'Verità e bellezza'
Essays in Honour of Raffaele Torella

Edited by
Francesco Sferra and Vincenzo Vergiani

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Raffaele Torella

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Prefazione

'Beauty is truth, truth beauty,—that is all
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.'

John Keats, *Ode on a Grecian Urn*

Verità e bellezza, parole che potrebbero sembrare altisonanti ma che si addicono al titolo di un'opera come questa, con cui intendiamo rendere omaggio al nostro maestro e amico Raffaele Torella e al suo straordinario contributo agli studi sanscriti. Ma anche parole comunissime, da un lato, e problematiche, dall'altro, e, proprio per questo motivo, appropriate qui, perché Raffaele è un uomo con i piedi saldamente piantati per terra, cordiale, alla mano, attento agli aspetti pratici della vita, e amante dell'arte, della musica, e della buona compagnia, ma è anche un raffinato intellettuale e studioso coltissimo, sempre consapevole della vertiginosa complessità del mondo, quello dell'India antica e medievale che è al centro della sua ricerca non meno di quello odierno.

Noi, naturalmente, lo abbiamo conosciuto innanzitutto nella sua veste di docente. Per una scelta dovuta in larga misura alla sua personalità e al suo modo di intendere il ruolo, Raffaele non è mai stato uno di quei buoni insegnanti che guidano i propri allievi passo passo, quasi tenendoli per mano, e che spesso sono preziosi nelle fasi iniziali della formazione delle giovani menti. Piuttosto, fa parte di quei maestri che invogliano a porsi domande anziché

ad accettare acriticamente le opinioni prevalenti e, ancor più, di quelli che sono fonte di ispirazione. Sono questi i tratti che ci hanno colpito tanti anni fa, quando eravamo studenti, e nel fare questa affermazione abbiamo la presunzione di esprimerci anche a nome di tutti coloro che hanno avuto la fortuna di conoscerlo e di studiare con lui. Si tratta di una scelta pedagogica che evidentemente ha dato i suoi frutti, come dimostrano questi due volumi, ai quali hanno contribuito tra gli altri molti suoi ex allievi.

Raffaele fa dunque parte anzitutto di un lignaggio di ispiratori, che trascendono gli schemi usuali e in qualche misura guardano addirittura con sospetto l'etichetta di «maestro». Se noi e altri riusciremo a seguire le sue orme sarà perché avremo saputo essere ispiratori a nostra volta. E se è vero che al cuore di ogni attività umana c'è il desiderio, e nel caso dell'insegnamento il desiderio di trasmettere, è altrettanto vero che il modo di interpretare e assaporare questo desiderio non può essere trasmesso *sic et simpliciter*: ciascuno deve trovare *il proprio*. Così ha fatto Raffaele seguendo Raniero Gnoli, suo maestro diretto, come Gnoli fece a sua volta seguendo Giuseppe Tucci, e questi seguendo Carlo Formichi e Giovanni Vacca, in una *paramparā* di cui non sapremo mai con esattezza l'origine. Ciascuno mettendoci del suo, ciascuno interpretando il proprio compito in modo particolare, con il proprio stile, facendo maturare in sé qualcosa che c'era già, certo, ma anche qualcosa che si è sviluppato piano piano e si è accresciuto grazie allo studio, alla ricerca, al porsi in modo critico davanti al proprio oggetto con interrogativi e ipotesi, e con la disponibilità a lasciarsi plasmare da questo oggetto, in poche parole, a lasciarsi «mettere in discussione». Ed è per questo —ci sembra di poter dire— che lo studio per Raffaele è anzitutto uno strumento o, forse meglio, un vero e proprio percorso di crescita personale, un modo per entrare in contatto con la vita in un senso più intimo e più grande. Nulla a che vedere, dunque, con il semplice accumulo di conoscenze, per quanto importante possa essere —anche per lui— il continuo tenersi aggiornato, raccogliere dati e ampliare il proprio sapere. La ricerca è piuttosto un modo di essere, ha a che fare con la materia viva dell'esperienza umana di ieri e di oggi. E sono l'incandescenza di questa materia e il modo rispettoso di maneggiarla e di plasmarla, vivi nelle sue parole e sedimentati, in parte, nei suoi scritti, che sono stati e sono per noi fonte di ispira-

zione. È in gioco un processo complesso, paragonabile alla nutrizione: comprende la metabolizzazione e l'assimilazione. Non è di mero travaso che stiamo parlando, ma piuttosto di qualcosa di molto simile all'accensione di un fuoco, a una scintilla.

Quando l'abbiamo incontrato, intorno alla metà degli anni Ottanta, Raffaele era un ricercatore alla Sapienza poco più che trentenne. Quel giovane professore, di bell'aspetto e dalla brillante personalità, già spiccava tra la varia umanità (dal mediocre al sublime) del corpo docente. Era amichevole, sorridente, pronto a condividere in aula i racconti della sua vita, dei suoi viaggi e incontri con personaggi illustri e non, delle sue innumerevoli letture e curiosità intellettuali, della ricerca continua di tabacco di qualità per l'amata pipa. Al tempo stesso si avvertiva in lui un'autorevolezza fondata da un lato sulla fiducia in sé e nelle proprie capacità, dall'altro sull'ampiezza e profondità della sua cultura (in campo indologico, ma non solo). Andavamo alle sue lezioni confortati dalla certezza che non sarebbero mai state banali, che ogni volta ne saremmo usciti arricchiti, capaci di guardare alle cose con occhi nuovi. Al tempo stesso, imparavamo —quasi senza rendercene conto perché, come si è detto, l'insegnamento raramente passava attraverso spiegazioni sistematiche— a fare filologia in maniera rigorosa ma non pedissequa, accostandoci alle opere della tradizione sanscrita con attenzione scrupolosa alla lingua ma anche alle forme culturali proprie dell'India classica, alle dinamiche socio-antropologiche che si intravvedono nei testi, alla visione del mondo e alla *forma mentis* degli autori, acquisendo consapevolezza del fatto che, se gli interrogativi che gli esseri umani si pongono sono fondamentalmente gli stessi attraverso lo spazio e il tempo, ciò che va valorizzato e studiato e capito è la varietà e l'originalità delle risposte che le diverse culture hanno dato nei vari contesti storici, rifuggendo da facili essenzialismi. Addio all'idea antiquata dell'India Eterna, per far posto invece alla meraviglia e all'ammirazione per l'infinita ricchezza delle idee, delle religioni, dei fenomeni artistici, che le civiltà del subcontinente hanno espresso nel corso dei millenni. Resi consapevoli dell'irriducibile alterità della cultura indiana, abbiamo imparato da lui ad accostarci ai testi sanscriti con profonda umiltà, come si addice a chi debba mettersi nei panni dell'altro, ma anche incoraggiati (ognuno di noi a modo suo) a trovare la propria voce, a esercitare il proprio senso critico,

a seguire le proprie inclinazioni. Non è un caso che Raffaele non abbia tirato su schiere di esperti di śivaismo kashmiro, ma ricercatori attivi nei campi più svariati dell'indologia (come dimostrano anche i contributi degli allievi a questi volumi) e che, nei suoi rapporti con gli studenti, non si sia mai atteggiato a guru.

Seguendo le orme di Raniero Gnoli (con cui ha sempre mantenuto un forte legame anche dopo il suo pensionamento, avvenuto nel 2000) Raffaele ha insegnato ai suoi studenti a condividere idee, scoperte e materiali, forte della convinzione che alla fine la qualità e il talento emergono e vengono riconosciuti, e li ha sempre incoraggiati a seguire il suo esempio, guardando oltre i confini rispettabilissimi ma pur sempre ristretti dell'indologia italiana e perseguendo tutte le occasioni di formazione, scambio e lavoro a livello internazionale. Grazie a lui, abbiamo conosciuto e ascoltato a Roma numerosi ospiti stranieri, fra cui molti nomi eccellenti dell'indologia mondiale, e con il suo aiuto e la sua benedizione, molti di noi sono partiti per l'India, l'Austria, la Francia, la Germania, e così via, per periodi di studio più o meno prolungati. Negli ultimi anni Raffaele si è spesso compiaciuto di aver dato impulso e continuità alla «Scuola Romana» di studi indologici, i cui rappresentanti sono oggi sparpagliati per il mondo, non di rado in sedi universitarie prestigiose, di sicuro una conseguenza positiva a lungo termine del suo incitamento a sprovincializzarci.

Lo stesso percorso professionale di Raffaele d'altronde si è svolto costantemente tra questi due poli: da un lato Roma, la città natale, il luogo degli affetti familiari e degli studi, da cui (fino ad anni recenti) non ha mai voluto allontanarsi a lungo, anche quando ciò avrebbe potuto accelerare le tappe della sua carriera; dall'altro, il mondo, con la fitta rete di rapporti con la comunità accademica internazionale, rete alimentata non solo dalla condivisione di interessi ma anche dalla sua naturale socievolezza, amore della convivialità, e benevola, compartecipe curiosità verso il genere umano. Se nella sua produzione accademica Raffaele si concentra soprattutto sulla filosofia della Pratyabhijñā, dando un contributo inestimabile all'avanzamento di questo settore di studi, i suoi interessi e le sue letture spaziano in molti campi, dando luogo a scambi intellettuali e istituzionali che sono spesso l'occasione per stringere amicizie personali significative. Anche di tale aspetto danno testimonianza questi volumi, tra i cui contributori figurano

studiosi stranieri e italiani legati a Raffaele da rapporti decennali di affetto e stima.

Proprio l'esigenza di mantenere quest'opera entro dimensioni ragionevoli, malgrado la fama e la popolarità del festeggiato, ci ha indotti innanzitutto a restringere il campo dei contributi agli studi indologici classici. Per ragioni personali, alcuni degli invitati non hanno potuto accettare o non sono riusciti a terminare il loro contributo, e ce ne rammarichiamo. È anche possibile che nel compilare la lista degli inviti ci sia sfuggito qualche nome che pure aveva tutti i titoli, personali e accademici, per contribuire a questi volumi: se così fosse, porgiamo agli interessati le nostre sincere scuse.

Per concludere, desideriamo ringraziare l'Università degli Studi di Napoli "L'Orientale" per aver accolto quest'opera nella collana Series Minor. La pubblicazione è stata resa possibile dal generoso contributo finanziario del DAAM, della Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Cambridge, e del progetto ERC «Translocal Identities. The Śivadharma and the Making of Regional Religious Traditions in Premodern South Asia» (n. 803624), diretto da Florinda De Simini. A tutti siamo immensamente grati.

Un ringraziamento speciale va agli studiosi che hanno contribuito a questi volumi anche per la pazienza con cui ne hanno atteso la lunga gestazione e a coloro che ci hanno aiutato in vari modi, tra cui i revisori anonimi, Daniele Cuneo, Carlo Fabrizio, Bianca Persiani, Serena Saccone e, in particolare, Małgorzata Sacha (Gosia per gli amici) e Mrinal Kaul per l'apparato iconografico.

Roma, agosto 2022

Francesco Sferra e Vincenzo Vergiani

Foreword

'Beauty is truth, truth beauty,—that is all
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.'

John Keats, *Ode on a Grecian Urn*

Truth and beauty — two words that might sound lofty but are so apt for the title of this work in honour of our teacher and friend Raffaele Torella and his extraordinary contribution to Sanskrit studies. They are ordinary yet not at all simple words, which makes them perfect for describing Raffaele: a grounded man, who is amiable, easygoing, attentive to the practical aspects of life, and a lover of art, music, and good company. But also a sophisticated intellectual and erudite scholar, as aware of the dizzying complexity of the world of ancient and medieval India that lies at the heart of his research, as he is of the world today.

We first met him, of course, as a university lecturer. Largely due to his personality and his philosophy of teaching, Raffaele has never been one of those teachers who lead pupils step by step, as if taking them by the hand, and often play an invaluable part in the early stages of the education of young minds. Rather, he encourages pupils to raise questions instead of uncritically embracing prevalent views, and he is also a great source of inspiration.

These are the characteristics that struck us many years ago, when we were undergraduates, and we are sure that all those who

have had the good fortune to meet him and study under his guidance would agree with us. His pedagogical choice clearly proved fruitful, as shown by these two volumes, which contain contributions from, among others, many of his former pupils.

Thus, Raffaele is the representative of a line of inspiring teachers, who transcend the usual schemes and to some extent even consider the label 'teacher' suspect. If we and others are able to follow in his footsteps, it is only because we have found our personal ways of being inspiring teachers ourselves. If desire is at the heart of every human activity, for teachers this translates into the desire to hand down knowledge, which each does in *their own way*. Raffaele did so by following his teacher, Raniero Gnoli, who in his turn followed Giuseppe Tucci, who followed Carlo Formichi and Giovanni Vacca, in an unbroken *paramparā* whose precise origin we will never know. Each adopted a personal touch, bringing a unique contribution and style to the task. These certainly stemmed from an inborn talent, but also from something else that gradually developed through study, enquiry, and critical reflection on one's subject, guided by questions and hypotheses, coupled with an earnest willingness to let oneself be shaped by the object of research, even to the point of questioning one's views and beliefs.

