silence and its eloquence, see Rigopoulos 2015: 101–117. As the South Indian mystic Ramaṇa Maharṣi (1879–1959) once wrote: 'Silence, the universal language, which always springs out from the heart, is the state of grace' (Sri Ramana Maharshi 2012: 157, my translation).

I bow to the Teacher of Teachers who, by inclining His gaze,
From the corner of His eye discharges
The waves of nectar of His boundless compassion
On the ascetics who are worn-out by the sultriness of the
    desert of rebirths.[136]

Kṛṣṇa's hint of laughter shatters Arjuna's bewildered silence and anticipates the dissolution of the hero's mortal anguish: in fact, it is the definite cure to Arjuna's 'disease' caused by *śoka* and *moha*. More to the point, it signals the theological truth that Govinda has *already* dissolved his negative condition, even before the pouring forth of the nectar of his words. His hint of laughter is the expression of the gushing out of his superabundant grace, which eradicates the disciple's doubts[137] and vanquishes the numbness of his mind and body.

Theologically, the prefix *pra* can indeed be interpreted as meaning 'supreme'/'excellent,' pointing at the spiritual dimension of Kṛṣṇa's hint of laughter. A reason that supports such interpretation is the implied body language of the two protagonists: whereas Arjuna's posture as a *prapanna* entails that he has thrown himself down at his lord's feet, Kṛṣṇa the *guru* stands up facing his disciple and illumining him with a hint of laughter which 'comes from above' and is indicative of his otherworldly eminence.[138] Arjuna awaits everything from Kṛṣṇa, with his eyes fixed upon him as his last resort — concentrating his attention on Kṛṣṇa's feet, they being the receptacle of divine power and grace[139] — and the

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[136] *Śrīśāṃkaragranthāvaliḥ, sampuṭaḥ* 11, 1972: 257–258 (my translation). In Medieval Europe, a parallel is represented by the 'compassionate eyes' (*misericordes oculi*) of the Virgin Mary, the 'Gracious Queen.'

[137] Doubts (*saṃśaya, saṃdeha*) must be dissolved since they confuse the mind and paralyze action. Given two or more alternatives, the wise must exercise thorough discrimination (*viveka*) in order to establish what is right and what is wrong and decide his/her course of action.

[138] On these issues, see Prentiss 2000.

[139] The sacredness of the *guru*'s feet is sung in countless devotional hymns, past and present, as in this beautiful incipit: *mānasabhajare guru caraṇam | dustarabhavasāgarataraṇam* | 'Worship in thy mind the guru's feet: [these alone] carry over the ocean of existence, hard to overcome.' *Gurugītā* 76b solemnly proclaims: *pūjāmūlaṃ guroḥ padam,* 'The root of worship is the foot of the guru.' To Śaṅkara is attributed a hymn of eight verses in praise of the guru's lotus feet (*guror aṅghripadme*), the *Gurvaṣṭaka*; see Mahadevan 1970: 28–35.

lord bountifully turns his beaming countenance towards him and gives him peace, filling the hero's emptiness with his luminous gaze which annihilates all sins. It is the sacred moment of *darśana*, the transformative experience of seeing the divine person and, most importantly, of being seen by him.[140]

Arjuna's surrender to the lord entails his 'falling like a stick, with the eight limbs of his body touching the ground' (*sāṣṭāṅga daṇḍavat*; forehead, chest, palms, knees, and feet): love of god and fear of god are perfectly integrated in the all-important act of prostration, the *praṇipāta* or *namaḥ*.[141] On his part Kṛṣṇa, standing upright, through the first, imperceptible opening of his mouth in laughter/smile asserts his *saṃkalpa*, i.e. his 'intention' of love towards his *bhakta*. And through the expansion of his facial muscles, the lord radiates and pours down on Arjuna his invigorating, pure *preman*.[142] Thus Arjuna's devout attitude as a *pra-panna* inevitably attracts Kṛṣṇa's graceful hint of laughter, his *pra-hasan*, the call of love being irresistible. The *prahasann iva* abolishes all hierarchies and signals the bond of intimacy between the two that characterizes their relation throughout the BhG. Even at the beginning of chapter 4, Kṛṣṇa tells Arjuna that he will teach him his ancient (*purātana*) yoga precisely because he is his loyal devotee and comrade (*bhakto 'si me sakhā ca*; 4.3c). This bond of love is truly 'the highest secret' (*rahasyam uttamam*; 4.3d) and such relation between *guru* and *śiṣya* will find its culmination in chapter 11 when the lord will grace his devotee with the vision of his univer-

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[140] See Valpey 2010: 380–394.

[141] A disciple must always approach the guru by reverently prostrating himself/herself to him. As Kṛṣṇa tells Arjuna in BhG 4.34:

Learn to know this (*tad = jñāna*) by obeisance (*praṇipātena*) (to
    those who can teach it),
By questioning (them), by serving (them);
They will teach thee knowledge (*jñānam*),
Those who have knowledge, who see the truth.
(Edgerton 1964: 26)

[142] As Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902) wrote to Swami Brahmananda (1863–1922) in 1895: 'All love is expansion, all selfishness is contraction. Love is therefore the only law of life. He who loves lives, he who is selfish is dying. Therefore love for love's sake, because it is the only law of life, just as you breathe to live. This is the secret of selfless love, selfless action, and the rest' (https://www.vivekananda.net/KnownLetters/1895_96NewYork.html).

sal form.[143] Indeed, after having had this astonishing revelation Arjuna praises Kṛṣṇa as the father of the world (*pitā'si lokasya*) and the most venerable *guru* (*tvam asya pūjyaś ca gurur garīyān*) whose greatness is matchless. He then asks Kṛṣṇa to please forgive him if in the past he treated him lightly, as if he was just his comrade and friend (11.42–43). In particular, at 11.42 Arjuna says:

> And if I treated Thee disrespectfully, to make sport of Thee
>   (*avahāsārtham*),
> In the course of amusement, resting, sitting or eating,
> Either alone, O unshaken one (*acyuta*), or in the presence
>   of those others,
> For that I beg forgiveness of Thee, the immeasurable one.[144]

Herein the noun *avahāsa*, 'jest'/'joke,' 'derision,' is derived from *ava* + √*has* meaning 'to laugh at'/'deride.'[145] Remarkably, it is the only other occurrence in the whole poem besides *prahasann* at 2.10b of a term derived from verbal root √*has*. The compound *avahāsārtham*, which Edgerton translates 'to make sport,' can be more appropriately rendered 'with jesting'/'deriding purpose,' 'by way of a joke.' As a prefix to verbs, *ava* — literally 'down,' 'off' —[146] can be used to express disrespect and depreciation.[147] It is noteworthy that Arjuna begs Kṛṣṇa to forgive him if in the past he 'put him down' and treated him disrespectfully (*asatkṛta*): here the *upasarga ava* is meant to draw attention to the sin of irreverence verging on blasphemy, which the hero and all humans are prone to commit through their frivolous attitudes and humorous language. The prefix *ava* of *avahāsārtham* — entailing inferiority/horizontality, i.e. humanity — stands in complementary opposition to the prefix *pra* of *prahasann iva* — entailing superiority/verticality, i.e. divinity. My suggestion is that Kṛṣṇa's *pra* + √*has* at 2.10b and Arjuna's *ava* + √*has* at 11.42a are an interrelated pair, mirroring two opposite and yet corresponding modes of expres-

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[143] On divine visions in the MBh, see Laine 1989.
[144] Edgerton 1964: 59.
[145] Monier-Williams 1988: 106.
[146] See Whitney 1987: 396; Goldman and Sutherland Goldman 2002: 148.
[147] See Apte 1986: 238.

sion of laugh/jest, the first being sublimely divine and the second being all too human. Such contrastive wordplay is not casual but consciously aimed at by the poet of the BhG.

With regard to the hero's supplicant words to his guru-god, Hiltebeitel remarks:

> Friendship (*sakhyam*) is thus a suitable relationship for understanding Krishna's dharmic role, but, as Arjuna says, it is not adequate to carry the devotional appreciation of Krishna in his universal form. Thus, after the theophany, Arjuna apologizes for his earlier familiarity with Krishna, that is, as he puts it, for:
> 'Whatever I said rashly, thinking Thee my boon companion (*sakhe 'ti matvā*), calling Thee "Kṛṣṇa, Yādava, Companion (*sakhe*)!"'
> (11.41)
> Arjuna is, of course, forgiven his familiarities, and he stands as the exemplar of both of these relationships to Krishna: those of *sakhi* and *bhakta*, the former implying a variety of social and dharmic relations, the latter a means to salvation.[148]

Hiltebeitel's authority notwithstanding, I think that his statement needs to be corrected. As Malinar notes: 'Well-established social relationships of kinship (father-son), friendship/comradeship (*sakha*) and love (*priya*) are now placed within the religious framework of *bhakti*.'[149] In such framework, friendship is regarded as one of the highest forms of devotion given that *sakhya* is the penultimate, eighth limb of the 'nine limbs' (*navāṅgāni*) of *bhakti* which culminate in self-surrender, i.e. *ātmanivedana*, which is a synonym of *prapatti* (see *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* 7.5.23).[150] Therefore, that Arjuna's intimacy and comradeship with Kṛṣṇa — which is extolled as the paradigm of *sakhya*[151] — resulted in his falling at the latter's feet must be appreciated as the hero's final, crowning achievement along the *bhakti* path (*mārga*).[152] This is the reason

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[148] Hiltebeitel 1990: 258.

[149] Malinar 2007: 184.

[150] See Rigopoulos 2005: 204–206. On *bhakti* in the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa*, see Gail 1969.

[151] The noun *sakhi* ('friend,' 'companion') occurs in BhG 1.26d, 4.3c, 11.41ab, 11.44c.

[152] In commenting upon *prahasann iva*, Swami B. V. Tripurari (2010: 40) notes: 'Kṛṣṇa's smile further indicates his affection for Arjuna, who remains his

why Kṛṣṇa gazes at Arjuna with tenderness, since by completely surrendering himself to his lord he has done *the one* right thing, which solely counts.

It should be noted that the epithet *acyuta* ('imperishable'/ 'unshaken'/'changeless') with which Arjuna acknowledges Kṛṣṇa's divinity at 11.42c, had been used by the hero at the beginning of the poem, i.e. at BhG 1.21d, when he had asked Hṛṣīkeśa to halt the chariot between the two armies. This name is meant to hint that Arjuna was all along aware of Kṛṣṇa's divine nature, though his comradeship with him had brought him to forget such truth as he was misled by the *avatāra*'s humanity, i.e. the veil of Kṛṣṇa's *māyā*.[153] Besides 1.21d and 11.42c, *acyuta* is used a third time at the end of the poem, at 18.73b, when Arjuna pronounces his last, solemn words:

> Destroyed the confusion; attention (to the truth) is won,
> By Thy grace, on my part, O Changeless One (*acyuta*);
> I stand firm, with doubts dispersed;
> I shall do Thy word.[154]

The curling of the god's lips, the corners of his mouth turned up, and the glimpse of his glimmering teeth are for Arjuna as well as for all *bhakta*s the sure sign of the lord's benign favor. Such benevolent *darśana* of Kṛṣṇa's mouth and teeth coexists with the wrathful vision of the god's mouth and terrible tusks (*daṃṣṭrākarāla*) in the theophany of chapter 11 (in particular 11.23, 11.25, and 11.27). Indeed, ultimately Kṛṣṇa is the supreme godhead who is responsible for the manifestation, preservation, and annihilation of all beings. But leaving aside the god's cosmic form and his destructive function as the personification of time/death (*kāla*), the *darśana* of Kṛṣṇa's laughter/smile is thought to be so captivating — his teeth being compared to the buds of jasmine flowers, reflecting

friend even as he becomes his disciple. In the Gauḍīya tradition, the disciple sees the *guru* as a dear-most friend. The *guru* teaches the disciple like a friendly elder. Here Kṛṣṇa's smile indicates the union of friendship and servitude that characterizes Arjuna's love for him.'

[153] See Piano 1994: 89, n. 21c. If *acyuta* is a well-known epithet of Viṣṇu-Kṛṣṇa, in the epic it is also the epithet of great warriors such as Yudhiṣṭhira.

[154] Edgerton 1964: 91.

the splendor of his rosy lips — that his *bhakta*s are advised to constantly contemplate such sheer beauty within their hearts. Once again, the act of seeing plays a key function being the way through which the god's grace is effectively conveyed.

Through his hint of laughter Kṛṣṇa challenges Arjuna's entanglement to the world by calling attention to what solely is, i.e. the *ātman*. The lord's laughter exhibits his pure joy (*ānanda*) and blissful equanimity,[155] his *līlā* or playful attitude towards existence that subverts mundane preoccupations and ordinary, well-established patterns of thought.[156] As Swami Mukundananda notes: 'In sharp contrast to Arjuna's words of lamentation, Shree Krishna smiled, displaying that the situation was not making him despair; rather he was perfectly happy with it. Such is the equanimous attitude exhibited by someone with knowledge in all situations.'[157]

Kṛṣṇa laughs also because he knows beforehand that his *bhakta* will assuredly reach him: then Arjuna's hair will stand on end not anymore due to the despondency/grief born out of ignorance (1.29c) but as the unmistakable sign that he has realized Kṛṣṇa's true identity. This is testified by the hero's reaction at BhG 11.14, after witnessing his lord's cosmic form, in which he is depicted in the typical position of a devoted disciple worshipping his chosen deity:

Then filled with amazement (*vismayāviṣṭo*),
His hair standing upright (*hṛṣṭaromā*), Dhanaṃjaya[158]
Bowed with his head (*praṇamya śirasā*) to the God,
And said with a gesture of reverence (*kṛtāñjaliṛ*):[159]

While the hero's crisis was originally determined by his sentiment of pity, its solution is now represented by another overwhelming emotion, i.e. awe at the sight of Kṛṣṇa's theophany.[160] Nothing but

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[155] Which is reminiscent of the perfect joy exalted by Saint Francis of Assisi (1181/1182–1226), the *ioculator Domini*; see Benedetti 2019: 29–40.

[156] On these issues, see Narayan 1989: 181–182.

[157] https://www.holy-bhagavad-gita.org/chapter/2/verse/10.

[158] A name for Arjuna, meaning 'the wealth-conqueror.'

[159] Edgerton 1964: 56.

[160] On this glorious manifestation of the divine as *mysterium tremendum et fascinans*, see the classic study of Otto 1950.

bhakti can secure such otherworldly vision, as the lord proclaims at 11.54:

> But by unswerving devotion (*bhaktyā tv ananyayā*) can
> I in such a guise, Arjuna,
> Be known and seen in very truth,
> And entered into, scorcher of the foe.[161]

Devotion is therefore indispensable. Arjuna alone was granted the privilege of seeing the lord's cosmic form, precisely because *bhaktiyoga* (14.26) is the most excellent type of discipline an adept can resort to. Eventually, by realizing Kṛṣṇa as the highest godhead one goes beyond virtue and vice, beyond *dharma*s of all kind. Along these lines BhG 18.66, the so-called *caramaśloka* or ultimate verse, declares:

> Abandoning all other duties (*sarvadharmān*),
> Go to Me as thy sole refuge (*śaraṇa*);
> From all evils I thee
> Shall rescue: be not grieved![162]

Arjuna's original conflict between *kuladharma* and *kṣatriyadharma* which led to his tragic breakdown and impasse has been definitely superseded by his loyalty to the lord of the universe who abides in the heart of each and every one (*sarvasya cāhaṃ hṛdi saṃniviṣṭo*, BhG 15.15a) as their inner controller (*antaryāmin*). The complete surrender of body, mind, and all possessions to the guru-god is the acme of *bhakti*,[163] after which nothing else is needed: all duties drop away just as a flower drops off as soon as its fruit appears.[164]

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[161] Edgerton 1964: 61.
[162] Edgerton 1964: 90. See also Malinar 2007: 222. On Śaṅkara's commentary on this verse, see Marchignoli 2018: 233–235, 355–356.
[163] Significantly, in Śrī Vaiṣṇava circles the theology of *prapatti* is understood as a development of BhG 18.66.
[164] As per the insightful comment made by saint Ramakrishna (1836–1886) in Gupta 1942: 406.

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A Fragment of Pramāṇa from Gilgit[*]

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1. Introductory remarks

To the best of our knowledge, the single-folio fragment edited here has not been identified in any publication.[1] We cannot determine with certainty the actual identity of the text (although we will attempt a hypothesis). However, we can ascertain its contents: this is the beginning of a rather sophisticated epistemological *prakara-*

[1] The most up-to-date list of identified materials is von Hinüber 2014. On p. 105, the leaf is described as follows: 'No. 42: Unidentified Pages 3223–3224: 1 folio; folio no. extant: 1 (? on the right margin!); beginning of a text. — Ed.: –.'

ṇa. To date, this is only the second *pramāṇa* work to emerge from the Gilgit hoard, next to Dharmakīrti's *Hetubindu.*[2] The fragment is thus an important witness of philosophical-epistemological studies in greater Gilgit, an area usually not identified as a great citadel of *pramāṇa* learning.

We could not perform a personal autopsy of this single birchbark leaf, now kept in New Delhi. Our access to the witness consists of digital reproductions of monochrome microfilm images. In the facsimile edition, the leaf is found in volume 10, page nos. 3223–3224.[3] On the so-called Rissho CD-ROMs, the images are on vol. 3, 21/07.[4] We also had access to microfilm copies once prepared for J. W. de Jong.[5] The three sets do not differ greatly in quality, although perhaps the last one is somewhat clearer to read. The folio is in nearly perfect condition, except for a triangular tear (or perhaps delamination) in the upper right corner of the *recto.* This results in the loss of two *akṣara*s from the beginning of *pāda* b of the opening verse and the loss of a single *akṣara* from the very end of the fragment. The string space is protected by interrupting two lines on the *recto* and three on the *verso.* Judging by the paleographical features (the script is what is usually referred to as Gilgit/Bamiyan type II or proto-Śāradā), the copy was made in the latter part of the scriptorium's history, ca. 7th c. CE or slightly later.[6]

Given the style and the content, this short fragment can be viewed as belonging to a '*pramāṇa*-type' treatise. Since the manuscript can be roughly dated to the late 7th c. or perhaps early 8th, the text must either precede or be from around that time. In light of the usage of some technical terms, it must be regarded as post-Dharmakīrtian. This would place it most likely after the beginning of the 7th c. It starts with a *sragdharā* verse, where, among other

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[2] See Wille in Steinkellner 2016.

[3] Lokesh Chandra (1974: 8) describes the fragment as follows: '42. It is again a single folio without any number. The last line reads: सत्ताप्रसंगो बोधकं प्रमाणमिति ।। ।। अत्र तु प्रमाणप्रमेयविषयनिश्चायकप्रत्यया' The reading *bodhakaṃ* is a mistake for *bādhakaṃ.*

[4] On this collection, see von Hinüber 2014: 92–93.

[5] We thank Jonathan Silk for granting us access to this source.

[6] We thank Noriyuki Kudo and Jundo Nagashima for sharing their thoughts on this issue.

things, the author declares his intention to provide his audience with a rejection (*bhaṅga*) of the deluded views of the opponents, through a collection of good refuting arguments (*bādhakaiḥ satprayogaiḥ*), perhaps to be used in public debates.

The main theme of the fragment is a criticism of the real existence (*sattā*) of things that are uncreated, that is, causeless and permanent (*sthāvara*).

At the beginning of the treatise, the author introduces the opponents as people who depend on a transmitted tradition and ignore the power of *pramāṇa*s. As he says immediately after, they all agree on the existence of entities that are causeless and permanent, thus suggesting the presence of a general fictitious Brahmanical opponent.

The thesis of the Brahmanical opponents is spelled out as follows: 'Those [things that are] not dependent on real things (*bhāva*) that are the cause of their arising and admitted as permanent are indeed existent.'

As for what is the third sentence in our translation, we have two versions:

(i) The first one is *ante correctionem*. There is a list of entities that are conceived of as uncreated, permanent, and real by the opponents, some being common to more than one tradition, some being specific to certain Brahmanical traditions. These are: Viśveśvara that is the cause (*hetu*) [i.e., the efficient cause] with regard to bodies, faculties, and world-systems,[7] the authorless word (*apauruṣeyaśabda*), the universals (*jāti*), the Self, etc.

The authorless word is of course a hallmark of Mīmāṃsā thought. The notion of Viśveśvara as the efficient cause with regard to bodies, faculties, and world-systems presents us with a more complex situation. The compound *tanukaraṇabhuvana* (or *tanubhuvanakaraṇa*) is found mostly in Śaiva sources.[8] However, we do have two significant occurrences of this compound in

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[7] For arguments against the existence of Īśvara, see Krasser 1999.

[8] Note that in the archival process, this folio was filmed immediately after the only Śaiva work in the hoard, the so-called *Devītantrasadbhāvasāra* (Sanderson 2009: 50–51). Sanderson (referring to a personal communication by Vasudeva) dates the folios of this text to the mid-6th c.

Buddhist sources. One is in Dharmakīrti's *Vādanyāya*, which assuredly predates this text. In that discussion, the compound is associated with the Vaiśeṣikas.[9] The other is in Kamalaśīla's *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, which is more likely later than this text, but could also have been almost contemporary. In this case, Kamalaśīla is quoting Aviddhakarṇa,[10] a thinker who is presented as a Naiyāyika in the *Pañjikā*, one who aims to prove the existence of Īśvara as an intelligent superior being that is the efficient cause for the material causes such as bodies, faculties, and world-systems.[11] This appears very similar to what our author seems to have in mind when employing the said compound. Accordingly, it is more likely that he has in mind the Naiyāyikas or the Vaiśeṣikas as his opponents here, rather than any Śaiva sources.

(ii) The second version is *post correctionem*. What is most likely a second hand[12] deletes the list of various entities and leaves only the notion of entities with exceptional power (*prabhāvātiśaya*) as the cause of the arising of bodies, faculties, and world-systems. This is, in the corrector's mind, most likely Īśvara. Therefore, based exclusively on this small fragment, it looks as if the second hand's intention is that of turning the treatise into an **Īśvarabhaṅga*, overlooking all the other entities. A possible explanation is that a reader (whose hand we now see preserved in the lower margin) noticed that the rest of the work refutes only Īśvara and

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[9] See *yathā puruṣātiśayapūrvakāṇi tanubhuvanakaraṇādīnīti pratijñāya tanukaraṇabhuvanavyākhyāvyājena sakalavaiśeṣikaśāstrārthaghoṣaṇam* (*Vādanyāya*, p. 52₈₋₉).

[10] Aviddhakarṇa is most likely an 'old' Naiyāyika. Very little is known about him. He might be the same person as Bhāvivikta, or there might have been two Aviddhakarṇas, a Naiyāyika and a Cārvāka. His/Their works are not preserved, except for fragments as testimonia in the works by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla (mostly in the *Pañjikā*). On this, see particularly Marks 2019.

[11] *yathoktam — tanubhuvanakaraṇopādānāni cetanāvadadhiṣṭhitāni svakāryam ārabhanta iti pratijānīmahe, rūpādimattvāt, tantvādivad iti.* (*Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā ad* st. 49, ed. p. 54₁₂₋₁₃). For a discussion of this quotation (also found in Abhayadevasūri's *Tattvabodhavidhāyinī*), see Marks 2019: 61, n. 182.

[12] The 'correction' added in the lower margin is in a very crude hand, unlike that of the original scribe. This does not necessarily mean that there was a second hand: the same hand may look different due to a change of stylus, etc. If the correction is not by the first hand, it could still be coeval. According to Charles DiSimone (whom we wish to thank), the script is not 'later' but more 'cursive.'

nothing else, or at least not directly. This is possible only if he had an incomplete work in front of him. Of course, it is also possible that he may not have understood the arguments completely and that is why he decided to curtail the list of objectionable items.

In our opinion, provided that the *ante correctionem* version is the original text, this was a *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi, a proof of the momentariness of things.

The similarity with the beginning of the Sthirabhāvaparīkṣā chapter of the *Tattvasaṅgraha* and the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* may lead to this conclusion. There, two of the same elements are found: *a)* a comprehensive list of permanent entities admitted by different Brahmanical opponents and *b)* the idea that they can all be refuted with a few arguments.[13]

If this is a *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi, we would be tempted to think of the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* by Arcaṭa. Arcaṭa is reported by Tāranātha as having lived in Kashmir and, in spite of Tāranātha's statement that he was coeval with the emperors Dharmapāla and Khri srong lde brtsan, is regarded as slightly earlier than Śāntarakṣita and Jinendrabuddhi (Funayama 1995: 195); accordingly, he perhaps lived around the beginning of the 8th c. His *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* is not preserved and only mentioned in his *Hetubinduṭīkā* (ed. pp. 82₁₄, 87₂₄).

Given the exiguity of the extant text, however, it is fairly impossible to determine anything about the work with certainty.

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[13] *atha vāsthāna evāyam āyāsaḥ kriyate yataḥ | kṣaṇabhaṅgaprasiddhyaiva prakṛtyādi nirākṛtam || uktasya vakṣyamāṇasya jātyādeś cāviśeṣataḥ | niṣedhāya tataḥ spaṣṭaṃ kṣaṇabhaṅgaḥ prasādhyate ||* (*Tattvasaṅgraha* 350–351) 'Or, [one might say that] this effort [viz. the composition of the *Tattvasaṅgraha*] is made in vain, because primordial nature and the other [entities admitted as real by the opponents,] [can] be refuted by establishing momentariness alone (st. 350). And, therefore, in order to reject [all those real entities admitted by the opponents,] such as the general properties—which have been and will be discussed—since they are not [in any way] different [inasmuch as they are ultimately impermanent], momentariness is clearly established [in the present chapter] (st. 351).' In the *Pañjikā*, Kamalaśīla paraphrases the *eva* in 350c with *ekaprahāreṇaiva*, 'in one clean swoop' (ed. p. 166₂₀₋₂₄).

2. Formatted diplomatic transcript

The *siddham* sign is expressed by a symbol. The numeration does not seem to survive, hence the folio number is tentative. We transcribe allophones of the *visarga*, the *jihvāmūlīya* (voiceless velar fricative) as x and the *upadhmānīya* (voiceless bilabial fricative) as f. The *recto* and *verso* of the folio are marked *r* and *v* respectively.

We use the following symbols:

⊙	string space
?	illegible element
+	lost *akṣara*
−	lost metrically long syllable
<*kiṃcit*>	scribal addition

[$1r_1$] *siddham* nānāvādapravīṇaif paragatabahaladhvāntavidhvaṃsadakṣais saṃbuddhājñāprapannaif prakaṭitam akhilaṃ vastutattvaṃ susūkṣmam | − − [$1r_2$] ye viprapannāf paramatavihitāpārthanād aprapannās teṣāṃ saṃmohabhaṅgax kriyata iha mayā bādhakais satpray?gaiḥ || [$1r_3$] iha hi samadhigatavācyavācakasambandhagamitaśāstrārthāvadhāraṇanipuṇā api yathādhigatasamayasaṅketāsā[$1r_4$]ditapāratantryavṛttayo⊙napekṣitapramāṇaprabhāvaprasarās svodayanibandhanabhūtabhāvānapekṣiṇas sthāva[$1r_5$]rābhimatās santy eva sa⊙ttāvyavahārāliṅgitaprasarās tanukaraṇabhuvan<o>-hetuviśveśvarāpauruṣeyaśa[$1r_6$]bdajātyātmādisaṃjñitā [*kākapada* sign] iti tadvibhramavinivāraṇāya kiñcinmātrakam abhidhīyata iti | ye svasattāyām udayani[$1r_7$]bandhanabhūtabhāvānapekṣiṇo na te samāsāditasattākās tadyathā vyomotpalādayaḥ | svasattāyām udayanibandha-[lower margin] [in a second hand, no marking]-dayanibandhanabhūtāf prabhāvātiśayabhājo bhāvā

[$1v_1$]-nabhūtabhāvānapekṣiṇaś ca sthāvarābhimatāf paraparikalpitā bhāvā iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ | sattāvasāyasaṃ[$1v_2$]janitaprabhāvātiśayā bhāvās svodayanibandhanabhūtabhāvāpekṣābhivyāptā | tannivṛttā ca pravṛttir vyāpyasyeti svapra[$1v_3$]kāśā vyāpakaviruddho⊙palabdhir upadarśitaprayoga iti na pakṣadharmaviṣayaviparyāsāvasara iti nā[$1v_4$]nvayavibhramaḥ | ye samā⊙sāditasattākās te svasattāyām udayanibandhanabhūtabhāvāpekṣiṇo

dṛṣṭās tadya[1v_5]thā vrīhyādayaḥ | svodaya☉nibandhanabhūta-
bhāvāpekṣāvidhurabhūtānāṃ sattābhyupagame vandhyāsutavira-
citaci[1v_6]tragaganakusumamāloditasaurabhyabhāvanābhāvita-
marakatavarṇāvabhāsāvabhāsitaśaśaviṣāṇaśobhātiśaya[1v_7]sattā-
prasaṃgo bādhakaṃ pramāṇam iti || || atra tu pramāṇaprameya-
viṣayaniścāyakapratyayānapekṣiṇa +

3. Standardised edition with critical notes

nānāvādapravīṇaiḥ paragatabahaladhvāntavidhvaṃsadakṣaiḥ
saṃbuddhājñāprapannaiḥ prakaṭitam akhilaṃ vastutattvaṃ
[susūkṣmam |
tasyāṃ[14] *ye viprapannāḥ paramatavihitāpārthanād aprapannās*
teṣāṃ saṃmohabhaṅgaḥ kriyata iha mayā bādhakaiḥ satprayogaiḥ[15] *||*

iha hi samadhigatavācyavācakasambandhagamitaśāstrārthāvadhā-
raṇanipuṇā api yathādhigatasamayasaṅketāsāditapāratantrya-
vṛttayo 'napekṣitapramāṇaprabhāvaprasarāḥ, svodayanibandha-
nabhūtabhāvānapekṣiṇaḥ sthāvarābhimatāḥ santy eva, sattāvya-
vahārāliṅgitaprasarās *tanukaraṇabhuvanodayanibandhanabhū-
tāḥ prabhāvātiśayabhājo bhāvā (*ante correctionem*: tanukaraṇabhu-
vanahetuviśveśvarāpauruṣeyaśabdajātyātmādisaṃjñitā) iti tadvi-
bhramavinivāraṇāya kiṃcinmātrakam abhidhīyata iti | ye sva-
sattāyām udayanibandhanabhūtabhāvānapekṣiṇo na te samāsādi-
tasattākās tadyathā vyomotpalādayaḥ | svasattāyām udayaniba-
ndhanabhūtabhāvānapekṣiṇaś ca sthāvarābhimatāḥ paraparikal-
pitā bhāvā iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ | sattāvasāyasaṃjanita-
prabhāvātiśayā bhāvāḥ svodayanibandhanabhūtabhāvāpekṣābhi-
vyāptāḥ[16] | tannivṛttyā[17] nivṛttā ca pravṛttir vyāpyasyeti svaprakāśā
vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhir upadarśitaprayoga iti na pakṣadha-
rmaviṣayaviparyāsāvasara iti nānvayavibhramaḥ | ye samāsādita-
sattākās te svasattāyām udayanibandhanabhūtabhāvāpekṣiṇo

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14 *tasyāṃ*] conj. (Isaacson), damaged Ms
15 *satprayogaiḥ*] conj., *satpray?gaiḥ* Ms
16 °*ābhivyāptāḥ*] em., °*ābhivyāptā* Ms
17 *tannivṛttyā nivṛttā*] conj. (a conj. *tannivṛttinivṛttā* is also possible), *tannivṛttā*
Ms (eye-skip)

dṛṣṭās tadyathā vrīhyādayaḥ | svodayanibandhanabhūtabhāvā-
pekṣāvidhurabhūtānāṃ sattābhyupagame vandhyāsutaviracitaci-
tragaganakusumamāloditasaurabhyabhāvanābhāvitamarakatava-
rṇāvabhāsāvabhāsitaśaśaviṣāṇaśobhātiśayasattāprasaṅgo bādha-
kaṃ pramāṇam iti || || atra tu pramāṇaprameyaviṣayaniścayakapra-
tyayānapekṣiṇa ?

4. Translation

> The very subtle reality of things has been proclaimed in its
> entirety by those who have embraced (*prapanna*) the teach-
> ing (lit. command, *ājñā*) of the Perfectly Awakened One;
> [they are] well-versed in many different doctrines [and]
> skilled in eliminating the thick darkness [of the delusion] of
> the opponents.
> [However, there are those] who have opposed (*viprapanna*)
> that [teaching] (*tasyāṃ*)[18] [and those] who have not em-
> braced (*aprapanna*) it due to [its] refutation (*apārthana*)
> done by [some] who hold other views. In this [treatise], I
> [shall] refute their delusion with some good refuting argu-
> ments.

Now, in this world (*iha*), even though skilled in determining the
meaning of the treatises made clear through the well-known rela-
tion between designated and designator (*vācyavācakasambandha*),
a multitude [of people] who ignore the power of *pramāṇa*s are
engaged in the acquired/transmitted dependence on a conven-
tion according to the way the agreed-upon doctrine (*samaya*) is
learnt [in different traditions].

[The convention is as follows:]

'Those [things that are] not dependent on real things (*bhāva*) that
are the cause of their arising and admitted as permanent are in-
deed existent.

> [Version 1, *ante correctionem*] [These, which according to you
> Buddhists are] continua that are marked/included (*āliṅgita*)

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[18] Or, less likely, *tasmin*, referring to *vastutattva*.

(?) with the predication as existent[,] are termed [—according to the various Brahmanical systems—] Viśveśvara that is the cause [i.e., the efficient cause] with regard to bodies, faculties, and world-systems, the authorless word, the universals, the Self, etc.'

[Version 2, *post correctionem*] [These, which according to you Buddhists are] continua that are marked/included (*āliṅgita*) (?) with the treatment/predication as existent, being the cause of the arising of bodies, faculties, and world-systems, are real entities (*bhāva*) possessing an exceptional power[, namely, Īśvara].'

In order to eliminate their error, just a few [arguments need to] be said.[19]

Those [entities] that, with regard to their own existence, do not depend on [other] entities that are the cause of their arising [can]not be admitted as existent (*samāsāditasattāka*), like, for example, a lotus in the sky. And the entities (*bhāva*) [that are] admitted as permanent [and] are imagined by the opponents are independent from real entities (*bhāva*) that are the cause of their arising with regard to their own existence. Thus, there is the cognition of [something] contradictory to the pervader[, i.e. the cognition of the independence from things that are the cause of their arising].

The entities that are originated through the conceptual determination of 'existence' [that is, they are conceptually constructed as existent] and have a special power (*prabhāvātiśaya*) [namely, causal efficiency] are pervaded by the dependence on real entities that are the cause of their arising.

Moreover, the presence of the pervaded is negated through the negation of that (*tannivṛttyā*) [i.e., the dependence]. Thus, the perception of [something] contradictory to the pervader [i.e. the perception of dependence] in the argument shown [above] is self-evident. Therefore, there is no room (*avasara*) for [any] error regarding the object of the property of the subject (*pakṣadharma*).

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[19] Namely, by refuting the permanence of things one rejects all the real entities that are admitted by the Brahmanical opponents and are listed above.

Accordingly, there is no mistake, [viz. a] positive concomitance [of *sādhya* and *hetu* in the opponent's argument].

The [entities] that are admitted as existent are commonly observed as being dependent on real things that are the cause of the arising with reference to their own existence. This is like, for example, rice.

If one admitted the existence of entities that are devoid of the dependence on entities that are the cause of their arising, then, the refuting argument (*bādhakaṃ pramāṇam*) would be the undesired consequence of the existence of the fragrance produced from a garland of multicoloured flowers in the sky that was put together by the son of a barren woman or the superior splendour (*śobhātiśaya*) of the hare's horn (*śaśaviṣāṇa*) illumined by the splendour of the colours of an emerald visualised through meditative realisation [or: meditative realisation about the fragrance produced from a garland of multicoloured flowers in the sky that was put together by the son of a barren woman].

However, in this regard, [entities] independent from the cognition that ascertains the cognisable object of the *pramāṇa* …

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Gilgit Fragment No. 42 — fol. *1 *recto*

Gilgit Fragment No. 42 — fol. *1 *verso*

Imagine the World…
Abhinavagupta vis-à-vis the Psychoanalytic Mystic

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1. The enigma of imagination

Imagination has a fascinating history in both the Western and the Indian philosophical traditions. Whether thought to be the divine power that creates the world or the genius of the artist or just the human mental faculty that creates fancies, imagination has captivated and engaged the greatest philosophical minds since time immemorial. Imagination is a multifarious, protean entity. It would be a difficult task to cover all the concepts of imagination that have been formulated in the course of the history of Western philosophy. Even more improbable would be to give a reasonable account of the numerous concepts of imagination in various cultural and philosophical traditions. And yet, there is something common to human thinking on imagination, irrespective of the fact that the different ways in which we define it might be culturally specific. The lure of imagination has something to do with creativity, freedom and a spontaneous game. The creative or productive form of imagination might be associated with either the human or the divine or both. After centuries of philosophical investigation, the question of *what* imagination is is still open but,

paraphrasing Leibniz, we might better ask *why* there is imagination at all, and what functions are usually ascribed to it.

In my short essay, I would like to offer some reflections on the creative but not necessarily fanciful function of imagination in two apparently distant traditions: so-called non-dualistic Kashmir Śaivism and modern psychoanalysis. And more specifically, I would like to indicate some intriguing convergences and similarities in the philosophical speculations on imagination of two outstanding thinkers: Abhinavagupta (10th–11th c.) and Wilfred Ruprecht Bion (1897–1979), the former a polymath and Tantric master, the latter also a polymath and real revolutionary in the context of contemporary psychoanalytic thought. In what follows, I will argue that for both Abhinavagupta and Bion, imagination is something more than just a psychological faculty, even though the extra-psychic origin of imagination is quite obscure. This is so, especially in the case of Bion. Both thinkers, of course, use different conceptual and theoretical frameworks in their respective efforts to locate and give an account of imagination as a phenomenon existing both in and beyond the psychological realm. For the purpose of this essay, I will examine the subject of imagination in relation to intentionality, intuition, and creativity. But before approaching the specific subject of my investigation, I think it is not out of place to look briefly at some selected concepts of imagination that might serve to better contextualize both Bion's and Abhinavagupta's respective speculations on imagination.

The idea of the productive imagination is not alien to the Western philosophy. The divine pedigree, if any, of the human imagination remained unclear. Plato drew a definite line between the mimetic phantasies of the artist (in *Republic*) and the divine visions of inspired seers (in *Phaedrus* and *Timaeus*). In his opinion, human imagination is mimetic; it simply reflects the things of our sensory world, which itself is nothing more than a copy of the transcendental ideas. Yet, in his late dialogues, we meet with an intriguing idea of the revelatory imagination. In *Timaeus* (71a, p. 620), he speaks of the images and phantoms (*eidōlon* and *phantasmaton*) that appear during the night and day and might seduce the soul. According to Plato, god supplies men with the power of divination (*manteia*) so that they might recognize truth because, as he observes in his *Republic* (II. 382e, p. 130), god 'doesn't change him-

self or deceive others either by appearances (*phantasiai*) or by words, or by sending signs, either in visions or in dreams.'[1] Plato presented imagination as a paradox, something that might be both deceitful and revealing. Because of this, imagination is to be ultimately subordinated to reason. It was only with the advent of Aristotle that the psychological function of imagination was dealt with more comprehensively. With his enigmatic definition of imagination as 'that in virtue of which a particular image (*phantasma*) comes about to us' (*De Anima* 428a1–2, p. 56), Aristotle opened up the on-going discussion in Western philosophy and psychology to encompass the connection between imagination and imagery. In *De Anima*, he discussed extensively some connections between imagination and perception, thinking, belief, emotions and movement. Plato had already suggested connections between imagination, movement and desire, but it was Aristotle who presented this intuition in a more systematic and psychological way. He observed that 'whenever imagination initiates motion, it does not do so without desire' (*De Anima* 433a20, p. 68). Linking desire with anticipation, we might, following Polansky,[2] consider *phantasia* to be something that can present what is not yet but is desirously anticipated. If so, we might think about Aristotelian imagination as a stimulating psychic power (or quasi-faculty)[3] that makes animals or humans tend and turn towards the anticipated object (or objects, in general). It seems that already with Plato, and then surely with Aristotle, imagination had been associated with intentionality. We will come back to this interesting issue later on, when we discuss the concept and functions of imagination in both Abhinavagupta and Bion.

Many philosophers put imagination at the basis of all sense perception and experience in general. For Hume, imagination, the 'creative power of mind,' was responsible for 'compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded

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[1] Cf. Grube's translation (1992: 59), where the word 'image' is used to render '*phanatasia.*' On *phantasia* as both appearance and the faculty responsible for appearances, see Silverman 1991. On Plato's concept of imagination, see Kearney 1998: 87–105.

[2] See Polansky 2007: 432.

[3] Cf. Shields 2016: 291.

us by the senses and experience' (*Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* 2.5, p. 13). Hume ascribed to imagination the power to form the ideas that cannot be traced to impressions. In a sense, for Hume, ideas are all fictions but given that some of them are required to render experience coherent, we might consider them to be necessary fictions. Without the productive imagination and its fictions, experience might remain incomprehensible to us. [4] The next step toward the model of the synthesizing imagination was taken by Kant, who understood imagination as a faculty that was fundamental to human cognition, contributing to perception, aesthetic appreciation, and so forth. According to Kant, imagination—the productive imagination—is the capacity to synthesize, to weave the texture of the mental fabric. In his opinion, imagination is 'a blind though indispensable function of the soul, without which we would have no cognition at all, but of which we are seldom even conscious.' [5] Kant elevated the status of imagination in his first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but already in the second edition he gave primacy to reason. The productive imagination (the faculty of intuitions) was subordinated to reason (the faculty of concepts). [6] Heidegger continued where Kant stopped. In his *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, he addressed one of the most important functions of imagination, it being a (pre-mental?) horizon without which it would not be possible for the mind to function. It is worthwhile quoting the related passage from his work, where Heidegger makes his point in a clear way:

> The imagination forms in advance, and before all experience of the essent, the aspect of the horizon of objectivity as such. This formation of the aspect in the pure form [*Bild*] of time not only precedes this or at experience of the essent but is also prior to any such possible experience. In offering a pure aspect in this way, the imagination is in no case and in no wise dependent on the presence of an essent. It is so far from being thus dependent that its pre-formation of a pure schema, for example, substance (perma-

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[4] Cf. Costelloe 2007: 42–44.
[5] *Critique of Pure Reason* A78/B103, p. 211.
[6] See *Critique of Pure Reason* B151–161, pp. 256–262. For the excellent analysis of the evolution of Kant's idea of imagination, see Kneller 2007, especially in the chapter 'The failure of Kant's imagination,' pp. 95–121.

nence), consists in bringing into view something on the order of constant presence [*ständige Anwesenheit*]. It is only in the horizon of this presence that this or that 'presence of an object' can reveal itself.[7]

With Heidegger, we arrived at a clear intuition of imagination conceived of as the matrix of mind. This great topic was addressed by both Bion and Abhinavagupta, each one in his own particular terms. We will address this issue in the last section of this essay.

2. Imagination in India

It would be an interesting to be able to give a similar account of the productive imagination in the context of Indian philosophy, but, as Shulman rightly observes, 'surprisingly little has been written about the imagination in South Asia, both ancient and modern.'[8] Indeed, there are not many studies that approach this subject. Shulman proposed that in India the concept of imagination might be examined with reference to various Sanskrit terms, like *pratibhā, kalpanā, vikalpa, bhāvanā,* and *sambhāvanā.*[9] But to be fair to the wider concept of imagination—the cosmic, world-creating imagination—we might be better advised to start our short analysis by examining two other and yet important concepts, that is: *māyā* and *saṃkalpa.*

In Vedic literature we might already find some allusions to the productive form of imagination. The obscure word *māyā* appears there in various, both positive and negative, contexts with manifold meanings, among them: 'illusion,' 'artifice,' 'capability or power to create.' Renou, skeptical about the possibility of giving a single clear-cut definition, proposed that there might have originally been two different words *māyā* that had merged into the complex and polysemic notion to be found in Vedic texts.[10] Gonda proposed defining *māyā* as 'incomprehensible insight, wisdom, judgement and power enabling its possessor to create something

[7] Heidegger 1968/1929: 138.
[8] Shulman 2012: 3.
[9] See Shulman 2008: 482.
[10] See Renou 1948: 290–298.

or to do something, ascribed to mighty beings,'[11] whereas Goudriaan, while generally accepting Gonda's definition, narrowed it down, as follows: '(*māyā*) is a wondrous power which is used in order to create some unexpected or novel appearance with a certain end in view.'[12] With Gonda's and Goudriaan's renderings of *māyā* we are closer to the notion of *bhāvanā*, a popular term usually referred to in the context of speculations on the generative/productive aspect of imagination. We will come back to *bhāvanā* soon.

The Vedic imagination was, above all, the ritualistic imagination. As Patton observed, 'it was a ritual realm where both imaginative and social realities were brought to mind and played out in the public arena.'[13] The ritual was expected to produce the anticipated goal, and to achieve this goal the announcement of the 'intention' of the ritual was required before any other ritual operations might ever be initialized. Already in Vedic literature we come across the word *saṃkalpa*, which, among other things, might mean 'an intention' and 'a mental anticipation.'[14] *Saṃkalpa*, belonging to the realm of mind, was said to be responsible for the creation of the world and, as such, was associated with *māyā*. In *Mokṣopāya*, a 10th c. Kashmirian text, we can read that the mind (*manas*), by power of its *saṃkalpa* (intention, will or volition), eternally performs the creation of the world, producing the 'splendor of Indra's net' (*indrajālaśrī*)[15] as if it were physically spread out.[16]

The Vedic ritualistic imagination had its prototype in the gods' creative imagination. Bhartṛhari, the fifth-century grammarian-philosopher, described the Vedas as the *anukāra* of *brahman*.[17] The term *anukāra* can be explained as a copy or mirror image.[18] The Advaitavedāntin Gauḍapāda ascribed to *ātman*, the ultimate self, a

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[11] Gonda 1959: 126.
[12] Goudriaan 1978: 2.
[13] Patton 2005: 1.
[14] Cf. Malamoud 2008: 29. Following Böhtlingk (1870–1873), Malamoud accepted the wider meaning of *saṃkalpa* as imagination (2008: 28).
[15] On *indrajāla* as *māyā*, see Goudrian 1978: 213–219.
[16] See *Mokṣopāya* 3.1.16, ed. p. 29.
[17] See *Vākyapadīya* 1.5.
[18] See Timalsina 2015: 31.

creative/concealing power, *māyā*. According to Gauḍapāda, it is the *ātman* that imagines itself on its own through its creative power (*māyā*) and realizes distinctions.[19] It projects itself outward in the form of the sentient being (*jīva*) and then in the form of various external and internal things.[20] The ultimate self (*ātman*) and not the individual self (*jīva*) is a master of the imaginative power of creation/concealment. As Timalsina noted: 'when Gauḍapāda uses the term *ātman*, the self is described as "endowed with" *māyā* (GK III.10). However, when he uses the term *jīva*, the self is "constructed by" *māyā* (GK IV.69).'[21] For Advaitavedāntins, imagination constitutes an ontic paradox: it creates the world that 'does not exists' (independently), and yet the world 'exists' in its true foundation, that is in *brahman*.[22] Imaginative (constructive) mirroring comprehended as an epistemological principle lies at the background of many Indian theories of perception. For Buddhist philosophers such as Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti, direct perception is free from conceptual or imaginative constructions that are, at best, convenient fictions that serve for communication. Contrary to the Buddhists, Naiyāyikas hold that there exist some mental concepts or imaginings (*vikalpa*) that are the true representations of reality.[23] The important issue in Indian epistemology is a differentiation of perception into conception-free perception (*nirvikalpapratyakṣa*) and conception-loaded perception (*savikalpapratyakṣa*). If it is possible for *nirvikalpapratyakṣa* to occur, then, in consequence, we can speak about a direct perception that is not 'contaminated' with any conceptualization/imagination (as it has been argued, among others, by Buddhists). Then, the problem

[19] See *Gauḍapādakārikā* 2.12, p. 22. Timalsina 2013: 594.

[20] See *Gauḍapādakārikā* 2.16, p. 26.

[21] Timalsina 2013: 601. Timalsina (2013: 602) argues that, according to Gauḍapāda, *māyā* is inherent to the self. He also identifies *māyā* with *kalpanā*. This allows him to bring Gauḍapāda's concept of imagination closer to that of the Śaivādvaitins.

[22] The cognitive approach to the study of consciousness in various Advaita schools is extremely promising for a deeper understanding of the functions and the status of imagination in Advaitic thought. In this regard, the recent studies by Timalsina (2006, 2008) might be of the great help.

[23] For an extended discussion on conceptual or imaginative constructions in the context of the Indian theories of perception, see Matilal 1986.

that arises here is: what is actually perceived in a conception-free percept? The Advaitins, especially Śaivādvaitins, had to find some answer to the enigma of the cosmic creative/concealing power that has nothing to do with *vikalpa*, and yet in some sense is responsible for the very 'existence' of the created world (no matter its ontic status) dominated by *vikalpa*. Before proceeding, however, with our analysis of the Śaivādvaitins' possible solution to the above paradox, we should first say something about yet another Sanskrit term usually associated with imagination, that is, *bhāvanā*. The generative aspect of imagination is highlighted by the term itself: *bhāvanā* might be understood as 'generation, often in the sense of manifestation or bringing to the surface or configuring (reconfiguring) a form.'[24] For the Mīmāṃsakas, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians and epistemologists, and the grammarians, *bhāvanā* is mental in its origin and is somehow connected with acts of enlivening or co-creating memory and meaning.[25] It serves to link the agent with the objects of his actions, thus bringing about the transition from potential to action.[26] As we might remember, the same intuition concerning the primal function of imagination, i.e. bringing about the transition from potential to action, can be found in *De Anima* by Aristotle. Seen from this perspective, imagining seems to be more a performative process than a representational one. No wonder then that *bhāvanā* was eventually adopted into the Indian meditative traditions, where it was transformed into a sophisticated kataphatic practice.[27] The complexity of *bhāvanā* conceived as the spiritual technique for self-transformation might be exemplified by its broad definition by Padoux:

> *Bhāvanā,* we may remark, in a Tantric context, is both vision, creative *(√BHŪ)* meditation, or intuitive realization, and identification with the object mentally created or intuited.[28]

With the advent of the Śaivādvaitins, like Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, imagination was elevated to the status of a spontane-

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[24] Shulman 2012: 19.
[25] See Shulman 2012: 19.
[26] See Shulman 2012: 21.
[27] Cf. Chenet 1987.
[28] Padoux 1990: 205, n. 93.

ous and free (*svatantra*) creative expression of both divine and mundane subjects; however, in the case of the latter — an impoverished and limited expression due to his or her own identificatory habits. Abhinavagupta's concept of imagination would deserve a thorough monographic study, where the whole constellation of terms related in some way or another to imagination—like *pratibhā, kalpanā, vikalpa, bhāvanā, saṃkalpa, utprekṣā, manorājya,* etc.—would be thoroughly examined. For the purposes of this essay, however, I shall limit my analysis to those aspects of Abhinavagupta's speculations on imagination that are strikingly similar to the ones that are discussed in the contemporary psychoanalytic theory of mind.

3. *Abhinavagupta vis-à-vis Bion*

A starting point for the discussion on the concept of imagination in non-dual Śaivism and modern psychoanalysis might be Abhinavagupta's statement that for the mundane subject (*paśu*) objects exist inasmuch as they rest on a mental construction (*vikalpa*).[29] In terms of Bion's particular mentalistic cosmology, one can say that we 'dream out' our world, whose essence ('O') is ultimately not to be known by means of any mentalizing act. For both thinkers, the world is to be imagined. Now, the question that might be posed here is about the ontic status of this imagined world. We might also be concerned about the status of our knowledge. If everything is a matter of mental (imaginative) construction then do we still have the instruments to distinguish between dreams, hallucinations and percepts? According to the Śaiva non-dualists, the veridicality of our percepts versus various other forms of mentalizations, like hallucinations, fancies etc. is to be defended by upholding an idea of the real self-presentation of Śiva (ultimate reality) as the world substance. Our veridical cognizing acts depend, then, on our intuitive grasp of the ultimate reality, our seeing as if through the curtain of Śiva's cosmic play (*krīḍā, līlā).* Similarly, according to Bion, the ineffable ultimate realm ('O'), lies beyond the grasp of the external senses and is only ex-

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[29] See *Īśvarapratyābhijñāvimarśinī*, vol. II, p. 263.

perienced by an inwardly receptive sense organ, intuition. Now, we might say that for intuiting anything, in a minimal sense, a subject is required who intends toward what is (still?) a non-subject. Accordingly, our subsequent steps to locate the possible notion(s) and functions of imagination in Abhinavagupta's and Bion's speculations, respectively, will require us to briefly sketch out what is, for both thinkers, to be understood by intentionality and intuition.

Both Bion and Abhinavagupta are convinced that subject and object are not two entities independent of each other, but that they are mutually interwoven and connected through intentionality. To avoid any unnecessary misunderstanding, we need to comment at this point on how 'intentionality' might be understood with regard to, respectively, Śaiva non-dualism and psychoanalysis. According to the Śaiva non-dualists, a whole universe unfolds out of Śiva's own substance. They describe this emanation process with the use of particular 'energetic' metaphors revolving around the concept of five *śakti*s, which act like a prism refracting the primordial unity of Śiva and thus creating multiplicity. This multiplicity might be conceived of as a matrix that gives rise to a net of interconnected mundane subjects and objects arranged in descending order of subtlety. Their ontological status is neither real nor unreal.[30] The cognizing mundane subjects partake in the original cognizing subject that is Śiva himself. Just like him, the mundane subjects are able to stir in themselves the wish or desire to reach for the domain of not-me. By this very act of reaching or extending toward something that is not me, intentionality is being established. Now, Torella has made an important observation about Somānanda's technical term *aunmukhya*, which appears in the *Śivadṛṣṭi*:

> Somānanda envisages the first outline of a dynamic wave stirring the surface of the quiescent bliss of Śiva consciousness (the first *śakti*), named after a concept that also has a strong aesthetic connotation, *nirvṛti* 'lysis, contentment,' the deep sense of inner satisfaction associated with an intense aesthetic enjoyment: this dy-

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[30] *Śivadṛṣṭi* 288.169; see Torella 2014: 7.

namic wave represents the very first opening of a disposition to create, a desiring state still without a definite object (the second *śakti*), technically called *aunmukhya* 'tension towards…'[31]

Intentionality is a corner stone of cognizing. But intentionality is not merely cognitive; it is also conative. We can venture to say there is no cognition without conation — no knowing without willing and wishing. In psychoanalysis, intentionality is expanded to include preconscious and unconscious experience.[32] In his late work entitled *The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology* Husserl puzzled us with his brief remark on the 'unconscious intentionalities' as something discovered by 'depth psychology.'[33] In psychoanalysis, the unconscious in its most radical form is conceived of as something that breaks with the way that consciousness functions. The intriguing idea of the Husserlian 'unconscious intentionalities' might be helpful in our deeper understanding of the continuity between unconscious and conscious subjects. As Ogden put it: 'consciousness and unconsciousness are conceived of as mutually dependent, each defining, negating, and pre-serving the other.'[34] Differences between the conscious and the unconscious might be exemplified by the incongruity of their respective subjects and objects. In its extreme form unconscious intending seems to extend to a realm that does not yet contain the specific object, to a realm governed by unconscious phantasies, and to what Bion called the 'preconceptions,' the latter, roughly speaking, being forms of inherited knowledge.[35]

[31] Torella 2014: 552.
[32] See May 1966: 63.
[33] See Husserl 1970/1936: 237.
[34] Ogden 1996: 18.
[35] Due to lack of space in this essay, I will omit the discussion on the concepts of both consciousness and the unconscious (including unconscious phantasy) in contemporary psychoanalysis, philosophy of mind, and in many strands of cognitive studies and neurosciences. The reader might be well advised to refer to the most important publications on the topic, e.g. Leuzinger-Bohleber, Arnold and Solms 2016, Boag, Brakel and Talvitie 2015, Cavanna and Nani 2014, Chalmers 2002, Dennett 1991, Flanagan 1992, Karlsson 2010, Velmans 2000, 2009. Cross-cultural research on consciousness is currently an emergent field (e.g. Rao 2002). For Indian academic studies on consciousness (and the unconscious) following Indian concepts of psychology, see e.g. Paranjpe, Ho and Rieber 1988, Rao, Paranjpe and Dalal 2008, Rao and Paranjpe 2016.

In his *Tantrāloka* (35.1cd–2ab), Abhinavagupta makes an interesting point on the inherited knowledge: 'In this world, all human activities hold in that they have as reference point an ancient complex of innate cognitions and beliefs (*prasiddhi*): this is what is called *āgama*.'[36] While commenting on the notion of *prasiddhi* in both Utpaladeva's and Abhinavagupta's speculations, Torella asserts that there are two lower forms of *prasiddhi* that contrast with yet another form, the highest.[37] The two lower forms both entail normativity and/or habituality. The highest *prasiddhi* coincides with intuition, *pratibhā*. According to the Kashmirian philosophers, intuition reaches far beyond the region of mentation. Abhinavagupta's concept of *pratibhā* is particularly complex, as its meaning blends philosophy, aesthetics and religion. *Pratibhā*, like *prasiddhi*, has its higher and lower forms but as a mode of cognizing is not gradual. It enlightens in just one flash. It allows reality to shine forth. In *Tantrāloka* 13.132, Abhinavagupta discusses *prātibhaṃ jñānaṃ* or *mahājñānaṃ*, knowledge that arises without the mediation of the senses and their objects, and without any former instructions or studies. This is the highest possible form of intuitive knowledge, to be achieved only by those whose *pratibhā* is at its utmost. *Pratibhā* is inborn, active in each mind, but its power and intensity differs from one person to another. People with a less sharp intuiting capacity require some supportive mental activity like *bhāvanā*, the projective imagination. *Bhāvanā* is gradual by its nature, requires some effort and repetition, and a master to instruct and to supervise. It consists in the mental manipulation of conceptual contents, making them more and more vivid until they cannot be distinguished from the percepts. In short: *bhāvanā* constructs reality, whereas *pratibhā* enlightens it.[38]

Just like the Kashmirian masters, some contemporary psychoanalysts—classed, somewhat metaphorically, as 'psychoanalytic mystics'[39]—focus in their investigations on the question of con-

[36] Tr. Torella 2013: 458.
[37] See Torella 2013: 464.
[38] From Abhinavagupta's detailed discussion of the two notions: *bhāvanā* and *pratibhā*, it is obvious that *pratibhā* could not be taken to be 'the exact equivalent of imagination,' as it is sometimes stated in discussion on imagination in India (cf. Sreekantaiya 1980: 11).
[39] Eigen 1998, Merkur 2009, Merkur 2010.

structivism in the theory of mentation, ineffability, subjectivity, and creativity. The most original thinker referred to as a 'psycho-analytic mystic'[40] was Wilfred R. Bion, a British psychoanalyst born in India.[41] Following the Kleinian tradition, Bion advocates for an idea of inborn knowledge. In his theoretical and clinical works, he examines the role of both intuition and imagination in humans constructing their knowledge. He postulates mental space as a thing-in-itself that is essentially unknowable, pre- or non-verbal, but that can be represented by non-discursive thoughts, including phantasies, dreams, and memories (alpha elements). Bion's conception of mental or inner space concerns the inner world, one which arises from of what he calls 'O' or 'Ultimate Reality.' 'O' can be experienced or 'intuited,' to use Bion's term, but not known. Bion says about 'O' that:

> […] it is assumed that this cannot be known by any human being; it can be known about, its presence can be recognised and felt, but it cannot be known. It is possible to be at one with it. That it exists is an essential postulate of science but it cannot be scientifically discovered. No psycho-analytic discovery is possible without recognition of its existence.[42]

According to Bion, there is a link between this ineffable space, a sort of Kantian noumenal reality, and our constructed cognitions. Bion postulates a 'preconception,' a necessary antecedent to all forms of thought (be it a conception, concept, or deductive system). When a preconception is 'realized,' that is, comes into contact with sensory data close to it, it becomes a conception and a concept. A concept constitutes an organising principle of experience. Bion maintained that preconceptions form the potential for growth and development at each new encounter in which the

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[40] More on the 'mystical' aspects of Bion's thinking, see Grotstein 2007.

[41] Bion was born in Mathura (UP) in 1897. Many generations of his family had served in colonial India for the British Empire. At the age of eight he was sent to England to attend preparatory school, never again to return to India. As he himself wrote in his autobiographical *Long Weekend*, all his life he retained a strong affection for the country of his birth. He died in November 1979, just two months before a planned visit to Bombay.

[42] Bion 1970: 30.

individual is open to experience.[43] Preconceptions appear to be inter-related, dependent upon one another and overlapping, 'enabling mind in favourable circumstances to develop according to an innate structuring.'[44] If these structures fail to develop, a psychotic perception of reality dominates. In such a mental state the subject does not perceive but hallucinates. Intuition, which is an aspect of our mental apparatus, enables us to couple preconceptions with their mental counterparts. Preconceptions might be conceived of as innate 'expectations' in the Kantian sense. Intuition, in the Bionian sense, might be conceived of as a propensity to, intending or tending towards the truth. Bion calls it attention. He writes:

> A special function was instituted which had periodically to search the other world in order that its data might be already familiar if an urgent inner need should arise; this function is attention. Its activity meets the sense impressions half-way instead of awaiting their appearance.[45]

With Abhinavagupta and Bion, we arrived at a very sophisticated version of constructivism according to which there exists a 'true' reality that lies behind our constructed world of perception. We can reach this world but not with the use of our mental devices. Our mental constructions are nothing else than useful models of this reality, and they are not totally 'wrong.' They are anchored in this reality and linked to it by our inherited preconceptions. Intuition might guide us to grasp the reality that is governed by imagination free from the mental stuff. The question then remains: what is this imagination like?

4. Imagination. On creation/creativity and freedom

Charles Rycroft, a British psychoanalyst, noted that the psychoanalytical literature tends to subsume imagination under the heading of phantasy and has the same difficulty as do the arts in deciding

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[43] Bion 1962a, 1962b.
[44] Shaw 2014: 74.
[45] Bion 1962a: 5.

whether and when phantasy (imagination) is escapist or creative, defensive or adaptive. He then claimed that it is generally accepted that creative imaginative activity involves the participation of unconscious non-verbal phantasy.[46] Beres proposed a broad concept of imagination.[47] He wrote:

> I believe that the basic process, the capacity to form mental representations and which I call imagination, is the same whether the resultant product be a hallucination, a fantasy, a symbol, an image, a thought, a dream, or a symptom.[48]

According to Beres, then, imagination is the psychic function responsible for producing mental representations, and as such it operates in the context of normal mentation, pathological mental processes, and artistic creativity.[49] In accordance with his constructivist point of view, he defines reality as 'a relative, indeterminate concept, influenced by the imaginative process in man.'[50] We might say that in contemporary psychoanalysis, imagination is not only associated with the unconscious (it has been so since Freud), but has been elevated to the status of the matrix of human mentation. With this, quite unexpectedly, psychoanalysis has turned back to the Romantic (if not Antique) roots of the concept of the productive imagination. We might remember that, for example, according to Coleridge, imagination is 'esemplastic'; its main function is to 'shape into one' and to 'convey a new sense.'[51]

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[46] See Rycroft 1995: 78. 'Unconscious phantasy' (a different term from 'fantasy') is one of the most debated and multifaceted concept in psychoanalysis. This term is commonly used by the adherents to the Kleinian tradition in psychoanalysis. Bearing in mind the limited space in this short essay, and with the risk of oversimplification, we might say that for Klein, unconscious phantasies are the primary unconscious content (cf. Spillius 2001: 362), or as Segal (1994: 400) put it 'a set of primitive hypotheses about the nature of the object and the world.' These unconscious 'hypotheses' are not yet thoughts, the mature products of mentalizing processes, but rather a peculiar combination of primitive ideas and feelings (cf. Spillius 2001: 365). Grotstein (2008: 197–199) seems to equate the unconscious phantasying with Bionian 'dreaming' (on the Bionian concept of dreaming, see below).

[47] See Beres 1960a, 1960b.

[48] See Beres 1960a: 260.

[49] Beres 1960a: 267; Beres 1960b: 329.

[50] See Beres 1960b: 329.

[51] Coleridge 1907: 214.

Imagination is thus responsible for making our experience coherent and meaningful. Reflecting on the link between imagination and unconscious phantasy, Britton recalls Coleridge's concept of primary and secondary imagination.[52] In his opinion, Coleridge's primary imagination resembles Susan Isaac's concept of unconscious phantasy as the mental expression of all sensation and instinct. On the other hand, secondary imagination is something that might be taken to be creatively reconstructive and to function in the absence of the object.

Curiously enough, Bion cites many authors of the Romantic period, such as Coleridge, Keats, Blake, and Wordsworth. Much like Kant, he postulates the human synthesizing faculty that underlies all mental processes, all human emotions and cognitions. He calls it 'alpha-function,' and his followers would tend to call it 'the capacity to dream.'[53] Alpha-function allows you to interpret a raw sense data by forming the fabric of symbolic thinking. It creates concepts and then thoughts (alpha-function/dreaming → mentalizing → thinking). Bion describes alpha-function thus:

> It seemed convenient to suppose an alpha-function to convert sense data into alpha-elements and thus provide the psyche with the material for dream thoughts, and hence the capacity to wake up or go to sleep, to be conscious or unconscious. According to this theory, consciousness depends on alpha function, and it is a logical necessity to suppose that such a function exists if we are to assume that the self is able to be conscious of itself in the sense of knowing itself from experience of itself.[54]

We should note that for Bion there is not a clear difference between thinking and imagining (dreaming). The former needs the latter as its precedent. According to Bion, each creative process—and thinking and imagining (day-dreaming) are such—involves dismantling previous mental arrangements, be it views, theories, or images. This allows the formation of new arrangements. It is

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[52] Britton 1998: 113.
[53] Cf. Grotstein (1981: 515) on imagination as a key factor in Bion's concept of alpha function.
[54] Bion 1962b: 308.

not only the arrangement, but it is also the overall setting, something that Bion calls the container, that should be deconstructed in the process of creation. Bion regarded the effort of dissolution as having the quality of a small psychic catastrophe, a 'going-to-pieces.' Imagination is then both a deconstructive and constructive endeavor. Intuition, as an agent of change, engenders catastrophe, emotional turbulence, and the possibility for creative transformation. DeMasi further developed the Bionian theory of 'the catastrophic transformation,' linking together the concepts of imagination (dreaming) and intuition. In what he calls 'dream-thought' (dreaming for intuiting), the dream corresponds to a symbolic transcription of an emotional experience and the images of the dream refer to the thoughts of a language that tries to integrate the dreamer's emotional story, defences or unconscious fantasies. On the other hand, 'dream-delusion,' the psychotic state proper, allows no room for intuition (insight) and interferes with the dream-thought function. In 'dream-delusion,' the visual perception annihilates the intuitive imagination and takes the place of representation.[55] Ogden alludes to the same idea of a catastrophic breakdown of the imaginative function when he states:

> The opposite of a good dream is not a nightmare but a dream that cannot be dreamt: what might have become a dream remains timelessly suspended in a no-man's land where there is neither imagination nor reality, neither forgetting nor remembering, neither sleeping nor waking up.[56]

In her study on Abhinavagupta and Utpaladeva's concept of imagination, Ratié links imagination to a quest for freedom and creativity. She states that 'the most ordinary experience of imagination is a possible path towards the absolute.'[57] Her assertion seems particularly convincing when we look at Abhinavagupta's commentary on verse 1.5.10 in his *Īśvarapratyābhijñāvimarśinī*. At some point, he remarks that the individual subject is actually the Lord

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[55] See DeMasi 2003: 1160.
[56] Ogden 2005: 53.
[57] Ratié 2010: 346.

that creates the universe. It is just that the individual subject imagines himself to be limited.[58] As Ratié observes in reference to Abhinavagupta's commentary, the absolute consciousness is constantly engaged in a cosmic creative activity, recreating the world 'at every moment' (*pratikṣaṇam*).[59] As we already said, according to Abhinavagupta, the mundane subject (*paśu*) relies on a mental construction (*vikalpa*) in his judgments on existence and the properties of objects.[60] The freedom of the *paśu* playing with his mental constructions is just a reflection of Śiva's own freedom and spontaneity (*svātantrya*). Essentially, these two 'plays' do not differ from each other given that the mundane subject is not different from Śiva as the absolute subject. And yet, a difference exists to the eyes of the individual being who enjoys the fruits of his/her actions and depends on *karman*.[61] It seems that *svātantrya* is a prototypic creative imagination of the Lord that has its mirroring counterpart in the world governed by *māyā*. The divine imagination acts both as a cosmic concealment (*tirobhāva*) and revelation (*anugraha*, 'grace'), thus creating the dynamic dance of Śiva. Says Abhinavagupta:

> What is more difficult to accomplish than this: to manifest, within the One who is Light itself, the negation of Light, at the very time when his luminous essence shines forth undivided? Therefore, it is the supreme freedom of the Supreme Lord thus to manifest himself as the bound soul, causing that part [of the phenomenal world] that is the experiencer to arise, and, through that [experiencer], manifesting the objects of experience. This is called the power of *māyā* of the Lord, according to what has been stated: *māyā* is that which deludes.[62]

Considering Abhinavagupta's concept of *svātantrya*, we may say that the human imagination is but a shadow of the divine play of Śiva. The human imagination 'creates' art, myths, dreams, and

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[58] Cf. *Tantrāloka* 9.144b–146, 13.103–105 and elsewhere.
[59] See Ratié 2010: 369.
[60] See *Īśvarapratyābhijñāvṛtti*, vol. II, p. 263.
[61] Cf. *Tantrāloka* 13.109b–110a.
[62] *Īśvarapratyābhijñāvṛtti ad* 2.3.17, vol. II, p. 141. Tr. by L. Bansat-Boudon and K. Tripathi, quoted after Bansat-Boudon and Tripathi 2011: 129, n. 528.

perceptions as well as hallucinations. And by doing so it 'conceals' and 'reveals' something thus perpetuating and imitating god's prototypical *svātantrya.*

5. Conclusion

For both Abhinavagupta and Bion, imagination is the matrix out of which the fabric or the reality of the world is produced. Abhinavagupta understands imagination as Śiva's power and freedom to create. Śiva's *svātantrya,* his creative play of imagination, creates the world stuff. The human imagination, especially in its form of artistic creativity partakes in the nature of the cosmic play of Śiva. Bion, unlike Abhinavagupta, stops at the threshold of ineffability in his tracing of the roots of imagination. For Bion, our imagination informed by intuition allows us to become 'O,' but not to know 'O.' Even if, at times, he calls this ineffable realm the godhead, the ultimate reality or the absolute truth, he seems to be skeptical about any possibility of knowing it. But, according to him, one can 'become' one's 'O'...

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The Meaning of the Term *trairūpyam* in the Buddhist Pramāṇa Literature

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It is well-known, at least by scholars of early medieval Indian Buddhism, that the term *trairūpyam* is central to the epistemology of the influential Buddhist scholars Dignāga, who was active c. 480–540, and Dharmakīrti, who was active at a time yet to be firmly established in the period c. 550–c. 650. For they asserted that the validity of any logical reason (*liṅgam, hetuḥ*) adduced in inference is conditional on its possessing all three of the features (*trīṇi rūpāṇi*) to which this term refers. Thus in *Nyāyabindu* 2.5 Dharmakīrti states:

> *trairūpyaṃ punar liṅgasyānumeye sattvam eva sapakṣa eva sattvam asapakṣe cāsattvam eva niścitam.*

Moreover the *trairūpyam* of a [valid] logical reason has been determined to be (1) its being invariably present in the probandum (2) and only in the similar, and (3) never in the dissimilar.

and in *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 2.9 with the prose introducing it:

> *tat punas trairūpyam* **anumeye 'tha tattulye sadbhāvo nāstitāsati** *niścitā.*

Moreover that *trairūpyam* [of a valid logical reason] has been determined to be (1) presence in the probandum (2) and in what-

ever is of the same kind, and (3) absence from whatever is not [of that kind].

The verse portion in bold is identical with 2.5ab of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya.*[1]

Now, while there is agreement among scholars as to how to understand the concept of *trairūpyam* in Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's account of inferential knowledge, the same seems not to be the case when it comes to the understanding of the literal meaning of the term. This short contribution addresses the issue of that meaning. I offer it as an inadequate token of my respect and gratitude to my colleague and near contemporary Raffaele Torella for his major contributions to the study of Indian philosophy, particularly to that of the Kashmirian Pratyabhijñā literature.[2]

The taddhita suffix *-ya* (*ṢyaÑ*) added to the stem *trirūpa-* to form the derivate *trairūpyam* in *Nyāyabindu* 2.5 and the prose introducing *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 2.9 might be thought to convey abstraction (*bhāvaḥ*), so that *trairūpyam* would mean 'the property, condition, state, or fact of possessing the three features' or 'triformity,' the word being formed in this analysis from the adjective *trirūpaḥ* understood as a genitive bahuvrīhi compound meaning 'possessing the three features' (*trīṇi rūpāṇi yasya*), i.e. *trīṇi rūpāṇi yasya tat trirūpam. tasya bhāvas trairūpyam.* This analysis would appear to be the basis of Steinkellner's German rendering of the term as Dreiformigkeit.[3]

There is no doubt that Sanskrit grammar does allow one to form the abstract derivate *trairūpyam* with the suffix *ṢyaÑ* to express the meaning '*trirūpa*-ness,' 'triformity'/'Dreiformigkeit.'[4]

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[1] See the lemmata in Jinendrabuddhi, *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*, Chapter 2, Part 1, p. 32.

[2] I thank Harunaga Isaacson, Mai Miyo, and Daisei Michimoto for kindly supplying me with materials to which I did not have access at the time of writing, and Miyako Notake for the same, and for pointing out a number of typographical and other errors in my drafts.

[3] Steinkellner 1979: 32, n. 64: 'die Dreiformigkeit des Grundes'; and 2013, vol. 2, p. 126, n. 227: 'die Dreiformigkeit (*trairūpya*) eines richtigen Grundes.'

[4] It may be formed in this sense in accordance with *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 5.1.123 (*varṇadṛḍhādibhyaḥ ṣyañ ca*), and 5.1.124 (*guṇavacanabrāhmaṇādibhyaś karmaṇi ca*) 'The suffix *ṢyaÑ* (-*ya*) too[, in addition to *imaniC* (-*imán*), causing vṛddhi of the first syllable of that to which it is added,] expresses the state of being (*bhāvaḥ* [5.119])

Indeed, this reading of *trairūpyam* in *Nyāyabindu* 2.5 is put forward by Vinītadeva (c. 710–770) in his commentary on that text, lost in Sanskrit, but surviving in its canonical Tibetan translation. There he glosses *trairūpyam* in the words *tshul gsum pa'i dṅos po ni tshul gsum pa ñid do,*[5] from which the Sanskrit may readily be restored as *trirūpasya bhāvas trairūpyam* ' *trairūpyam* means *trirūpa*-ness [the state, condition, or fact of being one that possesses the three features, i.e. the three characteristics of a valid logical reason].'[6]

The same analysis is given by the Jaina scholar Haribhadrasūri in his commentary on the *Nyāyapraveśakasūtra* composed by Dignāga according to the Tibetan tradition but by his pupil Śaṅkarasvāmin according to Chinese testimony and contemporary scholarship.[7] On the *Nyāyapraveśakasūtra*'s statement *hetus trirūpaḥ. kiṃ punas trairūpyam*[8] 'A [valid] logical reason has three [essential] features. But what is [this] *trairūpyam*?' Haribhadrasūri comments as follows: *sa ca trirūpaḥ. trīṇi rūpāṇi yasyāsau trirūpaḥ, trisvabhāva ity arthaḥ. ekasya vastuno nānātvam apaśyan pṛcchaka āha: kiṃ punas trairūpyam. kim iti paripraśne. punar iti vitarke. trirūpasya bhāvas trairūpyam*[9] 'And that [(valid) logical reason] is *trirūpaḥ* 'possessing the three features,' which is to say, 'possessing the three essential characteristics (*trisvabhāvaḥ*). An enquirer, failing to see how a single entity can be multiple [now] says "But what is [this] *trairūpyam*?". The word "what" (*kim*) indicates that this is a question. The word "but" (*punaḥ*) expresses doubt. [The word] *trairūpyam* is the abstract of [this bahuvrīhi] *trirūpaḥ* [i.e. *trirūpa*-ness].'

However, I propose that in the case of *Nyāyabindu* 2.5 and the prose introducing *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 2.9 the *bhāvaḥ* interpretation

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that to which it is added [i.e. that-ness], after [words for] colours and the words [in the *Gaṇapāṭha*] headed by *dṛḍhaḥ*… The suffix *ṢyaÑ* is also used after words denoting qualities and also after the words [in the *Gaṇapāṭha*] headed by *brāhmaṇaḥ* to denote those persons' work as well as [to form abstract nouns from them, e.g. *brāhmaṇa*-ness].'

[5] Peking 5729:11a3; Derge 4230:9b1. Cited in Lasic 2007: 489.

[6] As Lasic has pointed out (2007: 488), the *pa* of *thsul gsum pa'i* (← *trirūpasya*) indicates that the translator [rightly] understood *trirūpasya* to be a bahuvrīhi compound.

[7] Steinkellner and Much 1995: 16–18.

[8] P. 1, ll. 8–9.

[9] P. 16, ll. 7–10.

is not what Dharmakīrti intended. For if we understand *trairūpyam* as an abstract noun formed from a bahuvrīhi then *Nyāyabindu* 2.5 would mean:

> The [valid] logical reason's (*liṅgasya*) property of having three features (*trairūpyam*) has been determined to be (1) its being invariably present in the probandum (2) and only in the similar, and (3) never in the dissimilar.

and *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 2.9 with its introduction in the auto-commentary would mean:

> Moreover, that property of having three features (*trairūpyam*) has been determined to be (1) presence in the probandum (2) and in whatever is of the same kind, and (3) absence from whatever is not [of that kind].

To opt for this reading is to render Dharmakīrti incoherent. For these are not the property, state, condition, or fact of possessing the three features. They are the three features themselves. The logic of the statement requires therefore that *trairūpyam* should mean not *trirūpasya bhāvaḥ* (*/ trirūpatvam*), but simply 'the three features' (*trīṇi rūpāṇi*):

> The [valid] logical reason has been determined to have three features (*trairūpyam*), [namely]…

In this reading the suffix *-ya* of *trairūpyam* is otiose (*svārthe, svārthikaḥ*), added to the stem form *trirūpa-* (*trīṇi rūpāṇi*), now a karmadhāraya compound meaning 'the three features' rather than a genitive bahuvrīhi, without modifying the meaning of that to which it has been added.

Now, this otiose use of *-ya* (*ṢyaÑ*) is no less correct in Sanskrit than its use to form an abstract noun. Though not mentioned by Pāṇini in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* itself it is frequently encountered in Classical Sanskrit and has been covered accordingly under Kātyāyana's *Vārtika* 1 on *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 5.1.124:

> *brāhmaṇādiṣu cāturvarṇyādīnām upasaṃkhyānam.*

> Words such as *cāturvarṇyam* ('the four caste-categories') should be added [to the open list (*ākṛtigaṇaḥ*) of] those [words taking the suffix *ṢyaÑ*] that begins with *brāhmaṇaḥ*.

In his *Mahābhāṣya* Patañjali adds two more examples when commenting on this *Vārtika*:

> *brāhmaṇādiṣu cāturvarṇyādīnām upasaṃkhyānaṃ kartavyam: cāturvarṇyaṃ cāturvaidyaṃ cāturāśramyam.*

> To the words headed by *brāhmaṇaḥ* one should add words such as *cāturvarṇyam*: *cāturvarṇyam* 'the four caste-categories,' *cāturvaidyaṃ* 'the four Vedas' or 'the four Vidyās,' and *cāturāśramyam* 'the four [brahmanical] disciplines.'

The *Kāśikāvṛtti* on this Sūtra of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* makes explicit what is merely implicit in the *Vārtika* and *Mahābhāṣya* by stating that in such words the suffix *ṢyaÑ* is otiose (*svārthe*):

> *cāturvarṇyādīnāṃ* **svārtha** *upasaṃkhyānam. catvāra eva varṇāś cāturvarṇyam. cāturāśramyaṃ trailokyaṃ traisvaryaṃ ṣāḍguṇyaṃ sainyaṃ sānnidhyaṃ sāmīpyam aupamyaṃ saukhyam.*

> Words such as *cāturvarṇyam* should be added [to the scope of this rule] as synonymous [with the expression to which the suffix *ṢyaÑ* is added]. [Thus] *cāturvarṇyam* means nothing other than (*eva*) *catvāro varṇāḥ* 'the four *varṇas*.' [10] [Likewise] *cāturāśramyam* ('the four disciplines'), *trailokyam* ('the three worlds'), *traisvaryam* ('the three [Vedic] pitch accents'), *ṣāḍguṇyam* ('the six Guṇas'), *sainyam* 'an army' (syn. *senā*), *sānnidhyam* 'presence' (syn. *sannidhiḥ*), *sāmīpyam* 'proximity' (syn. *samīpam*), *aupamyam* 'comparison' (syn. *upamā*), and *saukhyam* 'happiness' (syn. *sukham*).

The Jaina grammarian Vardhamānasūri cites these and yet other cases of otiose *ṢyaÑ*-suffixation in the auto-commentary of his *Gaṇaratnamahodadhi* on the Pāṇinian *Gaṇapāṭha*. Thus on 3.165:

> *catasra eva vidyāś cāturvaidyam.*

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[10] The fact that the particle *eva* follows *catvāraḥ* rather than *varṇāḥ* here should not be taken to mean that the grammarians considered that derivates formed by applying *ṢyaÑ* to a compound in which the prior stem is a numeral are formed in this way to add emphasis or restriction to the number. For if that were the case, they would not have declared that the suffix is *svārthikaḥ*. For the same reason we should not think that the fact that such words are singular in their grammatical number expresses collectivity (*samāhāraḥ*) rather than simple plurality in the way, for example, that the suffix -ī (*ṄīP*) in the *samāhāradvigu* compound *aṣṭādhyāyī* makes this mean 'a collection/set of eight chapters' (*aṣṭānām adhyāyānāṃ samāhāraḥ*) rather than simply 'eight chapters' (*Aṣṭādhyāyī* 4.1.21: *dvigoḥ*).

on 3.167:

> *sarvavedā eva sārvavaidyam.*

on 3.178:

> *sarvavedā eva sārvavaidyam. sukham eva saukhyam. senaiva sainyam. āvasatha evāvasathyam. mālaiva mālyam. upamaivaupamyam. bheṣajam eva bhaiṣajyam. sarvavidyā eva sārvavaidyam.*

on 3.179:

> *sarvalokā eva sārvalaukyam. catasra eva vidyāś cāturvaidyam athavā catvāra eva vedāś cāturvaidyam. catvāra evāśramā brahmacārigṛhasthavānaprasthayatilakṣaṇāś cāturāśramyam. ṣaḍ guṇā eva sandhivigrahayānāsanadvaidhībhāvasaṃśrayalakṣaṇāḥ ṣāḍguṇyam.[11] tribhāvā eva traibhāvyam. traya eva śabdās traiśabdyam.[12] traya eva svarā udāttānudāttasvaritalakṣaṇās traisvaryam.[13] tisra eva vidyā ānvīkṣikītrayīvārtālakṣaṇās traividyam. traya eva lokās trailokyam. traya eva kālā vartamānabhūtabhaviṣyalakṣaṇās traikālyam.[14]*

on 3.180:

> *hāsa eva hāsyam. pradhānam eva prādhānyam. samānam eva sāmānyam. saṃnidhir eva sāṃnidhyam. tadartha eva tādārthyam. samam eva sāmyam. catvāra eva varṇāś cāturvarṇyam.*

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[11] For *ṣāḍguṇyam*, see *Mahābhārata* 12.69.64–66.

[12] Cf. *Nyāsa* on *Kāśikāvṛtti* on *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 5.1.124: *traya eva śabdās tu traiśabdyam. cāturvarṇyāditvāt* **svārthe ṣyañ** 'The word *traiśabdyam* means no more than 'three words.' [The suffix] *ṢyaÑ* is otiose [in this case] because the word belongs to the group headed by *cāturvarṇyam.*

[13] Cf. *Kāśikāvṛtti* on *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.2.34: *traisvaryeṇa vede mantrāḥ paṭhyante* 'In the Veda the Mantras are recited with the three pitch accents'; *Śābarabhāṣya* on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 2.1.32: *traisvaryaṃ cātusvaryaṃ ca* 'three pitch accents and four pitch accents.'

[14] As in the *Traikālyaparīkṣā* 'An Examination of the Three Times' of Dignāga, which is also the title of the 21st chapter of Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha* (vv. 1785–1856). See also *Bhāmatī* on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* on 2.4.17: *indriyāṇāṃ vartamānamātraviṣayatvān manasas tu traikālyagocaratvād bhedenābhidhānam* 'They are referred as distinct because the sense-faculties have only present entities as their objects, whereas the mind has [entities] in the three times [past, present, and future] as its objects'; *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī*, vol. 1, p. 109: *traikālyatrailokyayor ekatvāt* 'because the three times and three worlds are one'; and *Trīśikātātparyadīpikā* v. 433–434a: **siddhīḥ* (corr. : *siddhiḥ* Ed.) *pūrvoktalakṣaṇāḥ | traikālyadarśanādyās tā bhagavān bhairavo yathā || āptvā* 'Having obtained, like Lord Bhairava himself, those supernatural powers already defined, such as seeing [everything] in the three times …'.

It may be objected that *trairūpyam* is not among the words listed here. But that absence carries no weight, since the list is not intended to be exhaustive. Rather, explains Vardhamānasūri, it is an *ākṛtigaṇaḥ*, an open list of examples. So, he says, other such words may be recognized and added to the list.[15] In his commentary *Padamañjarī* on the *Kāśikāvṛtti* on *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 2.1.59 Haradatta explains that one is free to add to such a list by noting other instances of the same usage, defining an *ākṛtigaṇaḥ* as follows: *prayogadarśanenākṛtigrāhyo gaṇa ākṛtigaṇaḥ* 'An *ākṛtigaṇaḥ* is a set (*gaṇaḥ*) that must be construed from individual instances (*ākṛti*-) by observing usage.'

Applying this principle we may add the following:

1. *traiguṇyam* in the meaning 'the three Guṇas' (**traya eva guṇās traiguṇyam*) on the evidence of *Mahābhārata* 12.332.17: *tatas traiguṇyahīnās te paramātmānam añjasā | praviśanti dvijaśreṣṭha kṣetrajñaṃ nirguṇātmakam ||* 'Therefore, O best of the twice-born, because they are free of the three Guṇas they quickly merge into the Supreme Self, the perceiver of all, [for that soul too is] free of the Guṇas'; and 6.24.45ab (*Bhagavadgītā* 2.45ab): *traiguṇyaviṣayā vedā nistraiguṇyo bhavārjuna* 'The Vedas have the three Guṇas as their sphere of operation. O Arjuna, you should be free of those Guṇas.' On this occurrence in the *Gītā* Rāmānuja comments in his *Gītābhāṣya*: *trayo guṇās traiguṇyaṃ sattvarajastamāṃsi* 'The word *traiguṇyam* means "the three Guṇas," namely *sattvam*, *rajaḥ*, and *tamaḥ*'; and on Rāmānuja's comment Vedāntadeśika comments in his *Tātparyacandrikā*, echoing the grammarians:

   > *atrārthāntarāsaṃbhavāc cāturvarṇyādīnāṃ svārtha ity upasaṃkhyānāt svārthikaḥ pratyayaḥ.*

   > Because no other meaning is possible, the suffix [*ṢyaÑ*] is otiose (*svārthikaḥ*) here. For words such as *cāturvarṇyam* are added [to the list beginning with *brāhmaṇaḥ* of words formed by the suffixation of the taddhita *ṢyaÑ*] [but] as expressing [not 'N-ness' (*bhāvaḥ*) or 'the [characteristic] activity (*kriyā*) of N but] the same meaning as N (*svārthe*).'

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[15] On 3.180: *ākṛtigaṇaś cāyam. tenānye 'pi veditavyāḥ.*

See also Abhinavagupta, *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī*, vol. 1, p. 150: *nīlāder api traiguṇyātmatvāt* 'because a patch of blue too consists of the three Guṇas'; and Vācaspatimiśra, *Bhāmatī* on Śaṅkarabhagavat's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* on 2.4.8: *traiguṇyaṃ sukhaduḥkhamohāḥ* 'The three Guṇas are pleasure, pain, and delusion';

2. *traidoṣyam* 'the three defects (*trayo doṣāḥ*); see Veṅkaṭādhvarin, *Vidhitrayaparitrāṇa* on v. 12: *traidoṣyarahito vidhiḥ* 'injunction free of the three defects';

3. *traimāsyam* 'the three months' (the period of the rains); see Yaśomitra, *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyavyākhyā*, p. 105: *trimāsam eva traimāsyam* 'The word *traimāsyam* has the same meaning as *trimāsam* "the three months"'; and

4. *traivarṇyam* 'the three caste-categories'; see Viṣṇubhaṭṭa's *Anargharāghavapañcikā* on 5.40a (*traivarṇyamātravyavasitajagato bhārgavasya* 'of Bhārgava, who has reduced the population to only three caste-categories [by destroying the Kṣatriyas]'): *trayo varṇās traivarṇyam. cāturvarṇyāditvāt svārthe ṣyañ* 'The meaning of the word *traivarṇyam* is 'the three caste-categories.' The suffix *ṢyaÑ* is otiose [here] because the word belongs to the set beginning with *cāturvarṇyam.*'

In support of the position that *trairūpyam* too should be added to the list, that it *can* mean 'the three characteristics' rather than 'triformity,' and that it *does* so in the *loci classici* of the *Nyāyabindu* and *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, we have Dharmottara's commentary on the first. He does not direct his readers to the exegesis of *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 5.1.123–124 when explaining the meaning of the word. But he does show unambiguously that he understands Dharmakīrti to be using the suffix *ṢyaÑ* in this way, because he glosses *trairūpyam* with *trīṇi rūpāṇi*, exactly in the manner of the grammarians presenting cases of otiose suffixation:

> *liṅgasya yat trairūpyam, yāni trīṇi rūpāṇi, tad idam ucyata iti śeṣaḥ.*
> (Dharmottara, *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, p. 91, l. 9)

> [I shall now explain this] *trairūpyam*, [namely] the three features, of a [valid] logical reason. The words 'I shall now explain this [*trairūpyam*] (*tad idam ucyate*)' are to be supplied to complete the sense.

Moreover, at least two other examples of the use of *trairūpyam* with otiose *ṢyaÑ* can be cited. The first is in the Sanskrit grammatical literature. The *Kāśikāvṛtti* uses the term frequently when a rule allowing an option generates three forms. Thus, for example, on *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 4.1.38 (*manor au vā*):

> *tena trairūpyaṃ bhavati. manoḥ strī mánāvī manā́yī mánuḥ.*

> Therefore there are three forms (*trairūpyam*) [permitted]: *mánā-vī, manā́yī,* and *mánuḥ*[, all meaning] 'the wife of Manu.'

on *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 4.1.112 (*śivādibhyo 'ṇ*):

> *tena trairūpyaṃ bhavati: gāṅgo gāṅgāyanir gāṅgeyaḥ.*

> So three forms arise: (1) *gāṅgaḥ,* (2) *gāṅgāyaniḥ,* and (3) *gāṅgeyaḥ.*

on *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 4.1.159:

> *tena trairūpyaṃ sampadyate: gārgīputrakāyaṇir gārgīputrāyaṇir gārgī-putriḥ. vātsīputrakāyaṇir vātsīputrāyaṇir vātsīputriḥ.*

> So three forms arise: (1) *gārgīputrakāyaṇiḥ,* (2) *gārgīputrāyaṇiḥ,* and (3) *gārgīputriḥ*; [likewise] (1) *vātsīputrakāyaṇiḥ,* (2) *vātsīputrāyaṇiḥ,* and (3) *vātsīputriḥ.*

on 5.1.36:

> *tena trairūpyaṃ sampadyate dvaiśāṇaṃ dviśāṇaṃ dviśāṇyam.*

> So three forms arise: (1) *dvaiśāṇam,* (2) *dviśāṇam,* and (3) *dviśā-ṇyam.*

and on 5.1.83:

> *tena trairūpyaṃ bhavati: ṣāṇmāsyaḥ ṣaṇmāsyaḥ ṣāṇmāsikaḥ.*

> So three forms arise: (1) *ṣāṇmāsyaḥ,* (2) *ṣaṇmāsyaḥ,* and (3) *ṣāṇmā-sikaḥ.*

Likewise *Padamañjarī* on *Kāśikāvṛtti* on 5.1.36:

> *trairūpyaṃ bhavatīty aṇy ekaṃ yati dvitīyaṃ ṭhaño luki tṛtīyam.*

> That is to say, there are three forms: one with the suffix *aṆ*, the second with the suffix *yaT*, and the third when zero is substituted for the suffix *ṭhaÑ*.

This last citation shows unambiguously that *trairūpyam* is being used to mean 'three forms' rather than 'triformity,' as does *traiśabdyam*, since that is used by the grammarians as a synonym of *trairūpyam* and is explained, as we have seen above, as one of the cases of the otiose use of *ṢyaÑ* (*traya eva śabdās traiśabdyam*). For its synonymity see, for example, *Kāśikāvṛtti* on 6.2.11: *traiśabdyaṃ hi naḥ sādhyam: mātuḥ sadṛśo mātrā sadṛśo mātṛsadṛśa iti.*

The second use of *trairūpyam* with otiose *ṢyaÑ* (*trīṇy eva rūpāṇi*) is in Abhinavagupta's *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī*, vol. 3, p. 26, in his gloss on *trairūpyeṇa* as it occurs in Utpaladeva's *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti* (on his own *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā* 2.1.8):

> *evaṃ trairūpyeṇeti brahmādirūpatvocitena sṛṣṭyāditrayeṇa.*

> Thus with three forms (*trairūpyeṇa*), namely with the three beginning with emission that accord with his being [the three deities] Brahman[, Viṣṇu,] and [Rudra].

If Abhinavagupta were understanding *trairūpyeṇa* in the sense of *trirūpatvena* (*trirūpasya bhāvena*) then he would have had to gloss it with an abstract such as *sṛṣṭyāditrayarūpatvena.*

Alternative renderings of the term *trairūpyam*, namely 'triple characterization.'[16] 'threefold characteristic,'[17] and 'triple characteristic,'[18] paraphrase rather than capture the term in either of the literal meanings allowed in Sanskrit, perhaps reflecting awareness that the *trirūpasya bhāvaḥ* interpretation is unsatisfactory without seeing the *svārthe ṣyañ* alternative and therefore seeking a translation that keeps the singular number.[19]

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[16] Tillemans 1999: 80; 2000: 22 and 115; 2021: 455: '*na tv ayaṃ pāramārthiko hetus trairūpyābhāvāt* "This, however, is not a real reason, because it lacks the triple characterization.".' This translation was later adopted by Steinkellner (2017: 123).

[17] Sakai 2020: 376: 'the threefold characteristic of a good reason property, i.e., *trairūpya*.'

[18] Hugon 2020: 137; Gorisse 2020: 112: 'the triple characteristic of the evidence-property (*trairūpya*).'

[19] Several scholars in this field, perhaps influenced by uncertainty as to how exactly to construe the term, have opted not to translate it at all, preferring to speak of the *trairūpya* theory, the *trairūpya* condition, or the *trairūpya* system. See, e.g., Ganeri 1999: 101; Prets 1999: 333 and 339; Kanō 2011: 231 etc.; Franco 2020: 89.

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D'impronte e ombre tra India e Grecia. Questioni e visioni di storia del pensiero politico e filosofico tra il V e il II secolo a.C.[1]

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Le désir de retrouver dans l'Inde des pensées modernes qui y auraient été devancées de tant de siècles, fait des ravages fâcheux. Il faut prendre garde de méconnaître les lois mêmes du développement de l'esprit. Des idées subtiles, complexes, ne s'ajustent pas si exactement en des temps si éloignés et dans des phases de civilisation si disparates…
(Émile Senart[2])

I

Per un quadro storico intorno al frammento di Aï Khanum
— inv. Akh III B 77 P. O. 154 (MP³ 2563.01)[3] —

L'immenso archivio storico, costituito da frammenti di scritti pervenuti sino a noi su vari supporti vegetali, litici, artificiali, come

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[1] Ringrazio vivamente Maria Giulia Cotini (Università di Roma, La Sapienza/ EPHE, programma Erasmus, 2006-2007) e Joel Calicharane (EPHE, SHP, 2006-2009) che con le loro ricerche e la loro luminosa presenza alle nostre *Conférences EPHE* parigine hanno aperto nuovi orizzonti a un'insaziabile curiosità. Cotini, nell'ambito delle sue ricerche su «*Gravis* e *Guru*», mise in luce nuovi aspetti del ruolo di *guru* nel *Milindapañha* e Calicharane diresse il suo studio sul contributo della monetazione alla storia politica dei regni greco-battriani.

[2] Senart 1896: 282.

[3] Vedi Privitera 2011: 131-132 e nn. 110-115; Canali de Rossi 2004: 269 § 457.

pure i dati archeologici e numismatici, testimoni questi della presenza e attività di società antiche, suggeriscono allo storico una conclusione di estrema banalità, sebbene non sempre compresa nella sua fertilissima dinamica: l'uomo non ha mai cessato di muoversi in senso fisico e intellettuale verso l'alterità di nuovi spazi, società o idee. Le visioni diverse che attraverso i secoli vennero a costituire l'archivio delle fonti sulle quali appoggiano gli studi odierni illustrano la varietà caleidoscopica degli incontri, e il lento processo osmotico delle alterità, vicendevolmente trasmesse.

Prendendo spunto dal frammento di un testo filosofico greco riportato alla luce il 18 settembre 1977 ad Aï Khanum, nell'antica Battriana[4], vorremmo qui proporre un tentativo di lettura critica delle possibili modalità d'incontro socio-politico, culturale e intellettuale in una regione in cui coesistettero e continuano a coesistere società che si distinguono per lingua, istituzioni sociali, politiche e religiose. Le fonti antiche e gli studi moderni sulla questio-

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[4] Aï Khanum, situata nell'antica Battriana, alla confluenza dei fiumi Daria-i-Panj e Kokcha. Secondo Leriche (2014: 69), «Aï Khanoum a été créée ex nihilo sous la forme d'un triangle rectangle de plus de 200 ha dont les deux côtés de l'angle droit s'appuient respectivement sur l'Amou Daria et sur l'affluent de celui-ci, la Kokcha. Les fouilles ont montré que la ville a été fondée directement comme une cité à part entière au cours du IIIe siècle et a été abandonnée au milieu du IIe siècle av. n. è.»; vedi anche Leriche 2007: 140-144. La fondazione risale ai primi decenni del III sec. a.C. ed è attribuita, secondo alcuni, a Seleuco I Nicator (312-281 a.C.) e secondo altri a Antioco I Soter (281-261 a.C.), cfr. Crisci 1996: 163 e n. 17. Occorre tuttavia precisare, come nota Gardin, che l'insediamento della regione risale all'epoca achemenide. E la lettura del paesaggio insegna come le canalizzazioni per l'irrigazione della pianura e dei piemonti di Aï Khanum, lungi dall'essere dovuti al 'fattore greco', esistevano prima della venuta dei coloni. Cfr. Gardin (1980: 500): «Une interprétation nouvelle vient dès lors à l'esprit, qui lève la contradiction : le monumental projet de Rud-i Shahrawan (fig. 10) ne pouvant être dissocié des programmes d'irrigation qui en sont tributaires, il faut faire remonter la conception de ceux-ci à l'époque achéménide, même si leur réalisation se place pendant la période grecque. En d'autres termes, c'est sous la tutelle perse que prit forme l'ambitieux schéma d'aménagement du Rud-i Shahrawan, destiné à la mise en eau des dernières bandes de terre irrigables aux abord de l'Oxus et de la Kokcha ; et les Grecs n'eurent en l'espèce qu'à laisser s'achever dans ces régions des ouvrages que les Bactriens avaient projetées, voire commencés, bien avant la conquête macédonienne. Une telle restitution, dictée par l'archéologie de surface, change radicalement l'idée première que nous nous faisions du rôle de la colonisation grecque dans le développement régional de la Bactriane ; et l'on mesure à ce seul exemple le plaisir que nous avons pu prendre à lire de pareille manière l'histoire, ou les histoires que le paysage voulait bien raconter».

ne sono più che abbondanti, e tra questi spicca il sovente citato libro di Tarn[5], una sintesi a largo spettro, a suo modo una guida narrativa utile, se non un programma, per lo studioso che, al pari di Sisifo, voglia accingersi ad affrontare il gigantesco corpus delle fonti antiche inerenti al tema. Mezzo secolo dopo Tarn, Klaus Karttunen, dotato di rarissime competenze e di finissimo spirito critico, ha rinnovato gli studi sul contesto indo-greco in epoca ellenistica[6]. In tempi recenti la pubblicazione di cataloghi e rapporti di scavo, come pure un numero importante di studi su sottotemi particolari, hanno arricchito il campo di riflessione intorno alle pratiche intellettuali e alle circostanze che hanno potuto favorire gli incontri in una regione strategica in cui le vie fluviali e terrestri, fino a data recente, non hanno mai cessato di garantire il flusso degli umani *destini incrociati*[7].

I.1. Il ritrovamento dell'impronta di un testo filosofico greco

È a Nur Mohammed, capomastro sul cantiere della tesoreria del palazzo di Aï Khanum[8], che dobbiamo la scoperta dell'impronta

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[5] Tarn 1951. Di recente sono apparsi numerosi studi a largo spettro, tra i quali segnaliamo Wulff Alonso 2014 e Beckwith 2015.

[6] Vedi, e.g., Karttunen 1989; Karttunen 1997, in partic. p. 271: «Next we must consider the origin and development of Greek states in Bactria and India. There has been a controversy of viewpoint: Hellenistic in Tarn (1951): Indian in Narain (1957) — and both to excess. In fact both did rather well from their particular viewpoints. Tarn, however, in addition to his daring hypotheses, could not really understand Eastern history (and was much too sure that he did), while Narain seems to have had an erronoeus idea of the meaning of Hellenism. Both failed to see the importance of the Iranian element. Perhaps a more balanced approach is now possible, with so much new numismatic and archaeological evidence available. After Tarn and Narain, who, in addition to texts, mainly had to rely on evidence east of the Hindukush, the position of Bactria as the "kernland" is now established by archaeology».

[7] Riprendo qui l'idea che illustra a meraviglia l'affascinante viavai lungo le vie della seta e che, in tempi remotissimi, presi da Italo Calvino ne *Il castello dei destini incrociati* (1973), allorché ancora immersa negli studi filosofici, cominciò a manifestarsi una curiosità insaziabile verso gli spazi, le persone, le idee e la storia del loro intrecciarsi, cfr. Scherrer-Schaub (1982: 77-102). Dal canto suo, nel descrivere la situazione geografica della Battriana, Gentelle (2005: 97) giustamente evita la fraseologia d'uso: «La Bactriane est située sur des lignes d'échanges à carrefours multiples dans l'ensemble des territoires asiatiques (manière moins linéaire de dire les 'routes de la soie')».

[8] Robert (1968: 431-454) centra il suo studio sulla stele messa in luce ad Aï Khanum, nel pronaos del hérôon «aux sarcophages». La stele, dice l'iscrizione,

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di alcuni frammenti di testi letterari greci[9] su pergamena e di un papiro srotolato che si presentava «inséré entre les strates fines d'une couche de boue séchée, dont la face écrite était tournée vers le ciel». Rapin sottolinea il carattere eccezionale del ritrovamento che, com'egli descrive, dipende in parte dalla finezza del loess «qui compose le sol, mais surtout de la chance du fouilleur, qui fit que son couteau, poussé obliquement, se glissa dans l'étroi-

porta le famose massime delfiche di Clearco e fu eretta nel *téménos* di Kinéas. Robert dedica un esame particolare al contesto storico (ivi 422), aggiungendo (ivi 431) «il ne me paraît point douteux que Kinéas ait été le fondateur, l'oïkistés, de notre ville sur l'Oxus, enterré, à l'intérieur même de la ville, sur l'agora». L'idea di Robert fu ripresa da vari autori che attribuirono la fondazione della città a Kinéas «onorato con una sepoltura *intra muros*», cfr. Crisci 1996: 164 e n. 25. In merito alla data di fondazione, Grenet (2015: 520) propende per una fondazione «vers 290-280 sans doute à l'initiative d'Antiochos Ier, co-régent de son père Seleucos». Nell'ambito della discussione con Hoffmann (2016: 165-166, e n. 2), Bernard (2004: 232-231), a proposito di Clearco e della sua supposta visita ad Aï Khanum, si attiene alla posizione di Grenet, seppur propendendo per un Antioco non più co-reggente, bensì re: «Il y a un problème à la clé : il ne s'agit pas simplement d'un texte philosophique, il s'agit d'une grande ville qui a eu son histoire et dont la date de fondation elle-même a donné lieu à des discussions éperdues, certaines grotesques, bien entendu. Mais après tout, Antiochos Ier, en tant que roi, aurait pu fonder Aï Khanoum, et non pas son père. Il a passé toute sa jeunesse là-bas. Sa mère était bactrienne, donc il avait mille raisons d'aimer Aï Khanoum, de s'en soucier et de participer, certainement à sa création: puisque c'est la plus grande ville grecque, hellénistique, de l'Asie centrale. Il n'y pas d'autres sites de cette taille-là, ni de cette richesse, en Asie centrale». Per una descrizione più ampia della tesoreria, la cui costruzione, per opera di Eucratide, fu di poco anteriore all'abbandono di Aï Khanum (intorno al 145 a.C.), si suppone in seguito alle incursioni di nomadi provenienti da nord— opinione questa messa in dubbio da altri studiosi—, vedi Rapin, Hadot, Cavallo (1987: 229-230). Se l'ipotesi del viaggio in Asia di Clearco nata dal ritrovamento ad Aï Khanum dell'iscrizione su stele delle massime delfiche, ipotesi dettagliatamente avanzata da Robert, non è condivisa dall'insieme degli studiosi — vedi a esempio Isnardi-Parente 1992: 177—, è possibile invece ritrovare un insieme di dati convergenti che indicano la presenza di inviati alessandrini e greci presso i Seleucidi, dati che vengono a confermare i legami stretti esistenti tra le corti ellenistiche e alcune città greche da cui provenivano i filosofi della scuola di Aristotele, aspetto questo che sarà trattato in altra sede.

[9] Vedi Crisci (1996: 166) a proposito del testo letterario (tav. CXXb) la cui scrittura «risulta curata, nitida e ariosa, non priva di analogie con esempi grafici del III-II secolo a.C. provenienti dall'Egitto tolemaico. Si possono citare, a titolo di esempio PPetr I 19, del 226-225 a.C., PPetr I 9, databile al regno di Tolomeo Filadelfo…» Lo studio paleografico (Cavallo 1987 e Crisci 1996) sembra confermare l'ipotesi della trasmissione di pratiche intellettuali da Alessandria alla Battriana dopo il regno di Tolomeo Filadelfo, vedi Scherrer-Schaub 2017: 262-263.

te et presque invisible fissure produite par la décomposition du support en papyrus»[10]. Senz'altro in questo caso sono entrati in gioco la fortuna, ma soprattutto le competenze e l'abilità di Nur Mohammed e di S. Farhazi[11], il restauratore dell'impronta del papiro. Fu così che i due archeologi afghani contribuirono a rivelare l'esistenza del frammento di un testo filosofico greco fino ad allora sconosciuto. La scoperta interessò i cultori di studi ellenistici e gli storici della filosofia di età ellenistica, sui quali ritorneremo in seguito. Dopo la loro scoperta, il testo filosofico, i testi letterari e le iscrizioni trovate *in situ* suscitarono una folta raccolta di studi eruditi centrati sulla storia e la filosofia ellenistica, mentre il lato indiano della questione rimase in qualche modo in ombra.

I.2. Papiro e filosofia: dall'impronta al testo

> Nella statuaria di età ellenistica il rotolo di papiro — la forma libraria più antica per il mondo mediterraneo — è già attributo comune di filosofi appartenenti alle scuole più diverse, dagli stoici agli epicurei, e persino gli allievi di Socrate, nonostante la propensione dichiarata del maestro per la dimensione orale del fare filosofia, possono essere ritratti con un rotolo tra le mani.
> (Lucio Del Corso[12])

> Il dialogo è un discorso costituito da domande e risposte riguardo a qualche questione filosofica o politica, con la opportuna determinazione dei caratteri dei personaggi presentati, e una dizione stilisticamente appropriata. La dialettica, invece, è la tecnica dei discorsi mediante la quale costruiamo o distruggiamo una tesi sulla base delle domande e delle risposte degli interlocutori.
> (Diogene Laerzio III.48[13])

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[10] Rapin, Hadot e Cavallo 1987: 232, e note relative; Rapin 1992: 115-116. Riguardo alla possibile datazione del frammento, Rapin cita Cavallo la cui opinione è pressoché unanimemente accettata: «L'étude paléographique proposée par G. Cavallo (1987: 119, n. 295) a permis d'établir que ce document s'insère sans difficulté dans le contexte des productions papyrologiques actuellement connues et qu'il présente les caractères paléographiques des écritures gréco-egyptiennes de l'époque ptolémaïque. La rédaction pourrait se situer aux environs du milieu du IIIe siècle av. J.-C.».

[11] Cfr. Rapin, Hadot e Cavallo 1987: 225-266.

[12] Del Corso 2011: ix. La tardiva statua della dea *Prajñāpāramitā* (fig.) la cui mano sinistra tiene un libro (*pustaka*) con l'invocazione *nama prajñāpāramitāyā*, mentre la destra fa il gesto dell'argomentazione (*vitarka/vyākhyānamudrā*), risponde in qualche modo ai due rilievi segnalati in Scherrer-Schaub 2017: 241 e 260, l'uno proveniente dal Gandhāra e l'altro da Ostia.

[13] Diogene Laerzio 2006: 349. Cfr. Dorandi 2013: 269, ll. 533-535.

Come rileva Hadot (Rapin, Hadot e Cavallo 1987: 245), il brano filosofico di Aï Khanum tradisce la fraseologia tipica dei dialoghi, in particolare dei cosiddetti «dialoghi narrativi» che Diogene Laerzio (III, 50)[14] attribuisce a non meglio precisati autori, i quali

> [a]ffermano, infatti, che di essi alcuni siano in forma drammatica, altri in forma narrativa, altri ancora in forma mista. Ma costoro, nel differenziare i dialoghi, hanno usato una terminologia più adatta alla tragedia che alla filosofia.

L'accordo degli studiosi fu generale nel notare che il discorso filosofico, tramandato dal frammento, contiene elementi risalenti alla teoria platonica delle idee, con particolare riferimento ai temi della *causalità* e della *partecipazione* (μέθεξις)[15]. Hadot, dopo aver vagliato diverse ipotesi, così conclude:

> [l]a plus grande prudence s'impose donc car, finalement, aucun des arguments que nous avons énumérés n'est décisif. D'ailleurs le genre littéraire du dialogue permettait à l'auteur d'exprimer aussi bien ses propres idées que celles d'un adversaire, ou de conduire le répondant, par des arguments purement dialectiques et artificiels dans une impasse. On peut dire seulement que tel qu'il se présente à nous actuellement, notre fragment suppose que l'interrogateur et le répondant admettent également la théorie des Idées. Cela ne veut pas dire que le dialogue soit nécessairement l'œuvre d'un platonicien. Mais, dans l'état actuel de nos connaissances et de notre recherche, nous ne pouvons savoir quel a pu être l'auteur de notre dialogue ni même finalement sa tendance doctrinale. Le problème de son interprétation définitive reste donc en suspens[16].

Qualche anno dopo la traduzione francese di Hadot (Rapin, Hadot e Cavallo 1987: 244-249), il frammento, situato da Cavallo (1987: 237) intorno alla metà del III sec. a. C., fu tradotto in italiano e studiato nel contesto delle scuole ateniesi da Isnardi-Parente[17], dalla cui dotta lettura si possono desumere alcuni dati i quali evocano una serie di *possibili* punti di incrocio, se non di con-

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[14] Testo greco in Dorandi 2013: 269, ll. 547-550; trad. in Reale 2006: 351.
[15] Limpidissimo al riguardo Hadot, in Rapin, Hadot e Cavallo 1987: 246-247; seguito da Isnardi-Parente 1992: 178-179. Cfr. Previtera 2011: 115-140, in partic. 131 e note.
[16] Rapin, Hadot e Cavallo 1987: 248-249.
[17] Isnardi-Parente 1992: 169-188.

trasto, tra pensatori indiani e greci, all'epoca in cui, presumibil-
mente[18], il testo circolava in Battriana dove fu forse (o piuttosto,
avrebbe potuto essere) letto o udito, se non discusso, da intellet-
tuali di diversa provenienza. Dal canto suo, Crisci, al seguito di
Cavallo, volgendo un attento esame paleografico al frammento di
Aï Khanum, ne conferma la datazione confrontando la scrittura
ad altri esempi egizi del III sec. a.C.[19]

I.3. *Temi e termini filosofici*

Prima di chiedersi se il testo originale di Aï Khanum, giunto a noi
in forma estremamente frammentaria, abbia potuto suscitare l'in-
teresse di intellettuali di passaggio o residenti in Battriana, è bene
volgere la nostra attenzione alla traduzione di Isnardi-Parente[20]:

> Col. II
> A. «Noi diciamo che non solo i sensibili (*partecipano*) delle idee,
> ma le idee stesse le une delle altre[21]…».

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[18] Dall'analisi paleografica di Cavallo, sembra lecito supporre che il testo fu
conosciuto ad Aï Khanum nel corso del III sec. e fino alla metà del secolo succes-
sivo, quando il sito fu abbandonato. Cfr. Crisci 1996: 162-163, 165-166 e n. 40. Su
un altro episodio di possibile transmissione delle pratiche intellettuali alessan-
drine nelle regioni del nord-ovest indiano, cfr. *supra* n. 9.

[19] Cfr. Rapin 1992: 116. L'autore (ivi 119) è dell'idea che il frammento fu co-
piato e che quindi provenga da una «officine méditerranéenne», ipotesi che,
personalmente, condividiamo per le ragioni addotte sopra, n. 8 *sub finem*. Del
Corso (2011b: 15), indagando sulla provenienza dei papiri platonici, databili al
regno di Tolomeo I Soter (305-282 a.C.), e con riferimento ai famosi documen-
ti usati «per fabbricare cartonnages, involucri di cartapesta dipinta e stuccata che
avvolgevano le mummie dei defunti nella necropoli di Gurob, una cittadina situ-
ata nella parte meridionale della regione del Fayum», descrive l'ampia area di
trasmissione dei papiri, da parte dei coloni: «Questi coloni, tra cui figuravano ex
soldati, ufficiali e funzionari dell'amministrazione tolemaica, provenivano non
soltanto dalla capitale, Alessandria, e dalle altre città dell'Egitto abitate da Greci
già da secoli, come Naucrati, ma anche da una pluralità di regioni del mondo
ellenistico, inclusa Creta e città della Magna Grecia vera e propria: a rigore, i più
antichi manoscritti di Platone potrebbero essere stati scritti in una qualsiasi di
queste regioni». Un fatto questo particolarmente istruttivo anche per quanto
riguarda gli scambi tra Oriente ellenistico e nord-ovest dell'India.

[20] 1992: 169-188, 173 (Col. II-III), e 174 dove l'autrice aggiunge: «La colonna
IV è troppo mutila per essere tradotta»; per l'edizione critica si veda ivi 170-173
(Col. II-IV). Rinviamo nel contempo il lettore interessato alla trascrizione ed edi-
zione critica del testo greco in Rapin 1987: 237-244; per la traduzione si veda
Hadot (Rapin, Hadot e Cavallo 1987: 244, Col. II-IV).

[21] Si potrebbe forse supplire quanto segue: «Noi diciamo che non solo i sen-

B. «Lo diciamo infatti».

A. «Ma dunque come causa stessa di quelle medesime[22] non …
partecipa a sua volta di quella realtà che sono le idee, in quanto
esso stesso di per sé è causa del fatto che le altre cose partecipino
di queste …»

(seguito incerto: si legge distintamente solo; «alle altre idee singo-
larmente prese»).

Col. III

A. «sì che per queste stesse ragioni è necessario che la causa della
partecipazione sia (immobile), dal momento che immobile è, per
i motivi che abbiamo detto, ciascuna delle idee, e per il fatto che
eterno è il processo di nascita e morte delle cose sensibili …»[23].

B. «È necessario», disse.

A. «Ma allora questa sembrerebbe essere la suprema e prima fra
tutte le cause»[24].

B. «È giustamente», disse.

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sibili (*partecipano*) delle idee, ma le idee stesse le une delle altre… [*senza escluder-
si vicendevolmente ?*]».

[22] Si potrebbe forse avanzare una lettura alternativa: «Ma dunque come causa
stessa di quelle medesime [idee, l'Uno in quanto] non [essere relativo] partecì-
pa a sua volta di quella realtà che sono le idee, in quanto esso stesso di per sé è
causa del fatto che le altre cose partecipino di queste …» Cfr. Fronterotta 2001:
371 § 6, «La natura dell'essere nel Sofista»: al commento di *Sofista* 257b3-4, in cui
lo Straniero/l'Eleate (*Sofista* 257b3-4) insiste sul fatto che «la forma di non essere
introdotta dalla nozione di diversità non deve intendersi come contraria
all'essere (ἐναντίον τοῦ ὄντος), la sua negazione assoluta, bensì come appunto,
diversità (ἕτερον)», Fronterotta aggiunge: «Questa immagine del non essere,
che va dunque inteso come *non essere qualcosa*, quindi come *essere diverso da qual-
cosa*, era in effetti delineata nella quinta serie di deduzioni dell'esercizio dialetti-
co del Parmenide, là dove veniva sottoposta ad analisi la natura dell'uno che non
è. In tal caso, infatti, il non essere dell'uno era assunto in senso relativo, perché
non indicava la non esistenza dell'uno stesso, ma la sua diversità dalle altre cose;
il non, si precisava, enuncia la diversità dell'uno da ciò che lo segue, dalle altre
cose; e non la sua negazione assoluta». Troviamo nella lettura di Platone di
Fronterotta un dossier irresistibile per un possibile contrasto con tesi filosofiche
e logiche indiane di epoca classica che tuttavia esulano dal presente contesto.

[23] Isnardi-Parente (1992: 171, n. 7) così commenta: «Il significato suggerisce
la presenza di un 'immobile' o di un sinonimo: l'autore qui pone tre stadi, una
causa prima che è il punto fermo e finale di arrivo cui si può risalire, un eidos
immobile (= sempre uguale a se stesso, fuori dal divenire, ecc.), un divenire con-
cepito come processo eterno e quindi anch'esso dotato a suo modo di una forma
di identità e coerenza nella continuità. Il gár con cui sono introdotte le frasi
seguenti sembra indicare una caratterizzazione che possa servire a giustificazione
delle altre proprio per il fatto di essere dello stesso tipo».

[24] Cfr. Speusippo CHLGPh 31, ll. 11-16 e ll. 19-24.

A. «E ciò è causa a tutti (gli esseri?) e a tutte le idee … reciproca-
mente …
(seguito incerto: compare chiaramente leggibile solo «niente di
nessuno»).

Isnardi-Parente commenta (1992: 178):

Il brano di opera ignota verte sul problema della *méthexis* (parteci-
pazione): sul problema cioè del Sofista, giacché si tratta di *méthe-
xis* fra idee; ripreso tuttavia in un'ottica che platonica non è più.

Più avanti (ivi 179) il commento dell'*ellenista* risveglia l'attenzione
dell'*indianista*.

Il problema del Sofista è stabilire la possibilità di un nesso fra va-
lori ideali, identificando alcune idee la partecipazione alle quali è
imprescindibile per ogni realtà, come ad esempio le idee di
essere, medesimo, altro, reciprocamente coesistenti e quindi
'partecipabili' insieme in mutua *koinônía* o *sumploké*[25] (già in
posizione diversa si pongono le due idee di quiete e di moto[26],
seppur assunte anch'esse fra i *mégista géne*: poiché in esse il rappor-
to di alterità trapassa in quello di opposizione, come i passi 255a,
257b dicono chiaramente esse si presentano quindi come alterna-
tive e non coesistenti)[27].

Vediamo ora un altro passo (Isnardi-Parente, ivi 184-185) dove, con
pacata e prudente analisi, l'autrice sottopone a una critica min-
uziosa le varie ipotesi che potrebbero condurre a un'eventuale
attribuzione del brano ad autore conosciuto. Per inciso, ella nota:

[I]l personaggio del dialogo afferma anche che la causa deve
essere analoga all'idea, che è immobile, e, in diverso modo, anche

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[25] Ovverosia, in mutua associazione o combinazione, cfr. GEL 970a e 1684b,
ss. vv.

[26] Su «quiete e moto» rinviamo alla discussione di Nāgārjuna MMK II (Gatā-
gataparīkṣā). Bhattacharya, a più riprese, ha commentato il capitolo in modo
critico suggerendo un'interpretazione consona alle categorie grammaticali (vedi
Bhattacharya 1980; 1980-1981; 1986).

[27] Cfr. Hoffmann 2016: 191. Hoffmann riproduce l'edizione e la traduzione
di Rougemont in *Corpus Inscriptionum Iranicarum* II 2012: 207-208, n° 131. Lo stu-
dioso francese intende concentrarsi «sur les principaux éléments doctrinaux qui
permettent à coup sûr, comme on le verra, d'identifier l'interlocuteur principal
du fragment de dialogue comme un académicien postérieur de Platon», prece-
duto in questo da Hadot 1987 e Isnardi-Parente 1992.

al susseguente processo del divenire, che è eterno, ipotizzando quest'ultimo come perenne processo cosmico di generazione e distruzione. Ora, non solo si cercherebbe invano nel Platone dei dialoghi l'applicazione di un termine come *ā́ídios* al divenire sensibile; ma si cercherebbe anche invano in Aristotele l'attribuzione a Platone del principio di eternità del mondo. Al contrario, secondo Aristotele (*De Coelo*, 279b32 sgg.), Platone ha posto nel *Timeo* la cosmogonia come realmente avvenuta nel tempo; e l'atto di *boétheia* e di difesa (*ὑperapología*) che tende a interpretare la cosmogonia del *Timeo* come descrizione allegorica adombrante l'eternità del cosmo e la sua genesi atemporale è attribuita ad 'alcuni' che non possono essere se non i suoi diretti discepoli, Speusippo e Senocrate…[28]

Incontriamo nel brano, messi in scena dal dialogo, due filosofi di scuola ateniese (?) che tra altri temi discutono della natura dei primi principi, della causa del divenire, del processo di 'nascita e morte'[29]; temi questi, se non concetti omologhi[30] (sui quali ritorneremo in seguito), diversamente esaminati entro un quadro storico-culturale specifico, al centro delle preoccupazioni filosofiche e scientifiche indiane. I «luoghi del sapere» (*vidyāsthāna*)[31], tra i quali si annoverano la grammatica (*śabdavidyā*)[32] e la

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[28] L'ipotesi Speusippo è presto scartata da Isnardi-Parente sulla base di un attento quanto prudente esame della questione (1992: 185-186), ma la studiosa si mostra piuttosto favorevole all'ipotesi «Senocrate» (1992: 186-188), aggiungendo infine: «La conclusione di questo discorso non oltrepassa i limiti dell'ipotesi. Avanzo la congettura che ci troviamo di fronte a un frammento di dialogo giovanile platonizzante — ma nella forma più che nella sostanza — di Aristotele, dialogo che potrebbe essere identificato con il Zophistés; e che quanto vi è contenuto possa andare ad aggiungersi alle diverse, pur fragili e ipotetiche, testimonianze che ci conducono sulle tracce della perduta dottrina di Senocrate». Cfr. Previtera 2011: 131-132 e nn. 110-115.

[29] In questo caso le Idee in quanto paradigma perenne/modello eterno, definite attraverso il rapporto di partecipazione (*méthexis*) che le cose sensibili intrattengono con esse, così come le idee tra loro stesse.

[30] Il termine «omologo» è qui inteso in senso matematico, come avente cioè un ruolo o una posizione analoga all'interno di figure o funzioni specifiche.

[31] Si veda Torella 2008. Già del resto gli «ausiliari del Veda» (*vedāṅga*), ovverosia le «scienze» connesse alle pratiche rituali vediche. Tra le innumerevoli pubblicazioni sul tema, rinviamo all'articolo di Staal (2006: 108): «That the chief concern of the Indian sciences has always been with human language is apparent from the earliest classifications of sciences. During the late Vedic period, around the middle of the first millennium BCE, a list is given of sciences that are called 'limbs of the Veda' (*vedāṅga*). They are the science of ritual (*kalpa*) to which

medicina (*cikitsāvidyā*), forse prima ancora delle diverse scuole di pensiero, furono confrontate a problematiche analoghe ad alcuni dei *topoi* filosofici evocati dal brano in questione, quali la categoria di causa e il processo del divenire inteso nell'ambito di un «processo cosmico di generazione e distruzione». Non solo i due *vidyāsthāna,* a cui abbiamo appena accennato, offrono un modo alternativo di analisi delle cause e dei rapporti temporali i quali interessano da vicino il problema del divenire ma le loro scuole fiorivano appunto nelle regioni del nord-ovest indiano, in partico-

geometry (*śulba*) is attached; phonetics and phonology (*śikṣā*); etymology (*nirukta*); grammar (*vyākaraṇa*); prosody (*chandas*); and astronomy/astrology (*jyotiṣa*)». Sui *vidyāsthāna*, le *vidyā*, i *vedāṅga* nelle fonti brahmaniche e buddhiste, cfr. Seyfort Ruegg 1995: 103, n. 12; ivi *sub finem*: «Le terme *vidyāsthāna* se trouve pour la première fois en sanskrit dans le *Nirukta* (I.15) de Yāska. Les sciences que maîtrise le brahmane sont énumérées aussi dans le *Dīghanikāya* (I, p. 88)».

[32] A proposito del *vyākaraṇa*, è interessante contrastare la definizione *minimalista* di «realtà» che si può desumere dal nostro brano e quanto insegna l'aforisma 5.1.119 di Pāṇini, e il commento di Kātyāyana e Patañjali. Pāṇini è fatto risalire al IV sec. a.C. e nacque, così si dice, nel borgo di Śalātura nel Pakistan attuale, secondo alcuni nella regione di Peshawar, secondo altri nella regione di Taxila. In merito all'idea di un accenno alla scrittura greca da parte di Pāṇini, Vincenzo Vergiani fa gentilmente notare quanto segue: Nel *sūtra* 4.1.49 Pāṇini si limita a regolamentare il femminile (poco comune) di un gruppetto di nomi che aggiungono alla base maschile *-ānī*, anziché solo la /ī/ finale. Fra questi nomi compare *yavana*, da cui *yavanānī*. Ma è Kātyāyana, almeno un secolo dopo Pāṇini, che nel *vārttika yavanāl lipyām* fa riferimento alla *yavanānī lipiḥ*. A proposito di Pāṇini e della sua conoscenza della scrittura, vedi Vergiani 2019. Si fa appello all'aforisma in questione nelle discussioni controverse sulla natura dello *śabda,* e lo si trova citato da Candrakīrti (c. 600 d.C.) in una glossa al termine *tattva*, cfr. Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 237-238, n. 457 e *infra* n. 165. Deshpande (2006: 217) descrive con particolare chiarezza la situazione di frontiera delle regioni del nord-ovest nella loro complessa pluralità: «Pāṇini does not seem to present the Sanskrit dialect of a particular region, including his own northern region, to be the core or the standard dialect. The northern dialect is on a par with the eastern dialect in his description, both being equidistant from the abstracted core of the generic Sanskrit language which forms the target of his general description. The abstracted core is not the language of any specific social, temporal, or geographic domain. This lack of emphasis on a specific region, including his own, may possibly reflect the political weakness of his own region, in relation to other regions. Perhaps he was unwilling to recognize the superiority of the central or eastern region. Such a possibility indeed occurs to us when we contrast Pāṇini with Patañjali». In questo caso, è interessante sottolineare la posizione di Pāṇini sulla lingua sanscrita, la quale invece di indulgere in considerazioni «riduttive» per non dire «integriste», rivela un'attenzione imparziale al campo di studi, propria del sapere scientifico, condizione necessaria allo sviluppo di un sistema teorico coerente, quale fu l'opera dell'immenso grammatico indiano.

lare a Taxila, in epoche non lontane dai testi ritrovati ad Aï Khanum[33].

D'altro canto, è fuori dubbio che il pensiero filosofico indiano, sin dalla più alta antichità, sembra aver teorizzato a modo suo la distinzione necessaria nel corso del processo cognitivo, sia esso teorico, descrittivo o morale, tra il fatto empirico osservato e sperimentato e la sua espressione «professa», ovverosia apertamente dichiarata per tramite del linguaggio naturale o artificiale[34]. E qui gli esempi non mancano, *in primis* Pāṇini. D'altro canto sembra lecito pensare che l'osservazione dell'empireo — la corsa del sole, le fasi della luna, l'osservazione degli astri, le eclissi osservate e conosciute sin dal *Ṛgveda*[35], come pure, per quanto riguarda l'arte medica, l'osservazione del corpo e dell'essere umano nella sua totalità, portarono a distinguere le varie forme di causalità e le riflessioni teoriche sul processo del divenire, sul movimento, sul

[33] Non solo le due *vidyā* a cui accenniamo rappresentano un campo e un modo alternativo di analisi delle cause o dei rapporti temporali, i quali molto hanno a che vedere con il problema del divenire; ma, come detto, le scuole di medicina e di grammatica, se non alcuni dei loro scolarchi, sono presenti nelle regioni del nord-ovest indiano, in particolare a Taxila, in epoche assai vicine al periodo di possibile attività intellettuale fiorente ad Aï Khanum. Cfr. Karttunen 1989: 62; 1996: 51. I trattati classici della medicina indiana, *Caraka*° e *Suśrutasaṃhitā*, premettono, in apertura all'opera, il racconto eziologico della trasmissione della scienza medica (Āyurveda, a rigor di termini, «Veda [relativo] alla longevità», vedi Torella 2008), rivelata da Indra ai Ṛṣi, tra i quali Ātreya Punarvasu, seguito dal lignaggio dei successivi discepoli. Il nome di Ātreya appare anche nelle fonti buddhiste: fu il famoso, forse leggendario, medico di Taxila presso cui fu inviato Jīvaka, figlio di Bimbisāra e futuro medico anche di Śākyamuni Buddha (*Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinayavastu*, Cīvaravastu, *Gilgit Manuscripts* III.2.26-37, 26.7-8, cfr. III.2.23). Vedi anche Wujastyk 2003.

[34] È nondimeno opportuno notare con Pollock che la tradizione śāstrica ha, dell'empirico, un'altra idea. Essa infatti afferma che sono le regole infuse per così dire nel praticante che determinano la pratica (1985: 507b): «All knowledge derives from *śāstra*; success in astrology or in the training of horses and elephants, no less than in language use and social intercourse, is achieved only because the rules governing these practices have percolated down to the practitioners — not because they were discovered independently through the creative power of practical consciousness — 'however far removed' from the practioners the *śāstra* may be. As for learning the *śāstra* itself, this is the necessary commencement of the tradition, and later serves to enhance the efficacy of the practice, as we saw the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* to have asserted and as Yaśodhara reiterates here. It makes the practice 'stronger,' reliable, and consistent, unlike uninformed practice, whose effectivity is altogether fortuitous».

[35] Cfr. CHSI 573-575.

tempo. Analizzando la tensione tra teoria e pratica nei testi indiani, Pollock (1985: 510a) nota:

> This dialectical orientation is especially prevalent in the medical tradition. As is well known, the *Suśrutasaṃhitā* urges the student to examine cadavers carefully and subject them to anatomical scrutiny. 'For it is only by combining both direct observation and information of the *śāstra* that thorough knowledge is obtained.' The *Carakasaṃhitā* confirms this view, asserting that 'Of all types of evidence, the most dependable is that directly observed,' and in a memorable epigram, proclaiming that 'The wise understand that their best teacher is the very world around them'.

Forse è proprio sull'analisi delle cause dal punto di vista teorico ed empirico che avrebbe potuto instaurarsi un discorso fecondo. Tra i vari fatti e personaggi che arricchiscono il quadro socio-culturale del III sec. a.C. troviamo Erasistratos (Ἐρασίστρατος) conosciuto come esperto anatomista — praticava la dissezione dei cadaveri ad Alessandria — il quale fu medico di Seleuco I Nicator e del figlio Antioco I Soter (sulla loro presenza in Battriana, cfr. *supra* n. 8 e *infra* n. 76) e famoso per il suo abile intervento presso Seleuco che si concluse con la serena accettazione da parte del canuto Seleuco dell'opportunità di cedere la giovane e bellissima moglie Stratonice (Στρατονίκη) ad Antioco. Ora, Erasistratos non fu solo un medico praticante ma contribuì in qualche modo alle discussioni sulla natura delle cause dal punto di vista teorico e pratico che fiorivano all'epoca nelle scuole di medicina. Già Aristotele aveva insistito sul fatto che i primi princípi,

> the *archai* or axioms of a science, cannot be proved or demonstrated, and hence cannot be given as explanation (*APo.* I.2.71b26-33, 3.72b19-25) — indeed, explanation has got to terminate somewhere (cf. *Metaph.* Γ 4.1006a6-9) in prior and unexplainable premisses in order to avoid infinite regress or circularity (*APo.* I.3)[36].

Tra i contemporanei di Aristotele troviamo Dioclès (Διοκλῆς)[37], il quale sostiene

> to be of no practical use to try and aetiologize everything: for ordinary medical purposes explanation must stop somewhere. Neither

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[36] Hankinson CHHPh IV.14: 508.

[37] Διοκλῆς di Carystos, contemporaneo di Aristotele e, secondo alcuni, influenzato dalle idee dello Stagirita, cfr. Hankinson CHHPh IV.14: 508 e n. 65.

does [Diocles] say that the things to be left unexplained actually are first principles, only that they are akin to them — and his point may be that some things must be accepted for pragmatic reasons as basic, even if they may not in fact be so. Diocles may well be the first explicitly to point out the pitfalls of explanatory dogmatism, while echoing the anti-theoretical empiricism of the Hippocratic treatise *On Ancient Medicine*; he even goes so far as to suggest that aetiologizing serves a purely rhetorical function. Erasistratus apparently went further still, refusing to allow that antecedent causes were genuine causes on the grounds that they were not sufficient for their effects[38].

Sembra lecito pensare che la problematica e le linee generali del discorso dei medici alessandrini —se incontro vi fu…— avrebbero potuto trovare una certa consonanza con alcuni *sutta* nei quali il Buddha invita all'azione e a un certo pragmatismo, anziché perdersi in discorsi eziologici. Pensiamo al noto *Cūlamāluṅkya-sutta,* che mette in scena il *thera* Māluṅkyaputta, il quale chiede al Buddha di dissipare i suoi dubbi.

> O signore, mentre solitario stavo meditando, sorse in me il seguente pensiero: «Vi sono teorie che il Beato non ha spiegato, ha trascurato e rigettato come "Il mondo è eterno o non è eterno". "Il mondo ha fine o è senza fine". "La vita e il corpo sono la stessa cosa o due cose diverse". "Il Tathāgata esiste o non esiste dopo la morte". "Esiste o non esiste dopo la morte o né esiste né non esiste dopo la morte". Il Beato non mi ha spiegato queste teorie».

In questo passo troviamo in nuce quelle dottrine filosofiche e l'argomento quadricuspide (*catuṣkoṭi*) che ritroveremo in Nāgārjuna e nei filosofi Mādhyamika di epoca classica e che saranno in seguito ampiamente discussi tra i maestri tibetani. Ma ritorniamo al *sutta* di Māluṅkya. Il Buddha risponde con un apologo.

> O Māluṅkyaputta, se un uomo fosse colpito da una freccia avvelenata, abbondantemente cosparsa di veleno, e i suoi amici e compagni, parenti e congiunti chiamassero un medico chirurgo ed egli tuttavia, dicesse: «Non voglio farmi estrarre questa freccia fino a quando non saprò chi mi ha colpito, se un guerriero o un brāhmaṇa, se un mercante o un servo» e dicesse: «non voglio farmi estrarre questa freccia, fino a quando non saprò chi mi ha colpito,

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[38] Cfr. Hankinson CHHPh IV.14: 508-509.

qual è il suo nome, qual è la sua gente», e dicesse … certamente quest'uomo, o Māluṅkyaputta, non riuscirebbe a sapere tutto ciò prima di aver finito il suo tempo.

Il Buddha spiega in seguito a Māluṅkyaputta che se qualcuno, in modo analogo, dicesse

Io non condurrò vita religiosa presso il Beato, fino a quando egli non mi spiegherà se il mondo è eterno o non eterno, se ha fine o non ha fine…, il Tathāgata o Māluṅkyaputta, non avrebbe ancora terminato di spiegare tutto ciò, che quest'uomo avrebbe già finito il suo tempo. O Māluṅkyaputta, sbaglia chi pensa che, una volta confermata la teoria: «Il mondo è eterno», allora potrebbe condurre vita religiosa.

E, affermando il ruolo centrale dell'*agire*[39], conclude

[p]erché, o Māluṅkyaputta, non ho spiegato tutto questo? Perché, o Māluṅkyaputta, ciò non è salutare, non appartiene ai fondamenti della vita religiosa, non conduce al sereno disincanto (*nibbhidā*), al distacco, alla cessazione, alla pace, alla conoscenza, al risveglio, al *nibbāna*: per tale motivo non ho spiegato tutto ciò. E che cosa, o Māluṅkyaputta, ho spiegato? «Questo è dolore», o Māluṅkyaputta, ciò ho spiegato…[40]

Altri *sutta* alludono a dottrine filosofiche che si vuole fossero in auge all'epoca del Buddha, in particolare il celeberrimo *Brahmajālasutta*[41] in cui troviamo messi in scena il *paribbājaka* Suppiya, sprezzante al riguardo del Triratna e il giovane discepolo Brahmadatta il quale invece loda il Buddha, il Dhamma e il Saṅgha. Quivi appare il famoso passo sui «sessantadue punti di vista errati» (*diṭṭhi*), insieme ai vari tipi di argomenti, in particolare l'argomen-

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[39] Ed è infatti appoggiandosi sull'osservazione empirica e l'analisi del *modus operandi* del *karman* che i pensatori indiani, se non il Buddha stesso, identificarono i fattori concomitanti alla produzione dell'effetto (*kārya*) in relazione alla causa (*kāraṇa*) e all'agente (*kartṛ*). Le scuole si distingueranno per gli argomenti e la natura da loro assegnata agli 'elementi' (*dharma*) del 'reale'. Cfr. Nāgārjuna MMK VIII (Karmakārakaparīkṣā), La Vallée Poussin 1913/1970: 180-191. L'atto (*karman*) e l'agire assumeranno in epoca classica una dimensione cosmica (cfr. *Abhidharmakośa* IV.1: *karmajaṃ lokavaicitryaṃ* [e l'atto è] *cetanā tatkṛtaṃ ca tat*), già presente nei testi antichi, seppur diversamente compresa.

[40] Cfr. Sferra 2001a: 225 e 229. Il *sutta* si conclude con l'insegnamento delle quattro verità: dolore, origine, cessazione e via che porta alla cessazione.

[41] Vedi Cicuzza 2001.

to quadricuspide (*catuṣkoṭi*), e tra i quali spiccano teorie filosofiche comuni all'India e alla Grecia.

Erasistratos (c. 304-c. 250 a.C.), in un passo citato da Galeno, mostra quanto l'ammissione del fatto che «fattori causali» —quali il freddo o il caldo— siano causa di specifici fenomeni possa essere problematica. Erasistratos si avvale del caso seguente.

> Most people, both now and in the past, have sought the causes of fevers, trying to ascertain and learn from the sick whether the illness has its origin in being chilled or exhausted or repletion, or some other cause of this kind; but this kind of inquiry into the causes of diseases yields results neither true nor useful. For if cold were a cause of fever, then those who have been chilled the more should suffer the greater fever. But this is not what happens: rather there are some who have faced extreme danger from freezing, and who when rescued have remained unaffected by fever… [while] many people who experience far worse exhaustion and repletion than that which coincides with fever in some others yet escape the illness. (Erasistratus, in Gal.[enus] *CP* [*De causis procatarcticis*] VIII.102-31; cf. XI.141-4; XIII.166-8)

Secondo la tradizione, fu proprio per mezzo dell'analisi della sequenza causale che Śākyamuni giunse alla conoscenza della realtà che fece di lui lo Svegliato (Buddha). Si può quindi supporre che la dottrina delle cause e della produzione condizionata (*paṭiccasamuppāda*)[42] fu relativamente presto oggetto di discussione tra le scuole che via via vennero a formarsi dopo la scomparsa del Maestro. Per quanto riguarda il divenire, inteso come

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[42] Senza peraltro poter decidere sulla cronologia delle fonti, è possibile tuttavia notare come alcuni testi presumibilmente conosciuti all'epoca di Aśoka e alcune iscrizioni, quest'ultime databili, sembrano indicare una certa qual progressione nell'identificazione delle cause del divenire incessante, doloroso (*duḥkha*) e impermanente (*anitya*). La sequenza che dal divenire, messo in moto dalle passioni maggiori (*rāga, dveṣa* e *moha*), rappresentate sul perno della ruota dell'esistenza (*bhavacakra*), porta al divenire in quanto produzione e cessazione dei fattori mondani, esemplificato dalla catena della produzione condizionata (*pratītyasamutpāda*), a un certo punto illustrata dalla ruota del divenire (*bhavacakra*) o dalla noria. Tra le iscrizioni che attestano elementi di questa progressione possiamo citare l'iscrizione del reliquario di Ramaka (c. 16/17 d.C.) o Bajaur (Baums 2012, A.14: 213 e n. 28); più elaborata la dedica del reliquario di Kurram (c. 146/147 d.C.; Baums 2012, A.39: 241-242, in partic. 242, l. 4); Senavarma, Swat (Baums 2012 A24: 227-233, in partic. 232). Cfr. de Jong 1974: vol. 2, 137-149, in partic. 139, n. 4.

processo di «generazione e corruzione» che già Megastene aveva notato essere un tema comune ai Greci e agli Indiani, esso rinvia alla meditazione sul corpo, praticata dai monaci buddhisti a partire dall'osservazione empirica del cadavere nelle varie fasi della sua progressiva decomposizione. Questo particolare tipo di meditazione detto *aśubhabhāvanā* — che, come diranno i testi di scolastica, ha lo scopo di indebolire le passioni (*kleśa*), per alcune fonti addirittura di distruggerle — nelle sue modalità evoca, almeno in parte, il procedimento di studio anatomico del corpo *post-mortem,* che troviamo nello *Śarīrasthāna* di *Suśrutasaṃhitā.* E, altro caso di fluidità, l'*aśubhabhāvanā* si ritrova intorno alla stessa epoca nella *Maitrī Upaniṣad* I.3.

Ma l'assai *vexata quæstio* è un'altra: come datare precisamente i testi cosiddetti *antichi*[43], quali il *Majjhima Nikāya* o il *Dīgha Nikāya,* ma anche le *Upaniṣad*? E non solo. Come pensare il quadro delle discussioni su questi argomenti tra pensatori indiani e greci, in un contesto, quello del III-II sec. a.C., in Battriana, nel Gandhāra o in Aracosia dove rari sono i dati archeologici ed epigrafici che attestano la presenza continua di comunità buddhiste? Il primo indizio è il ritrovamento di una moneta di Candragupta Maurya (c. 321-297 a.C.) che servì a datare la prima fase del grande *stūpa* (GStI) di Butkara I (Swāt, valle di Jambil, NP). Il sito, come nota Faccenna nel suo erudito quanto prezioso studio (1980a: 32), permette di seguire la presenza di religiosi buddhisti su un arco di secoli che va dal III sec. a.C. al X (ivi 173-174)[44]. Il monumento conferma una presenza continua tra il III sec. a.C. e la fine del II-inizio del I, mentre è solo intorno all'inizio dell'era comune (ivi 167-168) che si può accertare la presenza del grande *vihāra*[45].

[43] Cfr. le riflessioni fondamentali di Tournier sulla formazione delle scuole buddhiste e dei testi, in margine allo studio sulla formazione del *Mahāvastu* (Tournier 2017: 3-36).

[44] Cfr. Faccenna 2002: 107, il quale precisa: «Il sito ospita la principale area sacra buddhistica dello Swāt e una delle maggiori e più longeve della regione gandharica; la sua vita, attraverso fasi successive di ricostruzioni e ampliamenti, copre un arco di tempo che va dal III sec. a.C. fino al X sec. d.C., anche se nella sua lunga fase finale, che si apre con l'ultimo rifacimento tra la fine del VII e gli inizi dell'VIII sec., il santuario subisce una evidente contrazione del livello di vita». Si veda anche Filigenzi 2002.

[45] Tuttavia, tracce di altre costruzioni, tra cui bacini per l'irrigazione, sono visibili in epoca precedente, cfr. Faccenna 1980b: 629-632. Sulla formazione del

II

Storia e contesto

II.1. *Prima di Alessandro*[46]

L'estesa area geografica su cui governa il sovrano achemenide Dario I (522-486 a.C.), descritta nell'epigrafe trilingue di Bīsotūn (Behistun, provincia odierna di Kermanshah, Iran)[47], rinvia il lettore a uno spazio, una varietà di popoli, una pluralità di lingue, usanze e religioni la cui coesistenza e dinamica si ritrova, a intervalli precisi, attraverso i secoli. Ciò non vuol dire che la storia si debba necessariamente ripetere. Sta invece a indicare la presenza di un gruppo determinato di fattori i quali con regolarità si ritrovano in taluni modelli di governo quali appunto un certo tipo di confederazione o di impero. Ma l'importanza di Bīsotūn non finisce qui: l'epigrafe infatti ha tramandato il nome dei popoli tributari del sovrano achemenide, e informa sulle pratiche di can-

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complesso buddhista di Butkara I, cfr. Faccenna 2002: 107-112 e, in particolare sul *vihāra*, ivi 110-111. Nel vicino Swāt, la costruzione iniziale del monastero di Saidu Sharif I (cfr. Faccenna e Callieri 2002: 125, fig. 42) risale al I sec. d.C. e si protrae sin verso il IV-V sec. (ivi: 126). Per quanto riguarda l'associazione di una presenza di comunità buddhiste sulla base del rinvenimento di un *vihāra*, rimandiamo a Scherrer-Schaub, Salomon e Baums 2012: 140-141. Cfr. l'iscrizione A.12 epoca di Maues (Baums 2012: 211-212, 212) la quale attesta l'istituzione di un *saṃghāra-ma* nell'area di Taxila: «In the 78th year of the great king, the great Maues….Patika the son of the kṣaharata and governor of Cukhsa—called Liaka Kusuluka—establishes in the city of Takṣaśilā—the northeastern area is called Kṣema—in this area Patika establishes an unestablished relic of the Lord, the Śākya sage, and a monastery ([*saṃgha*]*ramaṃ*) in honor of all buddhas, honoring mother and father, for the increase of the lifespan of the governor with son(s), wife…».

[46] Vedi Karttunen 1989, II.8 e II.9.

[47] Su Dario I e l'iscrizione di Bīsotūn, si veda lo studio di Lecoq 1997: 83-96, 187-217. Sulle circostanze del ritrovamento dell'epigrafe in età moderna, Errington e Sarkhosh Curtis 2007: 5-7. King e Thompson (1907: xiv e n. 5) citano tra i primi europei che visitarono Behistun in tempi moderni Ambrogio Bembo, il quale viaggiò in Persia nella prima metà del Seicento, e a cui si deve «a comparatively accurate description of the sculptures on the rocks». Vedi Morelli 1803. In tempi antichi Ctesia, medico della scuola di Cnido, nato c. 441 a.C., inviato in Persia in circostanze poco chiare come medico alla corte di Artaserse II, fu il primo a vedere l'epigrafe che poi descrisse nei suoi *Persiká*. Ctesia attribuì l'epigrafe alla regina di Babilonia, Semiramis, attribuzione ripresa in seguito dal suo biografo, Diodoro Siculo (I sec. a.C.).

celleria, sull'etica particolare del sovrano ecc.[48] Tra le regioni governate dagli Achemenidi troviamo gli Ioni delle coste marittime e quelli dell'entroterra, e le terre al di là del mare, tra cui la Battriana, la Sogdiana, l'Aracosia, il Sind e il Gand(h)āra.

Un altro famoso passo di rara importanza attesta la vivacità degli scambi all'epoca di Dario I, che nell'iscrizione trilingue DE (Lecoq 1997: 217-218) del monte Elvend (sud-ovest di Hamadān) si autoproclama: «Je suis Darius, le grand roi, le roi des rois, le roi des peuples aux nombreuses origines, le roi sur cette terre grande au loin, le fils de Vištāspa, l'Achéménide»[49]. Il passo in questione proviene da uno dei numerosi frammenti che documentano le fondazioni del sito di Susa; quivi sono descritti i materiali e gli artigiani, provenienti da varie parti dell'impero, impiegati nella costruzione del palazzo voluto dal sovrano achemenide[50]. Il passo dell'iscrizione suggerisce a meraviglia l'andirivieni delle carovane attraverso l'impero[51].

§ 9. Le bois de cèdre a été apporté d'une montagne du nom de Liban ; le peuple assyrien l'a apporté jusqu'à Babylone ; de Babylone, les Cariens et les Grecs l'ont apporté jusqu'à Suse ; le bois de yakā a été apporté du Gandhāra et du Kermān.

[48] L'iscrizione di Bīsotūn presenta alcuni punti che si ritroveranno, anche se in forma leggermente diversa, nell'epigrafe di Aśoka. In particolare, riguardo alle pratiche di cancelleria, vedi Scherrer-Schaub (in prep. b). Citeremo a esempio (colonna IV.70), Lecoq 1997: 212-213: «Le roi Darius déclare: 'Grâce à Ahuramazdā, *voici le texte que j'ai traduit * en aryen [cfr. p. 213 n. 1]: et sur tablette et sur cuir [cfr. p. 213 n. 2], il avait été traduit aussi; j'ai traduit ma généalogie; je l'ai approuvée; et cela a été écrit et lu devant moi; ensuite, j'ai envoyé ce texte [cfr. p. 213 n. 3] partout parmi les peuples; l'armée y a collaboré'». Cfr. IV.65-67, Lecoq 1997: 211-212.

[49] La formula stereotipa è ripresa da Dario II (424-405 a.C.) nell'iscrizione in persiano antico di Hamadān D²Ha (cfr. Lecoq 1997: 267 v. 2).

[50] Stando alle datazioni generalmente ammesse, è interessante rilevare il momento storico: Dario I (522-486 a.C.) muore allorché Siddhārtha Gautama, il futuro Buddha (488-368 a.C.), è un bimbetto di due anni appena. Questi, narra la leggenda, venuto al mondo compie sette passi nelle direzioni cardinali affermando così il suo futuro ruolo di sovrano universale (*cakravartin*). Cfr. Scherrer-Schaub (in prep. b).

[51] Traduzione di Lecoq 1997: 236-237 (Dsf §§ 9-13). Cfr. Errington e Sarkhosh-Curtis 2007: 31. Errington aggiunge: «'Yakā-timber', i. e. shisham wood (Dalbergia sissoo), is still sold in Charsada in the Peshawar Valley and is much used in decorative Indian woodworking. The goldsmiths were Medes and Egyptians, who also decorated the walls, while the bricks were made by the Babylonians (DSf, § 3k; Kent 1953, p. 144)».

§ 10. L'or qui a été travaillé ici a été apporté de Lydie et de Bactriane ; le lapis-lazuli et la cornaline qui ont été travaillés ici, ont été apporté de Sogdiane; la turquoise qui a été travaillée ici a été apportée de Chorasmie.

§ 11. L'argent et l'ébène ont été apportés d'Egypte ; la décoration avec laquelle les murs ont été ornés a été apportée d'Ionie ; l'ivoire qui a été travaillé ici a été apporté d'Éthiopie, d'Inde et d'Arachosie.

§ 12. Les colonnes en pierre qui ont été travaillées ici ont été apportées d'un village du nom d'Abirādu, en Élam ; les tailleurs qui ont taillé la pierre étaient des Ioniens et des Lydiens.

§ 13. Les hommes qui ont travaillé le bois étaient des Lydiens et des Égyptiens ; les hommes qui ont fabriqué les briques étaient des Babyloniens ; les hommes qui ont décoré le mur étaient des Mèdes et des Égyptiens.

La dinamica degli spostamenti a lunga distanza di contingenti militari e di carovane e carovanieri per il trasporto di merci preziose (tra cui appunto libri o merci 'esoticamente attraenti' come ad esempio i fichi secchi richiesti da Bindusāra (320-273/2 a.C.), l'Amitrochates delle fonti greche nonché padre di Aśoka, ad Antioco I Soter [r. 281–2 giugno 261 a.C.][52]) ha caratterizzato e

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[52] Questa famosissima lettera, alla quale alludono vari autori, ellenisti (per esempio Virgilio 1999/2003: 48 e n. 111) o indianisti tra i quali il preziosissimo e spesso ingiustamente criticato Étienne Lamotte (1958: 241, 244), è stata recentemente riesaminata da von Hinüber (2010: 265). Tuttavia, è opportuno sottolineare due punti problematici nell'articolo di von Hinüber. Il primo riguarda Megastene, il quale fu inviato presso la corte di Candragupta Maurya (c. 321-297 a.C.) da Seleuco I Nicator secondo alcuni o da Sibyrtios secondo altri (*pace* von Hinüber 2010: 263), cfr. *infra* § II.2 e nn. Il secondo riguarda Δήμαχος / Deimachos/Deimaco di Platea, ambasciatore alla corte di Bindusāra: questi (*pace* von Hinüber *ibid.*: 265) fu inviato da Antioco I Soter (r. 281-261 a.C.) — dunque tra il 281 e il 272/3 a.C. (cfr. Bloch 1950: 93, n. 3). Per inciso, la risposta di Antioco alle richieste di Bindusāra, che il divertentissimo Athenæus Naucratita (attivo fine II-inizio III sec. d.C.), nel suo *Deipnosophistae* (XIV.67, 652f-653a, Kaibel III, p. 444.14-19), dice aver preso da Hegesander (FHG IV, F 43, p. 421), solleva due questioni d'apparenza banale. *In primis*, ci si può chiedere in quale occasione Bindusāra scrisse la sua richiesta (per quanto riguarda il quando, si può supporre tra il 281 a.C. e il 272 a.C.): fu in occasione dell'ambasceria guidata da Deimaco di Platea che Antioco I Soter inviò presso la corte Maurya (FGrHist 716)? In secondo luogo, dove si trovava allora Antioco I Soter? Da dove provenivano i fichi e il vino? E inoltre, dov'è che Bindusāra sapeva (o aveva sentito dire) che si potesse trovare un filosofo greco? Di fatto i tre 'prodotti' potevano provenire sia dalla Siria e dal mondo mediterraneo in generale, sia dalle

continua a caratterizzare il continente eurasiatico, anche se in tempi recenti i parametri della dinamica hanno forse un effetto più devastante. E, come vedremo, la coesistenza di entità socio-culturali e religiose diverse, in particolare nelle regioni del nord-ovest indiano, all'epoca di Candragupta (c. 321-297 a.C.)[53], favorì gli scambi di tecniche militari e persino spinse ad aggiustamenti del codice civile, un fatto questo che sta a dimostrare come la società indiana dell'epoca fosse composita e certamente più aperta alla fluidità delle idee di quanto invece sarà in altri momenti della sua storia[54].

II.2. La presenza greca nell'impero achemenide

La presenza di intellettuali e scienziati greci alla corte achemenide, di greci arruolati nell'esercito persiano e, nel contempo, di scambi commerciali tra Grecia e India, è fatto conosciuto[55]. Tra questi il più famoso fu senz'altro Ctesia di Cnido[56], il quale *forse*

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satrapie orientali o province del nord-ovest indiano. Infine, fu l'ambasceria inviata durante la co-reggenza? Sull'istituto della co-reggenza, inaugurato da Seleuco I Nicator, si veda Del Monte 1997: 436-437. Cfr. Virgilio 2003: 74, traduzione dell'iscrizione del cilindro di Borsippa. Ma v'è dell'altro. La richiesta di vino da parte di Bindusāra si incrocia per così dire con un'informazione che dobbiamo a Humbach (2007: 135-137), il quale nota come alla fine dell'elenco delle regioni, località e qualità gustative dei vini che ivi si producevano, Athenæus (*Deipnosophistae* I.48, 27d Kaibel p. 61.17-19) cita Χάρης/Carete di Μιτυλήνη/Mitilene a proposito del famoso dio onorato dagli Indiani il cui nome in traduzione greca è Soroadeios/Viticultore, altrimenti noto come Dionysos. Carete fu al servizio di Alessandro e lo accompagnò nella sua spedizione; all'epoca del Macedone, la vite «was cultivated in the Irano-Indian borderlands. Viticulture was possibly brought in this region by Greeks deported from Asia Minor under Darius and Xerxes, but in the view of Alexander and his companions it was Dionysos who had brought wine and ivy there on his campaigns toward the East. Particularly the city called Nysa by the Greeks, which Alexander reached soon after his entrance into India, impressed itself on the memory of the Greeks; its abundance of wine and ivy gave rise to a ten-day bacchanal celebrated by both the inhabitants of the place and the Macedonian soldiers in honour of the god of Nysa, whom the Greeks equated with Dionysos, transposed into Latin as Liber Pater». Si potrà ravvicinare il motivo alle rappresentazioni di scene potorie su alcuni rilievi dello Swat, cfr. Filigenzi 2002: 105-106.

[53] Sulle varie ipotesi relative all'avvento di Candragupta, cfr. Neelis 2011: 80-81 e note.

[54] Vedi sotto, Parte III.

[55] Filliozat 1975: 199; cfr. Karttunen 1989: 48-54.

[56] Già menzionato a proposito dell'epigrafe di Bīsotūn, cfr. *supra* n. 47.

riportò in patria alcuni dati sulla medicina indiana. Ctesia era noto ad Aristotele. Scrive Nichols:

> [a]lthough he frequently viewed Ctesias with suspicion (F45da; F45ka), he certainly accepted some of his testimony as trustworthy. He used Ctesias as his main source for his accurate description of the elephant. Like Ctesias (F45ba), Aristotle says the elephant tears down walls and can uproot a palm (HA 610a19; PA 659a1), but only names Ctesias directly when refuting him on a specific point (F48a and F48b) or to express disbelief[57].

Gli studiosi antichi e moderni sono spesso scettici sull'opera di Ctesia. Karttunen, seppur con occhio critico verso la fervente immaginazione del medico di Cnido, avverte i limiti di certe letture moderne e cita al proposito Schwarz il quale rileva come il termine greco ψεύδος usato dai successori di Ctesia significava allora «a conscious fiction» piuttosto che «liar», come invece ψεύδος fu spesso tradotto dai moderni. E anche Nichols tenta una valutazione meno negativa del medico di Cnido[58]. Per inciso, Filliozat fa notare che l'osservazione diretta di fatti indiani è da attribuire all'epoca di Alessandro. Ed è grazie ai frammenti «des Néarque, des Aristobule, des Onésicrite ou des Mégasthène», che possiamo «apprécier l'immense progrès que le contact direct fit faire à la connaissance de l'Inde en Occident»[59]. Filliozat fa inoltre notare come l'area geografica sottintesa dal termine 'India' si riferisca in epoca achemenide (e nei secoli seguenti), come si desume dall'iscrizione di Bīsotūn, alle regioni del 'grande' Gandhāra, l'Aracosia, la valle dell'Indo sino alla foce (il Sindh) e il Panjab[60]. Ricordando poi Strabone (c. 63 a.C - 19 d.C.), che si lamenta per la scarsità di fonti sull'India accessibili al tempo, e invitando a un esame cauto delle fonti, aggiunge, a proposito dei compagni di Alessandro:

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[57] Nichols 2011: 29 e nn. Cfr. Karttunen 1989: 80-85; 1997: 97-99.

[58] Vedi Karttunen 1989: 80-81 e Nichols 2011: 18-34.

[59] Filliozat 1975: 199. Strabone non è un caso unico, si veda a esempio Megastene, *infra* § III.1. Le riflessioni critiche degli autori antichi sono spesso ignorate dagli studiosi moderni troppo inclini ad adottare chiavi di lettura «labili» seppur estremamente alla moda, se non a praticare una lettura per così dire a singhiozzo.

[60] Filliozat 1975: 200.

> [C]es hommes ont parcouru l'Inde en soldats ne faisant que pass-
> er, ils n'en ont vu que des parties, ont beaucoup rapporté par ouï-
> dire et ne se sont même pas accordés sur ce qu'ils avaient vu de
> leurs yeux. Si donc ceux-là même qui, en grand nombre, ont été à
> portée de s'informer directement sur le monde indien n'en ont
> pu livrer qu'une connaissance si précaire et si incertaine, com-
> ment ne pas croire qu'à plus forte raison, dans les temps qui les
> ont précédés, les deux mondes grec et indien étaient restés totale-
> ment étrangers l'un à l'autre?[61]

Pur precisando in seguito:

> A s'en tenir à ces considérations, on pourrait être tenté de ne pas
> poursuivre l'enquête et de conclure dès à présent qu'aucune com-
> munication intellectuelle ne saurait avoir eu lieu entre l'Inde et
> l'hellénisme avant Alexandre et que les analogies relevées entre
> les doctrines médicales indiennes et grecques de cette époque
> sont purement fortuites, quelque nombreuses et précises qu'elles
> soient. Pourtant, il faut observer que les échanges intellectuels ne
> supposent pas nécessairement une connaissance réciproque com-
> plète, ni même des contacts directs. Nous ne serions donc pas
> fondés, du fait que l'Inde et la Grèce se sont fort mal connues dans
> l'antiquité, à croire que rien n'a pu passer de l'une à l'autre. Il
> suffit pour que nous devions pousser l'examen de la question de
> leurs rapports qu'un intermédiaire ait pu exister entre elles, et cet
> intermédiaire a été l'Empire perse[62].

II.3. *Ritorno ad Aï Khanum (c. 290-280 – 145 a.C.)*

L'esempio odierno delle armate di conquista e di occupazione si
trova in netto contrasto con quanto l'Antichità insegna[63]. Le atti-
vità culturali (lettura, teatro, musica) che fino in tempi recenti
furono parte integrante della società non lo furono sempre, o
piuttosto non solo, per diletto[64], e ne abbiamo prova in epoca

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[61] Filliozat 1975: 199-200, vedi Strabone 15.I, 2. Cfr. Bosworth 1996: 127.

[62] Filliozat 1975: 200.

[63] In realtà si tratta solo di mutamenti di parametro, e di cosa si intenda quan-
do si parla di «attività culturali». La questione sarà ripresa in altra sede.

[64] Cfr. Robert 1958: 13; Robert 1968: 442-443 e 455: «Mais il n'y avait pas seule-
ment des soldats et des 'officiers', — officiers qui sont tantôt guerriers, tantôt
administrateurs et chefs de district; il ne faut pas minimiser la culture de ces gens
qui sont toute autre chose que des 'trogues armés', — et pas seulement non plus
des graveurs de splendides monnaies. Il y a des pédotribes et des éphèbes,
puisqu'il y a un gymnase. Il y a des lapicides». Cfr. il decreto di Ilion in onore di

ellenistica. Rapin, indagando sulle circostanze dell'arrivo ad Aï Khanum dei libri che furono ritrovati all'interno della tesoreria del palazzo reale, spiega l'apparente contrasto tra cultura e amministrazione, richiamando il modello alessandrino[65]. In seguito, riprendendo Plutarco (*Alex.* 8.3), aggiunge:

> La relation entre la diffusion de livres et l'administration financière telle qu'elle se manifeste à Aï Khanoum n'est d'ailleurs pas vraiment un cas isolé dans le contexte hellénistique, puisque, lorsque Alexandre fit venir en Haute Asie les oeuvres de Philistos, Euripide, Sophocle, Eschyle, Télestès et Philoxène, c'est à son trésorier — et ami — Harpale à Babylone qu'il s'adressa[66].

Al proposito, Virgilio, avanza l'idea di alcuni secondo cui

> il più potente e controverso tiranno di Sicilia, Dionisio il Vecchio (405-367/6 a.C.) può avere attirato la curiosità di Alessandro attraverso la lettura in Asia dell'opera storica di Filisto di Siracusa ma anche dei ditirambi maliziosamente allusivi di Filosseno di Citera[67].

Seleuco I (281 a.C.), dal quale si evincono le attività del ginnasio e del suo personale, in particolare le funzioni rivolte agli dèi e al sacrificio. Vedi Virgilio 2003: 229-231, in partic. 230: «Nel teatro in tutti gli agoni celebrati della nostra città. Si costituisca anche un altare nell'agorà, quanto più bello possibile, sul quale si iscriva "Del re Seleuco Nicator". Il ginnasiarca celebri sull'altare il sacrificio per il re Seleuco nel dodicesimo giorno di ogni mese (*oppure*: del mese di Seleukios). Si istituisca anche un agone dei neoi e degli efebi. (*Linee 10-16*) E celebriamo anche, ogni quattro anni nel dodicesimo giorno del mese di Seleukios, un agone musicale, ginnico e ippico. In quel giorno in cui si celebra il sacrificio per Apollo capostipite della sua stirpe, le dodici tribù vadano in processione, e vi siano tregue giudiziarie per tutto il mese. (*Linee 16-25*) Si dia ai capitribù per i sacrifici quanto si dà in occasione del sacrificio per Atena… l'adunanza del popolo… a re Seleuco, poiché anche nel sacrificio per Atena a favore di re Seleuco … e della città… a favore del re… nel sacrificio per Atena… gli hieronomoi, come in sacrificio…».

[65] Sulla biblioteca di Alessandria, cfr. Canfora 2017: 12-21.

[66] Rapin 1992: 124 e n. 313.

[67] Virgilio 2003: 30 e n. 44, che cautamente commenta le fonti citate: «Si tratta tuttavia di deduzioni suggestive ma molto ipotetiche considerando che nel passo di Plutarco (*l. cit.*) i libri da inviare in Asia per soddisfare la richiesta di letture da parte di Alessandro non sembra siano stati scelti da lui stesso, ma da Arpalo, che avrebbe provveduto a inviargli le tragedie di Eschilo, Sofocle, Euripide, l'opera storica di Filisto, i ditirambi di Teleste e Filosseno. La lettura di Filisto può anche essere messa in relazione con i progetti di spedizione di Alessandro contro i Cartaginesi in Africa, in Iberia e in Sicilia: Diodoro XVIII, 4.4».

Finzione o realtà gli storici di Alessandro si sono soffermati più volte sulla personalità del Macedone, allievo del «più celebrato e abile filosofo, Aristotele» (*Alex.* 7, 2) che Filippo, nel 342, invitò in Macedonia all'epoca in cui il maestro insegnava a Μιτυλήνη/ Mitilene[68]. Plutarco (*Alex.* 7, 8-9) commenta il contenuto della corrispondenza tra il Macedone e il suo maestro:

> Sembra che Alessandro non abbia appreso dal suo maestro soltanto la politica e la morale, ma anche abbia assistito alle lezioni più approfondite e riservate che i filosofi chiamavano propriamente acroamatiche ed epoptiche, e che non divulgavano a tutti. Quando poi, passato in Asia, egli venne a sapere che Aristotele aveva pubblicato delle opere relative a queste discipline, gli scrisse una lettera di rimprovero franco, in nome della filosofia. Questo è il testo: «Alessandro saluta Aristotele. Non hai fatto bene a pubblicare i discorsi acroamatici. In che cosa infatti noi differiremo dagli altri se tutti saranno al corrente di ciò che ci fu insegnato? Io vorrei distinguermi per la conoscenza di ciò che è meglio, più che per la potenza. Sta bene»[69].

La distinzione tra i due tipi di insegnamento si riferisce agli insegnamenti mattutini e serali. La passeggiata mattutina nel Peripato, come usava chiamarla Aristotele, era dedicata alla «filosofia profonda e sottile» avente come oggetto l'osservazione della natura e le controversie (da essa suscitate); a questa erano ammessi solo i discepoli di provata abilità, zelo e attitudine allo studio. Mentre invece la passeggiata serale, la quale comportava lezioni di retorica, di logica e di questioni politiche, era aperta ai giovani uditori senza alcuna distinzione (Aulus Gellius 20.5.5). Per Alessandro quindi, se non per i suoi storici, la filosofia è al centro del gover-

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[68] Si veda *Alex.* § 7, 7–8, e la risposta di Aristotele 7, 8-9 (linea 9, Magnino legge: ἡ περι τὰ φυσικὰ πραγματεία): 46-47, e n. 25, in cui Magnino spiega le ragioni politiche dell'invito. Cfr. Chiaradonna 2011: 92-93.

[69] *Alex.* § 7, 7: 46-49 e in partic. 48-49, l. 7 e n. 28. Lettera a cui «Aristotele rispose rassicurando Alessandro, giacché gli scritti di cui egli parlava erano in realtà tanto pubblicati quanto non pubblicati: «In verità il trattato Metafisica (ἡ μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ πραγματεία) non è di nessuna utilità per l'insegnamento e l'apprendimento, ma è stato scritto come una traccia (ὑπόδειγμα) per coloro che fin da principio sono stati educati [nelle teorie esposte]". Le due lettere sono citate per intero da Aulus Gellius (20.5.10-12) — II secolo d.C. —, il quale riferisce di averle tratte "ex Andronici philosophi libro"». Vedi Chiaradonna 2011: 92-93 e note. Sullo stile epistolare in epoca ellenistica, cfr. Virgilio 2011: 55-69.

no[70], e non v'è da stupirsi se qualche decennio dopo il suo ritiro dall'India questo aspetto dell'arte del governare si ritroverà in Battriana[71].

II.4. *Candragupta (c. 321-c. 297 a.C.): l'entrata in scena dei Maurya*

La questione del possibile incontro tra Candragupta e Alessandro rimane irrisolta in quanto le fonti relative a Candragupta, come ben nota Karttunen, sono «hopelessly shrouded in legend»[72].

Dal canto loro, le regioni del nord-ovest, da sempre «Porta dell'India»[73] con le loro complesse reti e nodi stradali e per il fatto che in esse si congiungono le grandi aree continentali, rappresentarono, e rappresentano a tutt'oggi, una delle regioni più instabili sullo scacchiere politico «eurasiatico». A più riprese si hanno testimonianze sulle ragioni dell'instabilità della regione. Lamotte (HBI: 28) cita a tale proposito Diodoro Siculo sui ben noti disordini creatisi alla morte di Alessandro (Diodoro XIX, 14, 7) e sulle altrettanto note conseguenti lotte fra i diadochi del Macedone (Diodoro XVIII, 39, 6). Due anni dopo la sua morte (323 a.C.), alla spartizione dell'impero a Triparadisos (Siria), la Battriana e la Sogdiana furono assegnate a Stasanor di Soloi (Cipro), mentre Sibyrtios (c. 323-303 a.C.), oriundo cretese, ottenne l'Aracosia (la

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[70] Questo fatto è corroborato da studi storici sui *missi*-filosofi che assunsero funzioni diplomatiche nelle città greche, cfr. Savalli-Lestrade 2012.

[71] Secoli dopo, la «filosofia» (*ānvīkṣikī*) sarà maestra delle attività nell'*Arthaśāstra,* il trattato di amministrazione e politica di Kauṭilya che Olivelle (2017: 4) assegna al I sec. d.C., anche se probabilmente l'opera si appoggia su testi più antichi trasmessi oralmente. Cfr. Scherrer-Schaub 2007: 765-766. Su *ānvīkṣikī* «filosofia» o più propriamente «scienza investigativa», vedi Torella 2008: 14-15.

[72] Karttunen 1997: 257-258, e n. 27. Secondo alcune fonti, Alessandro, giunto ad Aornos/Ilam (Swāt), assegnò la sorveglianza della regione e della roccia di Aornos a un certo Sisicottos, «un alleato indiano» secondo Curtius Rufus (cfr. VIII, 11, 25), che fu al servizio di Bessos in Battriana. Vedi Olivieri 1996: 69. Briant (1996: 777) osserva: «Parmi les Indiens qui avaient amené des soldats à Bessos, on doit compter Sisicottos qui, en Bactriane, s'était rallié à Alexandre, et qui vient apparemment de la région des Assacéniens», tribù situata nell'Hindu-Kush, con capitale Massaga; insomma, Sisicotto fu forse un indiano della montagna, cfr. *infra* n. 87. Karttunen, ben ritenendo che Candragupta, molto probabilmente, iniziò la sua carriera nel nord-ovest, considera invece l'identificazione di Sisicotto con Candragupta come «hardly tenable», seppur «semanticamente» lecita, cfr. 1997: 258, n. 29.

[73] Vedi Rahman Dar 2007. Sull'irrequietezza di queste regioni nel corso dei secoli, cfr. Karttunen 1997: 258 e n. 30.

Gedrosia e l'Aria)[74]. Dopo la fuga poco onorevole dei satrapi, Stasanor rientrò in Battriana; alcuni autori sostengono che egli fu confermato nelle sue cariche da Antigonos Monophtalmos, generale di Alessandro (Diodoro XIX, 48, 1), deceduto a Ipsos (Frigia) nel 303 a.C.[75]

II.5. Seleuco I Nicator (312-281 a.C.)[76] e Candragupta Maurya (c. 321-297 a.C.)[77]

La presenza dei Maurya nelle regioni del nord-ovest sembra generalmente ammessa, anche se alcuni eventi legati alla loro presenza sono discutibili. L'arte degli indiani nel domare gli elefanti e impiegarli nelle imprese militari[78] fu nota ad Aristotele (384-322 a.C.); Alessandro ne fece uso nelle sue imprese in Asia e l'elefanteria (cfr. *infra* n. 109) divenne persino moneta di scambio politico. Avanzando verso le antiche provincie orientali di Alessandro, Candragupta Maurya si scontrò sull'Indo con Seleuco I Nicator, uno dei migliori generali del Macedone. Invece di uno scontro

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[74] Su Sibyrtios in Aracosia, vedi Bosworth 1996: 118-121; cfr. Bernard, Pinault e Rougemont 2004: 265-267.

[75] Cfr. Karttunen 1997: 257: «It has been suggested that Antigonus assigned Indian satrapies to Sibyrtius, but this remains a hypothesis». Sulla data di morte di Antigonos «à Ipsos (en 301)», vedi Virgilio 2011: 217.

[76] Per volontà di Alessandro, Seleuco si unì in matrimonio (324 a. C.) con la figlia del satrapo di Sogdiana Spitamenes, nobile battriano. I frutti della politica di alleanze matrimoniali voluta dal Macedone non sussistettero a lungo, ma Seleuco e Apama furono l'eccezione. Come nota Karttunen (1997: 25): «The marriages arranged by Alexander between his officers and Persian noblewomen were all dissolved after his death. All but one. Seleucus kept Apama, who was to give birth to Antiochus I, and with her the Persian court etiquette. As a daughter of Bactrian nobleman (Spitamenes) Apama's position as the queen probably helped Seleucos to keep the North-East, at least for a while».

[77] Su Candragupta vedi Karttunen 1997: 257-264. Vale la pena citare Iustinus, *Epitoma historiarum Philippicarum* (c. inizio III sec. d.C.) 15, 4, 10-21, che tra altri fatti ricorda Candragupta come un impostore e sovrano crudele (15, 4, 12-16) e, al contempo, ricorda la sua «fortuna» quando stremato giaceva addormentato: fu allora che un leone gli si avvicinò, asciugò con la sua lingua il sudore e lo svegliò dolcemente (15, 4, 17). Questo presagio gli assicurò in seguito il governo dell'India, allorché Seleuco «jetait les fondements de sa grandeur future» (15,4,20: *Sic adquisito regno, Sandracottus ea tempestate qua Seleucus futurae magnitudinis fundamenta iaciebat Indiam possidebat*). Cfr. André e Filliozat 2010: 142-143.

[78] Un altro capitolo sulla questione sarà aperto in Scherrer-Schaub (in prep. a).

frontale con il Maurya[79], si dice che Seleuco preferì negoziare un trattato di pace (303/305 a.C.)[80]. La posta in palio fu questa: Seleuco avrebbe ceduto le satrapie orientali al Maurya[81], ricevendo in cambio un contingente di elefanti. Scrive Karttunen:

> Thus a treaty was formulated and signed. The lands were ceded, the elephant force won. The treaty also included an agreement variously called κῆδος (Appianus) and ἐπιγαμία (Strabo). While the former word refers to a relationship achieved through marriage, especially the relationship between father- and son-in-law, the latter has often been used for the right of intermarriage (*ius connubium*) between states, but also for actual cases of intermarriage[82].

Gli studiosi hanno ampiamente commentato la clausola al trattato e il tipo di connubio inteso dall'accordo. L'ἐπιγαμία, come

[79] Diodoro Siculo (XIX.90.3) nota come i Seleucidi preferissero l'abilità e l'intelligenza delle trattative diplomatiche al vincere con la forza.

[80] Si veda Karttunen (1997: 72 e n. 17): «…the contract was ratified between Seleucos and Candragupta in c. 305 BC», sebbene, con la consueta prudenza, Karttunen aggiunga in nota che il fatto, malgrado sia verosimile, non è certo. Sulle fonti, ivi 261, n. 45. Cfr. Canali de Rossi (2004: 184): «Attorno al 303 a.C. la regione fu consegnata da Seleuco I al re Maurya Chandragupta in cambio di 500 elefanti…» Sui termini del trattato, di cui fa menzione mezzo secolo dopo Eratostene (c. metà del III sec. a.C.), ripreso da Strabone (XV,2,9), si veda Bernard (2004: 294-298), il quale data il trattato tra Candragupta e Seleuco I Nicator al 303 a.C.

[81] Si veda il giudizio di Karttunen (1997: 260-261): «It is a pity that we know so little of this eastern campaign of Seleucos and of his pact with Candragupta, but we have only brief references, as no full history of the period has been preserved. In any case, Tarn seems to have been right in supposing that Seleucos did not do so badly. He ceded the lands which he did not really possess or, at least, could not keep, and gained in exchange 500 elephants, which were a considerable force in successive wars in the West, where his opponents still had very few specimens of this new and for a while much appreciated weapon»; (ivi 195) «Candragupta gave Seleucus the valuable force of 500 elephants, much used in continual wars against rival kings. African elephants were soon seen in the armies of the Ptolemies, who were independently hunting in Ethiopia and Carthage, which could use the then not yet extinct elephant population in the Atlas country».

[82] Karttunen (1997: 261-264) discute a lungo sui termini effettivi del trattato e vaglia le varie ipotesi, tra le quali (ivi 263 e n. 58) favorisce le ipotesi di Foucher e Bernard che così commenta: «With the lands ceded by Seleucos to Candragupta a number of Greek settlers came under Mauryan suzerainty and thus outside the sphere of Greek legislation. It is quite possible that the main intention of the ἐπιγαμία was to give them some guarantee of social status. For

notò Loriaux parlando della bellissima e *très savante* Aspasia[83], era all'epoca di Pericle una prerogativa particolare:

> Si seulement Périclès avait pu épouser Aspasie, les choses seraient à coup sûr différentes et peut-être n'aurions-nous pas à débattre avec le *topos* d'Aspasie-hétaïre. Mais rompant avec la pratique aristocratique de l'alliance qui apparie volontiers entre elles des familles de cités différentes, la démocratique Athènes prône une stricte endogamie civique, à peine tempérée par quelques (rares) accords d'*epigamia* autorisant un Athénien à prendre femme dans une autre cité — or Milet n'était pas liée à Athènes par l'*epigamia*. Dès lors Périclès pouvait bien se séparer de sa femme pour se consacrer à Aspasie, ce qu'il fit avec ou sans l'accord de son épouse, la compagne à laquelle il manifestait ainsi son attachement n'en serait pas moins à jamais une simple concubine, tendrement aimée mais privée de tout droit à être sa « femme ». Quant au fils que la Milésienne donna à Athènes, jamais il n'aurait dû occuper la moindre fonction à Athènes, puisque sa naissance l'excluait de la citoyenneté en vertu du décret voté par les Athéniens sur proposition de son propre père en 451/0 : pour « partager » la *polis*, il faut être né de deux *astoi*, justifier d'une double ascendance athénienne, ce qui signifie peut-être que le fils d'une concubine pouvait être citoyen, mais à la stricte condition que cette dernière soit d'ascendance athénienne. Or, tel n'était pas le cas du fils d'Aspasie[84].

Un secolo e mezzo dopo Pericle, nelle regioni di frontiera «estremo-orientali», il diritto di *epigamia* stipulato da Seleuco I Nicator e Candragupta Maurya ebbe forse anche uno scopo politico[85], quello di favorire l'integrazione di popolazioni diverse per

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Seleucos as a Hellenistic monarch it would have been natural to be concerned about their position, and he could have made it a condition of ceding these lands. In this way he also cut short the criticism his Western antagonists otherwise would have inevitably directed at him. Perhaps the Greeks were now given the status of Kṣatriyas that they often have in Indian sources». Ivi 263 e n. 59. Si noti che il trattato fu rinnovato un secolo più tardi tra Antioco III (223-187 a.C.) e l'ultimo Maurya Sophagasenos (c. 206 a.C.), figura effimera la cui presenza alla stipula nel 206 a.C. (Antioco III si trova allora nelle regioni orientali dove risiede dal 212 al 205) offre la sola data possibile al riguardo. Cfr. Bernard 2004: 269.

[83] Platone nel *Menesseno* inscena Aspasia «maestro» di Socrate (cfr. Loriaux 2001: https://journals.openedition.org/clio/132, p. 3).

[84] Loriaux 2001: https://journals.openedition.org/clio/132, 8-9.

[85] Come nota Plutarco (*Alex.* § 47), Alessandro volle che i macedoni si abituassero ai costumi dei territori conquistati: «[E]gli cercava sempre più di confor-

istituzioni sociali, cultura, lingua e religione, quale fu appunto il caso in Aracosia, sulla scia della politica di Alessandro; secondo alcune fonti il Macedone ebbe ricorso, a più riprese, alle cerimonie pubbliche di matrimoni collettivi, per consolidare i territori conquistati ed evitare le tensioni politiche e sociali, affinché vi regnassero «ordine e pace».

Di fatto l'Aracosia, «strategically placed above the Indus plain»[86], insieme alla Battriana e alla Sogdiana, ambedue confinanti con le regioni pedemontane delle grandi catene montuose dell'Hindu Kush, Karakorum e Himalaya, guardava verso la valle dell'Oxus, verso l'Indo e i suoi affluenti e oltre, verso il sub-continente indiano da una parte e la Cina dall'altra. Attraversate da arterie di traffico militare e commerciale (l'iscrizione di Susa, come si è visto nel § II.1, insegna che gli artigiani e le materie preziose viaggiavano comunemente in epoca achemenide), queste terre erano frequentate da nomadi e semi-nomadi delle regioni alte che scendevano a valle[87] per il commercio del sale e dei cavalli (se non per eventuali incursioni) e incrociavano una varietà di popoli. Questo è il quadro che si ritroverà con Aśoka e che si protrarrà in seguito fino a noi, con altri attori, altre azioni, altri scopi.

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marsi nel modo di vivere dei Persiani e operava per avvicinare il modo persiano a quello macedone, ritenendo che avrebbe reso saldo il suo potere, mentre stava partendo per un lungo viaggio, con la concordia e la fusione di due popoli ottenuta mediante la benevolenza più che con la forza. Per questo egli scelse trentamila giovani e ordinò che si insegnasse loro la lingua greca, e che anche fossero addestrati nell'uso delle armi macedoni: appunto per questo scelse molti istruttori». Savalli-Lestrade (2012: 148 e n. 45) cita la clausola di epigamia nel trattato di isopolia concluso tra le città greche di Eretria e Oropos in Beozia, all'inizio del III sec. a.C. A proposito dell'epigamia, è interessante seguire le discussioni tardive dei filosofi indiani sul tema delle unioni tra gruppi sociali e secondo il lignaggio in Eltschinger 2000.

[86] Bosworth 1996: 119. Da Qandahār, via il passo Mulla, si raggiunge Quetta sul delta dell'Indo, uno dei possibili percorsi di Alessandro sulla via del ritorno verso Susa nel 324 a.C.

[87] È interessante notare come l'elenco delle satrapie che nel 331 a.C. vennero a dare man forte a Dario III Codomano (380 / r. 336-331 a.C.) dopo la sconfitta di Issos in Cilicia (333 a. C.) nel sud dell'Anatolia (Turchia), elenco menzionato nel resoconto di Arriano (*Anab.* III. 8.3-7), citi gli Indiani che confinano con la Battriana e, insieme agli abitanti dell'Aracosia, gli «indiani di montagna», cfr. Briant 1996: 777. Forte di questo folto contingente, Dario III si accampò a Gaugamele, presso il fiume Bumelos (*Anab.* III.8.7).

III

Visioni d'India

III.1. *Megastene ambasciatore di Seleuco I in Aracosia presso Sibyrtios e alla corte di Candragupta Maurya*

Prima della famosa missione presso Candragupta a Pāṭaliputra, Megastene (Μεγασθενής)[88] (c. 340-282 a.C.) soggiornò presso Sibyrtios in Aracosia[89] e fu probabilmente questo primo contatto con un'imprecisata India[90] a suggerire alcune delle sue osservazioni consegnate nei «suoi» *Indiká*[91]. In seguito egli fu inviato alla

[88] Rimandiamo allo studio su Megastene in Karttunen 1997: 69-94, limitandoci in questa sede a quegli eventi che meglio illustrano alcune modalità d'incontro, in particolare, in ambito filosofico.

[89] Sibyrtios, satrapo dell'Aracosia dal 325 a.C., fu confermato nella sua carica da Antigonos Monophtalmos nel 315 a.C., cfr. Bernard in Bernard, Pinault, Rougemont 2004: 267, 308. Helms (1982: 3) nota: «The city [i.e. Qunduhār/Kandahar] may have been the one where Alexander installed Menon as satrap (Arrian 3, 28, 1) and where the Seleucid satrap Sibyrtios lived according to later hellenistic tradition, at whose court Megasthenes, Seleucos I's ambassador to Chandragupta Maurya, is said to have spent much time during the third century B.C. (Timmer 1930; Eggermont 1942)».

[90] Se non con lo stesso Candragupta? La rappresentazione geografica dell'India, la delimitazione delle sue frontiere secondo gli storici di Alessandro così come la questione degli ambasciatori inviati in India in epoca ellenistica sono questioni assai complesse. Vedi Karttunen 1997: 102 sgg. e 1989: 157-160. Megastene (in Diodoro II.37.5-6) apprese, forse quando stava nelle regioni del nord-ovest, che alcuni filosofi esperti di scienze naturali spiegavano, a proposito dei numerosi fiumi che trasportano a valle importanti contingenti idrici, come questo fosse dovuto al fatto che le regioni che circondano l'India, le regioni degli Sciti, dei Battriani e degli Ariani, sono molto elevate rispetto alle pianure indiane; in tal modo, seguendo la legge naturale, essi scendono da ogni lato alla pianura sottostante dove gradualmente saturano il suolo generando a loro volta una moltitudine di fiumi. Quanto agli Ariani, abiavano la zona geografica estremoorientale dell'impero persiano situata tra «la chaîne du Zagros et les abords de l'Indus». Cfr. Diodoro II.37.6 (tr. francese) p. 69, n. 5, II.37.6, ll. 11-17 (testo greco).

[91] Sugli *Indiká* di Megastene vedi l'analisi critica di Karttunen 1997: 72-76. Riguardo all'India di Candragupta, Arriano (c. 95-175 d.C.), noto per l'uso attento delle fonti, è incline a pensare che Megastene ebbe una visione parziale dell'India. Anche se Arriano ammette che, in una data imprecisabile, Megastene si trovò a Pāṭaliputra e conobbe l'accampamento di Candragupta, per il resto (Karttunen 1997: 71) «he did not see much else. Of the Northwest he was naturally well informed. He also knew Mathura, but the entire South was known only from hersay. There is no reason to suppose that he ever proceeded further to the east than Pāṭaliputra». L'osservazione ricorda un passo di Strabone, il cui uso

corte di Candragupta a Pāṭaliputra da Seleuco I secondo alcuni e, secondo altri, dallo stesso Sibyrtios. A tale proposito, Bernard nota:

> La seule chose à peu près certaine, c'est que Kandahar servit de base de départ aux missions de Megasthène : avant même de se rendre à Pāṭaliputra il y aura trouvé des renseignements de première main sur le pays qu'il allait visiter. Comme à son habitude Seleucos avait fait preuve de discernement et fait en sorte que son envoyé à la cour des Maurya ne fût pas un novice en choses indiennes[92].

Gli scavi condotti a Qandahār (al-Qunduhār) da S. W. Helms nel 1976, di cui qui riportiamo un breve riassunto, permisero di confermare l'occupazione continua di una città antica situata «on (what has always been known as) the major trunk road between Persia and India, at or very near a long established junction»[93].

Di particolare rilievo, per quanto riguarda le modalità di *incontro degli umani destini incrociati* in Aracosia e dintorni, fu la scoperta avvenuta

> during the very last days of the last season, [of] the only stratified Greek inscription to be discovered at the site (Inv E1). The text, cut into a rectangular stone, is a metrical dedication of a statue group within a *témenos*[94].

Helms allude qui alla famosa iscrizione votiva di Aristonax, la cui lettura, tuttavia, rimane problematica. L'esistenza di questa «base di alabastro frammentaria, probabilmente sorreggente un gruppo statuario e riportante un epigramma in distici»[95], databile

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delle fonti, secondo alcuni, fu altrettanto accurato, a proposito dei compagni di Alessandro, cfr. *supra* n. 61. Per un complemento allo studio di Karttunen sulla propensione all'enfasi di Megastene a proposito di Pāṭaliputra e l'importanza dell'esercito di Candragupta, rinviamo a Bosworth 1996: 124 e n. 55.

[92] Bernard, Pinault, Rougemont 2004: 308.

[93] Cfr. Helms 1982: 3: «Today Kandahar (Persian Qandahār) is the second city of Afghanistan, a provincial capital since 1774 (named al-Qunduhār) when Timūr Shāh moved the centre of government to Kabul». Il breve riassunto sui vari periodi di occupazione della cittadella fortificata (qui appresso) riprende i risultati di Helms *op. cit.*: 13-14.

[94] Helms 1982: 13.

[95] Canali De Rossi 2004: 191-192, § 293: «Epigramma votivo. Prima metà del III secolo a. C.» Cfr. Fraser 1979: 12, ll. 32-34; Karttunen 1997: 288-289.

all'inizio del III sec. a.C.[96], è quindi anteriore di qualche decennio agli editti voluti dal grande Maurya a Qandahār. Questo fatto, e l'idea, molto diffusa e pedissequamente ripetuta, di un Aśoka apostolo del buddhismo, ispirarono voli lirici ad alcuni studiosi. Fraser, il primo a occuparsi dell'iscrizione, associando indistintamente la dedica di Aristonax e gli editti di Aśoka, ovverosia *un'epigrafe privata* e *un'ordinanza emanante da un'autorità pubblica*, non esita ad affermare che religione greca e buddhismo dovettero convivere a Qandahār.

> From the point of view of religious history the two texts, the dedication of the Greek statue-base in the *temenos* and the Aśokan edict, physically separated by only a few hundred yards, create, by their very juxtaposition, a new situation. Whatever chronological and geographical limits we set to the Seleucid and Maurya rule respectively, in the third century, there can be very little doubt that at one stage the two religions, Olympian and Buddhist, existed side by side at Kandahar, and in part at least expressed themselves through the medium of the same language[97].

Indiani, greci e iraniani residenti in Aracosia ebbero senz'altro modo di osservare le reciproche pratiche religiose, come del resto in altre regioni del nord-ovest indiano. E non v'è dubbio alcuno che Aśoka conobbe da vicino il buddhismo[98]. Ma la presenza del

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[96] Cfr. Fraser 1979: 9-10.

[97] Cfr. Fraser (1979: 12-13) che aggiunge: «The symbiosis may have been short, for Aśoka, in the fervour of his faith and his desire for conversion, is likely to have suppressed or discouraged the Olympian cults, but that there was a point of immediate contact between the two faiths cannot be doubted. One consequence of this is that the conversion of Greeks to Buddhism in third century Arachosia become a possibility, and such conversion may throw light on the reference in Aśoka's Thirteenth Rock Edict to the emissaries sent by him to the sovereigns of the hellenistic world, … Once more, this is speculative, but of the central fact that the Olympian religion and Buddhism met at Kandahar, we can no longer doubt».

[98] Una certa *doxa* vede in Aśoka un sovrano 'buddhista', molto spesso senza analizzare la questione, aderendo all'apologia del sovrano che troviamo, e.g., nell'*Aśokāvadāna* o nel *Mahāvaṃsa*. Recentemente, seppure *en passant*, Fussman si allinea su questa posizione (2015: 153-202, 159): «Another group of donors may have seen the miseries of war or participated in such action and turned devout Buddhists as in the case of Aśoka». Il *topos* richiamato da Fussman allude al XIII 'édit sur rocher' (Bloch 1950: 125-132) in cui il sovrano (o chi per lui) esprime rammarico per le sofferenze causate dalla conquista del Kaliṅga. Ritorneremo sull'editto di Qandahār in Scherrer-Schaub in prep. b.

Maurya in Aracosia fu forse più politica che religiosa, anche se gli editti proclamano un certo *habitus vivendi*, comune del resto ad altre obbedienze religiose e civili dell'epoca. A Qandahār, come già fu notato da Scerrato, l'aramaico, lingua di cancelleria dell'impero Achemenide, dall'Asia Minore all'Indo, rimase in uso presso le cancellerie dei sovrani ellenistici[99]. Tra gli editti di Aśoka rinvenuti a Qandahar e nelle sue vicinanze spicca l'iscrizione aramaica che rivela un interessante aspetto della pratica di traduzione di un testo indiano. L'iscrizione pubblicata da Benveniste e Dupont-Sommer fu da loro definita 'indo-aramaica'. Effettivamente, la traduzione in aramaico introduce alcuni termini *prākṛta* in trascrizione aramaica, seguiti dal termine <*shyty*>, a sua volta seguito da glosse o parafrasi in aramaico del termine indiano trascritto. Con particolare acume, Benveniste spiega le difficoltà del frammento aramaico e in particolare svela il senso dell'enigmatico termine <*shyty*>.

> On se servait donc de <shyty> pour annoncer une traduction ou une paraphrase en araméen du texte indien cité d'abord en transcription[100].

Infatti, alcuni passi dell'originale in lingua medio-indiana sono ripresi in trascrizione, con aggiunta di traduzione in aramaico che, a sua volta, contiene elementi iranici. Benveniste conclude così il suo studio:

> [u]n chapitre nouveau de l'épigraphie asokéenne est désormais ouvert où vont entrer, à côté du moyen-indien, trois langues de diffusion, l'araméen, l'iranien et le grec, étroitement associés et se traduisant mutuellement. Ce n'est pas seulement l'histoire religieuses des provinces du Nord-Ouest qui s'enrichit de nou-

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[99] Levi Della Vida in Pugliese Carratelli e Della Vida 1958: 5-6. Virgilio 2011: 27 e n. 29, sottolinea la meticolosità con cui Tolomeo Filadelfo rileggeva i documenti preparati dalle cancellerie; e, in nota, ricorda il libro di Esther (8.9) che mostra come «dans le cadre de l'administration de l'immense empire perse qui s'étendait 'depuis l'Inde jusqu'à l'Ethyopie', la chancellerie des rois achéménides adressait les lettres du roi, de l'une à l'autre des régions dans les satrapies, selon l'écriture et la langue de chaque peuple».

[100] Benveniste e Dupont-Sommer 1966: 452-453. Sul rinvenimento dell'iscrizione indo-aramaica, ivi 437-440; sulla tecnica di traduzione, ivi 440-441, 446-447, 450-451.

velles données. C'est un vaste procès de contact et d'échange entre langues et cultures diverses qui reprend vie sous nos yeux, aux confins de l'Inde et de l'Iran[101].

Ritornando alla questione della presunta convivenza di culti greci e buddhisti è utile ricordare che, se da un lato l'esistenza di una cancelleria bi-lingue (o pluri-lingue?) a Qandahār sembra un fatto appurato, d'altro lato gli scavi dell'antica roccaforte non hanno rivelato alcuna presenza di monumenti buddhisti, se non in epoca relativamente tarda[102]. Invece, già Senart sottolineò l'importanza strategica degli editti di Aśoka che nel Nord Ovest delimitavano i confini estremi dell'impero Maurya e, nel contempo, come visto prima, attraverso l'uso del greco e dell'aramaico per così dire «iranizzato» confermavano l'esistenza di una società tutto fuorché monolitica.

È interessante a questo punto ritornare a Megastene e ad alcuni *topoi,* abbondantemente commentati da una folta schiera di studiosi, al fine di tentare una lettura nell'ambito di documenti cronologicamente vicini agli *Indiká,* soffermandoci su dati conosciuti che sembrano trovare riscontro in alcuni passi dell'opera di Megastene. Come già accennato, Megastene[103], allorché soggiornava in Aracosia, fu inviato in India, probabilmente in seguito al trattato concluso da Seleuco e Candragupta (*supra* § II.5)[104]. Il suo «rapporto di missione» parzialmente ripreso da Arriano (c. 95-175), Diodoro Siculo (c. I sec. a.C.) e Strabone (c. 64 a.C.-25 d.C.), rivela una personalità particolare. Storico, geografo, naturalista, sociologo con un'autentica vena di etnografo, per certi versi la sua ambasceria sembra diretta verso una vera e propria azione di ricognizione, sullo sfondo della voga del tempo per lo *speculum regis*[105]. Esemplari al riguardo gli *Aigyptiaká*[106] che Ecateo di Abdera redi-

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[101] Benveniste 1966: 453.

[102] Cfr. Bernard, Pinault e Rougemont 2004: 329, n. 239; Verardi e Paparatti 2004: 97-98.

[103] Secondo alcuni, Megastene era oriundo delle colonie ioniche di Asia minore, senza tuttavia che la cosa appaia certa, cfr. Karttunen 1997: 70 e n. 5.

[104] Bosworth, invece, è d'altro avviso, cfr. *infra* n. 112.

[105] Megastene, riporta Strabone (XV.1.53-56, 55), si sofferma infatti sull'accampamento di Candragupta e sulla persona del re, un passo che commenteremo in altra sede.

[106] Secondo Murray (1970: 142, n. 5) «The exact title is unknown, probably περὶ Αἰγυπτίων». Virgilio (1999/2003: 49) menziona l'«opera sull'Egitto

ge per Tolomeo I Soter. Passione che, come dice Murray, si rivela presso Tolomeo II Filadelfo anche attraverso «the emergence of a chancellery style in papyrus documents, and in the court poetry of Alexandria»[107].

III.2. *Megastene e i gruppi o segmenti della società indiana*[108]

Fra i *topoi* che hanno suscitato l'interesse degli indianisti spicca l'elenco dei sette gruppi o segmenti (ἑπτὰ μέϱη, Diodoro II, 40, 1) della società, conosciuta se non frequentata da Megastene. Si è già accennato al fatto che Megastene ebbe una prima «iniziazione» alla società indiana quando stava con Sibyrtios in Aracosia. È probabile che allora, come oggi, le ambascerie avessero un carattere ufficiale che rispettava un preciso protocollo e, di conseguenza, gli ambasciatori, un perimetro ridotto di circolazione nel paese ospite; ed è quindi possibile che le osservazioni di Megastene si riferiscano, almeno in parte, all'ambiente ristretto della corte e delle sue dipendenze, forse anche all'accampamento del Maurya in Aracosia. Allora gli accampamenti non comprendevano solo le truppe «attive» ma anche i contingenti locali, nonchè artigiani, medici, veterinari, consiglieri e altre categorie civili che accompagnavano l'esercito per assicurarne la vita quotidiana e, naturalmente, dipendevano dall'amministrazione civile[109]. Vista così, la descrizione dei gruppi sociali assume un colorito diverso.

(*Aigyptiaká*) che Ecateo di Abdera scrisse sotto il patronato di Tolomeo, negli anni in cui Tolomeo era ancora satrapo (fra il 320 e il 315 a.C.) o nei primi anni del suo regno (305-300 a.C.), secondo la tradizione e le finalità della etnografia greca rinvigorita dalla spedizione asiatica di Alessandro».

[107] Murray 1967: 337.

[108] Si veda il capitolo «Castes or something else: Megasthenes on Indian society» in Karttunen 1997: 82-87. La questione è brevemente ripresa *infra* § III.2 e n. 118. Sullo sviluppo della stratificazione sociale, l'emergenza delle polis e dei centri urbani durante il primo millennio a.C., si veda Thapar 2002: 216 sgg.

[109] Si veda al proposito la descrizione dell'esercito in Strabone XV.1, 50 (2006: 15, i.52); cfr. Payer, 15, i.52: «Next to the city magistrates there is a third governing body, which directs military affairs. This also consists of six divisions, with five members to each. One division is appointed to cooperate with the admiral of the fleet, another with the superintendent of the bullock-trains which are used for transporting engines of war, food for the soldiers, provender for the cattle, and other military requisites. They supply servants who beat the drum, and others who carry gongs; grooms also for the horses, and mechanists and their assistants. To the sound of the gong they send out foragers to bring in grass, and by a sys-

È infatti possibile supporre che il passo di Megastene sulle componenti della società indiana[110] non sia il riflesso di un'organizzazione normativa della società, come alcuni studiosi hanno creduto di vedere introducendo categorie interpretative quali il censo, l'imposizione fiscale o le caste, ma sia piuttosto il risultato di osservazioni e discussioni avvenute in un contesto ristretto[111],

tem of rewards and punishments ensure the work being done with despatch and safety. The third division has charge of the foot-soldiers, the fourth of the horses, the fifth of the war-chariots, and the sixth of the elephants. There are royal stables for the horses and elephants, and also a royal magazine for the arms, because the soldier has to return his arms to the magazine, and his horse and his elephant to the stables. They use the elephants without bridles. The chariots are drawn on the march by oxen, but the horses are led along by a halter, that their legs may not be galled and inflamed, nor their spirits damped by drawing chariots. In addition to the charioteer, there are two fighting men who sit up in the chariot beside him. The war-elephant carries four men—three who shoot arrows, and the driver».

[110] Cfr. Strabo (XV, 1.52): Φησὶ δὴ τὸ τῶν Ἰνδῶν πλῆθος, e Diodoro (II, 40.1): Τὸ δέ πᾶν πλῆθος τῶν Ἰνδῶν, insomma, la «popolazione indiana», l'insieme delle genti (πλῆθος).

[111] È questa l'opinione di Strabone sul progresso delle conoscenze occidentali sull'India acquisite grazie alla spedizione di Alessandro e ai resoconti lasciati dai suoi storici; si veda Filliozat (1975: 199-200): «Il est même clair que ce progrès a été sans suite immédiate parce que le contact direct a été très vite rompu par l'expulsion, peu après la mort d'Alexandre, des préfets qu'il avait laissé dans l'Inde et par la reconquête du bassin de l'Indus par Candragupta. (…). Strabon déplore que dans les écrits qu'il consulte pour sa Géographie, près du début de l'ère chrétienne, "peu de choses avaient été ajoutées aux données de l'époque d'Alexandre". Strabon déplore en effet vivement que cet état de choses ne lui permette pas de tracer de l'Inde un tableau satisfaisant (XV, 1, 2-3)». Aggiunge Bosworth (1996: 127): «Megasthenes' account of India was invaluable to that it was an eyewitness account of a period of transition, before the full expansion of the Mauryan empire. He documented the wealth and military power which won Chandragupta his conquests, but the India he described was still the India of the Alexander period, variegated, disunited and ripe for conquest by the strongest power. The Mauryan empire in its developed form would have been described by later writers, Daimachus of Plataea, who visited the court of Chandragupta's successor, Bindusāra, and the mysterious Dionysius who represented Ptolemy Philadelphus before Aśoka. Unfortunately, these authors are little more than names. For Daimachus we have a few characteristically bilious criticisms by Eratosthenes, focusing on geographical data, and a handful of reports of curiosities. As for Dionysius there is no certain attestation of the content of his work. The Greek description of the Mauryan empire at its acme are, then, irretrievably lost. Megasthenes is the sole source to have made an impact upon the extant literary tradition, and he belongs in the world of the Alexander historians — a contemporary of men like Onesicritus and Nearchus, writing at much the same time as them and perhaps independently of them. His experiences ranged more wide-

prescindendo dall'insieme della società indiana dell'epoca nella sua effettiva e complessa diversità. Naturalmente, non è questa la sede per vagliare gli innumerevoli giudizi sull'opera di Megastene. Aderiremo invece al giudizio di Bosworth e Karttunen[112] i quali, senza mai rinunciare a un attento esame critico, concordano nel ritenere gli *Indiká* la migliore fonte classica sull'India.

III.3. *Indiká e Aigyptiaká: opere di propaganda?*

Murray esprime l'idea secondo cui gli *Aigyptiaká* di Ecateo di Abdera (365-275 a.C.), redatti tra il 320 e il 315 o, al più tardi, prima del 305 a.C.[113], e gli *Indiká* di Megastene[114] furono in qualche modo opere di propaganda volute da Tolomeo I Soter (322-283 a.C.) — satrapo e, a partire dal 305 a.C., re d'Egitto — e da Seleuco I Nicator (312-281 a.C.).

> In general Ptolemy obtained what he wanted, a work of propaganda portraying Egypt in a light which would appeal to Greek, and perhaps Egyptian, educated opinion; it began a war of books between the Hellenistic monarchies, which earned various

ly than theirs, but the society he described was the same». A proposito del misterioso Dionysius ambasciatore di Tolomeo II Filadelfo, vedi Scherrer-Schaub 2017: 254 e n. 37.

[112] Cfr. Bosworth 1996: 127; Karttunen 1997: 69. Per quanto riguarda il modus operandi, Bosworth (1996: 124 e nn.) è dell'opinione che esso sia «conducted from the viewpoint of a Greek observer thinking in Greek categories and affected by a tradition of Greek philosophical speculation». Vi è senz'altro una parte di verità in questo, ma non solo. Megastene a nostro parere (cfr. *supra* § III.1) possiede anche curiosità e lucidità, qualità che gli permettono da una parte di vedere l'India, o almeno alcuni fatti indiani, con gli occhi degli indiani e, dall'altro di esprimere dubbio su altri aspetti da lui ritenuti poco affidabili, precedendo in questo Pausania (seconda metà del II sec. d.C.), cfr. Scherrer-Schaub 2007: 758, n. 4.

[113] Murray 1970: 141-171, in partic. 143-144. Cfr. Karttunen 1989: 97-98; 1997: 87; Virgilio 2003: 49-50, e 2011: 27.

[114] Bosworth (1996: 121) anticipa l'ambasceria di Megastene e suggerisce la data di pubblicazione degli *Indiká*: «The evidence that we have suggests a relatively early date for Megastenes, a decade and a half before the canonical date. His embassy to Porus and Chandragupta is best placed around 319/318 B.C. and the publication of his Indiká seems to belong around 310, before the loss of the Indus lands to Chandragupta». Zambrini (1983: 1106) mette in luce un altro aspetto metodologico dell'opera di Megastene che verte a «comprendere gli Indiká nella loro specificità di opera letteraria a fini propagandistici basata sull'idealizzazione di una terra». Cfr. Squarcini 2007: 57-107, e in partic. 67-71.

learned men royal subvention: Berossus and Megasthenes replied for Babylonia and India, for the Seleucids were just as alive to the political importance of encouraging Greek veneration of older cultures. The significance of these works for the new kingdoms should not be underestimated; the popularity of Hecataeus among intellectuals was great, and it is probable that such books circulated in the early Hellenistic period among a far wider group than normally; for many potential mercenaries, officials, and traders will have wished to discover more about their future prospects, and many settlers will have been interested in the antiquities of their new world[115].

Ora, è noto che le tecniche di persuasione e le varie espressioni retoriche che vi si affiancano sono al centro delle dichiarazioni e declamazioni pubbliche e rappresentano quindi un elemento invariabile, anche se relativamente minore, della politica. Più interessante invece appare un altro aspetto della questione: il legame stretto tra politica e cultura, al quale abbiamo già accennato, e la crescente importanza del testo scritto. È interessante a questo punto ricordare con Canfora,

> Demetrio Falereo, singolare personaggio di cerniera tra Atene e Alessandria. Uomo politico e scolaro diretto di Aristotele oltre che amico e protettore di Teofrasto, [il quale] aveva governato Atene per un decennio (317-307 a.C.) agli ordini di Cassandro, quindi, alla sconfitta di questo, si era rifugiato dapprima a Tebe, quindi in Egitto presso Tolomeo Soter (322-283 a.C.). Qui aveva conseguito un alto prestigio politico e culturale: «primo degli amici di Tolomeo» (fr. 61 Wehrli), «iniziatore della legislazione tolemaica» (fr. 65 Wehrli) lo chiamano le fonti, che segnalano anche un suo specifico impulso alla raccolta di libri: «esortava il re ad acquistare i libri sulla regalità e sul comando» (fr. 63 Wehrli)[116].

Virgilio cita il passo in cui Plutarco parla dell'uso dello scritto in funzione mediatrice tra il sovrano e il suo consigliere, nella fattispecie Demetrio Falereo; quest'ultimo infatti esorta Tolomeo I, 'ormai *basileus*',

[115] Murray 1970: 166.
[116] Canfora 2017: 16. Su Demetrio di Falerea e le opere *Tipi di lettere/ Tupoi epistolixoi* e *Sull'elocuzione/ Peri ermeneias*, vedi Virgilio 2011: 60-61.

a procurarsi e a studiare i trattati sulla regalità e il comando, 'perché ciò che gli amici non sanno consigliare al re, nei libri è scritto[117].

A modo loro, come abbiamo visto, gli *Indiká* e gli *Aigyptiaká* si inseriscono nella voga letteraria dello *speculum regis.* Megastene e Ecateo di Abdera sono contemporanei, gli *Indiká* e gli *Aigyptiaká* furono composti a breve distanza di tempo, mentre i loro autori si trovavano ai capi opposti degli stati ellenistici, l'uno in Aracosia, l'altro in Egitto. Ambedue dedicano un'attenzione particolare alla persona del re e alla pratica del governo. Questo fatto sembra, almeno in parte, confermare l'idea che l'ambasceria di Megastene ebbe come scopo di fornire un rapporto preciso sullo stato dell'India e sul suo governo. Da quanto risulta dal confronto degli *Aigyptiaká* e degli *Indiká*, più che di propaganda per Megastene si trattò di redigere un *inventaire comparé, sinon raisonné,* delle conoscenze dell'epoca, con lo scopo di cogliere le analogie e le differenze tra il sistema di governo ellenistico noto a Megastene e quanto egli poté raccogliere, per conto di Seleuco I Nicator, sull'organizzazione del nascente «stato-impero» indiano dei Maurya.

A questo punto vale la pena soffermarsi su alcune tematiche che troviamo nei frammenti degli *Indiká*, iniziando dal famosissimo brano di Megastene sulle sette divisioni del corpo dei cittadini (πολιτεία, II.41.5) indiani (Diodoro, *Indiká* II.40-41) il quale, come già accennato, ha fatto versare abbondanti fiumi d'inchiostro[118]. Invece di ritornare sull'interpretazione in chiave indiana classica o moderna di ipotetiche divisioni sociali vigenti

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[117] Virgilio 2003: 49-50, n. 122; e 2011: 60, n. 152.

[118] Karttunen (1997: 82-87) passa in rassegna gli studi più importanti sulla questione. In particolare, alcuni autori affiancano agli ἑπτὰ μέρη il sistema delle caste oppure si avvalgono dell'*Arthaśāstra* (I-II sec. d.C.), ad esempio Falk 1982: 61-68, cfr. Eck 2003: 176-177. Al proposito, Karttunen (1997: 92-93) osserva: «We have already noted that the AŚ is no mirror of the Maurya empire. This text gives a theoretical reconstruction of an ideal state written down centuries later than Megasthenes and the early Mauryas. On its evidence the Maurya empire has often been described as a strictly centralized monolith, but when AŚ is left out, other evidence seems to support a much looser system for the Mauryan empire, which perhaps rarely interfered in already existing forms of local government. Different kinds of government were employed in the empire. There were self-governing cities, there were vassal kings and princes and tribes, there were various classes, and all had different relations to the central government».

all'epoca di Megastene, vorremmo tentare una lettura per così dire a distanza dell'oggetto in esame, in questo caso il rapporto di Megastene visto a partire dal modello di governo descritto da Ecateo di Abdera. Indubbiamente ambedue gli autori si riferiscono a non meglio precisati modelli di organizzazione politica che circolavano nell'ambiente dei filosofi greci in tempi più remoti. È parimenti evidente che le varie opere sul tema combinavano una visione ideale del governo e della regalità con i dati forniti dall'osservazione personale, se non raccolti presso i loro informatori. Per dirla in breve, i loro autori fecero opera di storico e di sociologo.