This is why we feel we can say that, for Raffaele, research is primarily a journey of personal growth, a way to connect with life in a more intimate and at the same time more exalted sense. For him, research has nothing to do with the mere accumulation of notions, even though he too appreciates the importance of staying updated, continuing to collect data, and expanding one's knowledge. Instead, it is a way of being, of engaging with the raw matter of human experience past and present. This incandescent matter and the respectful way in which he handles it resonate in his writings and have always been an inspiration to us. What is at play here is a complex process, comparable to nutrition that involves metabolism and assimilation. It is not the mere pouring of a substance from one vessel to another, but rather something akin to a spark that ignites a fire.

When we met Raffaele in the mid-1980s, he was a researcher in his early thirties at La Sapienza. A handsome young lecturer with a striking personality who already stood out among the diverse

humanity — from mediocre to uplifting — of the faculty. He was friendly, smiling, and always ready to regale the class with stories about his life, his travels and encounters with both illustrious and common people, his readings and intellectual interests, as well as his never-ending search for quality tobacco for his beloved pipe. At the same time students sensed his authority, rooted on the one hand in his self-confidence and belief in his own abilities, and on the other in the vastness and depth of his knowledge in the field of Indology and beyond. We attended his lectures knowing that they would never be banal, and each time we would leave the classroom enriched, capable of looking at things with new eyes. Since his lessons rarely relied on systematic explanations, with time we learnt to practice philology rigorously but not pedantically, approaching the works of the Sanskritic tradition with scrupulous attention not only to the language but also to the cultural forms of classical India, the socio-anthropological dynamics that transpire from the texts, and the authors' worldview and *forma mentis*. We thus became aware that, while the questions humans ask themselves are essentially the same across space and time, what should be valued and studied and understood is the diversity and originality of the answers that different cultures have given in different historical contexts, which taught us to steer clear of facile essentialism. We jettisoned the outdated idea of 'Eternal India' and began to experience wonder and admiration for the boundless wealth of the ideas, the religions, and the art forms to which the civilisations of the subcontinent have given birth in the course of millennia. With our newly acquired awareness of the impervious otherness of Indian culture, we learnt from him to approach Sanskrit texts with profound humility, as befits those who seek to put themselves in other people's shoes, but we were also encouraged — each of us in her or his own way — to find our voice, think critically, and follow our inclinations. It comes as no surprise that Raffaele did not produce a plethora of experts of Kashmirian Śaivism, but rather researchers active in a variety of fields within Indology — as also shown by his former pupils' contributions to these volumes — and that he never posed as a guru in his relationship with students.

Following the example of Raniero Gnoli (with whom he has always maintained close ties even after Gnoli's retirement in

2000), Raffaele has taught his pupils to share views, findings, and materials, firmly convinced that eventually quality and talent will out and gain recognition. He has always encouraged them to look beyond the very honourable yet narrow boundaries of Italian Indology and to seize all opportunities to study and work abroad. Thanks to him, as students in Rome we were able to make the acquaintance of numerous foreign guests — including several excellent exponents of international Indology — and listen to their lectures. With Raffaele's help and blessing, many of us left for India, Austria, France, Germany, and other lands, for study stays of varying length. In recent years, Raffaele has frequently taken pride in his having given momentum and continuity to the 'Roman School' of Indological Studies, whose representatives are now scattered worldwide, often holding posts in prestigious universities. This is certainly a long-term positive outcome of his encouragement to go beyond the parochial.

Raffaele's own professional trajectory has constantly moved between the two poles. On the one hand, Rome, his native city, the place of family affections and of his formative years, from which — until recently — he has never wished to stay away for too long, even when this could have accelerated his career. On the other, the world, with a dense network of relationships with the international academic community, sustained not only by shared scholarly interests, but also by his natural gregariousness, conviviality, and benevolent, empathic curiosity towards mankind. While Raffaele's research mostly focuses on the philosophy of Pratyabhijñā and has made an invaluable contribution to the progress in this field of studies, his interests and readings range over many areas, bringing about intellectual and institutional exchanges that have often led to meaningful friendships. These volumes are a testament to this, since their contributors include many Italian and foreign scholars who are linked to Raffaele by long-standing mutual affection and esteem.

Due to the need to keep this work within reasonable limits despite Raffaele's renown and popularity, we decided to limit the range of contributions to classical Indological studies. For personal reasons, some of the scholars we invited had to decline or were not able to complete their contributions in time, something we sincerely regret. It is also possible that, when we drew up the list of

contributors to be invited, we inadvertently left out some specialists who deserved to be on the list: if so, we offer them our sincere apologies.

Rome, August 2022

Francesco Sferra and Vincenzo Vergiani

Raffaele Torella with his pipe

Main Publications of Raffaele Torella

Volumes

2002   *The Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā of Utpaladeva with the Author's Vṛtti: Critical Edition and Annotated Translation.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass [1st ed. Serie Orientale Roma 71. Roma 1994: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente].

2008   *Il pensiero dell'India. Un'introduzione.* Roma: Carocci.

2011   *The Philosophical Traditions of India: an Appraisal,* Varanasi: Indica Books [Extended Engl. tr. of *Il pensiero dell'India: Un'introduzione,* cit.].

2013   Vasugupta. *Gli aforismi di Śiva. Con il commento di Kṣemarāja (Śivasūtravimarśinī).* Milano: Adelphi [1st ed. Roma 1979: Ubaldini Editore; 2nd ed. Milano 1999: Mimesis].

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2001   *Le Parole e i Marmi, Studi in onore di Raniero Gnoli nel suo 70°compleanno,* 2 vols., Serie Orientale Roma 92.1–2. Roma: Istituto Italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente.

2007	(With Giuliano Boccali) *Passioni d'Oriente. Eros ed emozioni in India e in Tibet.* Torino: Einaudi.
2016	(With Bettina Bäumer) *Utpaladeva, Philosopher of Recognition*, Shimla (IIAS) and New Delhi: D.K. Printworld.
2022	*Italian Scholars on India, Vol. I, Classical Indology.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

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Articles, reviews, and brief notes

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1976	'*Sārdhatriśatikālottarāgama.* Edizione critica.' *Rivista degli Studi Orientali* 50, 3–4: 279–318.
1979	'Due capitoli del *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha: Śaivadarśana* e *Pratyabhijñādarśana.*' *Rivista degli Studi Orientali* 53, 3–4: 361–410.
1980	'Una traduzione francese della *Parātriṃśikālaghuvṛtti* di Abhinavagupta.' *Rivista degli Studi Orientali* 54, 1–2: 171–200.
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1988	'A Fragment of Utpaladeva's *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛti.*' *East and West* 38: 137–174.
1989	'Eliade on Tantrism.' In Gherardo Gnoli (ed.), *Atti del Convegno sul tema 'Eliade e le religioni asiatiche,'* pp. 49–57. Serie Orientale Roma 64, Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente.
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1991	'Importanza di Utpaladeva.' In Stefano Piano e Victor Agostini (eds.), editore generale Oscar Botto, *Atti del IV e V Convegno Nazionale di Studi Sanscriti (Torino, 24 gennaio 1986 – Milano, 8 novembre 1988)*, pp. 101–106, Torino.
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2006   'Congelare il sapere: servitù e grandezza del manoscritto indiano.' In Giuliano Boccali e Maurizio Scarpari (eds.), *Atti del Convegno «Scritture e codici nelle culture dell'Asia: Giappone, Cina, Tibet, India. Prospettive di studio»*, pp. 245–256. Venezia: Cafoscarina.

2007   'Studies on Utpaladeva's *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛti*. Part I. *Apoha* and *anupalabdhi* in a Śaiva garb.' In Karin Preisendanz (ed.), *Expanding and Merging Horizons. Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass*, pp. 473–490. Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences.

2007   'Studies on Utpaladeva's *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛti*. Part II. What is memory?' In Konrad Klaus and Jens-Uwe Hartmann (eds.), *Indica et Tibetica. Festschrift für Michael Hahn zum 65. Geburtstag von Freunden und Shülern überreicht*, pp. 539–563. Wien: Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universität.

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Volume I

From Isolation to Union: *Pātañjala vis-à-vis Śaiva Understandings of the Meaning and Goal of Yoga* [1]

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1. Introduction

Two of the major currents of Sanskritic yoga in the medieval period were Pātañjala Yoga (also referred to as Aṣṭāṅga Yoga, 'Yoga of [i.e., attained by] Eight Auxiliaries'), going back to the seminal *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* (PYŚ, ca. 325–425) [2] and its commentaries, and Ṣaḍaṅga Yoga ('Yoga of [i.e., attained by] Six Auxiliaries'), which was widespread in tantric Śaiva (and, to a lesser extent, Vaiṣṇava Pāñcarātra and Buddhist) [3] scriptural and non-

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[1] I am delighted to contribute to this volume in honour of my first academic mentor, who introduced me to the study of Sanskrit, Indian Philosophy, and tantric Śaiva traditions at the 'Sapienza' University of Rome in the early 2000s. His fascinating lectures, some of which I still vividly remember 20 years later, as well as his brilliant and erudite writings, inspired me to pursue the study of Śaivism. I will always be grateful to him for having encouraged me to pursue my interest in the Śaiva traditions from Java and Bali, which I developed during my studies in Rome and which still forms my main research focus to date.

[2] In this article, PYŚ refers to the *Yogasūtra* (YS) with the *Bhāṣya* commentary, possibly by the redactor and systematizer of the *sūtra*s, i.e. Patañjali himself (Maas 2013: 61). On the dating of the PYŚ, see *ibid.*, and Bronkhorst 1985: 194.

[3] Cf. Sferra 2000:14, referring (for Pāñcarātra) to the *Viṣṇusaṃhitā* (30.57ff.) and the *Sanatkumārasaṃhitā* (Ṛṣirātra 1.14cd, 3.59cd), and to a number of tantric

scriptural sources. Recent scholarship has illuminated various aspects of the textual and religio-philosophical history of these two distinct yet related traditions, and also dealt with the relationship between them, for instance with respect to the number and status of the auxiliaries (*aṅga*).[4] Considering the enormous amount of available textual sources, more work needs to be done on the relationship between Pātañjala Yoga and Śaiva Yoga from the early medieval period onwards. One particular vantage point from which to approach this problem is the definition of yoga and its ultimate goal. This is epitomized by the ideal of isolation (*kaivalya*) of Spirit (*puruṣa*) from Nature (*prakṛti*) by way of the purification of the mind (*citta*), espoused by Pātañjala Yoga, vis-à-vis the ideal of union (*sāyujya*), qualitative sameness (*samatā, tulya,* etc.) or identification (*sātmya/ tādātmya*) with the Lord, championed by the Śaiva varieties of Ṣaḍaṅga Yoga.

In this article I shall return to this topic — to the study of which Prof. Torella has also contributed[5] — by comparatively surveying pertinent passages on the meaning and goal of yoga found in the PYŚ and in selected genres of medieval Śaiva literature, namely scriptural sources and commentaries belonging to the Pāśupata and Saiddhāntika traditions, as well as Old Javanese Śaiva scriptures. My aim here is not so much to present new material, but rather to analyze and link together some relevant passages to advance the argument that, even though Pātañjala and non-Pātañjala systems of yoga might very well have emerged from a shared prototypical milieu,[6] the PYŚ appears to have exerted an influence on the textual sources belonging to rival systems. For

Buddhist texts (*ibid.*: 15–16). Cf. also Zigmund-Cerbu 1963: 129–130, referring to a Pāñcarātra Sanskrit inscription from the Khmer domains mentioning *ṣaḍaṅgayoga.*

[4] Recent overviews of Ṣaḍaṅga Yoga and its relationship with Aṣṭaṅga Yoga are Vasudeva 2004, 2017; Mallinson and Singleton 2017: 7–11 (cf. also 17–45 on the definitions of yoga, the ancillaries, etc.). On Ṣaḍaṅga Yoga, cf. the seminal work by Grönbold ([English translation] 1996), as well as Sferra (2000, esp. 11–16) and Zigmund-Cerbu 1963.

[5] See in particular his discussion of the perception of Pātañjala Yoga by non-dualist Śaiva authors (Torella 2019, 2020).

[6] While Ṣaḍaṅga Yoga is likely to predate Pātañjala Yoga, it is not impossible that, as suggested by Wallis (2016), Śaiva sources 'drew on a common complex yogic milieu of the classical period, which must have included many texts now lost to us. The *ṣaḍaṅgayoga* was part of this milieu and clearly developed independently of Patañjali's more famous *aṣṭāṅgayoga*.'

instance, it seems that many Śaiva authors, while providing their own sectarian accounts of the ultimate goal of yoga, did have the Pātañjala understandings in mind. This intertextuality reveals an appropriation or creative (re)use[7] of the Pātañjala terminology by the Śaiva sources, and its application to affirm the hierarchically higher soteriological efficacy of the Śaiva system. Whether characterized by silent appropriation or more open criticism — by either openly or subtly critiquing it, Śaiva authors intended to distinguish themselves from a system that they deemed to be a rival as well as a partial truth —, this attitude suggests not only that the Śaivas may have been partly indebted to Pātañjala Yoga, but also that they could not avoid engaging in a dialectic relationship with what must have been a widespread and authoritative system of yoga in the mainstream Brahmanical religio-philosophical discourse.[8]

2. *Śaiva attitudes towards Pātañjala Yoga*

Śaiva texts, both by anonymous and identifiable authors, display a somewhat ambivalent stance towards yoga, championing one or more approaches across the fourfold soteriological spectrum formed by observances (*caryā*), ritual (*kriyā*), gnosis (*jñāna*), and yoga — the last item representing a sort of 'middle ground' between action and knowledge, in which to varying degrees internalized psycho-physical practices play a role as propaedeutic means of salvation and empowerment.[9] As Torella (2019: 656) has recently

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[7] The label 'adaptive reuse,' traditionally employed in the domain of architecture, has been recently discussed by Freschi and Maas (2017) in the context of South Asian textual and religio-philosophical traditions, as comprising four main aspects, viz. '(1.) the involvement of at least one consciously acting agent, who, (2.) in order to achieve a certain purpose, (3.) resumes the usage (4.) of a clearly identifiable object after an interruption in its being used. The attribute "adaptive" presupposes that the reusing person pursues a specific purpose by adapting something already existent to his or her specific needs' (*ibid.* 2017: 13). Deeming points 3 and especially 4 somewhat too restrictive, here I employ the term 'reuse' in a more general sense, as reflecting dynamics of conscious mimesis, appropriation and reelaboration characterizing traditional Indic text-building practices.

[8] Birch and Hargreaves (2016: 37), commenting on Patañjali's influence on medieval Brahmanical literature, contend: 'It is as though many erudite Brahmins kept the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* in their manuscript collections and pulled it off the shelf, so to speak, when in need of a reference on yoga.'

[9] A pioneering yet still useful study of yoga in Śaiva Saiddhāntika texts is Brunner 1994.

put it, 'side by side with an utterly derogatory attitude, the texts of non-dual Śaivism also address high praises to yoga.' In this context, 'yoga' refers to a variety of tantric yoga practices. These were sometimes contrasted with Pātañjala Yoga, deemed to be a less effective path characterized by detachment (*vairāgya*) and repeated practice (*abhyāsa*), as opposed to the tantric path characterized by empowerment and quick and effortless efficacy in bringing about the identification with Śiva or the supreme consciousness.[10] For instance, the Kashmirian polymath Abhinavagupta (*fl.* ca. 975–1025) repeatedly critiques the *yogāṅga*s of Patañjali (and any *yogāṅga*s, indeed) as an inferior, or even useless, method for realizing the supreme consciousness that is the highest goal of the non-dualist Krama system.[11] Another point of disagreement between Śaiva and Pātañjala Yoga traditions is the emphasis on God in the former system, as opposed to its marginality in the latter, where *īśvara* covers the secondary role of a perfect *puruṣa* that could serve as an optional support for focusing the attention of chronically agitated minds, or that of a bestower of grace who may at best help those who are in search of liberation (PYŚ 1.4, 2.1). This lack of theism inevitably relegated the Pātañjala Yoga system (and Sāṅkhya too, which provided much of its philosophical background) to a secondary position in the soteriological hierarchy in the eyes of the Śaivas — a view that already emerges in the seminal Pāśupata treatise *Pañcārthabhāṣya* (PBh) and continues to be attested in later sources of the Śaiva Mantramārga.

A similarly negative, yet somewhat more ambivalent, stance towards Pātañjala Yoga can be detected in the works by Śaiva Saiddhāntika exegetes, like the strictly dualistic Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa-

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[10] Cf. verse 14 of the Kashmirian nondualist short work *Svabodhodayamañjarī* by Vāmanadatta, contrasting this method (described in *Yogasūtra* 1.12 and *Bhagavadgītā* 4.36cd) to the 'effortless' (*ayatnena*) method of suppression (*nirodha*) championed by the text (Torella 2000: 404).

[11] Torella 2019 lists such passages as *Tantrāloka* 4.87 (against the five *yama*s or restraints), 4.95 (against the three *aṅga*s of fixation, visualization, and absorption), 4.104 (against repeated practice, *abhyāsa*), 4.90ab (against breath-control), and 10.215cd–216ab (against withdrawal of the senses from their objects), as well as *Mālinīvijayavārttika* 2.106–107; compare Torella 2020: 846–847, and see also *Tantrasāra* 4.13–27. The consideration of the *aṅga*s as mere preliminaries to the yoga proper, which is the realization of Śiva's powers, is a fairly widespread motif in Śaiva literature.

kaṇṭha (*fl.* ca. 900–950), Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha (II) (*fl.* ca. 950–1000), and Aghoraśiva (*fl.* ca. mid-12th c.). Since these authors reveal familiarity with the PYŚ, they seemingly consider Patañjali as an authority in matters of yoga. For instance, in his commentary to the *Yogapāda* (YP) of the *Mataṅgapārameśvaratantra*, Rāmakaṇṭha refers to the *Yogasūtra*s (YS) no less than 28 times, and quotes 19 different *sūtra*s (Creisméas 2015: 84–85).[12] Other Saiddhāntika authors too pay occasional lip service to Patañjali: for instance, Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, in his commentary on the YP of the *Mṛgendratantra*, approvingly refers to the YS and Patañjali multiple times (e.g. *ad* YP 6, 7cd, 54c–55b), and so does Aghoraśiva's commentary on the *Yogaprakaraṇa* of the *Sarvajñānottara*.[13] Post-10th-c. Saiddhāntika commentator Śrī Kumāradeva also quotes Patañjali with approval,[14] and Īśānaśiva in his *Īśānaśivagurudevapaddhati* (YP 2) utilizes the eight *yogāṅga*s taught by Patañjali instead of the six taught in most tantric scriptures. At the same time, like their Pāśupata predecessors, those authors never hesitate to affirm the supremacy of Śaiva Yoga, and sometimes openly critique Patañjali as the promulgator of a system of yoga that leads only to partial liberation.[15] But in doing so, they seem to implicitly acknowledge that that system was an obligatory point of reference in the domain of yoga by their time.

Influence from Pātañjala Yoga is detectable in some revealed Śaiva scriptures, such as Siddhāntatantras, especially those belonging to the later stratum of the corpus. Whereas the majority of the Siddhāntatantras adhered to the Śaiva Ṣaḍaṅga Yoga, post-10th-c. Sanskrit scriptures hailing from South India (alongside the 8th–9th

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[12] Patañjali's philosophy is referred to extensively by the same author in his commentary on the *Kiraṇa*, in the *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*, and in the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti*, commenting on the homonymous work by Sadyojyotis (ca. 675–725). The latter critiques the ideal of *kaivalya* by Sāṅkhyas (as well as the adherents to the yoga of Patañjali) in verses 2a and 53–56 (Watson, Goodall and Sarma 2013: 225–228, 445–460).

[13] On *Sarvajñānottara*, Yogaprakaraṇa 2, quoting YS 2.30 and 2.32 (on *yama*s and *niyama*s).

[14] Cf., e.g., *Tātparyadīpikā* on Bhoja's *Tattvaprakāśa* 52 (4th *pariccheda*), referring to the treatise of *bhagavat patañjali* (YS 1.10: *abhāvapratyayālambanā nidrā*), and echoing the wording of YS 1.15 (*dṛṣṭānuśravikaviṣayavitṛṣṇasya vaśīkārasaṃjñā vairagyam*) in the expression *avairāgyaṃ ca dṛṣṭānuśravikaviṣayarāgaḥ*.

[15] Cf., e.g., Rāmakaṇṭha on *Mataṅga* YP 1.3d.

c. Kashmirian *Netratantra*),[16] such as the *Ajitāgama* (Kriyāpāda 2.29),[17] the *Makuṭāgama* (*Prāṇāyāmavidhi* 1–2ab),[18] the *Suprabhedāgama* (YP 3.53–55ab),[19] the *Śāradātilakatantra* (YP 25.5–6),[20] and the *Jñānasiddhyāgama*,[21] as well as Tamil texts such as Tirumular's *Tirumantiram*,[22] adopt the eight auxiliaries of Pātañjala Yoga (or simply refer to Aṣṭāṅga Yoga) instead, while retaining at the same time their theistic yoga.[23] Intriguingly enough, earlier scriptures preserved in both Nepalese and South Indian manuscripts present redacted versions of the auxiliaries in the manuscripts or editions from the latter region, thereby documenting a shift from Ṣaḍaṅga to Aṣṭāṅga Yoga.[24] Some scriptures, such as the yoga sec-

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[16] Cf. 8.9 (*tataḥ prabhṛti mukto 'sau na punarjanma cāpnuyāt | aṣṭāṅgena tu yogena prāpnuyān nānyataḥ kvacit*) and 8.21 (*evam aṣṭāṅgayogena svabhāvasthaṃ paraṃ dhruvam | dṛṣṭvā vañcayate kālam amṛteśaṃ paraṃ vibhum*), as well as the description of the auxiliaries in-between. The text, however, still upholds a theistic view: supreme absorption (*paraḥ samādhiḥ*) implies the identification of the Self with Śiva (8.18).

[17] *yamādy aṣṭāṅgayogena vimalīkṛtamānasaiḥ | pūjyate netarais tasya pūjākṛtyaṃ viśiṣyate ||*.

[18] *yamaniyamāsanañ ca* [em.; *yamanīm āsanaṃ caiva* ms.] *prāṇāyāmam ataḥ param | pratyāhāraṃ ca dhyānaṃ ca dhāraṇā ca* [em.; *na* ms.] *samādhikam || aṣṭāṅgam iti vijñeyaṃ yogīnāṃ yogasādhanam |* (= *Suprabhedāgama* YP 3.54).

[19] *śaivānāṃ sādhanaṃ proktaṃ pañcadhā samudāhṛtam | yogāṣṭakāṅgau vakṣyāmi śṛṇuṣvaikāgramānasaḥ || yamaniyamāsanañ ca prāṇāyāmaṃ tataḥ param | pratyāhārañ ca dhyānañ ca dhāraṇā ca samādhikam || aṣṭāṅgam iti vijñeyaṃ yogīnāṃ yogasādhanam |*.

[20] *yogāṣṭāṅgair imān jitvā yogino yogam āpnuyuḥ | yamaniyamāv āsanaprāṇāyāmau tataḥ param || pratyāhāraṃ dhāraṇākhyaṃ dhyānaṃ sārdhaṃ samādhinā | aṣṭāṅgāny āhur etāni yogino yogasādhane.*

[21] Cf. pp. 1, 21, 38. Sanderson (2014: 90) sees this work by Jñānaśivācārya as a product of a late medieval South Indian milieu 'showing a similar admixture of the Tamil Śaiva Siddhānta, Śāktism, and Vedānta.'

[22] Cf. Tantra 3, p. 86 (vv. 551–552), where Aṣṭāṅga Yoga is regarded as a means to reach *samādhi*, equated to *jñāna*.

[23] Similarly, except the *Viṣṇusaṃhitā* and the *Sanatkumārasaṃhitā*, the majority of the Pāñcarātra Saṃhitās adopt Aṣṭāṅga Yoga: cf. Sferra 2000: 14, n. 12.

[24] For instance, the Devakoṭṭai edition of the *Kiraṇatantra* (58.2c–3) substitutes *tarka* of Ṣaḍaṅga Yoga with *āsana*. Since the Nepalese manuscripts retain *tarka*, Vasudeva (2004: 377) has regarded this substitution 'as an attempt [by a modern editor] to approximate the yoga of the *Kiraṇa* to the classical system of Patañjali'; Goodall (2004: 351–352, n. 735), however, has shown that the South Indian palm-leaf manuscripts on which the Devakoṭṭai edition was based already read *āsana*, thus suggesting that the adoption of the Pātañjala list of *aṅga*s goes back to the premodern period.

tions of the relatively late and 'śāstric' *Mṛgendra,*[25] reflect an attempt to 'hybridize' the Śaiva and Pātañjala lists of *aṅga*s. An analogous attempt is reflected in *haṭhayoga* texts, such as the *Gheraṇḍasaṃhitā,* the *Gorakṣaśataka,* and the *Vivekamārtaṇḍa*, which represents a distinct, 'Patañjalified' tradition of tantric Ṣaḍaṅga Yoga.[26]

A similar attempt to bridge the two systems is documented in roughly coeval (Sanskrit-)Old Javanese Śaiva scriptures, for instance through the creation of hybrid lists of seven *aṅga*s halfway between Ṣaḍaṅga Yoga and Aṣṭāṅga Yoga, as in the case of the *Tattvajñāna,*[27] or the adoption of certain Pātañjala elements and terminology in a Śaiva doctrinal framework, such as in the case of chapter 19 of the *Jñānasiddhānta*, or again the appropriation — and modification along theistic lines — of Pātañjala Yoga by incorporating excerpts from the PYŚ, as in the case of the *Dharma Pātañjala.*[28]

These attempts by post-9th-c. authors and transmitters of Śaiva texts to 'interpolate' certain passages in order to make them compliant with Pātañjala Yoga, or to hybridize Ṣaḍaṅga Yoga and Pātañjala Yoga, suggest a gradual rise in status and importance of the latter system in the course of the second half of the first millennium CE across the wider Indic world.[29] On the other hand, they also tell us that Pātañjala Yoga had achieved a somewhat paradoxical status in the religio-philosophical discourse, namely that of an authoritative system that did not engender a robust philoso-

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[25] See YP 3, listing eight auxiliaries including the six of Ṣaḍaṅga Yoga (in which *vīkṣaṇa = tarka*) plus *japa* and *yoga* itself as the climax: *prāṇāyāmaḥ pratyāhāro dhāraṇā dhyanavīkṣaṇe | japaḥ samādhir ity aṅgāny aṅgī yogo 'ṣṭamaḥ svayam.*

[26] On these texts, and the relationship between Patañjali and *haṭhayoga*, see Larson 2009 and Mallinson 2007; on Śaivism's appropriation of *haṭhayoga*, see Mallinson 2014.