III.4. Megastene sulla società indiana con un brevissimo excursus su alcuni aspetti della società egiziana in Ecateo

La lettura del passo in questione che troviamo in Diodoro (II.40.1-41.5) rivela un fatto importante: i sette gruppi o segmenti che compongono il corpo politico e sociale dei «cittadini» —detto alla greca, naturalmente— sono descritti in funzione del ruolo che assumono all'interno della società e visti come un insieme omogeneo nel quale ogni gruppo esercita il proprio ruolo in vista di un fine comune. Tra di essi fa spicco il primo, l'esiguo gruppo dei filosofi (σύστημα φιλοσόφων), tenuti in alta stima, i quali formano un segmento a parte e godono il privilegio dell'assoluta autonomia[119]. Unica eccezione per quanto riguarda le previsioni fauste e infauste da loro emesse: al terzo sbaglio sono ridotti al silenzio senza peraltro sapere se il loro mutismo sia definitivo oppure ristretto al solo prognosticare[120].

Il secondo gruppo o segmento è quello dei coltivatori o agricoltori che vivono in campagna e rifuggono dallo scendere in città

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[119] Cfr. Gautama 11,1, 7-8, 15 (Olivelle 2000: 207): «The king rules over all except Brahmins» (11,1); «As he sits on a high seat, all except Brahmins should pay homage seated at a lower level, and even Brahmins should pay him homage» (11,7-8), ossia: i Brahmani onorano il re sebbene siano seduti allo stesso livello.

[120] Cfr. Eck 2003 *ad* Diodoro II.40.3, n. 7. Sui filosofi (*philósophos, sophistés*), brahmani e asceti indiani, vedi Karttunen 1997: 55-64. Sugli astrologi vedi Gautama 11,15 (Olivelle 2000: 207): «He should also pay heed to what the astrologers and augurs tell him for, according to some his welfare depends also on that».

(πόλιν καταβάσεως); versano un fitto al re poiché, dice Megastene tramite Diodoro «l'India intera è proprietà del re e nessun individuo ha il diritto di possedere un lembo di terra; inoltre essi debbono versare alla tesoreria reale un quarto del raccolto». Il passo è interessante in quanto riflette una prassi indiana accertata, in particolare al prelievo di una percentuale del reddito da parte del re — fatto questo confermato a esempio in Gautama (tardo II sec. a.C.) per il quale il tasso fissato era del sei per cento, un valore che troviamo nei trattati sull'amministrazione e la politica, e in Āryadeva (attivo c. 150-200 d.C.) a proposito delle invettive dirette al sovrano dal filosofo Mādhyamika[121]. La gestione della lottizzazione territoriale sembra di comune interesse nel mondo ellenistico all'epoca di Megastene. Ne troviamo conferma nel trattato di Ecateo, peraltro ritenuto da Murray un modello idealizzato, che attribuisce a Mosè l'introduzione del principio di inalienabilità della distribuzione della terra allo scopo di favorire la crescita demografica[122].

Ritornando a Megastene, i bovari e i pastori che non vivono né in città né nei villaggi, bensì in tenda (nomadi, come riporta Arriano)[123], e hanno il compito di cacciare gli animali selvaggi e gli uccelli che divorano il grano, formano il terzo segmento o gruppo, mentre il quarto comprende gli artigiani. Breloer[124], dando credito alla descrizione di Megastene, osserva come i tre segmenti ai quali si è appena accennato rispecchino la divisione tradizionale del territorio indiano: il villaggio (i coltivatori), la giungla (i pastori e i cacciatori)[125], e la città (gli artigiani e i commercianti). Teoricamente forse, ma praticamente invece in questo caso la caratterizzazione dei tre segmenti dal punto di vista

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[121] Cfr. Gautama in Olivelle 2000: 209; Scherrer-Schaub 2007: 769-770 e n. 39.

[122] Murray 1970: 158.

[123] *Indiká*, in *Anab.* LCL 269: 338-339, § 11, ll. 11-15.

[124] Breloer 1934: 156, citato da Eck in Diodoro, 2003: 178, n. 7.

[125] È pur vero e da notare che il tredicesimo editto di Aśoka menziona gli *aṭaviyo*, «un adjectif dérivé "habitant de la forêt" au singulier collectif. Au Nord-Ouest *aṭavi* est pris dans un sens qui n'est pas usuel», che Bloch (1950: 129 et n. 15) traduce con «brousse», senza peraltro precisare cosa egli intenda con «sens non usuel». Gli *aṭavī* sono a dire il vero le genti che vivono percorrendo (< *aṭ-*) un certo spazio, proprio come il terzo segmento di Megastene, bovari, pastori, cacciatori, i quali «vivono in tenda» (σκηνίτῃ δὲ βίῳ χρῶνται, Diodoro II.40.6), descritti da Arriano (cfr. n. 123) e Strabone 15.I.41 come «itineranti».

territoriale rientra nell'oscuro campo delle ipotesi. Il quinto segmento descrive l'esercito (Diodoro II-41.2), il sesto, gli ispettori (Diodoro II.41.3), e il settimo e ultimo (II.41.4), i consiglieri tenuti in alta stima per il loro ceto sociale[126]. Così i consiglieri del re[127] e gli alti magistrati. Il testo conclude con un'osservazione di carattere generale: per ogni segmento del corpo politico vale il rispetto dell'endogamia e la stretta osservanza dell'appartenenza al segmento[128].

III.5. L'uso dei quadranti solari in India, a sud del 23° parallelo, e il ritrovo di uno gnomone ad Aï Khanum

Il contributo di Megastene alla nostra breve inchiesta non si limita a questo, pur celeberrimo, passo. Noteremo ancora un altro fatto interessante. Descrivendo la forma geometrica dell'India, Megastene (Diodoro II.35.1-2)[129] fornisce le misure della sua superficie. A questo proposito riporta alcune informazioni, senza precisarne la fonte:

> L'Inde dans son ensemble s'étend, dit-on, sur vingt-huit-mille stades d'est en ouest et sur trente-deux mille stades du nord au sud. Avec une telle étendue, elle passe pour être le seul pays du monde dont une si grande partie est située sous le tropique du Cancer, et en maint endroit du promontoire sud de l'Inde on

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[126] Āpastamba (tardo III sec. a.C.) si avvicina qui al resoconto di Megastene, in quanto allude a nobili (*ārya*) nominati dal re con il ruolo di proteggere i sudditi nei villaggi e in città; si veda *Āpastamba* 2. 26.4, in Olivelle 2000: 208.

[127] Mentre Āpastamba, apparentemente, non fa riferimento ai consiglieri del re, ne troviamo menzione invece in Baudhāyana (inizio del I sec. a.C.) I.18.7-8, in Olivelle 2000: 208: «The king should select as his personal priest (*purohita*) a man pre-eminent in all matters and follow his instructions»; Gautama 11.12, Olivelle 2000: 208. Cfr. Kauṭilya (I-II sec. d.C.) *Arthaśāstra* I.9.9-10.

[128] Si veda Diodoro II.41.5; cfr. Strabone 15.1.49. È interessante notare come la divisione della società indiana in sette gruppi, si ritrovi nello *Zayn al-akhbār* di Abū Sa'īd 'Abd al-Ḥayy ibn al-Ḍaḥḥāk ibn Maḥmūd Gardīzī (attivo nella prima metà dell'anno 1000). Come suggerisce Minorsky, le notizie sull'India si basano su «the report of an agent whom the Barmakid Yaḥyā ibn Khalid sent to India (circa A.D. 800) to collect medicinal plants and to draw up a report on Indian religions». Cfr. Minorsky 1948: 627-628. Sul ruolo di Yaḥyā ibn Khalid e della sua dinastia nella trasmissione di testi indiani, si veda Scherrer-Schaub (in stampa b).

[129] Per una riflessione critica sulle dimensioni dell'India, si veda Jacob 1995. È da notare che l'attribuzione di questi passi sull'India a Diodoro (cf. FGrHist 715, F4) non trova l'unanimità tra gli studiosi, vedi Eck 2003: xxxi-xxxvi.

peut constater que les gnomons (γνώμονας) ne projettent pas d'ombre et que la nuit les constellations de l'Ouest sont invisibles[130]; aux confins du pays, même Arcturus ne paraîtrait plus, et dans cette région-ci, dit-on, même les ombres prendraient la direction du sud[131].

Al riguardo riportiamo il commento di André e Filliozat a Plinius Secundus (*Naturalis historia* 2, 184).

> Les lieux de l'Inde où il n'y pas d'ombre sont ceux du Tropique du Cancer et ceux situés au Sud de ce Tropique. L'ombre de midi est supprimée chez eux seulement les jours et au moment où le soleil se trouve au zénith sur leur latitude. Cela arrive une fois l'an au Tropique du Cancer[132], le jour du solstice d'été, deux fois au Sud de ce Tropique : le jour où la course apparente du Soleil le fait passer à midi à la verticale du lieu avant le solstice et le jour où il passe à midi après le solstice[133].

Il passo di Megastene è di particolare interesse se posto a confronto con il secondo dei due strumenti ritrovati ad Aï Khanum[134]. Veuve, a cui si deve un esame attento dell'oggetto in questione e uno studio storico altrettanto accurato, presuppone che gli stru-

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[130] Cfr. Eck (Diodoro, 2003: 167, n. 8 et n. 10): «Ces phénomènes (constellations, ombres) sont constatés sur la côte indienne par Néarque, d'après Arrien, *Ind.* 25,4-8. La question est âprement débattue par Strabon 2,1,19-20, qui confronte les opinions de Mégasthène, Déimaque et Ératosthène. S'il est vrai qu'aucun écrivain grec n'a vu le sud de l'Inde ni Taprobane (Ceylon) comme l'affirme T. S. Brown, "The Merits [and Weaknesses] of Megasthenes" *Phaenis* 11, 1957: 16-20, 16, la source de Mégasthène peut être ici le texte de Néarque, encore que ni une source indienne (invérifiable), ni un voyage personnel de Mégasthène (invérifiable) ne soient complètement exclus».

[131] Diodoro 2003: 65. Arturo è la stella più luminosa dell'emisfero celeste boreale.

[132] In senso lato, a sud del ventiduesimo parallelo, dal Gujarat al Bengala. Megastene probabilmente riporta notizie raccolte presso i mercanti che imbarcavano dai porti lungo la costa. Al proposito, Baudhāyana (inizio del I sec. a.C.) e Vasiṣṭha (tardo I sec. a. C.) indicano l'ammontare delle tasse imposte ai prodotti importati via mare (Baudhāyana: I.181.1,14-15) e per il trasporto fluviale. Vasiṣṭha (19.17-28) aggiunge inoltre alcune regole che riguardano il contingente dell'equipaggio (il numero delle donne deve essere una volta e mezzo il numero degli uomini), e le condizioni e l'ammontare del pedaggio. Cfr. Olivelle 2000: 208-209.

[133] André e Filliozat 2010: 354, n. 113.

[134] Cfr. Bernard 1976: 299-302.

menti di Aï Khanum rimasero in uso fino verso la metà del II sec. a.C., senza scartare la possibilità che la loro data di fabbricazione possa risalire al III sec. a.C.[135] Veuve (1982: 39) descrive con precisione il funzionamento dello gnomone[136] notando tra l'altro quanto segue:

> Dans son déplacement apparent le soleil oscille d'environ 24° de part et d'autre de l'équateur, donc du plan du cadran. Au moment des equinoxes le soleil se trouve sur le plan de l'équateur et ses rayons effleurent les faces A et B sans projeter aucune ombre à l'intérieur du cylindre.

L'esame tecnico invita a indagare sull'origine dello strumento e, al proposito, Veuve (1982: 43-44) avanza due ipotesi. La prima, che lo gnomone sia stato trasportato ad Aï Khanum da una località situata a una latitudine vicina al 23° parallelo, dove lo strumento fu dapprima in uso. In questo caso sarebbe stato necessario modificare alcuni parametri per adattarlo alla latitudine di Aï Khanum (37°). La seconda ipotesi: lo gnomone fu copiato a partire da un originale situato a una latitudine di circa 23°, e una volta giunto ad Aï Khanum

> [i]l eut suffit de faire, sur l'original, le relevé de la partie intérieure du cylindre portant les gravures, de noter le diamètre du cylindre et le fait que son axe était perpendiculaire au plan de l'équateur.

Ora, dato che la pietra usata per la fabbricazione è un calcare in tutto simile a quello usato ad Aï Khanum per alcuni elementi dell'architettura e che questo proviene da una cava della regione che offriva pure un' abbondante manodopera specializzata, la seconda ipotesi sembra più verosimile. E Veuve (1982: 44) aggiunge:

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[135] Riferendosi al primo quadrante, Veuve (1982: 26) nota: «Le cadran fonctionnait donc au cours de la dernière période de la ville, c'est-à-dire vers le milieu du II s. av. J.-C. Mais rien ne s'oppose à ce qu'il ait été exécuté à une date plus haute, dès le III s. av. J.-C., bien que sa surface ne porte pas de traces d'une usure importante».

[136] Come nota Veuve (1982: 24 e n. 11), il termine «gnomone» col passare del tempo non designa più unicamente (come in Littré o in Garzanti) «la simple tige plantée verticalement dans le sol mais aussi de véritables cadrans solaires».

On remarque d'autre part que la valeur de 23°7' donnée par les
lignes horaires correspond à une latitude voisine du tropique
d'été, notion parfaitement connue dans l'antiquité. La recherche
des localités situées à proximité de ce tropique attire l'attention
sur deux cités qui avaient valeur de référence dans l'astronomie
antique, l'une chez les Grecs, à savoir Syène en Égypte, l'autre
chez les Indiens, à savoir Ujjain.

Se da un lato è un fatto noto che l'arte dei tagliapietre e degli
scalpellini fu importata dai primi Achemenidi dalla Ionia e dalla
Lydia[137], non è da escludere che astronomi e tecnici venuti da
Syene [Assuan] o da Ujjain o semplicemente persiani attivi in
Battriana e nelle satrapie circostanti, in grado di insegnare ad arti-
giani locali la tecnica gnomonica, sul modello degli strumenti
alessandrini, facessero parte della folta schiera di artigiani, filosofi
e letterati al seguito delle ambascerie politico-militari, tra
Battriana e mondo ellenistico, in particolare all'epoca di Tolomeo
II Filadelfo. La testimonianza di Megastene, che come abbiamo
visto passò diversi anni in Aracosia, e molto probabilmente visitò
la Battriana e il Gandhāra, e soggiornò a Pāṭaliputra presso
Candragupta Maurya, induce a propendere per Ujjain. A questo
proposito, sentiamo di nuovo Veuve (1982: 41), il quale ricorda il
legame tra le regioni dell'Avanti e il Nord Ovest indiano da una
parte e Pāṭaliputra dall'altra:

Ujjain, l'une des sept cités sacrées de l'Inde, est située dans
l'Avanti (Malwa) à une latitude de 23°11'[53]. Important centre poli-
tique, elle fut le siège d'un vice-roi sous l'empire maurya; Aśoka,
le souverain le plus célèbre de cette dynastie, fut l'un d'eux dans

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[137] Nylander 2006: 133: «[T]he Persians sought and got the knowledge of
stone-working and what can be achieved through it from a particular area of its
newly created empire: Lydia and Ionia. What Darius said, some 30 years after
Cyrus' conquest of western Anatolia in 546 B.C., about the stone-cutters in Susa
being Ionians and Lydians is amply confirmed by the analysis of the stone-work-
ing and construction practices as documented in Pasargadae, Persepolis and
Susa. Only in the west-Anatolian area and particularly in the Greek sphere do we
find the whole set of tools and working procedures used in early Achaemenid
Iran. The Ionian sphere knew the use of the efficient toothed chisel and had
developed similar principles of *anathyrosis*, setting work, clamping and dowelling
etc. In addition, both in Pasargadae, in Persepolis and Susa a great number of
masons' marks have been documented, not a few of which find excellent paral-
lels in western Anatolian contexts».

sa jeunesse. Ujjain était également un grand centre commercial, situé à un carrefour de routes importantes, l'une venant du Deccan au Sud et se poursuivant vers l'Inde du Nord-Ouest, l'autre reliant le port de Barygaza (Broach) à la plaine du Gange et à sa capitale Pataliputra (Patna). Foyer d'art et de science, Ujjain devient sous le règne de Rudradāman I (environ 130-160 ap. J. C.) le méridien O des astronomes indiens.

Se, come dice Veuve, non è da escludere che lo strumento di Aï Khanum possa risalire al III sec. a.C., in questo caso il riferimento all'uso dello gnomone al sud del tropico del Cancro, che Megastene riporta per sentito dire, avendolo forse appreso a Pāṭaliputra, sembrerebbe indicare che altri strumenti di questo tipo esistettero, alla fine del IV sec. a.C. nel sud dell'India, forse persino a Ujjain o nelle vicinanze. Non è infatti da escludere che astronomi attivi a Ujjain nel III sec. a.C. ebbero modo di incontrare tecnici e ingegneri provenienti dalla Battriana, dove gli stessi astronomi, geometri e artigiani di Ujjain e dintorni poterono, a loro volta, recarsi. Ed è di fatto ben noto che le due regioni conobbero un viavai di *destini incrociati* sin dalla più alta antichità, e ciascuna di esse a sua volta, al tempo di Megastene, apriva su itinerari terrestri e marittimi diretti verso la Persia e l'oriente ellenistico.

Il legame esistente tra la regione del Surāṣṭra e l'area greco-battriana, nel III sec. a. C., trova conferma nella famosa iscrizione di Rudradāman (c. 150 d.C.)[138], a Junāgaḍh (Kāṭhiāwar). Essa ricorda i lavori di ricostruzione degli argini del lago Sudarśana, distrutto dalle acque dei fiumi in piena, Suvarṇasikatā e Palāśini, prorompenti dal monte Ūrjavat, l'antico nome del monte Girnār le cui rocce recano le iscrizioni di Aśoka. L'inondazione, causata dalla rottura degli argini per cui —aggiunge l'autore dell'epigrafe— il Sudarśana si trasformò in Durdarśana (ll. 17-18), avvenne il primo *tithi* della metà oscura del mese di Mārgaśīrṣa, durante il regno di Mahākṣatrapa Rudradāman, ossia il 18 ottobre o il 16 novembre dell'anno 73 dell'era Śaka (150 d.C.). Dopo questo esordio l'iscrizione comporta una *narratio* storica, da cui si apprende che il lago-serbatoio fu costruito dal governatore della provincia

[138] In Kielhorn 1905-1906: 36-49; Sircar SI I: 175-80. Cfr. Mirashi 1981: 121-130, (N° 51); sulla datazione dell'iscrizione, ivi 124 (cfr. Kielhorn 1905-1906: 41).

(rāṣṭriya) Puṣyagupta, per conto di Candragupta Maurya; in seguito il lago artificiale fu dotato di canali per opera di *yavanarāja* Tuṣāspa, ingegnere del genio civile, al servizio di Aśoka[139]. A proposito di Tuṣāspa e della «réalité de ces Yavana [qui] est maintenant hors discussion», Benveniste nota:

> Il faut désormais admettre que Grecs et Iraniens vivaient là en voisinage étroit et qu'ils avaient en quelque mesure associé leurs communautés. Ainsi s'explique que le texte trouvé en 1958 à Qandahār soit bilingue, grec et araméen (un araméen qui contient une forte proportion de mots iraniens) ; c'est aussi pourquoi des personnages qualifiés de Yavana dans la tradition sanskrite portent des noms iraniens : tel le roi Yavana *Tuṣāspa.* Cela est clairement corroboré par l'ethnique composé *Yonakamboja* qui désigne comme s'ils formaient un seul peuple les *Yona* (*Yavana*) et les *Kamboja* iraniens[140].

Questo fascio impressionante di convergenze, rivelate dall'iscrizione di Junāgaḍh, invita a chiedersi se il fatto di trovare uno gnomone regolato sul tropico del Cancro ad Aï Khanum possa davvero considerarsi anomalo, dato che, qualche anno o decennio prima, Megastene —forse attingendo alle fonti alessandrine, se non per sentito dire— ricorda l'esistenza di uno strumento di questo tipo, usato a sud del tropico del Cancro, come rivela una lettura attenta degli *Indiká*[141].

[139] Sul contributo degli ingegneri iraniani per quanto riguarda le tecniche di irrigazione della regione di Aï Khanum, vedi Gardin (*supra* n. 4) e Gentelle 2005. Sulle canalizzazioni di Aï Khanum prima dell'arrivo dei coloni greci, *supra* n. 4; cfr. Fussman 1996: 245. È utile ricordare che il secondo degli editti detti «del Kaliṅga» (Bloch 1950: 140 e n. 29), conservati a Dhauli (distretto di Puri, Orissa: Hultzsch CII 1: 84-100) e a Jaugada (distretto di Ganjam, Orissa: Hultzsch CII 1: 101-118), le cui istruzioni sono indirizzate ai *missi* del Maurya, è rivolto alle città di Ujjainī e Takṣaśīla. Sugli scambi tra Battriana e India, cfr. Veuve 1982: 44-45.

[140] Benveniste 1964: 141 e note. Bloch (1950: 93-94, n. 5 *sub finem)* scrive a proposito di Tuṣāspa: «[Ce] Yavana est comme son nom l'indique clairement un Iranien. Par contre les rois proprement Grecs mentionnés dans l'édit XIII ne sont pas désignés comme Yona. Le groupement avec Kamboja et Gandhāra se retrouve dans les édits III et V».

[141] Veuve (1982: 47, n. 85) nota: «Retrouver le tropique du Cancer inscrit dans un cadran solaire fait pour une ville d'Asie centrale, reste donc, inexplicable, à moins que l'on accepte de voir dans celui-ci non pas un instrument utilitaire — fonction que remplissait au gymnase d'Aï Khanum le cadran hémisphérique ordinaire — mais un appareil destiné à l'enseignement de la théorie

IV

Visioni storiche e questioni filosofiche

In più occasioni gli storici di Alessandro, e gli studiosi odierni, ricordano la presenza di intellettuali e filosofi alla corte del Macedone e, discorrendo della spedizione in Asia, si soffermano sull'incontro di Alessandro con gli intellettuali di Taxila. Più tardi, all'epoca degli Indo-Greci, il discorso di Menandro con il monaco Nāgasena, consegnato nel *Milindapañha*[142], ha contribuito in qualche modo a occultare la pluralità e la ricchezza di fattori che concorrono all'incontro tra India e Grecia. La narrazione del *Milindapañha* in chiave buddhista e l'inserimento nel corpus para-canonico[143] fecero del *Milinda* un modello esemplare di «conversione» al buddhismo di un re, in questo caso Menandro (c. 155-130 a.C.). Ora, l'iscrizione del reliquario di Shinkot/Bajaur, databile al regno di Menandro (c. 150 a.C.)[144] presenta alcuni indizi che indicano un ambiente pluralistico[145], e ciò induce lo storico ad assumere una visione ampia e una lettura «dinamica».

IV.1. Testi a confronto

Se è vero che effettivamente non esiste un equivalente indiano per 'filosofia', esistono tuttavia migliaia di autori e di testi che per venticinque secoli si sono interrogati — a modo loro ed entro un contesto loro proprio — sulla natura dell'io e dell'universo, sull'epistemologia, sul linguaggio, sulla logica. Piuttosto che imporre un

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des horloges solaires qui aurait permis de visualiser la différence horaire entre Aï Khanum et Syène. Si l'on refuse cette explication il ne restera plus qu'à admettre que la latitude de 23°7 correspondant aux lignes horaires de notre cadran résulte "une erreur de conception ou d'une malfaçon dans la taille"».

[142] Sulla storia complessa del testo vedi Demiéville 1924: 1-35. Per una traduzione annotata, vedi Nolot 1995. Cfr. von Hinüber 2000: 82-86, §§ 172-180.

[143] Cfr. von Hinüber 2001: § 35.

[144] Vedi l'accurata rilettura e il commento di Baums 2012: 202-203. Per uno studio storico su Menandro, cfr. Fussman 1993, in partic. pp. 109-110, che riassume i risultati evinti dall'analisi delle iscrizioni del sovrano, concludendo: «Quant à l'interprétation historique, elle tient en peu de mots: le pouvoir de Ménandre s'étendait dans des raisons [sic: régions] difficiles d'accès et que les Britanniques, ni même l'actuel gouvernement pakistanais, n'ont jamais réussi à pleinement contrôler. Il s'agissait d'une suzeraineté, probablement légère, mais que les roitelets ses vassaux n'hésitaient pas à reconnaître publiquement. Que ceux-ci aient été bouddhistes n'implique en rien que Ménandre l'ait lui-même été».

[145] Cfr. Scherrer-Schaub 2014: 170 e nn.

modello univoco — che sarebbe oltretutto inapplicabile allo stesso pensiero occidentale nella sua globalità — converrà invece individuare i parametri entro cui queste speculazioni si muovono e valutarne la portata, cominciando proprio dagli elementi che più sono suonati estranei ai critici occidentali[146].

I primi accenni a maestri e pensatori indiani e al loro lignaggio[147] appaiono in alcune tra le più antiche *Upaniṣad,* la *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (BĀU) e la *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (CU)[148]. Lo svolgimento dei temi in esame si avvale di uno stile complesso e raffinato che abbina metafore enigmatiche, allegorie, mitemi, paradossi, come pure la descrizione se non definizione dell'assoluto in via negativa[149], il tutto ritmato da questioni poste dal narratore a se stesso, discussioni tra i maestri, o dialoghi suscitati dalla curiosità e dal gusto di sapere di un re, come a esempio le questioni poste a Yājñavalkya da Janaka, brahmano e sovrano di Videha[150]. Sempre

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[146] Torella 2008: 15-16.

[147] Cfr. BĀU 4.6. Come si è visto prima, il riferimento al lignaggio dei maestri si riscontra in altre fonti; tra queste, la *Carakasaṃhitā* indica il lignaggio di Ātreya Punarvasu, maestro di Caraka. Di particolare interesse, in ambito buddhista, le epigrafi di Deorkothar (Tyonthai Tensil, Rew district, Madhya Pradesh) databili intorno al II sec. a.C. In esse troviamo uno se non due lignaggi relativi ai donatori che pretendono di risalire al Buddha stesso (vedi Salomon 2014). Cfr. von Hinüber e Skilling 2013. Per un commento critico in cui l'autore sottolinea la cautela necessaria nell'affrontare la problematica del lignaggio e della datazione delle iscrizioni, vedi Tournier 2017: 18-19.

[148] Olivelle 1996: xxxiv, cfr. BEH II, 2010: 43.

[149] Cfr. Senart 1934 a proposito di BĀU 4.5.15: *Sa eṣa: Na-iti, na-ity ātma ; a-gṛhyaḥ, na hi gṛhyate : a-śīryaḥ, na hi śīryate ; a-saṅgaḥ, na hi sajyate ; a-sito na vyathate, na riṣyati.* L'uso della negazione e della via negativa (gr. ἀποφάσις, Aristotele περί ἑρμηνείας 6, 17a 25; cfr. sanscrito *apa-ūh- < apoha*), prediletta dall'*Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā* nel definire l'assoluto (e, per altri, il relativo), si ritroverà presso i filosofi e i logici buddhisti.

[150] Janaka è brahmano e *kṣatriya*, un fatto anomalo per l'ortodossia che la stessa BĀU (II.1.14-15, Senart 1934: 27) sottolinea nei due versi che concludono il dibattito in cui il brahmano Gārgya insegna (a pagamento) allo *kṣatriya* Ajātaśatru: «Alors Ajātaśatru: "C'est tout ? " et lui : "C'est tout !" Ajātaśatru: "Pour autant nous ne savons rien." Gārgya dit : "Acceptez-moi comme disciple." Ajātaśatru répondit : "C'est le monde renversé qu'un brahmane s'adresse à un kṣatriya pour qu'il lui explique le *Brahman.* Je vais t'instruire" … » Sul rapporto tra Brahmani e Kṣatriya quale appare nelle *Upaniṣad,* Olivelle (BEH II: 43-44) nota come queste ricordino «numerous episodes where a Brahman or a group of Brahmans who claim to be learned are worsted in debate by a Kṣatriya, who then goes on to teach a new doctrine to them». Sulla datazione delle più antiche

BĀU (III.1-9.26) introduce il dibattito tra Yājñavalkya e otto maestri, tra i quali la dottissima Gārgī Vācaknavī (III.8.12), su vari aspetti problematici del sacrificio[151] compiuto da Janaka, non solo brahmano e re, ma pure sacrificatore! Il dialogo con i brahmani (III.9.27-28) si rivela deludente. Yajñāvalkya perde pazienza, chiede di essere interrogato, ma i brahmani non danno seguito alle sue richieste. Allora, Yajñāvalkya conclude la discussione didattico-filosofica con un passo in versi in cui subentra la metafora uomo-albero[152] che chiude con un verso enigmatico. La presenza di donne dotte, Gārgī e Maitreyī (BĀU 4.5.1) —quest'ultima una delle due mogli di Yajñāvalkya, abilissima nelle controversie vediche[153]—, richiama alla mente un passo di Megastene il quale, per bocca di Strabone (15.1.58) nota, contrariamente a BĀU, come i filosofi e, tra questi, i brahmani

> do not share their philosophy with their wedded wives, for fear, in the first place, that they might tell some forbidden secret to the profane if they became corrupt, and, secondly, that they might desert them if they became earnest, for no person who had contempt for pleasure and toil, and likewise for life and death, is willing to be subject to another: and that the earnest man and the earnest woman are such persons…[154]

Upaniṣad, vedi Olivelle (BEH II: 44): BĀU, CU forse pre-buddhiste c. VI-V sec. a.C. —sebbene la cosa non sia certa— e *Kauṣītakyupaniṣad, Taittirīyopaniṣad* e *Aitareyopaniṣad* c. IV-III sec. a.C. Witzel, nota Olivelle (BEH II: 45), «places the early portions of the *Aitareyabrāhmaṇa* in the north-western region around the Sutlej and the later portions, and hence possibly also the *Aitareyopaniṣad,* further east in the Videha region».

[151] Cfr. BĀU 3.8.9-11, 3.9.

[152] Per un altro tipo di metafora «uomo-albero» vedi Sferra 2001b.

[153] BĀU 4.5.1. Senart (1934: 85 n. 1): «De *brahmavādin* il faut rapprocher *brahmodya*». Cfr. BĀU 3.8.1 in cui Senart traduce *brahmodya* con 'théologie' (1934: 54 n. 1) e in nota aggiunge «'Théologie' ne rend assez approximativement le sens de *brahmodya* qu'au prix d'un anachronisme auquel on voudrait échapper. Le mot témoigne que brahman est le point essentiel dans l'ordre de discussion visé ; mais le terme peut très bien avoir pris dès lors une portée plus générale dont la traduction 'théologie' respecte la possibilité». È sorprendente constatare come questa traduzione sia riproposta in tempi recenti, cfr. Olivelle 1996: 69. Certamente più consono Torella (2008: 27) che suggerisce di tradurre *brahmodya* con «controversie sotto forma di enigmi».

[154] Strabo 15.1.59, LCL 241: 100-101.

I Greci, che già sapevano di Socrate e della sua maestra, l'eccelsa Aspasia che Platone velatamente considerava come l'effettiva scrittrice dei discorsi di Pericle (Μενέξενος 235d-235b), non avrebbero certo trovato strano l'alto rango intellettuale di alcune donne indiane di cui fa mostra la *Bṛhadāraṇyaka.* Dal canto suo, il cretese Nearco (Νέαρχος c. 360-312/300 a.C.), compagno di Alessandro e navarco della flotta del Macedone, sulla via del ritorno[155], sempre per bocca di Strabone, associa la donna a quei sofisti che esaminano i fenomeni naturali. Dice Strabone (15.1.66, LCL 241: 114-115):

> Nearchus speaks of the sophists as follows: That the Brachmanes engage in affairs of state and attend the kings as counsellors; but that the other sophists investigate natural phenomena; and that Calanus is one of these; and that their wives join them in the study of philosophy, and that their modes of life are very severe.

Questo sembra richiamare un altrettanto celebre passo in cui Megastene, alludendo agli *śramaṇa*, la seconda categoria di filosofi, fa sapere che essi vivono nella foresta, praticano una ferrea *abstinentia,* e sono vestiti di corteccia. Alcuni sono medici o meglio «filosofi-umanitari» (τὸν ἄνθρωπον φιλοσόφους, Strabo 15.1.60), altri praticano le arti magiche e curano le malattie con trattamenti di indubbia (e dubbia) efficacia…; altri ancora praticano posture corporali particolari, stando immobili per intere giornate. Tra i filosofi-naturalisti si trovano anche indovini e «stregoni», e per finire una categoria di filosofi che si distingue dalle precedenti; al proposito, dice Megastene

> that there are others more accomplished and refined than these, but that even these themselves do not abstain from the common talk about Hades, insofar as it is thought to be conducive to piety and holiness; and that women, as well as men, study philosophy with them, and that the women likewise abstain from the delight of love[156].

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[155] Cfr. Plutarco *Alex* 56, n. 49. Dice Magnino a proposito di Nearco: «Originario di Creta si guadagnò fama soprattutto come ufficiale navale. Nominato capo della flotta nel 326 fu inviato da Alessandro a cercare una via per mare dall'India alla Persia, e anche a raccogliere informazioni esatte circa il litorale. Scrisse poi un'onesta e attendibile relazione del suo viaggio».

[156] Strabo 15.1.60, LCL 241: 104-105.

Anche l'*Āpastamba Dharmasūtra* (2.29.11-15)[157], probabilmente il più antico codice indiano (c. III sec. a.C.), rivela una società fluida e aperta: Āpastamba, segnatamente, cita le donne e gli Śūdra in quanto abili nello studio del *dharma*[158]. D'altronde, se da questo punto di vista Āpastamba sembra confermare quanto riportato da Megastene negli *Indiká*, è noto come la *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* rispecchi una società in profondo mutamento e introduca idee nuove rispetto alla tradizione vedica, giungendo a sovvertire in un certo qual modo l'ortodossia dell'ordine socio-istituzionale, come si è visto a proposito del ruolo rispettivo di brahmani e *kṣatriya* (cfr. n. 151). Una più ampia lettura del testo mostra come i racconti esplicativi della BĀU, i quali espongono la genesi del cosmo a partire dai primi princìpi[159], nel caso in esame *brahman* e *ātman*, elaborino al tempo stesso gli ordini in cui sono successivamente distribuiti gli «attori» della cosmogonia. Quanto poi al sottile rapporto tra *brahman* e *kṣatra,* la *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* I.4.9-15, I.4.11, precisa:

> En vérité, à l'origine, il n'existait que *Brahman*, lui tout seul (*brahma vā idam agra āsīt, ekam eva*). Étant seul, il ne se manifestait pas (*tad ekaṃ san na vyabhavat*). Alors, il produisit au-dessus de lui une forme plus excellente, la souveraineté (*tat śreyo rūpam atyasṛjata kṣatram*). Ces souverainetés qui sont, parmi les dieux Indra, Varuṇa, Soma, Rudra, Parjanya, Yama, Mṛtyu, Īśāna. Aussi n'est-il rien au-dessus de la souveraineté (*tasmāt kṣatrāt paraṃ nāsti*). Et c'est pourquoi le brahmane est, dans le *rājasūya*, assis au-dessous du kṣatriya. C'est à la souveraineté qu'il rend hommage, mais la matrice de la souveraineté est *Brahman* (*kṣatra eva tad yaśo dadhāti sāiṣā kṣatrasya yonir yad brahma*). C'est pourquoi, encore qu'il y ait la suprématie, c'est finalement à Brahman, sa matrice, que remonte le roi (*tasmād yad yad api rājā paramatāṃ gacchati*). Celui

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[157] Olivelle 2017: 52-53.

[158] Vedi Olivelle 2017: 53. Interessante seguire Pollock (1985: 506-508) e il passo del *Kāmasūtra* (I.3.4-12) da lui tradotto, a proposito dell'aforismo I.3.3: «The teachers of old maintained that instructing women in this *śāstra* is useless, because women cannot learn *śāstra*». Sviluppando gli argomenti in favore della dinamica tra teoria (*śāstra*) e pratica (*prayoga*), il passo conclude con l'aforismo I.3.12: «Therefore a woman may learn, from a trustworthy person and in private, the practice [alone], the *śāstra* as a whole, or a section thereof [according to her intelligence]».

[159] Cfr. *supra* § I.3.

qui fait violence à un brahmane blesse sa propre matrice. Il est le pire, s'étant attaqué au meilleur (*brahmaivāntata upaniśrayati svāṃ yonim ya u enaṃ hinasti svāṃ sa yonim ṛcchati sa pāpīyān bhavati yathā śreyāṃsaṃ hiṃsitvā*)[160].

Se la BĀU avvia un discorso che nei secoli successivi contribuirà a favorire lo sviluppo del pensiero indiano[161], le idee che troviamo espresse nei testi greci rinvenuti in Battriana e in Aracosia poterono suscitare la curiosità se non l'interesse di pensatori indiani presenti, come visto, nella regione. Gli esempi abbondano, in campo politico e «filosofico», di un possibile, se non assodato, incontro tra pensatori indiani e greci. Diciamo *d'emblée* che dal confronto tra testi indiani e greci, in questo caso il *Timeo*/Τίμαιος (c. 360 a.C.) di Platone e la *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,* risulta evidente che i temi trattati e persino il «movimento» dell'opera — narrazione cosmogonica e, secondo il caso, antropo°/ psicogonica con relativa presenza, distribuzione e organizzazione di esseri divini e umani, genesi o derivazione dal primo principio/dai primi principi o dibattiti sull'uno e il molteplice— malgrado la loro reciproca alterità ideologica e culturale, sarebbero parsi degni di discussione e scambi intensi da ambo le parti[162]. Non stupisce quindi trovare i dialoghi di Platone nella storia della filosofia greca, così come non dovrebbe stupire trovare le Upaniṣad nella storia del pensiero indiano. Tutto sta nella traduzione del termine «filosofia» e sul come intendere la sua storia. Lasciando, una volta ancora, a Sisifo lo svolgimento del tema, limi-

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[160] BĀU I.4.11, tr. Senart 1934: 13.

[161] Cfr. Biardeau 1968: 109-110. Tra i temi innovativi spicca l'insegnamento esoterico di Yājñavalkya, esperto ritualista, che nel terzo *adhyāya* (BĀU III.2.13, Senart 1934: 45) insegna al brahmano Jāratkārava Ārtabhāga, presente al sacrificio di Janaka, il ruolo del *karman* e cosa avviene del *puruṣa* alla morte: «Alors, se retirant à l'écart, ils causèrent. Et, parlant, c'était de l'action (*karman*) qu'ils parlaient et, louant, c'était l'action (*karman*) qu'ils louaient: on devient bon par l'action bonne, mauvais par l'action mauvaise (*puṇyo vai puṇyena karmanā bhavati, pāpaḥ pāpena iti.*)» Cfr. *Sutta Nipāta, Vāseṭṭho sutta* v. 650.

[162] Riferendosi alle produzioni artistiche del Gandhāra, Thapar (2002: 542 e n. 31) descrive così l'incontro tra mondo indiano e greco: «From the Indian perspective the themes and their meanings were familiar, the representation was different. But since culture is not static, this very representation became a legitimate part of the self-perception of the Indian. To the citizen of Taxila there would be little that was alien in this art».

tiamoci a citare un passo della prefazione scritta dai curatori della *Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*:

> Any division of any sort of history into chronological segments will be arbitrary, at least at the edges, and it would be absurd to pretend that philosophy changed, abruptly or essentially, in 320 BC and again in 100 BC. Equally, any history must choose some chronological limits; and the limits chosen for this History are, or so the editors incline to think, reasonably reasonable — at least, they are more reasonable than the traditional limits. It may be objected that the word 'Hellenistic' is now inept. (In truth, some historians dislike the word tout court.) But there is no other word with which to replace it, and it is used here without, of course, any ideological connotations — as a mere label, a sign for a certain span of time. The term 'philosophy', too, is not without its vagaries — what people have been content to name 'philosophy' has changed from age to age (and place to place), and at the edges there has always been a pleasing penumbra[163].

Torella si interroga su un possibile equivalente del termine «filosofia» nel senso maggiormente ammesso ai nostri giorni. Dopo aver preso in considerazione le varie posizioni assunte dagli indianisti sulla questione, nota:

> [i]nvero un termine sanscrito per struttura e significato vicinissimo al nostro 'filosofia' ci sarebbe, anche se su di esso non è mai stata finora richiamata l'attenzione: si tratta di *tattvajñānaiṣaṇā* («desiderio di conoscere la vera realtà») termine però di occorrenza assai rara. A *tattvajñānaiṣaṇā* si possono ricollegare termini molto più noti — che forse ne sono l'occulta matrice — quali *dharmajijñāsā* («desiderio di conoscere il *dharma*») o *brahmajijñāsā* («desiderio di conoscere il *brahman*»), che figurano in apertura rispettivamente dei *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* e dei *Vedāntasūtra*[164].

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[163] CHHP 1999: xii.

[164] Torella 2008: 15 e 174, n. 8. I primi tre capitoli delle *Madhyamakahṛdaya-kārikā* vertono sull'esame del pensiero Mādhyamika. MHK I.5 indica i titoli dei primi tre capitoli: *bodhicittāparityāgo munivratasamāśrayaḥ | tattvajñānaiṣaṇā ceti caryā sarvārthasiddhaye ||* (ed. p. 45). Il composto *tattvajñānaiṣaṇā* ricorre in MHK III.1: *yasya jñānamayaṃ cakṣuś cakṣus tasyāsti netarat | yatas tasmād bhavad dhīmāṃs tattvajñānaiṣaṇāparaḥ ||* (ed. p. 53). I capitoli seguenti esaminano in modo critico le posizioni dottrinali delle scuole buddhiste o eterodosse e non buddhiste o allodosse, alla luce del pensiero di Bhā(va)viveka.

Come nota Torella, il termine *tattvajñānaiṣaṇā* appare in *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* (I.5 e III.1) di Bhā(va)viveka (c. 490-570) e può essere ricollegato al termine *tattvagaveṣin,* «colui che va in cerca del reale», usato da Nāgārjuna (c. 200 d.C.) in *Yuktiṣaṣṭikākārikā* (30ab: *sarvam astīti vaktavyam ādau tattvagaveṣiṇaḥ ||*). E l'equivalenza delle due espressioni trova conferma nel commento di Candrakīrti (c. 600 d.C.) il quale, per inciso, glossa il termine *tattva* avvalendosi di Pāṇini 5.1.119[165].

Tornando al frammento filosofico di Aï Khanum, databile, come si è visto, intorno alla metà del III sec. senza che si sappia peraltro né come né quando giunse in Battriana, ci si può chiedere se i temi ivi esposti abbiano potuto circolare in Battriana o in Aracosia, in quali circostanze e secondo quali modalità. Una cosa infatti è chiedersi se un intellettuale indiano dell'epoca avrebbe compreso la teoria espressa dal frammento nelle sue più ampie generalità, oppure se un filosofo greco di stanza ad Aï Khanum sarebbe stato in misura di rispondere alle domande di un collega indiano. Altro invece poter dimostrare, soprattutto di fronte ai paladini di un positivismo datato, che l'incontro di filosofi indiani e greci o macedoni, ricordato dagli storici di Alessandro e commentato nei secoli successivi, incontro il quale sotto certi aspetti è più che verosimile, sia un fatto accertato. Ma la storia non è unicamente una sequenza di fatti[166].

> Il n'est certes pas indispensable de trouver des références explicites à la pratique détaillée de rédaction et de transmission. L'analyse du texte lui-même, de ses commentaires et l'étude des rapports que les textes entretiennent, peuvent raisonnablement se substituer à la paucité des données de micro-histoire. En en faisant l'économie, l'histoire serait dépourvue de moyens analytiques pour se faire. Et elle n'est certes pas, en tout cas pas uniquement, le « relevé topographique » de faits bruts (témoignages

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[165] Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 236-238 e nn., in partic. 237 e n. 457; cfr. *supra* n. 32.
[166] Cfr. Veyne (1971: 38): «Ajoutons que si un même "événement" peut être dispersé entre plusieurs intrigues, inversement des données appartenant à des catégories hétérogènes — le social, le politique, le religieux…— peuvent composer un même événement; c'est même un cas très fréquent: la majorité des événements sont des 'faits sociaux totaux' au sens de Marcel Mauss; à vrai dire, la théorie du fait social total veut dire tout simplement que nos catégories traditionnelles mutilent la réalité».

épigraphiques, textuels, iconographiques, etc.). Elle est également interprétation de l'ensemble des données en présence, bref, usage de la raison[167].

Cosa dicono i testi in esame? Se per concetti quali la nozione di causa, oppure per termini quali ἰδέαι o εἴδη, si può trovare una certa corrispondenza con concetti o termini omologhi nel pensiero indiano dell'epoca, ci si può invece chiedere se esistettero allora le condizioni effettive necessarie all'incontro e gli agenti in grado di tradurre la complessa teoria filosofica delle idee (ἰδέαι, II,5,10 e III, 20; εἴδη II, 25 e III, 7-8) sottintesa dal frammento — inv. Akh III B 77 P. O. 154 (MP³ 2563.01)—, e in una certa misura anche la nozione di partecipazione (μέθεξις) delle idee tra di loro e di partecipazione di queste alle cose empiriche (αἰσθητά II, 4, 24 e III, 12-13). Quale tra le correnti del pensiero indiano coevo avrebbe potuto far notare le inevitabili aporie a cui conduce il ricorso alla nozione di 'partecipazione' allo scopo di conciliare gli universali e il particolare? Chi avrebbe potuto avanzare la critica rivolta alle idee in quanto causa delle entità empiriche? Simili critiche erano mosse d'altronde all'interno stesso dell'Accademia e del Peripato. In un breve passo, tanto conciso quanto limpido, del suo *ΜΕΘΕΞΙΣ: La teoria platonica delle idee e la partecipazione delle cose empiriche,* Fronterotta fornisce un quadro della problematica sollevata dalla teoria platonica in termini limpidi e perfettamente traducibili dentro il contesto indiano, offrendo così un'ulteriore chiave di lettura per il testo lacunoso di Aï Khanum[168]. Pur ammettendo —e questa è opinione nostra— che gli

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[167] Scherrer-Schaub 2009: 156.

[168] Fronterotta (2001: xviii-xix): «D'altro canto, perché tutto ciò sia possibile, perché il soggetto conoscente riesca davvero a conoscere gli enti collocati al vertice della gerarchia ontologica ed epistemologica del reale — le idee — sembra necessario supporre che le idee si rendano a loro volta conoscibili al soggetto conoscente. Un passaggio niente affatto scontato, se le idee sono radicalmente diverse e separate dal mondo sensibile a cui il soggetto conoscente appartiene invece originariamente e costitutivamente. Ecco la ragione della difficile ipotesi della partecipazione delle cose empiriche ai generi ideali: soltanto a patto che i due livelli separati del reale siano posti almeno in parte in 'comunicazione', diviene legittimo credere che gli uomini — immersi nel mondo sensibile — riescano a conoscere le supreme realtà — rigorosamente estranee al mondo sensibile. E inoltre, più in generale, tutto ciò che si trova sul piano dell'apparenza e dell'eterna trasformazione della sfera sensibile deve intrattenere in qualche

incontri *incrociati* e la reciproca traduzione tra lingue diverse entri-no nel campo del possibile e del fattibile[169], rimane pur sempre la questione del dove: la Taxila degli storici di Alessandro o piuttosto la Taxila dell'epoca di Patañjali? (cfr. § I.3 e nn. 32-33); e inoltre: quando precisamente nel periodo che corre tra la fine del IV e la metà del II sec. a.C. (cfr. § I.1 e n. 8, § I.2 e n. 18) avvenne il presumibile incontro? In quanto ai protagonisti, Stoneman nota:

> [w]hat does seem fairly clear is that Greeks would not readily have distinguished different grades or types of Indian ascetic. For Greek purposes any of these could be called philosophers, or Brahmans. The fact that there could also be philosophers or asce-tics who were not Brahmans — referred to comprehensively in the inscriptions of King Asoka as *brahmanasramananam* — was surely beyond them. The point may be pressed further: Indian philoso-phies in the fifth and fourth centuries BC belonged to a fluid cat-egory: there were not just three systems, but a continuum… The Greek sources may reflect this fluidity, so that it is inappropriate to press them for adherence to a system established only later[170].

Questo tipo di fluidità si riscontra in altre fonti indiane più tarde. Citeremo due casi a titolo illustrativo. Il primo si trova nel Vinaya

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modo con le idee una temporanea relazione, attraverso la quale gli enti empiri-ci ricevono l'essenza, le caratteristiche, la definizione e il nome che sono loro normalmente riconosciuti: nessuna 'forma, nessuna struttura, nessun ordine', neanche apparente e temporaneo, sarebbe altrimenti possibile attribuire al puro e semplice divenire del mondo sensibile, se non in virtù della partecipazione alle idee». Si potrà porre a confronto ad esempio BĀU I.4. sulla genesi del mondo e in particolare sul ruolo di *nāma* e *rūpa* (I.4.7.) con cui l'*ātman*, sotto le specie di *puruṣa* (I.4.1), dispiega e distingue le entità dapprima indeterminate (*avyākṛta*) dicendo «questo ha tal nome, questo tale forma» (*asau nāma, ayam idaṃrūpa iti*, Senart 1934: 11). Cfr. Torella 2012: 8.

[169] Gli storici di Alessandro ricordano la presenza di interpreti, e l'uso di più lingue traspare dalla lettura stessa di alcune iscrizioni. Cfr. Karttunen 1997: 60-61 e n. 246.

[170] Stoneman 1995: 110; cfr. Thapar 1994/2000: 423. Sul composto *śramaṇa-brāhmaṇa,* Seyfort Ruegg (2008: 5, n. 3) riferendosi a Patañjali nota: «Sometimes the relation between these two categories has been represented as a more or less straightforward opposition. This view is reflected in Patañjali's explanation for the singular member of the copulative compound *śramaṇabrāhmaṇam*, which is said by him to be accounted for by the fact that there is a *virodha* "opposition" between the two referents of the two members of the compound; see *Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya* of Pāṇini II.iv.12 *vārtt.* 2: *yeṣāṃ ca virodha ity* [cf. II.iv.9] *asya avakāśaḥ | śramaṇabrāhmaṇam* |). The usage may then be contrasted with the dual number of the *dvanda* compound *brāhmaṇakṣatriyau* (see comm. ad II.iv.6)».

(*Mahāvagga* I 71) dove si afferma che l'asceta *aggika jaṭilaka* può essere ordinato (*upasampadā*) monaco buddhista ed esentato dal periodo di prova in quanto, aggiungono i *vinayadhara*, gli asceti *jaṭila* riconoscono la dottrina del *karman*[171]. Un altro caso interessante si trova nell'esordio del *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra* dove si apprende che i *bhikṣu* di ritorno dalla questua mattutina usavano sostare nel villaggio dei brahmani. Si racconta poi che in quel preciso frangente i brahmani chiesero ai *bhikṣu* di spiegare la differenza tra buddhisti e brahmani, dato che ambedue mirano all'ottenimento dell'onniscienza[172].

IV.2. Generi sommi tra Grecia e India: speculazioni linguistiche e filosofiche

> Students of Daniels Ingalls learned among other essential lessons how important is to take account of traditional categories and concepts when attempting to understand the cultural achievements of ancient India.
> (Sheldon Pollock[173])

Come visto (*supra* § I.3 e nn. 25-26), Isnardi-Parente indagando su un «possibile nesso fra valori ideali» nel *Sofista*, identifica «alcune idee la partecipazione alle quali è imprescindibile per ogni realtà». Tra queste (e qui citiamo di nuovo il passo in questione)

> le idee di essere, medesimo, altro, reciprocamente coesistenti e quindi 'partecipabili' insieme in mutua *koinônía* o *sumploké* (già in posizione diversa si pongono le due idee di quiete e di moto, seppur assunte anch'esse fra i *mégista géne*: poiché in esse il rapporto di alterità trapassa in quello di opposizione, come i passi 255a, 257b dicono chiaramente esse si presentano quindi come alternative e non coesistenti).

[171] Vedi il commento di Seyfort Ruegg 2008: 6, n. 4. È degna di nota la presenza di una 'Jaṭilasabhā' a Bhārhut (epoca Śuṅga, c. II-I sec. a.C.); vedi Tsukamoto 1996, vol. I: IV: Bhar 16.

[172] Vedi Scherrer-Schaub in stampa a.

[173] Pollock 1985: 499, n. 2, in riferimento a Ingalls 1965: 50. Ingalls incontra qui il pensiero di Senart citato in esergo. Cfr. Staal 2006: 106. Il '*Principle of Acceptance*' formulato da Staal può senz'altro essere esteso a tutti i luoghi del sapere. Seyfort Ruegg analizza la problematica da vari punti di vista in diverse pubblicazioni: vedi in particolare Seyfort Ruegg 2008. Riguardo ai problemi di traduzione, vedi Seyfort Ruegg 1992 e 2007.

Ora, i generi sommi (*mégista géne*) qui elencati rispecchiano categorie e princìpi tutti perfettamente traducibili e discussi nel contesto indiano, particolarmente in epoca classica. Inoltre, l'accenno del frammento al concetto di causa e al processo del divenire cosmico di generazione e corruzione illustrano una volta ancora come l'incontro tra Grecia e India non sopporta visioni riduzionistiche, ma invita piuttosto alla lettura lenta e profonda delle rispettive fonti. Il discorso filosofico sulla causalità che più tardi sarà discusso da Nāgārjuna (c. 200 d.C.) e Āryadeva (c. 170-270 d.C.), e commentato da Candrakīrti (c. 600 d.C.), si articola attorno a termini quali «esistenza», «essere», «fare», «divenire», espressioni d'uso presso i grammatici e presenti nell'antico *Nirukta*. Sarup nota a proposito di Yāska (c. 500 a.C.)[174]:

> Both Yāska and Plato sum up as it were the results of their predecessors in philological and etymological investigations in the *Nirukta* and the *Cratylus* respectively.

Ne mette anche in luce la «modernità»[175] e la vastità del sapere:

> The numerous exemplary quotations occurring in the *Nirukta* conclusively show that he knew the *Ṛg-veda*, the *Sāma-veda*, the *Atharva-veda*, the *Yajur-veda*, and their *pada-pāṭha*s, the *Taittirīya Saṃhitā*, the *Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā*, the *Kāṭhaka Saṃhitā*, the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, the *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa*, the *Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa*, the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, the *Prātiśākhya*s, and some of the *Upaniṣads*[176].

Seyfort Ruegg nota come, malgrado le difficoltà nel valutare l'importanza della materia filosofica in Pāṇini, per via della concisione e delle

> formulations quasi algébriques qui y sont employées, les commentateurs à partir de Kātyāyana et Patañjali y distinguent une doctrine de linguistique générale passablement élaborée ; d'ailleurs une pareille description d'une langue présuppose en grande mesure une théorie linguistique développée[177].

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[174] Sarup 1984: 54. Cfr. Seyfort Ruegg 1958: 23-30.
[175] Cfr. Sarup 1984: 58.
[176] Sarup 1984: 54-55.
[177] Seyfort Ruegg nella raccolta di studi del 1956, pubblicata nel 1959: 31.

Sempre Seyfort Ruegg[178], citando *Nirukta ad* I.1, aggiunge:

> un verbe a trait au devenir (*bhāvapradhāna*) tandis que le nom se réfère à l'existence (*sattvapradhāna*) qui est *mūrta*. Encore qu'une distinction nette ne soit pas clairement établie entre le *dhātu* et l'*ākhyāta*, le nom verbal est distingué à la fois du nom et du verbe ; il désigne l'action (*bhāva*) comme étant achevée ou 'figée' (*mūrta*) alors que le verbe désigne un procès qui est à achever dans le temps (*pūrvāparibhūta bhāva*).

L'autore cita poi *Nirukta* I.2, dove sono menzionate le sei modificazioni del divenire (*bhāvavikāra*) —*jāyate, asti, pariṇamate, vardhate, apakṣīyate* e *vinaśyati*— e mette in luce, a proposito della «teoria dell'azione», l'aporia sottostante:

> Le fait cependant que *asti* 'existe' soit compris dans une liste de modifications de l'action fait difficulté ; car *asti* ne peut être censé répondre à la question *kiṃ karoti* 'que fait-il?' d'une part et de l'autre la notion exprimée par *asti* ne peut être assimilée à celle qu'exprime le substantif. Ces problèmes ne reçoivent leurs solutions que dans le *Mahābhāṣya* (sur Pāṇ. I.3.1.) et dans les ouvrages des grammairiens philosophes.

La questione è complessa e meriterebbe un'analisi serrata. Notiamo per inciso che l'aporia qui osservata precede le speculazioni filosofiche che vertono sull'esclusione reciproca di «ciò che esiste in sé (*svabhāva*)» —e quindi non fabbricato, non dipendente da altri (*akṛtimaḥ svabhāvo hi nirapekṣaḥ paratra ca,* MMK XV.2, *Pr* 262.11)— e «ciò che è prodotto in virtù di cause e condizioni», sulle quali la scuola Madhyamaka, a partire dalle critiche mosse a dottrine buddhiste e allodosse, fonderà la teoria della causalità o produzione condizionata (*pratītyasamutpāda*)[179]. In

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[178] Seyfort Ruegg 1959: 24-25.

[179] Si veda in particolare MMK XV (Svabhāvaparīkṣā) et *Pr* 259-279. Cfr. YṢVṛ n. 462, pp. 240-243, e YṢVṛ ad YṢ kār 48, pp. 289-293 e note. Si contrasti con il discorso dello Straniero, il filosofo eleate in Platone (247c e 248c7-9), più consono alle posizioni dei Sarvāstivādin che alle tesi *mādhyamika*. *Sofista* 247c, tr. Chambry 1969: 101: «L'étranger: Je dis que ce qui possède naturellement une puissance (δύνἄμις) quelconque, soit d'agir sur n'importe quelle autre chose, soit de subir l'action, si petite qu'elle soit, de l'agent le plus insignifiant, et ne fût-ce qu'une seule fois, tout ce qui le possède est un être réel; car je pose comme une définition qui définit les êtres, qu'ils ne sont autre chose que puissance». Cfr.

quanto poi al ruolo centrale della scienza grammaticale in India, Seyfort Ruegg trova come

> [i]n this respect a certain convergence has arisen, consciously or unconsciously, between modern Western thought and classical Indian thought. For when the Indologist looks for ideas and methods that have played a modelling and paradigmatic role in the history of Indian thought, it is probably above all to the grammatical *śāstra* that he would turn. The Indian thinkers have indeed themselves pointed to the paradigmatic significance of grammar in their civilization, and one of them has referred to it as a universal science (*sarvapārṣada-śāstra*)[180].

Il vastissimo campo di ricerca aperto da Pāṇini rende definitivamente vano l'agone «comparativistico» tra pensiero indiano e greco se non «occidentale» all'insegna di una mal definita «ragione» o «razionalità», nel caso in cui l'agone si disputa avvalendosi di temi e nozioni reciprocamente traducibili, anche se polisemici in ambo le sfere, senza procedere all'esame attento della problematica. Ci si può chiedere ad esempio cosa significhi parlare di discorso razionale (*logos*) in Platone o nelle Upaniṣad quando affiancato ad esso (e questo in ambedue i casi!), si trova «l'esposizione immaginaria del *mythos*, libera dai vincoli di coerenza del discorso razionale»[181]? Oppure, per quale ragione studiosi di filosofia indiana e greca, a loro reciproca insaputa, tra la fine dell'Ottocento e l'inizio del Novecento, trovarono oscuro lo svolgimento l'uno della *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* e l'altro del Τίμαιoς[182]? Si sa che l'estraneità e l'opacità percepite alla lettura di un

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Fowler 1921: 371, 379, 381. Per il termine δύνᾰμις vedi GEL 453 § IV: «*capability of existing or acting, potentiality*, opp. *actuality* (ἐνέργεια)».

[180] Seyfort Ruegg 1978, ripreso in Seyfort Ruegg 2010: 1-2 e n. 3: «Helārāja on Bhartṛhari, *Vākyapadīya* iii.3.1. [Cf. the term *sarvavedapārṣada* in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* ii.1.58, vt. 1, and vi.3.14, vt. 2?]».

[181] Si veda Fronterotta 2001: xix.

[182] Regnaud (1878: 1-2) a proposito delle *Upaniṣad*: «Aussi, les indications que fournissent à cet égard les documents originaux laissent-elles extrêmement à désirer pour la clarté, l'enchaînement et le développement des idées : elles sont ou obscures ou pleines de lacunes, ou se bornent à de simples exposés dogmatiques». Nella sua *Analyse* Senart (1934: vii-xxviii), riassumendo la storia della trasmissione delle idee e della composizione della BĀU, trasmuta per così dire l'apparente oscurità in una complessa limpidità. E, a proposito del *Timeo*, sentiamo l'eccelso storico della filosofia Duhem (1913, I: 28): «Au moment d'aborder

testo possono avere diverse ragioni, non ultime le «proiezioni sub-liminali» determinate da un particolare contesto o momento storico, come nota Lo Turco (2005, cit. sotto). West, nel suo studio comparativo *Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient*, rivolgendosi al collega Fränkel esorta a una visione più ampia:

> See how the Greek scholar fears Upanishads. He does not merely think they are dangerous, he is really surprised to find that interest in them can coexist with sound interpretations. In a tidy world, I daresay, a Greek thinker would be fully explicable from Greek material. The facts are otherwise. The fact is that the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanishad* alone throws more light on what Heraclitus was talking about than all the remains of the other Presocratics together[183].

L'incontro effettivo o ipotetico tra filosofi indiani e greci pone lo studioso davanti a diverse questioni relative al problema della trasmissione ed eventualmente della traduzione delle idee filosofiche in voga durante il periodo in esame, come pure sulle modalità di lettura delle rispettive fonti dalle quali è possibile desumere il quadro culturale e socio-politico dell'epoca. Elementi questi che nel complesso contribuirono dapprima a stimolare la naturale curiosità dell'intellettuale e, in seguito, ad arricchire la reciproca «memoria culturale» —nel nostro caso memoria greca e indiana— che è forse utile sottolineare (e questo in entrambi i casi) non fu, probabilmente mai, un'entità né chiara e distinta, né monolitica e stereotipa, bensì estremamente ricca di fattori precedentemente «incontrati e incrociati» nel suo muoversi in spazi e tempi diversi.

la Cosmologie de Platon, on ne saurait se défendre d'un sentiment de crainte ; on est également effrayé et par la hauteur de la pensée qu'il s'agit d'interpréter et par les obscurités qui, trop souvent, en embrument les contours. […] Constamment inspiré par la plus haute Métaphysique, les théories physique et astronomique de Platon sont, en outre, liées de la manière la plus intime à des analogies géométriques et arithmétiques où se retrouvent les tendances de l'École pythagoricienne ; et ce symbolisme mathématique est singulièrement propre à faire hésiter les commentateurs modernes à qui la Philosophie pythagoricienne apparaît comme un mystère. En outre, la pensée de Platon s'exprime souvent sous la forme d'allégories dont les voiles poétiques laissent malaisément deviner les contours précis des propositions astronomiques». Certo, nulla di tutto ciò avrebbe stupito gli uditori/lettori e i filosofi indiani.

[183] West 1971: 201, citato in Stoneman 1995: 111, n. 86. Sulla critica alla posizione di Fränkel (1960: 254*sq*), vedi West 1971: 199-201.

Le difficoltà di interpretazione che sorgono in ambedue le sfere culturali non sono unicamente imputabili all'apparente o effettiva complessità dei dialoghi di Platone, delle *Upaniṣad* o d'altri testi ancora, ma lo sono anche per la «duttilità, mobilità e non tecnicità del linguaggio platonico che fa sì che termini uguali e sinonimici vengano usati con differente significato in differenti contesti filosofici», come sottolinea Isnardi-Parente. La sua critica potrebbe senz'altro essere applicata anche nel caso del pensiero indiano, mettendo in guardia lo studioso sul fatto che un tale modo di procedere

> si rivela facilmente discorso scolastico, discorso esegetico semplificatore che, non tenendo conto delle diverse valenze della terminologia filosofica di Platone, mira invece a imporre al discorso platonico uno schematismo derivativo che gli è estraneo[184].

La lettura parallela di fonti indiane e greche le quali, pur se non coeve, furono in teoria accessibili negli ultimi secoli a.C., e il loro esame approfondito invitano ad abbandonare le sterili scorciatoie sulle quali sfociano gli interrogativi formulati, come visto, in chiave ambigua, del tipo *obscurum* per *obscurius*. Sentiamo al proposito la ragione avanzata da Lo Turco (2005: 595) nella sua sottile analisi delle varie opinioni in riguardo al raffronto tra «scienza occidentale» e pensiero indiano:

> We begin to suspect that we are still faced with the famous messianic view of the West, deeply rooted in the West itself, a view that culminated with Husserl's *Krisis* and according to which the West is considered the source of rational enquiry (the touchstone of every possible form of thought) and also the place where it culminated historically in modern science. This view of the West is corroborated, among other things, by our unwillingness to grasp thought paradigms that are not established in our own society and hence by our reluctance to *interpret*[185].

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[184] Isnardi-Parente 1992: 180. L'avvertimento dell'autrice trova riscontro nella «diffidenza di Seneca (I sec. d.C.) verso le nuove scuole basate sull'esegesi, che rischiavano ai suoi occhi di trasformare la filosofia in filologia»; vedi Seneca, *Epistulae morales ad Lucilium*, Ep. 108, 23, cit. in Chiaradonna 2011: 98.

[185] Vedi anche le importanti riflessioni in Squarcini 2007: 100-107.

Come più volte richiamato nelle pagine precedenti l'incontro, se incontro vi fu, non avvenne tra due entità culturalmente definite da una gerarchia di valori arbitrariamente stabilita, ma piuttosto tra due entità di uguale statura messe, per così dire, «fronte a fronte» al centro di una dinamica complessa, fatta di scambi a breve e lunga distanza, di incontri tra persona e persona, tra testo e testo se non tra «scritto» e «scritto», di incontri mediati da traduzioni o interpreti, oppure di rievocazioni di un pensiero rimasto in ombra per decenni o per secoli e rimesso in auge, per rinnovato interesse.

I Greci —se incontro vi fu— poterono trovare presso i pensatori indiani un vivacissimo contesto intellettuale in cui correnti diverse si confrontavano tra loro avviando *discorsi incrociati* i quali, nei secoli successivi, porteranno alla formazione di scuole specifiche. Nel contempo, il *fronte a fronte* con i filosofi greci e la necessità che in tale frangente si impone di tradurre il proprio pensiero poterono provocare nei maestri indiani un fenomeno di distanziamento verso le loro stesse scritture che permise di vedere la diversità delle dottrine indiane, passate in rassegna da una velocissima carrellata. L'incontro sembra rivelarsi dapprima come un reciproco specchiarsi. Come è d'uso tutt'oggi, la conversazione, la discussione, lo scambio di argomenti rappresentano un luogo del sapere, distinto dal campo mentale proprio dei protagonisti. L'incontro/discorso è di per sé un moto, ovverosia una dinamica in continuo agire la cui tensione cinetica sfocia in un momentaneo dissolversi della reciproca alterità: e l'incontro altro non è se non un modo di vedere la complessità e la pluralità che nella loro dissomiglianza sono ciononostante traducibili e quindi reciprocamente comprese. L'abbandonarsi alla tentazione di un arresto del movimento porta a considerazioni stravaganti.

Un bravissimo archeologo, Claude Rapin, sulla scia di altri eruditi vede Aï Khanum come un centro culturale e originale dell'ellenismo «où se serait produite pour la première fois vers le milieu du IIIe siècle av. J.-C. **la synthèse** d'**une religion** indienne et **d'une pensée philosophique** grecque»[186]. Un modo di vedere che conta illustri predecessori e successori. Una problematica complessa che

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[186] Rapin 1992: 128. I termini fondamentali del Missverständig sono messi in grassetto da chi scrive.

da sola richiederebbe un lungo, anzi lunghissimo, commento. Dicemmo, al proposito:

> Les synthèses cependant, tout comme les « synchrétismes », se jouent sur le temps long et requièrent une analyse serrée et complexe, notamment parce que sur un temps long les accrétions sont multiples et, de plus, quelques-unes disparaissent quand d'autres surgissent, sans pour cela que *l'empreinte* de celles qui ont passé soit effacée complètement. Plus sobrement, au vu de la courte histoire qui nous a retenu ici, nous préférons parler d'un « circuit d'idées ou de motifs », ainsi que d'« échanges réciproques d'expertises et de contrastes ». Imaginer un flux est une manière de ne pas fermer l'un des aspects de la question. Dans le domaine des idées les personnes, comme les sociétés, peuvent se rencontrer, peuvent communiquer, peuvent se comprendre sans nécessairement *vouloir* ou *pouvoir* intégrer le système de l'interlocuteur, et c'est ainsi que le savoir garde originalité et dynamisme. Autre en effet le recouvrement d'un système par un autre: le monde d'aujour-d'hui montre bien où cela mène[187].

Sull'intreccio di tutte le storie, sentiamo l'anonimo viaggiatore approdato al castello dei destini incrociati:

> Certamente anche la mia storia è contenuta in questo intreccio di carte, passato presente futuro, ma io non so più distinguerla dalle altre. La foresta, il castello, i tarocchi m'hanno portato a questo traguardo: a perdere la mia storia, a confonderla nel pulviscolo delle storie, a liberarmene[188].

A Raffaele amico carissimo, studioso raffinato,
elegante, liberamente libero.

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Abbreviazioni e sigle

Alex.   *Plutarco: Alessandro.* Vedi Domenico Magnino
Anab.   Flavius Arrianus, *Arrian. Anabasis of Alexander.* LCL 236 (tr. inglese di Peter A. Brunt con testo greco a fronte).

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[187] Cfr. Scherrer-Schaub 2014: 171.
[188] Calvino 1973: 46.

	Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Heinemann, 1976-1983
Aulus Gellius	*Noctium Atticarum.* Cfr. Jeffrey Henderson e John C. Rolfe
BĀU	*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.* Si veda Senart 1934/1967 e Olivelle 1996
BCH	*Bulletin de correspondence hellenique*
BEFEO	*Bulletin de l'École française d'Extrême-Orient*
BEH	*Brill Encyclopedia of Hinduism*
CII	*Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum*
CIIr	*Corpus Inscriptionum Iranicarum*
CRAIBL	*Compte rendus de l'Académie des inscriptions et des belles lettre*
EI	*Epigraphia Indica*
CHHP	*Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*
CHLGPh	*Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*
CHSI	*A Concise History of Science in India*
CU	*Chāndogya Upaniṣad.* Si veda Senart 1930 e Olivelle 1996
Diodoro	*Diodore de Sicile. Bibliothèque historique. Tome II. Livre II.* Si veda Bernard Eck (tr. francese e testo greco a fronte)
Diogenes Laertius	Vedi Tiziano Dorandi (per il greco) e Giovanni Reale (per la traduzione)
DN	*Dīgha Nikāya*, Pali Text Society
GEL	*A Greek-English Lexicon.* Vedi Liddell & Scott
IIJ	*Indo-Iranian Journal*
JA	*Journal asiatique*
JIABS	*Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*
JIP	*Journal of Indian Philosophy*
LCL	*The Loeb Classical Library*
MN	*Majjhima Nikāya*, Pali Text Society
Payer	Alois Payer, *Quellenkunde zur indischen Geschichte bis 1858 —* Στράβων: Γεωγραφικά (Fassung vom 2008-04-29)
Quæstio 11/2011	Vedi Lucio del Corso e Ivanoe Privitera
SCO	*Studi classici e orientali*
SN	*Sutta Nipāta*, Pali Text Society
Strabo	*Strabo Geography Books 15-16.* Vedi Horace Leonard Jones. LCL 241. Cambridge, Massachusetts – London, England, Harvard University Press 1930, repr. 2006
T.	*Taishō Daizōkyō.* Takakusu Junjirō et al. Eds. 1924-1935. Taishō shinshū dai zōkyō. Tōkyō: Taishō issaikyō kankōkai
Tōh.	*Tōhoku. A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons (Bkaḥ-ḫgyur and Bstan-ḫgyur).* Edited by H. Ui, M. Suzuki, Y. Kanakura *et al.* 1934. Tōkyō: Tōhoku Imperial University. 2 volumi
Theophrastos	Regenbogen O. In Pauly-Wissowa, *Realenencyclopaedia.* Suppl. 7, col. 1354-1562

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— Figura —

Prajñāpāramitā con un libro nella mano sinistra recante l'iscrizione (1) ‖ *nama prajñāpārami*(2)*tāyā*, «Saluto alla Prajñāpāramitā!» Riprodotta da Oskar von Hinüber «Three New Bronzes from Gilgit». ARIRIAB vol. X, 2007: 39-43, Plate I.

The Second Chapter of the
Abhidharmasamuccayakārikā by Saṅghatrāta

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1. Introductory remarks

The core of this paper is the *editio princeps* of the Dhātusamuccaya (§ 3), namely the second chapter of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya-kārikā*, a compendium of the Abhidharma modelled on Vasu-bandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*, authored by an otherwise unknown Saṃmitīya teacher called Saṅghatrāta. For some details on his work and style, as well as on the *codex unicus* that contains his work, on the story of its discovery, and on its paleographic and codico-logical features, I refer the reader to another paper of mine, which also contains the edition and a tentative annotated translation of the first chapter, the Āyatanasamuccaya (Sferra 2020).

Displaying a typically cryptic wording, the thirty-five *anuṣṭubh* stanzas of the Dhātusamuccaya[1] deal with the following topics: general subdivision of the 18 *dhātu*s (st. 1); the number of *mano-dhātu*s (st. 2); the number of *dhātu*s in each of the spheres of ex-

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[1] As expected, the *pathyā* or 'regular form' is prevalent, but it is worth noting the relatively frequent use of regular extensions: stt. 1c and 12a are *na-vipulā*; stt. 10c, 19a, 27a, 31c and 34c are *ma-vipulā*.

istence (st. 3); the *dhātu*s in each of the spheres of existence (st. 4); the locations of *vijñāna* and the explanation of the compound *vijñānasthiti* (stt. 5–6); the seven abodes of beings and their destinies (stt. 7–8); the intermediate existence (*antarābhava*) (st. 9); the four descents of the foetus into the womb (*garbhāvakrānti*) (st. 10); the four ways of being born/sources (*yoni*) (stt. 11–12ab); *karmabhava* (stt. 12cd–13); the (intermediate) existence (st. 14); the spheres of existence and the aggregates (st. 15); the dependent origination (stt. 16–18); *avidyā* (st. 19); *saṃskāra*; (st. 20); *nāmarūpa* (stt. 21–23); *sparśa* (st. 24); *vedanā, tṛṣṇā, upādāna* (st. 25); *jāti* (st. 26); the 22 *indriya*s (stt. 27–29); their subdivisions (stt. 30–32); the four nourishments (*āhāra*) (stt. 33–34); the death and its causes (st. 35).

In the notes to the text (§ 4) and to the translation, relevant parallels with other Abhidharmic works, and in particular with the third chapter of the *Abhidharmakośa*, are quoted and in some cases briefly discussed.

For the most part, as is generally the case with the *Abhidharmasamuccayakārikā*, the Dhātusamuccaya presents classifications and definitions that match quite well those of the *Abhidharmakośa*, but sometimes differences from Vasubandhu's treatment of the same topics are evident. For instance, in st. 24 Saṅghatrāta defines contact (*sparśa*) as the union of three things (*trayasya saṃghātaḥ*). Even though the text is silent about the items of the triad, these are certainly to be identified with the sense faculty, its object and the relative primary awareness. This viewpoint, shared also by the Sautrāntikas,[2] is implicitly criticised in the *Abhidharmakośa*, which states that the six kinds of contact *arise* from the meeting (of the three) (*sparśāḥ ṣaṭ saṃnipātajāḥ*). In the *Bhāṣya*, Saṅghatrāta's opinion is overtly criticised.[3] Sometimes we find details that are not found in Vasubandhu's work or differences that cannot be easily explained. In st. 4 of the Dhātusamuccaya, for example, it is said that the states of existence in the Rūpadhātu are 15, while according to the *Abhidharmakośa* (3.2ab) they are 17.[4] At present I

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[2] See Tripāṭhī 1990: 218.

[3] See *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ad* 3.30b. For further references, see also de La Vallée Poussin 1971 vol. 2: 95, n. 2, and pp. 96–98.

[4] Cf. also Thích Thiên Châu 1999: 209–211.

am unable to explain the meaning of this difference and cannot exclude that it may depend on a simple transmissional mistake — although paleographically distinct, *paṃcadaśa* and *saptadaśa* are at least metrically equivalent. In this case, and in many others found in the *Abhidharmasamuccayakārikā*, the absence of other manuscripts (the only available manuscript does not even show any signs of corrections!), of any commentary and of a Tibetan or Chinese translation, makes it hard to correct the text or to confirm emendations and conjectures, or even simply to explain all details and provide plausible interpretations in every case.

Most of the transmitted text of the Dhātusamuccaya makes sense, but there are some stanzas of uncertain interpretation. The second quarter of stanza 14 is defective (three *akṣara*s are missing) and *pāda* 33b shows serious metrical problems and is almost certainly corrupt. It can be emended in a metrically satisfactory way only by making a rather big change. When I am unable to fully understand the text or propose sufficiently meaningful corrections, the translation is underlined or suspended. In the latter case three dots within square brackets point out the gap. Unfortunately, this happens especially towards the end of the chapter, where the parallels with the *Abhidharmakośa* are less evident or totally absent.

I had the opportunity to read this chapter on two occasions with a small group of colleagues and friends: once in Mahidol, at the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities (Mahidol University, Salaya Campus, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand, February 2015), and once in Paris, at the École Pratique des Hautes Études (PSL, November 2021). I express my sincere gratitude to the organizers of those seminars and to the participants, who offered useful insights and suggestions, in particular (in alphabetical order): Nalini Balbir, Vincent Eltschinger, Torsten Gerloff, Kengo Harimoto, Harunaga Isaacson, Kei Kataoka, Mattia Salvini, Gregory Max Seton, Peter Skilling, Judit Törzsök, and Vincent Tournier.

I owe special thanks to H. Isaacson and V. Vergiani who have kindly read the last draft of this paper and provided me with useful suggestions and corrections.

2. *Editorial policy*

The text presented here retains some peculiarities of the manu-
script. In particular, the sandhi, both internal and external, and
the orthography have not been standardized, and the dot (•)
inserted by the copyist between *pāda*s c and d of stanza 8 has been
faithfully reproduced. Apart from this, the text has been arranged
in metrical form, the numbers of the stanzas and the foliation
have been inserted between parentheses,[5] and the line-fillers have
not been reproduced.

For this edition, the following sigla and symbols have been
used:

[…]	enclose the foliation of the MS
]	separates the accepted reading, emendations or con-jectures from other readings
(…)	enclose the numbers of the stanzas
<…>	enclose *akṣara*s and *avagraha*s that are absent in the MS
{…}	enclose *akṣara*s that should be cancelled
❂	fleuron/wheel
r	*recto*
v	*verso*

3. *Text*

[2v_2] ṣoḍhā vyavasthitāḥ sarvva āśrayālaṃbanāśritāḥ |
dhātavo 'ṣṭādaśa$^\alpha$ manorūpasaṃmohanaṣṭaye || (1 [35])
ekaṃ viṣayibhāvena mana āyataneṣv iha |
āśrayadvayajatvāt tu dhātavaḥ sapta ṣaḍ manaḥ || (2 [36])
kāmadhātvādiṣu tv ete caturṣv eva hy ato <'>khilāḥ |
caturddaśa trayo [2v_3] <'>ṣṭau ca$^\beta$ kāmarāgādidūṣaṇāt || (3 [37])
kāmadhātur^6 ddaśāvastho$^\gamma$ rūpī paṃcadaśātmakaḥ$^\delta$ |

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catuḥsvabhāva ārūpyo᪳ nirmmalo 'nāsravas tridhā || (4 [38])
vijñānasthitayaḥ sapta᪳ cittābhiratiyogataḥ |
pariggrāhakabhāvena catasraś cittavarjjitāḥ ||᪳ (5 [39])
rūpe hi veditāsvādāt saṃjñābhiḥ sampralo[2v_4]bhitaṃ |
upastabdhaṃ ca saṃskārair vvijñānam avatiṣṭhate || (6 [40])
saptāsaṃjñibhavāggre ca sannivāsābhinandanāt |
satvāvāsā na nirddiṣṭā apāyā duḥkhapīḍanāt ||᪳ (7 [41])
te nārakāḥ satiryyaṃcaḥ pretā devanaraiḥ saha |
gatayo <'>vyākṛtāḥ kecit᪳ • sāsravāḥ skandhasaṃjñitāḥ || (8 [42])
tāsāṃ prāpaka ity uktaḥ paṃca[2v_5]dhaivāntarābhavaḥ⁷ |
gantavyagamanābhāvān nārūpyeṣūpapadyate || (9 [43])
saṃprajānan viśaty āste niryāti ca nireti na |
āste ca mūḍhas sarvvāṇi garbhāvakrāntayas trayāt ||᪳ (10 [44])
catasro⁸ yonayo devā nārakāś caupapādukāḥ |
pretā jarāyujāś cāpi nṛtiryyaṃcaś caturvvidhāḥ ||᪳ (11 [45])
avasthābhedaniyataṃ sāsra[2v_6]vaṃ skandhapaṃcakam |
karmma nāśāntarotpatti bhavākhyaṃ᪳ kṣaṇikaṃ dvayaṃ || (12 [46])
sadhātau vā sabhāgasya kliṣṭāt kliṣṭasya saṃbhavaḥ |
akliṣṭasya tathākliṣṭād bhavānāṃ pratisandhiṣu || (13 [47])
paṃcāṃgaś caturaṃgo vā <+++>bhava iṣyate⁹ |
ekāṃgaś cāpare nāsti yathāyogaṃ bhavatraye || (14 [48])
kāmarūpabhavau paṃcaskandhakau rūpadūṣa[2v_7]ṇāt |
catuskandhaka ārūpyaḥ karmma vā trividhaṃ bhavaḥ || (15 [49])
yaḥ kleśakarmmavastūnāṃ᪳ mohādibhyaḥ samudbhavaḥ |
sa pratītyasamutpādaḥ pratītyotpattilakṣaṇaḥ || (16 [50])
ākṣepo yadbalād yena yathā yasya yad atra ca |
yadbalād yena nirvṛttir yyathāsyāntaś ca yo yathā ||᪳ (17 [51])
triparvvaiṣa dvisandhiś ca dvādaśām[2v_8]gaḥ pravarttakaḥ |
kāryyakāraṇasaṃbandhaḥ sthitaś ca paripūriṇaḥ ||᪳ (18 [52])
dharmmo vipakṣo¹⁰ vidyāyā avidyānye <'>khilā malāḥ |᪳
saṃsṛṣṭatvān na saṃkleśād dhiyo <'>prakhyātilakṣaṇā || (19 [53])
kāyavākcittasaṃskārās sāsravaṃ karmma dṛṣṭayaḥ |
skandhaś caturttha āhārāḥ saṃskārāḥ kṛtakaṃ ca yat || (20 [54])

⁷ *paṃcadhaivā*° em.] *paṃcathaivā*° MS
⁸ *catasro* em.] *catusro* MS
⁹ *Pāda* b is hypometrical. In the manuscript there is no gap between *vā* and *bhava*. See below, n. 45.
¹⁰ *vipakṣo* em.] *vimokṣo* MS

yāvanto 'rū[3*r*₁]piṇo dharmmās tan nāma namanāt kila |⁵
anyan nāmākṣaracchedaḥ saṃjñākarmmasamāśrayaḥ || (21 [55])
rūpaṃ tu varṇṇasaṃsthānaṃ kvacid dṛṣṭyā nirūpaṇāt |ᵗ
rūpadhātuḥ kvacid rūpaṃ śreṣṭharūpasamāśrayāt || (22 [56])
asmin manasikārāntāḥ paṃca nāma vidādayaḥ |
rūpaṃ tu rūpaṇād uktaṃ yat kiṃcit bhūtabhautikam || (23 [57])
sparśas tra[3*r*₂]yasya saṃghātaḥ so <'>dhivākpratighāśrayaḥ¹¹ |ᵘ
vidyāvidyādvayāc¹² ᵠ caikaḥ¹³ paṃcaikaikaṣaḍātmakāḥ || (24 [58])
veditatrayajā tredhā tṛṣṇā paṃcavidhā tataḥ |
rāgaḥ kāmādyupādānam evaṃ karmmabhavīkṛtaṃ || (25 [59])
bhūjalāggnyanilavyomnāṃ¹⁴ sāsravasya ca cetasaḥ |
dhātutvaṃ rūpacaittādijanmasaṃdhāraṇād iti || (26 [60])
ādhyātmikāni [3*r*₃] strīpuṃstve jīvitaṃ paṃca vedanāḥ |
śraddhādīny amalāny evā'jñāsyāmītyādikaṃ trayaṃ ||ˣ (27 [61])
viṣayaggrahaṇārtthena ṣaṇḍhastrīnarabhedataḥ¹⁵ |
saṃtānadhāraṇād āyur ᵠ vvedanāḥ kleśapakṣataḥ¹⁶ || (28 [62])
vimokṣapakṣataḥ paṃca trayaṃ bhūmiviśeṣataḥ |
iṃdriyāṇi matis trīṇi vā kāyāt strīpumindriye ᵚ || (29 [63])
ṣaṭ tri[3*r*₄]dhā kuśalāny aṣṭāv aṣṭāv avyākṛtāni tu |
caturddaśa daśa trīṇi trayodaśa ca dhātuṣu || (30 [64])
aṣṭau na caitasāny eva caitasāni trayodaśa |
ekaṃ tu cittaṃ rūpīṇi sapta^αα karmmākhilāni na || (31 [65])
vā sapta karmmajāny āhur aṣṭau bhāvyāni sarvvathā |
naikam aṣṭa pradeśaś ca ṣaṭ ca labhyāni naiva hi || (32 [66])
gaṃdhādiḥ kabaḍī[3*r*₅]kāraḥ^αβ sāsravaḥ sparśa eva ca¹⁷ |
manaḥsaṃcetanā cittam^αγ ādhārāharaṇād iti || (33 [67])
sarvve kāme trayo rūpe yāvad eke sukhodayam¹⁸ |
ekaḥ parastāt pratyekaṃ vikalpo narakādiṣu || (34 [68])

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¹¹ °*pratighā*° em. Tucci] °*pratiṣā*° MS
¹² *vidyāvidyā*° em. Tucci] *vidyāvidvā*° MS
¹³ *caikaḥ* em.] *caika*° MS
¹⁴ °*anila*° em.] °*atila*° MS
¹⁵ *ṣaṇḍha*° em. Tucci] *ṣaḍve*° MS
¹⁶ °*pakṣataḥ* em.] °*pakṣavaḥ* MS
¹⁷ *sāsravaḥ sparśa eva ca* (or *sparśaś ca sāsravas tathā*) corr. Isaacson] *sāsravaḥ sparśas tathā* MS (*contra metrum*)
¹⁸ *sukhodayam* em.] *sukhodayaḥ* MS

āyuḥkṣayād dhi satvānāṃ cyutiḥ puṇyakṣayād[19] api |
dvayakṣayāt tathānyeṣām anyeṣāṃ nobhayakṣayāt || ❂ || (35 [69])

dhātusamucca[3r_6]yaḥ samāptaḥ || laru || ❂ ||

4. Notes on the text

α   Cf. *Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana* p. 92$_{2-4}$: […] *bhagavatā ā-*
śrayāśritālambanaṣaṭkabhedād aṣṭādaśa dhātavo nirdiṣṭāḥ | ta-
trāśrayaṣaṭkaṃ cakṣurdhātur yāvan manodhātuḥ | āśritaṣaṭkaṃ
cakṣurvijñānadhātur yāvan manovijñānadhātuḥ | ālambana-
ṣaṭkaṃ rūpadhātur yāvad dharmadhātur iti |.

β   Cf. *Abhidharmakośa* 1.30–31: […] *kāmadhātvāptāḥ sarve rūpe*
caturdaśa | vinā gandharasaghrāṇajihvāvijñānadhātubhiḥ || ā-
rūpyāptā manodharmamanovijñānadhātavaḥ | sāsravānāsravā
ete trayaḥ śeṣās tu sāsravāḥ ||; Abhidharmadīpa 1.18: […] iha
sarve 'pi rūpadhātau caturdaśa | rasagandhau savijñānau dhātū
hitvā trayo 'ntimāḥ ||.

γ   Cf. *Abhidharmakośa* 3.1ac: *narakapretatiryañco manuṣyāḥ ṣaḍ*
divaukasaḥ | kāmadhātuḥ […].

δ   Cf. *Abhidharmakośa* 3.2ab: *ūrdhvaṃ saptadaśasthāno rūpadhā-*
tuḥ […].

ε   Cf. *Abhidharmakośa* 3.3ab: *ārūpyadhātur asthāna upapattyā*
caturvidhaḥ |.

ζ   Cf. *Abhidharmakośa* 3.5–6a: *nānātvakāyasaṃjñāś ca nānā-*
kāyaikasaṃjñinaḥ | viparyayāc caikakāyasaṃjñāś cārūpiṇas tra-
yaḥ || vijñānasthitayaḥ sapta.

η   Cf. *Abhidharmakośa* 3.7b–8a: *catasraḥ sthitayaḥ punaḥ | catvā-*
raḥ sāsravāḥ skandhāḥ svabhūmāv eva kevalam || vijñānaṃ na
sthitiḥ proktaṃ.

θ   Cf. *Abhidharmakośa* 3.6cd–7a: *bhavāgrāsaṃjñisattvāś ca sattvā-*
vāsā nava smṛtāḥ || anicchāvasanān nānye.

ι   Cf. *Abhidharmakośa* 3.4ac: *narakādisvanāmoktā gatayaḥ pañca*
teṣu tāḥ | akliṣṭāvyākṛtā eva.

κ   Cf. *Abhidharmakośa* 3.16–17ab: *saṃprajānan viśaty ekas tiṣṭhaty*
apy aparo 'paraḥ | niṣkrāmaty api sarvāṇi mūḍho 'nyo nityam
aṇḍajaḥ || garbhāvakrāntayas tisraś cakravarttisvayaṃbhuvām |.

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[19] *puṇya°* em.] *puṇye* MS

λ   Cf. *Abhidharmakośa* 3.8cd–9: *catasro yonayas tatra sattvānām aṇḍajādayaḥ || caturdhā naratiryañcaḥ nārakā upapādukāḥ | antarābhavadevāś ca pretā api jarāyujāḥ ||.*

μ   Cf. *Abhidharmakośa* 3.24ab: *sa bhaviṣyadbhavaphalaṃ kurute karma tad bhavaḥ |*; and *Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana* p. 146_{3-4}: […] *bhaviṣyattraidhātukabhavaphalaṃ karma bhavaśabdenoktam | bhavaty anenāntaraṃ punarbhava iti bhavaḥ | yathā vahaty aneneti vahaḥ |.*

ν   Cf. *Abhidharmakośa* 3.26ab: *kleśās trīṇi dvayaṃ karma sapta vastu phalaṃ tathā |.*

ξ   Cf. *Abhidharmakośa* 3.19ab: *yathākṣepaṃ kramād vṛddhaḥ santānaḥ* […].

ο   Cf. *Abhidharmakośa* 3.20: *sa pratītyasamutpādo dvādaśāṅgas trikāṇḍakaḥ | pūrvāparāntayor dve dve madhye 'ṣṭau paripūriṇaḥ ||.*

π   Cf. *Abhidharmakośa* 3.28cd: *vidyā vipakṣo dharmo 'nyo 'vidyā'mitrānṛtādivat ||.*

ρ   Cf. *Abhidharmakośa* 3.21a: *pūrvakleśadaśā'vidyā.*

ς   Cf. *Abhidharmakośa* 3.30a: *nāma tv arūpiṇaḥ skandhāḥ.* See also *Bhāṣya ad loc.*: *nāmendriyārthavaśenārtheṣu namatīti nāma | […] iha nikṣipite kāya upapattyantare namanān nāmarūpiṇaḥ skandhā ity apare* (p. 142); and *Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana* p. 120_{3-5}: *kasmāc catvāraḥ skandhā nāmety ucyante? tṛṣṇābhiṣyanditakarmakleśavaśena namanāt, upa{pa}pattyantare* [20] *gamanād ity arthaḥ | rūpādiṣv artheṣu namatīti vā nāma | ālambanākāragrahaṇād iti yo 'rthaḥ |.*

τ   Cf. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ad* $1.10a_1$: **rūpaṃ dvidhā** — *varṇaḥ saṃsthānaṃ ca | tatra varṇaś caturvidho nīlādiḥ | tadbhedā anye | saṃsthānam aṣṭavidhaṃ dīrghādiḥ visātāntam |*; and *Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana* p. 95_9: *rūpaṃ dvidhā | varṇātmakaṃ saṃsthānātmakaṃ ceti |.*

υ   Cf. *Abhidharmakośa* 3.30bd: *sparśāḥ ṣaṭ saṃnipātajāḥ | pañca pratighasaṃsparśaḥ ṣaṣṭho 'dhivacanāhvayaḥ ||.*

φ   Cf. *Abhidharmakośa* 3.31ab: *vidyāvidyetarasparśāḥ amalakliṣṭaśeṣitāḥ |.*

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[20] The correction °*antare* for the reading °*antaraṃ* of the printed edition has been suggested me by H. Isaacson, both because a primary derivative like *gamana* cannot govern the 2nd case (accusative), and because of parallels, for instance in Yaśomitra's *Sphuṭārthā* (*maraṇakāle nikṣipte kāye upapattyantare namanād gamanād arūpiṇo vedanādayaḥ skandhā nāmety ucyante*, p. 468).

χ   Cf. *Abhidharmakośa* 2.3cd–4ab: *jīvitaṃ vedanāḥ pañca śraddhā-dyāś cendriyaṃ matāḥ || ājñāsyāmyākhyam ājñākhyam ājñātāvī-ndriyaṃ tathā |.*

ψ   Cf. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* ad 2.45ab: […] *ya ūṣmaṇo vijñāna-sya cādhārabhūto dharmaḥ sthitihetuḥ tad āyuḥ |.*

ω   Cf. *Abhidharmakośa* 2.2cd: *strītvapuṃstvādhipatyāt tu kāyāt strī-puruṣendriye ||.*

αα   See *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* ad 2.9cd (p. 42): *rūpīṇi punaḥ sapta cakṣuḥśrotraghrāṇajihvākāyastrīpuruṣendiryāṇi rūpaska-ndhasaṃgrahāt |.*

αβ   Cf. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* ad 3.39ab: **kavaḍīkāra āhāraḥ kāme**, *na rūpārūpyadhātvos tadvītarāgasya tatropapatteḥ | sa ca **tryāya-tnātmakaḥ** | kāmāvacarāṇi gandharasaspraṣṭavyāyatanāni sa-rvāṇy va kavaḍīkāra āhāraḥ |.*

αγ   Cf. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* ad 3.40ab: **sparśasañcetanāvijñā āhārāḥ sāsravās triṣu** | *sparśas trikasaṃnipātajaḥ, cetanā mana-skarma vijñānaṃ ca sāsravāṇy evāhārāḥ triṣv api dhātuṣu saṃ-vidyante |.*

5. Tentative translation

1–2. All the eighteen elements (*dhātu*), which are 'supporting basis' (*āśraya*), 'objects' (*ālambana*) and 'that which resorts to' (*āśrita*), are arranged in six ways.[21] In order to destroy delusion with respect to *manas* ('mind') and *rūpa*, among the *āyatana*s, the mind is one in as much as it is the [only] *viṣayin*.[22] Here [among the *dhātu*s], since it arises from two bases [that is to say, the six *indriya*s and their objects], the mind corresponds to seven [or] six *dhātu*s.[23]

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[21] In other words, the three groups contain six items each: six *dhātu*s are the 'supporting basis' (*āśraya*) [= six *indriya*s = six sense faculties/internal *dhātu*s], six are 'objects' (*ālambana*) [= six *rūpādidhātu*s = six corresponding elements/external *dhātu*s], and six are 'that which resorts to' (*āśrita*) [= six *vijñāna*s]. See above, n. α and the passage from the **Mahāvibhāṣaśāstra* quoted in Dhammajoti 2007: 38.

[22] See *Abhidharmasamuccayakārikā* 1.6cd: *manasaḥ sarvam ekasya svakalāpam apāsya vā ||* 'Everything [i.e., the twelve *āyatana*s] is [the object] of the mind alone, or [everything] apart from its own totality.' On this line, see Sferra 2020: 679, nn. 115–116.

[23] That is to say, it is seven in case we count 1 *manas* + 6 *vijñāna*s, or it is six if we count only the *vijñāna*s.

3–4. Therefore,[24] in the four [spheres], that is in Kāmadhātu, etc. [up to the Anāsravadhātu] there are [respectively] all (*akhila*) [*dhātu*s, that is, eighteen in Kāmadhātu], fourteen [in Rūpa-dhātu], three [in Ārūpyadhātu] and eight [in Anāsravadhātu]. Due to the corruption of attachment to desire-objects and so on,[25] the Kāmadhātu is endowed with ten states (*avasthā*).[26] The Rūpin [= Rūpadhātu] is made of <u>fifteen</u>.[27] The Ārūpya[dhātu] is four-fold.[28] The Anāsrava[dhātu] is pure in three ways.[29]

5. The locations of *vijñāna* (*vijñānasthiti*) are [properly speaking only] seven,[30] since [in them] there is mental delight (*cittābhirati*).[31] There are four [further locations], apart from the mind,[32] since [in them] there is the perceiver (*parigrāhaka*).

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[24] I take the particle *hi* as a filler to avoid the sandhi between *eva* and *ataḥ*.

[25] See above, n. β. Assuming that the explanation of the *Abhidharmakośa* can be applied here, we have the following scheme: in Kāmadhātu all 18 *dhātu*s; in Rūpadhātu 14 *dhātu*s (*gandhadhātu / rasa° / ghrāṇavijñāna° / jihvāvijñāna°* are absent); in Ārūpyadhātu only 3 *dhātu*s, namely *manodhātu / dharma° / manovijñā-na°*. The reference to the 8 *dhātu*s of the uncontaminated realm (*anāsravadhātu*) is not clear to me. Does it mean that there there are only the 6 pure *indriya*s + *manodhātu* and *dharmadhātu*?

[26] See above, n. γ. This number coincides with the taxonomy of the Sarvā-stivādins and of some Theravāda sources (e.g. *Kathāvatthu* 8.1, ed. pp. 360–361); in other words, also for the Saṃmitīyas — or at least for some of them — the *asura*s are not counted as a separate destiny, pace Thích Thiên Châu 1999: 203. L. de La Vallée Poussin (1971 vol. 2: 1) refers to a passage of the *Atthasālinī* (62) where indeed the *asura*s are counted as a separate destiny.

The emendation *kāmadhātur* instead of *kāmadhātor* is the easiest; another possible emendation might be *kāmadhātor ddaśāvasthā[ḥ]* ('There are ten states of the Kāmadhātu'). However, even though this is grammatically and metrically possible, it is stylistically less probable given that here the other phrases in the sentence are all nominative clauses where each of the realms is qualified by a bahuvrīhi.

[27] See above, § 1 and n. δ.

[28] See above, n. ε. The Ārūpyadhātu contains: 1) *ākāśānantyāyatana*, 2) *vijñā-nānantyāyatana*, 3) *ākiṃcanyāyatana*, and 4) *naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana* (a.k.a. *bhavāgra*); see de La Vallée Poussin 1971 vol. 2: 5.

[29] Perhaps this refers to the three categories of unconditioned *dharma*s: *prati-saṃkhyānirodha*, *apratisaṃkhyānirodha*, and *ākāśa*.

[30] See above, n. ζ. The list usually includes: 1) *nānātvakāyasaṃjñāḥ*, 2) *nānākā-yaikasaṃjñinaḥ*, 3) *ekakāyanānāsaṃjñinaḥ*, 4) *ekakāyasaṃjñāḥ*, 5–7) *arūpiṇas trayaḥ*.

[31] In the *naraka*s there is no delight, and this is the reason why they are not properly called locations. See also below, st. 7cd.

[32] See above, n. η and, e.g., *Saṅgītisuttanta* 1.11.18 (= *Dīgha Nikāya* vol. 3, p. 228). For further references, see de La Vallée Poussin 1971 vol. 2: 23–25. Yaśo-mitra in the *Sphuṭārthā* points out that form/colour and feelings correspond to

6. [These are called *vijñānasthiti*] since *vijñāna* abides (*vijñānam avatiṣṭhate*) in *rūpa* due to the tasting of feelings, allured by notions and supported by the *saṃskāra*s.

7. The seven abodes of beings (*sattvāvāsa*)[, namely the five destinies] and the [further two, i.e.] unconscious beings and the *bhavāgra*, are [called abodes] since [in them] there is a real delight for the abode. The bad [destinies] (*apāya*) are not described [as abodes] since [in them] there is the affliction of pain.[33]

8. These, i.e. 1) the beings who live in the hells, together with 2) the animals, 3) the *preta*s, together with 4) gods and 5) men are the destinies (*gati*) that are non-defined (*avyākṛta*).[34] Some [believe that the destinies that are] endowed with *āsrava*s are called [*upādāna*]*skandha*s.[35]

9. The intermediate existence (*antarābhava*) is said to be that which in five ways[36] makes these [destinies] to be attained (*prāpaka*). [The *antarābhava*] is not admitted with regard to those who belong to the Ārūpya[dhātu] since [in that sphere] there is neither something that should be reached (*gantavya*) [= the future aggregates] nor going (*gamana*) [= no *saṃkrānti* of the past aggregates].[37]

10. [The first being] enters [the womb] while being fully aware (*saṃprajānan viśati*), [the second] enters and lives [being fully aware] (*saṃprajānan viśaty āste*), [the third] enters, lives and dies [being fully aware] (*saṃprajānan viśaty āste niryāti ca*), whereas [the fourth] enters, does not go out [of transmigration] and persists [in it] (*na nireti, āste ca*) [performing] all [these actions] while

Kāmadhātu, *vijñāna*[*skandha*] and notions to Rūpadhātu, and the *saṃskāra*s to Ārūpyadhātu: *catasro vijñānasthitayaḥ rūpopagā vijñānasthitiḥ kāmadhātuḥ vedanopagā catvāri dhyānāni sañjñopagā traya ārūpyāḥ saṃskāropagā bhavāgraṃ tāsu cataṣṛṣu vijñānasthitiṣu pratiṣṭhitaṃ vijñānaṃ* (p. 69).

[33] See above, n. θ.

[34] See above, n. ι.

[35] It is not clear to me who the text refers to here.

[36] This reference is not completely clear to me. Are the five ways a reference to the five aggregates? Or perhaps this means simply that there are five *antarābhava*s, one for each *gati*?

[37] See also Thích Thiên Châu 1999: 207.

being confused.³⁸ The [four] descents of the foetus into the womb (*garbhāvakrānti*) are from three [conditions].³⁹

11–12ab. Four are the ways of being born (*yoni*): deities and beings who live in the hells are self-produced; the *preta*s are viviparous; human beings and animals, in their turn, are fourfold.⁴⁰ The five aggregates (*skandha*) endowed with impurities (*sāsrava*) are limited by the distinction of the states.⁴¹

12cd–13. [The] action (*karman*) by means of which there is an intermediate (*antarā*) origination [after] the destruction [= *maraṇa*] is called 'becoming' (*bhava*);⁴² [this action] is instantaneous [and] twofold: [namely, it occurs in a different sphere of existence] or in the same sphere of existence.⁴³ At the junctures

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³⁸ The reference here is probably to the Cakravartin, the Pratyekabuddha, the Sambuddha, and the Pṛthagjana (see above, n. κ and *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ad* st. 3.17b, p. 128: *tatra prathamā cakravarttinaḥ | sa hi praviśaty eva samprajānan na tiṣṭhati nāpi niṣkrāmati | pratyekabuddhas tiṣṭhaty api | buddho niṣkrāmaty api |*). The four descents of the foetus into the womb (*garbhāvakrānti*) can be summarized in this way: 1) *samprajānan viśati = cakravartin*; 2) *samprajānan viśaty āste = pratyekabuddha*; 3) *samprajānan viśaty āste niryāti ca = sambuddha*; 4) *mūḍho viśati na nireti āste ca = pṛthagjana*. See also *Sampasādanīyasuttanta* 5 (= *Dīgha Nikāya* vol. 3, p. 103) and *Saṅgītisuttanta* 1.11.37 (= *Dīgha Nikāya* vol. 3, p. 231). In this sentence, the word *sarvāṇi* is rendered 'all [these actions]' on the basis of *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ad* st. 3.16cd, p. 128: *kaścit punaḥ **sarvāṇy** evāsamprajānan karoti, praviśaty asamprajānan tiṣṭhati niṣkrāmaty api |*.

³⁹ That is, a healthy and fertile mother, the union of the father and the mother, and the presence of a *gandharva* (= an *antarābhava* being). See the quote at the beginning of *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ad* st. 3.12c (p. 121): *trayāṇāṃ sthānānāṃ sammukhībhāvāt mātuḥ kukṣau garbhasyāvakrāntir bhavati | mātā kalyāpi bhavati ṛtumatī ca | mātāpitarau raktau bhavataḥ samnipatitau ca | gandharvaś ca pratyupasthito bhavatīti |*. See also Kritzer 2014, in particular pp. 39–40. For further references, see de La Vallée Poussin 1971 vol. 2: 37.

⁴⁰ In other words, human beings and animals can be self-produced (*upapāduka, aupapāduka*), viviparous (*jarāyuja*), oviparous (*aṇḍaja*), or born from sweat (*svedaja*) (see above, n. λ). Some instances of the four originations for human beings are given in *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ad* 3.9a (p. 119); see also de La Vallée Poussin 1971 vol. 2: 28. The basic classification expressed in this verse is common also in non-Buddhist sources (e.g., *Suśrutasaṃhitā* 1.1.30 [ed. p. 5], *Manusmṛti* 1.42–45 [ed. p. 38], *Śivadharmottara* 8.2–5 [ed. p. 246]).

⁴¹ This statement is not completely clear to me. I assume that here the states correspond to the destinies, but I am not sure.

⁴² See above, n. μ. On *karmabhava* and *antarābhava*, see also *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ad* 3.4cd.

⁴³ Here the text is probably correct, but I am not sure if my translation catches the point.

between one life and another[44] there is the arising [of *dharma*s] of the same kind (*sabhāga*) [as those of the previous existence]: (the arising) of defiled [*dharma*s] derives from defiled [*dharma*s] as well as [the arising] of undefiled [*dharma*s] derives from undefiled [*dharma*s].

14. It is admitted that (the intermediate) existence (*bhava*) <u>possesses five limbs or four limbs and that it has one limb in due order</u>. Others [believe that] there is no [(intermediate) existence] in the three [spheres] of existence.[45]

15. The two states of existence of Kāma and Rūpa have five aggregates.[46] The Ārūpya [state of existence] has only four aggregates

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[44] In other words, when one takes rebirth.