[27] This text includes seven auxiliaries, i.e. the six standard auxiliaries of Ṣaḍaṅga Yoga plus *āsana* of Pātañjala Yoga. See Table 19.1 in Acri 2021.

[28] For a survey of these sources and, more generally, of yoga in Indonesia, see Acri 2021.

[29] The rise and 'canonization' of Pātañjala Yoga into Classical Yoga seems to have occurred in parallel to the rise and 'canonization' of the philosophical system of Vedānta — which elected Pātañjala Yoga as one of the valid means to achieve liberation — within what we now call 'Hinduism.' The rise of Vedānta influenced also Śaivism, which in South India flourished as a non-dualist Tamil variety of Śaiva Siddhānta from the 11th/12th c. onwards.

phical tradition — its textual corpus being limited to a handful of authoritative commentaries —, but that was restated in different ways by different currents, including the theistic ones.[30]

The above-mentioned facts highlight the close dialectic inter-relationship existing between these two systems of yoga and their textual corpora throughout the medieval and early modern period. Starting from these premises, in what follows I will compa-ratively discuss some select textual passages containing definitions of yoga and its goal in the PYŚ and medieval Śaiva literature.

3. The PYŚ

As remarked above, while Śaiva authors diverged from Pātañjala Yoga sources on such relatively marginal aspects as the definition and number of the *aṅga*s or the emphasis on *aṅga*s[31] other than *samādhi* as their climax,[32] or again the accentuation of sudden realization rather than gradual practice, a more central point of disagreement was the very definition of yoga and its ultimate goal. For instance, the commentary on YS 1.1 (*atha yogānuśāsanam*, 'here begins the authoritative teaching on yoga') clarifies that *yoga* is to be intended in the sense of absorption (*yogaḥ samādhiḥ*), i.e., *samādhau* (and then, by implication, not in the sense of connec-

[30] Insofar that its primary focus was not on philosophy but on practice, Pātañjala Yoga as formulated in the PYŚ was prone to transcend the boundaries of distinct philosophical schools, lending itself to integration into the scriptures of rival systems. The PYŚ was described by Larson (1999) as a 'tradition text' of 'non-sectarian' nature, which, conflating Sāṅkhya and Buddhist formulations, was itself characterized by a hybrid character. It has also been argued by various scholars (whose views are summarized in Larson 2008: 62–64) that the doctrine of the eight ancillaries originally belonged to a different—and possibly older—system and was merged into the PYŚ by the editor and commentator of the *sūtra*s.

[31] For instance, *āsana*s, *yama*s, and *niyama*s are usually mentioned in Śaiva texts containing accounts of Ṣaḍaṅga Yoga, yet they are considered mere prepa-ratory practices to the *upāya*s or *yogāṅga*s proper.

[32] While Pātañjala Yoga does not include *tarka* among the auxiliaries (but one may argue that, historically, *samprajñāta samādhi* is related to *tarka*), some Śaiva texts, such as the *Mālinīvijayottara* and post-10th-c. Kashmirian nondual Śaiva exe-getes, consider it the most important among the auxiliaries (Vasudeva 2004: 373). In many early Śaiva texts, *samādhi* is not regarded as the most important *aṅga*, and it is never regarded as a synonym of yoga, unlike in the PYŚ (Mallinson and Singleton 2017: 325).

tion, i.e. *yoge*).[33] Thus, the root *yuj* entails *samādhāna* ('concentration,' or 'absorption') into one's own Self, that is to say isolation (*kaivalya*) of *puruṣa* from *prakṛti*. That goal is achieved through the purification of *citta* from the three constituents (*guṇa*) of Nature, which thereby ceases to mistakenly identify itself with the *puruṣa*.[34] It follows that in the PYŚ *samādhi* is not only one, and the highest, among the ancillaries of yoga, but rather forms its very essence, which leads to the state of isolation amounting to final release.

Having defined yoga as the depletion of the activities of the mind (*yogaś cittavṛttinirodhaḥ*) in *sūtra* 1.2, the PYŚ goes on to describe the ultimate goal resulting from the higher type of *samādhi* in *sūtra* 1.3: *tadā draṣṭuḥ svarūpe 'vasthānam*, 'Then the seer is established in its own form.' This is a key *sūtra*, echoes of which, as I will argue, appear to recur in many of the passages discussed in this article. A central term is *avasthānam*, from the stem *ava+sthā*, which could be rendered into English as 'to stay, abide, stop at any place,' 'to abide in a state or condition,' 'to remain or continue (doing anything),' 'to be found, exist, be present,' 'to enter, be absorbed in' (Monier-Williams 1899: 106). The last two meanings seem to be particularly appropriate here in view of the meaning of *samādhi* as 'intense absorption or a kind of trance' (*ibid.*: 1159), alongside the other meanings of the stem *samādhā*, 'to place, set, lay, fix, direct, settle, adjust' (*ibid.*). Thus, the Pātañjala system regards liberation as the spirit or Soul being immersed and permanently established in itself.

The aforementioned state coincides with the end of its mistaken connection or identification (*saṃyoga*) with the tainted, outer-oriented mind, which is part of *prakṛti*:[35] in *samādhi*, the realization of the ontological difference between the subject and Nature, cal-

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[33] A definition explicitly mentioning the derivation from the *Dhātupāṭha* (IV.68) is found in Bhoja's commentary on the YS, the *Rājamārtaṇḍa* (ca. early 11th c.), on the same *sūtra* (*yogo yuktaḥ samādhānaṃ | yuja samādhau*), as well as in Vācaspatimiśra's (9th c.) commentary (*Tattvavaiśāradī*) on the PYŚ (*ad*. 1.1, p. 2), which explicitly excludes *yujir yoge* (as in *Dhātupāṭha* VII.7). Cf. below, n. 66.

[34] Cf. YS 3.55: *sattvapuruṣayoḥ śuddhisāmye kaivalyam iti*, 'When the purity of the consciousness (*sattva* ≈ *buddhi*) is equal to that of the Spirit, Isolation [occurs].'

[35] Cf. YS 2.17: *draṣṭṛdṛśayoḥ saṃyogo heyahetuḥ*, 'The connection between the seer and what is seen is the cause of what is to be removed (i.e., suffering).'

led *vivekakhyāti,* causes the cessation of suffering and the complete separation (or isolation or aloneness, *kaivalya*) of the subject from Nature. This state of liberation is conceived of as an unrestricted self-awareness of the subject, which is then established in its essential form (*svarūpapratiṣṭha*: see PYŚ 4.34). The term *svarūpapratiṣṭha,* which can be regarded as conveying a meaning that is analogous to that of *sūtra* 1.3, occurs multiple times in the PYŚ, viz. in 1.2, 1.3, 2.25, 3.50, and 4.34 — the final, climatic *sūtra* of the work; cf. *svarūpapratilambhe* in 2.6. Clearly, all these key terms epitomize the Pātañjala idea of liberation as *kaivalya.*

Having briefly presented relevant textual passages of the PYŚ and the key ideas conveyed by them, I shall now discuss instances of critique and/or reuse of this Pātañjala Yoga material in Śaiva literature.

4. *Pāśupata sources*

The view that yoga is to be intended in the sense of 'union' between the individual Soul and the Lord is already found in the 'proto-tantric' Pāśupata system, the earliest documented movement of Śaivism. Attesting to an early form of Śaiva yoga, this tradition — or rather constellation of traditions, collectively part of the Atimārga movement — arguably constitutes the prototypical system from which many medieval currents of Śaiva yoga originated.

For the Pāñcārthika Pāśupata system, whose philosophical tenets are outlined in Kauṇḍinya's PBh (prob. 4th/5th c.) on the *Pāśupatasūtra*s (PS) and in the *Gaṇakārikā*s (GK; prob. 8th c.) with Bhāsarvajña's *Ratnaṭīkā* (RṬ; prob. 10th c.), yoga (in the sense of 'union with God') is one of the five principles or *padārtha*s systematized by Kauṇḍinya. The Pāśupatas knew a specific form of yoga, called *pāśupatayoga.* This yoga, which is not described in the philosophical treatises but in Purāṇic texts,[36] mainly consisted in such disciplines as breath-control and postures, supernatural powers, as well as a form of 'yogic suicide' (*utkrānti*).[37] As such, it approached

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[36] See the early *Skandapurāṇa* (chapters 174–183); chapters 11, 14 and 15 of the *Vāyupurāṇa*; ch. 33 of the *Vāyavīyasaṃhitā* of the *Śivapurāṇa*; as well as several chapters in the *Liṅgapurāṇa.*

[37] The Pāśupata adept had to die before being united with Rudra (Sanderson 2014: 10–11). It is relevant to point out here that *utkrānti* is already mentioned as a means leading to liberation in PYŚ 3.39.

the *kriyāyoga* outlined in the second chapter of the PYŚ, but, unlike it, it was also characterized by a strongly theistic nuance.

We do not know much about the philosophical framework of this system of yoga, but some textual passages suggest that it may have been indebted to ideas elaborated in both Pātañjala and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika milieus. Hara (2002: 25–26) argued that, although Pāśupata theologians tried to deviate as much as possible from (Pātañjala) Yoga and even looked down upon it, condemning it as a false view and regarding its goal (*kaivalya*) as leading to suffering, its tradition still 'supplied the basic framework (Grundgerüst) for the formation of the Pāśupata theology' (*ibid.*: 46); furthermore, Pāśupata Śaivism 'tried to distinguish itself from the "Yoga" as a philosophical system, while taking full advantage of the "yoga" as a common heritage (Gemeingut) of Indian culture' (*ibid.*). Similarly, Hara (*ibid.*: 153) argued that the Pāśupata philosophical system emerged from Sāṅkhya and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ideas.[38] It is, therefore, not unreasonable to suppose that, while the yoga of the Pāśupatas tried to distinguish itself from those of its predecessors, especially by evolving in a theistic direction, it was also intellectually indebted to them.

Be this as it may, the critique of 'Yoga' alongside Sāṅkhya (*sāṅkhyayoga*),[39] and the association of both with *kaivalya* that we

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[38] 'Although the date of Kauṇḍinya is still uncertain, the main source he used for the philosophical foundation obviously was from the Sāṃkhya school of thought, though we meet occasionally the concepts of Nyāya as well as Vaiśeṣika'; cf. Gonda 1963: 214. Several scholars (cf., e.g., Bhandarkar 1913: 117; Matilal 1977: 85; Lorenzen 1991: 110, 134–135, 191; Hara 2002: 278) have noted that Pāśupatism was indebted to the Vaiśeṣika system, and vice-versa. Cf. Preisendanz 2011: 'Śaivism was the dominant religious background of the Vaiśeṣika tradition from at least the classical period onward […]. Pāśupatas were among those who were interested in Vaiśeṣika and wrote on it, and thus influenced the development of the tradition.'

[39] At least seven occurrences of this compound are found in the PBh (viz. *ad* 1.1 [twice], 2.17, 5.7, 5.39 [twice]). The fact that this compound should not be interpreted as 'the method (*yoga*) of Sāṅkhya' is suggested not only by the context, but also by the fact that in PBh *ad* 5.8 we find a separation between Yoga and Sāṅkhya: *evaṃ yat sāṃkhyaṃ yogaś ca varṇayati* […]. Cf. PBh *ad* 5.46: *yogaviśeṣaḥ | anyeṣāṃ kaivalyam | iha tu viśeṣo vikaraṇam iti*, 'Now the method of distinction with respect to yoga. In other systems the final goal is perfect isolation (*kaivalya*), but here the final goal is better, namely, freedom from the instruments' (tr. Hara 2002: 24), and *ad* 5.40, stating that the Pāśupata system is not founded on Yoga

find in the PBh suggest that Kauṇḍinya had a non-theistic/non-Pāśupata form of yoga in mind. This may very well have been Pātañjala Yoga; assuming that the PBh was composed at a slightly later date than the PYŚ, it is not impossible that Kauṇḍinya might have had access to that text. Thus, while the yoga described in Pāśupata philosophical treatises bears some similarities with the yoga described in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (VS),[40] thereby reflecting a different prototypical line of filiation — perhaps, a lost non-Pātañjala *Yogaśāstra* attributed to Hiraṇyagarbha,[41] or other sources belonging to an early 'common yogic milieu'[42] —, one may still try to detect instances of intertextuality between the PYŚ and the PBh (as well as the later RṬ) — something that has already been noted, for instance, with respect to such yogic items as the *siddhi*s or the *yama*s and *niyama*s featuring in the PBh.[43]

In PBh 1.1, Kauṇḍinya defines yoga as a (particular) contact (*saṃyoga*) between the Soul (*ātman*) and the Lord (*īśvara*): *atrātmeśvarasaṃyogo yogaḥ*. In this expression, which occurs no less

(in the Pātañjala sense?) as it forms an incomplete kind of knowledge leading to *kaivalya.* Compare RṬ, p. 14.28 and p. 15.3 (Pāśupata Yoga is superior as it brings about the complete end of suffering, not just *kaivalya*). Hara (*ibid.*) notes that 'the schools from which Kauṇḍinya tries to distinguish his own are Sāṃkhya and Yoga', whose highest goals are relegated to a position of secondary importance. PBh *ad* 1.1, p. 5.15–16, states that Sāṅkhyas and the Lords of Saṅkhya and (Pātañjala) Yoga are beasts (*paśu*); on pp. 2–3, it states that those attaining *kaivalya* (*kaivalyagataḥ*; cf. RṬ p. 23.5–7) are still in the cycle of transmigration, while the Pāśupata adept, being beyond *kaivalya* (*kaivalyavyatiriktaḥ*, PBh *ad* 5.40), obtains the end of suffering (Hara 2002: 27).

[40] It should be noted that the relevant *sūtra*s, describing yoga and *mokṣa*, were attributed by Wezler (1982) to the later, (Pātañjala?) yoga-influenced layers of the text. See *infra*.

[41] Harimoto (2021: 72) has hypothesizes the existence of an early system of yoga comprising five *aṅga*s (*āsana, prāṇāyāma, pratyāhāra,* and *dhāraṇā*) subscribing to the Vaiśeṣika mechanism of perception caused by contact (*sambandha/sannikarṣa/saṃyoga*) between objects, sense faculties, mind, and the Self (cf. PYŚ 2.54–55), and according to which yoga consisted in the contact (*saṃyoga*) between mind and Self only (cf. *Vivaraṇa* on PYŚ 1.1; Harimoto 2014: 200–203). Harimoto traces this type of yoga back to a pre-Pātañjala *yogaśāstra* traditionally ascribed to Hiraṇyagarbha (= Brahmā), which used Vaiśeṣika frameworks to describe its philosophical and soteriological system. Cf. below, n. 63.

[42] Cf. above, n. 6.

[43] See Hara 2002 (esp. 17–46); cf. also the practice of 'eruption' of the breath (*udghāta*) described in the PYŚ, the PBh, and several tantric texts (see Mallinson and Singleton 2017: 132–133).

than seven times in the PBh,[44] yoga coincides with the climax of the system. This definition mirrors the particular contact (*saṃyoga*) between the thinking-organ (*manas*) and the *ātman* in the Vaiśeṣika definition of yoga (and *mokṣa*) in VS 5.2.16–17, which has been regarded by Wezler (1982) as an influence by (Pātañjala?) Yoga — for a yoga-centred soteriology was not part of the original system, being unattested in the earliest stratum of the VS.[45] In Kauṇḍinya's formulation of *saṃyoga*, the term *īśvara* is used instead of *manas*, which gives to the definition of yoga a theistic orientation. Now, the 'special contact' postulated by the Vaiśeṣikas presupposes the absence (i.e., its elimination by way of yoga) of the 'wrong contact', engendering suffering, between the *manas* and the Soul: cf. VS 5.2.20, *tadabhāve saṃyogābhāvo 'prādurbhāvah sa mokṣaḥ*, 'Since this [*adṛṣṭa*] does not exist, there is no contact [between internal organ and Soul, i.e. life], and the non-manifestation [of a new body]. That is liberation.'[46] This *sūtra* closely mirrors YS 2.25: *tadabhāvāt saṃyogābhāvo hānaṃ tad dṛśeḥ kaivalyam*, 'Since this [ignorance that is the cause of the pain to be eliminated] does not exist, there is no contact [between the mind and the spirit]. This is the elimination [of pain], the isolation of consciousness.'[47]

[44] PBh 1.1, 1.20, 2.11, 5.2, 5.12, 5.20, 5.23.

[45] Cf. VS 5.2.16–17: *indriyamano 'rthasannikarṣāt sukhaduḥkhe tadanārambhātmasthe manasi | saśarīrasya sukhaduḥkhābhāvaḥ | sa yogaḥ*, 'Pleasure and pain [arise] out of the drawing near to each other of sense(s), internal organ, and object [of cognition]; this (i.e. the drawing near to each other...) does not arise when the internal organ is in the soul. [Then] there is neither pleasure nor pain for the embodied [soul]. This is *yoga*' (as reconstructed and translated by Wezler 1982: 663, who emends *saṃyoga* into *sa yogaḥ*); Candrānanda's *Vṛtti* (9ᵗʰ c.) on *sūtra* 17, *yadā hy ātmani mano 'vasthitam nendriyesu*, 'when the internal organ is established in the soul and not in the organs of senses' (*ibid.*: 650–652); and 9.13, *ātmany ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogaviśeṣād ātmapratyakṣam*, 'Because of a particular contact of soul and internal organ [taking place] in the soul [there arises] perception of the soul' (*ibid.*: 666). Wezler (*ibid.*: 673–674) tentatively identified in the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* by Praśastapāda (early 6ᵗʰ c.) a *terminus post quem* for the redaction of these *sūtra*s into the VS, but also reminded that 'one must not necessarily take for granted that these alterations and expansions of the VS cannot but be posterior to him'. This bears implications for the issue of intertextuality discussed here. For an analogous influence by the PYŚ on the *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* by Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana, see Oberhammer (1964) and Wezler (1984).

[46] According to Wezler (1982: 651, 669), this *sūtra* too would belong to the later, Pātañjala Yoga-influenced layer of the text.

[47] This wrong type of contact was defined in YS 2.17: *draṣṭṛdṛśayoḥ saṃyogo*

Thus, while the PBh's definition of yoga, echoing the formulation found in the VS, departs from the one given in the PYŚ, it also seems to presuppose it as an intermediary step, so to speak. That this was the case may also be evinced by the sequence of *sūtra*s 5.33–40 of the PS:

> *labhate rudrasāyujyaṃ* || *sadā rudram anusmaran* || *chittvā doṣāṇāṃ hetujālasya mūlam* || *buddhyā* || *svaṃ cittam*[48] || *sthāpayitvā ca rudre* || *ekaḥ kṣemī san vītaśokaḥ* || *apramādī gacched duḥkhānām antam īśaprasādāt* ||

> [The Pāśupata adept] obtains union with Rudra, keeping Rudra in his mind at all times. Having cut the root of the net of causes of faults by means of intellect and having fixed the mind by itself on Rudra [continuously], alone, secure, free from sorrow, careful, he may reach the end of suffering, because of the grace of the Lord.

This above-quoted string of *sūtra*s, explaining the category of 'yoga', characterizes the climax of the system, that is to say the final stage (*avasthā*) of the fivefold ascetic career of the Pāśupata adept according to Kauṇḍinya, during which he puts an end to his life in a charnel ground through 'yoga.' It presents conceptual and terminological analogies with both the PYŚ's and the VS's definition of yoga. First, *sūtra*s 33–34 declare that the goal of the system, union with Rudra (*rudrasāyujyaṃ*), is to be obtained through constant recollection (*anusmara*) of him.[49] Second, *sūtra*s 35–36 identify in the intellect (*buddhi*) the instrument to cut the root of the net of causes of faults (*doṣāṇāṃ hetujālasya mūlam* — a concept that is close to the Sāṅkhya idea of *samyagdṛṣṭi* or 'right knowledge' taking place in the *buddhi* (or in the *citta*, for Yoga). This operation discriminates the difference between *prakṛti* and

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heyahetuḥ, 'The connection between the seer and what is seen is the cause of what is to be removed (i.e., suffering).'

[48] I apply the emendation, suggested by Sanderson (*2004), of *saṃcittam* to *svaṃ cittam*. Compare RṬ *ad* GK 1.7: *yo vidyānugṛhītayā buddhyā svaṃ cittaṃ nirālambanaṃ karoti so 'mūḍha ity ucyate*, and *Pampāmāhātmya* 11.61cd–62ab: *tasmād asmin svakaṃ cittaṃ samstāpatyantaniścalam* (cf. Bisschop 2006: 17).

[49] *Anusmara* seems to be an equivalent of *dhyāna* of both Ṣaḍaṅga Yoga and Aṣṭāṅga Yoga (or, rather, of *tarka* of Ṣaḍaṅga Yoga), here denoting a type of meditation involving the visualization of the deity Compare the expression *īśvarapraṇidhāna* in the Kriyāyoga section of the PYŚ.

puruṣa, thereby leading to their separation. Third, in contrast to the PYŚ's ideal of *kaivalya* as the Spirit's establishment in its own form, as well as the VS's establishment of the *manas* in the Soul, *sūtra*s 37–38 define the climax of 'yoga' as establishing the *citta* — not a distinctive term of Sāṅkhya or Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, but rather of Pātañjala Yoga philosophy[50] — existing 'by itself' (*svaṃ*) in Rudra (*sthāpayitvā ca rudre*), thereby shifting the target from the Soul/ Self to the deity. Kauṇḍinya glosses *svaṃ* as *svayam eva svaguṇatvena,* 'by itself, with only its inherent property', which calls to mind the Pātañjala Yoga idea of an untainted, 'self-contained' *citta* or *buddhi* leading to *kaivalya.*[51] Thus, it is as if Kauṇḍinya — who, just like Patañjali, might have not only arranged but also redacted and even compiled some of the *sūtra*s — wanted to convey the idea that the pure *citta* in the state of *kaivalya,* triggered by *buddhi,* constitutes an intermediary stage, and that the final stage consists in its permanent fixation on Rudra. According to the commentary, this state is also achieved through the control of the senses from their objects (*evaṃ viṣayebhya indriyāṇāṃ jayaḥ kartavyaḥ,* PBh 5.38), a practice that is described in VS 5.2.16 (*indriyamano 'rthasannikarṣāt*), as well as in YS 2.54 (*svaviṣayāsaṃprayoge cittasvarūpānukāra ivendriyāṇāṃ pratyāhāraḥ*) and *Bhāṣya* thereon (where it is regarded as leading to *cittanirodha*). The ensuing state of release (*ekaḥ kṣemī san vītaśokaḥ,* PS 5.39), introduced in the PBh with a polemic note against 'those released by way of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga and who have reached isolation (*kaivalya*) [but] lack knowledge of themselves or of anyone else,'[52] includes the end of suffering — an ideal shared by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika soteriology and, implicitly, Pātañjala Yoga (cf. YS 2.25).

One may compare the expression *sthāpayitvā* (the causative form of the root *sthā*) in PS 5.38 (as well as *rudrastham,* 'fixed on Rudra,' in PBh *ad* 5.37) to similar expressions based on the same

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[50] *Citta* occurs only once in the PS (5.37), but some 18 times in the PBh. Cf. PBh *ad* 5.37, where *antaḥkaraṇa,* coupled with *manas,* glosses *citta* (*cittaṃ mano 'ntaḥkaraṇam ity arthaḥ*). Note that the treatment of *citta, antaḥkaraṇa* and *manas* in Śaiva (Mantramārga) sources is often imprecise (Vasudeva 2004: 425).

[51] Compare RṬ *ad* GK 1.7: *yo vidyānugṛhītayā buddhyā svaṃ cittaṃ nirālambanaṃ karoti so 'mūḍha ity ucyate* ‖ *tayā dhāraṇayā nirmalīkṛtaṃ cittaṃ rudratattve sthāpitaṃ sudīrghakālaṃ na cyavata.*

[52] *sāṃkhyayogamuktāḥ kaivalyagatāḥ svātmaparātmajñānarahitāḥ.* Cf. notes 39, 56.

verbal root *sthā* in the climatic passages of the PYŚ quoted above (i.e., *avasthānam* in 1.3 and *pratiṣṭha* in 4.34), as well as to *ātmasthe* in VS 5.2.16 (compare *ātmani mano 'vasthitam* in Candrānanda's *Vṛtti* on VS 5.2.17). The root *sthā* is commented in PBh on 5.38 as follows:

> *atra ṣṭhā gatinivṛttau | cittasya rudrād avyavadhānaṃ sthitir ity ucyate |*
> *[…] rudre cittam upaśleṣayitavyaṃ nānyatrety arthaḥ | evaṃ viṣayebhya*
> *indriyāṇāṃ jayaḥ kartavyaḥ |*

> Here the root *sthā* means to cessation of motion. The state of rest is the non-separation of the mind with Rudra. […] The meaning is: the mind should join Rudra and nothing else. Thus, one should restrain the sense-organs from their objects.