[45] The text is quite cryptic, and my interpretation, which among other things takes *yathāyogaṃ* as *bhinnakrama*, is very tentative. In the manuscript, *pāda* b is hypometrical. At present I am unable to find parallels for this verse that might help us to fill the gap. Of course, the three missing syllables could be restored in many ways. In his unpublished transliteration of the work, Tucci corrected the text into *tridvyaṃgo bhava* (for information on Tucci's copy, see Sferra 2020: 650–652). Other metrically acceptable possibilities could be words like *keṣāṃcid* (Isaacson's suggestion) or phrases such as *ihaiva* or *atraiva*. It is also possible that, after the description of the destinies (st. 8) and of the *karmabhava* (st. 12cd) that is their first cause, the text deals again with the *antarābhava* (already described in st. 9), the second cause of the destinies, in a way that is obscure to me. In fact, according to a scriptural passage quoted and commented on in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ad* 3.4cd, which does not contradict the viewpoints of the Saṃmitīyas, the 'states of existence' (*bhava*) are, *lato sensu*, seven: five destinies and two causes: *sapta bhavā narakabhavas tiryagbhavaḥ pretabhavo devabhavo manuṣyabhavaḥ karmabhavo 'ntarābhava iti | atra hi pañca gatayaḥ sahetukāḥ sahāgamanāś coktāḥ |* (p. 114, see also p. 121). This interpretation, which assumes that the gap should be filled with *antarā°* (giving rise to the hiatus *vā antarābhava*), is reflected in the translation by the use of the word 'intermediate' between parentheses. This interpretation would fit the statement that others do not accept the existence of the *antarābhava* in any of the spheres of existence, a position that was held by several Buddhist (and non-Buddhist) traditions (for some references, see de La Vallée Poussin 1971 vol. 2: 32, n. 1). However, it should be noted that the hiatus between the odd and even *pāda*s, albeit not impossible, is quite rare in the *Abhidharmasamuccayakārikā* (in 547 *anuṣṭubh*s it occurs only three times: stt. 159cd, 191cd, 539cd).

[46] Note that the spelling *catuskandha* for the expected *catuḥskandha* is attested in Abhidharmic literature (see, e.g., *Abhidharmakośa* 8.2c, *Abhidharmadīpavṛtti*, pp. 93, 139, 218).

since the *rūpa*[*skandha*] is negated [there]. Alternatively, the state of existence means the threefold action.[47]

16. The production of defilements (*kleśa*), actions (*karman*) and things (*vastu*)[48] due to delusion (*moha = avidyā*) and so on is the dependent origination, which is characterized by the arising of elements in causal succession.

17–18. The one by force of which, through which, in accordance with which, of which [...],[49] there is the projection [i.e. the projecting cause] (*ākṣepa*) [of the series in regular order (*anuloma*)];[50] the one by force of which, through which, in accordance with which, and of which there is the cessation (*nirvṛtti*)[51] [of the series in reverse order (*pratiloma*)] and that, accordingly (*yathā*), is the end [of suffering], this (*eṣa*) is [the *pratītyasamutpāda*, which is] endowed with three divisions (*triparvan*),[52] two conjunctions (*dvisandhi*),[53] [and] twelve limbs, which is the active force (*pravarttaka*), in which there is the connection between effect and cause and which is [fully] established for the one who accomplishes [the whole series] (*paripūrin*).[54]

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[47] Again, the text is unclear to me. Perhaps this is an alternative definition of *karmabhava*. The threefoldness might refer to several sets of three items: e.g. *kliṣṭa/akliṣṭa/avyākṛta, kāya/vāk/citta, dṛṣṭadharmavedanīya/upapadyavedanīya/aparaparyāyavedanīya* (cf. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ad* 4.50a–c: *niyatāniyataṃ tac ca niyataṃ trividhaṃ punaḥ | dṛṣṭadharmādivedyatvāt*).

[48] The threefold division of the twelve limbs of the *pratītyasamutpāda* is also mentioned in the *Abhidharmakośa* (see above, n. v) and is described in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (*ad* 3.26ab, p. 134), where it is explained that three limbs belong to *kleśa* (*avidyā, tṛṣṇā, upādāna*), two to *karma* (*saṃskāra, bhava*), and seven to *vastu* (*vijñāna, nāmarūpa, ṣaḍāyatana, sparśa, vedanā, jāti, jarāmaraṇa*).

[49] The words *yad atra ca* (lit. 'and that which is here') are obscure and probably corrupt.

[50] See above, n. ξ.

[51] Here the reading *nirvṛttir* (lit. 'production, development,' etc.) is possibly *metri causa* for *nivṛttir* or *nirvṛtir*.

[52] Saṅghatrāta is probably referring to the same division mentioned in *Abhidharmakośa* 3.20 (see above, n. o) and briefly explained in the *Bhāṣya* therein (*avidyā saṃskārāś ca pūrvānte jātir jarāmaraṇaṃ cāparānte | śeṣāṇy aṣṭau madhye|*, p. 131). In other words, two limbs belong to the past time (*avidyā, saṃskāra*), two to the future time (*jāti, jarāmaraṇa*), and eight to the present time (*nāmarūpa, sparśa, tṛṣṇā, vedanā, ṣaḍāyatana, vijñāna, upādāna, bhava*).

[53] Namely, those between past and present and between present and future.

[54] See *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya avataraṇikā* of 3.20d2: *kiṃ punar etāny aṣṭāṅgāni sarvasyāṃ jātau bhavanti | nety āha | kasya tarhi — **paripūriṇaḥ** ||*.

19. Nescience is a *dharma* that is the antagonist of wisdom (*vidyā*).[55] [It is] all the other impurities [of the previous lives].[56] [*Avidyā*] is characterized by a lack of knowledge (*aprakhyāti*) that does not derive [only] by defilements (*saṃkleśa*), since the mind is joined [also with *vastu*].[57]

20. The *saṃskāra*s of body, speech and mind,[58] the defiled action, the [wrong] view-points (*dṛṣṭi*), the fourth *skandha*, the [four] 'nourishments' (*āhāra*)[59] and what[ever] is conditioned (*kṛtaka*): [these] are the conditioning factors.

21. The immaterial *dharma*s, as many as they are, are generally held to be (*kila*)[60] *nāma*, due to [their] bowing (*namanāt*) [to-

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[55] See above, n. π.

[56] See above, n. ρ. Alternatively, 'Others [believe that *avidyā* is] all the [past] impurities [collectively considered].'

[57] Namely, with *vijñāna, nāmarūpa*, etc. (see above, n. 48). Cf. also *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ad* 3.27: *yasmād eṣa nayo vyavasthito bhavāṅgānāṃ tasmād avidyāpi kleśasvabhāvā vastunaḥ kleśād veti jñāpitaṃ bhavati* | (p. 135). Alternatively, but less likely, 'All the other impurities, since they are produced [by *avidyā*], are not due to a defilement of the mind. [*Avidyā*] is a lack of knowledge.'

[58] See *Arthaviniścayasūtra* (pp. 7–8): *avidyāpratyayāḥ saṃskārā iti* | *saṃskārāḥ katame? trayaḥ saṃskārāḥ — kāyasaṃskāraḥ vāksaṃskāraḥ manaḥsaṃskāraś ca* | *tatra kāyasaṃskāraḥ katamaḥ? āśvāsaḥ praśvāsaḥ* | *kāyiko hy eṣa dharmaḥ, kāyaniśritaḥ kāyapratibaddhaḥ, kāyaṃ niśritya vartate* | *tasmād āśvāsapraśvāsāḥ kāyasaṃskāra ity ucyate* || *vāksaṃskāraḥ katamaḥ? vitarkayitvā vicārayitvā vācaṃ bhāṣate, nāvitarkayitvā, nāvicārya* | *tasmād vitarkavicāro vāksaṃskāra ity ucyate* || *manaḥsaṃskāraḥ katamaḥ? raktasya yā cetanā, cittasya ca, tenāsya yā cetanā* | *caitasiko hy eṣa dharmaḥ, cittaniśritaḥ cittapratibaddhaḥ* | *cittaṃ niśritya pravartate* | *tasmāc cetanā manaḥsaṃskāra ity ucyate* ||.

[59] That is to say, usual food (*kavaḍīkārāhāra*), contact (*sparśa*), mental volition (*manaḥsañcetanā*), and consciousness (*vijñāna*) (see also below, st. 33). On the four nourishments, see, e.g., *Abhidharmakośa* 3.38d–40ab, *Saṅgītisuttanta* 1.11.17 (= *Dīgha Nikāya* vol. 3, p. 228) and the *Āhāravagga* of the *Samyuttanikāya* (vol. 2, pp. 11–27). For further references and some information, see Verpoorten 2011.

[60] It seems that here the particle *kila* is used in order to mark a preliminary, more general interpretation of *nāma* (st. 21) and *rūpa* (st. 22), later followed by a specific explanation of both (st. 23). The use of *kila* to refer to something generally or traditionally accepted, which is duly recorded in Emeneau (1969: 244–248) but does not fully matches any of the categories detected for this particle by van Daalen 1988 (it could only be partially associated with his category A), diverges from the prevalent way this word is used by Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmakośa* and its *Bhāṣya*. There seems to be only one place in the *Bhāṣya* (*vālāgramātraṃ kila* […], *ad* 1.44ab) where, according to Yaśomitra, *kila* could be interpreted in a similar way (*āgamasūcanārthaḥ kilaśabdaḥ*, p. 124). In all the other

wards the objects].[61] The other *nāma* [i.e. the one in the list of the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*s] is the distinction of syllables[, etc.], i.e. the basis for the functioning of notion (*saṃjñā*).

22. In its turn, *rūpa* is colour and configuration (*varṇasaṃsthāna*)[62] in some context [= when it is referred to as an *āyatana*], for the examination (*nirūpaṇa*) [of the object] is performed by the sight (*dṛṣṭi*); in another context *rūpa* is the *rūpadhātu*, since it is the support of a higher [type of] *rūpa* [= pure forms].

23. In this (*asmin*) [case, that is to say, in the series of the *pratītyasamutpāda*] *nāma* is the five[63] [*skandha*s] beginning with feeling (*vid*) and ending with primary awareness (*manasikāra*).[64] In its turn, *rūpa*, which is called [in this way] because of its becoming broken (*rūpaṇāt*),[65] is whatever is *bhūta* and *bhautika*.[66]

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cases, Yaśomitra points out that by means of *kila* Vasubandhu introduces others' viewpoints (just to quote a couple of instances, see *kilaśabdaḥ paramatadyotanārthaḥ, Sphuṭārthā ad* 1.28b, p. 77; *kilaśabdo vaibhāṣikavyākhyānapradarśanārthaḥ svamataṃ tu yat tat paścād ucyate,* ibid.), viewpoints that he does not accept uncritically but rather regards with some mental reservation or dislike (*kilaśabdena aruciṃ sūcayati, Sphuṭārthā* p. 124) (see also de La Vallée Poussin 1971 vol. 1: 94, n. 2). The latter use is not uncommon in śāstric literature (see. e.g., Kamalaśīla's commentary on *Tattvasaṃgraha* 2351d: *kilaśabdo 'rucisūcakaḥ,* and, as V. Vergiani kindly pointed out to me, Helārāja's gloss on *Vākyapadīya* 3.7.70: *kila ity asmin pakṣe 'ruciṃ sūcayati,* ed. p. 287₄₋₅).

[61] See above, n. ς. See also de La Vallée Poussin 1971 vol. 2: 94–95.

[62] See above, n. τ.

[63] The word *paṃca* is certainly corrupt. Instead of 'five,' one would expect 'four' or a word expressing the number four, referring only to the four immaterial aggregates (see *Arthaviniścayasūtra* pp. 8–9: *kataman nāma? catvāro 'rūpiṇaḥ skandhāḥ | katame catvāraḥ? vedanāskandhaḥ, saṃjñāskandhaḥ, saṃskāraskandhaḥ, vijñānaskandhaḥ | idaṃ nāma |*). A word that could match the context and would also be suitable for the metre is *skaṃdhā[ḥ] / skandhā[ḥ]*. From the paleographic point of view, though, it would still be hard to explain the scribal error.

[64] I assume that in this context *manasikāra* and *vijñāna* are synonyms. This is unusual, however, since *manasikāra* is sometimes described as one of the five conditions for the arising of *vijñāna*. See, for instance *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (p. 225): […] *pañcabhiḥ kāraṇais cakṣurvijñānam utpadyate | katamaiḥ pañcabhiḥ | cakṣuś ca pratītya rūpaṃ cālokaṃ cākāśaṃ tajjaṃ ca manasikāraṃ ca pratītyotpadyate cakṣurvijñānam | […] evaṃ śeṣāṇām indriyāṇāṃ yathāyogaṃ kartavyam ||*.

[65] Saṅghatrāta refers here to a relatively common etymology of the word *rūpa.* See, e.g., *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ad* 1.13d: *kasmāt punar ayam avijñaptiparyanto rūpaskandha ity ucyate | rūpaṇāt | uktaṃ bhagavatā — rūpyate rūpyata iti bhikṣavas tasmād rūpopādānaskandha ity ucyate | kena rūpyate | pāṇisparśenāpi spṛṣṭo rūpyata iti vistaraḥ | rūpyate bādhyata ity arthaḥ | […]* (p. 9). Cf. also *Sphuṭārthā avataraṇikā ad* 4.4ab: *rūpyata iti rūpalakṣaṇam* (p. 579); *Guṇabharaṇī* (p. 87): *rūpyate bādhyate iti*

24. Contact (*sparśa*) is the coming together of the three[, namely of *indriya*, *viṣaya* and *vijñāna*];[67] it is the basis for denomination [i.e. mental contact] (*adhivāc = adhivacana*) and for the [five] 'oppositions' (*pratigha*)[, namely, *cakṣuḥsparśa* and so on]. Due to *vidyā*, due to *avidyā* and due to the absence of the two [i.e. neither *vidyā* nor *avidyā*],[68] it becomes one, made of five, one, one, six.[69]

25. Born from the three feelings,[70] thirst is threefold.[71] From that, attachment derives in five ways,[72] that is to say, clinging to the objects of desire, etc. (*kāmādyupādāna*),[73] which in this way becomes action (*karmabhava*).

26. Earth, water, fire, wind, and space, as well as the defiled mind are elements (*dhātu*), since they support (*saṃ-dhṛ-*) the birth (*janman = jāti*) of *rūpa* and of the mental factors, etc.

27. The internal [*indriya*s are:] Strīndriya, Pumindriya, Jīvitendriya, the five feelings [i.e. *duḥkhendriya*, etc.],[74] Amal[endri-

rūpam; *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti ad* Pratyakṣapariccheda 215: *viṣayatayā kiñcin nirdiśyate yathā rūpyata iti kṛtvā rūpam*.

[66] See *Arthaviniścayasūtra* p. 9: *rūpaṃ katamat | yat kiñcid rūpam, sarvaṃ tac catvāri mahābhūtāni catvāri ca mahābhūtāny upādāya | katamāni catvāri ? tad yathā — pṛthivīdhātuḥ, abdhātuḥ, tejodhātuḥ, vāyudhātuś ca |* (the same words occur in Vasubandhu's *Pañcaskandhaka* p. 1).

[67] See above, n. υ and § 1.

[68] See above, n. φ.

[69] Here the text is most probably corrupt. In this context, i.e. considering *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ad* 3.31a (**vidyāvidyetarasparśāḥ** — *vidyāsaṃsparśo 'vidyāsaṃsparśaḥ, tābhyāṃ cānyo naivavidyānāvidyāsaṃsparśa iti |*, p. 144) and *ad* 3.32ab (**tajjāḥ ṣaḍ vedanāḥ** — *cakṣuḥsaṃsparśajā vedanā śrotraghrāṇajihvākāyamanaḥ saṃsparśajā vedanāḥ | tāsāṃ punaḥ **pañca kāyikī caitasī parā** — cakṣuḥśrotraghrāṇajihvākāyasaṃsparśajāḥ pañca vedanāḥ kāyikī vedanety ucyate, rūpīndriyāśritatvāt | manaḥsaṃsparśajā punar vedanā caitasikīty ucyate, cittamātrāśritatvāt |*, pp. 144–145), we would have expected a reading such as *vidyāvidyetarāt tredhā pañcaivaikā ṣaḍātmakāḥ*, 'Due to wisdom, ignorance and the other, [contact becomes] in three ways[, i.e. *vidyāsaṃsparśa*, etc.] [Born from contact,] there are six [feelings (*vedanā*)]: five [bodily and] one [mental].'

[70] Namely, pleasant, unpleasant, and neither-pleasant-nor-unpleasant. See *Arthaviniścayasūtra* p. 10: *vedanā katamā […] sukhā, duḥkhā, aduḥkhāsukhā ca*.

[71] That is, probably, *kāmatṛṣṇā, bhavatṛṣṇā*, and *vibhavatṛṣṇā*.

[72] Possibily because it is connected with the five objects of desire.

[73] Namely, *kāma, dṛṣṭi, śīlavrata* and *ātmavāda*. See *Arthaviniścayasūtra* p. 10: *tṛṣṇāpratyayam upādānam | upādānaṃ katamat ? catvāri upādānāni | katamāni catvāri ? kāmopādānam, dṛṣṭyupādānam, śīlavratopādānam, ātmavādopādānam |*.

[74] Cf. de La Vallée Poussin 1071: vol. 1, p. 105.

y]as,[75] that is to say *śraddh*[*endriya*]*,* etc., and the triad starting with
ajñāsyāmīndriya.[76]

28. [The external *indriya*s, i.e. *cakṣus,* etc.] are [*indriya*s] due to
the perception of the objects; [the internal *indriya*s are *indriya*s
due to] the distinction between *ṣaṇḍha, strī* and *puṃs* [in the case
of *strīndriya,* etc.]; *āyur* [= *jīvitendriya*] is [an *indriya*] due to main-
taining the continuum (*santāna*);[77] the feelings are [*indriya*s]
because they are on the side of the defilements;

29. the five [*śraddhendriya,* etc. are *indriya*s], because they are on
the side of liberation (*vimokṣa*); the three [*ajñāsyāmīndriya,* etc.]
are [*indriya*s] due to specific levels; alternatively the three *indriya*s
[= *ajñāsyāmīndriya,* etc.] are the mind (*mati*). [Since they are sove-
reign with respect to femininity and masculinity,] the two sexual
organs, female and male ones, [are *indriya*s distinct] from
Touch.[78]

30. [Of these 22 *indriya*s,][79] six are in three ways, eight are *kuśala,*
while eight are *avyākṛta.*[80] Fourteen, ten, three and thirteen are in
the *dhātu*s.[81]

31. [Of these 22 *indriya*s,] eight are not-mental factors; thirteen
are mental factors. One is the mind, seven are material (*rūpin*);[82]
none is *karman.*

32. Alternatively, it has been said that seven arise from the *karman*;
eight have to be meditated upon in every way. […]

[75] Cf. *Abhidharmakośa* 2.9b.
[76] See above, n. χ.
[77] See above, n. ψ.
[78] See above, n. ω.
[79] The 22 *indriya*s are listed in *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ad* 1.48 (p. 37). They can
be divided in five groups: 1) *cakṣurindriya, śrotrendriya, ghrāṇendriya, jihvendriya,
kāyendriya, mana-indriya,* 2) *strīndriya, puruṣendriya, jīvitendriya,* 3) *sukhendriya,
duḥkhendriya, saumanasyendriya, daurmanasyendriya, upekṣendriya,* 4) *śraddhendriya,
vīryendriya, smṛtīndriya, samādhīndriya, prajñendriya,* 5) *anājñātamājñāsyāmīndriya,
ājñendriya, ājñātāvīndriya.*
[80] This probably means that the six external *indriya*s (*cakṣurindriya,* etc.) are
kuśala, akuśala and *avyākṛta;* that *strīndriya,* etc. and the feelings are *avyākṛta;* and
that *śraddhendriya,* etc. and *anājñātamājñāsyāmīndriya,* etc. are *kuśala.*
[81] These numbers do not match those given in *Abhidharmakośa* 2.12.
[82] See above, n. αα.

33. Usual food, which is endowed with smell,[83] etc., defiled contact, as well as [defiled] mental volition, and [defiled][84] consciousness (*citta* = *vijñāna*) [, all are nourishment (*āhāra*)] since they provide (*āharaṇāt*) a basis [for the maintenance of life].[85]

34. Some (*eke*) [believe that] all [four nourishments] are in Kāma[dhātu], [but only] three in the Rūpa[dhātu][86] <u>until there is the arising of happiness [i.e. the attainment of *nirvāṇa* (?)]. One is afterwards for every single one. Conceptualization is in the hells, etc.</u>

35. Indeed, for beings, death (*cyuti* = *maraṇa*) results [only] from the destruction of life-force [or] from also the destruction of merit. For other [beings, death] results from the destruction of both, and for others, [it] does not result from the destruction of both.[87]

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[83] See above, n. αβ.

[84] See above, n. αγ. The qualification 'defiled' is because the last three nourishments could also be undefiled as Yaśomitra points out: *kavaḍīkārāhāras tryāyatanātmakatvāt sāsrava iti siddhaḥ | trayas tu sparśādayaḥ sāsravā anāsravāś ca sambhavantīty atas ta eva viśeṣitāḥ* (p. 494).

[85] With regard to the last three nourishments, Vasubandhu clarifies that *yāny api tu nābhyavahriyante, sthitiṃ cāharanti, tāny api sūkṣma āhāraḥ |* (p. 152).

[86] According to *Abhidharmakośa* 3.39ab, 40ab, the usual food is only in the Kamadhātu, whereas the other three nourishments are in all three *dhātu*s. See the following words of the *Bhāṣya*: *na rūpārūpyadhātvos tadvītarāgasya tatropapatteḥ | [...] cetanā manaskarma vijñānaṃ ca sāsravāny evāhāras triṣv api dhātuṣu saṃvidyante |* (pp. 152, 153).

[87] Here, the reference is most probably to the four alternatives mentioned in a passage from the *Prajñapti[śāstra]* quoted in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣaya ad* 2.45ab or to a similar list: *atha kim āyuḥkṣayād eva maraṇaṃ bhavaty āhosvid anyathāpi | prajñaptāv uktam — āyuḥkṣayān maraṇaṃ, na puṇyakṣayād iti | catuṣkoṭiḥ — prathamā koṭir āyurvipākasya karmaṇaḥ paryādānāt | dvitīyā bhogavipākasya | tṛtīyobhayoḥ | caturthī viṣamāparihāreṇa |* (p. 74). The same passage is quoted in Saṅghabhadra's **Nyāyānusāra* (see Cox 1995: 293) and in *Abhidharmadīpavṛtti ad* st. 138 (p. 102).

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Abhidharmadīpavṛtti
See *Abhidharmadīpa*.

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Ecce yoga. Il miraggio del nome, il fantasma della salute e la concomitanza delle 'cose' qualsiasi

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1. *Ecce yoga?* [1]

Per i cronisti della storia della parola sanscrita *yoga* la data del 21 giugno 2015 occupa un posto d'importanza capitale. Quel giorno l'intera superficie del globo terraqueo assisteva a un evento senza precedenti, una vera e propria epifania in mondo-visione: *ecce yoga!* era il *mantra* audio-visuale che invadeva le luminose superfici di un incalcolabile numero di schermi al LED, sui quali apparivano folle acclamanti, vogliose di inneggiare al miraggio della 'cosa' chiamata *yoga*. Schiere infinite di adepti zelanti e *followers* levavano

[1] In quanto segue intreccerò il senso indessicale ed enunciativo dell'adagio latino *ecce homo* —che trasla quanto si crede fu detto da Pilato per indicare, introdurre e tradire il Gesù fustigato (*Giovanni*, 19.5 [Ἰδοὺ ὁ ἄνθρωπος]; *Giovanni*, 1.29; 1.34-36)—, con quello segnatamente polemico del celebre scritto 'autobiografico' dell'ultimo Nietzsche (ossia *Ecce homo. Wie man wird, was man ist*, 1888, cfr. More 2014), in cui questi metteva a tema l'ossessione del fissare in immagini statiche la dinamica del procedere vitale, denunciando, con ciò, il patologico ricorso all'ideale, idolatrico, dell'idolo ideale. Per questa scelta —che si appaia a quella degli altri titoli dei paragrafi— e per la 'forma' di questo mio contributo, chiedo venia a Raffaele, che so non essere amante di siffatti stili e registri. Il mio auspicio, però, è che la 'sostanza' gli appaia comunque gradita.

al cielo odi di gloria e ripetevano, in tutte le lingue del mondo, quel medesimo annuncio. Un annuncio chiaramente salvifico, la cui articolazione pareva però ricalcare —alla stregua di un plagio sarcastico o di una *cover* profana— il dettato della celebre proclamazione giovannea: 'ecco lo *yoga*, l'agnello di Śiva che toglie i peccati del mondo'.

Emblematiche, a proposito di proclami, le parole pronunciate quel giorno da Narendra Modī durante il solenne e trionfale discorso d'apertura delle celebrazioni per la prima edizione mondiale dell'International Day of Yoga, tenuto nell'aula magna del Vigyan Bhavan di Delhi di fronte a una vasta *audience* internazionale. Parole reputate 'autorevoli' non solo poiché uscivano dalla bocca del *pradhānamantrī* ('Primo ministro')[2] di uno dei paesi più popolosi e prosperi del mondo —nel 2015 l'India contava una popolazione di oltre un miliardo e trecento milioni di persone e registrava ben 8 punti di crescita del PIL (che nel 1965 era a -2.64 punti)—, ma soprattutto perché provenivano dalla mitica terra di Bhāratamātā[3], la 'madre India', che allo *yoga* diede i natali.

Evidentemente avvertito di questi punti di forza, il discorso di Narendra Modī si apriva proprio con il seguente proclama:

> From the banks of the river Indus to every continent in the world yoga has spread harmony between man and nature and a holistic approach to health and wellbeing[4].

Un dire tanto audace e impegnativo quanto irrimandabile, vista la gravità dello stato di crisi in cui —a detta delle successive parole di Modī— versava l'umanità intera, afflitta da malanni, disagi, problemi e sofferenze di ogni sorta:

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[2] A proposito del 'miraggio del nome', si noti che è proprio la parola sanscrita *mantrin* (la quale rimanda sia al 'consigliere di corte' sia al 'conoscitore dei *mantra*') ad aver dato forma, attraverso il portoghese *mandarim*, al 'corpo' del funzionario civile detto 'mandarino'. Cfr. Cortelazzo e Zolli 1983: 710. Su Narendra Modī, vedi Jaffrelot 2019.

[3] Come per i confini di ogni altro stato-nazione moderno, anche la storia politica dei confini dell'India è la prima cosa a essere rimossa dal discorso dei paladini della geografia mitica degli stati. Cfr. Chattopadhyaya 2018; Asif 2020; Sinha 2006.

[4] N. Modī, *Introductory remarks*, International Conference on Yoga for Holistic Health, Delhi, 21.6.2015 [35 min.]. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=65&v=5qdgeOSTLRs&feature=emb_logo].

> The problems of modern lifestyles are well known. People suffer from stress related ailments, lifestyle related diseases like diabetes and hyper-tension. We have found ways to control communicable diseases, but the burden of disease is shifting to non-communicable diseases. Young people who are not at peace with themselves seek refuge in drugs and alcohol. There is ample evidence that practicing yoga helps combat stress and chronic conditions. If the body is a temple of the mind, yoga creates a beautiful temple[5].

Ritraendo in questo modo la disperante gravità dello stato di salute dell'uomo, Modī forniva le premesse al promettente annuncio a seguire: per quanto seria e urgente, la situazione è ancora risolvibile per coloro che vorranno prestar fede al valore del rimedio salvifico che il nostro 'autorevole' dispensatore chiama *yoga*.

Forte di tali premesse, il discorso inaugurale di Modī venne così ad assumere, senza imbarazzo, l'altisonante tono dell'annuncio profetico, diffondendosi nell'elogio degli straordinari e risolutivi benefici che lo *yoga* è in grado di offrire all'umanità sofferente. Dismessi i panni dell'uomo di stato, il *pradhānamantrī* Modī indossava i paramenti del *guru* ieratico che pronuncia il suo *mahāvākya*[6], il suo vaticinio: *ecce yoga!* Un vaticinio senz'altro già noto e mirabile ma che ora, tramite l'uso della lingua inglese, guadagnava rinnovata salienza ed eloquenza globale. Il vate Modī, inserendo l'antico termine sanscrito *yoga* all'interno di un discorso dominato dalle *keywords* egemoniche con cui l'imperante anglofonia mondiale detta e scandisce i contorni delle 'cose' di valore —che perciò meritano di esser desiderate—, ne esaltava il senso e ne amplificava l'appetibilità:

> The benefits of yoga are manifold. *When practised correctly and with discipline*, Yoga leads to: Perfection of our body's potential in

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[5] N. Modī, *Introductory remarks*, International Conference on Yoga for Holistic Health, Delhi, 21.6.2015 [35 min.]. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=65&v=5qdgeOSTLRs&feature=emb_logo]

[6] Trattasi di un ulteriore esempio delle commistioni e delle implicazioni politico-economiche che plasmano i rapporti tra la figura di ruolo del 'proferitore di verità' (ossia i vari pastori, patriarchi, pontefici, maestri, ministri, medici e *guru*) e la figura del destinatario delle stesse (ossia i vari gruppi di seguaci, pazienti e discepoli), che decidono, oggi come ieri, tanto l'ascesa quanto il declino di coloro che si ergono a *guru*. Cfr. Barton Scott 2017; Singleton e Goldberg 2014; Lucia 2014.

strength, skill, and general well-being, peaceful and stress-free living. […] [lunga digressione in lingua hindī] […] Control and mastery of our life-energies (*prāṇa*) leading to health, long and disease-free life, capacity for full enjoyment of life. Opening and refining of the heart's emotions leading to greater compassion, mutual understanding, and sensitivity to the needs of others. Full development of our mental powers, leading to heightened concentration, intelligence, creativity, intuition. Liberation of our spirit from ignorance, suffering, incapacity, leading to freedom, equality, constant joyfulness and inner strength to overcome all challenges of life. It awakens the deeper sense of unity and oneness with the whole Universe and all living beings. Together, these lead to the realisation of our highest divine Perfection[7].

A coloro che sono avvertiti della valenza biopolitica del ricorso a un siffatto e articolato 'lessico della salute', appare nitido l'obiettivo primo del vaticinio di Modī: l'umanità sofferente e ammalata necessita, più di ogni altra cosa, del benefico e salvifico —se non 'miracoloso'— rimedio universale detto *yoga*. Trattasi di una 'antica cura', univoca e certa, che da secoli l'India prescrive al mondo intero e che è ora nuovamente pronta a donare a tutti gli abitanti del pianeta, uomini, donne, vecchi e bambini. Di conseguenza, una volta informati del fatto che sono così tanti e tali i benefici a cui può condurre la 'cosa' chiamata *yoga*, tutti coloro che patiscono dei mali del mondo e sono mossi da amor proprio non si attarderanno nell'iniziarne la pratica.

Stando alle testimonianze della cronaca, fu ampio il consenso mediatico suscitato dai profetici vaticini, che riscossero l'unanime plauso anche degli alti rappresentanti di molte e influenti istituzioni mondiali, tutte sedicenti 'laiche' e 'moderne'. In quei giorni un crescente coro di voci provenienti da ogni parte del globo si dichiarava massimamente concorde circa l'importanza di celebrare il varo planetario di una nuova 'forma d'azione' salutare chiamata *yoga*[8].

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[7] N. Modī, *Introductory remarks*, International Conference on Yoga for Holistic Health, Delhi, 21.6.2015 [35 min.] (cors. mio). [https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=65&v=5qdgeOSTLRs&feature=emb_logo]

[8] Nelle pagine seguenti farò variamente uso di espressioni quali 'schema d'azione' o 'forma d'azione' per illustrare il portato operazionale e metodico che il termine sanscrito *yoga* esprime in seno ai contesti testuali in cui trova uso. Alla

Quello che veniva in essere al seguito della proclamazione dell'*ecce yoga* di Modī appariva alla stregua di una riedizione di un antico *lifestyle*, ora opportunamente votato alla *good health*, alla *disease-free life*, al *wellbeing* e al *welfare* del mondo di oggi[9]: un metodo pratico e sicuro, garante dell'ottenimento del tanto agognato vivere senza stress[10].

Data la scala e la portata biopolitica di un evento come l'International Day of Yoga, serve qui richiamare alcuni dei fattori che hanno contribuito alla sua ideazione e realizzazione. L'istituzione di un tale evento, infatti, non è stata certo un fulmine a ciel sereno, bensì —come accade per tutte le 'nascite'— è scaturita da un lungo e complicato processo di fecondazione e gestazione politica[11], preceduto da un intenso lavoro diplomatico al seguito del quale, durante la seduta plenaria dell'assemblea generale dell'ONU dell'11 dicembre 2014, venne approvata la risoluzione 69/131.

stregua del greco *téchne* e del latino *ars*, il vocabolo *yoga* serve lì a indicare i 'modi di fare' una cosa, qualsiasi essa sia. Ogni azione, infatti, può essere svolta in varie maniere, ma non tutte foriere di buoni prodotti; cfr. Bhattacharya, Dalmiya e Mukherji 2018. Per questo agli agenti serve cercare uno schema, un modello, una forma o un'immagine tipo che li sappia informare e guidare in modo utile e fruttuoso. Ogni 'dire ciò che è da farsi' è anche il mostrarne l'aspetto, anticipandone i contorni per favorirne la copia: è un dire che fa vedere ciò che si deve fare. Gli 'schemi d'azione' e le 'immagini guida', perciò, smuovono coloro a cui sono rivolte e li 'fanno muovere e agire' di concerto: «[…] il fare narrativo ri-significa il mondo nella sua dimensione temporale, nella misura in cui raccontare, recitare, vuol dire rifare l'azione seguendo l'invito del poema» (Ricoeur 1986: 131). In seno alla stessa trattatistica in sanscrito, infatti, il termine *yoga* rimanda sempre a uno schema da seguire, a un progetto da realizzare, affinché l'operare corporeo possibile proceda sotto la guida sicura di una forma imitabile. È così che l'informazione *prevede* la forma dell'informato; cfr. Simondon 2013. Siffatta disposizione all'imitazione appariva chiara a chi, come il Buddha, allestiva 'schemi d'azione' atti a 'raddrizzare' le tortuose vie dell'operare; cfr. Collins 2020.

[9] Cfr. Puustinen e Rautaniemi 2015.

[10] L'enfasi sugli effetti salutari dello *yoga* è riuscita a influenzare anche alcune tra le più antiche istituzioni indiane votate allo *yoga*. Si veda, ad es., la conferenza internazionale intitolata *Yoga as Therapy*, organizzata dal Kaivalya Dhama nel 2018; Puri 2019; Askegaard e Eckhardt 2012.

[11] Cfr. Horton, Westphal e Willems 2019. Il tema cruciale dell'organizzazione politica degli 'stili di vita' non solo *non è* una novità del nostro tempo ma è al fondo di ognuna delle tradizioni di *yoga* storicamente attestate. È perciò un tema centrale tanto per il passato quanto per il presente, come mostrano recenti ricerche rivolte all'uso politico dell'educazione al vivere di cui la 'pratica dello *yoga*' è oggi parte. Cfr. Jain 2020, 2015.

Il testo di questa risoluzione è capitale per la storia semantica tanto della parola *yoga* quanto del termine *samādhi*[12], dal momento che al suo interno viene istituita —con la forza del decreto— un'inedita forma di relazione tra *yoga* e salute (*global health*). I redattori di questa risoluzione, nell'illustrare il rapporto causale che unisce i due termini in questione, riarticolano la logica genealogica che lega la malattia alla cura e invertono il primato del 'patologico' sul 'normale'[13]. Nello spazio di poche righe, ciò che fino a quel punto apparteneva al dominio astratto dell''esotico' e dell''esoterico'[14] viene posto in stretta relazione con la concreta

[12] In quanto fine di diversi *yoga* del passato, la condizione detta *samādhi* è centrale in questo mio discorso. Il termine *samādhi* è oggetto di una notevole risemantizzazione a partire dai 'discorsi' (*sutta*) del Buddha, all'interno dei quali indica una peculiare condizione del plesso del *percipere/cogitare* —relativa tanto all'operare del corpo, quanto a quello di parole e pensieri—, il quale, dall'abituale stato di agitazione, distrazione, labilità (*vikṣepa, vyutthāna, vyudasta*), passa a quello di tranquillità, concentrazione, intensità. In questo contesto, il termine *samādhi* indica una sorta di 'coincidenza' tra l'esperienza esterocettiva e quella interocettiva, in cui la condizione di 'coesa inerenza' (*sam*+ √*dhā*) è effettiva. La parola *samādhi*, perciò, rimanda a una forma di cognizione compatta, unitaria, densa, diametralmente opposta a quella del suddetto stato di *vikṣepa* o *vyutthāna*, nel quale, di contro, la cognizione è labile, dispersa, frammentata. A partire dai *sutta*, sono tante le opere in cui si trovano varie illustrazioni di diverse articolazioni del *samādhi*, tra le quali segnalo il fondamentale distinguo tra un *samādhi* apparente (pāli *miccha*, sanscrito *mithyā*) e un *samādhi* effettivo (pāli *sammā*, sanscrito *samyak*). Trattasi di un distinguo tra due diverse condizioni del medesimo plesso del *percipere/cogitare*, alla stregua della differenza che passa tra uno stato di salute precario e uno stabile. Questo modo cotensivo di intendere il *samādhi* si ritrova all'interno della gran parte delle opere redatte in seno alle successive tradizioni del Mahāyāna. Tra queste, è davvero notevole la rassegna presentata all'inizio del *Samādhirājasūtra* (1.1-15), nella quale figurano oltre trecento accezioni del termine *samādhi*. In questa stessa opera vi sono varie occorrenze del termine *samādhi* in cui esso è in relazione al lessico strettamente medico ed è accostato a parole come *roga, vyādhi, bhaiṣajya*, sulle quali tornerò (cfr. stt. 4.18-25; 32.172-179). A tale proposito, segnalo che la parola *samādhi* è utilizzata anche nelle tradizioni dell'*āyurveda*, permettendo di postulare un nesso tra il termine *samādhi* e l'idea di 'salute'. Cfr., ad es., *Carakasaṃhitā* 1.1.58; 1.7.58; 5.12.83; 6.5.188; 6.10.63; 6.28.8; 8.9.3. Inoltre, Chakravarthi 2021: 27-57.

[13] A partire dalla lezione di George Canguilhem, è possibile intendere sia i termini in cui la condizione 'patologica' precede ed è storicamente anteriore a quella di 'normalità', sia le ragioni per cui la condizione idealtipica e normativa detta 'normalità' non solo non descrive ma concorre nell'occultare la 'patologia' e le sue cause effettive. Cfr. Canguilhem 1998.

[14] È questa, in nuce, la semiotica dell''esotico', ossia la forma di affezione patemica derivante dalla percezione della diversità dei 'modi di stare al mondo',

condizione di salute e benessere delle collettività metropolitane, elevando così lo *yoga* al rango dei beni più ambìti e preziosi del momento.

Vista la rilevanza di questa risoluzione dell'ONU, ne riporto per esteso un estratto, che è emblematico della searliana *declaration of status function*[15]:

> *Underscoring* the fact that global health is a long-term development objective that requires closer international cooperation through the exchange of best practices aimed at building better individual lifestyles devoid of excesses of all kinds,
> *Recognizing* that yoga provides a holistic approach to health and well-being,
> *Recognizing also* that wider dissemination of information about the benefits of practising yoga would be beneficial for the health of the world population,
> 1. *Decides* to proclaim 21 June the International Day of Yoga;
> 2. *Invites* all Member and observer States, the organizations of the United Nations system and other international and regional organizations, as well as civil society, including non-governmental organizations and individuals, to observe the International Day of Yoga, in an appropriate manner and in accordance with national priorities, in order to raise awareness of the benefits of practising yoga[16].

Data la vocazione universalista e la reputazione di cui gode l'ONU, questo suo sancire il nesso tra *global health* e *yoga* ha avuto un enorme potere persuasivo. Il fatto che sia stata proprio questa organizzazione a riconoscere che i «[…] benefits of practising yoga would be beneficial for the health of the world population», ha senz'altro favorito lo sviluppo su scala mondiale della 'missione evangelizzatrice' descritta nel punto 2 della risoluzione.

Una missione i cui dogmi fondamentali sono ora chiari: la salutare 'forma d'azione' chiamata *yoga* è un rimedio sempiterno, polivalente e indubitabilmente dotato di straordinarie proprietà. Un rimedio che, per il suo inestimabile valore, va offerto all'im-

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che si esprime sotto forma di un sentire in cui attrazione e meraviglia si mischiano con scabrosità e orrore. Cfr. Goto-Jones 2016; Mitter 1977.

[15] Rimando qui alla sue due 'costitutività'. Cfr. Searle 2010; Esposito 2020.

[16] Cfr. United Nations, res. A/69/131, 2014.

mensa platea di 'pazienti' che popola il pianeta, i quali, pur nella loro diversità, si riconoscono tutti nell'essere variamente 'affetti da patemi'. Una platea sterminata, fatta di soggetti sofferenti e bisognosi di cura —ossia *rogin* di ogni sorta—, ai quali, vista la risonanza mediatica dell'evento, non resta altro da fare che accogliere con gaudio il dono dell'antico e promettente rimedio detto *yoga*[17]. Trovandosi finalmente di fronte alla versione originale, 'autenticamente autentica'[18] della 'cura' per tutti i mali, nessuno di questi 'pazienti' può perdere l'occasione di affidarsi a esso, anima e corpo.

Trattasi, oltretutto, di una 'missione' fin troppo facile, dal momento che i singoli 'pazienti' non hanno neppure bisogno di chissà quale quota di fede o di speranza per credere nella bontà di questo *yoga*, certificata sia dall'impressionante numero di paesi e nazioni che ne promuovono l'uso, sia dal lustro derivante dal fatto che tale rimedio è giunto fino a loro grazie alle benevole mani di un nutrito novero di rappresentanti 'tradizionali', di titolari di ministeri competenti, di dispensatori scientificamente accreditati, di terapeuti autorevoli e fededegni, tutti parimenti animati da spirito caritatevole e intenti altruistici[19].

L'intersezione tra le prese di posizione di agenzie transnazionali come l'ONU e l'enunciazione dell'*ecce yoga* di Modī dava ora corpo e forma a un'inedita versione dell'antico 'mercato della salute'. Una nuova disposizione scenica dello spazio della cura, nella quale le transazioni in atto, gli scopi, le funzioni e le condotte delle diverse figure di ruolo implicate risultano tutte programmaticamente delineate: a fronte della definizione del contenuto del 'messaggio' (la 'cura' offerta, detta *yoga*), vengono individuati

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[17] Nelle pagine a seguire farò ampio uso di coppie di parole sanscrite, mutuate sia dai trattati di *āyurveda* sia dagli *yogaśāstra*, in modo da legare l'odierno discorso sulla 'salute' ai modi in cui essa veniva discussa e trattata in passato. Sarà quindi frequente il riferimento a coppie come *roga/yoga* (malattia/metodo [di cura]); *doṣa/bheṣaja* (pecca, sintomo/rimedio medico); *vyādhi/sādhana* (malanno/strategia terapeutica); *vikṣepa/samādhi* (agitazione/tranquillità), così come frequente sarà l'uso delle figure con cui dette fonti rappresentano gli 'agiti' e gli 'agenti' —ossia *rogin/yogin* (ammalati/curanti); *vyādhiyukta/vaidya* (pazienti/conoscitori del rimedio)— delle operazioni a cui rimandano le suddette coppie. Cfr. Petridou e Thumiger 2016.

[18] Cfr. Alter 2009.

[19] Cfr. Ravi Kumar 2015 (volume che ha ricevuto l'*endorsement* di Modī).

e istituiti tanto i suoi 'emittenti' (i 'medici' che somministrano la 'cura', detti *yogin*) quanto i suoi 'destinatari' (i 'pazienti' che necessitano della 'cura', detti *rogin*). Una volta chiarito il dettaglio del protagonista primo della scena —ossia il rimedio—, anche i profili dei mittenti e dei destinatari risultano chiari, consentendo l'agile e proficuo svolgimento di questa nuova stagione del 'commercio dei beni salvifici'[20]. Un commercio al cui andamento concorrono i suddetti tre figuranti —ossia *yoga*, *rogin* e *yogin*, ben distinti e distanti—, i quali, in quanto prodotti dalle logiche negoziali che governano l'andamento di questa disposizione scenica, sposano senza indugio l'illusione che vi sia uno spontaneo connubio tra domanda e offerta, tra beni in circolazione e bisogni primari, tra fornitura di rimedi ed esigenze di salute.

È proprio grazie a questo mutuo concorso che l'annuncio dell'*ecce yoga* del giugno del 2015 si è potuto reiterare, alla stregua di un *mantra*, collezionando milioni di *likes* e rimbalzando da una zona all'altra del mondo. Un'annunciazione multimediale in piena regola, in cui il verbo è sempre accompagnato da vorticosi sciami di immagini, video, slogan e gadget attinenti, la cui varietà e quantità generava un ipnotico effetto *surround*, pervasivo e perdurante. Data la posta in palio e le proporzioni dell'evento, la notizia della venuta al mondo di una 'cosa' così clamorosa e preziosa rimase per settimane tra le principali *breaking news* delle agenzie di stampa, occupando i taccuini dei compilatori degli almanacchi anagrafici della storia sociale, i quali si prodigarono, a loro volta, nel diffondere i dati di quella che ritenevano essere senz'altro una buona novella. A detta di tutti, il 21 giugno del 2015 fu la data di nascita della 'cosa' chiamata *yoga*, il giorno d'inizio di una nuova era. L'età aurea della 'yogafilia' globale pareva davvero iniziata.

Va anche sottolineato, però, che agli occhi di tanti la 'cosa' neonata non pareva affatto inedita. Lo *yoga* appena venuto alla luce non era nuovo o diverso, bensì l'ennesima incarnazione dello *yoga* identico e originario, che, grazie al prodigo operato di nuovi e benemeriti dispensatori, tornava alla ribalta, seppur sotto inedite spoglie. Per altri ancora, più scettici, il neonato *yoga* aveva qualco-

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[20] Cfr. Burger 2006; Singleton 2007.

sa di moderno, di -*less* o di *post*-, che insospettiva e non si accordava con tutto ciò che era a loro dato sapere.

A prescindere dalle distanze tra i punti di vista dei diversi testimoni, tutti rimasero incantati da questa sfavillante apparizione, che diffondeva speranze di salute e salvezza su una platea che, trovandosi di fronte a una sorta di rievocazione planetaria dei grandi concilî ecumenici della tarda antichità, non poteva rimanere indifferente a una così ampia e qualificata manifestazione di consenso e interesse per quella nuova 'forma di azione' salutare. Doveva senz'altro destare stupore vedere che le tante e variegate autorità e i patriarchi presenti sulla scena ribadivano, in piena comunione, un solo e medesimo motto, professando, con massima concordia, un unico 'credo': *sine yoga nulla salus*![21]

Del resto, è esattamente questo il gesto che fornisce potenza all'annuncio salvifico, il quale consta nel promettere a parole il sicuro ottenimento proprio di ciò di cui qualcuno patisce la mancanza. E sono davvero tanti i patimenti a cui il dispositivo della promessa riesce a dare sollievo[22]. Di conseguenza, è arduo per un paziente in preda al dolore riuscire a sottrarsi al fascino della promessa del raggiungimento di siffatti traguardi, soprattutto perché l'affidarsi alla promessa è l'unico modo per figurarsi, anzitempo, la fine delle pene e il recupero della salute[23].

Il consenso riscosso dall'annuncio di Modī va dunque inteso proprio a partire dal potere lenitivo e persuasivo di cui gode ogni promessa di risoluzione di un patimento. A questo proposito, si pensi a tutti coloro che, per anni, si sono sentiti assillati dal bruciante quesito 'what is *yoga*?'[24], al quale, finalmente, le parole di

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[21] Con questa parafrasi dell'antico adagio latino *extra ecclesiam nulla salus* —qui ripreso a partire da una più recente versione, ossia *sine ecclesia nulla salus*— intendo sintetizzare il primato che i dispensatori assegnano al proprio rimedio, enfatizzandone l'unicità e acclamandone le qualità eccelse, in modo tale da convincere i pazienti del potere che esso ha rispetto a tutti i patimenti.

[22] Si crea così una vera e propria 'economia della promessa': un sistema fiduciario retto tanto dall'esigenza, dal desiderio e dalla speranza di ottenere ciò che viene promesso quanto dal dovere del paziente di riporre in esso fiducia e piena credenza. Cfr. Miyazaki e Swedberg 2016.

[23] Cfr., sul regime biopolitico che governa l'andamento della logica contrappuntistica *pain/pain killer*, Fitzgerald 2020; Jackson e Moore 2020; Rosen 2019.

[24] Trattasi, però, di un quesito eminentemente 'merceologico' e 'inventariale' —dunque necessariamente reificante—, poiché considera ciò di cui tratta

Modī davano risolutiva risposta. A costoro ora bastava riporre fiducia nell'autorevolezza della persona che pronuciava l'annuncio affinché la 'cosa' si tramutasse nel loro nuovo oggetto di fede. Leggendo i resoconti e le cronache dell'evento, risulta evidente che molti si sentirono investiti dalla contagiosa epifania di una 'cosa' tanto mirabile quanto concreta, dotata di vita a sé stante. Il rimedio indicato dalla parola *yoga* appariva al mondo sotto forma di un nuovo salvifico *avatāra*, un provvidenziale ente fattivo, personificato, che può, vuole e deve manifestarsi, rendendosi, *motu proprio,* nuovamente visibile, presente e attuale. Disceso dall'alto delle vette da cui si domina il mondo, il verbo solenne dell'*ecce yoga* guadagneva lì un corpo mirabile ed eleggeva a propria dimora la libido dei suoi destinatari, che divenivano presto appassionati devoti e ferventi apostoli in terra della sua causa[25].

Dell'attrazione suscitata da questa neonata forma di fede nell'esistenza dello *yoga* danno riprova empirica gli indici di gradimento e di consumo della 'yogic life', i quali, nel breve arco di anni trascorsi dalla prima edizione dell'International Day of Yoga, sono cresciuti esponenzialmente. Una 'fede' decisamente contagiosa che, potendo profittare dell'influenza dell'acclamazione collettiva e dell'invadenza virale della propaganda via *web*[26], ha contribuito 'dal basso' a portare di casa in casa l'annuncio dell'*ecce yoga*. Cavalcando l'onda esponenziale degli algoritmi che governano l'infosfera, la notizia della venuta alla luce della versione 2.0 del 'miracoloso' rimedio indiano è divenuta il meme di milioni e milioni di dispositivi *touch screen*[27].

La capacità persuasiva e diffusiva di questa inusitata forma di 'yogafilia' —rivolta a uno *yoga* in veste laica, non settaria, accessi-

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alla stregua di una 'cosa' circoscritta, compiuta e tangibile, della quale si ritiene possibile fornire un'altrettanto chiara 'definizione'. Che la natura di un tale quesito sia strettamente 'merceologica' è mostrato dal modo in cui esso è stato strumentalmente impiegato —oltre cento anni fa— nel libro pionieristico di Svamin Abhedānanda (1866-1939), il cui primo capitolo, intitolato proprio 'What is Yoga?', mirava a stabilire una classifica tra i diversi *yoga* al tempo concorrenti. Cfr. Abhedananda 1902: 27-42; Foxen e Kuberry 2021.

[25] Cfr. McCartney 2019; Lucia 2018; McCartney 2017.

[26] Cfr., sulle logiche epidemiche che caratterizzano il diffondersi dei 'memi' all'interno dello spazio del 'virale' mediatico, Krämer 2015: 96-107.

[27] È questo, di fatto, l'odierno 'teatro' portatile in cui va in scena la metamorfica saga del patema collettivo. Cfr. Sæther e Bull 2020; Shifman 2014.

bile, medicalizzata e perfino *open-source*—, però, non è dipesa solo dal suo saper soddisfare i bisogni di una miriade di consumatori, ma soprattutto dal suo riuscire a raggiungere i piani alti delle principali organizzazioni internazionali che orientano e amministrano l'andamento degli stili di vita delle collettività di consumatori.

Dopo l'evento del giugno 2015, il sito ufficiale dell'ONU ha aperto una sezione permanente dedicata all'International Day of Yoga, dove questo è presentato come parte integrante della politica con cui la dirigenza, sponsorizzando vari 'eserciziari' e 'forme d'azione' assemblate *ad hoc*, indica al mondo le linee guida da seguire in vista del raggiungimento di specifici standard di salute e di benessere, individuali e collettivi, privati e pubblici. In tal modo, all'unisono con altre iniziative gemelle (ad es., l'International Day of Happiness, il World Health Day e il World Mental Health Day), la celebrazione del rituale collettivo dell'International Day of Yoga è entrata a far parte del canone delle *best practices* raccomandate e della lista delle parole chiave. In tal senso è significativo il titolo dell'edizione 2020 dell'International Day of Yoga: 'Yoga for Health — Yoga at Home'.

Non sorprenderà, perciò, sapere che l'esortazione a prendere parte all'annuale celebrazione del 21 giugno dedicata allo *yoga* è diventata parte integrante delle «global and regional awareness-raising campaigns» dell'OMS, che ha eletto la pratica regolare dello *yoga* al rango di mezzo strategico per il raggiungimento degli obiettivi salutistici fissati nell'utopico documento programmatico *Global action plan on physical activity 2018—2030: more active people for a healthier world*[28]. Analogamente, il sito ufficiale dell'UNICEF accoglie da tempo una pagina interamente dedicata alle 'Yoga poses for kids'[29].

Un gran numero di istituzioni nazionali hanno poi contribuito alla diffusione e al radicamento locale della pratica dello *yoga*. Nel 2020, ad esempio, il National Center for Complementary and Integrative Health (NCCIH) —la voce più autorevole in materia di sanità pubblica degli USA, a sua volta parte dei National Institutes of Health (NIH) controllati dal Department of Health

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[28] Cfr. WHO, *Global action plan on physical activity 2018—2030. More active people for a healthier world*, World Health Organization, Geneva 2018, p. 63.

[29] Cfr. https://www.unicefkidpower.org/yoga-poses-for-kids/

and Human Services (HHS)—[30] ha pubblicato un opuscolo di 40 pagine in cui si invitano medici, psicologi clinici e terapeuti di ogni sorta, a promuovere e prescrivere ai propri pazienti la pratica dello *yoga*[31].

Questi, a grandi linee, sono i contorni della 'scena' audio-visuale all'interno della quale si svolge l'odierno commercio delle tante 'forme d'azione' chiamate *yoga*. Una scena in larga parte dominata da *influencer* di alto bordo e dai portavoce delle versioni *mainstream* dello *yoga*, che invogliano i propri avventori a impegnative *full immersion*, promettendo un rapido, benefico e salvifico *total body workout*.

Raggiungendo i bisogni di milioni di consumatori e occupando le agende di influenti organizzazioni globali, la proclamazione dell'*ecce yoga* di Modī ha vistosamente contribuito all'istituzione di un inedito 'oggetto del desiderio': a prescindere da quale sia il malanno patito, uno soltanto è il rimedio altamente 'consigliato', poiché, *vox populi docet*, non vi è pena che lo *yoga* non estingua.

2. Sine yoga nulla salus?

Per vivere bene e tenersi lontani dai patimenti basta disporre di un metodo benefico: è questa, in sintesi, l'antica formula ribadita dall'annuncio *ecce yoga* di Modī. Una semplice regola di condotta, tanto chiara quanto ambigua, dal momento che, anche in questo caso, l'enfatico dire *sine yoga nulla salus!* non serve solo allo scopo di evidenziare ed esaltare i pregi e i meriti del metodo, ma anche quello di sminuire, fino a nascondere, la natura delle cause dei malanni di cui si promette la cura: il porre alla ribalta un prodotto 'salutare' relega nell'ombra il brulicante intrigo di interessi che ruota intorno a questo. La storia della medicina[32] offre ampia testimonianza di tale ambiguità e dei rischi a essa legati. È assai più facile spendersi nel combattere gli effetti sintomatici di un comune malanno anziché cimentarsi nel più arduo tentativo di estirpare alla radice le cause di mali incurabili.

[30] L'NCCIH è l'agenzia del governo federale statunitense che sovrintende alla ricerca scientifica relativa alla valutazione dei sistemi di cura diversi da quelli praticati dalla medicina convenzionale.

[31] Cfr. NCCIH, *Yoga for Health*, National Center for Complementary and Integrative Health, Bethesda 2020.

[32] Cfr., *infra*, § 3.

Tuttavia, dal momento che l'oggetto del contendere è la complessa e difficile arte di preservare lo stato di salute del fare, del dire e del pensare tanto dei singoli quanto delle collettività, non è affatto facile seguire le traiettorie pragmatiche e semiotiche per il cui tramite l'adagio *sine yoga nulla salus* si diffonde. Per tali motivi, chiunque intenda trattare di una faccenda così complessa è tenuto a osservarla da più punti di vista, valutando tanto la cifra biopolitica quanto il dettato sistemico di un tale procedere, articolato e multifattoriale, che tocca, simultaneamente, vari aspetti del vissuto e, perciò, va interpretato intrecciando i registri analitici di differenti àmbiti di ricerca. Penso, in particolare, ai contributi offerti dal recente dibattito sulle politiche del *modus vivendi*, della *cultura animi* e della 'cura di sé'[33], oppure a quelli degli àmbiti di ricerca che prospettano una storia naturale ed ecologica dei 'modi' con cui gli umani esercitano il loro moto nel mondo, dando così vita alle infinite varianti del disciplinamento dei 'modi di fare' che il filosofo Peter Sloterdijk ha chiamato 'antropotecniche'[34]. Trattasi di contributi imprescindibili, dal momento che la diffusione planetaria della 'forma d'azione' chiamata *yoga* mostra a chiare lettere il ricorso alle pratiche di disciplinamento. In questa prospettiva, lo *yoga* dei nostri giorni si inserisce a pieno titolo nel catalogo dei tanti e diversi 'modi di fare', eserciziari, prassi disciplinate e metodiche con cui, da sempre, l'animale umano manipola, mescola, plasma e confonde la vita e la forma, il *soma* e il *sema*, il mondo del sensibile e quello dell'espressione, il *percipere* topico e il *cogitare* scopico, gli istinti e la ragione, l'innato e l'appreso, l'esogeno e l'endogeno, l'avverso e il solidale, l'eccezione e la regola, il reale e l'ideale, il patologico e il normale. Dovendo dunque trattare di pratiche antropotecniche, vale la pena di prendere le mosse dal versante quantitativo e fare due conti.

Si noti che, sebbene nelle Americhe e in Europa la parola sanscrita *yoga* fosse praticamente sconosciuta fino agli ultimi anni

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[33] Sul 'salutismo', la *cultura animi*, il *modus vivendi* e l''uso' e la 'cura di sé', cfr. Pizzichemi 2021; Jackson e Moore 2020; Horton, Westphal e Willems 2019; Virno 2015; Corneanu 2011; Marrone 2005.

[34] Sloterdijk è un'autore attento a modelli e 'forme d'azione' che si incontrano nella produzione testuale di varie tradizioni sudasiatiche classiche. Cfr. Sloterdijk 2010; 2019; e Agamben 2011; 2014.

dell'Ottocento[35], nell'arco di soli cento anni ha raggiunto soglie impressionanti di notorietà.

Stando ai dati di una ricerca di mercato realizzata dall'agenzia Ipsos Public Affairs su commissione dello *Yoga Journal* e di Yoga Alliance[36], nel 2016 nei soli USA c'erano oltre trentasei milioni di individui dediti a qualche pratica di *yoga*, e circa ottanta milioni che si riconoscevano nella formula «likely to try *yoga*». Un'enorme platea di utenti, con un incremento di circa l'80% rispetto al 2012 (anno in cui i praticanti di *yoga* erano oltre i venti milioni, mentre nel 2008 non arrivavano a 16 milioni), e il cui operato si traduceva in un indotto economico annuo di quasi diciassette miliardi di dollari (rispetto ai quasi dieci miliardi del 2012), derivante sia dalle quote di iscrizione ai corsi erogati dai centri di *yoga*, sia dall'acquisto di capi d'abbigliamento appositi, suppellettili e attrezzatura propedeutica alla pratica, oggetti d'arredo domestico e letteratura a tema. A questi dati si dovrebbero aggiungere anche le cifre relative alla pratica dello *yoga* in paesi come la Cina, l'India, l'Australia e il Giappone.

Restando alle cose concrete e agli aspetti quantitativi, merita qui ricordare che sono centinaia gli oggetti, gli accessori e gli utensili utilizzati nella pratica quotidiana dello *yoga*, i quali sono tutti soggetti ai vincoli del *brand* oppure tutelati dal sistema del brevetto, del marchio registrato o del *copyright*[37]. Molti di questi oggetti, infatti, sono diventati parte integrante dei cataloghi delle multinazionali dell'abbigliamento sportivo.

Altrettanto eclatanti sono le cifre della presenza mediatica della 'forma d'azione' chiamata *yoga*. Tutti i principali *social-network* presenti sul *web* sono invasi dalle testimonianze e dalle immagini pubblicate da migliaia di *yoga influencers*, i quali, grazie alle schiere dei propri *followers*, contribuiscono alla crescita della 'cosa'

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[35] È notevole la testimonianza dello studio lessicologico di Thomas Bellot (1856), nel quale, in corrispondenza dell'inglese *yoke*, non viene riportato il termine *yoga*, sebbene vi sia il rimando alla radice sanscrita *yuj-*. Sulla storia della parola *yoga*, vedi Mori e Squarcini 2019; Maas 2013; White 2012.

[36] Cfr. *Yoga in America Study*, 2016: https://www.yogaalliance.org/2016 YogaInAmericaStudy.

[37] Cfr., ad es., Sinha 2010; Kitiarsa 2008; Burger 2006. Ricordo, però, che simili forme di reificazione e mercificazione sono in atto da secoli. Cfr. Squarcini 2007 e, sul versante opposto, Iyer 2018.

promossa e anche dei profitti derivanti dal mercato di *app* e *tutorial* a essa dedicati, generando un giro d'affari globale il cui totale è letteralmente incalcolabile. Si pensi anche al moltiplicarsi di eventi pubblici a tema e di *yogic flash mob*, e alla realizzazione di sempre più affollati 'Yoga Festival'[38].

La specifica 'forma d'azione' salutare annunciata nel 2015 da Modī non si è soltanto pandemicamente diffusa in tutto il globo ma è diventata endemica. L'astrusa ed esotica panacea orientale è ora una cosa normale. Nell'edizione 2019 dell'International Day of Yoga furono più di 190 le nazioni che aderirono all'iniziativa e si spesero, sempre sotto gli auspici dell'ONU, nel sollecitare la partecipazione dei cittadini alla rievocazione della celebrazione condotta da Modī nel 2015, fornendo, così, riprova quantitativa dell'avvenuta 'normalizzazione' dello *yoga*.

Sono cifre da capogiro, che a prima vista parrebbero discendere dalla miracolosa efficacia dello *yoga*. Se si guarda a questi indici quantitativi con i protocolli valutativi della *doxa* dominante — ossia se ci si affida alla *ratio* economica secondo cui 'la maggioranza vince' e 'l'utilità è il principio'—, si è obbligati a pensare che la ragione di un tale successo stia proprio nelle straordinarie qualità di cui è intrinsecamente dotato il rimedio detto *yoga*[39].

L'adesione a questo modo di intendere il rapporto fra 'quantità' e 'qualità' —il quale ricade anche sui modi di intendere i complessi processi di causazione che intercorrono tra cura e paziente e tra salute e malattia—, però, condiziona non poco i modi in cui si valutano e interpretano le cifre e i dati in questione. Da ciò consegue anche il dovere di dimostrare che la parola *yoga* indichi davvero una cosa a sé stante, la quale, alla stregua di tutte le altre cose del mondo, è sempre data e inequivocabilmente reperibile: è proprio a partire dal suo essere una 'cosa' che lo *yoga* può essere dato, preso, studiato e praticato.

La logica economico-quantitativa sottostante a questo atteggiamento reificante è evidente, così come lo sono i vantaggi pratici derivanti dal processo di mercificazione. Ritenere che lo *yoga* sia una 'cosa', ad esempio, permette di pensare che la storia dello

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[38] Cfr. Lucia 2020.
[39] Si intenda in quest'ottica anche la sua diffusione in Europa. Cfr., ad es., Bartos 2021; Jacobsen e Sardella 2020 (s.v. *yoga*); Newcombe 2019.

yoga possa esser scritta nello stesso modo in cui si scriverebbe la storia di qualsiasi altro bene di consumo esotico, come il tè, il caffè, il mais, il cacao, oppure la patata[40]. Trattasi peraltro di cose che, come lo *yoga*, sono tutte provenienti dalle Indie e che si sono ampiamente diffuse ed endemizzate nell'area mediterranea, alterando e contaminando le usanze alimentari e i costumi della commensalità[41].

Ma il criterio quantitativo ha vita breve quando si ha a che fare con forme e schemi d'azione, metodi di cura e modi di fare, la cui presenza e reperibilità si veicolano in maniera assai diversa rispetto a una patata o a una pannocchia. Non appena si cerca di afferrare il dettaglio dei contorni di una certa forma d'azione, essa ci sfugge, si moltiplica, fino quasi a vanificarsi. Esempio lampante di tale evanescenza è proprio l'*ecce yoga*: il proliferare delle varianti rende ingestibile la definizione dell'originale. Le copie di *yoga* esistenti sono talmente tante e difformi tra loro da far perdere la fede nell'esistenza di uno *yoga* originale anche all'adepto più devoto. Persino nel momento topico della valutazione clinica dell'efficacia terapeutica dello *yoga* i novelli iatromanti finiscono per dubitare dell'univocità della sua natura[42].

L'impiego del criterio 'cosale' e concettuale è incapace di fornire riprova empirica di ciò che, discorsivamente, dota di esistenza propria. Perciò conviene prendere le distanze dai modi di intendere in senso 'cosale' e quantitativo i rapporti che intercorrono tra cura e malanno, guardando alle forme d'azione chiamate *yoga* da una diversa prospettiva più attenta al portato processuale e agli aspetti qualitativi dei fenomeni.

L'esortazione al mutamento di angolazione non è un'istanza inedita. Al contrario, l'appello al cambio di prospettiva costituisce il perno su cui poggiano le soluzioni proposte da numerose tradi-

[40] Cfr., Rappaport 2017; Bonavia 2013; Reader 2009; Camporesi 1990; Ray e Srinivas 2012.

[41] Limitandoci all'Europa del XIII-XV sec., si vedano i libri di cucina, spesso risultanti da intricate traiettorie intertestuali in cui la trasmissione di una ricetta passa dall'arabo al persiano, al latino medievale, ai vernacoli europei. Cfr., ad es., Möhren 2016.

[42] Cfr. Cramer, Lauche, Langhorst e Dobos 2016. È l'interesse stesso per l'accreditamento dell'efficacia clinica dello *yoga* a suscitare diffidenza, al punto da scatenare accuse di ingerenza e di pregiudizio culturale.

zioni intellettuali sudasiatiche del passato, molte delle quali si sono qualificate proprio mediante la parola *yoga*. Penso, in particolare, al carattere antitetico (*nivṛttika*) e anamnestico reversivo (*pratiprasava*) delle soluzioni messe in campo da diverse tradizioni di *yoga* (vedi § 3), che guardano al complesso rapporto tra malattia, cura e salute in maniera diametralmente opposta a quella della maggioranza dei contemporanei.

Tali tradizioni mostrano consapevolezza dei coefficienti strutturali, processuali, metabolici e simbiotici che partecipano al configurarsi del sottile confine tra salute e malattia. Tradizioni oltremodo analitiche, che hanno esplorato il dettaglio delle forme di concomitanza e di causazione che intercorrono tra 'metodo' (*yoga*) e 'problema' (*roga*), tra rimedio e malanno[43]. A esse si deve la redazione di un ampio numero di opere votate all'indagine tanto dei fattori che minacciano lo stato di salute, quanto delle logiche e dei vincoli che legano le soluzioni ai problemi, i medici ai pazienti[44], i farmaci alle patologie. Lungi dal promuovere una concezione pessimistica del vivere, si sono spese nell'esporre i vantaggi derivanti da un diverso modo di intendere la delicata condizione di 'concomitante metamorfosi' in cui si svolge la vita, sempre in bilico tra il salubre agio (*sukha*) e l'insalubre disagio (*duḥkha*). Trattasi di un modo sistemico, realista e non riduttivo di vedere le cose: una sorta di neutralità a priori, che permette di guardare in maniera ecologica e dis-illusa all'insieme simbiotico del vitale. Si restituisce così centralità ai processi e ai cicli metabolici e, di conseguenza, anche al potenziale morfogenetico del malanno[45], del quale tutti i viventi conoscono bene l'invadenza e l'intensità.

Gli appelli al radicale mutamento del punto di vista ordinario avanzati da tali tradizioni, però, non sono entrati a far parte del *mainstream* dell'odierno discorso sullo *yoga*. Parecchi dei suoi esponenti, pur presentandosi come l'espressione moderna di tali tradi-

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[43] Per un pionieristico abbinamento tra *yoga* e terapia medica, vedi Paul 1851. A tal proposito è notevole la comunanza di repertorio lessicale tra le tradizioni di *yoga* e le arti mediche.

[44] Cfr. Cerulli 2012; Wujastyk 2012b.

[45] Riscattando così il ruolo e il potenziale vitale del disagio e della malattia. Cfr. Carel 2016; Fontanille 2005.

zioni e dichiarando la propria appartenenza formale a quegli stessi 'antichi lignaggi', trascurano —fino a occultarlo— il sopracitato carattere segnatamente destitutivo, 'antitetico' (*nivṛttika*) e 'anamnestico reversivo' (*pratiprasava*) delle loro prospettive.

Il contributo d'intelligenza che le tradizioni del passato hanno dato alla comprensione dei rapporti tra cura e malanno in termini processuali, però, è troppo grande per essere tralasciato. Se, ad esempio, guardiamo alle cifre dell'odierna diffusione dello *yoga* a partire dalla prospettiva processuale proposta da queste tradizioni, che invitano a non disgiungere mai i mezzi dai fini dell'azione terapeutica, vedremo che la ragione del successo di questa forma d'azione non sta nell'intrinseco potere a essa attribuito da coloro che la dispensano, bensì nel fatto che esiste un cospicuo numero di individui che è privato della salute dal dilagare di una medesima condizione patologica, la quale, a sua volta, è strettamente legata agli assetti e agli stili di vita a cui essi sono abituati[46]. La repentina metamorfosi a cui è oggi soggetto il rimedio chiamato *yoga* è dovuta alle continue variazioni di stato del malanno che è chiamato a risolvere. Ogni *yoga*, invece di essere una 'cosa' a sé stante, è sempre morfogeneticamente vincolato a specifici tipi di *roga*.

È piuttosto facile fornire prova empirica dei vincoli processuali e della forme di simbiosi che intercorrono tra le odierne varianti di *yoga* e le tipologie di *roga* diffuse ai nostri giorni, per documentare le quali è sufficiente abbinare le cifre elencate nelle pagine precedenti alle stime e agli indici statistici che descrivono lo stato di salute in cui versa la popolazione umana. Ad esempio, secondo i resoconti dell'OMS[47], oggi nel mondo ci sono milioni di persone che soffrono di depressione, disturbi alimentari[48], disturbi del sonno e *stress*.

Messi di fronte al dilagare delle patologie derivanti dalla sedentarizzazione forzata, i produttori di rimedi traggono vantaggio dalla promessa di guarigione nei termini di una salutare dinamizzazione, così come, dinnanzi alla diffusione del vuoto esistenzia-

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[46] Cfr., ad es., Cosenza, Recalcati e Villa 2006.
[47] Cfr. WHO 2016.
[48] Cfr. WHO 2016.

le[49], i professionisti della cura promettono pienezza esistenziale[50]. È questa la regola d'oro che consente il perpetuarsi del redditizio 'gioco della salute': a fronte dei patemi dovuti al disequilibrio vitale, il rimedio promette equilibrio[51].

La capacità persuasiva e l'efficacia di tale 'regola' sono testimoniate proprio dai modi in cui si articolano le varianti dello *yoga*, che, a partire dagli aggettivi impiegati per qualificarle, riflettono i profili delle specifiche condizioni di malessere a cui promettono rimedio. Il conio e la diffusione delle nuove configurazioni passano attraverso l'abbinamento della parola *yoga* —che funge da intercambiabile operatore valoriale erogante plusvalenza— a un termine disambiguante e qualificante, che rimanda al malanno che s'intende curare o a varianti del metodo: *power-yoga, yoga-flow, yoga-fusion, yoga-body, yoga-pilates, acro-yoga, yoga undressed, naked yoga, hot-nude-yoga, kindness-yoga, medi-yoga, yoga-ventures, dive-yoga, surf-yoga, yoga for golfers, yoga for runners, anusara-yoga, restorative yoga, integral yoga, integrative yoga therapy, be-yoga, tri-yoga, phoenix rising yoga therapy, hot-yoga, yin-yoga, prenatal-yoga, vocal yoga, hormone yoga, ganja yoga, kids-yoga, balyayoga®, cat-yoga, hybrid yoga, smartyoga,* ecc., fino ai più criptici *woga* (*water-yoga*), *doga* (*yoga for dogs*), *yome* (*yoga at home*), *yogatomo* (lo *yoga* coniato dal calciatore Nagatomo). Una lista zeppa di binomi inventati, ognuno dei quali è l'esempio patente non solo della stretta dipendenza che corre tra rimedio efficace e patema patito ma, soprattutto, della primazia di quest'ultimo sul primo. Binomi che mostrano che il patema patito è la remota matrice di tutti i rimedi.

È perciò malriposta la fede di chi crede nell'esistenza di uno *yoga* sovrano, unico, autonomo, a sé stante e finanche perenne (*sanātana*): privata del contesto e astratta dalle relazioni che la costituiscono, una 'cosa' del genere svanirebbe in un istante.

L'odierno successo dello *yoga* non va più inteso alla stregua di effetto unicamente causato dalla sopravvivenza spazio-temporale del potere terapeutico dell'originale e sempiterno rimedio effica-

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[49] Cfr., ad es., Recalcati 2015; Cosenza, Recalcati e Villa 2006; Furedi 2004.

[50] Cfr., ad es., Leder 1990; Caldwell 2018. Interventi di natura chiaramente compensatoria, rispondenti al dilagare di forme di 'alienazione' e di 'frammentazione' del sè. Cfr., ad es., Fisher 2017.

[51] Cfr., ad es., Jackson e Moore 2020; Rosen 2019; Singleton 2007.

ce detto *yoga*, il quale, non è affatto immune al trascorrere del tempo[52]. È assai più utile leggerlo e intenderlo in modo 'stereoscopico', tenendo simultaneamente presente sia la natura precaria e fantasmatica della salute, sia la pervasiva ingerenza dei patemi, gli effettivi moventi di tutte le cure.

3. *Extra roga, nulla salus*

Ma nonostante il primato del malanno sul rimedio sia evidente, l'odierna vulgata seguita a presentare lo *yoga* —rigorosamente sempre al singolare— come il mirabile mezzo per il cui tramite si raggiungono tanti e diversi fini. Tutti i promotori della cura che è lo *yoga* concordano nel dichiarare che questa sia la sola 'cosa' che deve occupare il centro della scena, mentre il patema, assieme alle sue cause, è meglio che resti nell'ombra.

Assecondando un simile approccio, si occulta un principio cardine della pragmatica medico-diagnostica, secondo il quale è il fine (ossia l'estinzione delle cause di un dato malanno) a motivare i mezzi, ossia i rimedi terapeutici. Malgrado ciò, la storia della medicina è piena di casi in cui siffatto principio è stato non solo violato ma addirittura rovesciato. Dalle riflessioni di Platone sul *pharmakon* in avanti[53], infatti, è noto quanto l'abuso della cura sia servito da oppiaceo rimedio, in nome del quale si finiva per avallare la persistenza delle cause del malanno di cui si prometteva la fine. Del resto, come già indicato nei *Problemata physica* di Aristotele, il rapporto tra salute e malattia è tutt'altro che limpido e scontato[54].

Da secoli, infatti, il culto del mezzo e l'oblio del discorso sui fini è ciò che accomuna medici e pazienti, costringendo entrambi a partecipare alla disperata impresa del nascondere la simbiotica

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[52] Emblematico, in merito, l'inizio del quarto *adhyāya* della *Bhāgavadgītā*, 4,1-2, nel quale l'espressione *sa kāleneha mahatā yogo naṣṭaḥ* indica il venir meno di un 'metodo' (*yoga*) precedentemente istituito, che, perciò, va nuovamente restituito, quasi a dire che non può darsi uno *yoga* assoluto, statico e sempre uguale a sé stesso. È questo il gravoso problema dell'obsolescenza con cui tutti i metodi di cura debbono confrontarsi.

[53] Cfr. Derrida 2015.

[54] Sulla malattia come condizione naturale, vedi la celebre *Prière pour demander à Dieu le bon usage des maladies*, che Pascal scrisse attorno al 1659 dopo una grave malattia (Locatelli 1950).

concomitanza che lega la salute alla malattia[55]. Un'impresa mai conclusa, poiché ancora oggi larga parte dei discorsi sullo *yoga* partecipano al perpetuarsi di questa rimozione collettiva. Molti dei promotori di questi discorsi guardano allo *yoga* come a un dispositivo sanitario d'emergenza. La pratica dello *yoga* è spesso presentata alla stregua di una pillola in grado di curare tutti i mali, a prescindere da ciò che li ha generati. Reificando la cura, però, si reificano e astraggono anche i mali da cui si cerca riparo, perdendo così contezza del loro essere sintomi dell'alterarsi del complesso equilibrio simbiotico che regge tutti i processi vitali.

Ma, come anticipato nel § 2, ciò che rende paradossale tale modo di intendere è che la gravità del rischio derivante dall'oblio della simbiosi che plasma l'alternanza tra salute e malattia era nota agli antichi autori dei trattati di *yoga* a cui i promotori del suddetto discorso fanno riferimento. Questi autori erano di tutt'altro avviso e avevano fatto della concomitanza dei coefficienti causali la loro pietra angolare[56]. Trattasi di un folto novero di autori e opere accomunati dall'urgenza di trovare un metodo (*yoga*) capace di porre rimedio, arrestandone il decorso, allo stato di disagio patemico[57] da cui è affetto l'individuo, assediato da diversi tipi di afflizioni (*kleśa*)[58] e patimenti (*roga*)[59]. Sommamente concreta era la loro

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[55] Cfr. Gadamer 1994.

[56] Si pensi alle affinità tra i modelli di causalità buddhisti e del Sāṃkhya, quali il *pratītyasamutpāda* e il *satkāryavāda*. Cfr., ad es., Maas 2020; Osto 2018; Shaw 2002.

[57] Con questa resa intendo sottolineare la condizione di concomitanza che lega ciò che è affetto ai fattori d'affezione, così da evitare il vizio nosografico che isola e ipostatizza il 'malanno' (*roga*, ossia *duḥkha*), ma soprattutto dare risalto al valore antitetico e cotensivo degli antonimi sanscriti *sukha* e *duḥkha*, il cui uso *marca* il distinguo tra due modi di valutare il procedere di qualcosa, il primo 'agevole' e il secondo 'disagevole'. Cfr. Inaba 2016; Costa 1990.

[58] Il termine *kleśa*, variamente traducibile a seconda del contesto (oltre ad 'afflizione', può indicare 'infezione', 'affezione', 'infiammazione', 'infestazione' ecc.), è centrale nell'Abhidharma buddhista e nell'opera di Patañjali (cfr. *Yogasūtra* 1.5; 2.2-14).

[59] L'uso del termine *roga* è copioso fin dai più antichi testi sanscriti. Deriva dalla radice √*ruj*, che indica l'atto di rompere, danneggiare, affliggere. Il termine *roga*, dunque, è usato per indicare gli stati di affezione, malattia, sofferenza patologica. Cfr., ad es., Chakravarthi 2021: 27-57; Maas 2007/2008. Il termine *roga* è ampiamente usato nel canone pāli (ad es. in *Rogasutta* in *Aṅguttara Nikāya* 4 [16. *Indriyavagga*], 157 (in PTS AN vol. 2, p. 143) e in opere buddhiste successive (ad

esigenza di far fronte ai fattori patogeni che affliggono le opere, le parole e i pensieri, per tener testa ai quali serve aderire ai processi reali, per sfruttarne meglio la forza. Tutte le indagini e le analisi messe a punto dai suddetti autori, infatti, sono segnate dalla concretezza. Pur provenendo da 'orientamenti' (*darśana*) distinti, sono presto approdati a un medesimo modo di intendere la logica genealogica che lega i malanni alle cure: un 'modo di vedere' (*vidyā*)[60] rigorosamente empirico, topico, pragmatico, incline al concreto e ostile alle 'soluzioni di continuità' (*bheda*).

Si tratta di un modo di vedere disincantato ed eversivo, che però, unitamente alla vocazione pragmatica ed empirista, ha permesso di mettere a tema il ruolo fondante del disagio patemico, rovesciando radicalmente la scena e trasformando, così, il danno in risorsa. L'irrompere di un sintomo è il movente che spinge a ricercarne le cause e i modi per arrestarlo e scongiurarne la recrudescenza. A 'ben vedere' è proprio l'insorgenza di un disturbo inedito che spinge il praticante dell'*ars medica* a rinnovare la sua

es., *Samādhirājasūtra* 1.9-10; 32.172-179; 34.44-46; 36.57-60; 38.50-51). Le tradizioni dell'*āyurveda* riconoscono appieno la forza morfogenetica della malattia, a partire dalla quale dispongono l'articolazione logica delle operazioni diagnostico-terapeutiche, scandita da un apposito lessico: *rogalakṣaṇa*, i segni di una specifica patologia; *rogahetu*, la causa genetica della malattia; *rogaviniścaya*, la procedura diagnostica; *rogaśama*, la condizione d'acquietamento di *roga*, dunque l'essere sulla via della guarigione, in convalescenza; *rogamukta*, l'esser guarito; *viroga*, la 'salute' in quanto condizione derivante, per contrasto, dall'assenza di *roga*. Cfr. Wujastyk 2009.

[60] Intendo il termine *vidyā* (da √*vid*, 'conoscere', 'capire', ecc.) in senso cotensivo, ossia leggendolo sempre a fronte dell'antonimo *avidyā*. La mia attenzione è quindi rivolta all'endiade *vidyā/avidyā* in quanto figurazione dell'ambiguità che affligge simultaneamente tanto il *percipere* quanto il *cogitare*. Questa resa della coppia *vidyā/avidyā* tiene conto sia dell'aspetto sinestetico-sensibile dell'atto 'visuale', sia della concretezza del riferimento alla dialettica capacità/incapacità di 'vedere le cose', tanto sensibile quanto intelleggibile. In questo modo si dà ragione del valore 'negativo' assegnato alla condizione di *avidyā*, che i nostri autori ritengono responsabile di tutti gli equivoci e le sviste, sia percettive sia cognitive: una sorta di miopia sinestetica, un'agnosia, che affligge l'intero 'vissuto patico' (*cittavṛtti*), a ogni livello, provocando la gran varietà di errori di valutazione a cui è soggetto il 'vedente' (*draṣṭṛ*). È nella condizione di *avidyā*, ad es., che si scambia il perituro per imperituro, l'impuro per puro, il disagevole per agevole, il non-sé per il sé. Cfr. *Yogasūtra* 2.3-5; 2.24. Insomma, è questa incapacità diacritica la grave 'malattia' a cui urge 'mettere fine' (*nirodha*) e i cui principali sintomi sono il 'sentirsi qualcuno' (*asmitā*) e il reputarsi 'agente in proprio' (*ahaṃkāra*). Cfr., su *vidyā/avidyā*, Hacker 1995; Rukmani 1986; Solomon 1969.

'arte', portandolo a far tesoro del malanno. Da questo punto di vista, egli non tarda a riconoscere l'effettivo valore dell'evento patemico e a rovesciare, in suo favore, la gerarchia dei fattori che orientano e governano i rapporti tra l'istanza sintomatica e quella diagnostica, tra il 'patema patito' e lo 'schema terapeutico'.

La lezione di metodo impartita dalle opere di questi autori, perciò, è davvero notevole e gravida di conseguenze. In ambito strettamente medico[61], il riconoscimento del primato causale alla patologia comporta la sua elezione a matrice: è la patologia il fattore genetico che dà forma agli schemi nosografici e ai metodi di cura (*yoga*). È questo l'assioma logico che informa le opere degli autori di cui sto trattando, per i quali la parola *yoga* non indica mai un oggetto finito, una cosa data, fissa e costante, sempre uguale a se stessa, bensì fa sempre riferimento a metodiche specifiche, tutte messe a punto per contrastare l'insorgenza degli effetti sintomatici (*phala*) provocati da cause patologiche (*hetu*), anch'esse costantemente in mutazione.

L'astuzia diagnostica e la perizia procedurale che caratterizzano l'operato degli autori in questione non sono né inedite né una loro prerogativa esclusiva. Fin dalle *saṃhitā* vediche, varie tradizioni di esperti avevano trattato il complesso rapporto tra salute e malattia, contribuendo alla messa a tema del carattere empirico e pragmatico del 'paradigma terapeutico'[62]: è solo quando un malanno scompare che un 'metodo di cura' è degno di questo nome. Siffatto appello al principio d'efficacia esalta e, allo stesso tempo, relativizza la cura, poiché ribadisce l'indissolubilità sistemica del legame che unisce i rimedi ai patemi, i sintomi alle cause. Ciò equivale a dire che la malattia funge da fondamentale criterio di garanzia della cura, subordinando il valore di quest'ultima all'effettiva capacità d'estinzione dei mali.

A proposito di morfogenesi in concomitanza, si guardi al modo in cui i redattori dello *Atharvaveda*, opera notoriamente legata alla storia dell'*āyurveda*[63], affrontano il palesarsi di varie forme di pato-

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[61] Cfr., ad es., Zimmermann 1989.

[62] Riprendo l'espressione 'paradigma terapeutico' da Wilhelm Halbfass che con essa voleva rendere conto della trasversalità storico-geografica della questione. Cfr. Halbfass 1992.

[63] Cfr. Filliozat 1964; Maas 2018; Roşu 2001a.

logia, qui indicate facendo ricorso alla figura di una demonessa di nome Nirr̥ti (termine che indica dissoluzione, entropia e rovina, tutti fenomeni di cui è la personificazione)[64]. Le modalità operative e il significato di Nirr̥ti sono ricavati dal rovesciamento dello schema dell''ordinamento ordinario' (r̥ta), dando così corpo e forma antonimici a tutto ciò che ad esso risultava antinomico[65]. In quanto emblema della disarmonia, la figura di Nirr̥ti è peculiare: a differenza di altri demoni, infatti, non viene deprecata e scacciata, bensì supplicata e pacificata. In un inno dell'*Atharvaveda* Nirr̥ti è descritta come *grāhi* (da √*grah*, 'afferrare'), ossia come una pervasiva forza predatrice.

Ed è al fine di strappare l'infermo dalle braccia di Nirr̥ti che si leva minaccioso l'*incipit* di *Atharvaveda* 3.11.1-4[66] (ma anche di altri, quali *Atharvaveda* 2.9.1):

> 1. Mediante la (mia) oblazione ti libero, perché tu viva, dal morbo sconosciuto (*ajñātayakṣma*) e dal morbo regio (*rājayakṣma*). Se Grāhi ha afferrato così costui, da essa, o Indra e Agni, liberate costui.
> 2. Se la sua vita è consumata, o se è trapassato, se è stato condotto proprio vicino alla morte, io prendo lui dal seno di Nirr̥ti (Distruzione); lo ho salvato per (una vita) di cento autunni (anni).
> 3. Mediante un'oblazione che ha mille occhi, che dà centupla forza, centupla vita, ho preso costui, affinché Indra lo conduca durante gli autunni alla riva di là di ogni sventura.
> 4. Vivi prosperando cento autunni, cento inverni, cento primavere: cento (te ne diano) Indra, Agni, Savitar, Br̥haspati. Io ho preso costui con una oblazione che dà centupla vita.

> *muñcā́mi tvā havíṣā jīvanāya kám ajñātayakṣmā́d utá rājayakṣmā́t |*
> *grā́hir jagrā́ha yády etád enaṃ tásyā indrāgnī prá mumuktam enam ||* 1

[64] Su Nirr̥ti, vedi *R̥gveda* 1.24.9 (implorazioni per allontanarla); 5.41.17 (sovrintende alla vecchiaia); 7.104.9 (è l'entità a cui si affidano gli sfruttatori e gli ingiusti); 10.61.1-4; *Atharvaveda* 3.6.5 (è invocata contro i propri nemici); 3.11.2; 7.42.1-2. Nella letteratura epico-didattica Nirr̥ti è la figlia/moglie di Adharma, mentre la sua prole consiste in Mr̥tyu, Bhaya e Mahābhaya.

[65] Dunque, malattia e trasgressione rituale/morale possono risultare correlati. Sul rapporto fra 'malattia' (*yakṣma*, *pāpman*) e 'pecca' (*enas*, *āgas*), si vedano, ad es., *Atharvaveda* 2.10.1, 8.7.3 e *R̥gveda* 5.3.7, 6.74.3.

[66] Tr. Papesso 1994: 81.

yádi kṣitāyur yádi vā páreto yádi mṛtyór antikáṃ evá |
tám ā́ harāmi nírṛter upásthād áspārśam enaṃ śatáśāradāya ‖ 2
sahasrākṣéṇa śatávīryeṇa śatā́yuṣā havíṣāhārṣam enam |
índro yáthainaṃ śarádo náyāty áti víśvasya duritásya pārám ‖ 3
śatáṃ jīva śarádo várdhamānaḥ śatáṃ hemantā́n chatám u vasantā́n |
śatáṃ te índro agníḥ savitā́ bṛhaspátiḥ śatā́yuṣā havíṣāhārṣam enam ‖ 4

Il valore risolutivo dell'oblazione è subordinato all'effettiva capacità della stessa di liberare la vittima dalla terribile stretta di Nirṛti: è dall'arresto della forza di quest'ultima che la prima trae la sua potenza, inscrivendo, con ciò, il valore dell'oblazione in seno alla suddetta logica della 'concomitanza dei coefficienti causali'.

Questa maniera di articolare la relazione tra la matrice della condizione patemica e la genesi della soluzione schematica è adottata anche dalle tradizioni dell'*āyurveda*, i cui trattati più antichi mostrano piena contezza delle ragioni pratiche della propria origine: sono la pochezza e la brevità della vita ad aver generato gli sforzi tesi alla ricerca di modelli di condotta in grado di accrescerne la durata e di ritardarne la fine. Secondo la *Suśrutasaṃhitā* (c. IV-VI sec.), infatti, è la precarietà della vita ad aver motivato la disposizione di un sapere ausiliario —qui detto *āyurveda* e organizzato in otto àmbiti (*aṣṭāṅga*)—[67] volto a estenderla nel tempo. È la perentorietà della morte a spingere il vivente verso la ricerca di un'ambrosia in grado di contrastarla.

Gli stessi otto àmbiti del trattamento terapeutico (*cikitsā*) descritti nella *Suśrutasaṃhitā* sono specularmente e cotensivamente ricavati dal distinguo pratico tra otto principali tipologie patologiche:

1. tecniche d'estrazione di corpi estranei (*śalya*);
2. tecniche di chirurgia oculare e auricolare (*śālākya*);
3. tecniche e rimedi corporei (*kāyacikitsā*);
4. saperi contro i disturbi dei modi d'essere e degli stati d'animo (*bhūtavidyā*);
5. rimedi ai difetti di crescita degli infanti (*kaumārabhṛtya*);
6. trattamento e preparazione degli antidoti (*agadatantra*);
7. trattamento e preparazione di decongestionanti e fluidificanti (*rāsāyanatantra*);

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[67] Cfr. *Suśrutasaṃhitā* 1.34.5-10 (in part. 1.34.8, per l'uso di *aṣṭāṅga*; 1.34.6).

8. trattamento e preparazione di tonici e stimolanti (*vājīka-raṇatantra*)[68].

Dunque, è l'aderenza ai caratteri morfologici del patema preso in esame a orientare il sequenziamento dei diversi àmbiti dell'intervento medico-terapeutico.

A partire da questi pochi esempi di morfogenesi in concomitanza, non sorprende il fatto di rintracciare la stessa concezione modale, sistemica e 'olistica'[69] del vissuto patemico anche al di fuori delle tradizioni e delle opere menzionate. Diversi autori, infatti, provenienti da contesti diversi, si sono adoperati per declinare, in seno ai rispettivi àmbiti, il principio logico del paradigma diagnostico-terapeutico e, riconoscendone il potere euristico e cogliendo i vantaggi del suo esser basato sulla presa d'atto del disagio patemico, lo hanno largamente utilizzato.

Il ricorso a tale paradigma, infatti, è puntuale e frequente e lo si trova, sempre rappresentato in forma tetralemmatica, tanto nei *cikitsāśāstra* ('trattati di medicina'), quanto nei *mokṣaśāstra* e *yogaśāstra*[70]. La logica che organizza i contenuti di opere come la *Suśrutasaṃhitā* è la stessa che orienta la disposizione nosografica di numerosi altri modelli e metodi di cura del disagio patemico: da quello indicato negli antichi *sutta* del Buddha, a quello esposto dai passi di ispirazione proto-Sāṃkhya riportati nello *Śāntiparvan* del *Mahābhārata*; dal disperato lamento di Arjuna (vedi *Bhagavadgītā* 1) con l'affettuosa promessa salvifica di Kṛṣṇa (*Bhagavadgītā*, 18.66), fino a quello presentato negli *Yogasūtra*, in cui il disagio cognitivo provocato dal profluvio degli stimoli (vedi *Yogasūtra* 2.15) dà forma a un metodico procedere anamnestico reversivo (*pratiprasava*) volto al suo acquietamento (vedi *Yogasūtra* 1.2).

Di questo accordo di massima tra vari orientamenti e metodi di cura dà riprova ancora più lampante il lessico tecnico impiegato in differenti opere, le quali abbondano di rovesciamenti semanti-

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[68] Cfr. *Suśrutasaṃhitā* 1.1.6-9.

[69] Malgrado il termine 'olismo' sia decisamente inflazionato, la concezione che di esso si aveva nelle antiche tradizioni mediche di area mediterranea merita attenzione. Cfr. Thumiger 2021.

[70] Penso, in particolare, agli *incipit* di quei *mūlasūtra* in cui l'istanza del trovare rimedi al disagio patemico, fisico o cognitivo, occupa una posizione di rilievo. Cfr., ad es., *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.2; *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.1.6; *Yogasūtra* 2.15; *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 1-2.

ci, conî e neologismi condivisi[71]. Tale lessico procede spesso per insiemi di termini e tetralemmi, dunque in modalità cotensiva e contrappuntistica, ricco di antonimi e anafore[72], di metafore sia agricole e botaniche[73] sia fluviali e idrologiche[74]. Per tali ragioni, va esso stesso inteso alla stregua di uno strumento di cura, poiché permette di vedere ciò che l'abituale uso di parole a sé stanti tende a coprire. L'interpretazione del potenziale teoretico di un siffatto repertorio lessicale è dunque di grande importanza, per la comprensione tanto delle opere in cui viene utilizzato quanto della genesi interdiscorsiva dei contenuti veicolati[75].

Tra i vari esempi d'adozione della suddetta sistemica modale è emblematico quello del tetralemma diagnostico che si trova nella prima parte (Sādhanapāda) degli *Yogasūtra*. Anche in questo caso, la proposta di uno schema d'azione quadripartito prende il via dalla presa d'atto del disagio patemico che va evitato (*heya*, cfr. *Yogasūtra* 2.16), consistente nella concretissima, seppur 'non ancora giunta' (*duḥkham anāgatam*, cfr. *Yogasūtra* 2.16), ingerenza del disagio (*pariṇāmatāpasaṃskāraduḥkhaiḥ*, cfr. *Yogasūtra* 2.15), ossia il trittico di patemi che affliggono, sincronicamente, l'insieme delle cognizioni, le forme dell'interazione ambientale e il dominio del pulsionale corporeo[76].

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[71] I trattati classici di arte medica, la *Carakasaṃhitā* e la *Suśrutasaṃhitā*, condividono categorie e lessico tecnico comuni alle tradizioni di *sāṃkhya*, *nyāya* e *vaiśeṣika* del loro tempo. Cfr., ad es., Preisendanz 2013: 63-139; Chattopadhyaya 1991: 149-281; 457-482; 483-528; 529-540; Comba 1990, 2001; Wezler 1984b. Sul rapporto tra empiria e teoria in medicina, vedi Malinar 2014; Engler 2003.

[72] Sulla semiotica tensiva degli antonimi, cfr. Greimas e Fontanille 2013: 108-114.

[73] Sono questi gli àmbiti in cui abbondano i prestiti lessicali e in cui si intrecciano i modelli rappresentativi della botanica, dell'agricoltura e dell'allevamento, che ricorrono a coppie come fertilità/sterilità, umidità/aridità, plasticità/rigidità, vitalità/mortalità. Cfr., ad es., Benveniste 2001, vol. II: 376-383. Inoltre, Hidas 2019; O'Brien-Kop 2017; Schmithausen 2009; Dessein 2008; Wojtilla 2006.

[74] Un lessico segnatamente modale e spesso mutuato dall'idrologia, così come dal vocabolario fluviale e dal dominio delle metafore acquee. Cfr., ad es., Roşu 1999-2000; 2001b.

[75] La vasta diffusione del lessico relativo alla medicina e alla guarigione è spia del valore pragmatico ed empirico a essi riconosciuti. Cfr., ad es., Wujastyk 2012a; Maas 2007/2008; Smith 2007; White 2006; Lyssenko 2004; Bronkhorst 2002: 115-121; Wezler 1990; Zimmermann 1989; Larson 1987; Wezler 1984a; Roşu 1978.

[76] Tale formulazione richiama la triade della *dukkhatā* presente nei testi buddhisti già dai *sutta* in pāli (ossia *dukkhadukkhatā*, *saṃkhāradukkhatā*, *vipariṇāma-*

Di conseguenza, il secondo momento del procedere diagnostico è la messa a tema del motivo della patogenesi (*heyahetu*), il quale consiste nell''accostamento contagioso' (*saṃyoga*)[77] da cui scaturiscono le figure ipostatiche del 'soggetto vedente' (*draṣṭṛ*) e dell''oggetto visto' (*dṛśya*) (*Yogasūtra* 2.17, 2.23-24).

Individuato così il motivo del patema, il terzo momento dello schema contempla la possibilità di estinguere (*hāna*) (*Yogasūtra* 2.25) la causa stessa del 'triplice patema' mediante l'arresto (*nirodha*) del decorso.

Il quarto e ultimo momento dello schema è quello in cui si riconosce all'abilità discriminativa (*viveka*)[78] il ruolo di mezzo effettivo dell'istanza terapeutica (*hānopāya*) (*Yogasūtra* 2.26-28).

In estrema sintesi, dunque, la sequenza logica del tetralemma in questione è la seguente: la cifra del disagio patemico (*heya*) è sintomaticamente ravvisata nei tre tipi di *duḥkha* (*Yogasūtra* 2.15-16); la causa del patema (*heyahetu*) pertiene eziologicamente a

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dukkhatā; ad es., *Dīgha Nikāya*, PTS, vol. III, p. 216; *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, PTS, vol. IV, p. 259; vol. V, p. 56). A una formula triadica allude anche *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 1. Notevole, in merito alla messa a tema dei fattori scatenanti il triplice articolarsi della malattia nei suoi effetti sintomatici (*doṣa*), l'*incipit* del *vimānasthāna* della *Carakasaṃhitā*.

[77] Con l'espressione 'accostamento contagioso' do risalto agli intenti diagnostici sottostanti alle descrizioni con cui questi autori illustrano le dinamiche patogenetiche. L'àmbito del 'contatto' (*saṃyoga*), ampiamente utilizzato in *Carakasaṃhitā*, è lo spazio ipotetico di cui si serve il discorso nosografico per delimitare l'area della 'contingenza' in cui due corpi —obbedendo al principio della ricorsività cotensiva che segna l'andamento di ogni ciclo biotico e metabolico— entrano in relazione, mescolandosi. La definizione del 'contesto di concomitanza' è perciò strumentale alla determinazione dei 'contenuti in committenza' dello stesso, sicché da distinguere un organismo patemico dai fattori patogeni. L'idea di una zona intermedia in cui avviene il 'con-tatto' tra le parti in causa, alla stregua di un'intercapedine, è intimamente legata a quella di 'causa patologica', ossia il dispositivo nosografico che permette l'isolamento del corpo paziente dai vettori patogenetici. Le 'somiglianze' tra agente patogeno e soggetto patente, quindi, sono individuate e distinte a partire dal punto in cui questi entrano in contatto (*saṃyoga*), dandosi reciprocamente forma visibile (*rūpa*). Lo spazio detto *saṃyoga*, perciò, è dunque il punto d'innesco del contagio patologico di cui le forme diadiche del 'visto' (*dṛśya*) e del 'vedente' (*draṣṭṛ*) sono i sintomi patenti, che negli *Yogasūtra* sono detti *kleśa* mentre nella *Carakasaṃhitā* sono detti *doṣa*. Sul tema del contagio, cfr. Das 2000; Zysk 2000.

[78] Ricordo che il *viveka* a cui il *sūtra* fa riferimento è implicito in *Yogasūtra* 1.12, come indica la glossa di Vyāsa, ossia l'atteggiamento diacritico che accompagnerà il ragionamento fino a *Yogasūtra* 4.28.

draṣṭṛdṛśyayoḥ saṃyogo heyahetuḥ (*Yogasūtra* 2.17-24); l'arresto [della causa] (*hāna*) è prognosticato nei termini di *saṃyogābhava / kaivalya* (*Yogasūtra* 2.25)[79]; lo strumento terapeutico (*hānopāya*) consiste nel ricorso alla *vivekakhyātir aviplavā* (*Yogasūtra* 2.26-28).

Il *sūtrakāra* dedica la restante porzione del Sādhanapāda (*Yogasūtra* 2.29-55) alla prescrizione dei moduli (*aṅga*) attraverso cui un paziente può rendere operativo il 'metodo [di cura]' (*kriyāyoga*). I primi cinque *aṅga* servono sia da moduli terapeutici sia da sessioni riabilitative dello stato patemico del paziente, il quale, grazie all'antidoto (*pratipakṣa*, cfr. *Yogasūtra* 2.33-34)[80], può ora toccare con mano l'ingerenza patica che la semiotica degli stati di cose esercita sui suoi stati d'animo[81].

Si può dunque sostenere che il tetralemma su cui si regge l'architettura del metodo (*yoga*) proposto dagli *Yogasūtra* riassuma le fasi di una vera e propria terapia semio-somatica. È fin dalla glossa di Vyāsa ai *sūtra* su indicati che sappiamo della stretta parentela logica tra questo schema d'azione diagnostico-terapeutico e il tetralemma in uso presso le tradizioni mediche del tempo. La glossa richiama queste ultime per chiarire e ribadire il significato delle quattro fasi (*caturvyūha*) illustrate dai *sūtra* e propone una terza variante del tetralemma stesso.

A tale proposito è significativa la porzione del *bhāṣya* in cui Vyāsa conclude la disamina di *Yogasūtra* 2.15 (*pariṇāmatāpasaṃskāraduḥkhair guṇavṛttivirodhāc ca sukhaṃ duḥkham eva sarvaṃ vive-*

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[79] Si vedano a tale proposito le occorrenze di *kaivalya* in *Yogasūtra* 3.50; 3.55; 4.26; 4.34.

[80] Per la resa di *pratipakṣa* come 'antidoto', dunque come 'rimedio' contrastivo e controtensivo, in ottica metabolica, cfr. Schmithausen 2014: 145-146, 247-259, 449-500, 508, 519; Steinkellner 1999; Janacek 1951 (in part. pp. 522-533). La formula *pratipakṣabhāvana* risente dell'ampia discussione nei testi buddhisti coevi, che la presentano spesso assieme a *vitarkabādhana*. Vedi, ad es., *Madhyāntavibhāga* 4.1-18; *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkara* 18.10; *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* 1.26; 4.42; 5.60-63; 7.8-9; 7.27. In queste opere il tema dell'antidoto, legato al paradigma medico e 'terapeutico' e imparentato con quello dell'inculcamento (*sātmibhāva*), è nodale, anche se poi verrà sottoposto a severo scrutinio da autori successivi, a partire da Dharmakīrti (VI-VII sec.). Cfr., ad es., *Pramāṇavārttika* 1.220-223.

[81] La coppia 'stati d'animo' e 'stati di cose' —mutuata dalla semiotica delle affezioni di Greimas e Fontanille (2013)— è atta a segnalare l'intreccio pratico che correla il triplice dominio dell'esperienza motoria, somatica e sensibile a quello dell'esperienza patica, semantica e intelligibile.

kinaḥ ||), ossia il *sūtra* precedente a quelli contenenti il tetralemma in oggetto:

[…] Ora, preso atto che il seminale morbo da cui origina un così grande accumulo di disagio e malessere è il non vedere come stanno le cose, ne consegue che il rimedio per la sua estinzione sia la corretta visione [delle cose]. Ragion per cui, nella stessa maniera in cui i trattati di medicina illustrano le quattro fasi [del procedere diagnostico], ossia [l'accertamento su base] sintomatica della malattia; [l'individuazione della] causa della malattia; [lo scorgere la possibilità della] guarigione dalla malattia; [la prescrizione e la somministrazione del] rimedio, di certo anche la [metodica presentata in questo] trattato procede seguendo [le medesime] quattro fasi. Esse sono [parafrasandole]: [la presa d'atto della cifra] del disagio ondivago del divenire; [l'individuazione] della causa di un siffatto divenire; [lo scorgere la possibilità] dello svincolamento da tale causa; [la prescrizione e somministrazione] del rimedio atto allo svincolamento [dal disagevole divenire]. Dunque[82], sono i turbamenti derivanti dall'esposizione al divenire, forieri del moltiplicarsi del disagio, a dover essere eliminati; è la commistione[83] tra *pradhāna* e *puruṣa* la causa di ciò che va eliminato; è il ritrarsi definitivo dagli effetti della commisione il dissolvimento [della causa di ciò che va eliminato]; ed è la retta visione il mezzo per attuare questo dissolvimento.

[Infine,] a proposito della natura propria di colui che procede all'eliminazione, [si sappia che tale natura] non può essere né estinta, né acquisita. Infatti, qualora se ne accettasse l'estinguibilità, s'incorrerebbe nelle [fallacie] della 'tesi della distruttibilità [del sé]', mentre, qualora se ne accettasse l'acquisibilità, [s'incorrerebbe nelle fallacie] della 'tesi della generazione causata [del sé]'[84]. Rifiutando entrambe queste prospettive, si opti per la tesi della persistenza [del sé]: è questa la retta visione.

tad asya mahato duḥkhasamudāyasya prabhavabījam avidyā | tasyāś ca samyagdarśanam abhāvahetuḥ | yathā cikitsā sāstraṃ caturvyūham 'rogo rogahetur ārogyaṃ bhaiṣajyam' iti | evam idam api sāstraṃ caturvyūham eva | tadyathā 'saṃsāraḥ saṃsārahetur mokṣo mokṣopāya' iti | tatra duḥkhabahulaḥ saṃsāro heyaḥ | pradhānapuruṣayoḥ saṃyogo heyahetuḥ | saṃyogasyātyantikī nivṛttir hānam | hānopāyaḥ samyagdarśanam |

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[82] Riferendosi a quanto sarà indicato in *Yogasūtra* 2.16-26.
[83] Cfr. n. 77 *supra*.
[84] Cfr., di contro, Nāgārjuna, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 15.10-11, 21.7-17.

> *tatra hātuḥ svarūpam upādeyaṃ vā heyaṃ vā na bhavitum arhatīti |*
> *hāne tasyocchedavādaprasaṅga upādāne ca hetuvādaḥ | ubhaya-*
> *pratyākhyāne śāśvatavāda ity etat samyagdarśanam ||2.15||*

Malgrado fosse noto agli autori tradizionali, il merito della ricostruzione filologica della genesi del rapporto che lega i due tetralemmi (*caturvyūha*) va ad Albrecht Wezler (1984a)[85]. In questo stesso studio i due schemi tetralemmatici in esame sono stati accostati anche a un terzo e importante tetralemma, ossia quello esposto fin dai più antichi *sutta* del Buddha e noto come *caturāryasatya*, sul quale tornerò più avanti.

Data l'importanza che riveste all'interno del mio ragionamento, reputo utile chiarire l'associazione tra tetralemmi proposta da Vyāsa, anche perché la forma in cui questi riporta le sequenze del metodo medico in 'quattro fasi' (*caturvyūha*) a cui fa riferimento nella glossa a *Yogasūtra* 2.15 —attribuita a un non meglio specificato *cikitsāśāstra*— è assai sintetica. Della stessa, perciò, mi sia permessa la seguente parafrasi:

1. la fase detta *roga*, ossia l'operazione ispettiva e anamnestica attraverso la quale il medico prende atto dei sintomi[86];
2. la fase detta *rogahetu*, ossia l'individuazione delle cause del patema tramite la correlazione tra fattori patogeni e coefficienti causali responsabili dei sintomi;
3. la fase detta *ārogya*, ossia l'arresto delle cause del patema, l'operazione prognostica con cui il medico si accerta di disporre di rimedi efficaci e li prescrive;

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[85] Oltre ai paralleli con le opere buddhiste individuati da Wezler, si vedano *Milindapañha* 4.17 e 4.33, e alcuni brani di Asaṅga: *Yogācārabhūmi* (*Śrāvakabhūmi* 253) *tatra duḥkhasatyaṃ vyādhisthānīyaṃ tat prathamataḥ parijñeyam || samudayasatyaṃ vyādhinidānasthānīyaṃ tac cāntaraṃ parivarjayitavyam || nirodhasatyam ārogyasthānīyaṃ tac ca sparśayitavyaṃ sākṣātkartavyam || mārgasatyaṃ bhaiṣajyasthānīyaṃ tac cāsevitavyaṃ bhāvayitavyaṃ bahulīkartavyam ||*) e *Bodhisattvabhūmi* 17. Vedi anche *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* 6.2: *yatra hi sakto yena ca bādhyate yataś ca mokṣaṃ prārthayate, tad evādau vyavacāraṇāvasthāyāṃ duḥkhasatyaṃ parīkṣyate | paścāt ko 'sya hetur iti samudayasatyam, ko 'sya nirodha iti nirodhasatyam, ko 'sya mārga iti mārgasatyam | vyādhiṃ dṛṣṭvā tannidānakṣayabheṣajānveṣaṇavat | sūtre 'py eṣa eva satyānāṃ dṛṣṭānto darśitaḥ | katamasmin sūtre — caturbhir aṅgaiḥ samanvāgato bhiṣak śalyāpahartā iti.* Inoltre, vedi Anālayo 2022; Wujastyk 2012; Maas 2007/2008.

[86] Per un esempio di descrizione eziologica della malattia e dei suoi effetti sintomatici, vedi *Carakasaṃhitā* 3.1.1-12. Cfr. Zimmermann 2021; Chakravarthi 2021: 27-57; Das 2003: 548-550; 568-569. Sulla dialettica tra nosografia e diagnostica, vedi Meulenbeld 1991.

4. la fase detta *bhaiṣajya*, ossia il trattamento, l'insieme delle opera-
zioni terapeutiche con la somministrazione dei rimedi atti a debel-
lare le istanze patogene e a ripristinare la salute del paziente.

Malgrado non sia esplicitato da Vyāsa, sappiamo, grazie allo studio
di Wezler prima citato, che la sua rappresentazione del tetralem-
ma medico è riconducibile alla tradizione della *Carakasaṃhitā*. Al
fine di chiarire la natura dei parallelismi tra *yogaśāstra* e *cikitsāśā-
stra*, esaminiamo da vicino la porzione della *Carakasaṃhitā* a cui
pare alludere il *bhāṣya* di Vyāsa.

La *Carakasaṃhitā*, costituita da 120 *adhyāya* ripartiti in otto prin-
cipali *sthāna*, è la più antica opera di *āyurveda* conosciuta, la cui
redazione (Meulenbeld 1999, vol. 1A: 105-115) si colloca tra il 100
a.C. e il 200 d.C., risultando anteriore dunque tanto al *bhāṣya* di
Vyāsa quanto agli stessi *Yogasūtra*. Si tratta di un'opera influente,
espressione di una tradizione medica tanto autorevole quanto sis-
tematica. Ciò è evidente fin dal primo *adhyāya* del *sūtrasthāna*, in
cui si sottolinea l'importanza che ha per l'adepto del metodo
medico, qui chiamato *āyurveda*, l'avere contezza del quadro d'in-
sieme del fenomeno patologico[87]. Questo richiamo alla perizia è
svolto mediante l'eloquente immagine dell'imperituro triplice
intreccio' (*trisūtraṃ śāśvataṃ puṇyam*), che fissa un principio di
mutuo sostegno tra l'indagine eziologica (*hetu*), l'accertamento
sintomatologico (*liṅga*) e la somministrazione terapeutica (*auṣad-
ha*)[88].

Di tono simile è anche l'ottavo *adhyāya* dello stesso *sūtrasthāna*,
che tratta dei vincoli tra percezione sensibile e intelletto, nonché
delle relative patologie. Il nono *adhyāya*, intitolato 'sunto dei quat-
tro quarti [del metodo medico]' (*khuḍḍākacatuṣpāda*)[89], illustra le

[87] Cfr. Preisendanz 2007.

[88] Cfr. *Carakasaṃhitā* 1.1.24-25.

[89] Il titolo è strettamente correlato a quello del decimo *adhyāya* (*Caraka-
saṃhitā* 1.10.1-24), il *mahācatuṣpāda*. Quest'ultimo richiama la suddetta quaterna
ma ne discute in relazione alla tradizione medica di Maitreya, che qui viene
screditata (*Carakasaṃhitā* 1.10.22). L'analisi del significato teoretico delle par-
tizioni interne e delle titolature di un'opera è di estrema importanza, benché
siano questi gli aspetti maggiormente esposti all'operato redazionale. Cfr.
Preisendanz 2018. La rivalità e la polemica tra diverse prospettive mediche strut-
tura anche l'andamento delle singole tradizioni. Cfr. Fiordalis 2017.

componenti della 'quaterna' (*catuṣpāda*) su cui si regge il metodo medico trasmesso da Ātreya, in cui compaiono termini affini a quelli indicati nella versione del tetralemma presente nel *bhāṣya* agli *Yogasūtra*. I protagonisti sono menzionati all'inizio: medico (*bhiṣaj*), attendente (*upasthātṛ*), sostanze medicinali (*dravya*), paziente (*rogin*) (*Carakasaṃhitā* 1.9.3-5)[90].

Ma è circa alla metà del nono *adhyāya* che troviamo il passo dedicato allo schema d'azione tetralemmatico (cfr. in partic. *Carakasaṃhitā* 1.9.18-22). Questa porzione del testo fa seguito a tre stanze in cui si denuncia la presenza di medici ignoranti e di impostori[91], il cui operato lede la reputazione pubblica dell'*ars* terapeutica. Questo richiamo al clima concorrenziale in cui si esercita la professione medica aggiunge salienza dialettica alla formulazione del tetralemma:

> 18. Perciò, è chiamato 'salva vita' il medico che è intento sulla quaterna, [vale a dire:] teoria, comprensione del [suo] significato, applicazione [e] operare oculato.
>
> 19. Costui, avendo contezza di questa quadripartizione, dunque delle cause, dei segni sintomatici, dei rimedi e di ciò che impedisce il tornare in essere dei malanni, è il migliore tra i medici, adatto [a fare il medico] del sovrano[92].
>
> 20. La qualità e i difetti di un'arma, dei trattati e dell'acqua si palesano a seconda del recipiente. Perciò, per svolgere [adeguatamente] il trattamento [il medico] dovrà affinare la prioria sapienza.
>
> 21. Visione, ragionamento critico, cognizione di causa, buona memoria, dedizione, operosità[93]: per colui che possiede queste sei qualità non vi è alcun obiettivo che risulti irraggiungibile.

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[90] Cfr. *Carakasaṃhitā* 1.9.3-5: *bhiṣag dravyāṇy upasthātā rogī pādacatuṣṭayam | guṇavat kāraṇaṃ jñeyaṃ vikāravyupaśāntaye || vikāro dhātuvaiśamyaṃ sāmyaṃ prakṛtir ucyate | sukhasaṃjñakam ārogyaṃ vikāro duḥkham eva ca || caturṇāṃ bhiṣagādīnāṃ śastānāṃ dhātuvaikṛte | pravṛttir dhātusāmyārthā cikitsety abhidhīyate ||*). Il richiamo a questa quaterna si estende, praticamente immutato, per secoli, arrivando fino all'opera di Bhāvamiśra (c. XVI sec.). Cfr., ad es., *Śusrutasaṃhitā*, 1.34.15-24 (16. *ete pādāś cikitsāyāḥ karmasādhanahetavaḥ | guṇavadbhis tribhiḥ pādaiś caturtho guṇavān bhiṣak ||*); Vāgbhaṭa, *Aṣṭāṅgahṛdayasaṃhitā*, Sūtrasthāna 1.27-29; Bhāvamiśra, *Bhāvapakāśa*, *pūrvakhaṇḍa*, 6.37-54.

[91] *Carakasaṃhitā* 1.9.15-17.

[92] Altro passo affine a quanto qui descritto è quello di *Carakasaṃhitā* 3.6.13.

[93] Si noti che il lessico qui impiegato è il medesimo che si trova tanto nei trattati di *yoga* quanto di *nyāya*. Cfr. Preisendanz 2013.

22. Sapienza, intelligenza, comprensione dei trattamenti, espe-rienza pratica, efficacia e affidabilità: ognuna di queste [qualità] è sufficiente a [giustificare l'uso della] parola 'medico' (*vaidya*).

tasmāc chāstre 'rthavijñāne pravṛttau karmadarśane |
bhiṣak catuṣṭaye yuktaḥ prāṇābhisara ucyate || 18
hetau liṅge praśamane rogāṇām apunarbhave |
jñānaṃ caturvidhaṃ yasya sa rājārho bhiṣaktamaḥ || 19
śastraṃ śāstrāṇi salilaṃ guṇadoṣapravṛttaye |
pātrāpekṣīn yataḥ prajñāṃ cikitsārthaṃ viśodhayet || 20
vidyā vitarko vijñānaṃ smṛtis tatparatā kriyā |
yasyaite ṣaḍ guṇās tasya na sādhyam ativartate || 21
vidyā matiḥ karmadṛṣṭir abhyāsaḥ siddhir āśrayaḥ |
vaidyaśabdābhiniṣpattāv alam ekaikam apy ataḥ || 22

Data la cogenza logica e la sistematicità tassonomica di queste stanze della *Carakasaṃhitā*, si comprende il motivo per cui Vyāsa le richiama nel commento al tetralemma degli *Yogasūtra*. In esse, infatti, si delineano tanto la struttura formale quanto il decorso pratico del trattamento terapeutico (*cikitsā*), evidenziandone sia i principî fondanti sia i fattori coesivi.

Lo schema tetralemmatico qui citato evidenzia i caratteri por-tanti del metodo diagnostico-terapeutico, il quale, partendo dalla presa d'atto del vincolo genetico che unisce il rimedio al malanno dipende tanto dal rigore con cui viene applicato, quanto dalla riscontrabilità pratica della sua efficacia. Questo empirismo con-ferisce forza e salienza all'*ars medica*: la pratica medica riscuote credito sociale e guadagna valore politico e 'biopolitico'[94].

A questo punto, è d'uopo tornare alla sopra citata formula del *caturāryasatya* del Buddha[95], la cui articolazione logica in quattro parti (vedi Wezler 1984) risulta parallela tanto al tetralemma dei *cikitsāśāstra* (ossia *roga*, *rogahetu*, *ārogya*, *bhaiṣajya*) quanto a quelli degli *yogaśāstra* (ossia *heya*, *heyahetu*, *hāna*, *hānopaya* secondo gli *Yogasūtra*, e *saṃsāra*, *saṃsārahetu*, *mokṣa*, *mokṣopāya* secondo la glos-sa di Vyāsa). Trattasi di una formula d'importanza capitale, in

[94] Cfr. Preisendanz 2015.
[95] Come è noto, il composto in oggetto è solitamente reso tramite la formula 'quattro nobili verità' o 'quattro verità dei Nobili'. Tra la vasta letteratura special-istica dedicata all'interpretazione della formula in questione, segnalo Anālayo 2022; Harvey 2013; 2009; 2003; Gotō 2005; Anderson 1999; Norman 1982.

quanto mirabile sunto dell'intera proposta del Buddha e perciò largamente nota e decisiva per il mio discorso.

La fortuna riscossa da questa formula è ampiamente testimoniata dalla lunga storia della sua ricezione. In virtù della sua eloquenza, lo schema diagnostico-terapeutico riflesso nel termine *caturāryasatya* si è imposto sulla scena del dibattito nosografico ed è rimasto per secoli al centro della riflessione, a prescindere dalle affiliazioni e dalle appartenenze. Esso ritorna nei *mūlasūtra* dei principali *darśana*, tra i quali appunto gli *Yogasūtra*.

Ciò che colpisce nello schema quadripartito è l'inedita centralità assegnata alla concretezza pratica e patica della condizione patologica, a fronte e in forza della quale può darsi la presa d'atto del disagio patemico[96]. Ponendo come primo momento del tetralemma l'attualità dello stato patologico, il Buddha invita a riconoscere la condizione di verità del sostrato patologico, elevandolo così al ruolo di condizione necessaria e indispensabile per affrancarsi e ritrovare un più salubre equilibrio. In altri termini, invece di ostinarsi nell'osannare la condizione di agio e obliare la persistenza del disagio, giova riconoscere tanto l'immanenza della concomitanza metabolica che le determina quanto il primato della seconda sulla prima. Un primato pratico, non teoretico, del quale è possibile prendere concretamente atto proprio a partire dalla scoperta della reversibilità della loro relazione. Da ciò procede la liberazione dal regime scopico dei dualismi di maniera e delle polarizzazioni fittizie, che affliggono tanto il dominio concreto della percezione quanto quello astratto delle rappresentazioni mnestiche. Dunque, abbandonando l'incerto terreno delle pseudo certezze eidetiche si vince l'illusione dei 'nomi' e delle 'forme' (*nāmarūpa*), restando saldamente ancorati all'effettiva 'verità' dell'incertezza patemica (*duḥkhasatya*)[97].

Questa assegnazione del primato pratico al disagio patemico non è frutto di mera astrazione, né tanto meno di derive pes-

[96] Cfr. Chakravarti 1951: 77-99; 318-321. Richiamo qui la proposta di Paul Williams circa la resa del termine *duḥkha* con *pathos/pain* in senso corporeo. Cfr. Williams 1997-1998.

[97] Qui, come in altre tradizioni, la preferenza accordata a *duḥkha* rispetto a *sukha* non ha nulla a che fare con la sfera del giudizio morale, ma rappresenta il gesto semiotico per il cui tramite si ripristina il primato del dominio topico dell''incompiutezza' su quello scopico e idealtipico delle cose 'compiute'.

simistiche, bensì consegue all'altrettanto empirica presa d'atto della già citata 'concomitanza dei coefficienti causali'[98], che permette di reinserire la condizione patemica all'interno di un sistema organico di forze immanenti, effettive e sempre in divenire, restituendola al ciclo metabolico di cui partecipa.

È a partire da questo assetto inedito che muove lo schema d'azione diagnostico-terapeutico della formula *caturāryasatya*, il quale, in estrema sintesi, può dirsi così disposto:

> 1. *duḥkhasatya*, la presa d'atto anamnestica e l'accertamento sintomatico dello stato patologico;
> 2. *samudayasatya*, l'accertamento della matrice eziologica dello stato patologico;
> 3. *nirodhasatya*, l'accertamento della prognosi;
> 4. *mārgasatya*, l'accertamento del viatico terapeutico, consistente nell''itinerario in otto moduli' (*āryāṣṭāṅgikamārga*).

Il tetralemma diagnostico dalla formula *caturāryasatya* è basato sul riconoscimento empirico della concomitanza dei fenomeni, al cui interno si intrecciano senza soluzione di continuità gli sguardi derivanti da varie prospettive, dalla medicina alla gnoseologia, dalla filosofia della natura alla semiotica, dall'estetica all'etica. Ciò farà guadagnare al Buddha i titoli di 'sovrano tra i medici' (*vaidyarāja*), di 'grande medico' (*mahāvaidya*), di 'grande terapeuta delle affezioni' (*mahākleśacikitsaka*)[99] e, infine, di 'maestro dei rimedi' (*bhaiṣajyaguru*)[100].

4. *Homo liber de nulla re minus, quam de morte cogitat*[101]

Questa rassegna di testimonianze sui quattro diversi tetralemmi nosografici aveva l'obiettivo di mettere in luce due aspetti intima-

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[98] In sanscrito *pratītyasamutpāda*, in pāli, *paṭiccasamuppāda*. Cfr., ad es., Salvini 2014; Shulman 2008; Chinn 2001; Jurewicz 2000; Bucknell 1999; Kritzer 1999; Garfield 1994; Cox 1993.

[99] Cfr., ad es., Granoff 2017; Anālayo 2011; Bronkhorst 2002; Liyanaratne 1996; Pierce Salguero 2022; Pierce Salguero 2017; Heirman e Torck 2012; Kitagawa 1989. È notevole l'impiego che di questi stessi termini fa la celebre raccolta degli appellativi rivolti a Viṣṇu, il quale, come è noto, è una figura evidentemente concorrente a quella del Buddha. Cfr. *Viṣṇusahasranāma* 164 (*vaidyaḥ* [rif. a Dhanvantari]), 287 (*auṣadham*), 578 (*bheṣajam*), 579 (*bhṛṣak*).

[100] Cfr., ad es., Iyanaga e Giebel 2018; Schopen 2017; Pierce Salguero 2014.

[101] Cfr. Spinoza, *Etica,* pt. IV, prop. 67: «L'uomo libero a nessuna cosa pensa meno che alla morte, sicché la sua sapienza è una meditazione non della morte,

mente correlati: da un lato, intendeva tratteggiare una storia minima dell'impiego del modello topologico-metabolico della concomitanza dei coefficienti causali, e, dall'altro, mirava a illustrare i motivi della persistenza nel tempo del favore accordato a un medesimo schema d'azione diagnostico-terapeutico.

L'intreccio di questi aspetti è decisivo non solo per la storia dell'indagine medica (intesa in senso stretto), ma anche per la più ampia storia delle antropotecniche, in senso lato. Coniugare il versante 'scopico/prospettico' (*dṛṣṭi*, *darśana*) con quello 'topico/operazionale' (*kriyā*) è il compito che spetta a coloro che si dedicano, mediante pratiche disciplinate, al governo dei disturbi dei vari cicli metabolici che determinano l'andamento del complesso regime della salute. Trattasi di un intreccio cruciale anche per la comprensione delle diverse 'metodiche forme d'azione' (*yoga*) passate in rassegna.

Tale pratica, assidua e scrupolosa, ha caratterizzato l'operato degli esponenti tanto delle tradizioni mediche, quanto di quelle soteriologiche. Esponenti di tradizioni distanti che, pur dissentendo sui fini della terapia, sono concordi circa l'urgenza di disporre di un mezzo che ne favorisca la messa a punto e si trovano d'accordo anche nel rivalutare l'importanza del sentire patemico.

La sinossi lessicale che segue, accostando tra loro gli elementi delle quattro quaterne, ne amplifica il ruolo e funge da quadrivio schematico, atto a illustrare i motivi della concordanza tra i diversi quartetti nosografici presi in esame, tutti rivolti al medesimo patema, radunandone i differenti elementi all'interno dei confini di un unico quadrivio di 'metodi' (*yoga*). Pur discordi nei fini, questi appaiono palesemente affini nel sostenere una medesima posizione di fondo: è l'immanenza somatico-topica dell'affezione patica a determinare l'ordinamento del regime semiotico-scopico di cui partecipa l'esperienza eidetica. Ecco, dunque, la sinossi lessicale del quartetto di quaterne, qui disposte in ordine cronologico, diversamente dall'ordine in cui le ho trattate sin qui:

ma della vita» (*Homo liber de nulla re minus, quam de morte cogitat, & ejus sapientia non mortis, sed vitæ meditatio est*).

Buddha	Caraka[102]	*Yogasūtra*	Vyāsa
duḥkha	*roga*	*heya*	*saṃsāra*
samudaya	*rogahetu*	*heyahetu*	*saṃsārahetu*
nirodha	*ārogya*	*hāna*	*mokṣa*
mārga	*bhaiṣajya*	*hānopāya*	*mokṣopāya*

Già il semplice accostamento dei termini presenti nei quattro tetralemmi mostra il carattere programmatico e pragmatico di tutti i percorsi, che pongono alla base della rispettive traiettorie lo stesso fondamento patente: il patema patito è il saldo terreno su cui tutti e quattro si poggiano, sebbene lo chiamino in modi diversi. Altrettanto univoco è il consenso circa l'ordine della sequenza dei quattro passi da farsi in vista del raggiungimento del fine.

Sono queste le ragioni pratiche che hanno motivato il persistere nei secoli di un così solido accordo tra specialisti di *cikitsā*, di *mokṣa* e di *yoga,* parimenti impegnati nel fronteggiare la natura sfuggente e fantasmatica della salute, concordi nel riconoscere il primato morfogenetico esercitato dalla somatica del disagio patemico (*roga, duḥkha, saṃsāra*) sulla semantica della configurazione dei diversi rimedi terapeutici (*bhaiṣajya, āryāṣṭāṅgikamārga, aṣṭāṅgayoga*), la cui anatomia, perciò, non può che essere aderente e isomorfa a quella dei disagi.

Una nuova stagione di studio delle opere dei suddetti specialisti si annuncia assai promettente. Questa potrebbe iniziare proprio dal proseguimento della lettura intertestuale e dell'analisi sinottica dei quattro tetralemmi. Lo studio analitico degli stessi, facendo tesoro delle concordanze e dei parallelismi derivanti dalla lettura sinottica e tenendo memoria della cifra metabolica e simbiotica della *ratio* che sostiene la suddetta concordia, trarrebbe profitto dall'osservare anche il minuto dettaglio delle quattro quaterne, scorgendo aspetti e relazioni insospettate[103].

Per un assaggio di quanto sia promettente l'analisi intertestuale di questi temi, si veda il terzo volume del lavoro enciclopedi-

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[102] Per agevolare la comparazione, invece di quella riportata nel testo della *Carakasaṃhitā* citato sopra, adotto qui l'articolazione lessicale della stessa presentata nel *bhāṣya* di Vyāsa, di cui ho trattato prima e a cui rimando.
[103] Come esempio delle possibili direzioni in cui potrebbero dirigersi futuri supplementi della ricerca sinottica, porto il caso della trattazione dei diversi *rasa*

co di G. Jan Meulenbeld sulla storia della medicina indiana, interamente dedicato agli indici delle fonti citate nelle altre parti dell'opera. Arrivati alla lettera 'y' si scorge una lista di fonti che procede per cinque colonne, occupando tre pagine fitte[104], opere il cui titolo inizia proprio con la parola *yoga*. Si tratta di un centinaio di testi, molti dei quali ignoti, dal più vario orientamento, difformi nel genere e nello stile, provenienti da epoche e àmbiti disparati. Tutti concordano nel far corrispondere alla parola *yoga* la comune esigenza di disporre di un 'modo di fare' metodico e ad ampio spettro. Sia che discutano di medicina, di calcolo astronomico o di disturbi degli stati d'animo, le diverse opere elencate hanno a che fare con eventi la cui cifra è segnatamente 'problematica', dunque patemica e dolente (*duḥkha*).

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presente nella sezione *sūtrasthāna* di *Carakasaṃhitā* (1.26.1-35): il lessico impiegato è davvero notevole e illustra, con mirabile dettaglio, le tante implicazioni estesiologiche e psicosomatiche in gioco. La concezione che l'autore della *Carakasaṃhitā* ha dei *rasa* è di chiara matrice somato-topico-patemica, in quanto il termine *rasa* indica sia quello che chiameremmo 'sapore' —da intendere come sapore di qualcosa in sé, 'succo' di una cosa, esito liquido di un'estrazione, reazione a degli esaltatori sapidici—, sia quello che definiremmo 'modo di sentire il fluire —influire/affluire/defluire— sensibile', ossia il gusto che si prova 'toccando' le varie sostanze con cui si entra in 'contatto/concomitanza/confusione' (*saṃyoga*) tramite l'atto, la parola o il pensiero. Dal contatto con esse se ne trae il gusto, somigliandogli. Le conseguenze estetico-sinestetiche di una siffatta fenomenologia dei *rasa* sono notevoli, proprio tenendo conto che è dai *rasa* che derivano i relativi *bhāva*, ossia gli 'stati d'animo' correlati ai '[sapori] sentiti', i 'sentimenti' dati dalle 'cose sentite [fluire in sé]'. Ed è proprio di questi aspetti che trattano le tradizioni letterarie note come *rasaśāstra* (cfr. Pollock 2016; Chakrabarti 2016), le cui opere potrebbero esser messe anch'esse in proficua sinossi con testi come la *Carakasaṃhitā*.

    [104] Cfr. Meulenbeld 2002, vol. III: 150-152.

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Śāntarakṣita on the Induction Problem.
A Translation of Vādanyāyaṭīkā 14,12–16,29[*]

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1. Introduction

In a contribution to the proceedings of the conference on *Logic in Buddhist Scholasticism. From Philosophical, Historico-Philological and Comparative Perspectives* held in Lumbini in 2013, I referred to a digression in Śāntarakṣita's *Vādanyāyaṭīkā* (VNṬ) in which this commentator on Dharmakīrti's last work clearly addresses the problem of **induction**[1] and its **solution**.[2] This digression is part of Śāntarakṣita's comments, in VNṬ 13,22–17,23, on Dharmakīrti's explanation of the justification (*samarthana*) of 'effect' as logical reason (*kāryahetu*) in its being a functional component for proving (*sādhanāṅga*) a 'cause' (*kāraṇa*) (VN 3,18–4,14). The immediate occasion for his digression is Dharmakīrti's statement concerning the method for establishing a causal relation: 'This [entity] comes

[1] Steinkellner 2015b: 173.

[2] Or where he at least indicates how Dharmakīrti's methodical formula must be understood so as not to allow for an induction problem to arise.

to be when that [other entity] is present, [and] even if the [various] causes of this [entity], which are different from that entity [and causally] capable, are present, [this entity] does not come about in the absence of that [entity].'[3] This particular digression may also be taken as an example for many others on different topics and problems dispersed throughout Śāntarakṣita's commentary. While these have rarely been noticed or examined until now, they are almost always of considerable interest for historians of Indian philosophy.

Śāntarakṣita first provides a detailed explanation of the meaning of this sentence and its components (VNṬ 13,30–14,12). Here, he also refers to the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and other works of the master (VNṬ 14,6f).[4] It is possible that even before Śāntarakṣita's digression there was an awareness of the problem of induction, as can perhaps be seen in Arcaṭa's explanation of the *anvayaniścaya* in the case of a *kāryahetu* (HBṬ 45,11–50,7 and 153,16–160,12). This has not yet been examined in detail as far as I know.[5] But the clarity of Śāntarakṣita's presentation and his refutation of possible alternative suggestions for a deviation (*vyabhicāra*) of an effect such as smoke from its cause such as fire merits a complete translation of this passage. This is, therefore, presented here to augment my reconsiderations of the induction problem in Dharmakīrti.[6]

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[3] VN 4, 2f: *idam asmin sati bhavati, satsv api tadanyeṣu samartheṣu taddhetuṣu tadabhāve na bhavatīti*. For earlier formulations in Dharmakīrti's work, cf. Steinkellner 2013: II.193–197, and for the withdrawal of my wrongly assumed setback in the formulations of his later works, the *Hetubindu* and the *Vādanyāya* (ibid., 194f and 197–198), cf. Steinkellner 2015b: n. 34 and my paper for the proceedings of the Heidelberg Dharmakīrti-Conference 2014 (Steinkellner 2021b, n. 22).

[4] He thereby implicitly refers to all earlier formulations, such as in PVSV 22, 2–4, PVin 2.85,6–7, and HB 4,13–5,1. On these cf. Steinkellner 2013: II, notes 354–355. He thus confirms that Dharmakīrti in his later works did not (!) diverge from the meaning of his earliest formulation in this work of his youth.

[5] Satoru Noriyama has published a Japanese translation of the latter text (Noriyama 2004).

[6] It can be assumed that some later representatives of the Buddhist *pramāṇa* tradition also dealt with the issues discussed here by Śāntarakṣita and that they contributed further ideas, but these later developments are beyond the scope of my present research possibilities. For Dharmottara's treatment in his commentary on the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* passage, however, one may compare the Anhang 1 in Steinkellner 2013: II.335–345.

I would like to acknowledge my gratitude to Prof. Lhagpa Phuntshogs and Prof. Dramdul for having given me the possibility in April 2013 to collate Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana's edition of the *Vādanyāyaṭīkā*[7] with the photostat copy of the Kundeling manuscript kept at the China Tibetology Research Center in Beijing, and to Mrs Huang Wenjuan and Dr. Luo Hong for their generous support during my stay there.

2. Translation of Vādanyāya 3,18–4,14[8]

Also in case of an effect as reason[9] there is a justification for [it being] a functional component of a proof: For that effect as a [logical] mark (*kāryaliṅga*) which is applied in proving a cause, the establishment of the relation between effect and cause with that [cause] [results] through the two valid cognitions proving presence and absence [respectively]. For example: 'This [entity] comes to be when that [other entity] is present, [and] even if the [various] causes of this [entity], which are different from that entity [and causally] capable, are present, [this entity] does not come about in the absence of that [entity].' For, thus, that this is beyond doubt an effect of that is justified.

Otherwise, [i.e.] if only [the proposition] '[this] does not come about in the absence of that' (*tadabhāve na bhavati*) is communicated, the [causal] capacity of the latter would be in doubt, since also another [entity] is absent there [where the latter is absent]. Another [entity, then,] may be capable with regard to [producing] this [effect]; [it could be] because of the absence of that [other entity that] this [effect] did not come about. In the absence of that [cause], moreover, the absence [of the effect] would be [nothing but] an accidental concurrence (*yadṛcchā-saṃvāda*), just as a date palm which grows in regions where mother marriage is customary is absent in other regions where mother marriage does not occur.

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[9] *kāryahetāv api* R, VNṬ 13,23 : *kārya(hetor?) api* VN$_{Ms2}$

In this way this [entity] is established[10] as the justified effect of that [entity]. Being[11] established, it proves through its own presence the presence of that [cause], because an effect does not deviate from [its] cause. And[12] if [a specific effect] does not deviate, the same rule [holds true] for all effects and their [specific] causes.

3. Translation of Vādanyāyaṭīkā 14,12–16,29[13]

(VNṬ 14,12–16,29:) [Explaining Dharmakīrti's formulation of a method for ascertaining causality]
(VNṬ 14,12–15,18:) [1. Explaining the phrase 'this does not come about in the absence of that': this statement entails the exclusion of alternative causes of smoke such as a cow or a horse]

The [word] **thus** (*iti*)[14] is used in the sense of this, namely, 'in this manner' or [in the sense] of exclusion (*vyavaccheda*). It is negated by this [word *iti* in the sense of exclusion], therefore, that also cows, horses and so on which are near[15] in place and time to this [fire] are a cause with regard to the production (*janana*) of smoke. For if these, [namely] a cow, a horse and so on, were a cause of this [smoke], the arising of smoke would then follow even when the fire is gone, because these [cow, horse and so on] are [still] near [in place and time].

(VNṬ 14,15–15,18:) [1.1. Refutation of alternative causes]
(VNṬ 14,15–16:) [1.1.a. Refutation of the alternative 'a cow etc. produces smoke in dependence on firewood.']

[Objection:] 'In dependence on other causes[16] [such as firewood and so on], these[17] [cow and so on] are productive of this

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[10] *sidhyati* VN : *bhavati* Ms²

[11] *sat* VN : om. Ms²

[12] *ca* VN : om. Ms²

[13] Words from the VN are in bold. Printer's mistakes such as gemination of *t* before *v*, as well as variant sibilants (*ś, ṣ, s*) are not noted.
Editorial signs: {..} deleted in the Ms; ⟨..⟩ added in the margin; (..) reading uncertain.

[14] *itir* em. : *iti* R, Ms². This *iti* concludes the formulation of the method in VN 4,2–3.

[15] °*sannihita*° Re, T : °*sanihita*° Ms

[16] *indhanādikāraṇā*° R, T : *indhanādi*{*kāra*}*kāraṇā*° Ms

[17] *te tasya* R : *tes ta tasya* Ms

[smoke]. Therefore this is a *non sequitur*.' [Answer:] If it is [proposed] in this way [namely, that they depend on other causes], also these [other causes such as firewood] are certainly [still] near this [fire]. Thus, the [above-stated] consequence is not lost.

(VNṬ 14,17–27:) [1.1.b. Refutation of the alternative 'both fire and other entities produce smoke.']

[Objection:] 'Also fire produces[18] this [smoke] in dependence on a cooperating [cause] (*sahakārin*). Thus, this [answer] is not appropriate.' [Answer:] Is it not the case, when it is possible in this way, that fire is the cause for the arising of smoke? Then why do you say something that is opposed to your previous and later [statement], namely, that just a cow or a horse and so on is the cause of this [smoke], but not fire? [Opponent:] 'May then also this fire be a cause [of smoke], but cow, horse and so on as well!" [Answer:] That is not right because in this case the cognition of common absence (*vyatireka*) is impossible. That is to say: Even if the cow and other [entities] are gone and fire is present, that which is caused by fire comes about only when the complex of firewood and so on is present at this [place]. [This is so] because a relation of cause and effect of entities is conceived in reference to the continuum (*prabandha*) of a cause and to the continuum of an effect in the form "the continuum of an effect presupposes the continuum of a cause,' but not[19] [in reference] to the different phases [of these continua]. For, the cognition of [all] those who have not [yet] obtained[20] a superior [capacity of] cognition does not come about as based on [various] particulars (*viśeṣa*) in the form 'this is the early phase, this is the later.' The definition of valid cognition, however, is promulgated[21] by the Merciful One in reference to those of ordinary [capacities of] cognizing,[22] as said [by the master]: 'This nature of valid cognition which belongs to common practice has been explained. Even in this respect, confused opponents mislead the world.'[23]

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[18] *janayati* em. : *janayanti* R, Ms
[19] *na tu* Ms, T (*ma yin no*) : *tat tu* R
[20] *na hy asamāsādita°* Ms : *nahi samāsādita°* R (n.e. T)
[21] *praṇīyate* Ms (*bkod do* T) : *praṇayitaṃ* R
[22] *°darśinaś* Ms, T : *°darśibhiś* R
[23] PVin 1. 44, 2–4.

(VNṬ 14,27–15,13:) [1.2. Refutation of possible deviations of smoke from fire as the cause]
(VNṬ 14,27–15,6:) [1.2.1. The case of smoke in a bedroom]

[Objection:] 'Then there is a deviation [of smoke from fire] because in the case of a bedroom (*vāsagṛha*), for example, smoke occurs even in the absence of fire.' [Answer:] No. Also this[24] [type of smoke] certainly presupposes a continuum of fire. The difference [between the two types of smoke at stake] is, however, caused [by the fact that these two types are] directly or indirectly [brought about]. Yet those with an acute mind developed by virtue of practicing the differentiation between the natures of manifold entities recognize the quite evident difference between two continua of smoke that are [preceded] by an interrupted or an uninterrupted continuum of fire,[25] when these occur in the place and so on [i.e., and the time] of a bedroom and so on [indirectly] or [directly] of a kitchen.[26] Therefore an inference [of fire] is also in different ways [i.e., as a direct or an indirect cause] not contradicted. On account of exactly this [reason], an inference in the case of an effect as reason (*kāryahetu*) and of a perception of the effect of something in contradiction [as reason] (*viruddhakāryopalambha*) has been explained as being dependent upon place, time and so on:

> 'It is further[27] accepted that also in the case of an effect of something in contradiction, place, time and so on are taken into consideration. Otherwise [this non-perception] would deviate [from non-existence], like ashes [that deviate] in a proof of non-coldness.[28],[29]

(VNṬ 15,7–13:) [1.2.2. Smoke produced by fire is not produced by smoke.]

Or a certain [person][30] differentiates in the form 'this is smoke produced by fire, [whereas] this is [smoke] produced by smoke'

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[24] *na tasyāpi* Ms, T (*ma yin te / de yaṅ*) : *bhūtasyāpi* R
[25] °*dahana*° Ms (*me'i* T) : °*darśana*° R
[26] Cf. PVSVṬ 105,15–17 (~ PVṬ 64a4f).
[27] For the meaning of *api* here, cf. Steinkellner 2013: II, n. 93.
[28] *bhasmevāśītasādhana iti* em. T (*bhasmevāsītasādhana iti* Ms) : *gatyevāsīta(?)sādhanaṃ iti* R
[29] PV 1.6.
[30] Śāntarakṣita seems to allude to the *pūrvapakṣa* that introduces an alternative interpretation in HBṬ 155,9–27.

because he is [seemingly] provided with a mental eye that was o-
pened by the stick of additional competence in investigating the
differences between manifold entities. Even so, a deviation [of
smoke from fire] is not very likely. That is to say: Smoke that is pro-
duced by fire does not come about from smoke, because [in this
case] it would follow that [smoke] would be without a cause. And
so the following [idea] is disregarded[31] as being of no value as well,
when it was said:

> 'If, therefore, smoke arises on account of smoke[32] that does not
> [arise] from fire, thus [smoke would have to arise also] from a ter-
> mite hill. Who would prevent the arising of this[33] [smoke in this
> way]?' and so forth.[34]

(VNṬ 15,13–18:) [1. Conclusion]

Therefore the firm conviction (*niścaya*) has to be granted, that
these— cow, horse and so on— are not a cause with regard to this
[smoke]. Thus, however, it is established that only fire is the cause
of this [smoke], not [another entity] such as a horse. And as[35] [the
property of] being a cause [of smoke] is applied to fire on account
of [their] common presence and absence in the way just ex-
plained, so is [the character of] being a cause[36] [of smoke] to be
applied to the total complex of firewood and so on. Or if commu-
nicated just in form of a statement of one and the same [concep-
tion][as in VN 4, 2f]: '**Even if the [various] causes of this** [smoke]
which are different from that fire **[and] capable**, such as firewood,
are present, [smoke] **does not come about in the absence of that**
[fire].' In the case of a cow, a horse and so on, however, it must be
recognized by way of the method (*vidhi*) explained [above] that
[they] are not the cause [of smoke] on account of the fact that
[they] have no common absence.

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[31] *upekṣyate* Ms (*dor bar bya'o* T) : *upekṣate* R
[32] *dhūmād* Ms (*du ba las* T) : *dhūmo* R
[33] *tasya* Re (*de ni* T) : *stasya* Ms
[34] Source not identified, but this stanza is also cited in HBṬ 155,26f, PVSVṬ
101,17f and TR 61*,11–12. For the example of the termite hill, cf. PV 1.38–39, PVin
2.59–60; for an explanation of this example, cf. Steinkellner 2015b: n. 24.
[35] *yathā ca* Ms (*dper na …'am* T) : *tathā ca* R
[36] *kāraṇatvaṃ* Ms : *kāraṇaṃ* R

(VNṬ 15,19–16,29) [2. Explaining the phrase 'even if the (various) causes of this (entity) which are different from that entity (and) capable (of producing its perception) are present': without this phrase, the fire's capacity would be in doubt.]

[Question:] 'That much certainly is correct to say, namely "**[this entity] does not come about in the absence of that [other entity]**."'[37] On the other hand, to what purpose has it been said "**even if the [various] causes of this [entity], which are different from that entity [and] capable [of producing its perception], are present**"?' [Answer:] He says '**for thus**' and so on. For, when it is stated[38] **thus** by [the words] '**even if** [the various causes] **are present**' and so on, **the fact that this** smoke **is the effect of that**, [i.e.] the fact that it is the effect of fire, **is justified**, ascertained, [and] **beyond doubt**.

(VNṬ 15,22–29:) [2.1. Refutation of another entity as being the cause of smoke]

Otherwise, [i.e.] if it is not communicated in this way, [i.e.] if **only** '**[this entity] does not come about in the absence of that [entity]**'[39] is communicated, then, [i.e.] **when** [the words] '**[this entity] does not come about in the absence of that [entity]**'[40] **is communicated, the capacity of this** fire **is in doubt, since also another [entity]**, however, such as a cow or a horse and firewood and so on, **is absent there**, [i.e.] at the particular place empty[41] of fire. Thus, on what account would the [fire's] being the cause [of smoke] be certainly known? That is the meaning of the whole [formulation]. For this very reason he says: 'For the non-production of an effect, when efficient causes of the [effect] are present, indicates an incompleteness[42] of [these] other causes.'[43] Exactly this, namely, that the capacity of this [cause] is otherwise in doubt, he clarifies[44]

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[37] *tadabhāve na bhavati* VN 4,3 : *tadabhāvena bhavati* R
[38] *'bhidhīyamāne* Ms : *'bhidhīyamāno* R
[39] *tadabhāve na bhavati* VN 4,3 : *tadabhāvena bhavati* R
[40] *tadabhāve na bhavati* VN 4,3 : *tadabhāvena bhavati* R
[41] °*śūnye* Ms : °*śūnya*° R
[42] °*vaikalyaṃ* Ms (*yin nam 'ba' źig la* T) : °*vikalpaṃ* R
[43] Cf. PVin 1.43,10f.
[44] *sphuṭayati* Ms (*bsal bar byed pa yin no* T) : *sūcayati* R

[by stating]: '**Another [entity]** [may be capable] **with regard to this** [effect]' and so on. **With regard to this**, [i.e.] with regard to the effect called smoke,[45] **another [entity]** indeed, such as a horse, or perhaps firewood and so on,[46] [may be] **capable**; [and] **because of the absence of that** [other entity] **this** [effect] **did not come about** at this place empty of fire.[47] The meaning is: On account of what is it ascertained that this did not come about because that, on the other hand, is absent?[48]

(VNṬ 16,3–14:) [2.1.1. In that case the absence of smoke in the absence of fire would be accidental.]

If [asked]: 'When another [entity] is capable with regard to this [effect of smoke], [i.e.] this [effect] did not come about because that [other entity] was absent, then why would this [effect] be absent in the absence of that [other cause, namely fire]?,' he says: '**In the absence of that [cause]**' and so on. **In the absence of that** fire, **moreover**,[49] that which is this **absence** of smoke **would be** [nothing but] **an accidental concurrence**, meaning in the manner of the crow-and-the-palm-tree maxim. If, however, [the words] '**even if** [the (various) causes of this (entity), which are different from that entity (and) capable (of producing their perception)], **are present**' are stated, then there is no accidental concurrence because on account of the proximity[50] of all [other causes] to this [place] it is ascertained that in the absence of only that, this is absent. The intention is thus.

[Question:] 'Compared with what is an absence[51] in the absence of that an accidental concurrence?' [Answer:] He says: '[where] **mother marriage**'[52] and so on. **In a region** where **mother marriage is customary**, is practiced, that [region] is so. Thus, [this] is a determinative compound[53] with the word 'region.' [I.e.]

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[45] *dhūmākhye* Ms (*du ba … grags pa ni* T) : *dhūmaśva°* R
[46] *yadi ⟨ve⟩ndhanādi samarthan* Ms : *yad indhanādisamarthan* R
[47] *dahanaśūnye* Ms : *dahanaśūnya°* R; n.e. T
[48] *asya tv abhāvāt* Ms (*'di med pa las* T) : *asya svabhāvāt* R
[49] *punar* em. : *puna* Ms, (*kyaṅ* T) : *dhūma°* R
[50] *sannidhānād* Ms, T : *sannipātād* R
[51] *nivṛttir* Re : *nivṛtti°* Ms
[52] *vivāha* Re, T : *vidhāha* Ms
[53] *°samāsaḥ* Re : *°samāsa* Ms

in this [region] and this [marriage], on account of metaphorical usage because it is the place of origin, [i.e.] as much as whose **origin**, arising, of that one is taking place[54] in the Persian region. Just as **the absence** [of date palms] **in another region**, such as the Mālavaka region, **where mother marriage does not occur**, is an accidental concurrence, so also in the case at stake. That is to say: Because of the absence of a specific soil this [date palm] is absent in another region, but not because of the absence of mother marriage. In this way the absence of the [former] in the absence of the [latter] is of the-crow-and-the-palm-tree type. And the [present case] is likewise.

(VNṬ 16,15–29:) [2.1.2. *If the demonstrative in the phrase* asmin sati bhavati *is not explained as fire or as the complex of fire, firewood and so on, the effect smoke would arise before that complex.*]

Or it is explained in another way. **For example: this** effect such as smoke **comes to be, when that**, the complex of fire, firewood and so on, **is present**. The completion of the sentence, however, is to be rendered as above.[55] Only that is to be understood as the purpose of this [formulation]. This [above part of the formulation] emphasizes the function of perception. [The words] '**even if … are present**' and so on [emphasize the function of] non-perception; **which are different from that [entity]**, moreover, [means] from that complex of the causes fire and so on. [Even if] **the causes of this** [smoke] **which are different [and] capable**, such as a cow, a horse, [are present], [smoke] **does not come about in the absence** of the complex of causes of fire and so on. But this has been said in reference to the opponent's opinion. These [different causes such as cow, horse and so on], however, are not a cause of this [smoke]. If, on the other hand, they were its cause, then it would follow that smoke arises also before the complex of these [fire and so on] is near and as [it does] later.[56]

[Objection:] 'The fact that these [different causes] produce[57] that [smoke] is [given] in dependence on that [complex of fire

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[54] °*bhāvina* em. : °*bhāvi na* R
[55] Cf. VNṬ 14, 3f.
[56] *paścād iva ca* Ms (*phyis kyaṅ du ba* T) : *paścād iva* R
[57] *tajjanakatvaṃ* Ms (cf. *skyed par byed pa yin no* T) : *tatkr̥takattvaṃ* R

and so on].' [Answer:] Then it follows that this complex is the cause. [Objection:] 'May then both [the complex of fire and so on and the different causes, such as cow, horse and so on, be the cause of smoke]! For us there is no drawback whatsoever.' [Answer:] [That] is not [correct]. It was said [before] 'because a knowledge[58] of common absence is impossible in this case,'[59] so that even if all these [different causes] have disappeared, when this complex [of fire and so on] is present, an arising of that [smoke] is certainly taking place. Thus it needs to be said '**it does not come about in the absence of that.**' [Question:] 'Then to what purpose is [the phrase] "**even if … are present**" and so on employed?' [Answer:] He says: '**For, thus,**' and so on. **Otherwise**, [i.e.] **if** [only the proposition] '**[this] does not come about in the absence of that** complex' **were communicated**, **the [causal] capacity** of this complex **would be in doubt, since also** this, cow, horse and so on, **is absent there** so that **another [entity]**, cow, horse and so on, **may be capable in this regard** [and] **because of the absence of these** [namely cow, horse and so on] [smoke] **did not come about. In the absence of that** complex [of fire and so on], however,[60] **the absence** [of smoke] **would be [nothing but] an accidental concurrence.** The rest is as above.

Bibliography

Abbreviations

ATBS	Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien
BKGA	Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens
DhTh	Shoryu Katsura (ed.), *Dharmakīrti's Thought and Its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy. Proceedings of the Third International Dharmakīrti Conference Hiroshima, November 4–6, 1997.* (BKGA 32) Wien: VÖAW, 1999
Re	emendation by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana
R.S.	Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana
STTAR	Sanskrit Texts from the Tibetan Autonomous Region
VKSKS	Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens

[58] °*gates* Ms : °*gatas* R
[59] VNṬ 14, 20
[60] *etasya tu* Ms (*de'i …yaṅ* T) : *etasya* R

VÖAW   Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften
WSTB   Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde

Primary sources

HB   *Dharmakīrti's Hetubindu.* Critically edited by Ernst Steinkellner on the basis of preparatory work by Helmut Krasser † with a transliteration of the Gilgit fragment by Klaus Wille. (STTAR 19) Beijing-Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House – Austrian Academy of Sciences Press 2016.

Ms   the Kundeling manuscript of VNṬ (https://oeaw.ac.at/ikga/digitales/materialen).

Ms²   the Drepung manuscript of VNṬ (cf. Steinkellner 2021a).

PV 1   See PVSV.

PVSV   *Pramāṇavārttika(sva)vṛtti* (Dharmakīrti) – Raniero Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti. The First Chapter with the Autocommentary.* (SOR 23) Roma: IsMEO 1960.

PVSVṬ   *Pramāṇavārttika(sva)vṛttiṭīkā* (Karṇakagomin) – Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, *Ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam (svārthānumānaparicchedaḥ) svopajñavṛttyā, Karṇakagomiviracitayā taṭṭīkayā ca sahitam.* Ilāhābād: Kitāb Mahal 1943.

PVṬ   *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* (Śākyabuddhi), Kapitel 1 – P 5718, Je 1b–348a8, Ñe 1b–85b2.

PVin 2   *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (Dharmakīrti), Kapitel 2 – *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya. Chapters 1 and 2.* Critically ed. Ernst Steinkellner. (STTAR 2) Beijing-Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House – Austrian Academy of Sciences Press 2007.

R   VN and VNṬ as edited by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana.

T   Tibetan translation in support of VN² if Peking and Derge versions concur.

TR   *Tarkarahasya* – Hideomi Yaita, *Bukkyō Chishikiron no ganten kenkyū – Yogaron inmyō, Dharmottaraṭippanaka, Tarkarahasya* [= Three Sanskrit Texts from the Buddhist *Pramāṇa*-Tradition – The *Hetuvidyā* Section in the *Yogācārabhūmi,* the *Dharmottaraṭippanaka,* and the *Tarkarahasya*]. (Monograph Series 4) Narita: Naritasan Shinshoji 2005, 261–407 (= 1*–72*).

VN   Michael Torsten Much, *Dharmakīrtis Vadanyāyaḥ. Teil I. Sanskrit-Text.* (Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens 25) Wien: VÖAW 1991.

VN_Ms   *Vādanyāya,* Manuscript: see Steinkellner 2015a.

VN_Ms2   *Vādanyāya,* the Drepung Manuscript: cf. Steinkellner 2021a.

VNṬ   *Dharmakīrti's Vādanyāya. With the Commentary of Śāntarakṣita.* Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Patna: (Appendix to *JBORS* 21 and 22) 1935–1936.

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Imagined Landscapes or Through the Year: The Descriptions of All Seasons and All Seasons' Gardens in Indian Literature[*]

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The subject of the cycle of seasons in Sanskrit literature has been aptly discussed by Danielle Feller in her 1996 book *The Seasons in Mahākāvya Literature*. I would like to touch on the topic once again in order to put more stress on the different tendencies which can be observed in the gradual development of this theme in its two forms: as the *ṣaḍṛtuvarṇana* genre and as the consistent description of all seasons being a part of certain court epic poems or *mahākāvya*s. It turns out that, starting from a depiction of natural phenomena, Indian authors ended with a dream landscape, where the charms of all seasons met.

1. Introductory remarks
The descriptions of nature and the influence of nature on humans are perhaps one of the favourite subjects of poets all over the world. Obviously, we find them in the oldest layers of Indian

literature[1] as well as in the literature written in various modern Indian languages. In Sanskrit *kāvya* tradition, however, they belong to poetical convention (*kavisamaya*) forming a well-defined canon of *topoi*. The depiction of each of the six seasons of the year should follow certain prescriptions presented in detail by theoreticians of Sanskrit literature. Each season has its protagonists, as it were, in the world of flora and fauna as well as in the human sphere. At this point it is worth reminding that the inventory of plant names in Sanskrit was pan-Indian. However, the flora and fauna of various regions differed to some extent, and even the same plants could blossom in different months.[2] Nevertheless, *ṛtu*s were introduced through a conventional and unified pan-Indian set of images presenting the animal and floral realms during the year.

2. The Ṛtusaṃhāra and ṣaḍṛtuvarṇana genre

At some point, coherent compositions of stanzas devoted to the cycle of six seasons (*ṣaḍṛtuvarṇana*) began to appear. As is well-known, the oldest preserved example of the *ṣaḍṛtuvarṇana* genre is the *Ṛtusaṃhāra* traditionally ascribed to Kālidāsa. According to Siegfried Lienhard:

> We can be certain, however, that the *Ṛtusaṃhāra*, although the oldest preserved example of this genre, was preceded by a long period of development and has a long tradition behind it. […] The excellence of the *Ṛtusaṃhāra* may explain why no other early poems about the cycle of the seasons have survived.[3]

Then Lienhard introduces three other representatives of the genre, Durlabha's *Ṛtuvarṇana*, belonging to the mid 16th century, and two works bearing the title *Ṣaḍṛtuvarṇana*: one written by Vararāja one century later, and the other authored by Vīreśvara from Almora at the beginning of the 18th century. All the men-

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[1] There is a chapter analysing examples from Vedic literature in V. Raghavan 1992.

[2] Despite this, the incongruence concerning the blooming season is very rarely encountered in Sanskrit *kāvya* literature (Čejka 1998: 17, 174).

[3] Lienhard 1984: 109.

tioned poems differ in size and poetical values, and the poets start their works with the descriptions of different seasons, but they are homogeneous compositions of a single author. Lienhard does not give any alternative titles of the *ṣaḍṛtuvarṇana*s, but more on the subject can be found in V. Raghavan's *Ṛtu in Sanskrit Literature.* Raghavan also edited an anonymous *Ṣaḍṛtuvarṇana* in 35 verses,[4] which was wrongly labelled as the *Ṛtusaṃhara* of Kālidāsa in the Saraswati Mahal Library of Tanjavur.[5] As Raghavan pointed out, it is highly possible that it is a compilation of verses of different authors. He identified stanza 4 as belonging to the *Gītagovinda.*[6] Raghavan also edited Durlabha's *Ṛtuvarṇana,*[7] a poem which he calls the most successful attempt, full of beauty as well as interesting information:

> A variety of attitudes, poses and activities of women, as also of men, their diverse dress, make-up, food, pastime etc. according to the seasons is depicted here. The varieties of perfumes and fragrant pastes according to the *Ṛtus*, architectural data like underground chambers for stay in winter and the little heaters that men and women carried on their bodies in the cold, mechanical fountains and shower-bath in summer […].[8]

The catalogues of Sanskrit manuscripts record a handful of other *ṣaḍṛtuvarṇana*s, and Raghavan indicates seven manuscripts of *ṛtukāvya*s mentioning that also modern Sanskrit poets explore the subject. Indeed, there are still unknown *ṛtukāvya*s and perhaps some of them of utmost significance. In 1990, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan published one of such works, namely the *Ṛtuvarṇana* of Siddhicandragaṇi (ca. 16th c.), critically edited and translated by Kantilal B. Vyas. It is an interesting anthology of verses devoted to *ṣaḍṛtu*s, written by different poets including Siddhicandra himself. The names of some poets are given, whereas some others remain unknown. Siddhicandra, an eminent Jaina scholar, flourished at the court of emperor Akbar.

[4] See V. Raghavan 1966: 28–33.
[5] Raghavan 1972: 129–130.
[6] Raghavan 1966: 28.
[7] See V. Raghavan 1971: 21–48.
[8] Raghavan 1972: 130–131.

His anthology starts with the description of spring in 139 stanzas, then summer is presented in 120 stanzas, the rainy season in 137 couplets, autumn in 54 verses, *hemanta*—winter—in as many as 64 strophes, and 36 of them are devoted to *śiśira*—the cool season. The 3 verses concluding the anthology refer to the transition of seasons (*r̥tusaṃdhi*). Each chapter is announced by the author: *r̥tuvarṇane vasantavarṇanam, atha grīṣmaḥ, atha prāvr̥tvarṇanam, atha śaradvarṇanam, atha hemantavarṇanam, atha śiśiraḥ, atha r̥tusaṃdhiḥ.* Interestingly, each chapter is structured more or less in the same way. First, we find a selection of *muktaka*s presenting each season in general, of course in agreement with *kavisamaya.* Even if these are stanzas created by different poets, there is no repetition of motives, as Siddhicandra skilfully adds verses providing new items and colours to the picture of the time of the year being described. In this way the stanzas of different authors finally form a consistent vernal or rain poems. In the case of the vernal season, the song of the cuckoo (*kokilālāpa*) has been set apart, not included among the general characteristics, perhaps because it is an important and common *topos.* In the monsoon chapter, Siddhicandra assembles 13 strophes showing lightning, which is typical of this season, and announcing it: *atha vidyut.* He also gives three verses devoted to the subject of the women venturing out in the rain to meet their lovers (*atha varṣasvairiṇī*). After this 'introductory' delineation, the section concerning the winds typical of each season is implemented (*atha vasantavāyavaḥ*, etc.). Thus, we are given the poetical characteristics of winds starting from the famous Malaya breezes full of fragrance of sandal trees to the wintry gales.[9] Then follows the section concerning travellers undertaking their journeys during different seasons (*atha vasantapathikaḥ, atha grīṣmapathikaḥ*, etc.). One could name this sections *viraha* poems, because they all refer mainly to the unbearable pains of separated lovers. The heroes and heroines of these *muktaka*s, tormented by the painful separation, speak to animals, plants and clouds as in the two stanzas of anonymous writers found in the *Pravr̥tvarṇana*:

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[9] Only 4 stanzas are devoted to the *śiśira* winds, and summer winds receive even less attention — 3 stanzas, whereas vernal winds are described in 48 stanzas.

utsṛjann ahaha sarvato viṣaṃ
        kīrtyase jalada jīvanapradaḥ |
etad eva suhṛdānuśikṣitaṃ
        bhasma saṃdahati yo viyoginaḥ || 5 || — kasyāpi [10]

Though you, o cloud! are spreading *viṣa* ('poison,' 'water'), you are known as a life-giver; (it is true what) friends tell (lit. teach) me, that even ashes burn those who are separated from their lovers.[11]

kiṃ megha garjasi mayūra niyaccha vācaṃ
        gacchānyataḥ stanitadagdhakadaṃbavāta
ye sapriyā vrajata bho bhavanāni teṣāṃ
        ekākino vayam abhājanam īdṛśānām || 2 ||[12]

O cloud! Why do you thunder (here)? O peacock! Stop (*niyaccha*) your cries. You wretched *kadamba* breeze blowing so forcefully (*stanita*), go elsewhere. Approach the mansions of those who are with their spouses (*sapriyāḥ*); we lonely beings do not deserve these (pleasures).[13]

It is possible that some of the stanzas building the *pathika* part of the chapter come from unknown *dūtakāvya*s which contributed to the establishing of this particular genre. In the *pathika* sections of the *Pravṛtvarṇana* and the *Vasantavarṇana* there are even subsections announced by appropriate headings: *atha vasantavirahiṇyaḥ* and *atha varṣavirahiṇyaḥ*.[14] The summer-time traveller's description is accompanied by the *prapāpālikā* section, i.e. eight stanzas describing the charms of the girls in charge of the water house. That part is especially interesting as it does not belong to the usual inventory of *grīṣma* motives. One stanza is authored by Siddhi-

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[10] Vyas 1990: 110.
[11] Slightly modified translation of Vyas 1990: 111.
[12] Vyas 1990: 112.
[13] Vyas 1990: 113.
[14] Contrasting the hero's distress with the heart-capturing beauty of the season goes back to the *Rāmāyaṇa* picturing how the beauty of spring affects love-lorn Rāma. It seems that *bārahmāsā* (lit. 'twelve months') poems and songs full of *viraha* also belong to this line.

candra and the rest by anonymous authors. They are all full of sentiment of love, as exemplified by Siddhicandra's stanza:

pīte 'pi śīte salile vilambya
     kṣaṇaṃ punaḥ kiṃ pathikāgato 'si |
śṛṇu prapāpāli na yāti sā me
     yāntaḥsthitā kāpi mahāpipāsā || 95 || — siddhicandrasya [15]

'Having once drunk cold water, why O traveller, just after a little while, have you returned?' 'Hear, O water-girl, some insatiable thirst within me is not still quenched.'[16]

And here is the verse of an anonymous author:

dṛśaṃ prapāpālikayā prakāśite
     niveśayan kumbhadhiyā kucadvaye |
viveda paṃthaḥ kalaśāt paricyutāṃ
     na vāridhārāṃ mukhasaṃginīm api || [17]

The traveller did not notice the flow of water, poured in his mouth from the water-pot, as his eyes were fixed on her prominent breasts, which he took to be the water-pots.[18]

Siddhicandra also provides the chapters with sections showing the entertainments—*keli*s or *krīḍā*s—typical of each season. For summer it is *jalakeli* or frolicking in the water. One can agree that this is the most suitable entertainment in the hot season. There is no sport mentioned for the spring whereas the game of swinging is ascribed to monsoon time. As one remembers, *dolākeli* was mentioned by Kālidāsa as a spring pastime and ritual in the *Raghuvaṃśa* (9.46) and *Mālavikāgnimitra*. Discussing games in ancient India, Jeanine Auboyer notices that the act of swinging, although tightly associated with the spring, can be linked with the rainy season too:

A whole series of facts are there to show that it was a ritual or sacred game, connected indeed with magic, linked more or less

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[15] Vyas 1990: 80.
[16] Vyas 1990: 81.
[17] Vyas 1990: 80.
[18] Vyas 1990: 81.

evidently to the seasonal cycle of the harvest, fertility, fecundity and love. [...] The fact that the swing is related to the rainy season and fertility, leads us naturally to consider it as a magic charm, for assuring abundant crops and fertility.[19]

The pastime proper for autumn is the spin-dance (*bhramarīkrīḍā*) described by an anonymous poet as follows:

> *bhramāt prakīrṇe bhramarīṣu kiṃcic*
> *celāṃcale caṃcalalocanānām |*
> *kucau kadācij jaghanaṃ yuvāno*
> *vilokya sāphalyam avāpur akṣṇām || — kasyāpi*[20]

The young dandies considered themselves very fortunate when the lovely-eyed (lit. with moving eyes) damsels, sporting in a spin-dance (inadvertently) dropped off their garments, making their (fascinating) breasts slightly visible, and once in a while even their posteriors (*jaghana*).[21]

There are only 3 verses devoted to it.

During *hemanta*, playing ball (*kandukalīlā*) seems to be the best amusement of the young ladies. Siddhicandra gives 11 stanzas on this subject. The cool season of *śiśira* invites everyone to take a part in another game. This is *dṛgmīlanakriyā* or *dṛgmīlanakeli*. Most probably it is a kind of hide-and-seek. Three stanzas given in the *Śiśira-varṇanam* speak about maidens whose beauty excludes them from the game, e.g.:

> *naitasyāḥ prasṛtidvayena sarale śakyaṃ vidhātuṃ dṛśau*
> *sarvatraiva vilokyate mukhaśaśijyotsnāvitanair iyam |*
> *itthaṃ madhyagatāsakhībhir asakṛd dṛgmīlanakeliṣu*
> *vyāsiddhā rudatī mukhaṃ ca nayane sve garhate kanyakā || 67 ||*[22]

'This maiden's eyes are so wide that they are impossible to cover fully; and by the light of her charming moon-like face she can perceive everything on all sides.' When the lady-friends surrounding the maiden repeatedly said this in their eye-covering game

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[19] Auboyer 1955: 133, 134.
[20] Vyas 1990: 130.
[21] Vyas 1990: 131.
[22] Vyas 1990: 152.

(*dṛgmīlanakeli*) and forbade her entry in the game, the maiden wept and regretted that she has such a (lustrous) face and such (wide) eyes.[23]

Such fusion of the pastimes and the seasons' description in literature must be connected on the one hand with the festival calendar and the presence of specific plays and games involved in the seasonal festivities, on the other hand with natural conditions making people prone to undertake a certain type of activity, as for instance frolicking in water during summer. Siddhicandra could add the entertainment section into the seasons depiction because of the existence of poems describing the enjoyment of games and sports throughout the year. One can mention here the *Ṛtukrīḍāviveka* of Lakṣmīdhara, the court poet of the King Tirumaladevarāya (reign 1565–1572) of the Aravidu Dynasty.[24] Also a short anonymous *Ṣaḍṛtuvarṇana,* already mentioned above as edited by V. Raghavan in 1966, contains short prose statements at the end of the chapter about appropriate sports and pastimes of each season. At the end of the five-stanza-long *Vasantavarṇana* we read:

> *vasantakāle ārāmakrīḍā bhavati* |[25]

Amusement in the garden is (proper) in the springtime.[26]

The *Grīṣmavarṇana* (9 stanzas) ends with:

> *grīṣmartau jalakrīḍā kartavyā* |[27]

In summer frolicking in water should be performed.

For the rainy season (9 stanzas), just as in Siddhicandra's anthology, swinging, i.e. *hindolakrīḍā*, is prescribed.
The *Hemanta(śiśira)varṇana*[28] recommends:

> *vākyaṃ hāsyakāraṃ vadaty avirataṃ māse sahasye vaśaḥ* ||[29]

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[23] Vyas 1990: 153.
[24] Krishnamachariar 2004: 866.
[25] Raghavan 1966: 29.
[26] The translations are mine if not otherwise stated.
[27] Raghavan 1966: 30.
[28] Raghavan 1966: 33.
[29] Despite the title *Ṣaḍṛtuvarṇana*, there is no *śiśira* section. It can be said that both cold *ṛtu*s are treated together.

> The stories/sayings provoking laughter should be told uninterruptedly in the month of *sahasya* (December/January).

There is no sport appropriate for autumn mentioned. Perhaps the sentence is missing. It is the shortest section of the poem, consisting only of four verses.

Summing up, according to our knowledge the *r̥tu* poems were normally the works of a single author. Siddhicandra's collection is in this respect unique, being an anthology, but its importance cannot be reduced to that fact only. The compiler brought to the readers' attention not only the oeuvre of the famous masters but also many interesting stanzas of unknown poets. What is more, he structured his *florilegium* in a specific manner showing the significance of different motives and unveiling certain aspects connected with seasons but rarely exposed in *r̥tu* literature. One could call this work an encyclopaedia of *r̥tu* motifs. Or, better, one could say that Siddhicandra himself was a living encyclopaedia containing uncountable numbers of verses, since we know that he was a practitioner of the art of *avadhāna*, bearing the title of *śatāvadhānī*.[30] He preserved the most beautiful *r̥tumuktaka*s in his memory and created a comprehensive anthology supplementing them with his own compositions.

3. Six seasons in the epic poems (mahākāvyas)

As is well known, making use of the *r̥tu* topos is obligatory for *mahākāvya* writers. And indeed, these poems picture at least two or three seasons. The whole cycle of seasons is found only in certain *mahākāvya*s. The first of such descriptions where all seasons are mentioned one by one occurs in the *Raghuvaṃśa*. As Danielle Feller states:

> In this cycle, which starts with the monsoon, Kālidāsa impartially dedicates two verses to each season, *hemanta* and *śiśira* being seemingly considered as one and the same season, since only one verse is dedicated to each.[31]

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[30] On *avadhāna* see Cielas 2017 and also Sudyka and Galewicz 2012.
[31] Feller 1996: 76.

In fact, this cycle from *Raghuvaṃśa* 19.37–47 is more a description of the amorous pleasures of the libidinous King Agnivarṇa through the year than a presentation of the seasons. It reminds us of the enjoyments of seasonal pastimes, especially the fact that almost all the *krīḍā*s and *keli* serve to extol feminine beauty and arouse love passion. Perhaps we could think about this passage as an archetype of the *ṛtukeli* subgenre.

On that note the 'song' of seasons was created by Gaṅgādevī (14th c.) in her *Madhurāvijaya*.[32] In the sixth chapter or *sarga* of her poem the Vijayanagara poetess presents the six seasons, but in fact we are offered a description of the royal ladies throughout the year and their love-making with the king in summer, monsoon, autumn, winter and springtime.[33]

Another early description of the season cycle is found in the *Kirātārjunīya*. The most important and innovative difference between Bhāravi (ca. 6th c.) and Kālidāsa's (4th–5th c.) execution of the task is that all the seasons are coming together in order to help the Apsarases to seduce Arjuna. In stanza 10.18 it is said clearly that we have a group of seasons on the Indrakīla mountain, namely *ṛtugaṇa*. All the seasons display their attributes trying to attack Arjuna's senses. In vain, as even this army cannot disturb his ascetic practices (*Kirātārjunīya* 10.37–38).

Again, in the *Śiśupālavadha* of Māgha (ca. 8th c.) all the seasons appear together on the Raivataka mountain to pay homage to Kṛṣṇa and offer him the best they have. The same task stands before them in the poem *Kapphiṇābhyudaya* of Śivasvāmin (9th c.):

> The six seasons simultaneously appear on the mountain to honour king Kapphiṇa. There is spring, when mango groves, Vakula trees, saffron plants, and Navamālikā creepers put forth sweet and fragrant flowers. There is summer when peacocks hide themselves under their plumage, and when the men in the camp enjoy the breeze of funs in pleasure huts. There is the rainy season which depresses the ladies whose husbands are abroad as the sweet but melancholy notes of peacocks reach their ears and the rumbling noise of the clouds rends their hearts. There is autumn when the water in the ponds becomes limpid and the lilies smile

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[32] More about the poetess and her *mahākāvya* in Sudyka 2013.
[33] Sudyka 2013: 54–55.

brightly. There is dewy autumn when the nights are clear and the moon shines pleasantly. That is the time when Ketaka plants blossom and paddy fields ripen. There is the winter season when snow destroys the charm of lotus ponds. Everywhere it is so desolate and dreary, and the Nameru trees with leaves yellow and sere are seen here and there.[34]

In the *Naiṣadhacarita* of Śrīharṣa (12th c.) one encounters an innovation in the treatment of the subject of the simultaneous advent of all seasons. In the first canto Nala, suffering pangs of love, enters a pleasure-park which is filled with all the seasons (*sarvartughane vane*, st. 1.105). Danielle Feller has proved that this is not an empty phrase, but the park encompasses all the *ṛtu*s, even if they come in utter disorder.[35] But, seen through Nala's eyes, this paradisiacal garden one could dream about is a set of many morbid images. It is love-longing which distorts reality. Of course, by reality we understand the world of *kāvya*. The phenomena that normally evoke pleasure are considered utterly disgusting by Nala.[36] This characteristic attitude is handed over to the next generations of authors as we could see in the *viraha* stanzas from Siddhicandra's anthology: a cloud spreading poison, the order imparted to the 'wretched' breeze perfumed by *kadamba* flowers to go away.

To sum up, the descriptions of the six seasons found in the *mahākāvya*s seem to be structurally of the following three types:

1. Amorous enjoyments through the year.[37]
2. All the seasons coming together with a definite aim.
3. The garden of all seasons.

All the landscapes contained in the discussed works are imaginary, created by the poets guided by the rules given in the treatises

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[34] Shankar and Hahn 1989: XXXV–XXXVI.
[35] Feller 1996: 214.
[36] The best example of this attitude are verses 1.84 and 1.101.
[37] A similar passage can also be found in Bhartṛhari's *Śṛṅgāraśataka*. Stanzas 33–37 describe the taste of love, sweet but sometimes bitter, during vernal season; stanzas 38–39 speak about pleasures of love during summer; stanzas 41–46 describe lovers in the time of monsoon arrival; stanza 47 is devoted to love in autumn and stanzas 48–50 speak about amorous delights in winter.

on literary theory. However, all the time we see innovations and new traits in the treatment of the centuries-old theme. And this innovative approach is also in accordance with the advice of theoreticians. The refining and amplification of the natural features of wintry, vernal, autumnal or monsoon landscapes made them unnatural. But perhaps the all-*ṛtu*s garden appears to be the most unnatural development in the topos of the six seasons, as it is definitely not possible in the natural environment. On the other hand, it can be appealing to everyone's imagination, something everyone would like to experience and enjoy. Of course, nowadays certain aspects, for instance the vegetation proper to different seasons, can be recreated in an artificial environment. But not all the charms of the seasons can be reproduced in green houses, so the dream of having such a garden at someone's disposal has not been fulfilled yet. Only in literature can we walk, together with Nala or other heroes, in such gardens.

4. Aru Shah at the Court of Ṛtus

Strangely enough, the motif of the six-seasons garden has been taken up by a modern American novelist of Indian origin, Roshani Chokshi, who writes for children and young adults. Her latest book, *Aru Shah and the End of Time. A Pandava Novel*, published in 2018 is based on Hindu mythology and heavily relies on Indian culture. Aru (Arundhati) Shah, a twelve-year-old girl, is in fact reincarnated Arjuna. She and the other Pandava sister Mini (Yamini) try to save the world and prevent a certain Asura from reaching Śiva and making him perform the dance that would end Time forever.

Aru and Mini visit the Court of Ṛtus in order to receive objects which will help them in their difficult fight. As they reach the Court, they see an unusual park:

> Around them, the forest was divided into six pieces, like a pie. In one section, frost sleeved the tree branches and icicles dangled like ornaments. In the next, a heavy downpour of rain made the trunks difficult to see. The third section was a riot of blossoms, the rich earth bursting with flowers and perfume. The fourth section was bright and dry, sunlight dappling the leaves. In the fifth, the

leaves had turned scarlet and gold. The sixth section was a rich dark green.[38]

The Pandava sisters also see the personifications of seasons. Summer's facial features were changing from feminine to masculine, because 'Hotness doesn't belong to any one gender' as Summer declared. Winter was a pale-skinned man with frosted hair and silver eyes. Monsoon 'a gray-skinned woman whose hair clung damply to her face. She looked soaked to the bone, and delighted about it.'[39] Spring is shown in such a way: 'Vines crawled over her skin. There were flowers in her hair. Her mouth was a rose.'[40] Autumn and Pre-winter were outside the Court of Seasons, so there is no description of them.

It is not difficult to notice that the sections in the seasons' park are not following the order established in Indian literature. After the wintry landscape comes the rainy forest, then the vernal garden succeeded by the summer scenery. Autumn is described in Western categories: scarlet and gold leaves. In the *kāvya* tradition the main colour would be white. The last piece of garden must be representing the pre-winter. The personifications of seasons have different gender in comparison with the Indian tradition. Vasanta, for instance, is a man and a companion of the God of Love, Kāma. Despite all these disparities, it must be the garden created by Śrīharṣa that inspired Roshani Chokshi!

It is a well-known fact that the story of Nala and Damayantī has completely captivated Indian imagination. Śrīharṣa executed it in a remarkable way although the famous scene of the game of dice and its aftermath is missing. He focused on the sentiment of love, telling how Nala was suffering from love-longing but finally married his beloved. The last two cantos concentrate on their amorous play, *ratikrīḍā*. Such treatment of the subject inspired miniature painters. To quote B. N. Goswamy, the distinguished Indian art historian and an expert on Pahari painting:

> [...] the painter had gone with perfect ease on to the love-making of Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā as described in Jayadeva's text showing them

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[38] Chokshi 2018: 133.
[39] Chokshi 2018: 135.
[40] Chokshi 2018: 135.

in several paintings in actual physical union. Here, in the *Naiṣa-dhacarita*, the painter had the opportunity to do that again and even in greater detail as the series of drawings which treat of this are proof.[41]

Drawings and paintings of the Nala-Damayantī story are found in the collections of museums not only in India but around the world. The Museum of Fine Arts in Boston houses a very important collection of 29 drawings made for Rājā Saṃsār Cand of Kangra (1774–1823). Other American museums also possess a dozen or so miniature paintings with that theme.

Roshani Chokshi explains in the Glossary which accompanies her Pandava novel that she conducted a serious research on Indian mythology but was also told different stories at home. One of such stories definitely was that of Nala and Damayantī, and it was not difficult for her to see the Boston drawings and publications on them and other miniatures illustrating the *Naiṣadhaca-rita*,[42] including the garden of Nala.

If it is so, once again the interconnections between Sanskrit literature and art have revealed themselves. The subject of the *Nai-ṣadhacarita* illustrations is very fascinating in itself but I leave the analysis of paintings of Nala's six seasons garden to art historians.[43]

5. Conclusion

We have seen that the *ṣaḍṛtuvarṇana* genre has also other interesting examples to be studied besides the *Ṛtusaṃhara,* among them collections of stanzas by various authors. And among the verses comprised in *ṛtukāvya*s certain thematic groups are of spe-

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[41] Goswamy 2006: 20.

[42] One of the Boston's miniatures has served as the book cover for Deven Patel's 2014 study devoted to Śrīharṣa's poem.

[43] A very interesting remark of B. N. Goswamy shows the cooperation of pandits and painters. In canto I of the *Naiṣadhacarita*, verse 82, there is a comparison of the pomegranate tree fruits with Damayantī's breasts. As Goswami explains: 'Apparently the artist of the drawing in his first design had missed out this detail, but the detail was thought worthy of inclusion by the person writing the note in the left margin, possibly the *paṇḍit* under whose guidance the artist was working' (Goswamy 2006: 31). As a result, the pomegranates became too prominent.

cial interest. These are the verses describing *viraha*, which could have links with *dūtakāvya*s and the *bārahmāsā* tradition.[44] The stanzas devoted to seasonal pastimes were then gathered in the collections of *muktaka*s linked by the theme of *ṛtukrīḍā* and later on appeared in collections under this or similar titles.

The description of the six seasons also entered as a homogenous whole into the domain of *mahākāvya*. The execution of this subject saw innovations and developments as I have pointed out above. Finally, the picture of the all-seasons garden has found its way into modern Indian English literature.

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[44] An interesting example is the *Saṃdeśarāsaka* by Abdul Rahman (ca. 14th c.). This Apabhraṃśa poem, consisting of 223 stanzas, can be situated on the boundaries of the message-poem genre. This is how its author presents it: 'an unnamed heroine sees a traveller, and after learning that he is on his way from Multan (*mūlatthaṇu*—SR 2.65) to Cambay (*khaṃbhaittah*—SR 2.65, 67), she asks him to convey a message to her husband, who went on business to Cambay. She describes to him her feelings throughout the whole year of her husband's absence [...]' (Sudyka 2013: 70).

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Vivakṣā and the Formation of Meaning According to Bhartṛhari

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There is surprisingly little modern scholarship on the concept of *vivakṣā*, literally the 'desire to say or speak,'[1] generally translated (as I do here) with the phrase 'speaker's intention,' which is current in modern linguistics. And yet, the term occurs several times first in the *Mahābhāṣya* (henceforth MBh) and later in the *Vākyapadīya* (henceforth VP) of Bhartṛhari and his commentators.[2] Furthermore, it later resonates outside Grammar, notably in the works of Pramāṇa and Pratyabhijñā authors, and in Alaṃkāra-

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[1] The word *vivakṣā* is an action noun from the desiderative stem of the root *vac*-, derived by *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (henceforth A.) 3.1.7, *dhātoḥ karmaṇaḥ samānakartṛkāt icchāyāṃ vā*, and thus equivalent to the phrase *vaktum icchā*. Beside the noun, in Bhartṛhari's works (and those of other Grammarians, from Kātyāyana onward) one also frequently comes across various verbal forms from the same stem (*vivakṣyate, vivakṣita,* etc.), as well as roughly equivalent expressions from other roots, most notably *abhisaṃdhāna* and *prayuyukṣā* (both briefly discussed below). The phrase *vaktum icchā* is itself used once in VP 1.111. See also VPVṛ 1.107 *vaktur icchā*; and VP 3.14.505 (*vaktum iṣṭe*).

[2] There are about 80 occurrences of the term *vivakṣā* and related forms from the stem *vivakṣa*-, including those with negative prefix *a*-, in the MBh (cf. Pathak and Chitrao 1927, s.v.); and more than 80 in the *kārikāpāṭha* alone of the VP (cf. Bhate and Kar 1993, s.v.).

śāstra. Leaving aside these later developments, here I will concentrate on the role played by *vivakṣā* in speech production and, in particular, in the process of the formation of meaning, especially as outlined in the passage where the term occurs for the first time in the VP,[3] namely the *Vṛtti* on 1.13. My intention is to shed light on its centrality in Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language. Many of the intuitions concerning the concept of speaker's intention scattered across the MBh find a new consistency, significance, and depth in the treatment *vivakṣā* receives in the VP. In doing so, I will also clarify some misconceptions that in my opinion have obfuscated the understanding of *vivakṣā* until now. For that purpose, I will devote the next paragraph to a brief survey of the secondary literature on *vivakṣā*.

1. Vivakṣā in the works of the early Pāṇinīyas. A survey of secondary literature

The first Indologist to discuss *vivakṣā* was Franz Kielhorn in an 1887 article entitled 'Some devices of Indian grammarians.' According to Kielhorn, this concept was one of the 'devices' — a term that perhaps reveals a slightly condescending attitude — to which Pāṇinīyas resorted to solve perceived problems in the formulation of rules in Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. However, in this case the great German scholar seems to have completely missed the point. A survey of the occurrences of *vivakṣā* in the MBh shows that the Sanskrit grammarians do not invoke it to bypass or overcome derivational hurdles, as is the case with *yogavibhāga* and other 'technical' interpretative procedures described in the article.[4] Rather, Patañjali generally appears to refer to *vivakṣā* to account for the limits of grammatical description, namely cases where the attested

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[3] When I use the name *Vākyapadīya* (or the abbreviation VP), without indicating a specific locus, I intend the *kārikāpāṭha* of the three *kāṇḍa*s that comprise the work as well as the *Vṛtti* on the first two *kāṇḍa*s, which I regard as Bhartṛhari's auto-commentary. For a more detailed explanation of the way I refer to the various parts of the VP, which takes the complex situation of its current editions into account, see Appendix.

[4] In fact, Kielhorn gives no actual example of *vivakṣā* being employed by the Grammarians as an escape route out of supposed difficulties or omissions in Pāṇini's system. The same holds for the device *anabhidhāna*, which Kielhorn associates with *vivakṣā* dismissively saying that both are 'really of no value whatever.'

forms are not those one would expect or where theoretically possible forms are not attested. To put it differently, the emergence of *vivakṣā* in the grammatical discourse acknowledges the self-evident fact that, along with its own phonic form and its meaning (which can only be a mental representation that may or may not have an external referent), any verbal expression also entails the individual speaker's motivation for uttering it,[5] while at the same time it implicitly recognises that language, as a system of verbal signs, follows its own rules, not always predictable despite its overall regularity.[6]

Other occurrences of *vivakṣā* equally indicate a complex and multifaceted concept. In several passages Patañjali points out that one can correctly interpret a verbal expression only by taking into consideration the speaker's intention (see for example the passage quoted just below). This is a consequence of the fact that language has a certain inbuilt ambiguity or, better, openness, which allows people to use the same words with rather different meanings in mind, and yet, usually to no detriment to mutual understanding and, ultimately, communication. For instance, according to Grammarians a word can express either the universal or the particular. Whether it is one or the other in any given context, it only depends on what the speaker has in mind: 'If, then, the generality is also particular, and the particular also generality, the generality and the particular cannot be determined. They can be determined. How? According to the speaker's intention.'[7] In the

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[5] As Helārāja states in the first lines of the *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* (henceforth Pr) on VP 3.3.1: *prayogeṇābhijvalitaiḥ śabdais tritayam avagamyate: ātmīyaṃ rūpam, arthaś ca phalasādhanaḥ, prayoktur abhiprāyaś ca* (SI 3.i.122.5–6); tr. Houben 1995, 331: 'Through words that are manifested by using [them], three things are understood: the own form [of the word]; the thing-meant that is productive of some result; and the speaker's thought.' VP 3.3.1 starts with *jñānam prayoktuḥ*, of which *prayoktur abhiprāyaḥ* is a gloss, mirrored by Houben's rendering of *abhiprāya* with 'thought.' However, the primary meaning of *abhiprāya* is 'purpose, intention,' thus *prayoktur abhiprāyaḥ* is virtually synonymous with *vivakṣā*.

[6] From the perspective of a modern linguistic sensibility and understanding, the irregularities of natural language are of course historical accidents. Unfortunately, the Sanskrit Grammarians never took full stock of the diachronic dimension of language.

[7] MBh *ad* A.1.1.66–67 (1.172.2–3): *yadi tarhi sāmānyam api viśeṣo viśeṣo 'pi sāmānyaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣau na prakalpete. prakalpete ca. katham. vivakṣātaḥ.* Tr. based on Filliozat 1980: 288.

bhāṣya on A.1.2.58, Patañjali illustrates this point with the help of a lively vignette:

> The name of the universal also expresses the individual as well as the universal. How does one know that the name of the universal also expresses the individual? This is how one knows it: someone asks a cowherd seated amid a large herd of cattle: 'Do you see the cow here, by any chance?'; the cowherd understands: 'He sees the cows, and he asks if I see the cow. He certainly intends (*vivakṣitam*) a particular [cow].' [8]

One key passage in Patañjali's unsystematic treatment of *vivakṣā* is found in the *bhāṣya* on A.5.1.16, *tad asya tad asmin syād iti*, [9] which teaches that the *taddhita* suffixes given in the following rules are introduced after a nominal stem *x* in the sense of 'this may be of *x* or in *x*,' e.g. *prāsāda* 'mansion' + *cha* = *prāsādīya*, as in the example *prāsādīyā iṣṭakāḥ* 'bricks that may be sufficient/suitable for a mansion.' Responding to a criticism of the wording of the rule, Patañjali remarks:

> What is the purpose of the word *syāt* [in the sūtra]? [So that the rule] will not apply here: *prāsādo devadattasya, prākāro nagarasya*. Now, even though the word *syāt* is mentioned, why does [the rule] not apply here in *prāsādo devadattasya syāt* 'the mansion may be Devadatta's,' *prākāro nagarasya syāt* 'The wall may be [that] of the city'? One should specify that [here] the optative (*liṅ*) is [used] in the sense of 'possible' (*śakya*). […] Let us say then that *iti* is mentioned [for that purpose]. If [*iti* is used], on that basis [one should assume that] *vivakṣā* [comes into play]. [10]

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[8] MBh *ad* A.1.2.58 (1.230.17–20): *jātiśabdena hi dravyam api abhidhīyate jātir api. kathaṃ punar jñāyate jātiśabdena dravyam api abhidhīyate iti. evaṃ hi kaścin mahati gomaṇḍale gopālakam āsīnam pṛcchati. asti atra kāṃcid gāṃ paśyasīti. sa paśyati paśyati cāyaṃ gāḥ pṛcchati ca kāṃcid atra gāṃ paśyasīti nūnam asya dravyaṃ vivakṣitam iti.* Tr. based on Filliozat 1986: 239.

[9] The passage is quoted and translated, possibly for the first time, in van Nooten (1983: 43), who completely misunderstands it (for a critique of this translation, see Scharf 1995: 66, n. 3).

[10] MBh *ad* A.5.1.16 (2.342.22–26): *syādgrahaṇaṃ kimartham. iha mā bhūt. prāsādo devadattasya prākāro nagarasyeti. atha kriyamāṇe 'pi syādgrahaṇe iha kasmān na bhavati. prāsādo devadattasya syāt. prākāro nagarasya syāt iti. śakyārthe liṅ iti vaktavyam.* […] *evaṃ tarhi itikaraṇaḥ kriyate tataś ced vivakṣā bhavati.* Two very similar passages occur in the MBh *ad* A.4.2.21 and 5.2.94.

In an article that (to the best of my knowledge) is the first entirely devoted to *vivakṣā*, van Nooten (1983: 49) presents this MBh passage as evidence that here Patañjali proposes to formulate a *paribhāṣā* centred on an alleged 'principle of *vivakṣā*,' which 'is introduced in the manner of a *paribhāṣā* indicated by a *jñāpaka*. The *jñāpaka* is the term *iti*, the *vivakṣā* is used to obviate the necessity for introducing special rules to preclude the misapplication of Pāṇini's formulations.' According to van Nooten (possibly influenced by Kielhorn, even though the latter is never mentioned), Kātyāyana's tentative suggestions to identify and formulate more accurate semantic conditions for the introduction of some suffixes taught in the sūtras are rejected by Patañjali, who interprets the mention of *iti* (in fact, more accurately, the *iti*-clauses found in these rules) as a clue (*jñāpaka*) by means of which Pāṇini is supposed to indicate that the application of the rule is subject to the arbitrariness of the speaker's intention (*vivakṣā*).

However, neither the *bhāṣya* nor later works contain any hint to *itikaraṇa* as a possible *jñāpaka*. In fact, the presumed *vivakṣā-paribhāṣā* is not found anywhere in the later Pāṇinian *paribhāṣā* literature, as van Nooten himself (p. 51) eventually must admit. On the contrary, commenting on A.5.1.16, Kaiyaṭa lucidly explains the function and implications of the *iti*-clause. With regard to the term *prāya*, he notes:

> The meaning [of *prāyasya*] is: of the quasi totality [of people]. Therefore, Grammar teaches words only as they express the meaning in which people use them, because the tradition of Grammar is rooted in usage. And this is the tenet that sometimes [i.e. in some sūtras] is epitomised by the use of *iti* [in a rule]. In those cases the word *iti*, being [used] in the sense of the cause [for the introduction of a certain suffix], makes [Grammarians] go along with *vivakṣā*. [...] And speakers do not have the desire to use the expression *prāsādīyo devadattaḥ* to convey that 'it may be Devadatta's mansion,' because the use of such an expression only occurs to convey [that Devadatta] may belong [to the household,] etc.[11]

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[11] *samagrakalpasyety arthaḥ. tasmād yatrārthe lokāḥ śabdān prayuñjate tadarthā-bhidhāyina eva śāstreṇānuvidhīyante, prayogamūlatvād vyākaraṇasmṛteḥ. ayam eva nyāyaḥ kvacid itikaraṇenopasaṃgṛhyate. tatretiśabdo hetvarthaḥ san vivakṣām anusāra-*

Van Nooten's fundamental confusion consists in misconstruing *vivakṣā* as an interpretative principle concocted by the Grammarians, a stratagem to get out of derivational difficulties. In light of this and other passages, my contention is that in the *bhāṣya* on A.5.1.16 Patañjali simply points out how difficult, if not impossible (especially in the field of *taddhita* derivatives like those under discussion), it is to predict where a suffix will apply and where it will not, even when the formal and semantic conditions superficially appear to be the same. Like any good linguist, the Grammarian is bound to observe the actual usage, record the quirks of the language, which is never completely regular, and allow for some leeway in the application of rules.[12] Pāṇini was aware of the great variability of usage and tried to account for it in various ways: virtually all the *taddhita* rules are optional (see A.4.1.82, *samarthānāṃ prathamād vā*), which means that in principle secondary derivatives can freely alternate with the corresponding analytical expressions (e.g. *upagor apatyam/aupagavaḥ*); moreover, the semantic conditions for the introduction of *taddhita* suffixes are often quite vague, leaving a grey area in the application of the rule.

Radicchi (1993: 223), while being cursorily dismissive of van Nooten, incurs in the same mistake. She writes:

> From Patañjali comes the formula, quasi *paribhāṣā*: *itikaraṇaḥ kriyate tataś ced vivakṣā*, '*iti* is there, from it *vivakṣā* is deduced.' That is, only in Pāṇini's *sūtra*s, in whose formulation *iti* appears, the *vivakṣā* can legitimately be invoked.[13]

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yati. [...] *na ca lokasya prāsādo devadattasya syād ity arthapratipādanāya prāsādīyo devadatta iti śabdaprayogecchā bhavati, bhavādyarthapratipādanāyaivaitacchabdaprayogāt* (MBh-Pradīpa p. 21).

[12] On this issue, cf. Renou's lapidary assessment (1940: 131): 'Comme l'indique KV elle-meme 5.2.95, le *vivakṣārthatva* d'*iti* a pour effet de rendre approximative (*prāyika*) la règle où il figure, en subordonnant à l'intention (c'est-à-dire en fin de compte à l'usage: *laukikam artham anusārayati* disent les *vṛtti*) l'application du sūtra concerné. Il est fort douteux que Pāṇini ait voulu cette conséquence.' Renou is right, I believe, to question the assumption that this might have been Pāṇini's motive in using *iti*.

[13] The restriction of the recourse to *vivakṣā* only for rules mentioning the word *iti* is itself questionable, for the presumed 'formula' quoted above does not contain an *eva* that might support the claim. However, Radicchi too does not dwell on the alleged 'technical' uses of *vivakṣā*.

On the other hand, Radicchi notes that

> [...] in Patañjali's dialectic *vivakṣā* enters at times with a vitality demanding revision of F. Kielhorn's old opinion, never denied, i.e., *vivakṣā*, like *anabhidhāna*, is an artifice 'of no value whatever.'

Moreover, Radicchi correctly underlines (p. 224) the significance of a later portion of the same *bhāṣya ad* A.5.1.16, which presents a distinction between two varieties of *vivakṣā* — *prayoktrī* and *laukikī* — a distinction that I believe underlies much of Bhartṛhari's reflection, even though it is not explicitly recalled. The MBh passage reads:

> And *vivakṣā* is twofold. There is in fact *vivakṣā* at the [individual] speaker's level (*prāyoktrī*), and there is *vivakṣā* at the level of the speech community (*laukikī*). Surely, [individual] speakers with a sweet, charming, polished tongue will use sweet, charming, polished words. There is *vivakṣā* at the level of the speech community when there is majority agreement. The speech community is indicated by [the term] 'majority.' And here in *prāsādo devadattasya syāt*, [and] *prākāro nagarasya syāt*, there would be no majority agreement [about the meaning] if the suffix [*cha*] was introduced.[14]

This distinction captures a crucial aspect of language. There is ample individual freedom in its use, as reflected by individual variations in pronunciation, vocabulary, complexity, redundancy, register, and other 'stylistic' features that together amount to a unique idiolect for each speaker.[15] But, on the other hand, language is a system of signs that obeys its own rules and cannot be bent to the whims of any single speaker because, beyond a certain level of idiosyncrasy, it risks failing as a means of interpersonal communication. In fact, any tongue is alive insofar as it is the

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[14] *vivakṣā ca dvayī. asty eva prāyoktrī vivakṣā asti laukikī. prayoktā hi mṛdvyā snigdhayā ślakṣṇayā jihvayā mṛdūn snigdhān ślakṣṇān śabdān prayuṅkte. laukikī vivakṣā yatra prāyasya sampratyayaḥ. prāya iti lokaḥ vyapadiśyate. na ca prāsādo devadattasya syāt prākāro nagarasya syād iti atra utpadyamānena pratyayena prāyasya sampratyayaḥ syāt* (MBh 2.342.28–343.6).

[15] For a survey of themes related to the manifestations of 'speaking subjectivity' in the works of Sanskrit grammarians, see Aussant 2013. The author briefly deals with *vivakṣā* (pp. 7–8), directing the readers to the contributions of Renou (1940), van Nooten (1983), Radicchi (1993), and Scharf (1995, 2002).

medium of verbal exchange of a community of speakers (the *loka* of the Grammarians) who all use it according to (roughly) the same grammatical rules, repertoire of sounds, and lexicon. The individual speakers can choose a higher or lower register, a plain or flowery style, a down-to-earth or polished vocabulary, etc., but they cannot change the morphology or syntax at will or use a word in a sense that is neither its primary meaning nor one of its conventional secondary meanings.[16] As I will show in the coming pages, Bhartṛhari is acutely aware of this 'communal' or 'systemic' dimension of *vivakṣā*,[17] which reflects the autonomy of language as a semiotic system and strictly determines the boundaries of individual freedom.

To complete this short survey, I will mention Scharf 1995, which approaches the topic of *vivakṣā* starting from a solidly argued critique of van Nooten's article and, especially, the latter's unfounded view that Patañjali did not consider the limits imposed on *vivakṣā* by what Scharf (like many others) calls 'linguistic convention.'[18] Scharf rightly notes (p. 67): '[...] it is the business of a grammarian to take the ordinary speaker's conception into consideration in formulating and discussing grammatical rules, and that what the speaker means, what he has in mind, namely, his

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[16] Here I deliberately leave out the thorny issue of poetic language, which would require a separate treatment by an author better qualified than myself.

[17] Pace Radicchi (1993: 226) who claims, without offering any evidence or consistent argument: 'The idea emerging in Patañjali's dialectics on the *laukikī vivakṣā*, of the language as an autonomous organism in which tendencies develop, disappears in the philosopher Bhartṛhari.'

[18] The use of the term 'convention' applied to language only makes sense if the term is taken in its weak sense of 'the way in which something is done that most people in a society expect and consider to be polite or the right way to do it' (*Oxford Dictionary* online, s.v., last accessed 2-8-2021). But the Grammarians consistently reject the idea that the relationship between *śabda* and *artha* might be based on convention in the stronger sense of a conscious, voluntary agreement between different parties or stakeholders. For them, starting with the famous first *vārttika* in the MBh (*siddhe śabdārthasaṃbandhe* ...), this relation — whatever its origin — is a given for any speaking community and each of its new members. Thus, it may be appropriate to talk about language conventions about certain conversational or discursive habits adhered to by a given community (for example, deploring the use of expletives in certain situations), but the term is misleading if used about the structures of language (phonology, morphology, syntax, and lexicon).

intention (*vivakṣā*), is the essential motivator of speech.' Much of the article is then devoted to a detailed analysis of the place of *vivakṣā* in the MBh discussions on grammatical gender.[19]

However, even Scharf seems to be somewhat misled by Kielhorn's stance, when he writes (p. 67) that 'the principle [of *vivakṣā*] is proper as an essential part of the outlook of a grammarian. A grammarian must account for the fact that people speak of an item as having a status it does not have ontologically.' The term 'principle' inappropriately suggests that this is primarily a tool of the Pāṇinīyas' conceptual apparatus rather than an aspect of speech production of which the Grammarians acknowledge the function and importance. As for the latter half of the comment, it misses an important point: for the Grammarians, the fact that language does not reflect reality faithfully is not the exception, but rather the norm at the level of *vyavahāra*. It is only on the *paramārtha* plane that, in Bhartṛhari's metaphysical view, the structures of language are homologised to the structures of the cosmos that is an evolute of Brahman.

2. Earlier scholarship on vivakṣā in the Vākyapadīya

Radicchi's article, published in the proceedings of the first international conference on Bhartṛhari (Bhate and Bronkhorst 1993), is allegedly a treatment of *vivakṣā* in the VP.[20] However, she confines her survey to the occurrences of the term in the *kārikā*s alone, ignoring the *Vṛtti*. No explanation for that is given in the article, but I suppose this is because Radicchi is one of the scholars who have questioned Bhartṛhari's authorship of the *Vṛtti*.[21] This

[19] Scharf 2002 looks at the role *vivakṣā* plays in the Grammarians' discussions on the order and application of *kāraka* rules, an important topic that is beyond the scope of this article.

[20] Van Nooten (1983: 51) briefly hints at the VP, concluding that 'the latter work hardly elaborates on a grammatical system involving a *vivakṣā* principle, [which] may indicate that Bhartṛhari was aware of its limitations.' Besides the skewed approach to *vivakṣā* discussed above, this statement may give the impression the topic is barely touched upon in the VP, which is simply untrue.

[21] To be fair, Radicchi's stance on the *Vṛtti* authorship is seemingly one of neutral, open-minded scepticism, as she writes (2009: 355): 'In the light of this still-open question, I believe it methodologically correct to keep what we read in the kārikās separate from what we read in the vṛtti'; but then she adds: 'as

omission is of no small consequence for a study of Bhartṛhari's views on *vivakṣā*, as we will see in the following pages, because it makes her overlook the important passage in VPVṛ 1.13.

Before moving on to a thorough examination of the said passage, it is worth mentioning two articles by Subramania Iyer, the great pioneer of Bhartṛharian studies. In a paper devoted to the philosophical outlook of the Vaiyākaraṇas, and especially to Bhartṛhari and his commentator Helārāja, Subramania Iyer (1948) draws attention to the role that the speaker's intention plays in their view of language and verbal communication (p. 395):

> [...] when words are used, three things are understood by us: (1) the form of the word, consisting of an entity over and above the sequence of sounds heard; (2) the meaning; (3) the intention of the speaker.

He notes that, while the relation between the first and the second components can be characterised as *vācyavācakabhāva* (signifier-signified relation), that between the first and the third is said to be *kāryakāraṇabhāva*, a relation between cause and effect, since 'it is the intention of the speaker which calls up particular words for use.' According to him, the attention paid to the latter relation, which would be beyond the pale of Grammarians, is a consequence of Bhartṛhari's well-known willingness to engage with the ideas of other thinkers — the attitude that a few decades later Houben has aptly dubbed as 'perspectivism.' It is in order to take into account the view of those who believe that 'the word does not point to any external object, but only refers to the intention of the speaker' — writes Iyer — that Bhartṛhari talks about *kāryakāraṇabhāva*.[22] Later in the paper, without establishing a connection

undoubtedly divergences and differences in thought are found between the former and the latter.' Now, the latter is an apodictic statement, the truth of which needs to be proved. Unfortunately, in her article on *vivakṣā* Radicchi simply ignores the *Vṛtti*. However, even if one suspects it to be the work of a different author, the *Vṛtti* certainly deserves to be taken into account as a major early witness of Bhartṛhari's thought.

[22] Subramania Iyer is certainly thinking of passages such as the following, where Helārāja attributes this view to the Buddhists: *saugatānāṃ vikalpapratibimbasya bhedānadhyavasāyād bahiṣ pravṛttiḥ. prāmāṇyaṃ tu vaktrābhiprāya eva śabdā-*

with this view, the author presents 'the particular doctrine of the Vaiyākaraṇas,' epitomised by Patañjali's famous dictum, *śabdapramāṇako vayam, yac chabda āha tad asmākam pramāṇam*,[23] adding that for the Grammarians '*artha* does not mean the external reality but whatever the word brings to the mind.' In this regard, he refers to the distinction Helārāja often makes between *vastvartha* and *śabdārtha*: the latter expression implies that language builds a reality of its own, as it were, and essentially refers to it. While acknowledging the attention paid to the speaker's intention in Bhartṛhari's work, Subramania Iyer never mentions the term *vivakṣā* and mostly refers to passages from Helārāja's commentary.

Twenty years later, Subramania Iyer (1968) once again touches on the concept of speaker's intention in an article devoted to the primary and secondary meanings of words. There he gives a succinct and accurate account of the concept in the context of Bhartṛhari's ideas on *ekaśabdadarśana*, the theory according to which a single word can have several meanings.[24] As Subramania Iyer remarks, this raises the question of how the word manages to convey only one of its meanings in any given context. In this respect, he writes (p. 101),

> Bhartṛhari emphasises that before a polysemic word can convey
> any meaning at all, it is necessary that the speaker should intend

nāṃ na bāhye vyabhicārāśaṅkanāt, anyavyāvṛttimātraniṣṭhatā tu bahiḥ 'According to the Buddhists, there is external projection [of mental objects] since people do not realise the difference of the conceptual reflection [of an object] [from the object itself]. However, words are [considered] authoritative only with regard to the speaker's intention, not with regard to the external reality, because [the Buddhists] suspect that [words] do not correspond [to the external reality]; on the other hand, with regard to the external reality, [words] only rest on the exclusion of other [meanings]' (VP 3.i.237.16–18). Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika* 1.3cd–4: *avisaṃvādanaṃ śābde 'py abhiprāyanivedanāt ǁ vaktṛvyāpāraviṣayo yo 'rtho buddhau prakāśate | prāmāṇyaṃ tatra śabdasya nārthatattvanibandhanam*; in his *Vṛtti*, Manorathanandin glosses *vaktṛvyāpāra* with the words *vaktur vyāpāro vivakṣā*.

[23] In his translation (p. 396): 'We go by the authority of the word. What the word says is our authority.'

[24] The opposite view, *anekaśabdadarśana*, maintains that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the linguistic sign (the word) and its meaning. Thus, one is faced with as many different words as are the meanings signified, even though the phonetic structure of the word is the same. As Subramania Iyer (1968: 100) notes, the Grammarians themselves 'hold both those views. They adopt one or the other according to convenience or according to the topic discussed.'

to convey a particular one from among its many meanings. The word has the power [...] called *abhidhā*, but this power will work only when the speaker intends to apply it in a particular case. [...] [T]he power of the word to convey its meaning is eternal. In actual speech, however, one begins with something which is in the speaker's mind, his desire or *intention to say something particular* [emphasis added]. This is referred to by the word *abhisaṃdhāna* by Bhartṛhari.

The last sentence in this passage is puzzling. The term *abhisaṃdhāna* can mean 'intention' and therefore, more specifically, 'speaker's intention,' and is used in this sense in VP 2.410 (both verse and *Vṛtti*),[25] but this is the only *kārikā* in which it occurs. Two more *kārikā*s, VP 2.406 and 432, contain the phrase *prayoktā abhisaṃdhatte* in a related sense. There are a few other occurrences of forms from the verb *abhisaṃdhā-* belonging to the same semantic field, all of them, as far as I can tell, in the latter part of the second *kāṇḍa*. On the whole, though, the term *vivakṣā* and related forms from the desiderative stem *vivakṣa-* are far more frequent. I cannot find any plausible explanation for Iyer's odd oversight, especially in light of the salience of the passage I am going to discuss in the rest of this article.