Although the root *sthā* is used the context of the final and perpetual abiding of the mind in Rudra rather than of the Soul in its own form, its gloss as 'cessation of motion' (*gatinivṛttau*) finds a parallel in the PYŚ's explanation of the actionlessness of the *puruṣa* in 1.9.[53]

A definition of yoga (*lakṣaṇam … yogasya*) and liberation as the *manas* abiding in the Soul and the conjunction of the Soul with the Lord is found in the Pāśupata Yoga section (ch. 1)[54] of the early *Skandapurāṇa* (ca. 6th–7th c.):

> *pratyayasya bahir lopo manasyātmani saṃsthite ||* 14cd
> *abhisandhiḥ pare caiva īśvarasyātmanaś ca ha |*
> *eṣa yoga iti vyāsa kīrtitaḥ śambhunā purā ||* 15

> When the mind abides in the Soul, [there arises] the interruption of the mental conditions pertaining to the outer reality, as well as the conjunction of the Lord and the Soul in the supreme reality. O Vyāsa, this was declared to be yoga by Śambhu in former times.

This passage, which traces the teaching of yoga to Śambhu (either Śiva or Brahmā, i.e. Hiraṇyagarbha?), contains echoes of both the Vaiśeṣika and Pāśupata definitions of yoga, apparently conceived

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[53] 'Thus [another example]: The Spirit is one whose fundamental properties have been denied, it is without action. In [the sentence] "The arrow comes to a standstill, will come to a standstill, has come to a standstill", the meaning of the verbal root (*sthā*, "to stand still") is to be understood as the cessation of motion' (*tathā — pratiṣiddhavastudharmā, niṣkriyaḥ puruṣaḥ | tiṣṭhati bāṇaḥ, sthāsyati, sthitaḥ, iti gatinivṛttau dhātvarthaḥ*).

[54] This is the *Dhyānavidhi,* ch. 174 of the *Skandapurāṇa* (Bhaṭṭarāī's ed.).

of as two steps towards liberation — the first purifying the *manas* by isolating it from the sense-objects and establishing it in the Soul, the second conjoining the Soul with Rudra.

A definition of liberation as the establishment of the *citta* in Rudra is elaborated in a passage of a much later text, the prob. 10th-c. RṬ on the GK (1.6ab, pp. 16.3–11), which bears close similarities with the section of the PS/PBh discussed above:

> *doṣahetujālasya mūlākhyānivṛttau cittasya rudre 'vasthānam atyanta-niścalatvaṃ sthitir ucyate | [...] kevalarudratattvāvasthiticittatvaṃ yogitvam | anurudhyamānacittavṛttitvaṃ nityātmatvam | [...] śarīrādi-viyuktatvam ekatvam | [...] bāhyādhyātmikakriyāśūnyatvam niṣkriya-tvam | samastacintārahitatvaṃ vītaśokatvam ity etāni lakṣaṇāny asya yogasyātyantotkṛṣṭatvapratipādanārtham uktāni |*

> Fixedness is when the mind, upon the destruction of what is called the root of the net of causes of faults comes to rest in Rudra and is absolutely immovable. [...] The condition of yogin (*yogitva*) means that the mind rests uniquely on the principle of Rudra. The condition of being of constant Soul means the state where all the activity of the mind (*cittavṛtti*) is depleted. [...] The state of being alone (*ekatva*) means the separation of the body [from the Soul], etc. [...] The state of actionlessness means absence of both bodily and spiritual action. Freedom from suffering means the absence of all concerns. These characteristics are mentioned in order to show the extreme eminence of [this type of] union.

The commentary on fixedness (*sthiti*), the fourth attainment (*lābha*) in the system outlined by the text, closely echoes PBh 5.35–40: *atyantaniścalatvam* ('the state of being absolutely immovable') conveys the same idea of *gatinivṛttau*, and so does *niṣkriya-tvam* ('the state of being without action'), which parallels the *niṣkriyaḥ (puruṣaḥ)* of PYŚ 1.9.5–6 referred to above. Further, the expression *cittasya rudre 'vasthānam* (cf. *kevalarudratattvāvasthiticittatvaṃ* in the same passage) roughly corresponds to *cittasya rudrād avyavadhānaṃ* in PBh 5.38; the former expression may be regarded as a virtual 'calque' of *draṣṭuḥ svarūpe 'vasthānam* in PYŚ 1.3, shifting the focus from the Self to Rudra. Another notable expression is *anurudhyamānacittavṛttitvaṃ* ('the state where all the activity of the mind is depleted'), qualifying *nityātmatvam*,[55] which

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[55] Cf. PBh *ad* 5.3, discussing the state of constancy (*nityatva*) of the Soul when the adept, having stilled the mind by modifying its link with the objects of per-

recalls the *yogaś cittavṛttinirodhaḥ* of YS 1.2. It implies that, while yoga itself is not the stilling or cleansing of the mind, a stilled/pure mind is a necessary condition for reaching liberation.[56] Further, the definition of the state ensuing from the cleansing of the mind, i.e. aloneness (*ekatva*), intended as the separation of the body from the Soul and so forth (cf. *ekaḥ* in PS 5.39), calls to mind the concept of liberation as absence of the connection between *manas* and the Soul, which causes the non-manifestation of a new body, expounded in VS 5.2.20. However, I wonder whether the expression also implies a reference to (or reuse of) the Pātañjala Yoga concept of *kaivalya*, which, as we have seen above, in the Pāśupata system seems to have been understood as a necessary yet intermediate step in the process of attaining yoga or final liberation as union with Rudra — the superiority of *pāśupatayoga* lying in its theistic force.

It is tempting to regard the above-discussed kaleidoscope of conceptual and terminological correspondences detected among relevant passages of the PYŚ, the VS, the PS-*cum*-PBh, the early *Skandapurāṇa*, and the RṬ as an instance of intertextuality spanning several centuries. Admittedly, it is often difficult to disentangle the exact relationship between those correspondences and echoes, not to mention the directionality of any actual borrowings — for example, one may hypothesize that both the VS and the PBh independently drew these concepts from a non-Pātañjala Hairaṇyagarbha system of yoga (Harimoto 2021: 72), or some kind of shared yogic milieu. However, it does not seem unreasonable to propose that the PBh, while critiquing Sāṅkhya and (Pātañjala) Yoga, might have had in mind the PYŚ. This is consistent with the window proposed for the dating of the PBh to the 4th/5th c. CE, which is nearly coeval to the probable date of compilation of the PYŚ (i.e. 325–425), and suggests that soon after its

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ception and fixing it on God, is joined to Rudra: *tasmin nirvṛtte maheśvare yukto nitya ity ucyate | ātmā iti kṣetrajñam āha*, '[The Soul] is called "constant" when this [object, i.e. God] has been achieved and one is united with the Great Lord. They call "Soul" the knower of the field.'

[56] This stance reflects a common trend in Śaiva definitions of yoga (see below), according to which a mind stilled/cleansed by way of (Pātañjala) yoga is a necessary yet not sufficient condition to reach release, being only capable of leading the adept to *kaivalya*.

first diffusion this text had already started to be perceived as an authoritative source in the Indic religio-philosophical discourse. Further, the apparent similarities existing between the PYŚ and the RṬ suggest that the latter text consciously reused the former when formulating its own theistic soteriology.[57] The fact that the reuse of the PYŚ is more evident in the RṬ supports the view that the status of the former text became increasingly important in theistic milieus near the end of the first millennium CE.

5. *Śaiva Saiddhāntika sources*

In harmony with the Pāśupata scriptures and commentaries discussed above, Śaiva sources of the tantric Mantramārga reflect a thoroughly theistic understanding of the meaning and goal of yoga. As many such definitions of yoga in Mantramārga scriptural sources have been studied before,[58] there is no need to delve into them here. I would like to return, however, to a passage of the Trika scripture *Mālinīvijayottara* (1.46–47) that describes a specific form of initiation called *yogadīkṣā*:

> *yogadīkṣāṃ samāsādya jñātvā yogaṃ samabhyaset |*
> *yogasiddhiṃ avāpnoti tadante śāśvataṃ padam ||*
> *anena kramayogena saṃprāptaḥ paramaṃ padam |*
> *na bhūyaḥ paśutām eti śuddhe svātmani tiṣṭhati ||*

> After receiving initiation into yoga and learning [the fundamentals of] yoga, he should practise [it]. He will attain the perfection of yoga and at its end the eternal state. By this sequence of events the ultimate state is attained. One does not return into bondage but abides in one's own pure self. (tr. Vasudeva 2004: 245)

Vasudeva (2004: 245) notes that *yogadīkṣā* is not a variety of initiation commonly encountered in Śaiva scriptures, and argues that it may reflect an originally Pāśupata method, for the compounds

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[57] Cf. Maas 2020: 'Soon after its composition, the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* was recognized widely as an authoritative exposition of Sāṃkhya philosophy.' Elsewhere, Maas (2013: 66) proposes a slightly later timeframe: 'the PYŚ was widely accepted to be the authoritative exposition of Yoga at the beginning of the seventh century.'

[58] See, e.g., Brunner 1994; Vasudeva 2004; Mallinson and Singleton 2017: 19–23.

yogadīkṣaḥ and *yogadīkṣitaḥ* occur in the Pāśupata inscription of Paldi (Udaipur).[59] This may very well be the case, and yet the supreme state (*paramaṃ padam*) conceived of as the elimination of bondage and 'abiding in one's own pure Self' (*śuddhe svātmani tiṣṭhati*) strikes me as similar to the Pātañjala yoga goal of isolation, as worded in YS 1.3, 2.25, 3.50, and 4.34. Thus, one may detect a terminological influence from the PYŚ,[60] whether direct or via a PYŚ-influenced Pāśupata source. It goes without saying that the passage may have been formulated with a theistic background in mind: since the supreme state mentioned in the verse must reflect the goal of the Śaivas, abiding into one's pure Self can only correspond to identity with the Lord, as per the non-dualist stance of the *Mālinīvijayottara*.

I will now discuss selected passages drawn from commentaries on the Yogapādas of Saiddhāntika scriptures by authors who, while still subscribing to Śaiva Ṣaḍaṅga Yoga, reveal an either implicit or explicit knowledge of Patañjali's system. Whether their intent was polemic or neutral, those passages suggest that those authors, when characterizing Śaiva Yoga, considered the PYŚ an obligatory reference (counter)point.

An oft-quoted passage featuring a typically Śaiva definition of yoga as union with Śiva is the commentary by Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha on *Mṛgendratantra* YP 2a (*tadātmavattvaṃ yogitvaṃ*). In line with what we expect from the orthodox current of dualistic Śaiva Siddhānta espoused by Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, it is introduced by a statement and a quotation from the early Saiddhāntika work *Svāyambhuva-sūtrasaṅgraha* (Vidyāpāda [VP] 2.24) on the centrality of initiation (*dīkṣā*) as the sole means capable of bestowing liberation, defined as *niratiśayakaivalya*, i.e. isolation without superior.[61] A translation by Sanderson runs as follows:

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[59] Indeed, *yogadīkṣitaḥ* also occurs in PBh *ad* 1.9. A description of *yogadīkṣā* also constitutes the main subject of Paṭala 17 of the Saiddhāntika *Kālottarāgama*.

[60] Cf. also the *śloka*-quarter *ātmani cetanaḥ sthitaḥ* in the *Dharma Pātañjala* (quoted below, p. 61). It is perhaps not coincidental that another passage of the *Mālinīvijayottara* that deals with the propaedeutic role of initiation in the qualification for Śaiva Yoga has been shown to betray an influence from the PYŚ: cf. 4.6–8, referring to *sabīja* yoga, which corresponds to *sabīja samādhi* of YS 1.46 (Vasudeva 2004: 244).

[61] *dīkṣaiva mocayaty ūrdhvaṃ śaivaṃ dhāma nayaty api* || *iti śruter dīkṣāyā eva nira-tiśayakaivalyāvāptihetutvāt.* A relatively early Saiddhāntika scripture that characte-

tadātmavattvaṃ yogitvam | 2a

yujyate śivatvalakṣaṇayā svasvarūpābhivyaktyāvaśyam iti yogī | tasya bhāvo yogitvam ātmavattvāvinābhāvi | ata eva 'yujir yoge' ity asya dhātor yogaśabdo jñeyaḥ na tu 'yuja samādhau' iti | asya samādhirūpasya tadaṅgatveneṣṭatvāt ||

To have self-mastery [is] to be a yogin.

The term Yogin means 'one who is necessarily conjoined with' (←√*yuj*) the manifestation of his nature[. A yogin], in other words, [is one who must experience] the Śiva-state (*śivatvam*). It is being a yogin [in this sense] that is the invariable concomitant of self-mastery. It should be understood, therefore, that the term Yoga derives its meaning not from √*yuj* 'to be absorbed [in contemplation]' but from √*yuj* 'to join.' This is supported by the fact that Yoga in the form of absorption (*samādhiḥ*) is taught [separately] as one of its auxiliaries. (tr. Sanderson *1999: 4)

Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha stresses the theistic nature of yoga by explicitly stating that *yuj* is to be understood as 'union' (rather than *samādhi*, as in the PYŚ), and this union is 'unity of nature' with the Lord; further, he explains that *samādhi* is one of the auxiliaries of yoga, thus implicitly critiquing the PYŚ's view that *samādhi* is a synonym of yoga itself.[62] Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha here is seemingly playing with words, for *tadātmavattvam* can mean both (in a general sense) 'self-mastery'[63] and (in a more specifically Śaiva sense) 'to

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rizes the attainment of Śiva-ness as the goal of yoga (and not of initiation) is the *Sarvajñānottara* (Yogaprakaraṇa 30): 'Having entered into that [state of unity with Śiva brought about by yoga], the knower of yoga visibly becomes Śiva, whose nature is immortality, who is omniscient, omnipervasive, subtle, the Lord of everything and the all-doer', *amṛtātmā śivaḥ sākṣāt tasmin viṣṭas tu yogavit | sarvajñaḥ sarvagaḥ sūkṣmaḥ sarveśaḥ sarvakṛd bhavet.* Aghoraśiva, commenting upon this passage, tries to bring it in line with the Saiddhāntika orthodoxy by identifying yoga as part of *dīkṣā*.

[62] Cf. Aghoraśiva's gloss on *Sarvajñānottara,* Yogaprakaraṇa 2: *na tu pātañjalāder* [em.; *patañjalāder* ms.] *iva samādhirūpaṃ tasya yogāṅgatvena śruteḥ* [em.; *śrute* ms.].

[63] As suggested by *jitākṣayopapadyate* ('It is accomplished by he whose senses have been controlled') in *pāda* 2b, and its gloss *jitendriyasya tv acirād eva svarūpalābhaḥ* ('He whose senses have been controlled quickly obtains his essential nature'). Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha closes the passage with a quotation by Sanaka that echoes the definition of Yoga in the VŚ 5.2.16–17 (quoted above, n. 45): 'When a person has controlled his senses, their objects, the subtle elements, and his mind, he becomes free of all desire and dissolves into his ultimate identity' (*indriyāṇīndriyārthāṃś ca tanmātrāṇi manas tathā | niyamya gatisaṅkalpaḥ paramātmani līya-*

possess one's *ātman*': as pointed out by Brunner (1994: 428–429), to understand the statement *tadātmavattvaṃ yogitvam* we must remember that, according to Saiddhāntika scriptures, 'the essence of any sentient being […] is not different from Śiva's own[; …] to "possess one's *ātman*" is therefore to have become like Śiva.'[64] As Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha explains, the yogin is characterized by Śiva-ness as the inevitable consequence of the manifestation of his real nature (*śivatvalakṣaṇayā svasvarūpābhivyaktyāvaśyam*). *Abhivyakti* is typically used in Śaiva texts as a technical term denoting the 'manifestation' of the divine qualities or powers (for instance, *jñānaśakti* and *kriyāśakti*) intrinsic to Śiva's nature that takes place in the liberated adept. Thus, one's real nature is neither the isolated, pure Soul (untainted by *guṇa*s and identification with *prakṛti*), as the Pātañjala view would have it, nor the exclusive union with Rudra, as the Pāśupatas would have it, but rather the manifestation of the pure Soul's intrinsic Śiva-ness, which amounts to qualitative (but not numerical) sameness with Śiva.[65] Explicitly (and polemically) reinterpreting the sense of *yuj* against the PYŚ's understanding in the background,[66] the above-quoted passage appears to constitute a manifesto of the superiority of the Saiddhāntika ideal of yoga and its goal vis-à-vis the Pātañjala one.

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te iti). Sanaka here may be one of the sons of Brahmā, also called Hairaṇyagarbha, who was deemed to be the revealer of the yoga-themed treatise *Dharmaputrikā* (Barois 2020: 12–13; 29 n. 55), and the promulgator of a non- or pre-Pātañjala *yogaśāstra* (Harimoto 2021: 72).

[64] Contrast the Pāśupata definition of *yogitvam* as the mind's resting uniquely on the principle of Rudra (*kevalarudratattvāvasthiticittatvaṃ*) expounded in RṬ 1.6ab.

[65] A nondualistic Śaiva definitions of yoga as identity (i.e., both qualitative and numerical sameness) with the Lord is found, e.g., in Kṣemarāja's *Uddyota* on *Svacchandatantra* 6.45cd: […] *yogaṃ tadaikātmyaprāptim*, '[…] yoga is the attainment of identity with that.'

[66] Analogous reinterpretations are found in Rāmakaṇṭha's *Mataṅgavṛtti*, introduction to YP 1.7 mentioning the auxiliaries (*atha kaścid 'yuja samādhāv' iti dhātvarthānusāreṇa 'yogaḥ samādhir' iti bhrāntyā manyate pātañjalabhāṣyakāra iti*); and in Aghoraśiva's commentary on *Sarvajñānottara*, Yogaprakaraṇa 1.2 (*ata eva yujir yoga* [em.; *yujin yoga eva* ms.] *ity asmād dhātor yogaśabdaḥ, na tu yuja samādhāv iti*). As pointed out above (n. 33), since neither the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* nor Bhoja's *Rājamārtaṇḍa* make an explicit reference to the rejected etymology of *yuj* in the sense of 'connection' (and the latter does not homologize *yoga* to *samādhi*), the commentary that Rāmakaṇṭha had in mind was probably the *Tattvavaiśāradī* by Vācaspatimiśra (*ad* PYŚ 1.1): see Creisméas 2015: 90.

I will now turn to a passage by the Saiddhāntika exegete Rāmakaṇṭha (II), Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha's son. In his commentary to the YP of the *Mataṅga,* this author mentions Pātañjala Yoga several times, mainly to criticize its philosophical and soteriological positions.[67] At the very outset, he specifies that the form of yoga explained in the Tantra is the Ṣaḍaṅga Yoga, not the Aṣṭāṅga Yoga of Patañjali and others,[68] and concludes in the following manner:

> *uttamaś cāyaṃ pātañjalādigītayogavidhibhyaḥ, asya vakṣyamāṇana-*
> *yenātmayogatayā tebhyo buddhiyogebhyaḥ prakṛṣṭatvaṃ yataḥ* | 1.1

> Further, this [yoga taught in the Tantra] is superior (*uttamaḥ*) to the yogic methods of the treatises of Patañjali etc., for it is preeminent compared to those yogas of the intellect (*buddhiyogebhyaḥ*) by virtue of being the yoga of the Soul (*ātmayogatayā*), following the method that is going to be expounded.

Here Rāmakaṇṭha assigns a higher position to the Śaiva Yoga taught in the *Mataṅga* with respect to the yoga taught by Patañjali by using *buddhi* as a synonym of *citta*, which is the soteriological fulcrum of the PYŚ, so as to contrast it to the notion that the fulcrum of Śaiva Yoga is the *ātman*, which is ultimately a Śiva. An analogous point seems to be adumbrated by Aghoraśiva when commenting on *Sarvajñānottara, Yogaprakaraṇa* 1.1, to defend the superiority of Śaiva Yoga vis-à-vis Pātañjala Yoga: 'This [yoga] purifies the Soul, not the mind, as the followers of Patañjali maintain, because the yoga of Śiva causes the manifestation of omniscience and so forth' (*puruṣasyaivāyaṃ saṃskārako na tu pātañjalānām*[69] *iva cittasyety arthaḥ, śivayogasya sarvajñatvādiprakāśakatvāt*[70]).[71]

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[67] For a thorough analysis of Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary, see Creisméas 2015.
[68] *Mataṅgapārameśvaravṛtti* YP 1.1: *sa cāyaṃ ṣaḍaṅgo vidhir asmiṃs tantre, na tv aṣṭāṅgo vidhir yathā pātañjalādividhiṣv* [*pātāñjalādividhiṣv* ms.] *abhihitaḥ.*
[69] Em.; *na _ _ taṃjalānām iva* ms.
[70] Em.; *sarvajñatvādiprakāśakāt* ms.
[71] A similar hierarchizing view, according a lower position to Pātañjala Yoga with respect to Śaiva soteriology, is the distinction between 'pervasion of the Self' (*ātmavyāpti*) and 'pervasion of Śiva' (*śivavyāpti*) made by Kṣemarāja in his commentary on *Svacchandatantra* 4.387–390, 433–434. As noted by Torella (2019: 651), *ātmavyāpti* 'corresponds to the state of *kaivalya*, sought by the followers of the Sāṃkhya and Pātañjala yoga, in which "the self becomes aware of its own form having overcome the identification with the bonds" (IV.434ab *pāśāvalokanaṃ tyaktvā svarūpālokanaṃ hi yat*).' This forms an intermediate step that should not be pursued by the yogin seeking the ultimate *śivavyāpti.*

The division between higher (i.e., internal and subtle) and lower (i.e., external and coarse) yoga is expounded in *Mataṅga* VP 1.2–5, which declares that the latter causes extreme suffering (*atīvaduḥkhadaḥ*) and is only necessary to cleanse the mind of the yogin. Having done so, he realizes the establishment (*avasthānam … vyaktim āyāti*) of the subject in its own nature, by virtue of the yoga's function as an auxiliary. As noted by Créismeas (2015: 89), here we find a possible reuse of the key term *avasthānam* found in YS 1.3, but in a Śaiva sense. In his commentary, Rāmakaṇṭha unpacks his critique of Pātañjala Yoga, as well as his reorientation along Śaiva lines, by explaining that the *buddhiyoga* is produced by confusion (*bhrānti*), as its adepts believe that the Self has no agency (cf. *niṣkriyaḥ puruṣaḥ*, PYŚ 1.9), whereas in reality it is the supreme agent and knower. Further, the depletion of the mind's activity (*cittavṛttinirodha*, an obvious reference to the yoga of the PYŚ), while cleansing (*apamārjana*) the mind, actually produces extreme suffering (*atiduḥkhada*), hindering as it does the manifestation of the innate powers of knowledge and action (*sarvajñakartṛtva*).

For Rāmakaṇṭha, the status of Pātañjala Yoga as an auxiliary (*aṅga*) — as opposed to the preeminence of Śaiva Yoga, accomplished through visualizations (*bhāvanā*) and a relation (*sambandha*)[72] with the Lord (*Mataṅgavṛtti ad* YP 1.4–5) — implies that it can only allow the adept to reach the intermediary state of *pralayakevalin* ('isolated by final dissolution'). This term is found in several post-scriptural Saiddhāntika sources, sometimes along with that of another category of semi-liberated Souls, the *vijñānakevalin* ('isolated by knowledge'). For the Śaivas, a *kevalin* is not, as in Pātañjala Yoga, one who is isolated from *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, but one who is separated from some (but not all) the bonds — for instance, the *guṇa*s, as in Pātañjala Yoga — fettering the individual non-liberated Soul.[73] The intermediate position of the *kevalin* is in

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[72] Compare *Mataṅgavṛtti* YP 1.10d–11ab, which defines the relation between the meditator and the meditated (i.e., the Lord) as *sthiti* ('maintenance' or 'fixation'), which in its turn amounts to yoga (*dhyeyasya dhyeyarūpatayā dhyātuś ca dhyātṛrūpeṇa yā sthitiḥ, sa eva yogaḥ sambandhas tayoḥ*).

[73] Saiddhāntika sources (e.g., *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha* VP 1.5, *Kiraṇa* VP 1.23, *Suprabhedāgama* 3.53, etc.) list *kevala* ('isolated') as an intermediary state of the Soul between the bound experiencer (*sakala, bhoktṛ*) and the liberated through initiation (*amala, śuddha*). See below, n. 76.

harmony with the one accorded by the Śaivas to Pātañjala Yoga, and suggests an intentional reuse of the climactic word of the latter system along inclusivistic lines.

6. *Old Javanese Śaiva sources*

While the most widespread form of yoga documented in Sanskrit-Old Javanese Śaiva literature from Java and Bali is the tantric Ṣaḍaṅga Yoga,[74] Aṣṭāṅga Yoga was by no means unknown. Besides the hybrid lists of auxiliaries attempting to bridge Ṣaḍaṅga and Aṣṭāṅga Yoga mentioned above, such as the one in the *Tattva-jñāna*, including the six *aṅga*s of Ṣaḍaṅga Yoga plus *āsana*, we find fragments of Pātañjala Yoga doctrines interspersed within otherwise thoroughly Śaiva texts that uphold Ṣaḍaṅga Yoga. For instance, a cluster of verses in the *Jñānasiddhānta* (ch. 19.5–7) — one of which finds a parallel in the *Kiraṇatantra* — defining the categories of individual Souls and the climax of liberation as becoming the Spotless Śiva echoes Pātañjala Yoga ideas, and a terminology that may be traced to the PYŚ (see Acri 2011; 2021: 278).[75] The definition of the mind (*citta*) projected towards liberation as *śuddhasūkṣmasvayambhogī* 'pure, subtle, experiencing itself only' in v. 6 echoes the characterization of the state of *kaivalya* found in YS 1.3, 3.55, etc. Further, the triadic repartition of the conditions of the Soul (*sakala*, *kevala*, and *śuddha*) that is commonly found in Saiddhāntika sources is reinterpreted in the commentary to v. 5,[76] which declares that the condition of impurity (*malinatva*) means that the mind (*citta*) is not separated from the three constituents,

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[74] See, for example, a widespread verse listing the six *aṅga*s in Sanskrit-Old Javanese Śaiva *tutur* and *tattva* texts, which has parallels in several Siddhānta-tantras (see Table 19.1 in Acri 2021: 277). Those Old Javanese sources appear to have inherited their Śaiva Yoga system from relatively early Saiddhāntika texts that were in circulation in the Archipelago, such as the *Mataṅga*, the *Kālottara*, and the *Kiraṇa*.