3. *The formation of meaning: VP 1.13 and its Vṛtti*

VP 1.13 occurs in the context of a sequence of verses extolling the unique power of grammar as a tool for the pursuit of liberation. Its *Vṛtti*, which — as mentioned above — contains the first occurrence of the term *vivakṣā*, expounds views that at first sight may seem alternative to one another and offer different understandings of the verse. For that reason, it has drawn some attention in the context of the modern debate on the authorship of the *Vṛtti* because, as discussed below, some scholars have pointed to it as possible evidence that the commentary was written by someone else than Bhartṛhari. This is not the place to survey the controver-

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[25] VP 2.410 [SI 406; 2, p. 304] *prayogād abhisandhānam anyad eṣu na vidyate | viṣaye yataśaktitvāt sa tu tatra vyavasthitaḥ ||*; and the beginning of the *Vṛtti* thereon: *yac cedam uktam abhisaṃhitaḥ śabdo vācaka iti, prayogād uccāraṇād anyad abhisandhānam na vidyate.*

sy surrounding the authorship of the *Vṛtti* or, even less, attempt to settle it. Therefore, I will not directly engage with the arguments of those who suspect a different authorship. Having flagged this issue here, below I will be content with pointing to the consistency of these views with Bhartṛhari's overall theory of language and their numerous parallels in other parts of the VP.

VP 1.13 states that meaning comes to be established through language and claims that grammar alone can reveal the inner workings of language. Here is the verse followed by my translation, which I will justify below after examining the challenges posed by some of the terms used by Bhartṛhari and the solutions proposed by other scholars before me:

> *arthapravṛttitattvānāṃ śabdā eva nibandhanam |*
> *tattvāvabodhaḥ śabdānāṃ nāsti vyākaraṇād ṛte ||*

> Words alone are the foundation of the [key] elements for the formation of meaning. There is no comprehension of the true nature of words without grammar.

Each of the terms — *artha*, *pravṛtti*, and *tattva* — in the compound that opens the verse is notoriously polysemic, and the relations between them are liable to multiple and widely diverging semantic-syntactic analysis, as a survey of some translations of the verse into modern European languages shows:

◊ Subramania Iyer (1965: 19): 'The expression of what one wants to say (the principle of the use of things) depends upon words and the truth concerning words cannot be understood except through Grammar.'
◊ Biardeau (1964: 45): 'Les paroles sont le seul fondement de la nature vraie des objets signifiés et de leur usage. Sans la grammaire, on n'a pas la connaissance de la réalité vraie des paroles.'[26]
◊ Rau (2002: 7): 'Nur Wörter sind Behälter für Sachverhalte [Wahrheiten], die das Streben nach einem Zwecke beinhalten.

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[26] 'Words are the sole foundation of the true nature of the signified objects and their use. Without grammar, there is no knowledge of the true reality of words' (my tr.).

Die Kenntnis der wahren Bedeutung der Wörter ist nicht ohne Grammatik möglich.'[27]

The semantic complexity of the initial compound is well illustrated by Subramania Iyer's choice to offer two distinct translations side by side. The first translation ('the expression of what one wants to say') is quite loose: there is no English term corresponding to the Sanskrit *tattvānām,* while *pravṛtti* is (presumably) rendered with 'expression,' and *artha* with the phrase 'what one wants to say.' The rendering of *artha* anticipates the reference to *vivakṣā* found at the very start of the *Vṛtti,* but it essentially takes *artha* as 'meaning' in all the three senses indicated by Helārāja (cf. n. 6), embracing both the content of the cognition that invariably precedes any utterance and the complex subjective motives that lead to convey that content verbally. The second of Subramania Iyer's translations — 'the principle of the use of things' — given in brackets right after the first (without any explanation) is somewhat more literal, but otherwise mystifying: here *tattva* is translated with the singular 'principle' (while of course *tattvānām* is plural), *pravṛtti* with 'use,' and *artha* with 'things.' Taken at face value, the phrase 'the use of things' has no obvious connection with speech and verbal communication,[28] but at least it clarifies that here Iyer takes the initial compound as a double genitive *tatpuruṣa*: *arthānāṃ pravṛttes tattvam.*[29]

On the other hand, Biardeau's translation — 'the true nature of the signified objects and their use' — suggests that she understand *arthapravṛtti* as a *dvandva,* which then functions as the first

[27] 'Only words are carriers for states of affairs [truths], which contain the striving for a purpose. Knowing the true meaning of words is not possible without grammar.' (I am grateful to Daniele Cuneo for this English rendering of Rau's German translation.) Rau's understanding of *arthapravṛttitattvānām* makes no sense to me, thus I will not comment on it below.

[28] I suspect Subramania Iyer may in fact have meant 'verbal usage' for *pravṛtti* and 'thing meant' for *artha,* but this is a mere conjecture. His translation mirrors Vṛṣabhadeva's gloss: *artho dravyaṃ pravṛttiḥ kriyā tayos tattvāni* […] (Sph 44.9).

[29] Note that in his gloss of the verse Vṛṣabhadeva gives two alternative analyses of the compound (first as a double genitive *tatpuruṣa,* then as a *tatpuruṣa* the first member of which is a *dvandva*): *arthapravṛttitattvānām iti. arthasya pravṛttir vyāpāraḥ tasya tattvāni. arthaś ca pravṛttiś ceti vā dvandvaḥ* (Sph 44.8–9). These alternatives underlie some of the views presented in the *Vṛtti.*

member of a genitive *tatpuruṣa*. However, one of the two terms in Biardeau's translation is conceptually obscure: while the translation of *artha* as 'signified object' (i.e. the concept or notion denoted by a speech item) is common and widely accepted, it is difficult to guess whether the 'use' of such objects refers, in Biardeau's intention, to the mental operations one carries out with them (as the wording may suggest) or the verbal usages that reflect these mental objects.

Ogawa 2017 is entirely devoted to VP 1.13 and its *vṛtti*. The article is extremely informative and usefully points to several intra-textual references in other sections of the VP.[30] The author's translation of the verse leaves the initial compound intentionally untranslated,[31] postponing the solution of the problems it raises to the ensuing pages, where he analyses the views presented in the *Vṛtti* arguing — correctly, I believe — that all of them equally reflect Bhartṛhari's ideas. However, immediately after the translation of the verse, Ogawa states his basic understanding of the three terms: *artha* 'meaning, thing,' *pravṛtti* 'activity,' and *tattva* 'essence, essential property, the property of being that.' It is worth noting that none of these translations render *tattvānām* with a plural equivalent term or endeavour to explain the plural, which points to another exegetical difficulty confronting us.

Without claiming to deal with all the problems raised by this verse and its modern interpretations exhaustively, I will clarify my position on the sense of this verse, especially its first line, and the terms used in it. As is known, in this section (vv. 11–22) of the first *kāṇḍa* Bhartṛhari gives an impassioned apology of grammar. In VP 1.12 [32] he claims that grammar is the direct route to the supreme essence of language that has attained the differentiation of form,

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[30] In the author's conclusion (p. 55, with minor typos corrected), 'Bhartṛhari can achieve the purpose of expounding his theory of meaning with such a concise expression as *arthapravṛttitattva*. We see that in the above-mentioned points are accurately reflected Bhartṛhari's theories of the linguistic item-meaning relation, of the sentence meaning, of *apoddhāra*, and of conception.'

[31] Ogawa (2017: 43): '*arthapravṛttitattva*s have indeed linguistic items (*śabda*) for their basis. The essence (*tattva*) of [the forms of] linguistic items is not understood except through grammar.'

[32] *prāptarūpavibhāgāyā yo vācaḥ paramo rasaḥ | yat tat puṇyatamaṃ jyotis tasya mārgo 'yam āñjasaḥ ||.*

i.e. speech in its mundane, articulate manifestation, as is commonly experienced by humans. It is in relation to this level of language that in the second half of v. 13 it is asserted that without grammar there can be no comprehension of the true nature (*tattva*) of verbal expressions (*śabdānām*).

The first half of v. 13 clearly makes a statement about the relationship between verbal expressions and meanings.[33] Words (*śabdāḥ*) are said to be the foundation (*nibandhanam*) of meaning (*artha*). However, one should not forget that the distinction between *śabda* and *artha* is ultimately artificial: a string of sounds produced by the human phonatory apparatus is recognised as a speech unit (a word, phrase, sentence, or text) or, to put it differently, it qualifies as a sign or signifier only to the extent that it carries meaning, namely thanks to its acknowledged connection to a signified object or denotatum within a system of similar signs.

My contention is that here, in VP 1.13 and the *Vṛtti* thereon, Bhartṛhari looks at how meaning takes shape in the mind during the thought process that eventually leads to speech production. It is a complex process, in which one can *analytically*[34] identify several components. These essential elements are referred to with the term *tattva* in the compound *arthapravṛttitattvānām*, and I think the plural is pointedly used to evoke the many facets or dimensions of the process. In the *Vṛtti*, Bhartṛhari examines them one by one, and therefore he refers to the element or principle that at any given step becomes the focus of his reflection with the singular form *tattvam*.[35]

As for the term *pravṛtti*, its basic meaning is 'activity,' as Ogawa points out. The translation 'use, usage' (adopted in Biardeau and

[33] As there is no doubt that in this context Bhartṛhari is presenting his views about the relationship between grammar and its object, i.e. ordinary language, on the one hand, and the highest reality, on the other, it seems legitimate to take *artha* in the sense of 'signified object' and, more broadly, 'meaning' rather than merely 'object,' namely an entity having an extra-mental, external existence.

[34] I say 'analytically' because the distinction between *śabda* and *artha* is a theoretical operation carried out a posteriori. According to Bhartṛhari, the cognition that underlies and precedes any utterance is unitary, just like the utterance itself in its dual nature of signifier/signified, as he argues throughout the VP, and particularly in *kāṇḍa* 2.

[35] See e.g. the initial sentence of the *Vṛtti*, discussed below: *arthasya pravṛtti-tattvaṃ vivakṣā.*

one of Iyer's renderings of the compound) may be appropriate in other contexts, but here I suspect it stems from the (possibly sub-conscious) association with the expression *pravṛttinimitta*, fre-quently recurring in (especially later) grammatical literature, which refers to the 'cause of application' of a word — that is, the speaker's reason for the use of a certain word or phrase. Thus, sometimes *pravṛtti* can indeed be translated in an extended sense with 'use.' However, taking *pravṛtti* in that sense in *arthapravṛtti* — as, for example, in Biardeau's 'use of the signified objects' — would be an odd reversal of perspective, the sense of which es-capes me. One can say that speakers 'use' words, certainly not meanings!

I surmise that here Bhartṛhari employs the word *pravṛtti* in a sense close to its derivational meaning, namely as an action noun of the verb *pravṛt-*, in the sense of 'coming forth, origination, rise.'[36] Accordingly, the first half of v. 13 maintains that language — here primarily intended not as the metaphysical *śabdatattva* that is identical with Brahman,[37] but rather as the diversified, arti-culate language characterised as *prāptarūpavibhāga* in VP 1.12 (quoted above)[38] — is the core element in the way meanings arise in the minds of individual speakers.[39] Thus, on the basis of these considerations, I take the compound *arthapravṛttitattvāni* as refer-ring to the 'essential elements [that contribute] to the formation of meaning.'

[36] Cf. the use of the term *pravṛtti* in VP 3.7.33 and 3.9.41.

[37] Cf. VP 1.1: *anādinidhanaṃ brahma śabdatattvaṃ yad akṣaram | vivartate 'rtha-bhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ ||*.

[38] Note the use of the plural *śabdāḥ* in 13b, possibly to make it clear that the verse refers to language as speech in its countless, multiform manifestations.

[39] We can confidently exclude that the verse refers to the way sound strings (words or sentences) come to be associated with specific denotata. For the Grammarians, the relation between *śabda* and *artha* is *nitya*, fixed or permanent, namely a given, for all those who are born into a speech community. This view is clearly presented in VP 1.23: *nityāḥ śabdārthasambandhās tatrāmnātā maharṣibhiḥ | sūtrāṇāṃ sānutantrāṇāṃ bhāṣyāṇāṃ ca praṇetṛbhiḥ ||* 'There, the great sages who are the authors of the sūtras, vārttikas and the Bhāṣya have declared words, mean-ings and their relation to one another to be eternal' (tr. Subramania Iyer 1965: 24). This in turn harks back to the first *vārttika* in the MBh: *siddhe śabdārthasa-mbandhe* [...]. Cf. also VP 1.28: *nityatve kṛtakatve teṣām ādir na vidyate | prāṇinām iva sā caiṣā vyavasthā nityatocyate ||*.

Most of the *Vṛtti* on VP 1.13 deals with possible complementary understandings of the initial compound *arthapravṛttitattvānām.* It is in the first of these interpretations in the *Vṛtti* that one comes across the first mention of *vivakṣā* in the VP, in a passage that may be regarded as a definition of this concept. The view in question can be confidently ascribed to Bhartṛhari himself because, unlike most of the views following it, it is not preceded by phrases such as *apara āha* or *athavā.* Moreover, the fact that it is found at the very beginning of the auto-commentary strongly suggests its prominence in Bhartṛhari's view of meaning. Here is the passage (cf. SI 1.44.3–5), followed by my translation:

> *arthasya pravṛttitattvaṃ vivakṣā. na tu vastusvarūpatayā* [SI °*stu-rū*°] *sattvam asattvaṃ vā. vivakṣā hi yogyaśabdanibandhanā.* [40] *yogyaṃ hi śabdaṃ prayoktā vivakṣāprāpitasannidhāneṣv abhidheyeṣu pratyartham upādatte. tad yathopalipsamānaḥ prativiṣayaṃ yogyam evendriyam upalabdhau praṇidhatte.*

The essential element in the formation of meaning is the speaker's intention, not the existence or non-existence [of what is conveyed] as something having the nature of a reality. Surely, the speaker's intention is based on [the avail of] suitable[41] expres-

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[40] Cf. the nearly identical words used at the beginning of VPVṛ 2.432 [SI 428; 2, p. 310]: *yogyaśabdanibandhanayā vivakṣayā śabdapramāṇakaḥ prayoktā śabdaśaktim anugacchaṃs taṃ [taṃ] vivakṣitam* [*anugacchann api vivakṣantaṃ tam* SI] *arthaṃ tathā tathā samīhate* (for the translation, see § 4.5 below).

[41] Cf. Sph 44.18–21: *yogyas tadvivakṣāpratipādanasamarthaḥ śabda tasya nibandhanaṃ vivakṣāśabdārthaḥ. nanu vivakṣā śabdārthaḥ, tat kiṃ yogyaśabdanibandhanatvenety āha* <u>*yogyaṃ hi*</u> *iti. etad uktaṃ bhavati. ye te 'rthāḥ pratipādyās te vivakṣāto na vyatiriktāḥ, ato vivakṣaiva satyayogyaśabdanibandhanā tayā ca vivakṣayā te 'rthā sannidhāpyante prakalpyante* 'A suitable verbal expression is [one] capable of conveying the speaker's intention regarding *x* [i.e. a given meaning]; the word *vivakṣā* stands for [that which is] the foundation of that [suitable verbal expression]. One may object that, [if] the meaning of a verbal expression is the speaker's intention, then why does [the author] say that it is the foundation of suitable verbal expressions? Therefore, it is said: "<u>the speaker [employs] the suitable verbal expression…</u>" The meanings to be conveyed are not distinct from the speaker's intention, that is why the speaker's intention is indeed the foundation of the truthful (*satya*?), suitable, verbal expression, and these meanings are brought forward [i.e. into the subject's awareness], [i.e.] formed, by the speaker's intention.' Ogawa (2017: 45) proposes to emend *satyayogyaśabdanibandhanā* to *satī yogyaśabdanibandhanā,* but I am unconvinced by his suggestion: there is no need for the present participle introducing the predicate *yogyaśabdanibandhanā,* and

sions, since for each meaning the speaker employs the suitable verbal expression once the [mental contents] to be expressed have been brought forward by the speaker's intention. [Similarly,] for example, one who wishes to perceive directs only that organ of sense that is suitable for a given object of sense at [the time of] perception [towards that object].

In this short but dense passage, Bhartṛhari makes some important points for the first time in the VP. Let us look at them in detail.

3.1. The outset of speech production

Bhartṛhari places *vivakṣā*, the speaker's intention, at the heart of the subjective process of the formation of meaning. As a desiderative action noun that can be paraphrased as *vaktum icchā* (cf. n. 1), literally 'desire to speak,' the word *vivakṣā* intrinsically refers to a subjective dimension of experience, as desire is by its nature highly personal and idiosyncratic. It alludes to the complex of needs and feelings that motivate human behaviour and are in a sense presupposed by grammar since, being pre- or extra-linguistic, they lie outside its province.

In Bhartṛhari's characterisation, the speaker (*prayoktṛ*), driven by the urge to express him/herself, looks for words that are suitable to convey the content that is emerging in the intellect.[42] Here he tries to capture verbalisation from the very outset, that is from the moment an idea is stirred inside the subject's mind to the moment it takes shape and is conveyed through an utterance.[43] This is confirmed by other mentions of *vivakṣā* in the first *kāṇḍa*.

the whole phrase cannot be easily connected with the final part of the sentence introduced by *ca* and containing the term *vivakṣā* again, but in the instrumental. However, I admit I also find *satya* at the beginning of the compound odd. Perhaps it is a marginal gloss that has crept into the main text.

[42] Even though this is never explicitly stated in the VP, common experience shows that the search for the right words to express one's thoughts is usually subliminal, although it can occasionally rise to the level of consciousness.

[43] This representation of verbalisation as a sequence of steps that begins with the appearance of the desire to communicate (*vivakṣā*) some mental content is clearly a post facto analysis of a psychic event that is subjectively experienced as instantaneous, a flash (*pratibhā*). Thus, Bhartṛhari's description of the process is to be regarded as a theoretical reconstruction of cognitive operations that normally lie outside conscience.

In a group of *kārikā*s starting with VP 1.52[44] Bhartṛhari looks at the transition from internal language to articulated speech. Internal language is compared to an egg enclosed in its shell, but with the potential to develop into a full-fledged individual. Its operation, namely its manifestation as speech, is compared to action because, like action, it consists in a sequential arrangement of parts, namely, the sounds that make up the utterance. The *Vṛtti*[45] describes this process as a movement to-and-fro[46] between the withdrawal (*pratisaṃhāra*) into the mind, where language constantly exists in an amorphous undivided form as the mere disposition (*bhāvanāmātrām*) to articulate speech, and its manifestation as speech, when — once the speaker's intention has been awakened (*prāptavivakṣāprabodhāyām*) — it once again takes the capacity to unfold in a sequence, acquiring the properties of its evolutes, such as words and sentences.

In the next verse[47] this oscillation from the unitary sequence-less cognition to the sequential utterance is compared to the

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[44] VP 1.52 [SI 51] *āṇḍabhāvam ivāpanno yaḥ kratuḥ śabdasaṃjñakaḥ | vṛttis tasya kriyābhūtā* [AA; °*yārūpā* Rau] *bhāgaśo bhajate kramam* || 'The operation of the force called "speech," which has a nature like [that of] an egg, is like action [i.e. a process] and takes sequence in [the arrangement of] its parts.'

[45] *sarvavibhāgodgrāhapratisaṃhāreṇa* [*bāhyo* SI; expunged AA?] *vyāvahārikaḥ śabdo 'ntaḥkaraṇe mayūrādyaṇḍarasavat pūrvavibhāgodgrāhabhāvanāmātrām avyatikrāman pratilīyate* [→ *pravilī°*?] *yathā caikasya śabdasya pratilayas* [→ *pravila°*?] *tathā dāśatayādīnām api. sa tv evaṃ pratilīnaḥ* [→ *pravilī°*] *pratyastamitabhāgaḥ, prāptavivakṣāprabodhāyām* [°*pratibo°* SI] *antaḥśabdavṛttau, vākyapadādivivartadharmam udgṛhya* [→ *upagṛ°*?] *pratyekam avayavodgrāheṇa kramaśaktiṃ parigṛhṇāti. sā cāsyodayapratyastamayanirbhāsamātrā kriyārūpeṇāvasīyate* (cf. SI 1.110.3–111.3).

[46] Its capacity of unfolding as articulate speech is said to be *udayapratyastamayanirbhāsamātrā* 'always manifesting through surge and cessation.' Vṛṣabhadeva (Sph 110.19–20) remarks: *yady api vyaktirūpopasaṃhāraḥ śaktyanuṣaṅgas tu vidyate* 'Even if its manifested form is withdrawn, nonetheless its connection with the capacity [to unfold] persists.'

[47] VP 1.53 [SI 52] *yathaikabuddhiviṣayā mūrtir ākriyate paṭe | mūrtyantarasya tritayam evaṃ śabde 'pi dṛśyate* || 'Just as the shape of some material object, which is the content of a unitary cognition, is reproduced on a canvas [in three stages], similarly three stages are observed also in speech.' Vṛṣabhadeva explains (Sph 111.19–22): *prathamato devadattaṃ vaktrādikrameṇopalabhate. tato buddhyā saṃkalayyaikatayā gṛhṇāti. punas tam evāvabhedakrameṇa (avayavabhedakrameṇa?) likhati.* <u>*evaṃ śabde 'pi iti*</u>*. prathamataḥ śravaṇe kramavān. tato 'lpabhūtaḥ kramaḥ, tataḥ parapratipādanāya kramavān iti* 'First, [the painter] perceives Devadatta in a sequence starting from the face etc.; then, he/she grasps it as one, after amalgamating [the various elements] mentally; then again, he/she draws him in a sequence of dif-

painting of a portrait: first, the artist's gaze scans the sitter, feature after feature; then, this leads to the formation of a partless and instantaneous cognition in his mind, which is followed in turn by the painting of the portrait, once again consisting in a sequence of acts. Similarly, in a dialogue the speaker's utterance, consisting of an orderly succession of sounds, gives rise to a unitary cognition in the listener's mind, which then leads to a reply, i.e. another utterance. Thus, the alternation between absorption and articulation is shown to take place not only in the individual experience (in the guise of the alternation between silence and speech), but also in the dynamics of inter-subjective verbal exchange. Here is how Bhartṛhari himself describes the process:

> Similarly, worldly language is grasped [by the hearer] in a sequence, [then,] as the sequence is withdrawn, it comes to rest on a unitary cognition, then it lays the form of [a new] cognition — undivided and devoid of sequence — onto [some] portion of its own manifestation, as if it imitated the nature of that, and then it enters ordinary discourse once again by acquiring the properties of the sounds in the sequence [produced] by the activation of the phonatory organs. And in this way speech, recurring without interruption through the three stages, does not transcend the relationship between subject and object.[48]

VP 1.54[49] stresses the key role played by the signifier — the sound structure of words — for both participants in the verbal exchange. The attention of both initially focuses on the forms of the words.

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ferent parts. Similarly ... also in speech. First, [the utterance] has sequence when it is heard; then, the sequence becomes minimal; then, it has sequence [again] for the sake of other [people]'s comprehension.'

[48] VPVṛ 1.53 [SI 52; 1.112.2–6]: [...] *tathā vyāvahāriko 'pi kramagrāhyaḥ śabdaḥ pratisaṃhṛtakrama ekabuddhinibandhano bhūtvā, niravayava[m a]kramaṃ* [niravaya-vakramaṃ SI] *buddhirūpaṃ tasyām ātmapratyavabhāsamātrāyāṃ pṛthagbhūtāyām iva pratyasya, tadbhāvam ivopanīya, karaṇavṛttikramadhvanidharmapratipattyā* [...] *punar api vyavahāram avatarati. tathā cāsau tisṛbhir avasthābhir avicchedenāvartamāno grāhyagrāhakabhāvaṃ nātivartate.* I take the last sentence to mean that throughout the three stages language remains at the worldly level, here epitomised by the dichotomy between subject (*grāhaka*) and object (*grāhya*).

[49] VP 1.54 [SI 53], *yathā prayoktuḥ prāg buddhiḥ śabdeṣv eva pravartate | vyavasāyo grahītṝṇām evaṃ teṣv eva jāyate ||* 'Just as the speaker's mind first turns to the words themselves, in the same way the hearers' determination is [initially] born in [i.e. applied to] those very [words].'

In the *Vṛtti*,[50] describing the speaker's effort to find the appropriate words to convey his/her thoughts, Bhartṛhari resorts to the same verb, *praṇidhā-*, used in VPVṛ 1.13 to compare the subject's search for the right words with her/his 'directing' the appropriate sense organ towards a given object of perception. Here he describes how the speaker, intent on formulating an utterance, directs her/his mind (*manaḥ praṇidhatte*) towards a certain sound as if connecting it (*saṃspṛśann iva*) with other sounds around it.[51] Similarly, the hearer, knowing that the understanding of meaning depends on the ability to distinguish the phonic form of words (*śabdarūpaparicchedādhīnam*), makes out (*nirdhārayati*) each word first. However, the stage consisting in the determination of the phonic form of words is not differentiated from the overall understanding of meaning because people are used to understanding the meaning and respond accordingly. Therefore, all word forms, as the source of all meanings, first occupy centre stage, then they become subordinated to meanings.[52]

The role of *vivakṣā* in triggering speech production is further pointed out in a verse of the *Pāṇinīyaśikṣā* quoted in VPVṛ 1.107 in Subramania Iyer's edition, but included in Rau's *kārikāpāṭha* as VP 1.119, in a sequence of *kārikā*s (VP 1.110–121) dealing with the physiology of phonation.[53] The verse reads:

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[50] VPVṛ 1.54 [SI 53; 1.113.3–6]: *yathaiva prayoktā śabda[viśeṣa]viṣayaṃ prayatnam ārabhamāṇaḥ* [*abhipadyamānaḥ* SI] *pratiśabdaṃ paritaḥ paricchinnāñ chabdātmanaḥ saṃspṛśann iva manaḥ praṇidhatte, tathaiva pratipattāpi śabdarūpaparicchedādhīnam arthagrahaṇaṃ manyamānas taṃ taṃ śabdaṃ sarvaiḥ saṃbandhibhir viśeṣaṇair āśritasaṃsargānugrahaṃ nirdhārayati.*

[51] Vṛṣabhadeva explains that Bhartṛhari uses the word *iva* to stress that the phrase 'direct the mind' is a figurative usage because 'language is not different from the mind,' and the connection really consists in the word emerging as a mental content (Sph 113.14–15: *tadā buddher avyatirekāc chabdasya ivaśabdopādānam. saṃsparśo hi viṣayabhāvagamanam*).

[52] VPVṛ 1.54 [SI 53; 1.113.6–8]: *arthapratipattibhāvanābhyāsāt tu [sā] śabdarūpaparicchedāvasthā na citrīkriyate. tasmāc cheṣibhāvakāṣṭhām anubhūya sarvārthayonayaḥ sarve śabdāḥ śeṣabhāvam artheṣu pratipadyante.*

[53] Note that another verse in this set, VP 1.111 (in fact, a verse quoted in VPVṛ 1.110 [SI 107]), contains the phrase *vaktur icchā*, synonymous with *vivakṣā*: *labdhakriyaḥ prayatnena vaktur icchānuvartinā | sthāneṣv abhihato vāyuḥ śabdatvaṃ pratipadyate ||* 'The air set in motion by the effort corresponding to the desire of the speaker strikes at the different places of articulation and is transformed into sounds' (tr. Subramania Iyer 1965: 162).

ātmā buddhyā samarthyārthān mano yuṅkte vivakṣayā |
manaḥ kāyāgnim āhanti sa prerayati mārutam ||

The Self sees things through the intellect and joins the mind with
the desire to speak. The mind strikes at the heat of the body which,
in its turn, prompts the vital air. (Tr. Subramania Iyer 1965: 104)

Vṛṣabhadeva elaborates:

First, to begin with, the Self sees the object with its instrument, the
intellect (*buddhi*). Then, having reached the [object], [the Self]
represents (*nirūpayati*) it with the [intellect]. Then, with the intel-
lect itself it [also] represents the word denoting it [i.e. the object].
Then, it makes the mind operate so that the suitable verbal expres-
sion is uttered. By means of what? By means of the intention to
speak (*vivakṣayā*), for desire inheres in the Self, not anywhere
[else].[54]

This explanation is reminiscent of a passage in Bhartṛhari's
Mahābhāṣyadīpikā on the first *vārttika*. Besides quoting the same
verse of the *Pāṇinīyaśikṣā*, the passage gives a definition of *praṇidhi*
'attention, focus' and describes the relation between word and
meaning as a relation between the instrument and the object
through the mediation of the action:

And in the threshing of the rice grains a relation [between the
pestle and the rice] comes into being mediated by the [action of]
raising and dropping of the pestle, and thanks to it the result,
[namely] the removal of the chaff that yields the grains, is ob-
tained. In the same way here [in the case of speech] too the word,
[conceived] as a substance, is the instrument; the meaning, [i.e.]
the grammatical object, is expressed; its understanding is the
result. It is the result of an action. But what action is it? Let us say
that the attention of the speaker, directed towards that [mean-
ing], prompts the words [to be uttered]; this attention is a mental
operation [establishing] that 'this [expression] is suitable to con-
vey that meaning.' That is the action, since it has been said: 'The

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[54] Sph 176.22–25: *prathamaṃ tāvad ayam ātmā buddhyā karaṇenārtham ālocaya-
ti. tatas taṃ pratipadya tayā nirūpayati. tatas tasya vācakaṃ śabdaṃ buddhyaiva nirū-
payati. tato yogyaśabdoccāraṇe mano vyāpārayati. kenety āha vivakṣayā iti. icchā hy
ātmasamavetā. na sarvatra.*

Self sees things through the intellect and joins the mind with the desire to speak.' Just as the unfocused, [i.e.] undirected, eyesight is unable to perceive the object with the mind despite the fact the organ of vision and the object of vision are [both] present, in the same way a word, albeit well-established in a [given] meaning, is unable to convey [it] unless the speaker's attention is [focused on it].[55]

The parallel with eyesight and the simile of the rice threshing are also employed by Bhartṛhari in VP 2.404–405 [SI 400–401], which describe the function of denotation (*abhidhā*) as the *intentional* association forged in the speaker's mind between a verbal expression (a signifier) and a meaning (a mental content):

yathā praṇihitaṃ cakṣur darśanāyopakalpate |
tathābhisaṃhitaḥ śabdo bhavaty arthasya vācakaḥ ||
kriyāvyavetaḥ sambandho dṛṣṭaḥ karaṇakarmaṇoḥ |
abhidhāniyamas tasmād abhidhānābhidheyayoḥ ||

Just like eyesight, directed [towards a perceivable object], leads to vision, similarly, a verbal expression aimed at a certain meaning is its signifier.
The relation between the instrument and the object is seen to be mediated by action. Therefore, [the relation] between the signifier and the signified is [equally] regulated by [the function called] denotation.[56]

The relation between signifier (*abhidhāna*) and signified (*abhidheya*) is described here as the relation between the instrument and

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[55] *yathā ca dhānyānāṃ vrīhīṇām avahanane muśalodyamananipātanābhyāṃ vya-vahitena saṃbandho bhavati tataś ca kaṇamokṣatuṣavipramokṣaḥ phalaṃ nirvartate. evam ihāpi śabdo dravyabhūtaḥ karaṇam. arthaḥ karma pratyāyyate. tadavabodhaḥ pha-lam. tat phalaṃ kriyāyāḥ. kā punaḥ sā kriyā. ucyate. praṇidhiḥ prayoktuḥ śabdān prera-yatas tadviṣayaḥ. praṇidhiś cetaso vṛttir ayaṃ yogya etam arthaṃ prayāyayitum iti. sā kriyā. evaṃ hy uktam. ātmā buddhyā samarthyārthān mano yuṅkte vivakṣayeti. yathā saty eva cakṣuṣi sati ca rūpe na cakṣur apraṇihitam anadhiṣṭhitam manasā viṣayālocane samarthaṃ bhavaty evaṃ śabdo vyavasthito 'rthe 'pi prayoktuḥ praṇidhānam antareṇa pratyāyane asamarthaḥ iti [...]* (*Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, p. 24 l. 26–p. 25 l. 5; my tr.)
[56] For the simile of threshing, cf. VPVṛ 2.405 [SI 401; 2, p. 303]: *tad yathā kaṇa-tuṣavipramokṣaviśiṣṭe taṇḍulajanmany ulūkhalamusalayoḥ karaṇādhikaraṇayor vrī-hīṇāṃ ca karmaṇām udyamananipātanarūpo 'vahantiḥ phalaprasavanimittaṃ tathābhidhānābhidheyor a[bhidhā]niyataṃ* [api niyataṃ SI] *sampratyayākhyaṃ pha-laṃ prakalpayitavyam.*

the object in the action of expressing. That is, an agent (the speaker) conveys an object (the meaning) by means of an instrument (an utterance), and the result is the cognition arising in the hearer. What is to be noted is that this formulation implicitly places the speaker centre stage: the verbal expression is only an instrument, its relation with the meaning is said to be mediated by the action, but the action is initiated by the speaker, motivated by her/his *vivakṣā*. To put it differently, there is no automatism in *abhidhā*: words do not express meanings unless they are intentionally used for that purpose by the subject.

3.2 The autonomy of language from reality

In VPVṛ 1.13 Bhartṛhari stresses the total autonomy of language from reality, stating that it reflects the speaker's intention, i.e. her/his subjective vantage, rather than the actual state of affairs (*na tu vastusvarūpatayā sattvam asattvaṃ vā*). It is a fact of common experience, of course, that much of what we say does not have any material or perceivable reality at all. We are able to talk about things and events that are completely fictional (for example in storytelling,[57] or every time someone speaks about the future) or exist beyond the range of ordinary perception.

But even things and events that do correspond to external realities live in a kind of fictional existence through language, less real than what we consider real according to common sense and yet more free because unfettered by the laws of physics and logic. Thus, Vṛṣabhadeva notes that 'something that, even though existing [in reality], does not emerge in (*ārūḍhasya*, lit. 'ride on') the speaker's intention, cannot enter ordinary discourse.' For example, when someone says *asiś chinatti* 'the sword cuts,' the actual human agent who must necessarily handle the sword is left out of the picture, as it were, because the speaker's focus is on the quality of the blade. And vice versa, 'something that does not exist [in reality], [when it is] present [to the mind], brought by the speak-

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[57] See e.g. VP 3.7.5, *śabdopahitarūpāṃś ca buddher viṣayatāṃ gatān | pratyakṣam iva kaṃsādīn sādhanatvena manyate ||*, echoing a passage in MBh *ad* A.3.1.26 that talks about the ability of story-tellers (*kathaka*) to make their characters (Kaṃsa, etc.) so vivid they seem to stand before the listeners' eyes (*pratyakṣam iva*).

er's intention, will enter ordinary discourse.' Thus, a common remark such as *devadatto ghaṭaṃ karoti* 'Devadatta is making a vase' — uttered when Devadatta is still moulding the clay — gives provisional existence to something, the vase, that has not come into being yet, but is anticipated by the speaker's mind. As Vṛṣabhadeva concludes, 'Surely, [*vivakṣā*] is the cause of the inclusion or exclusion [of something] into ordinary discourse regardless of [its] existence or non-existence in reality, [i.e.] externally.'[58]

The phrase *sattvam asattvaṃ vā* (or equivalent expressions such as *sann asan vā*, etc.) frequently occurs throughout the VP and its commentaries, almost like a refrain, often in the same contexts where *vivakṣā* also appears. See for instance the following *kārikā*s from different chapters of the third *kāṇḍa*:

> *sādhanavyavahāraś ca buddhyavasthānibandhanaḥ |*
> *sann asan vārtharūpeṣu bhedo buddhyā prakalpyate || VP 3.7.5 ||*

Moreover, the linguistic expression of the factors of action is based on states of the mind. It is the mind that conceives distinctions, either real or unreal, in things.

> *kriyāpravṛttāv ākhyātā kaiścit svārthaparārthatā |*
> *asatī vā satī vāpi vivakṣitanibandhanā || VP 3.12.5 ||*

According to some, when an action takes place, it is either for one's sake or for another's sake. Whether it is so or not, this is based on the speaker's intention.

3.3. Language shapes thought

While *vivakṣā* does not depend on external reality, its successful operation, with the transition from mental process to verbal expression, is said to rest on the availability of suitable (*yogya*) expressive means to talk about something.[59] Mental objects can

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[58] Sph 44.15–17: <u>*sattvam iti.*</u> *vidyamānasyāpi vivakṣām anārūḍhasyāvyavahārya-tvāt.* <u>*asattvam iti.*</u> *asato vivakṣāprāpitasannidhānasya vyavahāryatvāt. sā hi vastuto bahiḥ sattvam asattvaṃ vānapekṣya vyavahārasya pravṛttinivṛttikāraṇam.*

[59] After reiterating the Grammarians' view that the relation between word and meaning is fixed (*nitya*), beginningless (*anādi*) and unbroken (*aprāptaviccheda*), in VPVṛ 1.23 Bhartṛhari further describes it as *yogyatā*, 'an illuminator-illumi-

only take full and distinct shape in the subject's mind as long as language is able to make them accessible to the human intellect. To put it differently, according to Bhartṛhari language is not a mere vehicle of thought, but rather its essential prerequisite: it is language that makes thinking possible (see § 4.6 below).

The process of signification is briefly described in the next sentence of the *Vṛtti* (*yogyaṃ hi śabdaṃ prayoktā vivakṣāprāpitasannidhāneṣv abhidheyeṣu pratyartham upādatte*), outlining the operation of *vivakṣā*. Some internal or external stimulation — say, hunger — makes an idea surface to the awareness of the subject. For example, a hungry person may think 'I would like to eat some rice' and wish to convey this thought to someone, such as a servant. The incipient idea is given shape by language as the mind searches for a suitable linguistic expression to convey it. When the thought is formed, it can be communicated (*abhidheya*).

In the final sentence of the passage in question, the search that the mind, prompted by *vivakṣā*, conducts for a suitable form of expression is compared to the subject's instinctive selection of the appropriate organ of sense (e.g. sight, or hearing, or smell) for a given object (such as a mountain, or a bird's song, or the scent of a flower, respectively) that has entered the perceptual field. But the parallel only goes so far.[60] While only one sense is apt to apprehend a given object (for example, only smell will grasp the scent), *vivakṣā* can tap the boundless reservoir of language, for any mental content is amenable to be expressed and in more than one way.

The element the two processes of verbalisation and perception really appear to share is indeed desire. Significantly, in this pas-

nated relation, like that between sense-organ and object, whose cause is convention' (cf. SI 1.60.1–2: *indriyaviṣayavad vā prakāśyaprakāśakabhāvena samayopādhir yogyatā śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaḥ*; tr. Unebe 1994: 139). Unebe renders *yogyatā* with the phrase 'natural competency,' pointing out that here *samaya* is to be understood as 'custom,' i.e. 'established usage' (see also Houben 1995: 244–245, where *yogyatā* is translated with 'suitability'). Thus, through established usage, a certain word is naturally fit to express a given meaning.

[60] Elsewhere, Bhartṛhari himself reminds his readers that this parallel has certain limitations. For example, cf. VP 1.58 [SI 57]: *ato 'nirjñātarūpatvāt kim āhety abhidhīyate | nendriyāṇāṃ prakāśye 'rthe svarūpaṃ gṛhyate tathā ||* 'Therefore, when the form [of a verbal expression] is not clearly apprehended, people ask "what did you say?" [However,] when an object is to be cognised, the nature of the senses is not grasped in the same way.'

sage Bhartṛhari calls both processes with terms that are desiderative action nouns: *vivakṣā* and *upalipsā*.[61] Phenomenologically, this desire manifests itself as attention. In the case of perception, the subject directs the appropriate organ of sense towards the object, i.e. he/she focuses (*praṇidhā-*) on and apprehends it. In the case of speech, the subject strives to find the right words to say what is on his/her mind. It is noteworthy that Bhartṛhari uses a causative passive participle (*prāpita*) to refer to the mental process that brings forward the contents to be communicated so that they emerge in the subject's awareness. At any given time, we can assume, the subject operates a selection (again, largely subconscious) of what needs to be said and how, in what is inevitably a uniquely personal segmentation of reality.

3.4. The limitations of vivakṣā

The passage in VPVṛ 1.13 reveals another important aspect of *vivakṣā*, even though it does not spell it out. While it enjoys ample freedom regarding both the content and the form of expression, nonetheless the speaker's intention draws on expressive means that pre-exist it as well as each of the episodes in which it comes into operation. As shown above, when some mental content comes to the foreground, then the speaker's intention has to find suitable words to communicate it. These are always the words and structures the language of a speech community, which the Grammarians, from the first *vārttika* of MBh onwards,[62] call *loka*. Any risk of solipsism in the understanding of *vivakṣā* is therefore dispelled by the Grammarians' ever-present awareness of the social (*laukika*) inter-subjective dimension of language. Its limitations are inherent to intelligibility and functional to the primary purpose of articulate language, namely communication — one of the possible translations of the Sanskrit word *vyavahāra*. All speakers have to play by the rules — the rules of language — lest their speech be not understood. Individuals have some leeway in their

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[61] On *upalipsā*, lit. 'desire to perceive,' see Vergiani 2016.
[62] MBh, Vt 1 (1.6.14, 1.8.3, 1.8.7): *siddhe śabdarthasambandhe lokato 'rthaprayukte śabdaprayoge śabdena dharmaniyamaḥ yathā laukikavaidikeṣu.* (In the MBh, the *vārttika* is split into three segments, here separated by underscores.)

use of language (the ambit of *prāyoktrī vivakṣā*), but their freedom can never stretch to the point of bending the grammar of the language to personal whim.

Thus, to recapitulate, in the first of the views presented in VPVṛ 1.13 Bhartṛhari states that the speaker's intention is the key element in the process that causes the formation of meaning in the subject's mind and eventually leads to verbalisation. The choice of what to say in any given circumstance rests with the individual and is independent of reality: people can talk of things that do not exist, and even of things that are impossible in the world as they know it. However, speakers draw their expressive tools from a repertoire that is predetermined and has its own norms and inbuilt constraints. Thus, meaning takes shape between these two poles: the vast freedom enjoyed by the speaker at the ideational level and the availability of adequate means to convey feelings and ideas. If these means are insufficient — e.g. the first time one sees a new animal — one may literally be left speechless.

4. The other views in VPVṛ 1.13
4.1 'Another's view' or Bhartṛhari's own view?

In the first view, as we have seen in the previous pages, primacy is given to *vivakṣā*. In this way, Bhartṛhari reminds his readers that, ultimately, any utterance is a purposeful action, an *arthakriyā*, carried out to convey a message that, regardless of its specific content, is a concern of the speaker's. This is the key element in the formation of meaning: without it, there is simply no speech.

Now, it is worth looking at the other views discussed in VPVṛ 1.13 to find out whether they contradict the importance of *vivakṣā*. As I will show, in fact they anticipate many of the ideas Bhartṛhari expounds in later sections of his work and, therefore, can hardly be considered as alternative interpretations of the meaning of the *kārikā*, as some modern authors have maintained.

The second view is introduced by the words *apara āha*, lit. 'another says.' Once again, various scholars have taken this short sentence in very different ways, depending on their position in the debate on the authorship of the *Vṛtti*. For some, this is regarded as evidence that the *Vṛtti* is not Bhartṛhari's auto-commentary. Thus, Bronkhorst (1988: 6) notes: 'At different places the *Vṛtti* gives several interpretations of a single verse, or portion of a verse. For

instance, the word *arthapravṛttitattva* in VP 1.13 is explained in at least six ways.'[63] Similarly, Houben (1999: 187) remarks:

> As for the Vṛtti on *kārikā* 1.13, it is mainly devoted to a discussion of the compound *arthapravṛttitattvānām*, which is interpreted in no less than six or seven different ways, out of which at least one is clearly attributed to 'someone else.' It is to be noted, further, that the disagreements discussed under 1.13 are fully determined by the wording in the *kārikā*; there is no suggestion of a *kārikā*-independent disagreement between thinkers. Hence, one could not say that *kārikā* 1.13 tried to capture in a concise way a set of prevailing views on a given topic, and that the Vṛtti merely made these explicit.

On the contrary, I would like to argue that the variety of views presented in VPVṛ 1.13 may be seen as an example of Bhartṛhari's well-known habit to consider the same topic from different points of views and, therefore, does not disprove his authorship of the *Vṛtti*. As Aklujkar (1972: 185) observes:

> […] a careful reading of the TK [= VP] and its ancient commentaries will reveal that what seem to be different explanations are also statements of different theses and thoughts acceptable to Bhartṛhari on different levels and in different contexts…

Regarding the phrase *apara āha*, he (p. 186) notes:

> Another fact to be noticed in this connection is that quite frequently the alternative explanations are introduced by the word *apara*. One can show with unmistakable evidence that *apara* does not always mean simply 'someone else' or 'different'; it is often connotative of approval, as if it is intended to be dissolved as *na vidyate paro yasmāt*. […] The alternative explanations do not indi-

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[63] 'La Vṛtti donne plusieurs interprétations d'une seule strophe, ou portion de strophe, à des endroits différents. Le mot *arthapravṛttitattva* de VP 1.13, par exemple, n'est pas expliqué de moins de six façons.' After assessing a considerable amount of evidence, Bronkhorst concludes (1988: 22): 'Rien ne nous empêche de croire que l'auteur de la Vṛtti était l'étudiant direct de Bhartṛhari; c'est de toute façon une possibilité que nous ne pouvons exclure dans l'état actuel de nos connaissances.' ('Nothing prevents us from believing that the author of the Vṛtti is the direct disciple of Bhartṛhari; in any case, it is a possibility that we cannot exclude in light of our current knowledge'; my tr.)

cate that the author of the V[ṛtti] is uncertain about the meaning of a verse; he is, in fact, pre-equipped to deal with a verse in more than one way, for he himself has invested certain verses with convenient ambiguity and has thus made them amenable to different interpretations.

I also think that in VPVṛ 1.13 Bhartṛhari looks at the formation of meaning from a variety of perspectives that are acceptable to him, although perhaps with some caveats. This is confirmed by the fact that many of the views presented here are echoed in later passages of the VP, as I will show in the following pages.

4.2 The second view: nimitta

The passage (cf. VP 1.44.6–45.1) introducing the second view reads:

> *apara āha. arthasya pravṛttau tattvaṃ, vyavahāre yan nimittam. yadā hi nimittān nimittavatsv artheṣu nimittasarūpaḥ [°svarūpaḥ SI] pratyaya utpadyate tadārthena vyavahartuṃ śakyate. na tu saṃsargirūpāntaraviveke kaivalyaviṣayo vyavahāro vidyate. tad evaṃ jātiṣu prāptasvarūpatvād abhidhānānāṃ, <——?> sāmānyasya śabdanibandhanatvam ākhyāyate [āsthīyate SI].*

> Someone else [may] say: the [key] element in the formation of meaning is [that which serves as] the cause [of the use of a word] in verbal communication. For meaning can [only] be expressed when, due to a cause, a cognition arises conforming to the cause with regard to things-meant that are possessed with [such] a cause. But, if other [mental objects] that serve as correlates are absent, there exists no verbal communication whose content is the thing in isolation (*kaivalya*). Thus, generality is said to be the foundation of speech since words acquire their nature in [relation to] universals.

This second view is seemingly attributed to an unspecified 'other.' In keeping with Aklujkar's considerations quoted above, I think here Bhartṛhari does not have a specific thinker or school in mind (although one could probably find echoes of historically attested theories), nor do I think he is offering a different analysis of the compound he himself had used in the *kārikā*, which would definitely be odd. Rather, with his characteristically 'perspectivist' atti-

tude, he considers the formation of meaning from a different possible angle.[64]

Namely, he notes that, as far as the formation of meaning is concerned, someone else (*apara*) may say with good reason that the key element is the cause (*nimitta*) that prompts the speaker to resort to a certain expression. Clearly, here *nimitta* is equivalent to *pravṛttinimitta*, namely, some characteristic or set of characteristics that allow an entity to be assimilated to a class denoted by a certain term. The notion of *pravṛttinimitta* is traditionally divided into four categories: *jāti, guṇa, kriyā* or *saṃjñā* (cf. Abhyankar 1961, s.v. *pravṛttinimitta*). In the present context, the expression *nimittavatsv artheṣu* appears to imply that, faced with an object *x*, the speaker may refer to it as *go,* 'cow,' because of its genus (*jāti,* so *nimittavat = gotvavat*), or *śukla,* 'white,' because of its quality (*guṇa,* so *nimittavat = śuklatvavat*), or as *gacchati,* 'it is going,' because of the action (*kriyā*) it performs (so *nimittavat = gativat*), or by its proper name (*saṃjñā*), e.g. Śabalā (so *nimittavat = tatsaṃjñāvat*). However, this subdivision, which originates in the MBh (see Aussant 2009: 55 ff.), is not recalled in the *Vṛtti*, which only mentions *jāti*, possibly to be understood in the generic sense of any common property (*sāmānya*) shared by multiple individuals. Thus, when an object amenable to be assimilated to that cause because it has certain characteristics (namely, it is *nimittavat*) presents itself to the subject (either mentally or externally), a cognition arises which is shaped after that object (*sarūpa*).[65] For example, someone, seeing a cow in a field, forms a mental image of the cow, and part of this

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[64] It is worth noting that Vṛṣabhadeva does not comment on *apara āha* but introduces the second view simply with the words *vyākhyāntaram āha* 'he presents another explanation' (Sph 44.22).

[65] Cf. Sph 44.26–45.1: *yā etā vyaktayo bhinnā yāvaj jātyā noparajyante na tāvad idaṃ tad iti paricchinnena rūpeṇa vyavahāryāḥ. tad darśayati* <u>nimittāt</u> *iti. gotvādikāt.* <u>nimittavatsu</u> *iti. jātimatsu piṇḍeṣu. nimittasarūpaḥ* [my em., cf. the Mss sources quoted in SI 1, p. 44, n. 2; SI: *nimittasvarūpaḥ*] *iti. jātirūpānukārī. tadrūpeṇa hy arthena vyavahāraḥ iti* 'As long as the particulars are not coloured by a universal, they cannot be conveyed as [having] a determined form, as in "this is *x*." [BH] shows this [point] saying <u>nimittāt</u> "from such a cause…," namely, cow-ness, etc. <u>nimittavatsu</u> = of [meanings] having that cause, [i.e.] individual entities having [that] universal. <u>nimittasarūpaḥ</u> = [a cognition] conforming to the cause, [i.e.] imitating the form of the universal, since verbal communication takes place through a meaning having the form of that [universal].'

process of conceptualisation consists in the recognition that the being before one's eyes is the member of a known class, namely, it possesses *gotva*. This is the cause, the *pravṛttinimitta*, that prompts the association with the linguistic sign — the word *go* — and allows the entity in question to enter discourse (*vyavahartuṃ śakyate*), eventually leading to an utterance such as *tatra gaur asti*.

In this view, the emphasis is on the role that generalisation inevitably plays in the process of formation of meaning.[66] Since the relation between the linguistic sign — the word *go* — and its meaning/referent (i.e. the concept of cow/the particular cow in front of the speaker) is fixed,[67] language provides the tools for the cognitive segmentation and representation of reality operated by the intellect according to categories shared by the other members of the community. Some entity x_1 is perceived, and a cognition of it is born on the basis of the recognition that it has some general property X that is in turn associated with a certain linguistic sign:

$$\text{cow} > \quad \text{COW} > \quad \text{'cow'}$$
$$|\qquad\quad |\qquad\qquad |$$
$$\text{percept} \quad \textit{jāti} \quad \text{word}$$

Thus, the availability of the word *go* associated to the notion of a creature with certain characteristics facilitates the mental processing of the scene before one's eyes or, to put it differently, helps the subject to make sense of her/his surroundings.

Bhartṛhari draws a major epistemological implication from the inbuilt taxonomic disposition of language. He points out that the

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[66] Cf. the conclusion in Sph 45.12–13: *sāmānyaṃ śabdānāṃ nibandhanaṃ taddvāreṇa pravṛttir iti* 'Generality is the foundation of words, they operate by means of it.'

[67] This is one of the fundamental tenets of grammatical thought, unequivocally stated in the very first *vārttika* of the MBh (see n. 74). According to this statement, the relationship between word and meaning is *siddha* 'established, fixed.' Already in the Mbh the exact import of *siddha* is the object of some discussion. We can assume that for most Brahmanical grammarians this relationship had a metaphysical quality and, as far as Sanskrit was concerned, it went back to the beginning of time. From that angle, *siddha* means 'established once and for all,' hence 'eternal.' But on a mundane level, the statement simply acknowledges that the relationship of word and meaning is a given for all members of the speaking community (*loka*), handed down from one generation to the next.

unique individuality of the thing in isolation — the particular cow standing before the speaker — is unattainable by language.[68] The cow gets named only insofar as it is a specimen of a class of objects possessing certain common features. To move beyond generality, that is, in order to capture the uniqueness of the cognition of the specific cow (to the extent this is possible), the intellect needs to situate it in a spatial and temporal context in which some action is predicated of the cow. In the absence of such correlates (*saṃsargin*) — qualities, actions, other entities with which it is understood to interact — the thing in itself cannot enter the sphere of ordinary discourse, it remains a philosopher's abstraction. (On the impossibility of conveying the *kaivalya*, cf. below § 4.3.)

These epistemological considerations are also intimately related to Bhartr̥hari's language theory, which posits the sentence as the primary linguistic unit. Arguing that the thing in isolation is unable to enter ordinary discourse is the ontological/epistemological premise on which rests Bhartr̥hari's *akhaṇḍapakṣa*, the view that the sentence and the sentence meaning are unitary, an organic network of inseparable partial meanings in which each functions as an *upādhi* of all others.

From this angle it is particularly significant that the *pravr̥ttinimitta* view comes after the one emphasising the primacy of *vivakṣā*. The second view, focused as it is on the word meaning, presupposes a *padavāda* point of view and thus can only be provisionally acceptable to Bhartr̥hari. For the purposes of verbal communication, it is expedient that the word meaning should be some broad culturally shared notion. But at the same time, because of its inherent genericness, the word meaning is also inherently unstable or vague. The exact semantic value of the word is determined by the context, that is, when it is part of a sentence. However, the sentence — being an ever new and unique combination of such partial linguistic symbols, serving the needs of a particular speaker — is inevitably dominated by *vivakṣā*.

To put it differently, the word meaning takes full force and salience only when it is integrated into an act of communication.

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[68] Vr̥ṣabhadeva glosses *kaivalyaviṣayaḥ* with *jātyupadhānarahitaśuddhavastuviṣayaḥ* '[a verbal expression] the content of which is the mere entity without the support of the universal' (Sph 45.9).

As Bhartṛhari says in VPVṛ 2.407–408 [SI 403–404], 'Words are signifiers when they are connected with communication, not in the absence of communication.' [69] If they are not animated by the subject's desire to communicate with other beings, they are inert, mere signposts, as it were. The context of this remark is particularly interesting because it deals with a borderline situation, in which only two of the three semantic components identified by Helārāja (see n. 6) subsist, namely, the phonic form of the verbal expression and, crucially, the speaker's intention. In VP 2.407–408 [SI 403–404] Bhartṛhari notes that two superficially identically utterances can have entirely different imports if the reasons that prompt the speakers to utter them (namely, their *vivakṣā*) are different:

> *āmnāyaśabdān abhyāse kecid āhur anarthakān |*
> *svarūpamātravṛttīṃś ca pareṣāṃ pratipādane ||*
> *abhidhānakriyāyogād arthasya pratipādakān |*
> *niyogakāle manyante tān evaikatvadarśinaḥ ||*

> Some say that the words of the traditional texts have no meaning during the practice [to learn them by rote], and they stand for their mere [phonic] form when they are being taught to others. Those who uphold the singularity [of the word, i.e. polysemy] consider that these very [words] convey a meaning when they are employed [during a rite] because they are related to an expressive act.

The example here is that of Vedic texts as they are learnt in a class — traditionally, by repeating bits of them aloud after a teacher — and as they are recited in ritual contexts. Some thinkers regard the words that are repeated for the sake of learning as meaningless: the pupils may well be distracted (*vikṣiptamanas*) and keep exercising mechanically. Others (who probably include Bhartṛhari himself) think that even in this case words have meaning, for they stand for their own form insofar as 'the mere form is what [one] wishes to convey in that context.' [70] The same portions of text may

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[69] *abhidhānasaṃyogāc chabdānāṃ vācakatvaṃ, na tv abhidhānam antareṇety āhuḥ* (cf. SI 2, p. 304).
[70] *rūpamātraṃ hi tatra pratipādayitum iṣṭam* (cf. SI 2, p. 304).

be used by the same people (the teacher or the pupils once they have completed their training) in the ritual context, as required by the liturgy, where they carry full meaning (and, additionally, the power to affect the spiritual and material reality of the *yajamāna*). This clearly shows how the exact same sequence of words can have entirely different *nimitta*s depending on the speaker's intention.

4.3 The third view: *saṃsarga*

The considerations on the impossibility of the thing in isolation to enter ordinary discourse quite naturally lead to the next view, according to which the formation of meaning consists in the interrelation (*saṃsarga*) of various elements. The passage (cf. SI 1.45.3–5) reads:

> *vyavahāre vā tattvaṃ saṃsargaḥ. vicchinnarūpeṣv ivātyantasaṃsr̥ṣṭeṣu padārtheṣu pratyavabhāsamāneṣu, vyavahāro vākyanibandhanaḥ. na hi [svā]bhāviko* [om. SI] *[viśeṣāvacchinna-?>]* [om. SI] *saṃsargadarśanapratyastamaye kaścid api padārthagataḥ saṃsargo vyavahārāṅga[tvena]* [padārthagatavyavahāro SI] *vyavatiṣṭhate.*

> Or, [one may argue,] the [key] element [in the formation of meaning] in verbal communication is [the] interrelation [of partial meanings]. While word meanings that are completely interrelated seem to have distinct forms, verbal communication is [in fact] based on sentences. Surely, even some natural interrelation [occurring] in the word meanings cannot be of assistance to verbal communication if the apprehension of the interrelation [among distinct particular (meanings)] fails.

In this passage, for the first time in the VP, Bhartr̥hari affirms the centrality of the sentence (*vākya*) in verbal communication, anticipating many ideas that are further explored and developed later in the work. The wording of the passage, with its mention of word meanings (*padārtha*) that are intimately related to one another (*atyantasaṃsr̥ṣṭa),* but seem (*pratyavabhās-*) to be separate, suggests that words are conceived as autonomous speech items by speakers, but in fact they are only viable as components of sentences. If their connection fell apart, there could be no meaningful verbal exchange, even when the individual meanings might have some 'natural' affinity or connection (e.g. like 'tree' and 'branch'). The

phrase *kaścid api padārthagataḥ saṃsargaḥ* seems to adumbrate a hypothetical situation in which the unity of the sentence is dissolved (*pratyastamaye*) but some kind (*kaścid*) of relatedness persists between the individual meanings.[71]

In this way, if my understanding of the *kārikā* as referring to the formation of meaning is correct, the passage also appears to imply that, semantically, the unitary sentence precedes its eventual analysis into components (the latter being an intellectual operation carried out a posteriori by linguists and philosophers, but occasionally also by ordinary speakers[72]), a view that Bhartṛhari argues for at length in the second *kāṇḍa.*

As in the case of the *nimitta* view, here too Bhartṛhari does not present a radically alternative understanding of the formation of meaning, but rather adds another layer of complexity to his own description of the process. On the one hand, this perspective can be easily reconciled with the first view, which put *vivakṣā* centre stage, since the sentence meaning, unlike the word meaning, is always *particular*, originating as it does from the unique circumstances of the individual speaker. And, on the other hand, it integrates and mitigates the *nimitta* view, insisting on the interrelation (*saṃsarga*) of the various sentence components.

To put it differently, with this view Bhartṛhari maintains that *from the start* meaning originates in the mind as a unitary but internally articulated representation of a segment of external or internal reality, not as the mere sum of individual separate meanings.

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[71] Glossing *vicchinnarūpeṣu*, Vṛṣabhadeva remarks (Sph 45.18): *apratipādya-mānāṃs* [my em.; °*mānās* SI] *tān padārthān saṃsṛṣṭān api vicchinnān iva paśyanti* 'When word meanings are not being conveyed, [people] consider them as if they were distinct even though [in fact] they are [always] interrelated.'

[72] An example of a situation in which ordinary speakers parse the sentence and wonder about the meaning of single words is discussed e.g. in VP 2.72 (part of a long *pūrvapakṣa* from the point of view of *padavāda*) and its *Vṛtti*: *nirjñā-tārthaṃ padaṃ yac ca tadarthe pratipādite | pikādi yad avijñātaṃ tat kim ity anuyujyate ||* 'Moreover, as the meaning of a word whose meaning is well known [to hearers] is conveyed, [people] ask "what is that?" about [a word they do not know], such as *pika.*' The full sentence is given in the *Vṛtti*: *vanāt pika ānīyatām* 'Bring a *pika* from the forest!' — *pika* being the name of a bird. Elsewhere (VP 2.92) Bhartṛhari explains that, on hearing the sentence containing the unknown word, the hearer believes he/she can recognise other word meanings (those of *vanāt* and *ānīyatām*), assuming they are real, so he/she forms a provisional understanding of the whole sentence on the basis of that assumption.

4.4 The fourth view: kevalaṃ vastu

This view and the next are intertwined as they both start from a different interpretation of the compound *arthapravṛttitattva*, based on the understanding of the first two terms as a *dvandva*.[73] Thus, the so-called fourth and fifth views are in fact two sides of the same coin, each explanation complementing the other.

The former focuses on the import of the term *artha*. As is well known, the Indian linguistic speculation never makes a clear theoretical distinction between the two possible senses of the word: *artha* as 'thing' (namely, from a linguistic point of view, the referent of a word) and *artha* as 'meaning.' The same semantic ambiguity seems at play here, in the fourth interpretation of the compound *arthapravṛttitattva*:

> *athavārthaḥ kevalaṃ vastu, tyadādīnāṃ sattvalakṣaṇānāṃ viṣaya-mātram. tasya tu pravṛttitattvaṃ saṃsargaḥ. saṃsṛṣṭo hi kriyāsv artho guṇabhāvena pradhānabhāvena vopādīyate.*[74]

> Alternatively, *artha* is [any] entity [imagined] in isolation, [i.e.] the mere object (*viṣayamātram*) of [pronouns such as] 'that' etc. that point to something existent. But the [key] element of the formation of this [meaning] is interrelation since an interrelated meaning is expressed as either subordinate or principal with regard to actions.

Someone may understand *artha* in the compound as referring to a thing in itself, abstracted from any actual or possible context. Such a thing, in its uniqueness, is not accessible to ordinary discourse, as noted above (see § 4.2). It cannot be named, just pointed to. The only way to capture it verbally is through a deictic pronoun — 'that' — as Bhartṛhari notes immediately after. This may seem a very generic, rudimentary manner of referring to any

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[73] Cf. Vṛṣabhadeva's second interpretation of *arthapravṛttitattvānām*: *arthaś ca pravṛttiś ceti vā dvandvaḥ. artho dravyaṃ pravṛttiḥ kriyā tayos tattvāni teṣāṃ śabdo nibandhanam* (Sph 44.8–9).

[74] This corresponds to SI 1.45.6–7, which however shows some major variant readings: *aparo 'rthaḥ. kevalaṃ vastu tyadādīnāṃ vastūpalakṣaṇānāṃ viṣayamātram. tasya pravṛttitattvaṃ saṃsargaḥ. saṃsṛṣṭo hi kriyāsv artho guṇabhāvena pradhāna-bhāvena copādīyate.*

entity, but in fact it serves the purpose of turning it into a mental object (*viṣaya*), an existent (*sattva*), possessed at least with the secondary kind of existence (*upacarasattā*) ensured by language.[75] Its ontological status is left undetermined and, from the vantage point of linguistic semantics, it is irrelevant. In this way, Bhartṛhari seamlessly shifts from *artha*, the external object, to *artha*, the object denoted by a word, namely the meaning — or, as his commentator Helārāja will say, from *vastvartha* to *śabdārtha* (see n. 77 below). Indeed, here Vṛṣabhadeva glosses *vastu* simply with *nāma-padavācyam* 'that which is expressed by a noun' (Sph 45.26).

A clear terminological and conceptual parallel of this line in the *Vṛtti* is found in a verse of the *Bhūyodravyasamuddeśa* (VP 3.4.3), giving a definition of *dravya* in the philosophy of the Grammarians:

> *vastūpalakṣaṇaṃ yatra sarvanāma prayujyate* |
> *dravyam ity ucyate so 'rtho bhedyatvena vivakṣitaḥ* ||

> We call 'substance' that thing-meant which the speaker intends to express as distinguishable [from other things], with regard to which a pronoun pointing to an existent is used.

Commenting on this verse, Helārāja notes:

> Surely, it is impossible to characterise the countless natures of substances individually, therefore in this way [thanks to the definition given in the *kārikā*] a characterisation common to all substances is stated, because the nature of entity [as defined in the *kārikā*] is found everywhere.[76]

And he remarks that

> (b)y means of the term *vivakṣita* [Bhartṛhari] shows that this is not a characterisation of actual objects (*vastvartha*) but rather of word meanings (*śabdārtha*).[77]

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[75] Cf. VP 3.3.39ab: *vyapadeśe padārthānām anyā sattaupacārikī*. On *upacārasattā*, see Houben 1995: 257 ff.

[76] *pratipiṇḍaṃ hy aparimitasvabhāvo dravyāṇām aśakyo lakṣayitum iti sarvadra-vyasādhāraṇalakṣaṇam evam ucyate, vasturūpatāyāḥ sarvatra bhāvāt* (SI 3.i.187.11–12).

[77] *vivakṣitagrahaṇena na vastvarthasyedaṃ lakṣaṇam api tu śabdārthasyety āha* (SI 3.i.187.17-188.1).

Thus, if something can be indicated in a general way through a pronoun such as *tat*, it linguistically qualifies as a substance — not just beings and things possessing a physical body, but virtually anything: abstract notions, qualities, actions, events, imaginary creatures, even non-being!

The expression *vastūpalakṣaṇa* found in VP 3.4.3 (in its turn echoing *sattvalakṣaṇa* in VPVṛ 1.13) also occurs in VP 2.438 [SI 434], which points out how even nouns are unable to capture the unique individuality of particular beings:

> *vastūpalakṣaṇaḥ śabdo nopakārasya vācakaḥ |*
> *na svaśaktiḥ padārthānāṃ saṃspraṣṭuṃ tena śakyate ||*

> The word that refers to an entity does not express the assistance [that entity gives to the action], [i.e.] it is not capable of reaching [i.e. expressing] the capacities proper to things.

VPVṛ 2.438 notes that even the name (*saṃvijñānapada*[78]) of a thing signifies it as a bare existent, but is unable by itself to convey its properties, in particular the *sādhana* capacity (*śakti*) concerning its roles in different actions, unless this potentiality is realised, namely unless it occurs in the context of a sentence.[79] An early formulation of this view is presented under the fourth view in VPVṛ 1.13, when Bhartṛhari states that, even if one admits that *artha* may stand for *vastu* or *dravya*, the essential element in the formation of meaning (the mental content to be verbalised) is *saṃsarga*, namely, the connection of that mental representation to other similar

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[78] On the term *saṃvijñānapada*, see Houben (1995: 340, n. 564) and Ogawa 2009.

[79] *vastumātram anāśritaśaktiviśeṣam aparigṛhītasvadharmakaṃ yena saṃvijñāna-padenopalakṣyate* [*°padena nopalabhyate* SI] *na tad vastukṛtānāṃ <# stugatā?> śaktīnāṃ yad upakāri rūpaṃ tat savyāpāraṃ* [*svavyāpāraṃ* SI] *svakārye na śaknoti vaktum. na* [*sa* SI] *hi sa* [om. SI] *vastumātrasaṃsparśitvād bhedakāny upakārīṇi śa-ktirūpāṇi saṃspṛśati* (cf. SI 2, p. 312) 'The specific word (*saṃvijñānapada*) [denoting a thing], which <u>refers to</u> the mere <u>entity</u> without considering its specific capacities, [i.e.] without apprehending its unique properties, is unable to express the [entity's real] nature that, assisting (the capacities belonging to the entity, operates towards [the realisation] of its own effect. Surely, [the specific word] does not express the so-called capacities that differentiate [one object from another] [and] assist [in the actions], because it expresses the mere entity.'

ones, foremost among them the action, as the final sentence in the passage clarifies.

It is possible that with the fourth view Bhartṛhari intends to ac-knowledge the prominent place that entities (rather than actions) occupy in the ideational and linguistic representation of reality by ordinary speakers: all utterances are propositions about someone or something. However, as the image of the entity takes shape in the mind, its representation invariably entails the association with some action — minimally, as Bhartṛhari states in the second *kāṇḍa*, with the action of being.[80]

The end of the passage also admits that in the relation between the entity and the action the entity is sometimes expressed as subordinate to the action, while sometimes the opposite is true. This idea may seem unorthodox: the Grammarians usually consid-er the verb as the pivot of the syntactic unit that is the sentence, and the action it denotes as the core meaning. But such a view is only tenable at the level of *padāvadhikānvakhyāna*, the kind of grammatical explanation that provisionally accepts the reality of word meanings. If on the other hand one adopts the framework of *akhaṇḍapakṣa*, the sentence as a whole expresses a unitary mean-ing in which the hierarchy between the entity and the action is variable.[81]

This idea is also found in the *Vṛtti* on VP 2.304–305. In these *kārikā*s Bhartṛhari discusses the variability of word meanings, enu-merating various cases where the words, taken at face value and without considering the speaker's intention, do not convey the

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[80] Cf. VP 2.427–428 [SI 423–424]: *astitvenānuṣakto vā nivṛttyātmani vā sthitaḥ | artho 'bhidhīyate yasmād ato vākyaṃ prayujyate ||* 'Since the meaning [of any word] is expressed either as associated with being or resting on the cessation [of being], it is the sentence [alone] that is used [for communication]'; *kriyānuṣaṅgeṇa vinā na padārthaḥ pratīyate | satyo vā viparīto vā vyavahāre na so 'sty ataḥ ||* 'No [single] word-meaning, whether [denoting something] real or unreal, is cognised in ordi-nary communication unless it is associated with action. Therefore [the isolated word-meaning] does not exist.'

[81] Vṛṣabhadeva's commentary is not very perspicuous, but possibly suggests such a difference in communicative focus (Sph 46.10–11): *yathā edhāḥ pacanti ity edhānām aprādhānyam pākārthatvena.* […] *yathā 'odanaṃ pacati' iti odanārthatvāt pākasyaudanaḥ pradhānam* ('Thus, in *edhāḥ pacanti* "the firewood cooks," the fire-wood is secondary because it is meant for cooking, […] while in *odanaṃ pacati* rice is the main thing because cooking is meant for rice').

same content as the whole sentence. The first such case is when the expected relation between main meaning and subordinate meaning is reversed as it is not intended by the speaker (VP 2.304ab: *kvacid guṇapradhānatvam arthānām avivakṣitam*). A later *kārikā*, VP 2.306, gives an example of such a reversal taken from the *śāstra*, here Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*:

> *ākhyātaṃ taddhitārthasya yat kiñcid upadarśakam |*
> *guṇapradhānabhāvasya tatra dṛṣṭo viparyayaḥ ||*

> [In the sūtras teaching *taddhita* suffixes] one sees a reversal of the relation between primary and secondary [meanings] regarding finite verbs that are somewhat illustrative of the meaning of the *taddhita* formation [to be derived].

This verse alludes to Pāṇini's use of finite verbal forms (otherwise extremely rare throughout the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*) in certain rules of the *taddhita* section, e.g. A.4.2.59, *tad adhīte tad veda*, lit. '[*x*] studies that, knows that.' According to the conventions proper to this section (see Bhate 1989: esp. chs. 2 and 3), this is the general meaning of the derivatives that can be formed by the introduction of the suffix *aÏ* (read here by *anuvṛtti* from A.4.1.83), e.g. *vaiyākaraṇa* 'grammarian' from *vyākaraṇa* 'grammar.' Here, as Bhartṛhari notes in the *Vṛtti*, the standard grammatical stance about the primacy of the action is contradicted by the actual communicative function of the verb in this context, which is to convey the sense of the derivative:

> In such verbal expressions as A.4.2.59, *tad adhīte tad veda*, A.5.2.84, *śrotriyaṃś chando 'dhīta,* etc., there is the use of [a finite verb] that serves as the [semantic] condition [for the introduction of the suffix] as an indication [of the meaning of the *taddhita* derivative] because [that meaning] cannot be accounted for otherwise, therefore this is indeed the relation between the word [i.e. the derivative form] and [its] meaning found in ordinary language.[82]

Possibly to show that this loss of primacy of the verb is not limited to the specialised language of grammar, a few lines below in the same passage Bhartṛhari gives another example of the same phe-

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[82] *tad adhīte tad veda śrotriyaṃś* [°*yam* SI] *chando 'dhīta ityevamādiṣu śabdeṣu nimittabhūtasyopalakṣaṇatvenopādānād* [*bhūtasya nimittasyo°*] *anyathānupapattyā sa* [om. SI] *eva* [om. SI] *śabdārthasambandho vyavasthito loke* [...] (SI 2, p. 270).

nomenon. Although this too is taken from the *śāstra*, namely the MBh *ad* A.3.1.1, it is one of those passages in Patañjali's work that have the unmistakable flavour of a real-life dialogue. The discussion, which is not relevant to the present topic, is about the distinction between the causes or conditions (*nimitta*) of a grammatical operation (*kārya*) and the speech items that are conditioned (*nimittin*). Such a distinction, says Patañjali, is observed also in everyday life:

> For example, when there are several [people] seated, someone asks someone else: 'Which of them is Devadatta?', 'Which of the two is Yajñadatta?' He tells him: 'The one on the horse, the one on the stool.' Once [he is] told [that], he figures out 'That is Devadatta, that is Yajñadatta,' because the condition is [mentioned] for the sake of the operation concerning the conditioned.'[83]

Referring to this example in VPVṛ 3.306, Bhartṛhari remarks:

> [When someone says] *yo 'śve, yaḥ pīṭhe*, [the expression] points to the one who is mounted, or the one who is sitting on the stool. But when someone uses [expressions] such as *aśve sthīyatāṃ* 'stay on the horse,' *pīṭhe sthīyatām* 'stay on the stool,' one understands the main meaning [i.e. action].[84]

To put it differently, here Bhartṛhari seems to suggest that, when one considers the sentence as a unitary semantic unit, its focus — i.e. the key information the speaker wishes to convey in a particular verbal exchange — may sometimes be something about an entity rather than about the action in which it participates. In the example from the MBh, when someone says 'Devadatta is the one sitting there,' the action of sitting effectively just helps identifying Devadatta. On the other hand, in a command such as 'stay on the horse,' the focus is on the action, since the speaker's aim is to make something happen, namely, prevent Devadatta from dismounting.[85]

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[83] *tad yathā. bahuṣv āsīneṣu kaścit kaṃcit pṛcchati. katamo devadattaḥ. kataro ya-jñadatta iti. sa tasma ācaṣṭe. yo 'śve yo pīṭha ity ukte nimittasya nimittikāryārthatvād adhyavasyaty ayam devadattaḥ ayam yajñadatta iti* [...] (MBh 2.1.13–15).

[84] *yo 'śve yaḥ pīṭha iti [ya] ārūḍhaḥ sa pīṭhavartī* [samīpavartī SI] *vā ya[ḥ sa] -2-* [vāyam SI] *upalakṣyate. aśve* [agnau SI] *sthīyatāṃ pīṭhe sthīyatām ity atra tu niyogena mukhyārthapratipattir bhavati* (cf. SI 2, p. 270).

[85] The whole argument is resumed from another angle but in very similar terms in the final three *kārikā*s of the *Puruṣasamuddeśa*: VP 3.10.7, *guṇapradhā-*

4.5 The fifth view: pravṛtti (sādhanasādhya)

If one understands *artha* as 'entity,' its natural counterpart is action,[86] which is indeed the sense attributed to *pravṛtti* in the fifth view (cf. SI 1.46.1–4):

> *athavā pravṛttir janmādikriyākhyātapadanibandhanā. tasyāḥ pravṛttir iti samākhyātāyās tattvaṃ sādhyatvaṃ, sādhanākāṅkṣatā <# ṅkṣa-tvaṃ?>, kramarūpopagrahaḥ, kālābhivyaktihetutvam. aparas tv arthaḥ sattvamātraṃ, triṣv api kāleṣu svabhāvasiddham, abhidheyatvena pra-tyastamitakramarūpaṃ, nāmapadanibandhanam.*

> Or, [one may say,] *pravṛtti* [is activity, which] rests on verbs expressing actions such as taking birth, etc. The essence (*tattvam*) of what they call 'activity' consists in being [something] to be accomplished, [having] the expectancy of factors [to accomplish it], taking the form of sequence, [and] being the cause of the manifestation of time. On the other hand, the other [member of the *dvandva arthapravṛtti*] is *artha*, a mere existent, which is by nature complete in itself in all the three times, in which sequence as [a meaning] to be expressed has vanished, [and] is based on a noun.

Bhartṛhari immediately clarifies that by *pravṛtti* one should understand action[87] as expressed by verbs (*ākhyātapada*), namely, as a verbal meaning (*śabdārtha*) based on a mental construct, rather than an ontologically defined external reality. He hints to a classification of action that goes back to *Nirukta* and is also quoted by

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natābhedaḥ puruṣādiviparyayaḥ | nirdiṣṭasyānyathā śāstre nityatvān na virudhyate || 'With regard to the grammatical person, etc., changing what is taught in a different manner in Grammar, [when it has to do] with the distinction between principal and subordinate, is not contradictory since [the relation between verbal expression and meaning] is fixed [i.e. it is not determined by Grammar]'; VP 3.10.8, *yathānirdeśam arthāḥ syur, eṣāṃ śāstraṃ vidhāyakam | kiṃcit sāmānyam āśritya sthite tu pratipādanam ||* 'If meanings were according to the grammatical teachings, Grammar [would be] their creator. But, the exposition is [done] based on some generality in the established [speech forms]'; VP 3.10.9, *yo 'śve yaḥ pīṭha ity atra bhūtayor aśvapīṭhayoḥ | yathopalakṣaṇārthatvaṃ tathārtheṣv anuśāsanam ||* 'Just as the pre-existing horse and stool in [the sentences] "the one on the horse" and "the one on the seat" are [mentioned] just for the purpose of indicating [this or that person], so it is the [grammatical] teachings with regard to meanings.'

[86] Vṛṣabhadeva introduces this view connecting it with the preceding one: <u>*athavā iti.*</u> *dravyāśrayeṇa vyākhyāntaram āha* (Sph 46.11–12).

[87] Cf. Sph 46.12–13: *pravṛttir vyāpāraḥ kriyeti paryāyāḥ.*

Patañjali (cf. MBh *ad* A.1.3.1, 1.258.13–14), reducing action to six 'prototypes,' as it were: taking birth (*jāyate*), being (*asti*), changing (*vipariṇamate*), increasing (*vardhate*), declining (*apakṣīyate*), and perishing (*vinaśyati*).[88] This is followed by Bhartṛhari's own presentation of the defining features of 'action' (*tasyāḥ pravṛttir iti samākhyātāyās*[89]): 1) it is to be accomplished (*sādhyatvam*), i.e. it is not a self-standing entity; 2) it has expectancy of factors that can accomplish it (*sādhanākāṅkṣatā*); 3) it takes the form of sequence (*kramarūpopagrahaḥ*), i.e. it is conceived as a process with a temporal extension; and 4) it is the cause of the manifestation of time (*kālābhivyaktihetutvam*), i.e. it is situated either in the past or the present or the future.

Its counterpart, *artha* — a mere existent (*sattvamātram*), as pointed out in the fourth view — shows opposite and complementary features: it is conceived as complete in itself (*siddha*) across time, that is, it preserves its identity or nature (*svabhāva*) despite change. In fact, as the expression *abhidheyatvena pratyastamitakramarūpaṃ* suggests, even though entities have a temporal duration (*krama*, 'sequence'), this is not part of what is expressed (*abhidheya*) by the words denoting them. Ultimately, an entity is simply whatever may be denoted by nouns (*nāmapada*). In this way, Bhartṛhari indicates that there is a fundamental cognitive distinction between processes and things, but at the same time he intimates that this distinction reflects the basic linguistic dichotomy between verbs and nouns rather than reality (i.e. ontology).

In later sections of the VP Bhartṛhari argues at length that action is a mental construct, a view that can be traced back to the MBh. In a famous passage,[90] Patañjali states that action cannot be perceived but only inferred, because it is not a 'thing,' but rather

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[88] The same scheme is already mentioned in VP 1.3cd (*janmādayo vikārāḥ ṣaḍ bhāvabhedasya yonayaḥ*), and references to it recur throughout the VP, notably in the *Jātisamuddeśa* (VP 3.1.42–48).

[89] The phrase *tasyāḥ* (*pravṛttir*) *iti samākhyātāyās* is meant to put the otherwise common term *pravṛtti* in inverted commas, as it were, more decisively than the mere *iti* alone could do, paving the way to the ensuing enumeration of its defining traits.

[90] MBh *ad* A.1.3.1 (1.254.15–16); *ad* A.3.2.102 (2.114.10–11); *ad* A.3.2.115 (2.120.9–10): *kriyā nāma iyam atyantāparidṛṣṭānumānagamyāśakyā piṇḍībhūtā nidarśayituṃ yathā garbho nirluṭhitaḥ.*

consists of a sequence of moments during which one or several factors undergo a change of state. Clearly, here the term *anumāna* is not used to describe a formal inference, but rather the spontaneous, intuitive mental activity consisting in linking various elements to one another in a chain of causes and effects leading to a result. As Patañjali notes:

> That very [action] is realised to the extent that it is related to such and such word. To explain: someone wishing to go to Pāṭaliputra, having gone one day, says 'Today, I have gone there.' By such [a statement] it is not [meant] that his action of going is completed, but rather that the [expression] 'Today, I have gone there' is used considering that he has set off.[91]

In this passage (and analogous ones along similar lines) we find the first clear antecedents of a view that is developed and examined from various angles in the VP. According to this view, that which is conceived and expressed as action is a mental construct reflecting the speaker's subjective understanding and organisation of cognitive data of diverse nature (i.e. perceptual data, previously acquired information, cultural, contextual, and personal expectations, etc.), which is then conveyed through speech. What is included in the expression of a particular action, when it starts and when it ends, what factors are included in its representation, and which role each of them plays — this is all determined by *vivakṣā*, and thus in turn conditioned by the expressive means available in the language.

The extent to which the verbal expression of action corresponds to external reality varies considerably. The link between them can be tenuous or even inexistent. Common sentences such as 'The cow is black,' 'He will wait there,' or 'She thought about it' do not really reflect any perceivable movement or even change of state in the mentioned entities, and yet speakers use a verb to refer to their understanding of a certain situation, thus describing the

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[91] MBh *ad* A.3.2.102 (2.114.11–14): *sāsau yena yena śabdena abhisambadhyate tāvati tāvati parisamāpyate. tad yathā. kaścit pāṭaliputraṃ jigamiṣur ekam aho gatvāha idam adya gatam iti. na ca tāvatā asya vrajikriyā parisamāptā bhavati. yat tu gataṃ tad abhisamīkṣya etat prayujyate idam adya gatam iti.*

event as a sequence and situating it in time, as Bhartṛhari points out in the opening *kārikā* of the *Kriyāsamuddeśa* (VP 3.8.1):

> *yāvat siddham asiddhaṃ vā sādhyatvenābhidhīyate |*
> *āśritakramarūpatvāt tat kriyety abhidhīyate ||*

> As long as [something], whether complete in itself or incomplete, is expressed as [a process] to be accomplished because its sequential nature is taken into account, that is called 'action.'

The unspoken agent of both *abhidhīyate* in b and of *āśrita* in c is the speaker, who chooses to take account (*āśri-*) of the fact that a certain reality (either internal or external) exists in a temporal continuum and has a processual (*sādhya*) nature, expressing it by means of a verbal form. In fact, even physical objects of all kinds exist and change over time, but the commonsense view of the *loka* — which is the unquestionable authority (*pramāṇa*) for the Grammarians — considers them as self-contained and provided with a stable, enduring identity, therefore, as we saw above, they are referred to by nouns and pronouns.

For the first time in the VP, here Bhartṛhari introduces the distinction between *sādhya* and *sādhana*, which underlies his understanding of the syntactic relations between verbs and nouns in light of the Pāṇinian legacy of the *kāraka* system. Even this distinction is not as firm as one might assume. Commenting on VP 3.8.1, Helārāja remarks:

> On the language level, an entity is expressed by nominal bases as [something] having a nature complete in itself even if it is actually something that is being brought into being (*bhāvyamānātmakam*). To explain: when words for substances are used, they produce a cognition that rests on the general notion of mere existence even though they are in the state of being brought into being, as in *ghaṭaḥ kriyate, paṭaḥ kriyate* ('A pot is being made,' 'A cloth is being made'), for the state of being brought into being of the pot consists of the appearance in a sequence of its [various] stages, such as the body [of the pot], the top, etc. And this is not understood from the word *ghaṭa*, it is understood from the use of the word for action, [i.e.] *kriyate*.[92]

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[92] Pr *ad* VP 3.8.1 (SI 3.ii.5.10–15): *śabdena rūpeṇa vastu bhāvyamānātmakam api prātipadikaiḥ siddharūpam ucyate. tathā hi dravyaśabdāḥ pravartamānāḥ ghaṭaḥ kriya-*

To put it differently, the onus of expressing the processual nature of the entity called 'pot' that is in the course of being created falls onto the verb denoting the pot-maker's activity. On the other hand, a full identity as 'pot,' based on a mental image of the future object as a specimen of its kind, 'pot-ness,' is attributed by means of the word *ghaṭa* to the lump of clay that is being shaped by the craftsman but is in fact not yet a pot.

Ultimately, the choice between referring to an event as an action (i.e. by means of a verb) or as an entity (i.e. by means of a noun) participating as a factor (*sādhana*) in some other action depends on *vivakṣā*, as pointed out in VP 2.432 [SI 428]:

> *prayoktaivābhisaṃdhatte sādhyasādhanarūpatām |*
> *arthasya cābhisaṃbandhakalpanāṃ prasamīhate ||*

> It is the speaker who conceives [something as] having the nature of [the action] to be accomplished and [something else as] the factor of action, and who seeks to construe the meaning as the relationship [between them].

The *Vṛtti* opens with a reminder of the role of *vivakṣā* and its dependence on the expressive means of the language, putting the ordinary speaker at the centre of the process of verbalisation. The view is reiterated that the cause of a verbal usage (*śabdapravṛttini-mitta*) should not be sought in the actual state of affairs, due to the autonomy of language vis-à-vis reality:

> Through the speaker's intention, which depends on [the availabi-lity of] suitable verbal expressions,[93] the speaker, who relies on [the commonsense view vehiculated by] language (*śabdapramāṇa-kaḥ*), seeks to [convey] this [or that] intended meaning in this or that way, conforming to the [expressive] power of words. Surely, [the fact of] being in reality [an action] to be accomplished or [a substance] complete in itself is not the cause of verbal usage.[94]

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te, paṭaḥ kriyate ityādi sādhyamānāvasthesv api sanmātrākārāvalambanaṃ pratyayaṃ janayanti. ghaṭasya hi bhāvyamānāvasthā śivakastūpakādīnām avasthānāṃ krameṇa prādurbhāvaḥ. na cāsau ghaṭaśabdāt pratīyate, kriyata iti kriyāśabdaprayogād eva tada-vagateḥ.

[93] Note the use of the phrase *yogyaśabdanibandhanā* here to qualify *vivakṣā*, a clear intra-textual reference to the first view in VPVṛ 1.13.

[94] VPVṛ 2.432 [SI 428; 2, p. 310]: *yogyaśabdanibandhanayā vivakṣayā śabdapra-māṇakaḥ prayoktā śabdaśaktim anugacchaṃs* [anugacchann SI] *taṃ [taṃ] vivakṣitam*

The malleability of these categories in linguistic terms is especially evident in the case of action nouns, where action itself is entified and therefore associated with all the attributes (*upādhi*) normally ascribed to substances, starting with the universal (*jāti*). When it is expressed by a noun, an action can serve as a factor in another action expressed by a verb and be distinguished from other similar occurrences of the same general type of process (e.g. 'His cooking is better than mine'). In a later verse (VP 2.433 [SI 2.429]) Bhartṛhari himself shows with an example how the same real-life event can be represented either as an action through a verb or as a substance through an action noun:

> *pacikriyāṃ karotīti karmatvenābhidhīyate |*
> *paktiḥ karaṇarūpaṃ tu sādhyatvena pratīyate ||*

> Cooking is expressed as an object in [the sentence] 'he does the action of cooking,' but it is understood as [an action] to be accomplished when it has the nature of 'doing.'

The first sentence of the *Vṛtti* on this *kārikā* is probably corrupt and not entirely clear but, based on what is left of it, its sense seems to be faithfully reflected by Puṇyarāja's *Ṭīkā*:

> Here in [1] *devadattaḥ pacati* 'Devadatta is cooking' the action of cooking is perceived as the main thing. This is established to be exactly the same <u>cooking</u>, [i.e.] action of cooking, [understood] as the object here in [2] *pacikriyāṃ devadattaḥ karoti* 'he does the action of cooking.' However, doing the action of cooking [i.e. sentence (2)] conveys the surface form [i.e. *karoti*] as the main thing, [but] this does not correspond to the state of affairs.[95]

[vivakṣantaṃ tam SI] *arthaṃ tathā tathā samīhate. na hi vastutaḥ sādhyatvaṃ siddhatvaṃ vā śabdapravṛttinimittam.* As Puṇyarāja tersely summarises: 'This is to be accomplished, that is a factor, and they have a relation: all this results from a mental construct. Therefore, this means that it has no reality at all, it lives only through the speaker's wish' (*Ṭīkā*, p. 171: *idaṃ sādhyam idaṃ sādhanam, tayoś cābhisambandhaḥ, sarvam etat kālpanikam. tatas tattvaśūnyam eva prayoktṛsamīhāmātrajīvitam iti yāvat*).

[95] *Ṭīkā* (p. 171): *devadattaḥ pacatīty atra yā pākakriyā prādhānyenopalabdhā saiva pacikriyāṃ devadattaḥ karotīty atra karmatvenaiva paktiḥ pākakriyā vyavasthāpitā. pacikriyākaraṇaṃ tu prādhānyenonmajjadrūpaṃ pratipādayati naiṣā vastugatiḥ.*

Thus, according to a formal Pāṇinian analysis of the semantics of the second sentence, 'doing' is the main element while the cooking is relegated to the role of an auxiliary factor, but in fact this does not correspond to the state of affairs nor to the ordinary understanding of the expression, which is essentially the same as that of the first sentence in which the finite form *pacati* is used. As Bhartṛhari puts it: 'However, doing does not give up its lower status only because [in *pacikriyāṃ karoti*] the speaker intends to express it as [the action] to be accomplished.'[96]

4.6 The sixth view: pratyaya

The final view (cf. SI 1.46.5–6) comes full circle, asking once again the original question:

> *athavārthapravṛtteḥ kiṃ tattvam. artharūpākāraḥ pratyayātmā bāhyeṣu vastuṣu pratyastaḥ. sa ca śabdanibandhanaḥ.*

> Or, [alternatively,] what is the [key] element of the formation of meaning? It is that which constitutes a cognition having the appearance of the form of the thing-meant, which is laid upon external objects. And this [cognition] is based on language.

Like in the first view, *arthapravṛtti* is once again taken as a *tatpuruṣa*.[97] This time the answer is that the core of signification is a cognition (*pratyaya*). This is described as taking the appearance of the thing-meant, assuming (as is usually the case in the Grammarians' discussions about meaning) that the conversation is about some external object. With the expression *artharūpākāra*, Bhartṛhari seems to imply that knowledge consists of pure, luminous consciousness (*caitanya*, *prakāśa*), but in ordinary experience it appears to be shaped, as it were, by the object of knowledge, and thus is experienced as limited and segmented.

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[96] VPVṛ 2.433 [SI 429; 2, p. 311]: *karaṇaṃ tu sādhyatvenaiva vivakṣitatvād viprakṛtāvasthāṃ na jahāti.*

[97] Cf. Sph 46.27–28: <u>athavā</u> *iti tatpuruṣam āśrayati. vyavahriyamāṇasyārthasya kiṃ tattvaṃ kiṃ rūpam iti* [...]. Note that here Vṛṣabhadeva does not give a direct gloss of *pravṛtti*, but somehow renders it with the present participle *vyavahriyamāṇa*, thus directly linking the 'activation' (*pravṛtti*) of meaning to speech production.

Such a cognition, shaped by its content, is said to be projected onto external objects (*bāhyeṣu vastuṣu pratyastaḥ*). This passing remark suggests that Bhartṛhari sees the relation between *artha*, the mental object associated with the verbal expression, and the referent of the expression, the external thing (*bāhyaṃ vastu*), as one of superimposition, as is generally called in modern scholarship. This kind of relation is often evoked to describe the relation between *śabda* and *artha*, whereby the former is superimposed on the latter leading to their identification. Here a further step is taken, linking the verbal meaning (*śabdārtha*) to some object or event in the external reality, which is in its turn identified with the word/meaning complex.[98]

Even though here Bhartṛhari does not resort to the vocabulary that is generally associated with superimposition elsewhere in the VP and in other philosophical works, with such terms as *adhyāropa* and *adhyāsa*, nevertheless there is little doubt that this is what the participle *pratyasta* suggests. The same idea is found elsewhere in the VP, notably in VPVṛ 1.24–26 (SI 1.71.4–5; cf. also Ogawa 2017: 54), when Bhartṛhari explains the term *kāryakāraṇabhāva* found in VP 1.24, which describes the relation between *śabda* and *artha* as a cause-effect relation:

> *arthākāranirbhāsamātrānugatasya pratyayasyārtheṣu pratyastarūpa-syārthatvenādhyavasāye, tasyārthātmanaḥ śabdo nimittam.*

> When a cognition, in conformity with its portions that appear like images of objects, is determined to be [the same] as the object once the form [of the cognition] has been laid upon [those] objects, the verbal expression is the cause of a [cognition] which is identical with the [external] object.

The reference to the 'portions' of the cognition that correspond to the objects found in it suggests that the cognition Bartṛhari has in view here is a sentence meaning centred on an action involving one or more participants.[99] The individual words denoting them

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[98] Cf. Sph 46.29: *buddhir evopadarśitabāhyarūpākārā teṣu pratyastety ucyate* 'It is said that the cognition itself, which has the appearance of something represented as having an external nature, is laid upon those [external objects].'

[99] Cf. Sph 71.16–17: *mātrāśabdo 'vayavavacana upāttaḥ. arthākārair nirbhāsair avayava ivānusyūtasya pratyayasya* 'The word *mātrā* is used [in the *Vṛtti*] to refer to

convey meanings that — as seen above — are always generic and somewhat shifty, but their exact import becomes clear when they are employed in the context of a sentence. Thus, according to Bhartṛhari's understanding of the process as outlined in VPVṛ 1.13 and further detailed in the passage just quoted, when someone says *bhṛtyo gām ānayati* 'the servant is bringing the cow,' the words *bhṛtya* and *go* — well-established in ordinary linguistic usage as signifiers of entities sharing certain defining characteristics (namely, servants and cows), and therefore fit (*yogya*) for purpose — identify the specific servant and cow participating in the specific action the speaker is talking about through a double process of superimposition. First, the word is identified with the general notion (the *sāmānya*) and, then, with the particular entity in the real world: *ayaṃ bhṛtyaḥ, iyaṃ gauḥ*.

It is worth stressing that the first level of superimposition precedes any individual use of the word since, as noted above, the Grammarians consider the relation between word and meaning to be fixed, whereas the second is to some extent influenced or directed by *vivakṣā*, because the way speakers chose to represent events and even entities through language is highly variable and largely subjective.

This point is once again made in another passage of VPVṛ 1.48, which deals with the nascent moment of verbal communication: the linguistic expression is born in the mind, connected to some meaning, and manifested as articulated speech by the sounds produced by the phonatory apparatus.[100] The *Vṛtti* describes the process in greater detail:[101] once the identity between word and mean-

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the parts [of the cognition]. [A *mātrā*] is like part of a cognition that is entwined with appearances that are the images of objects.' The particle *iva* reminds the reader that in fact the cognition is unitary and partless, just like the sentence expressing it.

[100] VP 1.48 [SI 1.47] *vitarkitaḥ purā buddhyā kvacid arthe niveśitaḥ | karaṇebhyo vivṛttena dhvaninā so 'nugṛhyate ||* 'First conceived in the mind and applied to some meaning or other, it [i.e. the word] is helped by the sounds manifested by the articulatory organs.'

[101] VPVṛ 1.48 (SI 105.3–6): *iha śabdārthayoḥ so 'yam iti sambandhānugame kriyamāṇe, yac chabdarūpam arthe samāropayitum iṣyate, yasmin vārtharūpam upayogena vyāveśaṃ labhate, tat pūrvaṃ buddhinirūpaṇayā kṛtasaṃsparśam, abhidheyātmani prāpyamāṇam, yathābhiprāyaṃ rūpaviparyāseneva rūpāntaropagrāhi svarūpaṃ niveśayati.*

ing is apprehended,[102] the phonic form of the word (*śabdarūpam*) is superimposed (*samāropayitum*) on some meaning, or — from a different angle — one can say that the image of the thing-meant (*artharūpam*[103]) impregnates the word thanks to the latter's assistance (*upayogena*[104]) to the process of superimposition. Once the word has been associated with the mental representation of the thing-meant, it becomes an integral part of the meaning (*abhidheyātmani prāpyamāṇaṃ*[105]), in the sense that in the cognitive experience of speakers *śabda* and *artha* are inextricably fused together, and the word seems to transform into something essentially different.[106]

This process — as Bhartṛhari emphasises near the end of the passage — unfolds according to the intention (*yathābhiprāyam*) of the speaker.[107] Thus, we can assume that, even where the cognition of an entity originates from direct perception, the particular lexical item the speaker selects to refer to it — or, in other terms, the way he/she locates it within a taxonomy that is inscribed in the language — may vary depending on the vantage point from which it is considered by the speaker and the action in which it participates.[108] Illustrations of the way in which the speaker's intention

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[102] Vṛṣabhadeva glosses *sambandhānugame* with *sambandhavyutpādane*, noting that the relation cannot be created again ex novo because it already exists (Sph 105.13: *na punar niṣpādye sambandhe sthitatvāt*).

[103] Vṛṣabhadeva glosses this term with *arthākāraḥ* (Sph 105.16).

[104] Sph 105.16–17 explains *upayogena* as *vyāpāreṇa svarūpasamāropaṇākhyena* 'by means of the activity defined as the superimposition of its own form.'

[105] Even though there is some uncertainty about the text, Vṛṣabha seems to gloss *prāpyamāṇam* with *niveśyamānam*, lit. 'that is made to enter' the essence of what is to be expressed. Regarding compounds ending in *ātman* used in the VP, and especially in the *Vṛtti*, such as *abhidheyātman*, Aklujkar (1993b: 55, n. 21) notes that they often 'add the sense of "unit, a reified entity".'

[106] This idea is expressed by the phrase *rūpaviparyāseneva*, which Vṛṣabhadeva explains as follows (Sph 105.25): *śabdarūpam apahāya artharūpāpatteḥ, na tu paramārthataḥ svarūpabhā(hā?)nam ādarśasyeva mukharūpapratipattāv iti ivaśabdopādānam* 'Because it acquires the form of the thing-meant abandoning its nature of word, but in reality it does not give up its own nature, like a mirror when it reflects the form of a face, therefore, the word *iva* is used.'

[107] Cf. the gloss of *yathābhiprāyam* in Sph 105.24: *vaktur abhiprāyam anurudhyaiva. yaṃ hi vaktā abhidhitsati sa śabdaḥ tathā pratyavabhāsate* 'Only after it has conformed to the speaker's intention. Surely, the word that the speaker wishes to convey is the one that manifests itself accordingly.'

[108] Cf. VPVṛ 2.440 [SI 436] (SI 2, p. 313; the *kārikā* itself is quoted immediately below in the main text): *tad eva hi vastu lakṣaṇam apoddhṛtyādhyāropya vā ta[thā]*

shapes the utterance abound across the VP. For example, in VP 2.440 [SI 436] Bhartṛhari points out that nouns can only capture some aspect of any entity, but they are unable to express its true nature:

lakṣaṇād vyavatiṣṭhante padārthā na tu vastutaḥ |
upakārāt sa evārthaḥ kathaṃcid anugamyate ||

Word meanings are established on the basis of [some] characteristic [of the thing-meant], not on the basis of the real entity [itself]. The thing-meant is thought of in a certain way because it assists [in a certain action].

Thus, as the *Vṛtti* notes, 'the same woman can be referred to as daughter, sister, wife, or mother on the basis of specific associations.'[109] If we adopt the description of the process by which meaning is constituted as outlined above and apply it to this example, we can reconstruct its stages as follows.[110] A mental representation (still somewhat undetermined) of a certain woman comes forth in the awareness of the speaker; this triggers the search for a suitable word to refer to her; each of the potentially appropriate terms — *strī, duhitṛ, bhaginī, bhāryā, mātṛ* — is well-established in the usage with its particular connotations, since the identification (through the first-level superimposition) of a certain string of sounds, e.g. *mātṛ*, with a given general notion (namely, a female individual possessed with *mātṛtva*) preexists to any particular utterance; depending on a number of contextual factors, some of them extra-linguistic, the speaker chooses the most suitable word to talk about the woman, thus implementing the second-level superimposition (*seyaṃ mātā* 'this [woman] is the mother') by which the word/meaning complex comes to identify the actual individual woman intended by the speaker.

[om. SI] *tathābhidhīyate. āśrīyamāṇopakāraviśeṣaḥ sa eva vastvātmā kriyādidravyādi-sarūpatām <# yā-dra?> iva pratipadyate* 'Surely, the same entity is expressed in this or that way after extracting or superimposing [a given] characteristic [on it]. This very entity, the specific assistance of which is relied upon [for the action], takes up the nature, as it were, of a substance etc. in relation to an action, etc.'

[109] VPVṛ 2.440 (SI 2, p. 313): *tad yathā, ekā strī duhitā bhaginī bhāryā mātety apekṣāviśeṣaiḥ* [°*pekṣyā*° SI] *pravibhajyate.*

[110] This is of course an analytical, a posteriori reconstruction of a mental process that in the speakers' experience is instantaneous and largely subconscious — a *pratibhā*, in Bhartṛhari's terminology.

The *kārya-kāraṇa* relation between word and meaning can therefore be understood in various ways from different angles. Initially, the choice of a suitable lexical item helps the incipient cognition to be formed, as its content is determined by discriminating it from other objects when a suitable word is found to name it, based on some of its features.[111] As language operates as a classifying, conceptualising tool, from this angle the word is the cause, while the meaning is the effect (see the passage in VPVṛ 1.24–26 quoted above, ending with the words *tasyārthātmanaḥ śabdo nimittam*). On the other hand, the fact that a given entity presents certain features allowing it to be assimilated to a general kind leads to the use of a certain word to refer to it (namely, the assimilation to a specific kind works as its *pravṛttinimitta*, the cause for its application), thus reversing the cause-effect relation, as Bhartṛhari states in the same passage:

> In this way, due to the well-known relation of identity between word and meaning, the understanding that there is separation among the objects is the cause for the use of a [certain] word that resides in the internal organ and is manifested by sounds.[112]

The explanation given by Vṛṣabhadeva confirms and clarifies this view:

> The word is the cause (*nimitta* = *kāraṇa*) of that which constitutes meaning [and] has entered the cognition, therefore, after having mentioned [the relation] described as a cause-effect [relation], [Bhartṛhari,] accommodating into it [the relation] described as

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[111] The beginning of VPVṛ 2.440 (SI 2, p. 313) seems to suggest that the choice of a lexical item to name the thing-meant need not always be based on its most essential features (such as the *jāti*): *[adūra]viprakarṣāt* [°adūra° om. SI] *prāpitaṃ sad asad vā lakṣaṇaṃ padārthavyavasthāhetuḥ* '[Some] characteristic [of the thing meant], provided from [nearby or] faraway, real or unreal, is the cause of the establishment of the word meaning.' Depending on *vivakṣā*, it can favour secondary or even imaginary traits, identifying the same entity as a 'horse,' an 'animal,' a 'mount,' a 'gift,' a 'wonder,' etc. according to the context.

[112] VPVṛ 1.24–26 (SI 1.71.5–6): *tathārthāvagrahadarśanaṃ so 'yam iti śabdārtha-yoḥ sambandhaprasiddher nādābhivyaktasyāntaḥkaraṇasanniveśinaḥ śabdasya pravṛ-ttau kāraṇam.* I think that here by the term *darśana* Bhartṛhari refers to the commonsense worldview (fostered and reflected by language) according to which external reality is populated by discrete entities.

non-difference, says <u>In this way</u>, etc. The <u>separation among the</u> <u>objects</u>, [i.e.] the discrimination of objects [from one another], [and] the understanding is based on that [belief]. A cognition is the [mental] image of an object. [This is] <u>the cause for the use of</u> <u>a [certain] word</u>, namely, the relation [between *śabda* and *artha*]. In that respect, the meaning is the cause, the word is the effect, thus, there is a cause-effect relation [between them]. [The phrase] <u>that resides in the internal organ</u> [means] that it is [stored] in the mind, since a cognition that has the form of the word arises in connection with a cognition that has the form of the thing-meant. [The phrase] <u>is manifested by sounds</u> [means] that the word residing in the mind is manifested by means of the utterance of [speech] sounds, therefore the hearer determines [the meaning] from the utterance.[113]

The last sentence in the *Sphuṭākṣara* passage points to yet another, major dimension of the relation between *śabda* and *artha* as a cause-effect relation. At the other end of the process of communication, hearing a certain word will produce a cognition in the hearer that is similar (*sarūpa*) to the one that had originated in the speaker's mind before the utterance (a similarity based on the fact that speaker and hearer share the same linguistic code). One comes across this aspect of verbal communication — the effect produced by an utterance in the mind of the person addressed — in the initial lines of the *Mahābhāṣya* (1.1.10–11) where Patañjali wonders about the nature of *śabda* and, after considering a few possible answers, concludes:

> *kas tarhi śabdaḥ. yenoccāritena sāsnālāṅgūlakakudakhuraviṣāṇinām*
> *saṃpratyayo bhavati sa śabdaḥ*

> Then, what is the word? The word is that because of which, once it is uttered, the cognition appears of beings possessing a dewlap, tail, hump, hooves, and horns.

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[113] Sph 71.18–24: *tasyārthātmano buddhiniviṣṭasya śabdo nimittaṃ* [my em.; *ni-mitta* SI] *kāraṇam ity evam kāryakāraṇalakṣaṇaṃ sambandham abhidhāyātraivābheda-lakṣaṇam antarbhavayiṣyann āha* <u>*tathā*</u> *iti. arthavāgraho 'rthaparicchedaḥ tadātmaka-darśanam. arthākāraḥ pratyayaḥ.* <u>*tathā*</u> *iti. arthavāgraho 'rthaparicchedaḥ tadātmaka-darśanam. arthākāraḥ pratyayaḥ.* <u>*śabdasya pravṛttau kāraṇam iti sambandhaḥ.*</u> *tatrā-rthaḥ kāraṇam, śabdaḥ kāryam iti kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ.* <u>*antahkaraṇasanniveśinaḥ*</u> *iti. buddhisthasya. yato 'rthākārāyā buddheḥ śabdākārā buddhir utpadyate.* <u>*nādābhivyakta-sya*</u> *iti. nādoccāraṇena buddhisthaḥ śabdo 'bhivyajyate, yena śrotā uccāraṇād avasyati.*

Clearly, the person in whom the cognition of the cow occurs after the word 'cow' is pronounced is the hearer. However, in general the Grammarians focus on the speaker's side of verbal communication much more than the hearer's. And indeed, the mention in Vṛṣabhadeva's commentary is the single explicit reference to the hearer (*śrotṛ*) found in the various passages related to VPVṛ 1.13 that I have examined above.

In light of the arguments examined so far, it is evident that according to Bhartṛhari the relation between the mental representations (i.e. the cognitions) of entities and events and the words used to convey them is very intimate and highly complex, to such an extent that, as we saw above, it cannot be described as a linear cause-effect relation. Words too, as Bhartṛhari notes, are primarily *antaḥkaraṇasanniveśin* — stored, we may say, in the mind and ready to be retrieved on demand.[114] The link between these two kinds of mental contents is operative in the speaker's intellect from the very start of the chain of internal happenings that lead to the formation of meaning at the individual level and eventually result in speech, as I argue here.[115]

The final sentence of the passage on the sixth view points to the intimate connection between knowledge and language. Like *vivakṣā* in the first view, a cognition that is the meaning of a verbal expression is said to be based on language (*śabdanibandhanaḥ*), even though here Bhartṛhari does not insist on the availability of suitable (*yogya*) words, possibly because, from a cognitive point of view, even that which is directly unsayable is amenable to mental representation and, ultimately, verbalisation, albeit indirectly. In this way Bhartṛhari appears to suggest that the process by which thought takes shapes in the subject's mind is fundamentally iden-

[114] Cf. Aklujkar's description (2000: 7–8) of Bhartṛhari's view of *buddhi*: 'It is simply *citi* or *caitanya* in its aspect of holding the entire diversity of linguistic units (phonemes, words and sentences, i.e., *varṇa*s, *pada*s and *vākya*s) of which a person is aware. [...] This is the view of B[hartṛhari]'s *buddhi* as a static entity — when *buddhi* is at rest. But there is also a dynamic aspect to *buddhi*. In that aspect, it is a continuum of cognitions reflecting specific linguistic units [...] — cognitions here being sentences or functional equivalents of sentences.'

[115] For this reason, I think Ogawa's conclusion (2017: 53) that 'the sixth interpretation is made from the point of view of the causal relation on a hearer's part' is far too narrow and hardly warranted by Bhartṛhari's own words.

tical whether it eventually leads to verbalisation or not. The world is seen through the lenses of the notions and categories stored in the mind of individuals and inextricably associated with the linguistic expressions that designate them.

To put it differently, VP 1.13 and its *Vṛtti*, especially the sixth view equating *artha* with *pratyaya*, can be seen as the first assertion in the VP of the radical view presented in different and more explicit terms in the famous *kārikā*s VP 1.131–132 [SI 123–124], according to which all knowledge is inextricably infused with language:

> *na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte |*
> *anuviddham iva jñānaṃ sarvaṃ śabdena gṛhyate ||*
> *vāgrūpatā ced utkrāmed avabodhasya śāśvatī |*
> *na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta sā hi pratyavamarśinī ||*

> There is no cognition in this world that is not accompanied by language. All knowledge is transfixed by language, as it were.
> If knowledge ceased to have the perennial nature of language, the light [of consciousness] would not shine for that [nature] makes reflective awareness possible.

In light of these *kārikā*s, we can go back to the first hemistich of VP 1.13 and read it as Bhartṛhari's suggestion that speech units are the building blocks, as it were, of human thought, and the principles that govern language are homologous (if not identical) to the principles that shape cognition. In this sense, by revealing the underlying structures of speech, grammar, which in the second hemistich is said to be indispensable to discover the true nature of language, also sheds light on the inner workings of thought.

A perusal of the *Vṛtti* on VP 1.131–132 reveals evident links with the passage of VPVṛ 1.13 examined here, corroborating my understanding of the latter. In the former, Bhartṛhari does not discuss episodes of ordinary cognition but rather dwells on what we may call 'borderline' (although common) cases of mental activity, such as the peripheral perception of elements of the surroundings on the part of someone who is hurrying towards her/his destination or the persistence of *śabdabhāvanā*, the 'disposition to speech' that is innate in human beings (and possibly non-humans too), even in the sleeping state. The discussion of these cases appears to confirm what we had learnt from VPVṛ 1.13.

The perception of elements of the landscape such as the grass on the path, etc. gives rise to an unfocused cognition (which Bhartṛhari calls *avikalpaka jñāna*[116]) of the thing(s) in question, which form the background of the subject's awareness.[117] At this stage, the thing may only be referred to by means of a deictic,[118] which can apply to anything, even something barely acknowledged (like the grass on the path) or previously unknown and unexpected. As the *Vṛtti* puts it, in the person who hurries along the path there is a 'cognitive state in which the seed of the disposition to speech has become turned outward' (SI 1.188.7: [...] *sā jñānāvasthā yasyām abhimukhībhūtaśabdabhāvanābījāyām* [...]). I think this means that at subliminal level the subject 'recognises' the greenery, etc., along the path, but these perceptual data are not consciously processed any further. Vṛṣabhadeva explicitly links the vagueness of the cognitions of the surroundings to the lack of full activation of *śabdabhāvanā*: '[Such] a cognition is not appropriate for discourse because there is no manifestation of any clear disposition to speech, inasmuch as there is no discrimination that is not produced on the basis of that [disposition].'[119] Thus,

[116] VPVṛ 1.131 (SI 1.188.5–6): *yathāsya saṃhṛtarūpā [śabda]bhāvanā tathā jñeyeṣv artheṣūtpannenāpy avikalpakena* [°*kalpe*° SI] *jñānena kāryaṃ na kriyate* 'As the disposition [to speech] is in a withdrawn form, a cognition devoid of conceptualisation does not produce any effect even though it has arisen in relation to cognisable objects.' For a complete translation and detailed analysis of this passage, see Vergiani 2016, esp. pp. 9–12.

[117] Vṛṣabhadeva remarks that 'the cognitions [of the surroundings] are [like] discrete elements joined in a [perceptual] continuum when there is no activation of the disposition to speech' (Sph 188.25: *saṃhitaviparicchedeṣu jñāneṣu śabdabhāvanāvṛttilābhābhāve*).

[118] Cf. Sph 189.1–3: *jñānaviśeṣe 'py abhimukhībhūte na svakāryajananayogyatā śabdabhāvanābījasyābhimukhyam.* [...] *jñānaviśiṣṭāḥ śabdabhāvanāśaktayaḥ idantayā arthānām upagrahe bhānasya nimittaṃ bhavanti* 'Even if there is a specific knowledge that has turned outward, [*śabdabhāvanā*] has no capacity to produce its effect, [i.e.] the seed of the disposition to speech has not turned outward. [...] The powers of the disposition [to speech], particularised by a cognition, become the [potential] cause of verbalisation when one grasps objects as being "that".'

[119] Sph 189.25–190.1: *na vyavahārayogyaṃ jñānam, śabdabhāvanānāṃ spaṣṭānām {anā}virbhāvāt, tasmād aniṣpannasya paricchedasyābhāvāt.* (The curly brackets in the Sanskrit text indicate that according to the editor, the text may be corrupt.) However, as the later part of the *Vṛtti* points out, these unformed cognitions can be retrieved by memory if some other factor triggers their recollection (*sa ca nimittāntarād āvirbhavatsu śrutibījeṣu smṛtihetur bhavati*; cf. SI 1.189.3–4), precisely because there had been a 'subtle' (*sūkṣma*) activation of *śabdabhāvanā*.

the still vague, unformed cognition of an object (an external one, in the example, but presumably the same holds for mental ones, as those generated by imagination, reasoning, memory, etc.) is necessarily to be associated with a linguistic sign, a word that captures some of its characteristics (the *pravṛttinimitta*), thus assigning it to a given class of objects that share similar characteristics and are therefore liable to be called by the same name.

Only once the latter mental operation has taken place, the cognition of the external entity becomes distinct, namely, the entity is ascertained to be a specimen of a kind. That is the crucial moment when the mental representation of the entity becomes amenable to enter discourse, that is, it can be related to an action in which it serves as a factor (*sādhana*), and, through the action, to other entities. As VPVṛ 1.132 notes:

> And when the cognition as mere entities arises of [things] which have mutually distinct natures, [and] are not of assistance [to any action], whose essence is not the same as that of any other, the conceptual unification (*anusandhānaṃ*) [that takes place] at a later time, when they [all] contribute to one purpose in the [subject's] reflective awareness, and [consists in] grasping their connections through the interrelation of their capacities, is steeped in the nature of language.[120]

The emphasis Bhartṛhari puts here on what we may call internal verbalisation (the outcome of the full unfolding of *śabdabhāvanā*) as a necessary preliminary step in any mental operation that reaches the threshold of the subject's awareness confirms that, according to his view, the operation of human intellect is inextricably enmeshed with language regardless of whether its activity eventually results in speech.

5. *Conclusion*

In this article I have tried to shed clarity on the concept of *vivakṣā*, which first appears in the MBh and then plays a major role in

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[120] VPVṛ 1.132 (SI 1.191.4–192.1): *bhinnarūpāṇāṃ cānupakāriṇām [arthānām?]* [om. SI] *ā[tmāntarā]nātmanām itaretarasya vastumātrājñāne pratyavabhāsamāne yad uttara[kāla]m anusandhānaṃ pratyavamarśa ekārthakāritvam avibhāgena śaktisaṃsargayogopagrahas [tad] vāgrūpatāyāṃ pratibaddham* [baddham SI].

Bhartṛhari's theory of language and knowledge. As I have maintained above, his emphasis on *vivakṣā* as the key element in the formation of meaning at mental level prior to its verbalisation — evidenced by its prominent position in the first view of VPVṛ 1.13 — firmly puts the subject at the heart of speech production. There is no automatism in speech even though it is a 'natural' faculty. This implies that speaking is always intentional, a purposeful action, an *arthakriyā* aimed at some goal the speaker wishes to achieve through verbal interaction with other human beings. This is especially evident in commands and requests, but in fact it underlies all uses of language, including those seemingly most 'neutral.' Even answering a stranger who is asking for directions is triggered by the speaker's wish to help a fellow human being and thus comply with widespread cultural and social expectations about hospitality, courtesy, etc.

While here I have mostly focused firstly on rectifying the unfortunate misrepresentation of *vivakṣā* as a 'grammarians' device' that has until now dominated the scanty scholarship on the subject, and second on the important passage where the term first appears in the VP, much remains to be said to do full justice to the concept of *vivakṣā* in the works of the early Pāṇinīyas. In this final paragraph I will outline some further aspects of Bhartṛhari's treatment of *vivakṣā*, which I intend to examine in future publications.

The often complex set of motivations that converge into *vivakṣā* is largely made up of extra-linguistic factors, and accordingly it is barely touched upon by Bhartṛhari and his predecessors. However, the Grammarians discuss at large and with their usual linguistic subtlety how *vivakṣā* operates at various level of the process of speech production ranging from the ideational dimension, i.e. the subjective segmentation and depiction of reality that translates into what is spoken about and in what terms, to the formal and the pragmatic. At each juncture *vivakṣā* steps in and makes the utterance unique, shaping it according to the needs of the individual speaker. Seeking suitable (*yogya*) expressions to convey thoughts and feelings, the speaker is faced at virtually every step with several options, involving all aspects of language. In various passages of the VP (often developing Patañjali's observations), which deserve to be examined in depth for their wealth of linguistic insights, Bhartṛhari shows how *vivakṣā* affects the lexical

choices, the selection of morpho-syntactic structures (e.g. use of causative, analytical expression vs. *vṛtti*, etc.), and phenomena as diverse as implicature, autonymy, and linguistic register, as occasionally pointed out above.

The last of these, namely the issue of the speaker's choice between different language registers — the sociolinguistic dimension of language — is treated by Bhartṛhari at the very end of the *Vṛtti* passage discussed above where he briefly comments on the second hemistich of VP 1.13.[121] Grammar is the arbiter of correct (*sādhu*) language (that is, the *śiṣṭa*s' Sanskrit codified by Pāṇini), but the Grammarians are well aware that verbal communication takes place nevertheless. In this short passage the term *vivakṣā* does not appear but, significantly, Bhartṛhari employs another desiderative action noun, *prayuyukṣā*, to describe a situation where a speaker uses flawed expressions despite his/her 'intention to use' correct ones.[122] This kind of incorrect speech is called *apabhraṃśa*, here most certainly not the name of a specific variety of Middle Indo-Aryan, but rather a descriptive term for 'lower' or 'corrupt,' i.e. substandard expressions (from the point of view of Pāṇinian Sanskrit). Bhartrhari takes up the reflection on *sādhu* and *asādhu* speech again at the end of the first *kāṇḍa* in a passage (VP 1.175 ff. with the *Vṛtti*) where *vivakṣā* plays a significant role.[123] This, again, is a topic which I will discuss in a separate article.

Another major aspect in the operation of *vivakṣā* as described by Bhartṛhari (and already outlined in the MBh, as shown in

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[121] VPVṛ 1.13 (SI 1.47.1–2): <u>tattvāvabodhaḥ śabdānām</u>. *śabdasya tattvam avaikalyam anapagatasaṃskāraṃ sādhu svarūpam* 'The true nature of speech is flawlessness, its correct nature is one from which perfection has not disappeared.'

[122] VPVṛ 1.13 (SI 1.47.2–3): *anye tu tatprayuyukṣayā prayujyamānā vikalāḥ* [vikalā SI] *syur apabhraṃśā iti* 'However, when [someone], wishing to use that [flawless speech], uses other [expressions], these will be flawed, "corrupt".'

[123] See the last verse of the *kāṇḍa*, VP 1.183 [SI 147]: *ubhayeṣām avicchedād anyaśabdavivakṣayā | yo 'nyaḥ prayujyate śabdo na so 'rthasyābhidhāyakaḥ ||* 'Since both [varieties of speech, *sādhu* and *apabhraṃśa*] have been transmitted without interruption [from time immemorial], when one uses one word with the intention to use another word, the word that is used is not expressive of [the intended] meaning.' In this *kārikā* Bhartṛhari seems to suggest that in everyday life the correctness (*sādhutva*) of a verbal expression must be judged on the basis of the linguistic register the speaker had intended to use. So, from this angle, an *apabhraṃśa* word would only be 'incorrect' if the speaker wished to speak 'high' (i.e. Pāṇinian) Sanskrit.

Scharf 1995) that I have mentioned above but is worth examining in greater depth is that of the tension between the subjective expressive dimension of language and the constraints imposed by language itself as an autonomous semiotic system (the regularity of which is a pre-requisite of its intersubjective communicative function). The highest level of constraint over *vivakṣā* operates at formal level, unsurprisingly. Language demands that its users play by its rules. When the subject's *vivakṣā* agrees with the general *laukikī vivakṣā*, as commonly happens in everyday verbal exchanges, it hides in plain sight, as it were.

The inner tension between the normativity of language and the speaker's expressive freedom is frequently demonstrated in the VP (once again, often in the wake of MBh) in terms of *avivakṣā*. One consequence of the autonomous nature of language as a semiotic system is that, in a highly inflected language such as Sanskrit, all nouns and verbs must end in a declensional or conjugational suffix, respectively, which carries a quantum of diverse information. For example, a nominal ending will also signify the gender and number of the entity denoted by the base (*prātipadika*). These are structural features of language, which cannot be dispensed with. The Grammarians call them *nāntarīyaka*. However, this entails that in many contexts this information is *avivakṣita*, unintended by the speaker, forced on her/him by the grammar of the language.[124]

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[124] See VP 2.302: *yathaivātyantasaṃsṛṣṭas tyaktum artho na śakyate | tathā śabdo 'pi sambandhī pravivektuṃ na śakyate ||* 'Just as a [partial] meaning, which is closely interrelated [to other meanings], cannot be left out, in the same way a word too, having connections [with other words], cannot be isolated [from the whole sentence].' Echoing the *Vṛtti*, the *Ṭīkā* (p. 120) explains: *yathā matsyamāṃsārthinā matsyamāṃsasaṃsṛṣṭastokatvakkaṇṭakādir anupayogy api tyaktuṃ na śakyate, tathā śabdo 'py atyantasambandhāl liṅgasaṅkhyāpratipādakaḥ tatra "na kevalā prakṛtiḥ prayoktavyā, na ca kevalaḥ pratyayaḥ" iti pravivektuṃ parihartuṃ na śakyate* 'One who wants the flesh of a fish cannot leave aside the bits of skin, bones, etc. attached to the flesh of the fish, even though they serve no [purpose]. In the same way, also a word, which is expressive of gender and number, cannot be cut off, [i.e.] removed [from the sentence], because it has a very close relation [with the whole], [as] in that respect [it is said in the MBh *ad* 1.2.64] that "a mere base cannot be used by itself, nor [can] a mere affix.".'

An example of this is given in VP 2.385 [SI 381],[125] which looks at the injunction *vṛṣalair na praveṣṭavyam* 'Low-caste people must not enter,' noting that it implies that they are denied access to a certain building both individually and collectively. The *Vṛtti* further remarks that here neither gender nor number are really intended: in any case, a member of the *vṛṣala* caste, whether male or female, alone or accompanied, will be forbidden to enter.[126]

To conclude, the reflection on *vivakṣā* seems to be a common thread through Bhartṛhari's whole reflection on language and cognition. One important conclusion that is drawn is that, ultimately, one cannot determine the exact import of an utterance without taking the speaker's intention into account, as Bhartṛhari affirms in several places in the second *kāṇḍa*,[127] e.g. VP 2.303:

arthānāṃ sannidhāne 'pi sati caiṣāṃ prakāśane |
prayojako 'rthaḥ śabdasya rūpābhede 'pi gamyate ||

And even though these meanings are present and manifested, one understands the meaning that prompted [the use of particular words], *although there is no difference in the form* of the verbal expression. (my emphasis)

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[125] *vṛṣalair na praveṣṭavyam ity etasmin gṛhe yathā | pratyekaṃ saṃhatānāṃ ca praveśaḥ pratiṣidhyate ||*.

[126] The issue of unintended (*avivakṣita*) grammatical information is a recurring theme in the VP. See e.g. the sequence of *kārikā*s in the *Jātisamuddeśa* starting with VP 3.1.50: *lakṣaṇā śabdasaṃskāre vyāpāraḥ kāryasiddhaye | saṅkhyākarmādiśaktīnāṃ śrutisāmye 'pi dṛśyate ||* 'Even though capacities such as (grammatical) number, object, etc. occur in the same speech element, secondary usage is seen to operate for the correct formation of the word, in order to realise the effect [that is the action].'

[127] Another such place is 2.406 [SI 402]: *bahuṣv ekābhidhāneṣu sarveṣv ekārthakāriṣu | yat prayoktābhisandhatte śabdas tatrāvatiṣṭhate ||* ('As all [of] several signifiers [in a sentence] serve one goal, the verbal expression occurs in [the sense] that the speaker aims [to convey].') The *Vṛtti* illustrates this point with the example of a sentence where a word has various meanings or referents, e.g. the proper name Devadatta (in a place where there are several men bearing that name). In this situation, if someone says *devadatta ānīyatām* ('Bring Devadatta'), and the person addressed brings a man called Devadatta, but not the Devadatta the speaker had in mind, the sentence has been correctly decoded by the hearer but, nonetheless, their response is wrong because it does not correspond to the speaker's intention.

Commenting on this verse, Bhartṛhari reiterates that two verbal expressions may have an identical surface structure, namely, consist of exactly the same words, and yet convey completely different meanings. This demonstrates the capacity (*sāmarthya*) of language to be a communicative tool of extraordinary creativity and flexibility. It is worth to quote this *Vṛtti* in its entirety (cf. SI 2 p. 267):

kāryārtham arthānām āśrite 'pi sannidhāne, pratiniyatārthaprakāśa-naśaktiyuktena viśiṣṭena śabdena sannihitasyārthasya prakāśane 'pi kriyamāṇe, kriyāsādhanatvena vivakṣitāvivakṣitābhyām arthābhyām ayaṃ yukto 'yaṃ [om. SI] *na yukta iti tulyaśrutir api śabdas, tenaiva rūpeṇa pravartamāna, iha viṣaye prayojakenārthenārthavān ihāprayoja-keneti sāmarthyād avadhārayituṃ śakyate.*

Despite the fact that one has to rely on the presence of certain meanings [such as number, gender, etc.] for the sake of grammatical operations, even when such an occurring meaning is manifested by a specific speech item [i.e. a morpheme or word] that has the capacity of manifesting [that] determinate meaning, [the hearer concludes] 'this is appropriate, this is not' [in this context] on the basis of the meanings the speaker does or does not intend to express as factors of the action. Thus, a verbal expression that contains the same words (*tulyaśrutiḥ*) [as another expression], [namely] which occurs with that very form, can be determined to be meaningful according to the sense that prompted [its use] in one context, [while] in another [context] it does not.

This passage is part of a subsection of the second *kāṇḍa* starting with vv. 300–301 that deals with cases where, in various ways detailed in the following *kārikā*s, the utterance in fact conveys either more or less than what is explicitly denoted by the surface form. In vv. 314 and 315–316,[128] Bhartṛhari presents two lists enumerating the elements or factors that allow people to disambiguate the sense of formally identical sentences, such as verbal context, situational context, sense, appropriateness, location, and time. However, he does not seem to endorse these views unconditionally, but

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[128] VP 2.314: *vākyāt prakaraṇād arthād aucityād deśakālataḥ | śabdārthāḥ pravibha-jyante na rūpād eva kevalāt ||*; 2.315–2.316: *saṃsargo viprayogaś ca sāhacaryaṃ viro-dhitā | arthaḥ prakaraṇaṃ liṅgaṃ śabdasyānyasya saṃnidhiḥ || sāmarthyam aucitī deśaḥ kālo vyaktiḥ svarādayaḥ | śabdārthasyānavacchede viśeṣasmṛtihetavaḥ ||.*

rather to suggest that generally an utterance contains all the elements that are required for hearers to grasp its meaning (even though it may appear ambiguous when taken out of its discursive and situational context).[129] This is one of the aspects of the denotative function (*sāmarthya*) of language.[130] The meaning of an utterance is not some fixed content mechanically corresponding to the combination of speech items comprising the basic signifier (in his view, the sentence), but rather the thought the speaker wishes to convey. This explains why in VPVṛ 1.13 *vivakṣā* is listed first among the factors that contribute to the formation of meaning.

Appendix

At present, the reference edition of the *kārikā*s of the VP is the one by Wilhelm Rau, published in 1977.[131] In contemporary Bhartṛhari scholarship, the numbering of the *kārikā*s is generally the one found in Rau. However, this practice has a major inconvenience: as is widely acknowledged, Rau's *kārikāpāṭha* for *kāṇḍa*s 1 and 2 is inflated by the inclusion of several verses that are in fact quotations found in the *Vṛtti*, mostly from unidentified sources. Therefore, there is a discrepancy between Rau's numeration and that found in the standard edition by Subramania Iyer in several volumes (*kāṇḍa* 1, 1965; *kāṇḍa* 2, 1983), which includes the *Vṛtti* and Vṛṣabhadeva's *Sphuṭākṣarā* (a.k.a. *Paddhati*). Thus, for example, the last verse of *kāṇḍa* 1 in Rau is No. 183, whereas according to Subramania Iyer (1965) it is No. 147. This discrepancy is especial-

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[129] Cf. VP 2.412 [SI 408]: *padarūpaṃ tu yad vākyam astitvopanibandhanam | kāmaṃ vimarśas tatrāyaṃ na vākyāvayave pade ||* 'But this consideration really applies to a sentence consisting of a [single] word, implying [a form of the verb] "to be," not to a word that is part of a sentence.'

[130] See VPVṛ 2.315–316 (cf. SI 2 p. 273): *tatra kecit sāmarthyam evaikaṃ bhedāvadhāraṇanimittam iti manyante. yo 'py arthaprakaraṇābhyāṃ svābhāviko bhedaḥ samadhigamyate so 'pi sāmarthyād eva. sāmarthyam eva hi bahudhā pravibhajyate* 'Some think it is the [expressive] capacity [of words] itself that is the single factor which allows to determine their differences. Even the intrinsic differences based on sense and context are due to the [expressive] capacity alone since this capacity has several dimensions.'

[131] For a detailed critical history of the text with its commentaries and its various modern editions, see Aklujkar 1993a, virtually a *catalogue raisonné*.

ly mystifying when one refers to the *Vṛtti*, considering that the latter is not included in Rau.

In recent years, a file containing a revised edition of the text (in Roman transliteration) of the first two *kāṇḍa*s with the *Vṛtti* has widely circulated among scholars. I understand this edition was prepared by a team of Japanese scholars who some years ago had the fortune of attending readings of the two *kāṇḍa*s led by Ashok Aklujkar, the doyen of Bhartṛhari studies, and is based on Aklujkar's in-progress critical edition of the whole VP. More recently, Aklujkar has released a PDF file with his edition of the reconstituted text of the first *kāṇḍa* (*kārikā*s and *Vṛtti*) in Devanāgarī script, without the critical apparatus, essentially identical (as far as I can tell) with the one contained in the 'Japanese' file. When I quote the *Vṛtti* in this article, this is the text I rely upon and on which I base my translations. However, in light of the fact that many readers (especially those who are not Bhartṛhari specialists) may not have access to these files, and in order to help them navigate this complicated textual situation, here I regularly give the verse number according to Rau, followed by the number in Subramania Iyer, abbreviated as SI, in square brackets: e.g. VP 1.131 [SI 123]. Similarly, whenever I cite the *Vṛtti*, this is accompanied by the reference to the corresponding passage in Subramania Iyer's edition, in the following format: for the *Vṛtti* on *kāṇḍa* 1, SI 1 followed by page and line number(s); for *kāṇḍa* 2, SI 2 followed by the page number alone (as this volume does not numerate the lines). I also report any variant readings found in the text of the *Vṛtti* in Subramania Iyer in normal font in square brackets followed by the acronym SI. When the brackets and their content are in italics, I am simply reproducing Aklujkar's edition as it is.

For the third *kāṇḍa*, where the discrepancies between Rau and Subramania Iyer are very few, and Aklujkar's edition is not available yet, I refer to the verses in the usual way, with the abbreviation VP followed by book number 3, accompanied by *samuddeśa* and verse numbers. But for Helārāja's commentary, I refer to Subramania Iyer's edition in two volumes (part 1, 1963, and part 2, 1973), with SI, followed by 3.i. or 3.ii. as appropriate, plus page and line number.

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Pratyabhijñā: Recognition's Nature, Cause and Object. Critical Edition and Annotated Translation of a Portion of the Nyāyamañjarī

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It is an honour to be included in this volume dedicated to Professor Torella, widely regarded as the scholar who has done the most over the last few decades to increase our understanding of the Pratyabhijñā tradition. This article concerns *pratyabhijñā*. But the overlap is not as substantial as that might suggest. For here we will be concerned not with the Pratyabhijñā tradition, but with the phenomenon of 'recognition' in general. The analysis of this type of cognition contained in the portion of the *Nyāyamañjarī* edited and translated below covers such topics as its nature, its cause, its object, and the question of whether it can refute the Buddhist theory of momentariness by providing evidence for the existence of persistent entities. While I do not consider the consequences of this analysis for the kind of *pratyabhijñā* with which Torella's work has been concerned, namely *īśvarapratyabhijñā*, 'recognition of God,' I would be overjoyed if in the future someone more knowledgeable than myself about that Śaiva tradition were to take some of the concerns raised in this analysis and apply them to *īśvarapratyabhijñā*.[1]

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[1] An example of such a concern would be: Does recognition access just the present condition of its object (God/the Self, in the case of *īśvarapratyabhijñā*) or

1. Why re-edit the Nyāyamañjarī?

The best complete edition to date, which made an impressive number of substantial improvements over the previous editions, is E$_M$ (the Mysore edition of Varadacharya). It is possible to read just this and follow many of the arguments. This leads some to ask: Why collate manuscripts and produce new editions of the various parts of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, with the large amount of time and labour involved, when one can just use the Mysore edition? In fact, the text presented in the Mysore edition still contains many, many sentences that are either uninterpretable or interpretable but not what Jayanta wrote. A number of the latter instances are detectable just from carefully reading E$_M$; many more become evident when one takes into account readings found in E$_V$, P, S, C, A^d, M (see 'Abbreviations' section below), in the *Granthibhaṅga*, and in parallel passages. And these sources enable not just detection but also correction of corruptions. In order to highlight how frequently E$_M$ is deficient I have drawn attention to many instances in footnotes to the translation. How often do these deficiencies actually prevent one from understanding the argument in question? In this short passage alone, I count fourteen such instances, although in three of those it may have been possible to guess the correct reading before finding it in other witnesses. The commentary in E$_M$ also sometimes betrays that its author (Varadacharya) has not precisely understood the text. I draw attention to six such instances in footnotes.

2. Introduction to the Translation

In the 7th chapter (*āhnika*) of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, Jayanta deals with the topic of the self (*ātman*), and the evidence for its existence. At certain points he argues against Cārvākas, who hold that it is known by no means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), and Mīmāṃsakas, who hold that it is known by perception (*pratyakṣa*), which Jayanta

also a past condition? If the former, how do we know that that object is not momentary? If the latter, what is the instrument of the cognition? One of the sense-faculties? Surely they can only access forms that are presented to them in the present. Or is it a kind of memory involving the *manas*? But then, given that memory is not a *pramāṇa* ('means of knowledge'), how can recognition yield valid knowledge?

thinks is impossible. But the main opponents in this chapter are, as we would expect, the Buddhists and their theory of no-self (*anātmavāda*).

No-self is entailed by the theory of momentariness (*kṣaṇikavāda*), and most of the treatment of the topic of *anātmavāda* in this chapter concerns *kṣaṇikavāda*. One almost gets the impression that for Jayanta *anātmavāda* is synonymous with *kṣaṇikavāda*. Or perhaps it was that he felt *kṣaṇikavāda* to be the strongest argument for *anātmavāda*, and hence the one that demanded the bulk of his attention.

Jayanta's treatment of *kṣaṇikavāda* can be divided into three:

1. The Buddhist inference of momentariness from existence (i.e. Dharmakīrti's *sattvānumāna*).
2. The question of whether recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) can refute this inference.
3. The question of whether momentariness can be established by direct perception alone, without recourse to inference.

It is 2 that is edited and translated here. It consists of a Buddhist *pūrvapakṣa* section followed by a Naiyāyika *siddhānta* section. The Buddhist argues that recognition cognitions, i.e. those of the form *sa evāyam*, 'this is that very thing [that I encountered earlier],' are quite compatible with momentariness, for they involve falsely identifying a presently perceived object with a similar but numerically distinct earlier encountered one. The Naiyāyika argues that these recognition cognitions provide reliable evidence of the persistence of objects.

Since I have prepared a separate article analyzing the argumentation in this passage (Watson forthcoming), I will not provide further detail here about its content, but will let the following translation, accompanied by annotation, perform that task itself.[2]

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[2] I know of no translation of the passage into a non-Indian language, but it has been translated into Gujarati by Shah (1992). It has also been summarized in English by Kher (1992: 187–190 *pūrvapakṣa* section, and 198–201 *siddhānta* section) and Shah (1997: 109 *pūrvapakṣa*, and 112 *siddhānta*), discussed by Chakrabarti (2012: 202–206) and Ratié (2012: 201–203), and referred to in passing by Taber (1990: 56, n. 30).

The following translation has benefitted enormously from the fact that I read the *pūrvapakṣa* section in Oxford with Harunaga Isaacson in (I think!) 1999, the

3. Translation[3]

1 [Does recognition refute momentariness? *Pūrvapakṣa* section]
1.1 [The relative strengths of the inference and recognition]
1.1.1 [Recognition can have no impact on the inference while the pervasion is firm]

[Buddhist:] As for what is taught [by Naiyāyikas], namely that recognition, [since it] determines the enduring nature of things, is a refuter of the inference proving momentariness — that is also not clever, for there is no room for a refuter with respect to a reason-property (*hetu*) whose connection [with its property-to-be-proved (*sādhya*)] is firm.[4] For it has been said: 'For refutation and invariable concomitance cannot simultaneously occur in one thing, as they are opposed.'[5]

So also in the inference, 'A fire substance composed of many fire particles is cold because it has been produced,'[6] it is the lack of a connection [between being produced and being cool] which

[3] The following passage, from the middle of the 7th Āhnika of the *Nyāya-mañjarī*, is obviously translated from the edition given in this article; the corresponding passage in the Mysore edition is found in Vol. 2, pp. 307,8–311,5 (*pūrvapakṣa*) and pp. 328,13–336,8 (*siddhānta*).

[4] *Pratibandha* occurs commonly in Buddhist *pramāṇa* texts in this meaning of the firm connection between *hetu* and *sādhya*. This usage is also found in Rāmakaṇṭha's *Kiraṇavṛtti* (p. 148,13 *ad* 6:11d–12) and *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* (*passim*, e.g. p. 43,20 *ad* 1:17cd; twice on p. 53, four times on p. 55, and twice on p. 56 *ad* 1:22cd).

E_M's *aśithilapratibandhahetau* is an unnatural *karmadhāraya*.

[5] The relevant 'one thing' in this context being existence: it cannot both be refuted (by recognition) as an inferential mark of momentariness and be positively concomitant with momentariness.

[6] 'A fire substance composed of many fire particles' translates *tejo'vayavī*. This is preferable to E_M's *tejasvī* ('fire'), not only because it is the reading of P and C, but arguably on grounds of sense too. If the subject of the inference were just 'fire,' it could be invalidated by being unestablished (rather than by its lack of pervasion): fire atoms are not produced.

blocks the establishing of the property-to-be-proved, not the fact that it is contradicted by perception.[7]

1.1.2 [Recognition can potentially have an impact, but is in fact otherwise explainable]

Alternatively, what need to insist on this?

> Refutation through direct perception is possible in such inferences as this one of the coldness of fire, because there is clearly (*hi*) no other way of explaining the [direct perception of fire as hot — except by accepting that fire is not cold].
> But in this case [of the inference of momentariness from existence] it cannot work in that way [i.e. refutation through direct perception is not possible — because recognition can be explained in a way that does not require non-momentary entities].

For even if one accepts our momentariness theory, recognition is explainable as [carried out] by those whose minds are deceived by the rise of a mass of similar later and later moments.[8]
And things being thus —

1.1.2.1 [The uselessness of recognition]

> If the pervasion is loose, what is established by recognition?

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[7] The way to invalidate the claim that 'a mass of fire is cold because it has been produced' is not by putting one's hand in and feeling heat, but by showing that being produced and being cold are not concomitant. The implication is that to disprove momentariness it's not sufficient/appropriate to have a direct perception (specifically, recognition) of a non-momentary entity: existence and momentariness must be shown to lack concomitance.

Cf. from the *Īśvarasiddhi* section of the *Nyāyamañjarī* (Kataoka 2005: 90,5–7): *agnyanuṣṇatānumāne hi na vyāptigrahaṇapratīghātād aprāmāṇyam, api tu pratyakṣavirodhād ity uktam etat*; 'Indeed in the inference of the coldness of fire, invalidity does not result from any obstruction to the grasping of the pervasion, but rather from contradiction by direct perception; we have stated that above' (Vol. 1, p. 291,9). There Jayanta diagnoses the very same inference differently, claiming that what invalidates the inference is that it is contradicted by direct experience. Here he says that that is not relevant — that all that is relevant is whether or not the pervasion is tight. The explanation of this difference is that there he is writing as the *siddhāntin*, here as a Buddhist.

[8] I am accepting P's *sadṛśa-aparāpara* against *sadṛśa-parāpara* of the other witnesses, despite the non-occurrence in the *Nyāyamañjarī* of other instances of *aparāpara*, as it makes good sense here.

And if the pervasion is not loose, what is established by recognition?[9]

1.1.2.2 [Mutual dependence]

And [you can]not [claim] that it is recognition that is the cause of the disruption of the pervasion,[10] because that would entail the fault of mutual dependence. Only if the inference is defeated through its pervasion being disrupted can recognition become a means of knowledge. And only if recognition has become a means of knowledge (i.e. can indeed prove non-momentariness) can the inference be invalidated due to its lack of pervasion.

[Naiyāyika:] The same fault applies also to the validity of the inference.[11]

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[9] Two possible interpretations suggest themselves. (1) Whether or not the pervasion is firm, recognition is irrelevant either way, because it is otherwise explainable and thus not a means of knowledge. This seems to be the view of the editor of the Mysore edition who comments here: *pakṣadvaye 'pi pratyabhijñāyā apramāṇatvāt*. (2) The reason for the claim in the first half of the verse — that recognition is of no use even if the pervasion is not firm — is not that recognition has been disqualified as a means of knowledge, but that its job of disproving momentariness has already been done. Momentariness has become unestablished without its help.

Note that the syntax of the two half-verses could be interpreted differently, with the break coming after *siddham*, not after *vyāptiśaithilyam*: 'If the pervasion is established to be loose, what use is recognition? And if the pervasion is not established to be loose, what use is recognition?' Indeed, the scribe of S inserts a single *daṇḍa* — which he uses sometimes as a comma and sometimes as marking the end of a sentence — after *siddham* in the second line.

[10] E$_M$'s *na cettham* could be the result of a transmitter thinking that Jayanta was here continuing in verse: the addition of *ittham* produces a *śloka*.

[11] Mutual dependence has just been used by the Buddhist to undermine the validity of recognition; but it can also be used to undermine the validity of the inference. If mutual dependence entails that the validity of recognition requires the invalidity of the inference, does it not also entail that the validity of the inference requires the invalidity of recognition? If so, then the validity of the inference can never be established, because it first requires the invalidity of recognition, but that can only be demonstrated after the inference has been established to be valid.

The Buddhist elaborated the mutual dependence as follows: (1) Recognition is valid only if the inference is invalid. (2) The inference is invalid only if recognition is valid. Therefore, recognition alone cannot establish anything. The opponent here implies rather: (1) The inference is valid only if recognition is invalid. (2) Recognition is invalid only if the inference is valid. Therefore, the inference alone cannot establish anything.

[Buddhist:] No, because the validity of the [inference] is proved from the strength of its firm connection [i.e. that between reason-property and property-to-be-proved] alone. For its validity is not based on the weakness of recognition.[12]

1.2 [What is recognition?]

Moreover, could you please skilfully analyze what precisely this so-called recognition is? Is 'this is that very pillar' one cognition or is it two: memory and experience?

1.2.1 [It is two cognitions each with a distinct cause]

If it is one, you should state its cause — that from which it arises. It cannot be the sense-faculty, because that is powerless with regard to the 'that' part of the cognition. It cannot be a memory trace (*saṃskāra*), because that, for its part, lacks competence to produce the 'this' part.

> And the cognition cannot be produced from both [sense-faculty and trace] together, for their ability [to produce things] is known to stretch only as far as their own respective effects separately.[13]

To state it more succinctly: The Buddhist claims that recognition cannot invalidate the inference because it depends for its own validity on the inference being invalid. The opponent claims that the inference cannot invalidate recognition because it depends for its own validity on recognition being invalid.

[12] The Buddhist thinks that the Naiyāyika is subject to the fault of mutual dependence, but that he himself is not. How so? Because he thinks (1) that recognition cannot invalidate the inference because recognition depends for its own validity on the inference being invalid, but (2) that the inference *can* invalidate recognition, because it does not depend for its own validity on recognition being invalid. The inference enjoys independent validity; recognition does not.

Usually direct perception is stronger than inference. Here the reversal of order is due to the recognition of persistence being explainable other than by the actual persistence of things.

[13] A sense-faculty can produce an experience, a trace can produce a memory, but there is no evidence that the two could co-operate to produce a result that is half-memory and half-experience. As he says below, clay and threads do not together produce a pot-cloth.

All witnesses except S read *nirjñātam.* Since *nirjñā* is not attested in our dictionaries, perhaps S's *nirjātam* is preferable. But (1) an e-text search reveals that *nirjñā* and its derivatives occur commonly (in both the *Nyāyamañjarī* and elsewhere); (2) if *nirjātam* is original, the occurrences of *nirjñātam* are hard to explain; (3) given the relationship between P and S, the readings of the former should generally be given preference over the readings of the latter.

A trace can produce only memory, and a sense-faculty can produce only experience. [You Naiyāyika may say that a trace and a sense-faculty together produce recognition,] but one effect cannot arise from the two taken together.[14] For we don't find a single effect in the form of a 'pot-cloth' produced from a lump of clay and threads. And a sense-faculty [alone] is not capable of this kind of effect.

> It is a complete wonder how a sense-faculty, which is incapable of deliberation [since] it grasps merely the form as presented, could produce recognition.[15]

[14] The editor of E$_M$ comments: *smṛtitvānubhavatvayoḥ kadāpi sāmānādhikaraṇyāsambhavāt*, 'because "being a memory" and "being an experience" can never occur in the same thing.'

[15] It is striking that having been through the three options for the cause of recognition — sense-faculty, trace, and both taken together — he returns again to the sense-faculty but not to the trace. Perhaps this is because Jayanta's own position emphasizes the role of the sense-faculty more than the trace in that for him recognition is a kind of *pratyakṣa*.

Most witnesses (including P) read *grāhy avicārakam*; E$_M$ reads *grāhyaviṣayakam*. Weighing in favour of the former are (1) the fact that the latter is unmetrical (neither edition spotted that this is a verse), (2) the fact that the former is supported by *Granthibhaṅga*'s lemma — *avicārakam iti* — and (3) the weak contribution of *viṣayaka* to the meaning of the compound: 'whose object is what is perceived, namely, merely the form as presented.' E$_M$'s reading may have arisen from understanding the transmitted reading as *grāhya-vicārakam* and finding no pertinent meaning for *vicārakam*.

Cakradhara comments on the word *avicārakam*: *arthasannidhimātreṇa jñānasyotpatter avicārakatvam. tad uktam* "*sannihitaviṣayabalotpatter avicārakatvam*" *iti*. '[Perceptual] cognition is incapable of deliberation because it arises as a result of the mere presence of the object. Thus [Dharmakīrti] has said: "[Perceptual cognition] is incapable of deliberation because it arises [merely] as a result of the present object".'

The quotation is (with a change of *avicārakatvāt* to *avicārakatvam*) *Pramāṇaviniścaya ad* 1:8, p. 10,7–8: *na hīdam iyato vyāpārān kartuṃ samartham, sannihitaviṣayabalenotpatter avicārakatvāt. vicārakatve cendriyamanovijñānayor abhedaprasaṅgāt*. 'For this [perceptual cognition] cannot perform these activities, because — since it arises [merely] as a result of the present object — it is incapable of deliberation. And because if it were capable of deliberation there would be the unwanted consequence that perceptual and mental cognition would not be different.' Steinkellner's (2007) edition mentions this *Granthibhaṅga* citation, as well as the following: *Bhāmatī* p. 852,10–11 (1917 Bombay edition, Nirnaya Sagar Press), *Mataṅgavṛtti, vidyāpāda* p. 159,7–8, *Ślokavārttikaṭīkā* (= *Kāśikā*) Vol. 1, p. 240,26–241,5 (Trivandrum edition), *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* p. 111,6 (Thakur 1996 edition). Additional citations are: *Siddhiviniścayavṛtti ad* 3:8, Vol. 1, p. 187,13, *Nyāyakumudacandra* Vol. 2, p. 427,2–3, *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* Vol. 2, p. 37,4, *Pramāṇamīmāṃsāvṛtti ad* 1.2.5, p. 36,26 (thanks to Elliot Stern for the former and Harunaga Isaacson for the latter three).

Therefore this is two cognitions: memory is indicated by 'that,' and experience is indicated by 'this.'

1.2.1.1 [The two cognitions have distinct objects]

The content of the memory is the remembered object; the content of the perception is the perceived object. We observe no further cognition that apprehends the unity of those [two objects]. Just as the cognition of a pot and the memory of a cloth that arise in immediate succession do not have the same object, so these two (the memory and the perception involved in 'this is that X') should be viewed in the same way.[16]

1.2.2 [Even if it is one cognition, it does not refute momentariness]

Alternatively, let us allow that this is just a single cognition. Nevertheless, what kind of object it is in contact with must be examined.

Jayanta may have had Dharmakīrti's words in mind when he wrote *yathā-sannihitākāramātragrāhy avicārakam*; if so, then he very likely intended the first adjective as a *hetau viśeṣaṇam* explaining why the sense-faculty is *avicāraka*.

The words that Cakradhara uses before giving the Dharmakīrti citation — *arthasannidhimātreṇa jñānasyotpatter avicārakatvam* — occur also in a footnote in the KSTS edition of the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* (n. 47, p. 37). Ratié (2018) has shown that although these notes have mistakenly been taken to be comments of the editor, most or very probably all of them are in fact transcriptions of marginal annotations in manuscripts of the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī*. It seems then that the author of this particular marginal annotation was citing the *Granthibhaṅga* (unless Cakradhara was citing — without giving any indications that it was a citation — the source of the marginal annotation).

[16] In the previous section two claims were made about recognition: it consists of two cognitions; they have distinct causes. Here we add the third claim that they have different objects. This still leaves unexplained exactly how one gets from these two cognitions to the mental formulation 'this is that pillar' (*sa evāyaṃ stambhaḥ*). After all, in the sequence of cognitions the perception (denoted by *ayam*) precedes the memory (denoted by *sa*), but in the mental formulation of the cognition, at least as expressed in Sanskrit, the order is reversed with *sa* preceding *ayam*. Doesn't this imply that after the perception yields the *ayam*, and the memory then yields the *sa*, we need a third cognitional process whereby the mental sentence *sa evāyam*, 'this is that,' is arranged?

Nor is the motive for the 'two-cognitions' view clear. For the Buddhist can just say that recognition, though one cognition, is conceptual (*vikalpaka*), thus denying it any validity. That is indeed the line taken by Dharmakīrti in the *pratyakṣa* chapter of *Pramāṇavārttika*, 502cd ff.

That it is two cognitions was asserted by Prajñākaragupta (*tasmāt sa evāyam iti pratyayadvayam* [em.; *pratyadvayam* ed.] *evaitat, Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra*, p. 22,4)

If it is linked to past time, it is not different from memory.[17]
If it is qualified by the future, then it is more or less intention.[18]
If it is based solely on the present, then persistence is well established![19]
But if it is connected with all three times, it is impossible because of being self-contradictory:[20] things (such as the present and the past) whose own natures are separated through mutual discarding (*parasparaparityāgavyavasthita-*)[21] can in no way enter into one thing.

For just as

and Ratnakīrti (*idam ekam eva na bhavati, kāraṇabhedāt, viṣayabhedāt, svabhāva-virodhāc ca, Ratnakīrtinibandhāvali,* p. 113,14, *Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa*).

[17] If recognition grasped an object that existed in the past, it would be a case of memory, which involves two difficulties: it would no longer be a separate cognition, and it would not be a case of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) so would not be a means of knowledge.

[18] The Naiyāyika would not maintain that recognition is based in any way on the future; it is included here for the sake of completing the conceptual possibilities.

Cakradhara comments: *saṅkalpasyānāgataviṣayatvena darśanāt tatprāyatā.* 'It would be "more or less intention" insofar as intention is seen to have as its object the future.'

[19] This is sarcastic, the point being that a cognition based only on the present could hardly prove the enduring existence of things before and after the present!

Cakradhara comments: *etad* [em. Shah; *eted* ms.] *eva kṣaṇikatvaṃ yataḥ.* 'Because momentariness is precisely this [i.e. having as object something that only exists in the present, *vartamānaikaniṣṭhatvam*].'

[20] For each of these last four half-verses, all consisting of an 'if' clause followed by a main clause, there is the question of whether the subject of the 'if' clauses is the cognition or the object. In favour of the former is that then the subject of the 'if' clauses is the same as the subject of the main clauses. In favour of the latter is that the question to which these sentences respond concerns the object: *kīdṛśaṃ vastu?*

The matter is clarified by a reference of Jayanta's back to this passage in § 1.2.2.2 (*vartamānaikaniṣṭhatāyāḥ pradarśitatvāt*); it is evident from there that Jayanta intends the subject of *vartamānaikaniṣṭhaṃ* in the third of these four half-verses to be the cognition; and thus very likely that he took the subject of all four 'if' clauses to be the cognition.

The problem that then a question about the object seems to be answered by talk of the cognition can be answered as follows. For a cognition to be 'linked to past time' (first half-verse) means to have *as its object* the past / a past object; to be 'qualified by the future' (second half-verse) means to have as its object the future / a future object, etc.

[21] I.e. if something is past you can discard the possibility that it is present and vice versa.

> A cognition of blue, [by] removing red, etc. which are invariably concomitant with the absence of blue, determines [only] blue.[22]

So, in this case too

> A cognition of an object in the present, [by] removing past time and [future] time which are concomitant with the absence of the present, comes to grasp [only] the object in the present.[23]

1.2.2.1 [Recognition does not grasp an object qualified by a previous cognition]

In this way[24] the claim that recognition grasps an object that is

Jayanta takes the phrase *parasparaparihārasthita-*, which occurs commonly in the works of Dharmakīrti and his followers, and adjusts it in order to produce a metrically required heavy sixth syllable. For examples of the phrase in the works of Dharmakīrti, see *Vādanyāya* p. 15,7 and *Nyāyabindu* 3:75. Jayanta himself uses *parasparaparihāra* (not … *parityāga*) at least five times in the *Nyāyamañjarī.*

[22] The speaker here draws on the distinctively Buddhist *apoha* theory.

Cakradhara comments: *nīlaparicchedakaṃ hi pramāṇaṃ tadviruddhasya nīlābhā-vasyeva tadavinābhūtānāṃ pītādīnām api vyavacchedaṃ karoty eva.* 'For a means of knowledge that distinguishes blue certainly excludes not only absence of blue, which is opposed to the [blue], but also yellow and the like that are invariably concomitant with that [absence of blue].' Cakradhara wants to justify / underline Jayanta's claim that a cognition of blue excludes not only absence of blue, but also colours that are invariably concomitant with absence of blue. The reason may be that in the comparison that follows this, the analogues of colours such as red and yellow are the past and future; and there we want the past and future to be explicitly excluded.

[23] The editor of E*M* glosses *tadgrāhitām* as *sthiratvaviṣayakatvam.* That is very puzzling; *tat* in *tadgrāhitām* must certainly mean *vartamānārtha*. (I wonder if he rather meant to write *asthiratvaviṣayakatvam* or *kṣaṇikatvaviṣayakatvam.*)

The two verses, joined as relative and co-relative, continue the point immediately preceding them that a cognition can determine only something that is either past, present or future, not something that is more than one of those — since the three have mutually incompatible natures.

Below he refers back to the second verse in a way that indicates that he is talking here specifically of recognition (even though the word used in the verse is just 'cognition,' *jñāna*). Why does he feel entitled here to speak of recognition as 'a cognition of an object in the present' and to assert that it 'grasps only the object in the present'? Because out of the four options he has been through — of being connected with past, future, present, or all three — it is only the third one that does not lead to an untenable consequence. The only problem with the third one was that it meant recognition could not prove persistence, which is of course not a problem for the Buddhist.

[24] Namely, through the consideration that recognition, if it were one cognition, would grasp an object that exists only in the present.

qualified by a previous cognition[25] is countered. For a previous cognition cannot be a qualifier now, since it does not exist now. And because there can be no cognition of something qualified which does not grasp the qualifier.[26]

1.2.2.2 [Recognition does not grasp an essence devoid of coming into being and passing away]

If you say that recognition grasps the essence of a thing which is devoid of coming into being and passing away, that too is incor-

[25] This is a Nyāya position: the second of two that Jayanta puts forward in the *siddhānta* section.

[26] Are these two reasons supposed to be combined as two parts of one argument, or to form two independent arguments? It is difficult to combine them. The first (1) claims that a past cognition *cannot be a qualifier* of the present object. The second (2) claims that *if it were a qualifier* it would have to be perceived. Since 2 envisages something that is claimed to be impossible in 1, it looks like we have two independent arguments.

The best way to envisage their relationship is to see them as tackling two different parts of the compound *pūrvajñānaviśiṣṭārthagrāhitvam*. 1 counters the idea that something can be *pūrvajñānaviśiṣṭa*, qualified by a previous cognition; 2 counters the idea that one could grasp such a thing, *viśiṣṭārthagrāhitvam*.

1 is complete in itself — i.e. sufficient alone to counter the Nyāya position. 2 — that there can be no cognition of something qualified which does not grasp the qualifier — is not complete and sufficient; in fact, it is a Naiyāyika principle. A commonly given illustrative example is: one cannot grasp that someone is a 'person with a stick' (*daṇḍin*) without grasping the stick (*daṇḍa*). To make this into a complete argument against the Nyāya position we have to add: The qualifier is not / cannot be grasped in this case. The justification for this can be provided by 1: because it does not exist now. To that extent the two are not totally independent.

Given that Naiyāyikas assert the principle that the Buddhist here uses — that a cognition of something qualified must grasp the qualifier —, and given that they will have to accept that the qualifier here, the past cognition, no longer exists, how can they respond? One possibility would be to say that the object is qualified not by a previous cognition, but by the condition of having been perceived earlier, *pūrvajñātatva*. Jayanta does not in fact take this option, perhaps because such an idea is hard to unpack without a Mīmāṃsaka ontology, according to which the manifestation of an object is a property of the object. For Jayanta's actual response to this objection, see the end of § 2.4 below.

The Naiyāyika principle is the subject of a useful footnote in Kajiyama (1998: 49, n. 106), in which he lists a number of occurrences of it (in the *Ślokavārttika* and its commentaries, *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa*, *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa* and *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*, to which could be added many occasions in the *Nyāya-mañjarī*). But he mistranslates the occurrence of it in the text he is translating, the *Tarkabhāṣā*. He renders *nāgṛhītaviśeṣaṇabuddhir viśeṣye vartate* as 'cognition the

rect, because we have shown that [recognition] is based only on the present.[27] And the time of the passing away and coming into being of things must be the present or a time other than that. A time other than that, firstly, could not be grasped, as we have said.[28] But if the time of the passing away and coming into being of things is said to be the present, then from perceiving the [pre-

qualifier of which is not cognized does not occur in [an object, which is] the qualificand.' But we want the qualifer to be not of the cognition, but rather of the qualificand, i.e. the qualified object. So I see *agṛhītaviśeṣaṇa* not as a genitive *bahuvrīhi*, but as an instrumental *bahuvrīhi* (and I understand the locative differently): 'A cognition that does not grasp the qualifier does not occur with regard to the qualified object,' i.e. cannot grasp the qualified object.

[27] Where and how has he shown that recognition is based only on the present? The only thing he could be referring to is the two verses joined as relative and co-relative, and the four options he went through before that — of being connected with past, future, present, or all three* — of which it is only the third one that does not lead to an untenable consequence (§ 1.2.2). (See final paragraph of n. 23.)

All of these four choices however fall within the Buddhist's second line of defence. His final view of recognition was that it is not a separate cognition from the memory and the perception. He then treated it as a separate single cognition only for the sake of the argument, in order to show the unwanted consequences that follow from that. His comment here, that it is based only on the present, still falls within his second line of defence. It should be understood as: 'if recognition were one cognition — which it would be if it grasped an essence devoid of arising and passing away — then it would be based only on the present.' This in itself does not refute that it grasps a non-arising, non-decaying essence: this in conjunction with what comes next accomplishes that. This in itself *does* show however that this view of recognition could not prove non-momentariness.

* Cakradhara sees it this way: *atītaviṣayatve smṛtitulyatā, anāgataviṣayatve saṅkalpaprāyatetyādi vadadbhir vartamānaikaniṣṭhatā pradarśitā* (*Granthibhaṅga*, p. 191): '[Jayanta / We Buddhists] revealed that [recognition] is based only on the present when he / we made such claims as that if its object were in the past it would be the same as memory, and that if its object were in the future it would more or less be intention.'

Kher (1992: 189) gives an implausible gloss of this sentence: 'If Recognition is held to apprehend the being of an object without any relation either to origin or destruction, that, too, is not justified because this admits its association with the present only.' She seems to be either ignoring the *pradarśitatvāt* or interpreting it strangely.

[28] Where? He refers again to the point in § 1.2.2 that recognition, if it is a single cognition, must be based solely on the present (*vartamānaikaniṣṭha*), which he regards as established by the fact that of the four possibilities he gave there, only the third was tenable. Why is it a problem if a time other than the present could not be grasped? We have to supply two things: (1) If the time could not be grasped, neither could coming into being or passing away. (2) That coming into being and passing away are never grasped is contrary to our experience.

sent], the coming into being and passing away of things too, being concomitant with it, would also be perceived.[29]

> This wretched recognition, having come to prove that things endure, will leave having established that they are destroyed![30]

1.3 [Recognition results from the similarity of two things, not from the persistent existence of one thing]

Moreover, recognition, being seen to be based just on similarity in the case of hair, nails and such like that have been cut off and

[29] And thus we would have two problems. Recognition would not be grasping an essence devoid of coming into being and passing away. And even more seriously, we have arrived precisely at the Buddhist theory of momentariness!

The Buddhist traps the Naiyāyika by presenting him with the binary choice: either coming into being and passing away occur outside of the present, in which case we would never perceive them; or they occur in the present, in which case we would always perceive them.

The Naiyāyika might respond that the creation and destruction of the pot in front of me, say, take place outside of the present, but when the creation took place in the past, it was present, and when the destruction will take place in the future, it will be present. From the fact that these two take place outside of the current present moment, it does not follow that they could never take place in any present moment, and hence that I could never perceive them.

And he might challenge the presupposition involved in the second horn of the dilemma, that if creation and destruction occur in the present, they are concomitant (*avinābhūta*) with the present, and so must occur in every single present moment.

The suggestions put forward in the last two paragraphs of the text — that recognition perceives an object qualified by a previous cognition, and that it perceives the essence of a thing devoid of arising and passing away — should be taken to be structurally on the same level as the four temporal possibilities for an object of recognition. They are still within the context of the Buddhist's treatment of recognition as a separate and unitary cognition, for the sake of the argument only. Three of the four temporal possibilities along with these two suggestions are untenable for the Buddhist.

[30] Jayanta allows his Buddhist a rhetorical put-down, here personifying recognition as an incompetent who departs forlorn, having achieved the precise opposite of her mission.

Chakrabarti (2012: 203) summarizes this verse: 'Thus, recognition seems to behave like a strange nomadic nun who had come with the promise to prove the permanence of things, but goes away proving their impermanence and momentariness.' But *tapasvin* is such a common adjective in the meaning of 'miserable, wretched, distressed,' that it is perhaps unlikely that *tapasvinī* here denotes a nun.

Shukla comments on the verse: *amum artham evāha śāstradīpikākāraḥ — vivādādhyāsitā bhāvāḥ sattvāt kṣaṇavināśinaḥ | dīpavat pratyabhijñāpi syāt pradīpavad*

regrown [i.e. being seen not to prove persistence there],[31] should in exactly the same way not be able to prove persistence in the case of pillars etc. either.[32]

eva naḥ || ity anena. 'The author of the *Śāstradīpikā* makes the very same point in the following [verse]: * "Entities, which are the topic of dispute, perish in every moment like flames, because they exist. [Thus] for us recognition [of entities] too can / should be considered to be just like [recognition of] flames".' It is overstating it to say that Pārthasārathi here makes 'the very same point.' He makes the point that recognition of things like pillars can / should be explained as exactly parallel to recognition of flames, i.e. as falsely grasping a plurality of similar things as one thing. Jayanta's Buddhist's verse differs in the following ways. (1) It makes a stronger point. It is not just that recognition can / should be explained as resembling recognition of flames in having a plurality of objects, but that anyone who claims that recognition is one cognition, not two, will be led unavoidably to the conclusion of the momentariness of everything that exists. (2) In Jayanta's verse the momentariness of all entities is the unavoidable end point to which one is led. In Pārthasārathi's verse it is the starting point, already established by the argument from existence. From that it follows that recognition can take place with regard to a plurality of momentary objects. (3) The way in which one is forced, in Jayanta, from the postulation of recognition as a single cognition to universal momentariness is particular to Jayanta and has no parallel in Pārthasārathi. It involves, first, argumentation to the effect that the object of recognition, if it were a single cognition, would exist only in the present (and hence contain only qualifiers that are also restricted to the present); and, second, a consideration of the view that this object of recognition is an essence that exists in the present but is devoid of coming into being or passing away. This consideration involves realizing that something's coming into being or passing away must occur in the present or outside of the present. The latter is impossible for the reasons given, so we are forced into the view that a thing's coming into being and passing away are concomitant with the present. While one might be able to pick holes in the argumentation, it is clear that this argumentation, completely absent in Pārthasārathi, is what prompts Jayanta to characterize recognition as an incompetent that establishes universal momentariness.

* The verse occurs at p. 144,13–14 of the Krishnadas Sanskrit Series edition; p. 577,9–10 of the Kāśī, Vidyāvilāsa Press edition; and p. 414,13–14 of the 1913 Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series edition.

[31] The example occurs commonly in refutations of recognition. See for example *Pramāṇavārttika, pratyakṣa* chapter 503cd; *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* p. 144,3; *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvali* p. 75,20–21 (*Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ Anvayātmikā*), p. 90,14–15 (*Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ Vyatirekātmikā*), p. 116,28 (*Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇam*); and *Tarkabhāṣā* p. 36,7.

[32] There are uncontroversial cases of recognition occurring as a result of the similarity, rather than the numerical identity and unchanging nature, of the two things that are recognized as identical — for example someone's hair or nails and the 'same' hair or nails later after they have been cut and grown back to the same length. Thus all recognition should be able to prove is the similarity of the two things that recognition brings together, not their identity and persistence.

[Naiyāyika:] In those [cases of hair and nails, it does not refute persistence] because a refuter applies.[33]

[Buddhist:] A refuter[34] has already been stated[35] in this case [of pillars etc.] too, namely the impossibility of entry into a single thing by the past etc. (i.e. by more than one of the three times) which are mutually contradictory.[36]

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[33] The refuter is specified below in § 2.5 as the seeing of the shaven head in the period between the two sightings of the hair. And by extrapolation: the seeing of the nails at a shorter length in the intervening period.

[34] It is odd that *bādhakaḥ* is in the masculine here. The word does occur in the next sentence in apposition with the masculine noun *pratyaya*, but that does not explain its gender here, because in that sentence the *bādhaka* referred to is recognition, as a refuter of momentariness, whereas here the *bādhaka* is a refuter of recognition's ability to refute momentariness. Neither could the masculine gender be explained as reflecting the gender of *samāveśa* because it is not 'entry' which is the refuter here but rather the impossibility of entry. Perhaps Jayanta is understanding the masculine noun *hetuḥ*?

[35] In the following sentence (§ 1.2.2) and the two verses that followed it: 'But if it is connected with all three times, it is impossible because of being self-contradictory: things (such as the present and the past) whose own natures are separated through mutual discarding can in no way enter into one thing.'

[36] This mutual incompatibility of past and present can be interpreted in two different ways. (1) One thing cannot previously have been past and now be present. This is a strong claim and less plausible than the following weaker claim: (2) One thing cannot presently be qualified by both past and present, i.e. presently be both past and present. When this principle was appealed to above (§ 1.2.2) it was easy to interpret it in the more plausible, second way. The question there amounted to: what *is* the temporal location of the object of recognition (if the latter is one cognition): it cannot be both past and present because of this principle of mutual incompatibility.

But how about here? Here the principle is being used to rule out the possibility that a recognized pillar could be numerically identical with a previously experienced pillar. It is certainly capable of doing that if interpreted in the first way. The problem with this is that it can either be dismissed as being implausibly strong, or, if its plausibility is said to derive from the theory of momentariness, it is circular, i.e. it helps itself prematurely to the conclusion that is being aimed at. It is not incumbent on the Naiyāyika to accept this conclusion at this point and the Buddhist would not want to be assuming it here.

So let's assume that the Buddhist here intends it in the second, weaker sense. Perhaps it can still achieve its purpose in the following way. Recognition cannot establish that the current pillar is numerically identical to a previously experienced pillar, because to do that it would have to, in the present, perceive that this pillar is also qualified by the past. But it cannot do that, because by the weaker interpretation of the incompatibility principle, there is nothing that is simultaneously qualified by, i.e. connected with, past and present.

Therefore the momentariness of things is established based on inference, because there is no refuter of it in the form of the recognition-cognition.[37]

[…]

2 [Does recognition refute momentariness? Siddhānta section]

Moreover recognition, having, like the thousand rays of the sun,[38] dispelled the long dark night that is the Buddhist *siddhānta* through the glory of its own lustre, unceasingly reveals a whole host of entities to be absolutely permanent, and shines brilliantly

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[37] The Buddhist strategies against the feasibility of this refutation-by-recognition are, as we have seen:

1.1 Recognition can have no impact on the inference while the pervasion is firm.

1.2 It can be explained other than by the persistence of things, since people's minds can be deceived by the similarity of moments.

2.1 Recognition is two cognitions, perception and memory; it is not a single cognition separate from them.

2.2 If it were, it would only perceive the present, during which time a thing's destruction takes place, so it would actually prove momentariness.

3 We can see from the example of hair and nails that all recognition can prove is similarity.

This ends the Buddhist's defence of the inferential proof of momentariness, which has consisted of two parts: (1) An articulation and elaboration of the inference of momentariness from existence. (2) What has been translated so far in this article: A response to the objection that recognition can refute the inference. What comes next is a slightly different Buddhist position: that momentariness can be established even without inference — through direct perception. That is why this section ends with the words *tasmāt … siddham* ānumānikaṃ *bhāvānāṃ kṣaṇikatvam,* 'the momentariness of things, *based on inference,* is established.' The next sentence of the text reads: *apare punaḥ pratyakṣagamyam eva kṣaṇikatvam ācakṣate*; 'Now other [Buddhists] claim that momentariness can actually be known through direct perception'. When that section has been completed (p. 317,2), the Buddhist *pūrvapakṣa,* consisting of these three sections, ends, and the Naiyāyika *siddhānta* begins. It consists of three corresponding sections: (1) A refutation of the inference of the Buddhist inference of momentariness from existence (pp. 317,3–328,12); (2) An insistence that recognition can refute momentariness (pp. 328,13–336,8); (3) An insistence that momentariness cannot be established by direct perception (pp. 336,9–342,2.). We now skip to the second of these sections, to see Jayanta's responses to the points that the Buddhist has made in the passage translated above.

[38] E$_M$'s *dineśadīdhitidaśaśatavibhāgavatī* is inferior to P's *dineśadīdhitidaśaśatīva,* which gives us the simile we want.

in all directions.[39] So given its existence, who could claim that things are momentary?[40] And as for the abuse with which you maligned it above, that was all unbecoming!

2.1 [Is recognition one cognition or two?]

Regarding, first of all, the choice that you posed when you asked, 'Is "this is that thing" one cognition or two?' — our reply is as follows. How could one suspect that it is two, given that we are aware of it as a single cognition which, because of its identifying [of the 'this' and the 'that'] as co-referential, is directed towards the revealing of a single object? Obviously (*khalu*) what we experience is this single [cognition] that determines oneness [by informing us that] 'the "this" is the same as the "that," and the "that" is the same as the "this",' just like 'this is a pot' — not two cognitions having different objects, such as a cognition of a pot and a memory of a cloth arising in immediate succession.[41]

2.2 [What is the cause of recognition?]

Regarding [your question] 'What is the cause[42] of the rise of [recognition if it is] a single cognition?' [we reply]:

> Should an effect be known, what is the point of questioning its cause?
> Should an effect not be known, what is the point of questioning its cause?[43]

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[39] The editor of E*M* comments: *sūryālokarahitasamaye 'pi hi pratyabhijñā bhavati.* 'For recognition takes place even at times that lack light or sun (/ the light of the sun).' This doesn't seem to be a pertinent remark.

[40] E*M*'s reading is clearly inferior: there is no plausible referent of *tasya*.

[41] What we experience in recognition, namely 'this is that' is exactly parallel in structure to 'this is a pot' — not to the conjunction of 'this is a pot' and 'that was a cloth.'

E*M* here — *svatas tu yānekapratītir anubhūyate "ghaṭo 'yam" iti tan na nirantarotpannaghaṭajñānapaṭasmaraṇavad bhinnaviṣayaṃ buddhidvayam iti* — yields no coherent sense.

[42] E*M*'s *karaṇam* is an inferior reading to *kāraṇam*: (1) *kāraṇam* is the word used in this context throughout this passage, including in the verse that this sentence introduces; (2) it would be surprising to refer to a memory trace as a *karaṇam*; (3) *kāraṇam* provides the firm contrast with *kārya* that we need in the following.

[43] If an effect is observed, it makes no sense to question whether it has a cause or not. (It obviously must have.) If an effect is not observed, it makes no sense to question whether it has a cause or not.

And an effect cannot lack a cause, because [if it did] it would not be appropriate to even regard it as an effect. So there must be some cause of it. And indeed there does exist a cause of this cognition, namely a sense-faculty together with a memory trace (*saṃskāra*). And it is through observation[44] that we know these two to produce separate effects.[45] So in this case because [we observe that] these two things together operate for the sake of the rise of a single effect [i.e. recognition],[46] why do you not accept this [single effect] too? The reason that a single thing produced by both clay and threads, on the other hand, is not accepted is just that it is not observed. But this, since it is observed, is hard to deny![47]

The implication is that the Buddhist got things the wrong way round when he argued in § 1.2.1 that since we can come up with no satisfactory cause of recognition, it cannot exist — as a single cognition. The Naiyāyika rather starts from the fact that we experience it as a single cognition. If we thus experience a single effect, it is senseless to claim that it lacks a possible cause. That *something* is its cause is undeniable.

The editor of E$_M$ comments: *ucyatāṃ yatkiñcit kāraṇam, avaśyakatvāt*. It would be better if he had written *kiñcit kāraṇam* for *yatkiñcit kāraṇam*.

[44] The editor of E$_M$ takes this 'observation' to refer to experiences of positive and negative concomitance (*anvayavyatirekānubhavau*).

[45] The means by which we come to know that a sense-faculty produces sense-perception, and a memory trace produces memory, is that we observe these two effects to take place when their respective causes are active. Hence — he will now argue — the fact that we observe recognition to take place when sense-faculty and memory trace are active should be trusted to yield knowledge that these two are its cause.

E$_M$ marks the sentence break before *kāryatā* and has *pṛthak* as the final word of the previous sentence. Then the text would mean: 'And [recognition's] being an effect is known precisely from the observation of those two.' But its being an effect is not what we want being discussed here; the topic at hand, as announced by Jayanta at the beginning of this section, is what its cause is. The punctuation disguises Jayanta's intended meaning and implies a problematic one.

[46] The sense-faculty yielding the 'this' and the memory trace yielding the 'that.'

[47] It is worth pointing out that for Jayanta and other Naiyāyikas, though recognition is caused by a sense-faculty and trace, it is not both memory and experience (*smṛtyanubhavarūpa*). That would contradict the Nyāya tenet that one thing cannot have two universals (in this case *smṛtitva* and *anubhavatva*) inhering in it — at least not two universals at the same level: one thing can have, say, *ghaṭatva* and *dravyatva*, but not *ghaṭatva* and *paṭatva*. Indeed much of Śrī Harṣa's critique of Nyāya's conception of recognition consists in arguing that the Naiyāyikas' own views make recognition appear to be *smṛtyanubhavarūpa*, which goes against Nyāya principles (see Granoff 1978: 12–24). That Jayanta wants to avoid any implication that recognition is *smṛtyanubhavarūpa* may possibly be the

And just because we sometimes find an effect [namely perception] to arise from the action of the sense-faculty alone, it does not follow that the [sense-faculty] always produces its effects when it is in that condition [i.e. alone], because the production of other kinds of effect [takes place] in dependence on auxiliaries [in this case the memory trace].[48]

explanation for why he phrases things here differently from how they were phrased when the pot-cloth argument was put forward by the Buddhist in the *pūrvapakṣa* section.

There the Buddhist said *na hi mṛtpiṇḍatantunirvartyam ekaṃ ghaṭapaṭarūpaṃ kāryam upalabdham.* Thus one might have expected Jayanta the *siddhāntin* to include the phrase *ghaṭapaṭarūpam* here too, writing something like *ghaṭapaṭa-rūpaṃ mṛttantukāryaṃ tv ekam adarśanād eva nābhyupagatam. idaṃ tu dṛṣṭatvād durapalapam.* The omission of *ghaṭapaṭarūpam* may be intentional and significant. For if the argument were expressed here as 'The reason we don't accept a single effect produced by clay and threads, of the nature of both pot and cloth, is just that it is not seen; but recognition, since it is seen, is hard to deny,' then we might assume that just as the analogue of being produced by clay and threads — i.e. being produced by sense-faculty and trace — is to be accepted, so too the analogue of having the nature of both pot and cloth — i.e. having the nature of both memory and experience — is to be accepted.

[48] Just because the sense-faculty sometimes produces an effect without assistance, it does not follow that it always produces effects of that kind without assistance, because the cooperation of an auxiliary cause enables a different kind of effect. This answers the point that the Buddhist made in § 1.2.1: 'And the cognition cannot be produced from both [sense-faculty and trace] together, for their ability [to produce things] is known to stretch only as far as their own respective effects separately.' Jayanta here challenges this restriction of the ability of the sense-faculty to perception alone, by arguing that an auxiliary enables a different kind of effect.

E_M's readings mean something different: 'But because we sometimes do not find the effect [i.e. recognition] to occur, because only the sense-faculty is active [not a memory trace too], a thing of that kind [the sense-faculty alone] (*tathā-vidhasya*) does not always produce the effect, because the production of another effect [takes place] in dependence on an auxiliary [in this case the memory trace].'

The editor of E_M comments: *nanu tarhi indriyajanyaṃ sarvam api pratyabhijñā syād ity* [em.; *isy* ed.] *atrāha **kvacid ityādi**.* He sees this sentence as responding to the implied objection: 'In that case absolutely everything produced by the sense-faculty would be recognition.' The response is that the faculty will not produce recognition without the involvement of an auxiliary, namely a memory trace. What in the preceding sentences might imply that 'absolutely everything produced by the sense-faculty would be recognition'? Perhaps the contention that the main cause of recognition is the sense-faculty.

Varadacharya's interpretation is probably the best that could be done with the readings he found in his manuscripts. But there are problems with those

2.3 [What is the object of recognition?]

In response to the question posed, 'What kind of object appears in recognition?', we are extremely annoyed that these [Buddhist] disputants, despite having been given an answer one hundred times, ask us again and again. As [we] have said,[49] 'In this matter you should interrogate [i.e. investigate] your own valid cognitions, not other disputants.' The object that appears in recognition is qualified both by past time, and by the present time.

2.3.1 [How can mutually contradictory times qualify one thing?]

[Buddhist:] Earlier and later times, being mutually contradictory, cannot enter one thing. Therefore, as a result of their difference, the object itself is differentiated.

[Naiyāyika:] That is not the case, because even though [his] armlet, head-ornament, bracelet and earring are different, Devadatta is not differentiated.[50] An enquiry into whether wholes exist or do not exist [over and above parts] would move into another subject of debate. And in the chapter concerned with liberation [9th Āhnika], the existence of wholes will be established at great length.[51] So let us leave this topic aside for now.[52]

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readings. (1) They state an argument that seems muddled; the argument in P is completely clear. (2) E$_M$'s *api* is awkward. One could give sense to it as: '*in spite of* the action of the sense-faculty'. It is in spite of the action of the sense-faculty that recognition does not occur. But once we add 'alone' (*kevala*), the non-occurrence of recognition is exactly what one would expect, so a concessive *api* ('in spite of') is inappropriate. (3) It is hard to give sense to *antara* 'another' in *kāryāntara*. This is easy with P's readings: recognition as opposed to perception.

[49] See Vol. 1, p. 257,2 *vastupramitayaś caiva praṣṭavyā na tu vādinaḥ* and Vol. 2, p. 169,3–4 *pratītayaḥ praṣṭavyāḥ*.

[50] These different ornaments qualify different parts of his body, but we still think there is one Devadatta-whole containing all of these body parts.

[51] *Nyāyamañjarī* Vol. 2, pp. 515,5–518,11 = Kataoka (2018: 342[47]–334[55]). That section addresses arguments that have been articulated against the existence of wholes at Vol. 2, pp. 513,7–515,4 = Kataoka (2018: 348[41]–342[47]).

[52] If a whole exists over and above parts, it can contain parts that are qualified by mutually contradictory things, e.g. ornaments of different shapes, sizes and colours. So if the object of recognition is a whole that exists over and above its parts, then it can contain one part qualified by the past and one part qualified by the present.

Using the language of the Buddhist's verse above, we can say that earlier and later times, as a result of their difference, do differentiate the object, but only in

[Buddhist:] Because earrings and the other [ornaments that you mention] are not contradictory [they can all qualify one undifferentiated thing, but past and present are contradictory, so they cannot].[53]

[Naiyāyika:] No, because [you] accept contradiction on the basis of characteristics (*lākṣaṇikavirodha*).[54] For you who claim that 'all things have natures that are separated by mutual exclusion' (*parasparaparihāravyavasthitātmānaḥ*)[55] will certainly admit that these [earrings and the like] are contradictory.[56]

2.3.2 [How can the past appear in the present?]

[Buddhist:] Even if armlets and such like [ornaments] are contradictory, they exist at the same time, and so it could even be possi-

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the sense of subdividing it on the level of parts which can co-exist and belong to one whole.

The Buddhist of course denies that there is any such thing as a whole above parts — either any Devadatta above his body parts or any object of recognition containing temporal parts.

[53] The Buddhist here follows Jayanta's promptings not to get into the whole-parts issue, and formulates an objection that accepts, for the sake of the argument, that wholes do exist: a whole could be qualified by different ornaments but it could not be qualified by different times, as the latter are contradictory but the former are not.

[54] The term *lākṣaṇikavirodha* seems not to be used by Dharmakīrti, but Dharmottara, commenting on *Nyāyabindu* 3:72, *dvividho hi padārthānāṃ virodhaḥ*, writes *eko vāstavavirodhaḥ, dvitīyo lākṣaṇikavirodhaḥ*.

Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī* Vol. 2, pp. 321.11–14: *atha nāsty anayoḥ kiñcid viruddhatvaṃ svabhāvayoḥ | kathaṃ bauddhagṛhe jātas tvam evam abhibhāṣase || bhāvānāṃ parasparaparihāravyavasthitarūpatvād asty evaiṣāṃ lākṣaṇiko virodhaḥ*. 'If there is nothing contradictory about these two own natures, how is it that you, born in a Buddhist household, say this: "Because entities have natures that are differentiated by mutual exclusion, they contradict each other by means of their characteristics"?' Cf. also *Nyāyamañjarī* Vol. 1, p. 157,4: *etac ca lākṣaṇikaṃ virodham ācakṣāṇair bhavadbhir evopagatam.* 'And this is accepted by you who declare contradiction on the basis of characteristics!'

[55] Jayanta refers both to a claim of the Buddhist opponent in § 1.2.2 where he uses this terminology (see *parasparaparityāgavyavasthitanijātmanām*), and to claims made by Dharmakīrti and his followers: see, e.g., *Vādanyāya* p. 15,7 and *Nyāyabindu* 3:75.

[56] The Buddhist is trying to differentiate the two cases — ornaments on the one hand, and past and present on the other — in order to justify that co-existence is possible in the former case but impossible in the latter. Jayanta prevents this move by showing that Dharmakīrtian commitments should force the Buddhist to accept that the ornaments are also contradictory.

ble that they are all related to one Devadatta at that time.[57] But because past and present are not there at the same time,[58] how can things like pillars be qualified by both of them [at the same time]?[59]

[Naiyāyika:] [We] reply — The two times are cognized, and [yet] they are not both there — that would be really amazing![60]

[57] The Buddhist admits as a hypothetical possibility that different ornaments could qualify a single Devadatta — even though he would in the final analysis deny the existence of a single Devadatta — in order to contrast this with the case of different times qualifying a single object, which he does not even consider to be a hypothetical possibility. To that extent the Buddhist is not saying anything different from what he said in his last speech. The only difference is that there he was contrasting the two cases on the grounds that ornaments are not contradictory but past and future are, whereas here he is contrasting them on the grounds that ornaments, even if contradictory, can exist at the same time, whereas past and future cannot.

[58] The editor of E$_M$ attaches a note to this phrase (*bhūtavartmānayos tu yugapad asannidhānāt*): *yady api siddhānte yugapad sannidhānaṃ na; kintv ekavastuni. parantu kṣaṇikavādadadṛṣṭyāyam ākṣepaḥ.* 'Even if in the *siddhānta* [past and present] are not simultaneously there, but just there in the one object, nevertheless this objection is from the point of view of *kṣaṇikavāda*.' Varadacharya seems off the mark here. He thinks that in the *siddhānta* past and present are not simultaneously there. His view seems to be that in the *siddhānta* past and present both qualify the object, but not simultaneously. But (1) that is not the way the *siddhāntin* presents and defends the view below. (2) If that's the view, i.e. if the object was only qualified by the past in the past, and not now, how could that qualification be perceived now? (3) The Naiyāyika's response to this speech of the Buddhist clarifies that past and present *are* simultaneously there according to the Nyāya *siddhānta*. The import of the response is: given that we perceive both of them, how could they not be there (*sannihita*)? The sense in which they are *sannihita* is presumably that they are presently inhering in the object that is in connection with the sense-faculty.

Varadacharya's understanding comes from the fact that he regards the sentence following this one as not said by the Naiyāyika, but as a continuation of this speech of the Buddhist. For evidence against that, see n. 60.

[59] The direction of the Buddhist attack has shifted now. The fact that past and present are contradictory is no longer being put forward as an obstacle to their both qualifying one thing (since he admitted that contradictory ornaments could possibly qualify one thing); but rather the fact that they do not both exist at the same time. (Hence my insertion of a section break above this speech.)

[60] The Naiyāyika here takes it for granted that two times are cognized and uses that as evidence against the Buddhist claim that these two times are not simultaneously 'there' (*sannihita*). The Buddhist does not accept, of course, that two times are cognized, but the Naiyāyika feels able to assert it here, perhaps regarding it as having been sufficiently established in § 2.1 that recognition is experienced as a single cognition that identifies 'that,' i.e. a past object, with

[Buddhist:] Do you hold that the past, despite being past, continues to exist now?

[Naiyāyika:] No, we don't claim that it still exists now, rather that it did exist. If it were claimed to exist now, it would actually be present, not past.

[Buddhist:] Ah! In that case, the past, precisely because it is past, does not exist now; so how does it appear?

'this,' a present object. Or perhaps the Naiyāyika is just making a comment about the coherence of his own position: You Buddhists are claiming that our position is incoherent because the following two claims are incompatible — past and present are not simultaneously there and they both simultaneously qualify an object —; but we do not hold that past and present are not simultaneously there. We hold that both are cognized, so of course we hold that both are there.

E$_M$ punctuates after, not before, the *ucyate* that — on this interpretation — marks a speaker change, introducing this speech of the Naiyāyika. Punctuating after the *ucyate* is not impossible. The previous sentence would then mean: '… how can it be said that things like pillars are qualified by both of them [at the same time]?' Instead of waiting for the Naiyāyka to answer, the Buddhist would then continue: '[In your view] the two times are cognized, and [yet] they are not both there — that is really amazing! Or do you hold that the past, despite being past, continues to exist now?' So on that interpretation, the Buddhist would be speaking continuously from the beginning of this section, first making an assertion, followed by a question, then making another assertion, followed by another question.

But that we have a change of speaker introduced by *ucyate* is preferable for the following reasons. (1) If *ucyate* does not introduce a speaker change, then it is redundant. Jayanta could have conveyed the meaning of the previous sentence just as well without it. (2) We expect the Naiyāyika to reply to the question 'how can things like pillars be qualified by both?' Rather than question, statement, and another question all coming from the Buddhist, we expect the intervening statement to answer the first question and prompt the second. That is the pattern we have in the whole of the rest of this section: it consists of four other questions put by the Buddhist, each answered by the Naiyāyika. (3) Both P and S have a syntactic marker after *stambhādeḥ*, indicating that they took *ucyate* as introducing something said by the Naiyāyika. The mark in P looks like it was written not by a later hand but by Śitikaṇṭha himself, the learned scribe of P who is probably to be identified with the grammarian Śitikaṇṭha, author of the *Bālabodhinīnyāsa* (see Muroya 2009–10: 234–236). (4) If it is the Buddhist, not the Naiyāyika, who says 'The two times are cognized, and [yet] they are not both there — that would be really amazing!', the Buddhist is attributing to the Naiyāyika the view that past and present are not both 'there' (*sannihita*). But if he does that, then surely the Naiyāyika would challenge and reject this in what follows — for if they were not *sannihita*, it would be impossible for them to be perceived by a perceptual (*indriyaja*) cognition. But the Naiyāyika does not challenge this in what follows; so better to understand him as chalenging it here.

[Naiyāyika:] We reply that [it appears] precisely *as the past*. Past time is grasped *as the past*; the present, for its part, *as the present*. And as for the object, it is just one thing, but is connected with both, because that is the way that we grasp it.[61]

[Buddhist:] Because past time does not exist now, a cognition that has it as its content would be produced by a non-object.

[Naiyāyika:] No, because of the existence of a property-possessor that is qualified by the [past] and that produces cognition.

[Buddhist:] How can the past be a qualifier?

[Naiyāyika:] Because it appears in that way. You need to reflect on the cognition, 'This is that very thing [that I cognized earlier]' [which is the basic structure of all instances of recognition]. [And if you do, you will see that it informs us that] that which existed earlier exists still now. It is this object, qualified by past time [i.e. by the fact that it existed earlier], that appears in this cognition.

2.3.3 [Cognition of the one hundredth object]

[Buddhist:] How could a cognition that is produced by a sense-faculty make into its content an object that is qualified by past time that no longer exists?

[Naiyāyika:] [We] reply [as follows] —

Just as cloths or such like that have been observed earlier produce, at the time of the perception of the most recent one to be counted, cognitions such as 'this is the hundredth' — so likewise contact with past time, being a qualifier [of pillars and such like], becomes a cause of recognition of those pillars and such like.[62]

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[61] In n. 58 I offered an answer to the question of in what sense the past is 'there' in the present (it presently inheres in the object that is being presently perceived). Now we are in a position to offer an answer to the question of the manner in which the past appears in the present: it appears presently *as the past*.

[62] In order to make plausible that in cases of recognition (1) past time can qualify the recognized object and (2) this contact with the past can cause the recognition, Jayanta demonstrates the existence of analogues of these two in a case other than recognition. When ninety-nine things have been counted and one perceives the hundredth, the previous ninety-nine, despite being *past*, qualify the present one (otherwise it would not be regarded as the hundredth), and play a causal role with regard to the cognition 'this is the hundredth.'

The editor of E$_M$ comments: *śatādigaṇanavelāyāṃ antimam eva vastu indriyasannikṛṣṭam. tathāpi* [em.; *athāpi* ed.] *śatapadātyādijñānaṃ pratyakṣam eveti sarve*

[Buddhist:] The cloths that are being counted do exist; past time, by contrast, does not.

[Naiyāyika:] When wood-apples are being eaten, what will you say, O beloved of the gods? For [surely you admit that] we find cognitions such as 'The Punjabi has eaten a hundred wood-apples.'[63] And when ninety-nine wood-apples have not been eaten, the cognition 'This is the hundredth' does not occur with regard to one particular [wood-apple] (*ekatraiva*)[64] — the hundredth.[65] So just as in that case ninety-nine wood-apples, despite

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vadanti. tadvad ihāpi. 'At the time of counting the hundredth, say, it is only the last thing that is available to the sense-faculties. Nevertheless everyone says that cognitions such as "This is the hundredth foot-soldier" are actually direct perception. [So] it should be the same here too.' I.e. recognition too ('This is that thing') should be admitted to be a case of direct perception even though when it takes place only the object in the present (denoted by the 'this') is available to the sense-faculty. Perhaps Jayanta would say that there is something else available to the sense-faculty: the object's connection with the past (*atītakālayogaḥ*). He does at least say below that this connection 'appears' (*pratibhāsamānaḥ*) in the present.

[63] The verse suggested that the previous ninety-nine cloths, despite not being presently available to the sense-faculty, nevertheless cause the cognition 'one hundred,' just as past time, despite not being presently available, nevertheless causes recognition. The Buddhist pleaded that the two cases are not analogous because the previous ninety-nine cloths still exist; past time does not. This is not a difficult objection to answer, for even if the previous ninety-nine cloths were taken away or destroyed immediately after being counted, one could still count up to one hundred cloths. Jayanta chooses not to mention that particular possibility, but introduces the new example of fruits that are eaten as they are counted. The fact that the previous ninety-nine fruits have ceased to exist does not prevent them from giving rise to the cognition 'this is the hundredth.' Thus the fact that past time has ceased to exist does not disqualify it from causing a cognition in the present.

[64] The editor of E$_M$, by contrast, writes: ***ekatraiva*** — *haṭhāt ekakṣaṇe.*

[65] That the previous ninety-nine fruits are indeed playing a causal role is underlined by the fact that without them being taken into account the cognition 'this is the hundredth' would clearly not arise.

Shukla's edition includes the following note: *yadā navanavatiḥ* [em.; *navatiḥ* ed.] *kapitthā bhuktā eko 'vaśîṣṭa iti avaśiṣṭam ekam ādāya śatam iti vyavahāro bhavituṃ nārhati iti atītān api kapitthān ādāya śatam iti vyavahāraḥ tathā atītakālayogo 'pi pratyabhijñām ādhāsyatīti bhāvaḥ.* 'When ninety-nine wood-apples have been eaten, one remains. Taking into account [just] this one remaining one, the linguistic usage "hundred" would not be able to come about. Thus the linguistic usage "hundred" can only take place when the previous wood-apples, in spite of being past, are taken into account. Thus contact with past time too can produce recognition. That is the meaning.'

being past, become a cause of the cognition 'this is the hundredth,' because they mount the [present] appearance — so likewise connection with past time too, appearing [in the present] can bring about recognition.[66]

[Buddhist:] The cognition 'This is the hundredth' is merely conceptual cognition.[67]

[Naiyāyika:] O great-souled one! What for you is *not* merely conceptual? But there *are* people here who believe that conceptual cognitions are valid!

> And let the very same method that was laid out earlier on the occasion of the proof of universals be employed here to prove the existence of the numbers beginning with twoness.[68]

So enough of bringing in some [other] story.[69]

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[66] On this usage of the future as equivalent to an optative, see Speijer (1886: 266–267). Jayanta is particularly fond of it: see, in the space of two pages, Vol. 2, p. 267–9: *bhaviṣyati, sprakṣyanti, anubhaviṣyanti, śakṣyanti, kalpayiṣyate*; for another example in this passage see *pramāṇībhaviṣyati* in the last line of the whole passage.

[67] If it is merely conceptual cognition then so is that to which it is being compared, namely recognition. And if that is conceptual, then it is not a means of knowledge for the Buddhist, so it cannot deliver knowledge of persistent entities.

So long as cognition of a hundred is conceptual, and not a case of perception, we can keep intact the intuition that things that have ceased to exist cannot enter into perception. Yet only if that intuition is shown to be false can recognition count as a case of perception.

[68] The same method used earlier in the text (Vol. 2, pp. 29,5–47,4 = Kataoka 2010) to prove that universals are not just constructs, but exist externally in the object, can be used to prove that twoness, etc. are not just constructs, but exist externally in the object. If that is the case, 'this is the hundredth' can be perception rather than just conceptual cognition.

The editor of E_M comments interestingly: *anekavyaktyanugatasāmānyagrahaṇanyāyenaiva, anekakālānugatavyakter api grahaṇam upapādanīyam iti bhāvaḥ.* 'The meaning is that the grasping of an individual thing that is connected with more than one time can be made sense of in exactly the same way as the grasping of a universal that is connected with more than one individual.' One could argue that the two cases are disanalogous in the following way. When recognizing an object, one is putatively grasping its connection with both past and present; when identifying an object as a cow, one is grasping cowness as connected with that particular cow only, not as simultaneously connected with other cows.

[69] You are distracting me from my main purpose — establishing the validity of recognition — by bringing in some other story that is not apposite: the question of the validity of conceptual cognition in general.

2.3.4 [How can a sense-faculty access the past?]

[Buddhist:] Recognition-cognition grasps what is past; and it is produced by contact between object and sense-faculty. This for us is truly remarkable!

[Naiyāyika:] How remarkable? The object, first of all, certainly exists and is positioned right in front of the [sense-faculty]; this pillar or such like is the producer [of the recognition].

[Buddhist:] That does exist, [agreed,] but only at the present time.

[Naiyāyika:] No, because these [recognition] cognitions are not produced by an object that is connected with the present time alone. Past time too, just like the present, is the qualifier of the [object of recognition].[70] And the object, qualified by these [two times], brings about this cognition,[71] so it is produced by an object. And it is produced by a sense-faculty, because its occurrence correlates with the latter's occurrence.[72]

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[70] An object existing only in the present does not, for the Naiyāyika, produce a cognition of the form 'this is that.' Thus if all objects only existed for the present time, recognitions would never arise. We need some explanation of the difference between 'this is a pot' and 'this is that pot,' some extra factor that is present in the object of the latter, but not in the object of the former. The extra factor is qualification by the past.

The Buddhist will, of course, claim that even objects that exist only in the present can cause recognitions, by being mistakenly identified with previously existing objects. The Naiyāyika could point to the fact that an object of a type one has never experienced before does not produce recognitions — something to which the Buddhist will agree — and use this as evidence that if things existed only in the present they would never be recognized. The Buddhist would reply that in the case of a newly-encountered object, one of the causes of recognition is lacking, namely similarity to a previously encountered object.

The Pune manuscript has enabled improvement of E_M (and the other editions) here. E_M reads: *na kevalam, vartamānakālayoginārthena tatpratyayajananāt, tasya vartamāna ivātīto 'pi kālo 'vacchedakatāṃ pratipadyate.* 'Not only! Past time too, just like the present, becomes its qualifier, because a cognition of the [past] is produced by an object that is connected with the present time.' On the one hand, this takes as given precisely what is in question and what the Buddhist denies: that the object in the present produces a cognition of the past. On the other hand, its 'because' is working in the opposite direction to what one would expect. More natural would be: because the past qualifies the object, the object can produce a cognition of the past.

[71] The double *ca* in E_M is a clearly inferior reading. It can be explained as added by someone who mistakenly read *idaṃ jñānam* as nominative.

[72] When recognition occurs, the sense-faculty is active; when the sense-faculty is not active, recognition does not occur.

[Buddhist:] How can a sense-faculty operate with regard to an object that is past?

[Naiyāyika:] Who is this interrogation for? Not the sense-faculty, as it is insentient. But a person whose eyes are not open does not have this kind of cognition [i.e. recognition], while someone whose eyes are open, does. [That's just the way it is, and that's all we know:] so the person too is not suitable to be interrogated.[73]

[Buddhist:] Rather than [supposing that] this cognition grasps the past, it is appropriate to postulate its invalidity.[74] The ability of a sense-faculty [to function] also with regard to the past has never been observed before.

[Naiyāyika:] You should not [think] that. This invalidity that you speak of can be postulated as a result of cognizing a refuter. And there is no such thing in the case of recognition. As for your inference [of momentariness from existence, as a refuter of recognition], that has been rejected [above].[75]

[Buddhist:] Invalidity can certainly be supposed also from a defect in its cause.

[Naiyāyika:] Your holiness, that [defect] needs to be stated!

[Buddhist:] We just now stated it: a sense-faculty lacks competence to grasp a past object.[76]

[Naiyāyika:] You spoke very well, my dear child! This is not some kind of defect of the sense-faculty, like the defect that causes one to see floaters. A [sense-faculty]'s lack of competence applies to past time that is independent, not to past time that has become

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[73] E*M*'s reading is uninterpretable (lacking an object of *labhate*) as a result of eyeskip.

As pointed out by Sasaki (1996: 40–41), Jayanta's wording here (*visphā-ritākṣaḥ*) mirrors Umbeka's (*visphārite cākṣuṣi, Ślokavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* p. 176,10).

[74] E*M*'s reading does not yield such a good meaning: 'Because it grasps the past, it is better to postulate this cognition's invalidity.' It may have arisen owing to someone not considering that *atītagrāhitvāt* can be an ablative of comparison, and hence having no idea how to give sense to both the *varam* ('it is better') and the *yuktam* ('it is correct, appropriate').

[75] And therefore, with regard to the choice facing us, it is better to suppose that recognition grasps the past than that it is invalid.

'Rejected [above]': Vol. 2, pp. 317,3–328,12.

[76] A cognition that seems to grasp the past, but is produced by a sense-faculty that lacks that ability, should be deemed invalid, just as a cognition that seems to grasp hair-balls, but is produced by a sense of sight afflicted by floaters, should be deemed invalid.

a qualifier of the thing in the present that is the object of that [sense-faculty].[77] And as we have said,[78] this competence belongs not to it alone, but to it when it has a memory trace as its assistant.[79] Therefore it is established that this recognition-cognition does arise from contact between sense-faculty and object, having as its object an entity such as a pillar in the present that exists in front of one but is qualified by past time.

2.4 [An alternative view: Recognition is produced by the *manas*]

Alternatively recognition should be accepted — just like the cognition of jasmine as fragrant [when the faculty of smell is not

[77] Both sides agree that sense-faculties are unable to perceive 'past time that is independent', i.e. past time per se. The Naiyāyika thinks that under certain conditions (i.e. when the past qualifies an object that is being perceived) the sense-faculty can perceive the past. The Buddhist universalizes the sense-faculty's inability to perceive the past, so that these putative cases are simply a result of sense-faculty malfunction.

[78] Twice in § 2.2: 'And indeed there does exist a cause of this cognition, namely a sense-faculty together with a memory trace' and 'because the production of other kinds of effect [takes place] in dependence on auxiliaries [in this case the memory trace].'

[79] Chakrabarti (2012: 205) translates these last three sentences in the middle of his summary of this passage: 'That a sense-organ does not grasp a past object is not its fault like an ophthalmic disease. It is incapable of catching the past time as an independent object, but it does not have any inherent incapacity to grasp the past as a predicate qualifying a current object which is within its range. The sense organ is not by itself capable of accessing the past, but when it is assisted by a memory-trace it becomes so capable.' This is fine, but the sentences with which he precedes and follows this translation puzzle me.

(1) He introduces the translation by saying that Jayanta 'follows the verdict of his intuitive analysis of recognitive experience as mental (*mānasa*) and comes up with this rule:'. But in this part of the text Jayanta is proposing that recognition is caused by an external sense-faculty (*indriyaja*). It is only in the next section of the text that Jayanta gives the alternative view that recognition is *mānasa*, caused by the *manas*.

(2) He immediately follows this translation with the words: 'Thus recognition is established to be entirely a variety of sense perception. Jayanta does not quite explicitly accept the idea of a non-ordinary contact between the external sense-organ and a remembered past object, perhaps with the assistance of the inner sense. In the next passage he considers the possibility that recognition is an apperceptive mental awareness wherein the continuous identity of the object, and reflexively of the subject, is evidenced in direct experience.' So he is aware that two different positions are being suggested by Jayanta, and that according to the first, present one, recognition is 'a variety of sense perception.' Yet he

involved] — to grasp something qualified by a previous cognition[80] and to be caused by the *manas*.[81]

For just as, when a jasmine flower that although within the range of the visual faculty is grasped as qualified by its smell which is not

describes recognition as *mānasa* on that view. He contrasts that with the second view — which we will reach after one more sentence of translation, where Jayanta himself describes recognition as *mānasa* — by describing recognition on that view as 'an apperceptive mental awareness' that experiences the continuous identity of the object and subject. In fact the (continuous identity of the) subject is not mentioned as being experienced either in Jayanta's account of the second view that recognition is *mānasa* or in his account of the first view that it is *indriyaja*. And we can know that for Jayanta recognition is entirely object-focussed; for he has denied that the self can feature as the content of recognition or as the content of any act of perception earlier in the text: Vol. 2, pp. 270,5–275,18.

[80] In the previous position the object was qualified by past time, not by a previous cognition.

[81] The editor of E_M comments: **idam atra tattvam** — *laukikasannikarṣa-dvayajanyam ekaṃ jñānam iva, saṃskāra-indriyajanyaṃ 'surabhi kusumam' ityādi-jñānam api sarvasaṃmatam. kusumaṃ tu cākṣuṣam, saurabhaṃ tu ghrāṇagrāhyam. indriyadvayaṃ tu yugapan na prasarati. saṃskārasya indriyasahakāritvāt niraṃśatvāc ca pratyabhijñāyāḥ pratyakṣam eva tat. athavā saṃskārajanyasmṛtyupasthāpitaṃ viśeṣaṇaṃ bhāsate. iyam eva jñānalakṣaṇety ucyate. tathā ca laukikālaukika-sannikarṣadvayajanyaṃ jñānaṃ pratyabhijñeti na doṣaḥ. granthakāras tu alaukikaṃ sannikarṣaṃ* [em.; *sannikarṣa* ed.] *nāṅgīkarotīti mānasaṃ tad iti vadati. mānasatve bāhyatvenānubhavasyāsvārasyāpattyā anantarakālikaiḥ* [em.; *anantara kālikaiḥ* ed.] *alaukikas sannikarṣaḥ aṅgīkriyata iti jñeyam.*

'The following is [some] fact[ual background] to this [point] — Just as everyone accepts a single cognition produced by two ordinary contacts, so everyone also accepts such cognitions as "the flower is fragrant," produced by both a sense-faculty and a memory trace. The flower, on the one hand, is perceived by the faculty of sight, and the fragrance, on the other, is perceived by the faculty of smell. But two sense-faculties do not operate simultaneously [so a memory trace must be involved in the production of "the flower is fragrant," which makes its involvement in recognition unproblematic]. Because a memory trace can co-operate with a sense-faculty, and because recognition is partless, it is certainly a case of direct perception.

'Alternatively a qualifier appears that is contributed by a memory produced by a memory trace. It is this that is termed "[a connection] characterized by cognition." [It is a non-ordinary kind of connection.] And thus there is no fault in claiming that recognition is a cognition produced by two kinds of connection: ordinary and non-ordinary.

'But the author of the text [Jayanta] does not accept non-ordinary connections, so he says that recognition is produced by the *manas*. If it is produced by the *manas*, an incongruity results, because of the externality of the experience [of recognition, it being directed to an external object, which the

a possible object of that [faculty], that grasping cannot have taken place by means of an external sense-faculty, so that the cognition 'the flower is fragrant' is certainly caused by the *manas* — so likewise the qualifier of a pillar or such like when [that pillar] is qualified by an earlier cognition is not a possible object of the visual faculty.[82] So recognition is caused by the *manas*.[83] And given that

manas is not usually able to detect]. So those [Naiyāyikas] following immediately after [Jayanta] in time accept a non-ordinary connection. This should be known.'

So Varadacharya distinguishes three views here: (1) Recognition is produced by an external sense-faculty with the co-operation of a memory trace, and involves two ordinary connections. This corresponds to Jayanta's first view, that recognition is *indriyaja*, so it is a bit confusing that he illustrates it with 'the flower is fragrant', which Jayanta uses to illustrate his second view, that recognition is *mānasa*. (2) Recognition is produced by an ordinary and a non-ordinary connection. This he attributes to Naiyāyikas following Jayanta. (3) Recognition is produced by the *manas*: this is Jayanta's second view, which he elaborates in this section of the text.

[82] P enables significant improvement here. E$_M$ and the other editions have *atītakṣaṇaviṣaya* for *anīkṣaṇaviṣaya*, giving the meaning 'an object belonging to a past moment is a qualifier of the pillar or such like that is qualified by an earlier cognition'. We are left wondering why the pillar is characterized as having two qualifiers: a past object and a past cognition. It is also much easier to see why *atītakṣaṇaviṣaya* could have arisen if *anīkṣaṇaviṣaya* were primary (given the copious discussion we have just had of *atītakāla*), than why the change would have taken place in the opposite direction.

[83] A person can see a jasmine flower and has the cognition 'the jasmine is fragrant' even though its smell is not being perceived by the person's faculty of smell (perhaps because it is too far away or perhaps because the person's faculty of smell is not functioning). Jayanta compares this with recognition for two reasons: (1) the qualifiers of the objects of the two cognitions — the smell and a previous cognition — are both beyond the reach of the external sense-faculty that is active; and so (2) both cognitions are caused not by an external sense-faculty, but by the *manas*.

The two views of recognition — that it is caused by the sense-faculty and that it is caused by the *manas* — have been referred to earlier in the text in the following way: *pratyabhijñā nāma smaryamāṇānubhūyamānasāmānādhikaraṇya-grāhiṇī saṃskārasacivendriyajanyā pratītir iti kecit. anye manyante — smaryamāṇa-pūrvajñānaviśeṣitārthagrāhitvāt pratyabhijñāyāḥ, tadviśeṣaṇasya cārthasya bāhye-ndriyagrāhyatvānupapatteḥ, stambhādāv api mānasī pratyabhijñeti. nirbandhas tv iha nāsmākam, sā yathāstu tathāstu vā |* (*Nyāyamañjarī* Vol. 1, pp. 555,12–556,3). 'Some maintain that that which we term recognition is a cognition (1) that grasps the identity of what is remembered and what is experienced and (2) that is produced by the sense-faculty accompanied by a memory-trace. Others hold that because recognition grasps an object qualified by a remembered previous cognition, and because an external sense-faculty could not grasp an object as qualified by that, recognition even of things like pillars is caused by the *manas*. But on this issue I

[we] are maintaining that the internal organ [= the *manas*] grasps an external object [only] when the latter is qualified by a cognition produced by a previously active external sense-faculty, the unwanted consequence of the absence of blind people, [deaf people,] etc. does not result.[84] We have said this many times.[85]

[Buddhist:] The qualifier of the jasmine or such like, namely its fragrance, exists as something that is present. But in this case [of recognition] the previous cognition is past, so how could it be a qualifier?

[Naiyāyika:] In response to this, we have already said:[86] What will you do with it if it exists? For we find that wood-apples or [whatever is being counted] that have passed out of existence are

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have no insistence [one way or the other]. Let it exist in whatever way it may [the important point is just that it is valid].'

See also the following reference to the two views at the end of a breakdown of the various cognitive stages leading up to recognition — in this case recognition of a sound rather than a pillar: *tathā hi śabda utpadyate tāvat. tataḥ svaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ janayati, ajanakasya pratibhāsāyogāt. tataḥ tena jñānena śabdo gṛhyate. tataḥ saṃskārabodhaḥ. tataḥ pūrvajñātaśabdasmaraṇam. tatas tatsacivaṃ śrotraṃ mano vā śabdapratyabhijñānaṃ janayiṣyati* (*Nyāyamañjarī* Vol. 1, p. 554,11–14). 'For to explain — First a sound arises. Then it produces a cognition with itself (i.e. sound) as object, for something incapable of producing could not appear. Then the sound is grasped by that cognition. Then there is the awakening of a memory trace. Then there is a memory of a previously experienced sound. Then *either the faculty of hearing assisted by that [memory trace] or the manas* can produce recognition of sound.'

[84] If the *manas* is here being characterized as able to perceive external objects, does that not suggest that there would be no blind people, as the *manas* would be able to bypass the dysfunctional visual faculty and apprehend the external object directly?

No, claims Jayanta, for the view is not that the *manas* can autonomously grasp external objects, only that it can grasp external objects when they are qualified by previous cognitions (which were themselves produced by an external sense-faculty).

The editor of E$_M$'s comment is useful: *manasaḥ bāhye viṣaye 'pravṛttyeti hetuḥ. manaḥ bāhye naiva pravartata iti na. svātantryeṇa na pravartate ity eva.* 'The reason [that there is no such unwanted consequence] is: "because the *manas* does not function with regard to external objects." It is not that the *manas* does not act at all with regard to external objects, just that it does not act autonomously.'

[85] *Nyāyamañjarī* Vol. 1, p. 210,13–14: *nāpi manaḥ bāhyakaraṇanirapekṣaṃ bāhye viṣaye dhiyam ādhātum alam, andhādyabhāvaprasaṅgāt.* Vol. 1, pp. 275,10–276,1: *pūrvotpannacākṣuṣavijñānaviśeṣaṇasya bāhyasya vastuno mano grāhakam, iti nāndhādyabhāva ity uktam.*

[86] § 2.3.3.

[nevertheless] causal factors with regard to cognitions such as 'This is the hundredth.' So recognition-cognition, even if caused by the internal organ, certainly proves, as shown above, the persistence of entities.[87]

2.5 [The examples of hair and nails]

> Now as for the equivalence that you claimed[88] between recognition of a pillar or such like and recognition of hair and such like that has been cut [and then grown back], that too is not apposite.[89]

In the [hair example] what refutes [the recognition] is clearly the seeing of the shaven head in the period between [the two sightings of the hair]. But in the [pillar example] there is no such [refuter].

It's for precisely this reason[90] that we deemed recognition to be incapable of establishing the permanence of sound [since] it becomes deprived [of this ability] by the cognition of the cessation of a sound, [this cognition] appearing immediately [after the short-lived utterance].[91]

And the recognition of things like flames is also incorrect, because it is refuted by an inference from things like the [gradual]

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[87] Recognition, on this second view, is still able to deliver the information that its object existed previously. It is just that access to the past comes by a different means: the *manas* detects the object's qualification by a previous cognition.

[88] § 1.3.

[89] Shukla comments: *pūrvaṃ muṇḍiteṣu paścād utpanneṣu keśeṣu ta evāmī keśā iti pratyabhijñā yathaikatvasya sthiratvasya vā na sādhikā tadvat stambhādipratyabhijñāpi iti taulyaṃ khaṇḍayati — sāpīti.* 'Just as the recognition "These hairs are the very same ones [I saw previously]" with regard to hairs that have been previously cut and later grown again is not capable of establishing oneness or persistence, so likewise recognition of pillars and such like [is not capable of establishing oneness or persistence] — that is the equivalence [claimed earlier by the Buddhist] that [Jayanta] refutes now beginning with the words "that too".'

[90] I.e. because there is a refuter.

[91] Jayanta refers to the Mīmāṃsaka view that the phonemes (*ka, ga* etc.) are eternal and continue to exist in unmanifest form when not being actually articulated. He refuted it at Vol. 1, pp. 553,7–557,9. His point here is that just as a shaven head in between the two sightings of similar looking hair blocks the truth of the cognition 'this is that hair' at the time of the second sighting, so similarly the non-occurrence of the phoneme *ka*, say, in between two articulations of it, prevents Jayanta from being able to conclude 'This is that *ka*' at the time of the second articulation.

disappearance of the oil and the wick.[92] But there is no corresponding refuting inference either[93] in the case of pillars and such like. As for the inference [of momentariness] from existence [which you may adduce as a corresponding refuting inference], that has been well refuted.

2.6 [The relative strength of perception and inference]

And even if there is indeed no general rule that, when there is a conflict between perception and inference, perception is stronger

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[92] As one looks at a flame in a windless environment, one might think it remains the same numerically identical flame over time. But from the observation of the decreasing level of the oil and the decreasing length of the wick, one can infer that different fuel is being burnt at different times, and hence that the flame itself is different at different times.

Cakradhara comments: *tailavarttirūpasya kāraṇasya* [*kāraṇasya** conj.; om. ed.] *kṣayadarśanāt, kāraṇabhedaḥ pūrvakālata uttarakālānāṃ gamyate. na hi yad eva tailavarttirūpaṃ* [*rūpaṃ* em.; *rūpa* ed.] *pūrvakālāyāḥ kāraṇaṃ tad evottarāsām iti vaktuṃ śakyam. pratyakṣeṇa pūrvakālākāraṇasya tailavarttirūpasya kṣayadarśanād etatkāraṇabhedas tāvad iti. tattatkālā* [*tattatkālā* conj. Isaacson; *tataś ca kālā*** ed.] *dharmiṇyaḥ parasparabhinnā iti sādhyam, bhinnakāraṇajanyatvād ghaṭapaṭādivad ity anumānapravṛttiḥ.* 'Because we observe the [gradual] disappearance of the cause, namely the oil and the wick, we know that there is a difference between the cause [of the flame] at an earlier time and the cause of [the flames] at later times. For it cannot be said that the cause of the [flame] that exists at the earlier time, namely the oil and the wick [then], is exactly the same as the cause of later [flames]. The difference between these causes is beyond doubt (*tāvat*), because we observe by direct perception the destruction of the cause of the [flame] at the earlier time — the oil and the wick [that existed then]. This is the way the inference works: That the [flames] at different times — which are the proof-subjects — are mutually distinct is what is proved, because they are produced by different causes, like a pot and a cloth.'

* It is not impossible to make sense of the text without the *kāraṇasya*: 'Because we observe the disappearance of the form / matter of the oil and the wick'. But that involves taking the first *rūpa* in the passage in a different sense from the following ones. Both of the latter mark the end of *bahuvrīhi* compounds agreeing with *kāraṇa*.

** The free-standing word *kālā* (pre-sandhi *kālāḥ*) is clearly impossible. We have to conjecture for *tataś ca kālā* either *tattatkālā* or *tataś ca tattatkālā*. The first option preserves a closer number of syllables, but the latter could be explained as a kind of haplography.

[93] The sense of the 'either' (*api*) is: just as there is no perceptual refuter of recognition of a pillar, as there is in the case of recognition of hair or of sound, so too there is no inferential refuter of recognition of a pillar *either*, as there is in the case of recognition of a flame.

— since after all we see that the grasping of a fire-brand as a circle when it is twirled at great speed, despite being a perception, is refuted by inference[94] — nevertheless the inference of momentariness that is the topic at hand can be explained in other ways,[95] whereas the relevant perception [namely recognition of things like pillars] cannot be explained in any other way. So it is perception [in particular recognition] that refutes the inference of momentariness.[96]

And there is no mutual dependence,[97] for we do not accept that the validity of the recognition-perception is based on the falsity of the inference. The recognition-perception is valid simply because of the strength of its own cause/causes. It does not possess such a sorry state that it can only become valid when the inference is falsified.

[94] Cakradhara comments: *cakraṃ hi parimaṇḍalākāratvāt sarvadigbhir yugapat sambadhyate. tathārūpatvaṃ ca alātasya nāsti. ato 'numānena bādhaḥ. tathāhi — alātaṃ dharmi [alātaṃ dharmī* conj.; alātadharmī ed.] yugapat sarvābhir digbhir na sambadhyata iti sādhyam, alātatvāt, bhūmisthitālātavad ity anumānam.* 'For a circle, since it has a round shape, is simultaneously in contact with all of the directions. And a fire-brand is not shaped like that. Therefore there is a refutation [of direct perception] by inference. To explain further, this is the [full] inference: That the fire-brand — which is the proof-subject — is not simultaneously in contact with all of the directions is what is proved, because it is a fire-brand, like a fire-brand that is resting on the ground.'

* Cf. Cakradhara's use of *dharmiṇyaḥ* as a separate word in the parallel context in n. 92.

[95] Cakradhara comments: *kṣaṇikatvaparihāreṇaiva sattvasya prāṅnītyā sambhavāt.* 'Because of the possibility of existence without any appeal to momentariness in the manner described above.' He is referring to *Nyāyamañjarī* Vol. 2, pp. 317,3–328,12.

[96] The Siddhāntin here addresses the Buddhist argument put forward in § 1.1.

[97] The Siddhāntin turns to the specific Buddhist argument put forward in § 1.1.2.2.

4. Conventions in the edition

The section headings in square brackets and the paragraphing are my own; they aim to improve on Varadacharya's. There are six layers of apparatus that can occur underneath the main text, though it is rare that all occur on one page. They occur in the following order, and give the following information:

1. Variant readings.
2. Lacunae owing to manuscript damage or loss of folios.
3. Cakradhara's comments, given in his *Nyāyamañjarī-Granthibhaṅga*.
4. K. S. Varadacharya's comments, given in his *Ṭippaṇī*, the *Nyāyasaurabha*. These are found in footnotes in his Mysore edition of the *Nyāyamañjarī*.
5. Surya Narayana Shukla's comments, given in footnotes to his edition of the *Nyāyamañjarī*.
6. The source of citations or paraphrases; the location of passages within the *Nyāyamañjarī* that are being referred to; parallel passages that throw some light on the present passage.

I transcribe the text in 3, 4 and 5 as is, without normalizing sandhi. But in the main text above the layers of apparatus, my convention is not to apply sandhi across punctuation (including inverted commas), but to apply it everywhere else, whether or not it was applied in the witnesses. I occasionally separate words for the sake of readability. I have not adjusted the punctuation of text given in 3, 4 and 5, but the punctuation in the main text is my own and I do not record the punctuation of manuscripts in the apparatus of variants.

In all layers of the apparatus, a portion of text is repeated from above, preceded by its line number there, and followed by a lemma marker:]. After this follow, in the first layer of apparatus, the abbreviations of those witnesses that transmit that reading. (See the 'Abbreviations' section below.) Next come the variants, followed by the abbreviations of the witnesses that transmit them. What follows the lemma marker in all the other layers of apparatus is self-explanatory.

Differences between the witnesses resulting from orthographic variation (e.g. gemination or degemination of consonants in ligature with semivowels such as *dharmma* or *tatva*), or from the appli-

cation or non-application of sandhi, are ignored in the apparatus of variants. Such orthographic divergences are recorded only if they occur in a reading that differs from the accepted text in more ways than that.

The following symbols are used.

+	+क+ = क has been added after the first writing, either above or below where it is supposed to be read, or in the margin.
×	×क× = क has been cancelled.
- - -	क- - -ण = damage to the manuscript or folio loss means we have no evidence for what was written between क and ण
⌣	क⌣ण = there is one illegible *akṣara* between क and ण
⊔	क⊔ण = the scribe has left a blank space between क and ण

5. *Editorial policy*

I have collated the readings of the two editions that used manuscripts, E_V (the Vizianagaram edition) and E_M (the Mysore edition), and the following manuscripts: P (Pune, Śāradā script, birchbark), S (Shrinagar, Śāradā script, paper), C (Calicut / Kozhikode, Malayālam script, palm leaf), A^d (Adyar, Malayālam script, palm leaf) and M (Mysore/Chennai, Malayālam script, palm leaf); for more details see the 'Abbreviations' section below. The constitution of the main text has not been arrived at in a mechanical manner. Some of the principles I have drawn on are as follows. The first readings that can be rejected are those that involve an impossible word-form or a non-meaningful sentence. Then there are those that transmit a sentence that taken in isolation is meaningful, but does not fit what is required by context.

   When two or more readings are potentially appropriate in the context, I have judged that

• a reading with an unnatural *karmadhāraya* is less likely to be original than one with two inflected words

• the reading that best explains the distribution of the variants is to be preferred; i.e. a reading from which all other variants can easily be explained as arising is preferable to other readings that do not meet this condition

• the evidence of P carries more weight than any other witness (which is not to say that it is never corrupt)

• where P is not available, but its likely apograph S is, the agreement of S and either A^d or M is strong evidence for a reading (as they belong to separate branches of the transmission: see Graheli [2015: 112]) unless it is the kind of reading that could plausibly have arisen twice independently

• particles are more likely to have been added than to have dropped out. 'More likely' does not mean this is always the case, but it is consistent with the fact that P very often lacks particles found in other witnesses

In many individual cases the reasoning behind my choice is spelt out in a footnote to the translation.

6. The relationship between P and S

Graheli's detailed study of the relationship between the manuscripts that transmit the 6th *āhnika* of the *Nyāyamañjarī* suggests (2015: 96) that while S is unrelated to P for the first nine tenths of that *āhnika*, it then becomes a direct copy of P for the last tenth (i.e. from Vol. 2 p. 249,14 onwards). I was thus interested to examine the relationship between S and P for the section of the 7th *āhnika* edited here. That S continues to be derived from P for the whole of the 7th *āhnika* seemed likely in the light of Graheli's observation (2015: 54 and 86) that its scribe copied — and later crossed out — P's paratext at the end of both the sixth and seventh *āhnika*s, including the signature of P's scribe (but did not do so at the end of previous *āhnika*s).

The transmission of our passage yields plenty of strong evidence that S was copied from P, and some weak evidence that it was not.

What precedes the lemma marker in the lists below is the reading I have judged to be original. I do not give a list of witnesses that transmit it, unless that is relevant.

A. Evidence that S was copied from P

A1. Conjunctive readings in S and P

viśiṣṭa] *viśeṣṭa* PS
buddhidvayam iti] *buddhidvayamitiḥ* PS
kimiti neṣyate] *kimiti veṣyate* PS
yat punar] *ye punaḥ punar* PS
pratyabhijñāyāḥ kāraṇatvaṃ] *pratyabhijñāyā kāraṇatvaṃ* PS
ananuyojyaḥ] *ananuyojyāḥ* PS
apabhāṣitam] *apabhauṣitam* P; *apabhoṣitam* S. It is very difficult to decide whether P reads *bhau* or *bho*; I sway slightly towards *bhau*, but it is quite possible that a copyist read it as *bho*.
sa evāyam iti] *sa evāya×ṃ×miti* P; *sa evāyaṃmiti* S. *ṃmiti* is here obviously impossible. P has a line under the *anusvāra* which could be intended to cancel it. S's scribe could easily have missed the line, or not interpreted it in that way, and copied the *anusvāra*.
upajananāpāya] *upajanāpāya* PS
sannihitayor] *sahitayor* PS
tadbhāvābhāvā] *tadbhāvabhāvā* PS
Most of those are errors (the last three may be original).

A2. Errors in S that are easily explainable as resulting from the way an *akṣara* has been written in P

viṣayāvadyotana] *viṣayā×dyotana* P; *viṣayā udyotana* S. The illegible *akṣara* in P resembles an *u* as much as it does anything. I'm reluctant to report it as that because of an extra vertical extension protruding from the bottom which is absent in the other *u*'s I have seen in P; but it could certainly have been read as an *u*.
kim ekaṃ] *iti×kim ekaṃ* P; *iti him ekaṃ* S. P's *k* looks very like a *h* and could easily have been read as such by S's scribe.
itivan na] P; *iti yan na* S. P's *va* has a splodge that makes it plausibly a *ya*; in fact P's scribe may have originally written a *ya*, and then filled in the splodge to make it look like a *va*.
avagamyeta] *---myeta* P; *avagamyete* S. The line above the head-stroke in P is written as close to the *mya* as the *ta*. It is quite possible that S's scribe first copied it as indicating *te*, then realized that it should be indicating *mye* (perhaps when he got to the second half of the verse, which mirrors the wording of the first and which

clearly has *avagamyeta*), and then wrote a second horizontal line above the headstroke over *mya*. Indeed it is not impossible that he intended us to read these two lines as one continuous one modifying the *mya*, giving *avagamyeta*.

sahakāryapekṣaṇena] P; *sahakāryapekṣātona* S. S's non-sensical reading here is very likely a misreading of the three small vertical lines contained in P's *ṇ*. The first has been understood as a long *ā*, the second as part of a *ta*, and the third as combining with a line above the headstroke (indicating the *e*) to make an *o*. It is almost certain that S's reading arises from P's here, as the middle line of the *ṇ* would not have been mistaken for a *ta* in any other source, whereas a faint hook on the birchbark protruding down at this place combines with the middle line of the *ṇ* to give the appearance of a *ta*.

avacchedaka iti cet] P; *avacchedakātati cet* S. S's non-sensical reading is easily explainable as a result of its scribe not recognizing the three components of P's initial *i* as forming one *akṣara*. The first part to the left has been taken as a long *ā* and the other two as a *ta*. There is actually a gap between these latter two, whereas if they were a *ta* they would be joined; but the birchbark has a dark spot at that place, which makes the gap less visible than it would otherwise be.

- - -≍] P; *pratītimavamṛśabhū* S. *pratītimavamṛśa* corresponds to a part of P that is now destroyed at the bottom left edge of the folio. The *akṣara* that S has copied as *bhū* is a mess, but *bhū* is certainly a plausible interpretation of it. (The correct reading is *pratītim avamṛśatu.*)

bhav≍ ≍] P; *bhavat sā* S. It is possible that what P has written is *bhavān sa*, which is what we expect the text to be here, but it is easily interpreted as *bhavat sā*.

vacchinno 'rtha] P; *vacchinnārthe* S. The horizontal line above the headstroke in P that combines with the downward stroke that on its own denotes *ā* is written to the right of where one would expect it, because of lack of room above the *nna*. It could easily be mistaken as qualifying the *tha*, in which case we have S's reading.

viṣayagrahaṇe] P; *viṣayagrahaṇa* S. It is difficult to judge whether the horizonal line in P was intended to denote an *e* or not.

atikrāntasya] P; *abhinnāntasya* S. The *t* of P's *ti* contains at its bottom end a fully joined up circle: it thus resembles a *bh*. The

right hand part of P's *kr* is very feint; a scribe not spotting it would take the *akṣara* to be a *nn*.

B. Deviations of S from P that are not explainable in the same way as those in A2

B1. Some of the deviations of S from P that are not explainable in the same way as those in A2 are very easily explainable as copying mistakes on the part of S — for example a number of them are the common Kashmirian confusion of *i* and *e*, owing to non-difference in pronunciation.

B2. Some are not quite as easy as those in the previous group to explain, i.e. they require the scribe to be a little more inattentive:

śatakṛtvo] P; *śatakratvo* S
yattūktaṃ] P; *yad ≍ ktaṃ* S
bhūtaḥ kālo] P; *bhūtakālo* S
katham avaccheda] P; *katham anavaccheda* S
kevalava- - -māna] P; *kevalamartamāna* S. (P's *va* is very clear and does not resemble a *ma*)
puruṣas tv avisphāritākṣo] P; *puruṣas tu visphāritākṣo* S
buddher nendriya] P; *buddhendriya* S
stambhāder] P; *stambhādau* S
atītaṃ pūrvajñāna] P; *atītajñāna* S
virodhī] P; *vido* S
Within this group could perhaps be included *a/ā* confusions that have led to clearly incorrect readings:

ātmāno] P; *ātmano* S
tadāvasthānā] P; *tadavasthānā* S
pūrvamāsīt] P; *pūrvamasīt* S
uktam atra] P; *uktam ātra* S
etasyāṃ] P; *etasyaṃ* S

B3. Some could be explained as S correcting obvious mistakes in P:

tvijñāna] P; *vijñāna* S
mahimnraiva] P; *mahimnaiva* S

B4. But there are some that are not so easy to dismiss; all of S's readings below are plausible alternatives to P's:

upajanyate] P; *upajāyate* S. Sometimes the *akṣara*s in P are unclear and liable to be misread, but here P clearly writes *upajanyate*.

nirjñātam] P; *nirjātam* S. Again the relevant *akṣara* in P does not resemble *jā* but is very clearly *jñā*.

ārabhyate] P; *ārabhate* S. The relevant *akṣara* in P does not resemble *bha*.

apasāraṇam] P; *apasaraṇam* S[pc].

tatpratyayājananāt] P; *tatpratyayajananāt* S. Note that S's reading is found in other witnesses too.

B5. There are a few occasions where S has the reading we require, also found in other witnesses, and P is corrupt:

tatrocyata] P; *tatrocyate* S. (This is not just a case of application or non-application of sandhi: P's reading is incorrect.)

jñānajanakasyābhāvāt] P; *jñānajanakasya bhāvāt* S

avabhāsata] P; *avabhāsate* S. (This is not just a case of application or non-application of sandhi: P's reading is incorrect.)

C. Conclusions regarding the relationship between P and S

What conclusions can be drawn from this evidence?

C1. Was S copied directly from P?

There are many readings which can be known to 'derive from' P. We have under A1 above some shared readings which are certainly mistaken and which are not particularly likely to have arisen independently in manuscripts other than P. We have under A2 some very striking cases where S's readings almost certainly derive from the precise way in which *akṣara*s have been written in P. Nevertheless it cannot be ruled out that all of these readings in S derive not directly from P but via an intermediary — a close descendent of P.

S then is without doubt partially derived from P, but is it exclusively so? The evidence under B1, B2 and B3 above need not make us suspect that S's scribe consulted anything other than P for this section of text. But how about the evidence under B4 and B5? Taken in isolation, S's readings there seem just as likely to have arisen from S's scribe consulting another manuscript as from mistaken copying from P. All of S's B4 readings yield sense, and three of them yield just as good a meaning as P. And all of S's B5 readings are preferable to P's. But in all of those cases the relevant

*akṣara*s are clearly legible in P, and most yield sense, so there is no evident reason for S to switch to a different source at those points. And S's readings *could* have resulted from either mistaken copying or deliberate correction. When we add the consideration that, both before and after these cases, S was clearly derived from P, the evidence of B4 and B5 does not appear sufficient to entail that S consulted a different manuscript at these points.

C2. Procedural Implications

Whether all of S's deviations from P resulted from miscopying/ deliberate correction, or whether some resulted from consulting other manuscripts, the substantial number of deviations of S from P means that in the many places where P is now damaged but S provides text, we cannot necessarily assume that S's readings are what was in P. It does not carry quite the same weight of authority as P.

Where P and S preserve two different but equally plausible readings, we can follow the general principle that P's is to be preferred.

7. *The Relationship Between A^d and M*

Kataoka (2018: 377–376) has provided evidence from the 9th *āhnika* that M is an apograph of A^d. To what extent do the readings in this passage suggest that at this part of the *Nyāyamañjarī* M is an apograph of A^d?

A. Evidence that M was copied from A^d

In the lists below, all readings other than that of M and A^d — separated by '/' if there is more than one — are given before a lemma maker. The first of these is the one that I have judged to be original.

A1. Conjunctive readings

> *kāryam akārakaṃ / kāryam akāraṇaṃ*] *kāryam akāraṇakaṃ* A^d M
> *kvacit tu*] *kvacic ca* A^d M
> *yat punaḥ punar / ye punaḥ punar*] *yat punar* A^d M$E_M E_V$
> *ca*] *om.* A^d M

vadadbhir] *bhaṇadbhir* A^d ME$_M$
abhyupeyata / abhyupagata] *abhyupeyate* A^d M
paṭādayaḥ / ghaṭādayaḥ] *padātayaḥ* A^d ME$_V$
kapitthāni] *kapitthānāṃ* A^d ME$_M$E$_V$
kapittheṣv ekatraiva śatatame śatam iti / kapittheṣv ekatraiva śataṃ mayā bhakṣitam iti] *kapittheṣu tatraiva śatam mayā bhakṣitam iti* A^d M
bhāsopārūḍha] *bhāsoparūḍha* A^d M
tāvakaṃ] *bādhakaṃ* A^d ME$_M$
atītakāle] *atīte kāle* A^d ME$_M$E$_V$
atikrānta] *atīta* A^d ME$_M$
pratyabhijñājñāna] *pratyabhijñāna* A^d M
mānasam eva] *mānasaṃ* A^d M
pūrvajñāna] *pūrvavijñāna* A^d ME$_M$
jñāna] *vijñāna* A^d ME$_M$E$_V$
pratyabhijñājñānena] *pratyabhijñānena* A^d ME$_M$E$_V$
kāryakāritvaṃ sahakāryapekṣaṇena / kāryakāritvaṃ sahakārya-pekṣeṇa] *kāryakāritāṃ sahakāryapekṣaṇena* A^d M

A2. Conjunctive errors

While I have judged that none of A^d and M's readings in the previous section (A1) are likely to be original, they all yield a plausible sense and none of them can be ruled out as completely impossible. All of their readings in this section (A2), by contrast, must be mistaken.

vyāpārakārya / vyāpārajakārya / vyāpārād api kāryā] *vyāpārād api kārya* A^d M
tadāvasthānā] *tadavasthānā* S A^d M
bhāvāt tadviṣayaṃ] *bhāvāt na tadviṣayaṃ* A^d M
jñānam anarthajaṃ] *jñānam arthajaṃ* A^d M
viṣaya iti] *viṣayam iti* A^d M

B. Evidence weighing against M being copied from A^d

B1. Mistakes in A^d that are not in M

pratiṣṭhāpya] M; *preti* - - - A^d
ghaṭapaṭa] M; *ghaṭa* A^d
smṛtiḥ smarta] *smṛtismartta* M; *smṛtismatta* A^d
tadaikya] M; *tedaikya* A^d

tadgrāhitāṃ vrajet] M; *tadgrāhitā vrajet* A^d
dhvāntasantatir] M; *dhvantāntasantatir* A^d
darśanād] M; *daśanād* A^d
kālāvacchinna] M; *kālovacchinna* A^d
mahātman] M; *mohātman* A^d
tava na] M; *na* A^d
balīya] M; *virolaya* A^d
balavattayaiva] M; *balavatvattayaiva* A^d
nanv atikrānta] M; *na tv atikrānta* A^d
padārtha] M; *pādārtha* A^d
bāhyendriyopajanita] M; *bāhyendriyāpajanita* A^d
viśeṣaṇaṃ vartamāna] M; *viśeṣaṇavartamāna* A^d
kariṣyasi] M; *kariṣyati* A^d
ananyathā] M; *anyathā* A^d
prāmāṇyā] M; *prāmaṇyā* A^d

B2. Other striking differences between A^d and M

tejovibhavavidhūta] A^d; *tejonvavidhūta* M
avayavy asti] *avayavy apy asti* A^d; *avayavavyakti* M
gandhavatkunda] A^d; *gandhavatskanda* M

B3. Other minor differences between A^d and M

viśiṣyate] A^d; *viśeṣyate* M
sarvatra] A^d; *sartatra* M
nāstīti] A^d; *nnāstīti* M
durapalapam] *durupalāpaṃ* A^d; *durapalāpam* M
pratīti] A^d; *prīti* M
ālambanī] A^d; *ālambinī* M
kāle] A^d; *kāleya* M
lokitāḥ] A^d; *lokitā* M
padādayaḥ] A^d; *padātayaḥ* M
ato] A^d; *adho* M
navanavatiḥ] A^d; *navanavati* M
puro 'vasthito] A^d; *puro 'vasthite* M
aprāmāṇyaṃ] A^d; *aprāmāṇyāṃ* M
saurabham] *sauratyam* A^d; *saurabhyam* M
saṅgatā] A^d; *saṅgatāḥ* M
sthāpayi] A^d; *sthāpi* M

C. Conclusions regarding the relationship between A^d and M

The evidence in A1, and even more so that in A2, implies a close relationship of A^d and M. But was M directly and exclusively copied from A^d? The hypothesis that it was cannot be undermined by the evidence in B3, nor by that in B2; but it is difficult to reconcile with the evidence in B1. While some of the cases in B1 could possibly have resulted from M's scribe correcting obvious mistakes, many could not:

• If M were copied from A^d, or copied from a descendent of A^d, without there being any cross-contamination, then there would be no way to explain such readings as:

 tava na] M; *na* A^d. The *tava* is both required for a meaningful sentence, and the reading of all the other witnesses including P.

• If M were copied from A^d, we would have to assume that M's scribe was weighing every sentence extremely carefully and making such correct recoveries of the original reading from his own insight as:

 balīya] M; *virolaya* A^d
 kariṣyasi] M; *kariṣyati* A^d
 ananyathā] M; *anyathā* A^d
 nanv atikrānta] M; *na tv atikrānta* A^d
 dhvāntasantatir] M; *dhvantāntasantatir* A^d
 ghaṭapaṭa] M; *ghaṭa* A^d

But we do not get the impression from elsewhere that M's scribe was paying such close attention to meaning.

While some of the cases in B1, including perhaps some cases listed just above, could have been corrections on the part of M's scribe, it is difficult to believe that all of them were. Their combined impact is to throw considerable doubt on the hypothesis that M is a direct copy of A^d, or even that it is in the same line as A^d, separated by an intermediary/intermediaries but without additional cross-contamination.

Two further considerations against the hypothesis that M was an immediate or mediated descendant of A^d:

• A^d was sloppily written at the first time of copying, but the scribe then included a huge number of corrections (see Graheli 2015: 41–42). (In my limited experience with manuscripts I have never seen so many corrections in the same hand as that of the scribe.) A small, often not very visible, horizontal stroke above an *akṣara* is all that indicates that that *akṣara* has been cancelled and is not to be read. If M were derived from A^d at this part of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, we would expect that at least some of these cancelled *akṣaras* would have been mistakenly copied (perhaps prior to then being cancelled). I did not find a single such instance in this passage.

• M is certainly not nearly as close to A^d as S was shown in the previous section to be to P. The latter case suggests that when one manuscript X is directly copied from another Y (or even from an intermediary), many of the new mistakes in X can be explained by the particular way in which an *akṣara* appears in Y. I did not find any such cases in this passage. Kataoka (2018: 377–76) did find such a case in the 9th *āhnika*, which was what led him to the apograph hypothesis. But even if that case is taken as decisive for that part of the text, it is not decisive for this part of the text. That scribes of the *Nyāyamañjarī* sometimes copied different parts of the text from different witnesses is illustrated by the case of S being copied from, or derived from, P at some parts of the text but not at others.

If M is not exclusively copied from A^d or from an intermediary, how do we explain their close relationship that can clearly be inferred from the evidence in A1 and A2? We should await more evidence from the collation of other passages from the 7th *āhnika*, but there are at least two other possibilities: (1) M belongs in the same line as A^d, but consulted at least one other manuscript from another line; (2) M and A^d were both derived from a common source. If either of these two were the case, the existence in both manuscripts of mistakes not found in the other would be easy to explain.

8. *Abbreviations*

A^d A manuscript preserved in the Adyar Library, Chennai, No. 70179B. Malayalam script. Palm leaf. Incomplete: it covers, with some missing parts, *āhnikas* 6–12. For a detailed description of the

manuscript, see Graheli (2015: 40–43). The portion containing this passage (and indeed that containing the whole of the 7th *āhnika*) contains no traces of the original folio numbering. Graheli (2015: 275) lists the twenty-five folios of this manuscript that bear the trace of an alphanumerical folio numbering system that originally ran from *ka, kā, ki, kī* to *jhe, jhai, jho, jhau.* Taking *ka* as indicating 1v, *kā* as 2v, etc., we can say that our passage starts on folio 42v and ends on folio 49r. Graheli's table (2015: 276–77) correlates these numbers with not only the alphanumeric sequence but also the numbers of the photographs from which he was working. Since my access to the manuscript is by means of the same photographs (courtesy of the Adyar Library and Taisei Shida), I refer — for example in the margins of the edition — to the folios collated for this passage by photograph number (the passage starts on 237.1 and ends on 247.1). Anyone who does not have access to these photographs can consult Graheli's table to see which folios they refer to.

Some of its 'insignificant' readings, and some of its shorter lacunae owing to manuscript damage, are not reported in the apparatus. They are of course always reported if there is any variation among the other witnesses at that point. It was sloppily written at the first time of copying, but the scribe then included a huge number of corrections (see Graheli 2015: 41–42). Not all of the *ac* readings are recorded, even if there is variation among the other witnesses.

A[ll] A manuscript preserved in the Shri Ganganath Jha Campus of the Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan (previously: Ganganatha Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha), Allahabad, No. 833/52. Devanāgarī. Paper. 660 folios. Complete. [I thank Karin Preisendanz for sharing a copy of the manuscript as part of a cooperation scheme with the project mentioned below in the description of P.] I have used this not very good manuscript (cf. Graheli [2015: 35]: 'The manuscript is carelessly written, abounding in orthographical errors and nonsensical readings.') for other parts of the *Nyayamañjarī,* but for this passage have only glanced at it, and reported its readings very rarely. It was one of the manuscripts used by Varadacharya for E$_M$, and Graheli (2015: 80–83) has shown that it is an apograph of the paper Devanāgarī manuscript C–1374, Oriental Research Institute, Mysore, also used by Varadacharya.

ac *ante correctionem* (appended to the abbreviation for a manuscript as in P[ac]), indicates the reading of a manuscript before it was subsequently corrected by a scribe.

C A manuscript preserved in the Malayalam Department of the University of Calicut, No. 2606. Malayalam script. Palm leaf. 177 folios. Incomplete. [I thank Dominic Goodall and S. A. S. Sharma for making their photographs of the manuscript available to me.] For a detailed description of the manuscript, see Graheli (2015: 38–40). As he notes, it contains only the first six *āhnikas* and about a third of the seventh. The bottom half of the verso side of its final folio (the 177th surviving folio, but 187 in the original foliation) transmits the first part of our passage, and ends with the words *kiṃ sa evāyaṃ stambha ity ekaṃ jñāna* - - - (§ 1.2 of this edition; p. 308,10 of E$_M$, Vol. 2). So we lack the evidence of this important manuscript for the bulk of our passage.

conj. A conjecture. Differentiated from an emendation on the admittedly partially subjective grounds that less confidence can be felt regarding its correctness.

E$_K$ Part I *The Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Edited with notes etc. by Pandit Śrī Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla.* Kashi Sanskrit Series 106; Nyaya section 15. Benares: Jaya Krishna Dās Haridās Gupta, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1936.

E$_K$ Part II *The Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa With Notes by Pandit Śrī Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla. Part II, ed.* Dhundhirāja Śāstri. Kashi Sanskrit Series 106; Nyaya section 16. Benares: Jai Krishnadas-Haridas Gupta, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1934.

ed. The edition (of the text in question, given in the bibliography).

em. An emendation. Differentiated from a conjecture on the admittedly partially subjective grounds that more confidence can be felt regarding its correctness.

E$_M$ Volume 1. *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa, with Ṭippaṇī—Nyāyasaurabha by the Editor. Volume 1, ed.* K. S. Varadacharya. Oriental Research Institute Series 116. Mysore: 1969.

E$_M$ Volume 2. *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa, with Ṭippaṇī—Nyāyasaurabha by the Editor. Volume 2, ed.* K. S. Varadacharya. Oriental Research Institute Series 139. Mysore: 1983.

E_M^{ac} Readings found in the main text of E$_M$ which are corrected in an appendix at the end of the second volume.

E_M^{ka} Readings attributed in the footnotes in E$_M$ to *ka* — a manuscript 'acquired by the Oriental Research Institute, Mysore' (E$_M$ Vol. 1, English Preface, vii; see also Sanskrit *Prastāvanā*, 2: *etatsaṃśodhanālayasthaḥ kāgadapatrātmakaḥ kośaḥ 'ka' saṃjñayā yojitaḥ*). This has been identified by Kataoka (2011: 627) and Graheli (2015: 63) as C-1374 (ORI, Mysore), a paper Deva-

nāgarī manuscript referred to by the former as O_1 and the latter as O. Occasionally readings attributed to *ka* occur not in that manuscript, but in the printed editions that predate E_M: E_V and E_K. As Graheli (personal communication) and Kataoka (2011: 627) have suggested, this could easily be the result of misprinting *ka* when *kha* was intended.

E_M^{kha} Readings attributed in footnotes in E_M to *kha* — a previously printed edition: '*mudritakośa eva tulanātmakasaṃśodhanopayogārthaṃ "kha" saṃjñayā yojitaḥ*' (E_M Vol. 1, *Prastāvanā*, ii). There are two previous printed editions: E_V and E_K. Graheli (2015: 64–65) has demonstrated that although Varadacharya used both in order to constitute his text, he uses *kha* to mark specifically the readings of E_V. In this passage there are some readings attributed to *kha* that are different from the reading of E_V, and in all of those cases E_K reads the same as E_V: Varadacharya was misreporting.

E_M^{gha} Readings attributed in footnotes in E_M to *gha* — a manuscript in the Adyar Library (E_M Vol. 2, *Bhūmika*, viii). Graheli (2015: 64) confirms that this is Adyar library, 70179B, i.e. A^d above. There are only two readings in this passage attributed to *gha*; one of them is indeed that of A^d, but the other is the reading of the other witnesses. So here too we find the same kind of misreporting as that noted in Varadacharya's use of *ka*, *kha* and *ca*. Graheli (2015: 43) mentions misattribution of variants to *gha* in the 6th *āhnika*.

E_M^{ca} Readings attributed in footnotes in E_M to *ca* — manuscript preserved in the Ganganath Jha Research Institute, Allahabad (E_M Vol. 2, Bhūmika, viii), i.e. A^{ll} above (Graheli 2015: 64). Kataoka (2018: 378–377) has noted that Varadacharya sometimes confuses A^{ll} and the Mysore manuscript C-1374 (see E_M^{ka} above); readings that are not found in A^{ll}, but are found in C-1374 are not infrequently attributed to *ca*.

E_M^{ja} Readings attributed in footnotes in E_M to *ja*. Since Varadacharya nowhere defines this, and since he does not use *cha* that comes before this in the alphabet, his uses of *ja* are perhaps typos for one of the other *akṣara*s.

E_M^{pc} Readings given in a *Śodhanika* appendix at the end of the second volume of E_M.

E_V *The Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa.* Part 2 (*taduttarabhāgaḥ*). Ed. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailaṅga. Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series, No. 10. Benares: E. J. Lazarus & Co., 1896.

GB   *Cakradhara's Nyāyamañjarī-Granthibhaṅga*, ed. Nagin J. Shah. L. D. Series 35. Ahmedabad: 1972.

M   A manuscript preserved in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library (GOML), Madras / Chennai, R. 3583, S. R. 1712. Malayalam script. Palm leaf. [I thank Kei Kataoka for making his photographs available to me.] The manuscript is incomplete, lacking the first 6 *āhnika*s and the start of the 7th, beginning after the start of our passage. Arabic numbers beginning with '1' are written usually in the left, but occasionally in the right, margin of the recto sides of folios. Since these are more legible than the indications of older foliation, I refer to the Arabic numbers when referring to the pages of this manuscript. Some of its 'insignificant' readings and lacunae owing to manuscript damage are not reported in the apparatus. They are of course always reported if there is any variation among the other witnesses at that point.

Graheli (2012: 325–326) gives a description of two GOML *Nyāya-mañjarī* manuscripts: R. 3583 and R. 3631a. What is surprizing is that R. 3583 is described as having 9 lines in a page and R. 3631A as 8, whereas all of the pages that I have seen of R. 3583 have 8 lines in a page (I have not seen R. 3631A). Since neither of these two manuscripts contain *āhnika* 6, the focus of Graheli's research, most of the content of his descriptions, including the information about line numbers, consists of quotations from GOML catalogues. R. 3583 is described as beginning with *uta dve ete smṛtya-nubhavajñāne*. This means that more of the first folio was available at the time of the description (1927) — about 23 *akṣaras* more in the first line: now that a large part of the left edge of that folio is missing, it begins with the words *kāraṇaṃ vācyam yata utpadyate* (§ 1.2.1 of this edition; p. 308,12 of E$_M$ Vol. 2).

NM   *Nyāyamañjarī*. Unless otherwise stated, page numbers refer to the two volumes of E$_M$.

om.   An omission. '*karaṇa om.* P' = the word *karaṇa* is omitted in P.

P   A manuscript preserved in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (BORI), Pune, No. 390/1895–6. Śāradā. Birchbark. 432 folios. Complete apart from very occasional missing leaves. I have used digital photographs made available to me by Karin Preisendanz in a cooperation scheme with the Project 'Metaphysics and Epistemology of the Nyāya Tradition III — Sources, History, Ideas: A Critical Edition of the *Nyāyabhāṣya*' (FWF Project P 24388-G15) at the Department of South Asian, Tibetan and Buddhist Studies, University of Vienna. I thank BORI, Prof. Preisendanz, and the *Nyāyabhāṣya* project.

For a detailed description of the manuscript, see Graheli (2015: 45–49). The current binding seems not to be original, as some leaves are misplaced or wrongly oriented. Some time subsequent to this binding and prior to taking their photographs, BORI placed small white stickers at the top or bottom of each page, sequentially numbered from '1' on the first page, to '840' on the last. The names they have given the digital image files are as follows: '1a' for the page with white sticker '1,' '1b' for page '2,' '2a' for page '3,' '2b' for page '4,' and so on, where 'a' corresponds to *recto* and 'b' to *verso*. Graheli (2015: 46) reports that original folio numbers are given in Śāradā numerals on the lower left margin of the verso folios: they run from 2–149 (covering *āhnika*s 1–3), then begin again and run from 1–270 (covering *āhnika*s 4–12). But (as he notes) these are frequently lost due to the loss of that part of the leaf. Hence the numbers I use are those of the digital image file.

Our passage begins on 283b. Five sentences before the end of our passage, the manuscript becomes lacunose owing to loss of folios. Graheli (2015: 45–46) mentions other missing or misplaced folios but not these ones. The last part of our passage that is transmitted in the surviving parts of this manuscript is given on 290b. The last legible words on 290b (*stambhādāv- - -mānam api*) occur in E$_M$ at Vol. 2, p. 335, but 291a begins with text from p. 360, 291b with text from p. 357, 292a with text from p. 540, 292b with text from p. 538, and 293a with text from p. 362. I told Alessandro Graheli about this, and he replied (email, Sept 12th, 2018) that he now thinks that the folios that originally came after 290b, i.e. 149–152 in the original foliation, are lost.

pc   *post correctionem* (appended to the abbreviation for a manuscript as in P^{pc}), indicates a correction by a scribe of what was written first and then deleted.

r   *recto*, the front of a folio of a manuscript (as in 5r)

S   A manuscript preserved in the Oriental Research Library, University Campus, Hazaratbal, Srinagar, No. 10232 (Acc. No. 1933). Śāradā. Paper. 98 folios. Incomplete. [I thank Kei Kataoka for making his photographs of the manuscript available to me, and Karin Preisendanz for sharing the photographs available in the archive of the project series 'Metaphysics and Epistemology of the Nyāya Tradition — Sources, History, Ideas: A Critical Edition of the *Nyāyabhāṣya*,' in the framework of the cooperation mentioned in the description of P above.] For a detailed description of the manuscript, see Graheli (2015: 51–54). As he

(2015: 51) noted, folios are missing that correspond to E$_M$ Vol. 2, pp. 336,3–357,14;[98] this lacuna begins three sentences before the end of our passage.

unm.   unmetrical

v   *verso,* the back of a folio of a manuscript (as in 5v)

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[98] Graheli names them as folios 190–193, but I think he should rather have written 290–293.

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        See *Nyāyabindu.*

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        References to sections (§) refer to the edition contained in this
        article; references to page numbers refer to the following edition:
        *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa, with Ṭippaṇi—Nyāyasaurabha by the
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        the readings of this edition, but I use the following chapter numbers
        – 1 = Svārthānumāna; 2 = Pramāṇasiddhi; 3 = Pratyakṣa; 4 =
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न्यायमञ्जरी

1 [किं प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः क्षणिकत्वानुमानबाधकत्वम् ? पूर्वपक्षः]

1.1 [अनुमानप्रत्यभिज्ञयोः सम्बन्धः]

1.1.1 [अशिथिलप्रतिबन्धे हेतौ बाधकस्यासम्भवः]

यदपि क्षणभङ्गसाधकस्य पदार्थस्थैर्यावसायि प्रत्यभिज्ञानमनुमानस्य बाधक-
मभिधीयते, तदपि न पेशलम्, अशिथिलप्रतिबन्धे हेतौ बाधकस्य निरव-
काशत्वात् । उक्तं हि "बाधाविनाभावयोर्हि विरोधान्नैकत्र समावेशः" इति ।

"अनुष्णस्तेजोऽवयवी कृतकत्वात्" इत्यत्रापि प्रतिबन्धवैधुर्यमेव साध्यसिद्धिं
निरुणद्धि, नाध्यक्षबाध्यत्वम् ।

Variants

1 साधकस्य] PSCE$_M$E$_V$; साधनकस्यस्य A^d 1 प्रत्यभिज्ञान] PSCA^{d}E$_V$E$_M^{kha}$; प्रत्यभिज्ञान-
विज्ञान E$_M$ 2 प्रतिबन्धे हेतौ] P^{pc}S; प्र⏜बन्धे हेतौ P^{ac}; प्रतिबन्धहेतौ CA^{d}E$_M$E$_V$ 2–3
निरवकाशत्वात्] PSCE$_M$E$_V$; निरवकशत्वात् A^d 3 भावयोर्हि वि] PS; भावयोर्वि CA^{d}E$_M$
E$_V$ 4 अनुष्णस्तेजोऽवयवी] PCA^{d}S^{pc}E$_V$; अनुष्णस्तेजोऽवयवे S^{ac}; अनुष्णस्तेजस्वी E$_M$ 4
कृतकत्वात्] PSCE$_M$E$_V$; कृतेकत्वात् A^d 4 साध्यसिद्धिं] SCA^{d}E$_M$E$_V$; सा⏜सिद्धिं P

Manuscript damage; loss of folio(s)

3 विरोधान्नैकत्र] विरोधा---कत्र C

Source passages and parallels

3 बाधाविनाभावयोर्हि विरोधात्] NM Vol. 1, p. 284,13–14: न च तथाविधे बाधा संभवति
बाधाविनाभावयोर्विरोधात् । *Hetubindu* p. 29: तत्राबाधितविषयत्वं तावत्पृथग्लक्षणं न भवति,
बाधाविनाभावयोर्विरोधात् ।

1.1.2 [प्रत्यभिज्ञाया अन्यथासिद्धिः]

6 अथवा किमनेन निर्बन्धेन

अग्निशैत्यानुमानादौ युक्तं प्रत्यक्षबाधनम् ।

8 तस्य ह्यनन्यथासिद्धेः, इह त्वेवं न युज्यते ॥

प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः क्षणभङ्गपक्षे ऽपि सदृशापरापरक्षणगणप्रसवप्रतारितमतीना-

10 मुपपद्यमानत्वात् । एवं च सति   P 284a

1.1.2.1 [प्रत्यभिज्ञया किं सिद्धम्]

यदि हि व्याप्तिशैथिल्यं सिद्धं किं प्रत्यभिज्ञया । E_M 308

12 अथ न व्याप्तिशैथिल्यं सिद्धं किं प्रत्यभिज्ञया ॥

1.1.2.2 [इतरेतराश्रयत्वम्]

न च प्रत्यभिज्ञैव व्याप्तिविप्लवकारणम्, इतरेतराश्रयप्रसङ्गात् । व्याप्ति-

14 विप्लवेनानुमाने न्यग्भूते प्रत्यभिज्ञा प्रमाणीभवति, तस्यां च प्रमाणीभूता-

यां व्याप्तिवैधुर्यादनुमानाप्रामाण्यम् ।

16 अनुमानप्रामाण्ये ऽपि समानो दोष इति चेत्, न, तस्य स्वप्रतिबन्धमहिम्नैव A^d 239.1,

प्रामाण्यसिद्धेः । न हि तस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञादौर्बल्यनिबन्धनं प्रामाण्यम् ।   S 284r

――――――――――――――――― Variants ―――――――――――――――――
6 निर्बन्धेन] PSCA^{d}E$_M$; निर्बन्धनेन E$_V$ 7 नुमानादौ] PSE$_M$E$_V$; नुमानादेर् CA^d 8 तस्य
ह्यनन्यथासिद्धेः] PS^{pc}A^{d}E$_V$; तस्य ह्य---न्यथासिद्धेः C; तस्य ह्यनन्यथासिद्धि E$_M$S^{ac} 8
त्वेवं न] PSE$_V$; त्वेतन्न CE$_M$; त्वेवन्न A^d 9 प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः] PCA^{d}E$_M$E$_V$; प्रत्यभिज्ञाया
S   9 सदृशा] PS; सदृश CA^{d}E$_M$E$_V$ 10 पद्य] PSCE$_M$; लभ्य E$_V$E$_M^{kha}$; ---⌣ A^d 11
व्याप्ति] PSA^{d}E$_M$E$_V$; व्यापि C   11 प्रत्यभिज्ञा] PSA^{d}E$_M$E$_V$; प्रत्यभिज्ञाः C   12 सिद्धं
किं] PSA^{d}E$_M$E$_V$; सि---किं C   12 प्रत्यभिज्ञया] PSA^{d}E$_M$E$_V$; प्रत्यभिज्ञा C   13 न च]
PSA^{d}E$_V$; न C; न चेत्थं E$_M$ 14 प्रमाणीभवति] PSCA^d; प्रमाणं भवति E$_M$E$_V$ 14 च]
PSE$_M$E$_V$; *om.* CA^d 14–15 प्रमाणीभूतायां] SE$_M$E$_V$; प्रमाणीभूताय⌣ P; प्रमाणभूतायां
CA^d 15 नाप्रामाण्यम्] PCE$_M$E$_V$; न्प्रामाण्यम् E$_M^{ca}$; नाप्र---ण्यम् S; नाप्राण्यम् A^d 16
अनुमान] PSE$_M$E$_V$; आनुमान C; अनुमान्यन A^d 16 स्वप्रतिबन्ध] PSCA^d; प्रतिबन्ध E$_M$E$_V$
16 महिम्नैव] SCE$_M$E$_V$; महिम्नैव P; महिम्--- A^d 17 प्रामाण्य] PSE$_M$E$_V$; प्रामाण्यन्य
C; --- A^d 17 प्रत्यभिज्ञादौर्बल्य] PCE$_M$E$_V$; प्रत्यभिज्ञदौर्बल्य A^d; प्र×{×त्यभि---बल्य
S   17 निबन्धनं] PSCE$_V$; निबन्धन E$_M$; निबन्धननं A^d

――――――――――――――――― Ṭippaṇī: Nyāyasaurabha ―――――――――――――――――
11–12 यदि हि ... प्रत्यभिज्ञया] पक्षद्वये ऽपि प्रत्यभिज्ञाया अप्रमाणत्वात्   16 समानो दोष]
दोषः – अन्योन्याश्रयः

1.2 [का प्रत्यभिज्ञा ?]

18 अपि च केयं प्रत्यभिज्ञा नामेति नैपुणेन निरूपयितुमर्हन्त्यत्रभवन्तः । किम् "स एवायं स्तम्भः" इत्येकं ज्ञानम्, उत द्वे एते स्मृत्यनुभवज्ञाने ?

1.2.1 [द्वे ज्ञाने]

20 यद्येकम्, तदस्य कारणं वाच्यं यत उत्पद्यते । नेन्द्रियम्, "सः" इत्येतस्मिन्नंशे M 1r
तस्यासामर्थ्यात् । न संस्कारः, तस्यापि "अयं" इत्यंशे कौशलाभावात् ।

22 उभाभ्यां न च सम्भूय तज्ज्ञानमुपजन्यते ।
पृथक्पृथक्स्वकार्ये हि निर्झितं कौशलं तयोः ॥

24 संस्कारस्य स्मृतिरेव कार्यम्, इन्द्रियस्यानुभव एव । सम्भूय न तु ताभ्यामेकं E$_V$ 449
कार्यमारभ्यते । न हि मृत्पिण्डतन्तुनिर्वर्त्यमेकं घटपटरूपं कार्यमुपलब्धम् । न E$_M$ 309

26 चेन्द्रियमीदृशि कार्ये समर्थम् ।

यथासन्निहिताकारमात्रग्राह्यविचारकम् ।

―――――――――――――――――― Variants ――――――――――――――――――

18 अपि च] PSA^{d}E$_M$E$_V$; अपि च अपि च C   18 नैपुणेन] PSA^d; नैपुण्येन E$_M$E$_V$; नैपुणे
C   18 निरूपयितुम्] SCE$_V$; निरूपयितुं P; निरूपयितुमे A^d 19 स्तम्भः] PSCA^{d}E$_M$;
कुम्भः E$_V$E$_M^{kha}$; स्त⌣: E$_M^{ka}$ 20 यद्येकम्] SE$_M$E$_V$; ⌣यद्येकम् P; य--- A^d 20 तदस्य]
PS^{pc}E$_M$E$_V$; तदस्ये S^{ac}; --- A^d 20 इत्येतस्मिन्नंशे] PS; इत्यस्मिन्नंशे A^{d}ME$_M$E$_V$ 21 न]
PSA^d; न च E$_M$E$_V$; --- M   21 संस्कारः] SA^{d}ME$_M$E$_V$; संस्का⌣: P   22 न च] PSE$_M$
E$_V$; नापि A^d 22 पजन्यते] PA^{d}E$_M$E$_V$; पजायते S; धार्यते E$_M^{ka}$E$_M^{ja}$ 23 निर्झितं] PME$_M$
E$_V$; निर्जितं S; नि---T--- A^d 24 न तु] PS; तु न A^{d}ME$_M$; न E$_V$ 25 रभ्यते] PA^{d}E$_M$E$_V$;
रभते S   25 निर्वर्त्यमेकं] PSA^{d}E$_V$; निर्वत्येमेकं E$_M$ 25 घटपट] SME$_M$E$_V$; ×कार्य×घटपट
P; घट A^d 25 रूपं] PSA^{d}ME$_V$; रूप E$_M$ 26 न्द्रियमीदृशि] S; न्द्रियमीदृशि P; न्द्रियं
केवलमीदृशि A^{d}ME$_M$E$_V$ 27 ग्राह्यविचार] PSA^{d}ME$_V$E$_M^{kha}$E$_K$GB; ग्राह्यविषय E$_M$ *unm.*

――――――― Manuscript damage; loss of folio(s) ―――――――

19 इत्येकं ज्ञानम् … तत्प्रमाणीभविष्यतीति(§2.6)] इत्येकं ज्ञान--- C   20 यदपि
क्षणभङ्गसाधकस्य (§1.1.1) … कारणं वाच्यं] --- कारणं वाच्यं M   21–22 कौशलाभावात्
… सुपजन्यते] कौशला---ते M   24–25 ताभ्यामेकं … निर्वर्त्यमेकं घट] ताभ्यामेकं ---मकं
घट M   26 समर्थम्] सम्--- M

―――――――――――――――――― Granthibhaṅga ――――――――――――――――――

27 ग्राह्यविचारकम्] GB, p. 191: **अविचारकमिति** । अर्थसन्निधिमात्रेण ज्ञानस्योत्पत्तेरवि-
चारकत्वम् । तदुक्तम् – "सन्निहितविषयबलोत्पत्तेरविचारकत्वम्" इति ।

―――――――――― Ṭippaṇī: Nyāyasaurabha ――――――――――

24–25 सम्भूय न तु ताभ्यामेकं कार्यमारभ्यते] स्मृतित्वानुभवत्वयोः कदापि सामानाधि-
करण्यासम्भवात्

―――――――――― Source passages and parallels ――――――――――

27 यथासन्निहिताकारमात्रग्राह्यविचारकम्] NM Vol. 1, p. 78,1–2 निर्विकल्पकं प्रत्यक्षं पुरो
ऽवस्थितवस्तुस्वलक्षणप्रदर्शनमात्रनिष्ठितव्यापारं अविचारकमेव

28 इन्द्रियं प्रत्यभिज्ञानमातनोतीति विस्मयः ॥

तस्माद्द्वे एते ज्ञाने – "सः" इति स्मरणम् "अयम्" इत्यनुभवः ।

1.2.1.1 [भिन्नविषयता]

30 स्मृतिः स्मर्तव्यविषया, ग्रहणं ग्राह्यगोचरम् ।
न तदैक्यपरामर्शि दृश्यते प्रत्ययान्तरम् ॥

32 यथा निरन्तरोत्पन्ने घटज्ञानपटस्मृती ।
न तुल्यविषये, तद्वदेते अपि भविष्यतः ॥

1.2.2 [प्रत्यभिज्ञाया एकज्ञानत्वे ऽपि न स्थैर्यसिद्धिः]

34 यद्वा भवतु नामेदमेकमेव हि वेदनम् ।
तथापि कीदृशं वस्तु स्पृशतीति परीक्ष्यताम् ॥

36 अतीतकालयुक्तं चेत्, स्मरणान्न विशिष्यते ।
अनागतविशिष्टं चेत्, सङ्कल्पप्रायमेव तत् ॥

38 वर्तमानैकनिष्ठं चेत्, स्थिरत्वं तर्हि सुस्थितम् ।
कालत्रयपरीतं चेत्, विरोधात्तत्तु दुर्लभम् ॥

40 परस्परपरित्यागव्यवस्थितनिजात्मनाम् ।
एकत्र न समावेशः कथञ्चिदुपपद्यते ॥

─────────── Variants ───────────

28 इन्द्रियं] PE$_M$E$_V$; इन्द्रिय S; इन्द्रिय--- M   29 तस्माद्द्वे] PSE$_M$E$_V$; तस्माद्द्वे A^d 30 स्मृतिः स्मर्त] P^{pc}SE$_M$E$_V$; स्मृतिस्मर्त P^{ac}; स्मृतिस्मर्त्त M; स्मृतिस्मत्त A^d 31 तदैक्य] PSME$_M$E$_V$; तेदैक्य A^d 36 विशिष्यते] PSCA^{d}E$_M$E$_V$; विशेष्यते M   37 प्रायमेव] PA^d ME$_M$E$_V$; प्रयमेव S   37 अनागतविशिष्टं … प्रायमेव तत्] *om.* P, but then added in margin   38 वर्तमानैक] PA^{d}ME$_M$E$_V$; वर्तमानेक S   38 सुस्थितम्] PA^{d}E$_M$E$_V$; सस्थितम् S

─────────── Manuscript damage; loss of folio(s) ───────────

28–29 इन्द्रिय … तस्माद्द्वे] इन्द्रिय---M   31–32 दृश्यते … ज्ञानपटस्मृती] दृश्य---ज्ञानपटस्मृती M   35–36 कीदृशं … स्मरणान्न] कीद्---णान्न M

─────────── Granthibhaṅga ───────────

37 सङ्कल्पप्रायमेव तत्] GB, p. 191: **सङ्कल्पप्रायमेव तदिति** । सङ्कल्पस्यानागतविषयत्वेन दर्शनात् तत्प्रायता ।   38 स्थिरत्वं तर्हि सुस्थितम्] GB, p. 191: **स्थिरत्वं तर्हि (sic) सुस्थितम्** । एते(त)देव क्षणिकत्वं यतः ।

─────────── Ṭippaṇī: Nyāyasaurabha ───────────

38 स्थिरत्वं तर्हि सुस्थितम्] इयं परिहासोक्तिः । वर्तमानमात्रविषयत्वे क्षणिकत्वम् [*em.*; त्वभ् *ed.*] एव हि सिद्धेत् ।

42 यथा हि

   नीलाभावाविनाभूतलोहिताद्यपसारणम् ।

44   कुर्वता नीलबोधेन नीलं भवति निश्चितम् ॥

तद्वदिहापि

46   तदभावाविनाभूतभूतकालाद्यपोहनम् ।

   विदधद्वर्तमानार्थज्ञानं तद्ग्राहितां व्रजेत् ॥

1.2.2.1 [न प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः पूर्वज्ञानविशिष्टार्थग्राहित्वम्]

48 एतेन पूर्वज्ञानविशिष्टार्थग्राहित्वं प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः प्रत्युक्तम् । पूर्वज्ञान-
स्येदानीमसत्त्वेन विशेषणत्वानुपपत्तेः । अगृहीतविशेषणायाश्च विशेष्यबुद्धेर-

50 भावात् ।

1.2.2.2 [न प्रत्यभिज्ञाया जन्मनाशरहितस्वरूपग्राहित्वम्]

अथोपजनापायरहितवस्तुस्वरूपग्राहिणी प्रत्यभिज्ञेत्युच्यते, तदप्ययुक्तम्,

52 वर्तमानैकनिष्ठतायाः प्रदर्शितत्वात् । भावानां च नाशजन्मनोर्वर्तमानो वा

―――――――――――――― Variants ――――――――――――――

43 द्यपसारणम्] PA^{d}E$_M$E$_V$; द्यपस$\times$ंं$\times$रणम् S; द्यपस--- M 46 भूतभूतकाला] PSA^d
ME$_M$; भूतस्वस्वकाला E$_V$; भूतस्वस्वला E$_M^{kha}$ *unm.* 47 विदधद्व] PSA^{d}ME$_M$; वेदयन्व
E$_V$; वेदयद्व E$_M^{kha}$ 47 तद्ग्राहितां व्रजेत्] SME$_M$; तद्ग्राहिता व्रजेत् A^d; तद्ग्रा⌣तां व्रजेत्
P; तद्ग्राहिता भवेत् E$_V$E$_M^{kha}$ 49 अगृहीत] PE$_M$A^{d}ME$_V$; अग्रहीत S 49 विशेष्य] PSA^d
M; विशिष्ट E$_M$E$_V$ 51 अथो] PSA^{d}ME$_M$; अर्थो E$_V$E$_M^{kha}$ 51 जना] PSA^{d}MA^{ll}; जनना E$_M$
E$_V$ 52 नाश] PS; विनाश ME$_M$E$_V$; --- A^d 52 वर्तमानो] PME$_M$E$_V$; वर्तमाने S; ---
A^d 52–53 वा काल:] SME$_M$E$_V$; +वा+ काल: P; ---काल A^d

――――――――― Manuscript damage; loss of folio(s) ―――――――――

42–43 यथा हि … लोहिताद्यपसारणम्] ---हिताद्यपसारणम् P 44–45 म् ॥ तद्वदिहापि]
---दिहापि P

―――――――――――――― Granthibhaṅga ――――――――――――――

42–43 यथा हि नीलाभावा] GB, p. 191: **यथाहि नीलाभावे**ति । नीलपरिच्छेदकं हि प्रमाणं
तद्विरुद्धस्य नीलाभावस्येव तदविनाभूतानां पीतादीनामपि व्यवच्छेदं करोत्येव 46
तदभावाविनाभूत] GB, p. 191: **तदभावाविनाभूते**ति । वर्तमाना- भावावि[ना]भूता ये भूतादय
इति । 52 वर्तमानैकनिष्ठतायाः प्रदर्शितत्वात्] GB, p. 191: **वर्तमानैकनिष्ठतायाः पूर्वं
प्रदशि(sic)त- त्वा**दिति । अतीतविषयत्वे स्मृतितुल्यता, अनागतविषयत्वे सङ्कल्पप्रायत्वेत्यादि
वदद्भि- र्वर्तमानैकनिष्ठता प्रदर्शिता ।

――――――――――――― Ṭippaṇī: Nyāyasaurabha ―――――――――――――

46 तदभावा] **तदभावः** – वर्तमानाभावः 47 तद्ग्राहितां] **तद्ग्राहितां** – स्थिरत्वविषयत्वम्

――――――――――― Source passages and parallels ―――――――――――

50 अगृहीतविशेषणायाश्च विशेष्यबुद्धेरभावात्] NM Vol. 2, p. 501,7: न विशेष्ये च संवित्तिर-
गृहीतविशेषणा । 52 वर्तमानैकनिष्ठतायाः प्रदर्शितत्वात्] Section 1.2.2 (lines 34–47)

कालः स्यात्, तदन्यो वा । तदन्यस्तावद्ग्रहीतुमशक्य इत्युक्तम् । वर्तमाने तु
तदुत्पादविनाशकाले कथ्यमाने, तद्ग्रहणात्तदविनाभूतौ भावानामुत्पादविनाशा- A^d 237.2
वपि गृहीतौ स्याताम् ।

सेयं तपस्विनी स्थैर्यं प्रसाधयितुमागता ।   S 284v
प्रत्यभिज्ञा विनाशित्वं प्रतिष्ठाप्य गमिष्यति ॥

1.3   [सादृश्यात्, न स्थैर्यात्, प्रत्यभिज्ञा भवति]

अपि च लूनपुनर्जातकेशनखादिषु सादृश्यादृश्यमाना प्रत्यभिज्ञा स्तम्भादि- E_M 311
ष्वपि तद्वदेव न स्थिरतामुपपादयेत् । तत्र बाधकयोगादिति चेत्, इहाप्युक्त एव
बाधकः — परस्परविरोधिभूतादिकालसमावेशस्यैकत्र दुर्घटत्वादिति । तस्मात्,
प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रत्ययस्य बाधकस्याभावात्, सिद्धमानुमानिकं भावानां क्षणिकत्वम् ।
[...]

─────────────────── Variants ───────────────────
53 स्यात्, तदन्यो] PSA^{d}M; स्यात्, अन्यो $E_M E_V$ 54 भावानाम्] PM$E_M E_V$; भावनाम् S; ---
मु A^d 57 प्रतिष्ठाप्य] PSM$E_M E_V$; प्रेत्--- A^d 58 सादृश्यादृश्य] PSA^{d}ME_M; सादृश्यदृश्य
$E_V E_M^{kha}$ 59 बाधकयोगादिति] SME_M E_V; बाध+क+योगादिति P; ---योगा--- A^d 60
विरोधि] PA^{d}M$E_M E_V$; विरोदि S   60 दुर्घट] PSA^{d}M$E_M^{pc}E_V$; घ्ट E_M^{ac}

─────────────────── Shukla's notes ───────────────────
57 गमिष्यति] अमुमर्थमेवाह शास्त्रदीपिकाकारः — विवादाध्यासिता भावाः सत्त्वात्क्षण-
विनाशिनः । दीपवत्प्रत्यभिज्ञापि स्यात्प्रदीपवदेव नः ॥ इत्यनेन ।

─────────────── Source passages and parallels ───────────────
53 इत्युक्तम्] Section 1.2.2 (lines 34–47)   59–60 इहाप्युक्त एव बाधकः] Section 1.2.2
(lines 39–47)

2 [किं प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः क्षणिकत्वानुमानबाधकत्वम् ? सिद्धान्तः]

अपि च प्रत्यभिज्ञा स्वतेजोविभवविधूतबौद्धसिद्धान्तध्वान्तसन्ततिरभङ्गुरमेव
भावनिवहमनिशमुपदर्शयन्ती दिनेशदीधितिदशशतीव सर्वतो जाज्वलीतीति कः
सत्यां तस्यां क्षणभङ्गिनो भावानभिदध्यात् । यच्च यत्किञ्चन तस्यामपभाषितम्,
तत्सर्वमसमंजसम् ।

<div style="text-align:right">E_M 329</div>

2.1 [एकं ज्ञानं द्वे ज्ञाने वा ?]

यत्तावदिदं विकल्पितम्, "स एवायम्" इति किमेकं विज्ञानमुत द्वे इति,
तत्रोच्यते – सामानाधिकरण्येनैकविषयावद्योतनप्रवणैकप्रतीतिसंवेदनात् केयं
द्वित्वाशङ्का ? यो ऽयं स सः, यः स सो ऽयमित्येकत्वावमर्शिनी खल्वियमेका
प्रतीतिरनुभूयते, "घटो ऽयम्" इतिवत्, न निरन्तरोत्पन्नघटज्ञानपटस्मरणवद्
भिन्नविषयं बुद्धिद्वयमिति ।

<div style="text-align:right">A^d 241.3,
S 288v</div>

<div style="text-align:right">E_V 459,
M 7v</div>

_____ Variants _____

63 प्रत्यभिज्ञा] PSA^dME_V; प्रत्यज्ञि E_M   63 तेजोविभवविधूत] PSA^dE_ME_V; तेजोन्विविधूत
M   63 बौद्ध] PSA^dME_M; बोध E_VE_M^{kha}   63 ध्वान्तसन्ततिरभङ्गुर] PSM;
ध्वान्तसिद्धान्तसंततिरभङ्गुर E_M; ध्वान्तसिद्धनिर्भङ्गुर E_V; ध्वान्तसिद्धिनिर्भङ्गुर E_M^{kha};
ध्वन्तान्तसन्ततिरभङ्गुर A^d   64 निशमुप] SME_ME_V; निश×˙×मुप P; निश--- A^d   64
दिनेश] PME_ME_V; दिनीश S; --- A^d   64 दीधिति] PSE_VE_V; दीधित M; --- A^d   64
शती] SP(with a cross inserted above the व); शतीव भगवती M; शतविभागवती E_M
E_V; --- A^d   64 जाज्वलीतीति] PSA^dE_ME_V; जाज्वलतीति M   64–65 कः सत्यां तस्यां]
PS; कस्तस्यां सत्यां A^dME_V; कस्तस्य सत्यं E_M   65 यच्च यत्किञ्चन] PS; यच्च किञ्चन
A^dM; यच्च किंचन E_M; यत्किंचन E_V   65 तस्यामपभाषितम्] E_M; तस्यामपभौषितम्
P; तस्यामपभोषितम् S; तस्यामपि भाषितम् M; तस्य समभाषितम् E_VE_M^{kha}; त--- A^d   67
विकल्पितम्] PSME_M; कल्पितम् E_VE_M^{ca}; --- A^d   67 स एवायम्] ME_ME_V; स एवाय×˙×म्
P; स एवायंम् S; --- A^d   67 इति किमेकं] ME_ME_V; इति⌒किमेकं P; इति हिमेकं S; ---
A^d   67 विज्ञान] SME_ME_V; ऽविज्ञान P; --- A^d   68 तत्रोच्यते] SME_ME_V; तत्रोच्यत P; ---
A^d   68 सामानाधि] PSE_VE_V; समानाधि M; --- A^d   68 करण्येनैक] PSME_M; करण्येन
नैक E_VE_M^{kha}; --- A^d   68 विषयावद्योतन] ME_ME_V; विषयावद्योतना E_M; विषया⌒द्योतन P;
विषया उद्योतन S; --- A^d   68 संवेदनात्] PSE_ME_V; वेदनात् M; --- A^d   69 यो ऽयं स सः,
यः स सो] PS; यो ऽयं समः; यः समो E_VE_M^{kha}; यो ऽयमयं सः; यः सः ये सा M; ऽयमयं सः; यस्सः सो
A^d; यो ऽयमयं सः; यः सः सो E_M   69 खल्वियमेका] PSA^dME_M; *om.* E_VE_M^{kha}   70 प्रतीति]
PSA^dM; स्वतस्तु यानेकप्रतीति E_ME_V   70 इतिवत्, न] PA^dME_M^{gha}; इतियन्न S; इति तन्न
E_ME_V   70 रोत्पन्नघट] A^dME_ME_V; रोत्पन्नाघट S   71 मिति] ME_ME_V; मिति: PS; ---
A^d

_____ Manuscript damage; loss of folio(s) _____

70 रोत्पन्नघटज्ञानपटस्मरणवद्] ---रणवद् P

_____ Ṭippaṇī: Nyāyasaurabha _____

64 सर्वतो] सूर्यालोकरहितसमये ऽपि हि प्रत्यभिज्ञा भवति

2.2 [किं प्रत्यभिज्ञाकारणम् ?]

72 यत्तु किमेकप्रतीतिजन्मनि कारणमिति –

कार्यं चेदवगम्येत किं कारणपरीक्षया ।

74 कार्यं चेन्नावगम्येत किं कारणपरीक्षया ॥

न च कार्यमकारणं भवितुमर्हति, कार्यत्वस्यैवानुपपत्तेः, इति भवितव्य- P 289b

76 मेव तत्र कारणेन । अस्ति च संस्कारसहितमिन्द्रियमस्याः प्रतीतेः कारणम् ।
पृथक्कार्यतापि तयोर्दर्शनादेवावगम्यते । तदिह सहितयोरेककार्यजन्मनि व्यापा-

78 रात्तदपि किमिति नेष्यते । मृत्तन्तुकार्यं त्वेकमदर्शनादेव नाभ्युपगतम् । इदं तु
दृष्टत्वाद्दूरपलपम् ।

80 क्वचित्तु केवलेन्द्रियव्यापारजकार्यदर्शनान्न सर्वत्र तथाविधस्यैव तस्य E_M 330
कार्यकारित्वम्, सहकार्यपेक्षणेन कार्यान्तरजननात् ।

───────────── Variants ─────────────

72 जन्मनि] PSE_ME_V; जन्मनिरा M; --- A^d   72 कारणमिति] SE_M; करणमिति ME_M; ---
A^d   73 चेदवगम्येत] ME_ME_V; ---म्येत P; चेदवगम्येते S; --- A^d   75 कार्यमकारणं]
S; ---णं P; कार्यमकारणकं A^dM; कार्यमकारकं E_ME_V   75 त्वस्यैवानुपपत्तेः] SA^dE_M;
त्वस्यैवानुपप--- P; त्वस्यानुपपत्तेः ME_V   76 कारणम्] SME_M; कारण--- P; करणं
E_V; --- A^d   77 दर्शनादेवावगम्यते] PSM; दर्शनादेवावगम्यते A^d; दर्शनादेव गम्यते E_M
77 सहित] PS; सन्निहित A^dME_M   78 नेष्यते] A^dME_M; वेष्यते PS   78 कार्यं त्वेक]
PS; कार्यमेक A^dME_M   78 दर्शनादेव नाभ्युपगतम्] PS; दर्शनादेवानभ्युपगतम् A^dME_M
77–78 तयोर्दर्शनादेव … भ्युपगतम्] PSA^dME_M (but for differences between them, see pre-
vious entries); तयोर्दर्शनादेवाभ्युपगतम् E_VE_M^{kha} eyeskip from one दर्शनादेव to anoth-
er   79 दूरपलपम्] E_V; दू---रप---पम् P; दूरपलापम् SM; दूरुपलाप् A^d; दूरपत्तुवम्
E_M   80 क्वचित्तु] PSE_ME_V; क्वचिच्च A^dM   80 व्यापारजकार्य] PS; व्यापारकार्य
E_V; व्यापारादपि कार्य A^dM; व्यापारादपि कार्या E_M   80 सर्वत्र] PSA^dE_M; सर्वस्य E_V;
सर्तत्र M   80 तस्य] SA^dME_ME_V; ◡स्य P   81 कार्यकारित्वम्, सहकार्यपेक्षणेन] *conj.*;
कार्यकारि---सहकार्यपेक्षणेन P; कार्यकारित्वसहकार्यपेक्षातोन S; कार्यकारितां सहकार्यपेक्षणेन
A^dM; कार्यकारित्वम्, सहकार्यपेक्षण E_ME_V

───────────── Manuscript damage; loss of folio(s) ─────────────

72–73 जन्मनि … गम्येत किं कारण] ---म्येत किं कारण P   74–75 त किं कारणपरीक्षया …
कारणं भवितुमर्हति] ---णं भवितुमर्हति P

───────────── Ṭippaṇī: Nyāyasaurabha ─────────────

73 कार्यं चेदवगम्येत किं कारणपरीक्षया] उच्यतां यत्किञ्चित्कारणम्, अवश्यकत्वात् ।   77
दर्शनादेव] **दर्शनम्** – अन्वयव्यतिरेकानुभवौ   80 क्वचित्त] ननु तर्हि इन्द्रियजन्यं सर्वमपि
प्रत्यभिज्ञा स्यादित्यत्राह [*em.*; दिस्यत्राह *ed.*] **क्वचिदित्यादि**

───────────── Source passages and parallels ─────────────

73 कार्यं चेदवगम्येत …] NM Vol. 1, p. 468,4–5 = Kataoka (2017: 423,12–13): कार्यं
चेदवगम्येत किं कारणपरीक्षया । कार्यं चेन्नावगम्येत किं कारणपरीक्षया ॥

2.3 [कः प्रत्यभिज्ञार्थः ?]

82 यत्तूक्तं – कीदृशो ऽर्थः प्रत्यभिज्ञायामवभातीति – तत्रैते वादिनः शतकृत्वो दत्तोत्तरा अपि यत्पुनः पुनरस्माननुयुञ्जते, तेन बलवद्विद्विग्नाः स्मः । उक्त-

84 मत्र प्रमितयः प्रष्टव्याः, न तु वादिन इति । अतीतकालविशिष्टो वर्तमान-कालावच्छिन्नश्चार्थ एतस्यामवभासते ।

2.3.1 [कथमेकत्र परस्परविरोधिसमावेशः ?]

86   ननु पूर्वापरौ कालौ परस्परविरोधिनौ ।
        नैकत्र विशतस्तेन तद्भेदादस्तु भिद्यते ॥

88 नैतदेवम्, केयूरकिरीटकटककुण्डलादिभेदे ऽपि देवदत्तस्याभेदात् । अवय-व्यस्ति नास्तीति परीक्षणं वादान्तरगमनम् । अपवर्गाह्निके च विस्तरेणा-

90 वयवी साधयिष्यत इत्यास्तामेतत् ।

कुण्डलादीनामविरोधादिति चेत्, न, लाक्षणिकविरोधाभ्युपगमात् । परस्पर-

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_____ Variants _____

82 यत्तूक्तं] PA^{d}ME$_M$E$_V$; यद्-ूक्तं S   82 शतकृत्वो] PA^{d}ME$_M$E$_V$; शतकृत्वो S   83 यत्पुनः पुनरस्मा] *conj.*; ये पुनः पुनरस्मा PS; यत्पुनरस्मा A^{d}ME$_M$E$_V$ 84–85 वर्तमानकालाव] PSME$_M$E$_V$; वर्तमानकालोव A^d 88 भेदात्] PSA^{d}ME$_M$; भदात् E$_M$ 88–89 अवयव्यस्ति] PSE$_M$E$_V$; अवयवव्यक्ति M; अवयव्यप्यस्ति A^d 89 नास्तीति] PSA^d E$_M$E$_V$; न्नास्तीति M   89 गमनम्] PA^{d}ME$_M$E$_V$; गमन×̇ ×म् S   89 च] PSE$_M$E$_V$; *om.* A^{d}M

_____ Manuscript damage; loss of folio(s) _____

83 स्मः] --- P   85 च्छिन्नश्चार्थ] च्छिन्नश्---थ P   87 तद्भेदा] ---द्भेदा P   88 देवदत्तस्या] देवद--- P   89–90 विस्तरेणावयवी] विस्तरे---वयवी P   91 लाक्षणिक] ल्---क P

_____ Ṭippaṇī: Nyāyasaurabha _____

91 कुण्डलादीनामविरोधादिति] भूतभविष्यत्त्वयोस्तु विरोधः स्पष्ट   91 न, लाक्षणिक-विरोधाभ्युपगमात्] न हि कुण्डलविशिष्टवेषेण केयूरविशिष्टत्वं संभवति

_____ Source passages and parallels _____

82–83 तत्रैते वादिनः … बलवद्विद्विग्नाः स्मः] Cf. NM Vol. 2, p. 515,12–13: न च शक्नुमः [E$_V$; शक्नुयः E$_M$] पदे पदे वयमेभिरभिनवमल्पमपि किंचिदपश्यद्भिः तदेव पुनः पुनः पृच्छद्भिः शाक्यहतकैः सह कलहमतिमात्रं कर्तुम्   83–84 उक्तमत्र प्रमितयः प्रष्टव्याः, न तु वादिन इति] NM Vol. 1, p. 257,2: वस्तुप्रमितयश्चैव प्रष्टव्या न तु वादिनः ॥ and Vol. 2, p. 169,3–4: प्रतीतयः प्रष्टव्याः   90 अपवर्गाह्निके च विस्तरेणावयवी साधयिष्यते] NM Vol. 2, pp. 515,5–518,11 = Kataoka (2018: 342[47]–334[55])   91 न, लाक्षणिकविरोधाभ्युपगमात्] Cf. NM Vol. 2, pp. 321.11–14 (and GB *ad loc.*): अथ नास्त्यनयोः किंचिद्विरुद्धत्वं स्वभावयोः । कथं बौद्धगृहे जातस्त्वमेवमभिभाषसे ॥ भावानां परस्परपरिहारव्यवस्थितरूपत्वादस्यैषां लाक्षणिको विरोधः । NM Vol. 1, pp. 157.4: एतच्च लाक्षणिकं विरोधमाचक्षणैर्भवद्भिरेवोपगतम् । *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* ad 3:72 (द्विविधो हि पदार्थानां विरोधः) – एको वास्तवविरोधः, द्वितीयो लाक्षणिकविरोधः

92 परिहारव्यवस्थितात्मानो हि सर्वे भावा इति वदद्भिर्भवद्भिरभ्युपगत एषां
विरोधः ।

2.3.2 [भूतकाल इदानीं कथं प्रतिभासते ?]

94 ननु केयूरादीनां विरोधे ऽपि तदावस्थानादेकदेवदत्तसंबन्धित्वमुपपद्येतापि ।

भूतवर्तमानयोस्तु युगपदसन्निधानात्, कथं तद्विशिष्टता स्तम्भादेः ? उच्यते —

96 प्रतीयेते च द्वौ कालौ, न च सन्निहिताविति चित्रम् ।

किं भूतो ऽपि काल इदानीमस्ति ? मैवम्, नासावस्तीत्युच्यते, अपि त्वासी-

98 दिति । अस्तीत्युच्यमानो वर्तमान एव स्यात्, न भूतः ।

हन्त तर्हि भूतो भूतत्वादेव नेदानीमस्तीति कथं प्रतिभासते ? भूतत्वे-

100 नैवेति ब्रूमः । भूतः कालो भूततयैव गृह्यते, वर्तमानो ऽपि वर्तमानत-
यैव, अर्थस्तूभयानुगत एक एव, तथाग्रहणात् ।

102 ननु भूतकालस्येदानीमभावात्तद्विषयं ज्ञानमनर्थजं स्यात् । न, धर्मिणस्त-
दवच्छिन्नस्य ज्ञानजनकस्य भावात् ।

104 भूतः कथमवच्छेदक इति चेत्, तथाप्रतिभासात् । प्रतीतिमवमृशतु भवान्

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Variants

92 परिहार] PSA^{d}ME$_M$; व्यवहार E$_V$E$_M^{kha}$ 92 व्यवस्थितात्मानो] PA^{d}ME$_V$;
व्यवस्थितात्मनो SE$_M$ 92 वदद्भिर्भ] PSE$_V$; भणद्भिर्भ A^{d}ME$_M$ 92 रभ्युपगत] PS;
रभ्युपेयते A^{d}M; रभ्युपेयत E$_M$E$_V$ 94 केयूरा] PS^{pc}A^{d}ME$_M$E$_V$; कीयूरा S^{ac} 94
तदावस्थाना] PE$_M$E$_V$; तदवस्थाना SA^{d}M   94 त्वमुपपद्येता] PSA^{d}M; त्वमभ्युपपद्येता
E$_M$E$_V$ 95 कथं] PSA^{d}ME$_M$; *om.* E$_V$E$_M^{kha}$ 96 प्रतीयेते] PSA^{d}M; प्रतीयते E$_M$E$_V$ 96
कालौ] PSA^{d}E$_M$E$_V$; कालौ च M   97–98 त्वासीदिति] PSA^{d}ME$_M$; त्वासीद् E$_V$E$_M^{kha}$ 98
त्युच्यमानो] PSA^{d}ME$_M$; त्युच्यमानं E$_V$ 100 भूतः कालो] PA^{d}ME$_M$E$_V$; भूतकालो S   100
भूततयैव] PSA^{d}ME$_M$; भूततया E$_V$ 100 वर्तमानो ऽपि] PSA^{d}ME$_M$; वर्तमानो E$_V$ 102
भावात्तद्विषयं] PSE$_M$E$_V$; भावात् न तद्विषयं A^{d}M   102 ज्ञानमनर्थजं] PSE$_M$E$_V$; ज्ञानमर्थजं
A^{d}M   103 स्य भावात्] SA^{d}ME$_M$; स्याभावात् PE$_M$E$_M^{kha}$ 104 कथमवच्छेदक इति चेत्]
PA^{d}ME$_M$E$_V$; कथमनवच्छेदकातति चेत् S   104 प्रतीतिमवमृशतु] A^{d}ME$_M$E$_V$; ---⌣
P; प्रतीतिमवमृशभू S   104–105 भवान् "स] A^{d}ME$_M$E$_V$; भव्⌣⌣ P; भवत्सा S

Manuscript damage; loss of folio(s)

92 वद्भिरभ्युपगत] व---रभ्युपगत P   95 स्तम्भादेरुच्यते] स्तम्भादेः उ---ते P   97 मैवम्,
नासा] मैव---नासा P   99 तर्हि] त--- P   103 वच्छिन्नस्य] वच्छिन्--- P   104–105 इति
चेत्, तथाप्रतिभासात् । प्रतीतिमवमृशतु भवान्] इ---⌣भव्⌣ P

Tippaṇī: Nyāyasaurabha

95 भूतवर्तमानयोस्तु युगपदसन्निधानात्] यद्यपि सिद्धान्ते युगपत्सन्निधानं न; किन्त्वेकव-
स्तुनि । परन्तु क्षणिकवादरूढच्छायामाक्षेपः ।

Source passages and parallels

92 परस्परपरिहारव्यवस्थितात्मानो हि सर्वे भावा इति वदद्भिर्भवद्भिर्]Cf. *Vādanyāya* p. 15,7;
Nyāyabindu 3:75

“स एवायम्” इति । यः पूर्वमासीत्, स इदानीमप्यस्तीति । सो ऽयमतीतकाल-
विशिष्टो ऽर्थ एतस्यां बुद्धाववभासते ।

2.3.3 [शतज्ञानम्]

ननु असता भूतकालेन विशेषितमर्थं कथमिन्द्रियजा प्रतीतिरालम्बनीकुर्यात् ?
उच्यते –

अन्त्यसंख्येयसंवित्तिकाले प्रागवलोकिताः ।

यथा शतादिज्ञानानि जनयन्ति पटादयः ॥

अतीतकालसंसर्गो भवन्नेवं विशेषणम् ।

स्तम्भादिप्रत्यभिज्ञायाः कारणत्वं प्रपद्यते ॥

संख्येयाः पटादयः सन्ति, अतीतकालस्तु नास्तीति चेत्, कपित्थेषु
भक्ष्यमाणेषु किं वक्ष्यति देवानांप्रियः ? शतं कपित्थानि भक्षितवान्वाहीक
इति प्रतीतिदर्शनात् । न च नवनवतावनुपयुक्तेषु कपित्थेष्वेकत्रैव शततमे

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116 शतमिति भवति मतिः । अतो यथा तत्रातिक्रान्तान्यपि नवनवतिः कपित्थानि   M 8v

शतप्रतीतिहेतुतामुपयान्ति, प्रतिभासोपारूढत्वात्, एवमतीतकालयोगो ऽपि

118 प्रतिभासमानः प्रत्यभिज्ञामाधास्यतीति ।

     विकल्पमात्रं शतप्रत्यय इति चेत्, भो महात्मन्! किं वा तव न विकल्पमात्रम् ।

120 किन्तु जीवन्त्यमी सविकल्पकप्रामाण्यवादिनः ।

         यश्च सामान्यसंसिद्धौ प्रकारः प्राक्प्रदर्शितः ।

122   योज्यः स एव द्वित्वादिसंख्यासद्भावसिद्धये ॥

     इत्यलं कथाक्षेपेण ।

2.3.4   [इन्द्रियजं ज्ञानं कथमतिक्रान्तग्राहि ?]

124   नन्वतिक्रान्तग्राहि च प्रत्यभिज्ञाविज्ञानम्, इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजं चेति नः   E_M 333

कौतुकमिदम् । कियत्कौतुकम् ? अर्थस्तावदस्य पुरोऽवस्थितो ऽस्त्येव जनकः

126 स्तम्भादिः ।

     नन्वस्ति, स तु वर्तमानकाल एव । न, केवलवर्तमानकालयोगिनार्थेन तत्प्रत्य-

128 याजननात् । तस्य वर्तमानकाल इवातीतो ऽपि कालो ऽवच्छेदकतां प्रतिपद्यते ।

स च तदवच्छिन्नो ऽर्थ इदं ज्ञानमादधाति, इत्यर्थजमेतत् । इन्द्रियजमपि भवति,

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Variants

116 नवनवतिः कपि] PSA^d; नवनवतिकपि ME_M; नवनवति कपि E_V   117 भासोपारूढ]
PSE_ME_V; भासोपरूढ A^dM   119 महात्मन्] PSME_ME_V; मोहात्मन् A^d   119 तव न] PSME_M
E_V; न A^d   123 कथाक्षेपेण] PSE_ME_V; कथाक्षेपे⁀ E_V; कथान्तराक्षेपेण ME_M; ---क्षेपेण
A^d   124 नन्वति] PSME_ME_V; न त्वति A^d   124 ग्राहि च] PSME_M; ग्राहि E_M; --- A^d   124
प्रत्यभिज्ञाविज्ञानम्] PSE_V; प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् ME_M   125 कियत्कौतुकम्] PSE_V; किन्त्कौतुकम्
A^dM; किं तत्कौतुकम् E_M   125 पुरोऽवस्थितो] PSE_ME_V; पुरोऽवस्थिते M; पुरोऽवस्थि+तो+
A^d   127 केवलवर्तमान] M; केवलव---मान P; केवलमर्तमान S; के--- A^d; केवलम्, वर्तमान
E_ME_V   127–128 तत्प्रत्यया] PM; तत्प्रत्यय SE_ME_V; --- A^d   128 वर्तमानकाल] PSE_M
E_V; वर्तमान M; --- A^d   128 इवातीतो] SME_ME_V; इवाती⁀ो P; --- A^d   128 कालो]
PSE_ME_V; कालो विकालो M; --- A^d   129 वच्छिन्नो ऽर्थ] PA^dME_ME_V; वच्छिन्नार्थे S   129
इदं] PSE_V; इदं च A^dME_M

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Manuscript damage; loss of folio(s)

120 सविकल्पक] सविक---पक P   122 स ए---द्वि] स एव द्वि P   128 प्रतिपद्यते] ---
तिपद्यते P   129 भवति] भ---ति P

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Ṭippaṇī: Nyāyasaurabha

121 सामान्यसंसिद्धौ] अनेकव्यक्त्यनुगतसामान्यग्रहणन्यायेनैव, अनेककालानुगतव्यक्तेरपि
ग्रहणमुपपादनीयमिति भावः ।   129 इत्यर्थजमेतत्] तथा चार्थजन्यत्वात्तस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वम्

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Source passages and parallels

121 यश्च सामान्यसंसिद्धौ प्रकारः प्राक्प्रदर्शितः] NM Vol. 2, pp. 29,5–47,4 = Kataoka (2010)

130 तद्द्रावभावानुविधानात् ।

नन्वतीते ऽर्थे कथमिन्द्रियं प्रवर्तते ? कस्यैष पर्यनुयोगः ? नेन्द्रियस्य, अचेत- A^d 245.1

132 नत्वात् । पुरुषस्त्वविस्फारिताक्षो नेदृशीं प्रतिपत्तिं लभते, विस्फारिता-
क्षस्तु लभत इति सो ऽप्यननुयोज्यः ।

134 नन्वतीतग्राहित्वाद्वरमप्रामाण्यं कल्पयितुं युक्तमस्या बुद्धेः । नेन्द्रियस्यातीते S 289v
ऽपि सामर्थ्यं दृष्टपूर्वमिति । मैवम्, अप्रामाण्यं नाम बाधकप्रत्ययात्कल्प्यते, न

136 चासावस्ति प्रत्यभिज्ञायाम् । अनुमानं तु तावकं प्रतिक्षिप्तम् ।

ननु कारणदोषादपि कल्पत एवाप्रामाण्यम् । आयुष्मन्! सो ऽप्यु- E_V 461
M 9r,
138 च्यताम् । उक्त एवेन्द्रियस्यातीतविषयग्रहणे सामर्थ्यविरहः । वत्स! E_M 334
सम्यगुक्तवानसि । नायमिन्द्रियस्य तिमिरादिरिव दोषः । अतीतकाले P 290b

140 स्वतन्त्रे तस्यासामर्थ्यम्, न तद्ग्राह्यवर्तमानवस्तुविशेषणीभूते । संस्कारसचि-
वस्य चास्य सामर्थ्यम्, न केवलस्येत्युक्तम् । तस्मादतिक्रान्तकालविशेषि-

142 तपुरोवर्तिवर्तमानस्तम्भादिपदार्थविषयमिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नमेवेदं प्रत्यभि-

ज्ञाज्ञानमिति सिद्धम् ।

2.4 [अथवा प्रत्यभिज्ञानं मानसम्]

144   अथवा पूर्वविज्ञानविशिष्टग्राहि मानसम् ।
इष्यतां प्रत्यभिज्ञानं गन्धवत्कुन्दबुद्धिवत् ॥

146   यथा हि लोचनगोचरे ऽपि कुन्दकुसुमे तदविषयगन्धविशेषिते बाह्योन्द्रिय-
द्वारकं ग्रहणमघटमानमिति मानसमेव सुरभि कुसुममिति ज्ञानम्, एवं पूर्व-
148   ज्ञानविशेषितस्य स्तम्भादेर्विशेषणमनीक्षणविषय इति मानसी प्रत्यभिज्ञा ।
पूर्वप्रवृत्तबाह्योन्द्रियोपजनितज्ञानविशिष्टबाह्यविषयग्राहिणि चान्तःकरणे ऽभ्युप-   E_M 335
150   गम्यमाने सति नान्धाद्यभावप्रसङ्ग इति बहुशः कथितम् ।

ननु कुन्दादेर्विशेषणं वर्तमानमस्ति सौरभम् । इह त्वतीतं पूर्वज्ञानमिति कथं

───────────────── Variants ─────────────────

144 पूर्वविज्ञान] PSA^dME_M; पूर्वाभिज्ञान E_V; पूर्वाभिमान E_M^{kha}   144 ग्राहि मानसम्]
PSA^dME_M; ग्राह्यमाणम् E_VE_M^{kha} *unm.*   145 वत्कुन्द] PSA^dE_ME_V; वत्स्कन्द M   146
विशेषिते] PS^{pc}A^dME_ME_V; विशेषते S^{ac}   147 द्वारकं ग्रहणम्] SA^dME_M; द्वारकं ग्रहण× ×म
P; द्वारकग्रहणम E_V   147 मानसमेव] PSE_ME_V; मानसं A^dM   147–148 पूर्वज्ञान] PSE_V;
पूर्वविज्ञान A^dME_M   148 स्तम्भादेर्वि] PA^dME_ME_V; स्तम्भादौ वि S   148 शेषणमनीक्षण]
PSA^dM; शेषणमतीतक्षण E_ME_V   148 विषय इति] PSE_ME_V; विषयमिति A^dM   149
बाह्योन्द्रियोपजनित] PSME_ME_V; बाह्योन्द्रियापजनित A^d   149 ज्ञान] PSME_ME_V; ज्ञन A^d
151 विशेषण वर्तमान] PSME_ME_V; विशेषणवर्तमान A^d   151 सौरभम्] PSE_ME_V; सौरभ्यम्
M; सौरत्यम् A^d   151 त्वतीतं पूर्व] PA^dME_ME_V; त्वतीत S   151 ज्ञान] P; ज्ञा+न+ S;
विज्ञान A^dME_ME_V

───────── Manuscript damage; loss of folio(s) ─────────

143 इति सिद्धम्] इति --- P

───────────────── Ṭippaṇī: Nyāyasaurabha ─────────────────

145 गन्धवत्कुन्दबुद्धिवत्] **इदमत्र तत्त्वम्** – लौकिकसन्निकर्षद्वयजन्यमेकं ज्ञानमिव, संस्कार-
इन्द्रियजन्यं "सुरभि कुसुमम्" इत्यादिज्ञानमपि सर्वसंमतम् । कुसुमं तु चाक्षुषम्, सौरभं तु
घ्राणग्राह्यम् । इन्द्रियद्वयं तु युगपन्न प्रसरति । संस्कारस्य इन्द्रियसहकारित्वात् निरंशत्वाच्च
प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः प्रत्यक्षमेव तत् । अथवा संस्कारजन्यस्मृत्युपस्थापितं विशेषणं भासते । इयमेव
ज्ञानलक्षणेत्युच्यते । तथा च लौकिकालौकिकसन्निकर्षद्वयजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञेति न दोषः ।
ग्रन्थकारस्तु अलौकिकः [*conj.*; अलौकिकं *ed.*] सन्निकर्षं नाङ्गीकरोतीति मानसं तदिति वदति ।
मानसत्वे बाह्यत्वेनानुभवस्यास्वारस्यापत्त्या अनन्तरकालिके [*em.*; अनन्तर कालिकैः *ed.*]
अलौकिकस्सन्निकर्षः अङ्गीक्रियत इति ज्ञेयम् ।   150 नान्धाद्यभावप्रसङ्ग] मनसः बाह्ये विषये
ऽप्रवृत्तेर्यति हेतुः । मनः बाह्ये नैव प्रवर्तत इति न । स्वातन्त्र्येण न प्रवर्तते इत्येव ।

───────────────── Source passages and parallels ─────────────────

144–148 अथवा   पूर्वविज्ञानविशिष्टग्राहि   …   मानसी प्रत्यभिज्ञा] Cf. NM Vol. 1,
pp. 555,12–556,3: प्रत्यभिज्ञा नाम स्मर्यमाणानुभूयमानसामानाधिकरण्यग्राहिणी संस्कार-
सचिवेन्द्रियजन्या प्रतीतिरिति केचित् । अन्ये मन्यन्ते – स्मर्यमाणपूर्वज्ञानविशेषितार्थग्राहित्वात्
प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः, तद्विशेषणस्य चार्थस्य बाह्योन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वानुपपत्तेः, स्तम्भादावपि मानसी
प्रत्यभिज्ञेति । निर्बन्धस्त्विह नास्माकम्, सा यथास्तु तथास्तु वा ।   150 बहुशः कथितम्]
NM Vol. 1, p. 210,13–14: नापि मनः बाह्यकरणनिरपेक्षं बाह्ये विषये धियमाधातुमलम्,
अन्धाद्यभावप्रसङ्गात् । Vol. 1, p. 275,10–276,1: पूर्वोत्पन्नचाक्षुषविज्ञानविशेषणस्य बाह्यस्य
वस्तुनो मनो ग्राहकम्, इति नान्धाद्यभाव इत्युक्तम् ।

152 विशेषणम् ? उक्तमत्र – किं तेन सता करिष्यसि, शतादिबुद्धिष्वतिक्रान्तस्य
कपित्थादेः कारकत्वदर्शनादिति ?

154 तदेवमन्तःकरणजन्मनापि प्रत्यभिज्ञाज्ञानेन स्थैर्यमवस्थाप्यत एव भावा-
नाम् ।

2.5 [केशादिप्रत्यभिज्ञा]

156 या तु मुण्डितकेशादिप्रत्यभिज्ञानतुल्यता ।

स्तम्भादिप्रत्यभिज्ञायाः कथ्यते साप्यसङ्गता ॥

158 तत्रान्तराले मुण्डितशिरोदर्शनमेव बाधकम्, इह तु न किञ्चिदस्ति ।

अत एव शब्दे तदैव प्रस्फुरन्त्या विनाशबुद्ध्या वैधुर्यमुपनीता प्रत्यभिज्ञा   M 9v

160 स्थास्नुतामुपस्थापयितुमसमर्थेत्युक्तम् ।

ज्वालादावपि तैलवर्तिक्षयाद्यनुमानबाधितत्वाद् भ्रान्ता प्रत्यभिज्ञा, न तु तथा

───────────────── Variants ─────────────────

152 उक्तमत्र] PA^d ME_M; उक्तमात्र S; अत्र E_V E_M^{kha}   152 करिष्यसि] PSME_M E_V; करिष्यति
A^d   152 तिक्रान्तस्य] P; भिन्नन्तस्य S; तिक्रान्तस्यापि A^d ME_M E_V   153 कारकत्व] PS;
कारणत्व A^d ME_M E_V   154 करण] PS^{pc} A^d ME_M E_V; करणा S^{ac}   154 प्रत्यभिज्ञाज्ञानेन]
PS; प्रत्यभिज्ञानेन A^d ME_M E_V   156 प्रत्यभिज्ञान] P^{pc} SA^d ME_M E_V; प्रत्य~ज्ञान P^{ac}   157
साप्यसङ्गता] PSA^d E_M E_V; साप्यसङ्गताः M   158 तत्रान्तराले] PSE_M E_V; तत्रान्तराले A^d
M   159 तदैव] PSA^d ME_M; सदैव E_V E_M^{kha}   159 प्रस्फुरन्त्या] S; प्रस्फुर--- P; स्फुरन्त्या A^d
ME_M E_V   160 स्थास्नुतामुप] PSA^d ME_M; तु न तामव E_V E_M^{kha}   160 स्थापयि] PSA^d E_M
E_V; स्थापि M   160 तुमसमर्थे] PSA^d ME_M; तुं समर्थे E_V E_M^{kha}   161 क्षयाद्यनुमान] PSA^d
ME_M; क्षयानुमान E_V   161 न तु] PS^{pc} A^d ME_M E_V; नु त S^{ac}

────────── Manuscript damage; loss of folio(s) ──────────

158 तत्रान्तराले मुण्डित] तत्र---मुण्डित P   161 ज्वालादावपि] ---लादावपि P

───────────────── Granthibhaṅga ─────────────────

161 तैलवर्तिक्षयाद्यनुमानबाधितत्वाद्] GB, p. 195: **तैलवर्त्तिक्षयाद्यनुमानबाधितत्वादिति** ।
तैलवर्त्तिरूपस्य क्षयदर्शनात् कारणभेदः पूर्वकालत उत्तरकालानां गम्यते । न हि यदेव
तैलवर्त्तिरूपं [रूपं *em.*; रूप *ed.*] पूर्वकालायाः कारणं तदेवोत्तरासामिति वक्तुं शक्यम् । प्रत्यक्षेण
पूर्वकालाकारणस्य तैलवर्त्तिरूपस्य क्षयदर्शनादेतत्कारणभेदस्तावदिति । तत्तत्काला [तत्तत्काला
em. Isaacson; ततश्च काला *ed.*] धर्मिणः परस्परभिन्ना इति साध्यम्, भिन्नकारणजन्यत्वाद्
घटपटादिवदित्यनुमानप्रवृत्तिः ।

───────────────── Ṭippaṇī: Nyāyasaurabha ─────────────────

156 मुण्डितकेशादि] लूनपुनर्जातकेशादीत्यर्थः   159 प्रत्यभिज्ञा] **प्रत्यभिज्ञा** – 'स एवायं
गकारः' इत्यादीति शेषः

───────────────── Shukla's notes ─────────────────

157 साप्यसङ्गता] पूर्वं मुण्डितेषु पश्चादुत्पन्नेषु केशेषु त एवामी केशा इति प्रत्यभिज्ञा
यथैकत्वस्य स्थिरत्वस्य वा न साधिका तद्वत्स्तम्भादिप्रत्यभिज्ञापि इति तौल्यं खण्डयति –
सापीति ।

───────────── Source passages and parallels ─────────────

152 उक्तमत्र] Lines 113–117   157 कथ्यते] Section 1.3   159 तदैव प्रस्फुरन्त्या विनाशबुद्ध्या]
Cf. NM Vol. 1 p. 554,1–2: स्तम्भादिप्रत्यभिज्ञासु न तदैव विनाशधीः । क्षणभङ्गप्रतीकारं तेन
ताः कर्तुमीशते   160 इत्युक्तम्] NM Vol. 1, pp. 553,7–557,9

162 स्तम्भादावनुमानमपि बाधकमस्ति । सत्त्वानुमानं तु निरस्तमेव ।　　　　A^d 247.1

2.6　[प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोरसम्बन्धः]

यद्यपि च नैष नियमः – प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोर्विरोधे प्रत्यक्षं बलीय इति –　　E_M 336

164 त्वरिततरपरिभ्रमितचक्रीभवदलातग्राहिणः प्रत्यक्षस्याप्यनुमानबाध्यत्वदर्शना-
दिति, तथापि प्रकृतं क्षणिकत्वानुमानमन्यथासिद्धम्, अनन्यथासिद्धं तु प्रत्यक्ष-

166 मिति प्रत्यक्षमेव क्षणिकत्वानुमानस्य बाधकम् ।

न चेतरेतराश्रयत्वम्, अनुमानमिथ्यात्वनिबन्धनप्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रत्यक्षप्रामाण्या-

168 नभ्युपगमात् । स्वहेतुबलवत्तयैव प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणम् । न तस्येदं दैन्यम्,
यदनुमानमिथ्यात्वे सति तत्प्रमाणीभविष्यतीति ।

_____ Variants _____

163 च] SE_V; *om.* A^dME_M　　563 बलीय] PSME_ME_V; विरोलय A^d　　164
प्रत्यक्षस्याप्यनुमान] S; प्रत्यक्षस्याप्यनुमान A^dME_ME_V　　164 बाध्यत्व] SA^dME_M; बाधितत्व
E_V GB　　165 तथापि] SA^dME_M; तथा E_V E_M^{kha}　　165 अनन्यथा] PSME_ME_V; अन्यथा A^d
167 निबन्धनप्रत्यभिज्ञा] A^dME_M; निबन्धनं प्रत्यभिज्ञा E_V　　167 प्रामाण्या] PSME_ME_V;
प्रामण्या A^d　　168 बलवत्तयैव] PSME_ME_V; बलवत्तत्तयैव A^d　　168 प्रमाणम्] A^dME_M; *om.*
E_V E_M^{kha}　　169 मिथ्यात्वे] PSME_ME_V; मित्यात्वे A^d; मिथ्यात्वे M

_____ Manuscript damage; loss of folio(s) _____

162 स्तम्भादावनुमान] स्तम्भादाव---मान P　162–169 बाधकमस्ति … तत्प्रमाणीभविष्यतीति]
--- P　165–169 तथापि प्रकृतं … तत्प्रमाणीभविष्यतीति] तथापि प्र--- S

_____ Granthibhaṅga _____

164–165 प्रत्यक्षस्याप्यनुमानबाध्यत्वदर्शनादिति] GB, p. 195: **प्रत्यक्षस्याप्यनुमानबाधित-
त्वदर्शनादि**ति । चक्रं हि परिमण्डलाकारत्वात् सर्वदिग्भिर्युगपत् सम्बध्यते, तथारूपत्वं
च अलातस्य नास्ति, अतो ऽनुमानेन बाधः । तथाहि – अलातधर्मी युगपत्
सर्वाभिर्दिग्भिर्न सम्बध्यत इति साध्यम्, अलातत्वात्, भूमिस्थितालातवदित्यनुमानम् ।
165 क्षणिकत्वानुमानमन्यथासिद्धम्] GB, p. 195: **क्षणिकत्वानुमानमन्यथासिद्धम्,** क्षणिकत्व-
परिहारेणैव सत्त्वस्य प्राङ्नीत्या सम्भवात्

_____ Ṭippaṇī: Nyāyasaurabha _____

169 तत्प्रमाणीभविष्यतीति] अनुमानमिथ्यात्वाधीनं न प्रत्यक्षप्रामाण्यम्, किन्तु स्वकारणादेव ।

_____ Source passages and parallels _____

162 सत्त्वानुमानं तु निरस्तमेव] NM Vol. 2, pp. 317,3–328,12