[75] E.g., PYŚ 1.15–16, 1.24, 2.27, and 4.34. A clear echo is the mention of *saṃyama* in v. 7 (cf. PYŚ 3.4) as leading to liberation, as well as lower dispassion (*vāhya-vairāgya* [a spelling variant of *bāhyavairāgya*]), higher dispassion (*paravairāgya*), and fixation on God (*īśvarapraṇidhāna*); the couplet *vāhyavairāgya* and *para-vairāgya* correspond to *apara-* and *para-vairagya* in *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* 1.15–16, while *īśvarapraṇidhāna* occurs in YS 2.45.

[76] *sakalaḥ kevalaḥ śuddhas tryavasthaḥ puruṣaḥ smṛtaḥ | malinatvacittamokṣaḥ kalpyate nirmalaḥ śivaḥ* (≈ *Kiraṇatantra* VP 1.23; cf. above, n. 73).

thereby indicating the state of bound Soul. This viewpoint may reflect an archaic doctrinal status quo, in which Saiddhāntika ideas around stain (*mala*) had not yet been codified. Of course, it is also possible — perhaps more likely — that this reflects a relatively late attempt to attune Śaiva and Pātañjala Yoga ideas.[77]

What is by far the most significant Old Javanese source for our knowledge of Pātañjala Yoga in the Archipelago is the *Dharma Pātañjala*, a scripture presenting a detailed exposition of the doctrinal and philosophical tenets of the form of Śaiva Siddhānta that was prevalent in Java (Acri 2017). It devotes a long section (about one-third of its length), which it calls *yogapāda* in the manner of Sanskrit Siddhāntatantras, to Pātañjala Yoga. This section apparently follows the first three chapters of the PYŚ, either interweaving a few Sanskrit verses from an untraced versified recension of the *sūtra*s with an Old Javanese commentary, or directly rendering into Old Javanese what might have been a likewise unknown Sanskrit commentary. Although the prose section often bears a strong resemblance to the arrangement and formulation of the topics treated in the PYŚ, it occasionally diverges from the commentary, either by presenting specific doctrinal details that are found in other (sub-)commentaries, or by adding seemingly original elements that are as yet unattested elsewhere. Being shaped by an eminently theistic agenda, and imbued with Śaiva tenets, the *Dharma Pātañjala* aims at attuning Pātañjala Yoga (and philosophy) to Śaiva yoga (and philosophy). The author's priority was apparently to present a synthetic account of the most important doctrinal points and practical techniques of Pātañjala Yoga, and reformulate them in an idiom that was consonant with the local Śaiva theological milieu. It seems, therefore, relevant for the present enquiry to analyze some pertinent passages below.

At its very outset, before the start of the Yoga section, the *Dharma Pātañjala* stresses the soteriological importance of *samādhi*, along the lines formulated in the PYŚ, but charges the term

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[77] A relatively late transmission of the prototypical source of v. 19.5 of the *Jñānasiddhānta* to the Indonesian Archipelago is suggested by the fact that the second line of the verse found in the *Kiraṇa* is only preserved in South Indian manuscripts but not in Nepalese ones, and it is also absent from Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary (Goodall 1998: 221, n. 188).

with a theistic connotation.[78] The goal of absorption, the *summum bonum* (*paramārtha*), is indeed explained in v. 1 and its Old Javanese exegesis as the supreme aspect of the Lord Śiva (194.19–196.7). In the Yoga section, the text makes an attempt to reinterpret the *kaivalya* state of the Self (as per the Pātañjala Yoga definition) as the Śaiva *summum bonum*, intended as the manifestation of the divine powers of the Lord in the practitioner, who thereby becomes identical to Śiva. Whereas *sūtra*s 1.2 and 1.3 of the PYŚ define *samādhi* and *kaivalya*, respectively, the *Dharma Pātañjala* (298.2–4) echoes *sūtra*s 1.3 and 4.34 in reply to a question about what is the absorption of the yogin like in order to become one with the Lord, where the free-standing *śloka*-quarter *ātmani cetanaḥ sthitaḥ* defines the state of *samādhi*.[79] Having been conflated with *kaivalya*, it is glossed as the state where the mind is left behind by the Self and the *yogin* obtains the state of supernatural prowess, united with the Lord:

> *Consciousness rests in the soul* — The mind disappears. The mind is left behind in the Holy Soul. That is what closely adheres to the Lord. This kind of absorption will be met by the yogin endlessly. That is the reason why the state of supernatural prowess is met by him.[80]

The expression *kavəkas tekaṅ citta ri saṅ hyaṅ ātmā* renders the concept of *kaivalya*. Even if the Śaivas did not regard isolation as the final goal of yoga, the text seeks to attune it to the Śaiva idea of liberation.

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[78] *Dharma Pātañjala* (194.11–13): 'Right knowledge is not within reach if there is no absorption. The absorption not coming into being, the *summum bonum* is not known, for the obtainment of the *summum bonum* is the result of performing absorption' (*tātan vənaṅ samyajñāna, yatan hana samādhi, ikaṅ samādhi tan dadi ikā tan kinavruhan saṅ hyaṅ paramārtha, apan kapaṅguhan saṅ hyaṅ paramārtha doniṅ samādhi ginavayakən*).

[79] See also *pāda* 2d in v. 2 (290): *cittavṛttinirodhākhyaḥ | yogaḥ paramadurlabhaḥ | tasmin yoge samārabdhe | svayam ātmā prakāśate ||*, 'What is called the cessation of the functions of the mind is yoga, extremely difficult to achieve. Having undertaken that yoga, the Soul itself [alone] shines forth'; compare YS 1.2 (*yogaś cittavṛttinirodhaḥ*) and PYŚ 4.34 (*tadā svarūpapratiṣṭhaḥ puruṣaḥ*).

[80] *ātmani cetanaḥ sthitaḥ* — *hilaṅ* [em.; *hiliṅ* ms.] *ikaṅ citta, kavəkas tekaṅ citta ri saṅ hyaṅ ātmā, ya tekā rumakət ri bhaṭāra, lana pvekaṅ samādhi maṅkana kapaṅguhanya de saṅ yogi, ya mataṅnyan kapaṅguh ikaṅ kasiddhyan denira.*

Another attempt to define *samādhi* according to a theistic agenda is found in 196.8–14:

> Your representation of the *summum bonum*, that is what you [should] imagine during day and night. 'Paramount' is the name of insight, its characteristics are of one level with the *summum bonum*. This is the reason why 'absorption' is what is constantly practiced by him who desires the supreme pleasure, for that is what is designated as 'release.' There is the absorption toward the *summum bonum*: that leaves behind the latent impressions in the mind. That is called 'right knowledge,' as distinct from the 'wrong knowledge.'[81]

Here *samādhi* is equated with a salvific kind of knowledge (*samyajñāna*) and regarded as essential for attaining supreme pleasure (*sukha viśeṣa*), i.e. release. The statement that the characteristics of insight (*prajñā*), seemingly attributed to the yogin, are of one level (*samapada*)[82] with the *summum bonum* (*paramārtha*), an expression that is used in the text as a synonym of the Supreme Śiva, may refer to the Lord's qualities of omniscience and omnipotence, which constitutes a departure from the Pātañjala view.

A polemic on the role of *citta* in yoga may be hinted at in 290.10–13, where the Lord, having declared that the true nature of the Soul is met only when yoga is performed (*yan apa yan kapaṅguh jāti saṅ hyaṅ ātmā, yan ginavayakən ikaṅ yogātah*), dispels an objection related by his son Kumāra as to the experiencing of the Soul even without performing yoga:

> Kumāra:
> Whether yoga be performed or not, the Soul is still experienced by us.
> [The Lord]
> That which you call [Soul] is by no means the Soul: that is the

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[81] *Ikaṅ hiḍəpta ri saṅ hyaṅ paramārtha, ya ta inanənanənta ri rahineṅ vəṅi, ləvih pva ṅaraniṅ prājñā, samapada lakṣaṇanya lāvan saṅ hyaṅ paramārtha, ya ta mataṅnyan samādhi ṅaranikaṅ inabhyāsa saṅ mahyun ri sukha viśeṣa, apan yekā sinaṅguh kaləpasan ṅaranya, hana pvekaṅ samādhi ri saṅ hyaṅ paramārtha, ya ta maməkasakən sanaskāra riṅ citta, ya ta sinaṅguh samyajñāna ṅaranya.*

[82] This expression could actually be a corruption for *sapaḍa*, 'being the same,' or the separate words *sama paḍa*, if this were the case, the meaning would remain unchanged.

'mind'. The reason why it is designated as 'mind' is because it has the same object (*ekaviṣayanya*) [of perception as the Soul]. That is the reason why only the mind is experienced by him.[83]

The Lord observes that since both have the same object of perception, what is experienced or perceived (*kahiḍəp*) by the opponent (in the state of *kaivalya*) is just the mind, not the Soul. The implications of the passage seem to be that the mind should not be confused with the Soul,[84] and that stillness or dispassion of the mind alone, belonging to the realm of cognitive absorption, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the attainment of the final goal of yoga.[85] Indeed, in 294.15–22 the text critiques those who deem the stillness of the mind to be yoga and absorption, for those beings who obtain it are not liberated, but become the categories of lords of yogins known as 'disembodied' (*videha*) and 'dissolved in *prakṛti*' (*prakṛtilīna*).[86] Stillness or clarity of mind is, therefore, a means, and should not be confused with its end, as the opponent seems to do. This point is remindful of the perspective upheld by Rāmakaṇṭha when commenting on *Mataṅga* YP 1.1 and 1.3, and by Aghoraśiva when commenting on *Sarvajñānottara* Yogaprakaraṇa 1, to defend the preeminence of Śaiva Yoga (the yoga of the Soul) over Pātañjala Yoga (the yoga of *buddhi*, probably intended as a synonym of *citta*).

[83] *Tan kagavaya ikaṅ yoga kahiḍəp tah saṅ hyaṅ ātmā de mami, tamatan ātmā ikā liṅta, yekiṅ citta ṅaranya, mataṅnyan sinaṅguh citta, apan ekaviṣayanya, ya mataṅnyan citta juga kahiḍəp denya.* Here I have arranged this passage slightly differently from the printed edition, taking the Lord's reply to start from *tamatan*.

[84] That the issue was regarded in Java as one worthy of being problematized is suggested by the presence of a similar theme in the Sanskrit-Old Javanese Śaiva text *Vṛhaspatitattva* (35.18–19), where Vṛhaspati asks the Lord about the characteristic of the Soul in the body, 'for it is difficult to understand the difference between the mind and the Soul' (*apan ivəh ikaṅ citta lavan ātmā bhedanya*).

[85] This view is in harmony with that of Rāmakaṇṭha, according to whom the yoga of Patañjali constitutes a mere cleansing of the mind, which is propaedeutic to the higher Śaiva yoga: see *Mataṅgavṛtti* on YP 1.2–4, 3.5–6.

[86] *Dharma Pātañjala* 294.14–17: 'It is not right to designate the stillness of the mind as *yoga*, for there are the lords of yogins "disembodied" and those "dissolved into unevolved matter"' (*sumahur saṅ para, vruh ta kami ikaṅ sinaṅguh yoga ṅaranya, apan sabarinyān hənaṅ ikaṅ citta, ya ta samādhi ṅaranya, yan kva liṅa saṅ para, tan yogya ikaṅ hənaṅni citta, saṅguhən yoga, apan hana sira yogīśvara videha lāvan prakṛtilīna*).

Overall, the *Dharma Pātañjala* is not overtly polemical towards Pātañjala Yoga — in fact, it does not even mention Pātañjala Yoga as a (separate) system, let alone Patañjali[87] —, but rather expounds Pātañjala Yoga within a Śaiva framework.[88] As I have mentioned above, this attempt to (silently) attune Śaiva yoga to Pātañjala yoga appears to be especially significant in Śaiva scriptures composed or (re)compiled in the Indian subcontinent at a relatively late date (i.e. after the 9th or 10th c.). Thus, the attitude documented in Old Javanese sources may reflect, besides the eclectic attitude of Javanese authors, the rising status of Patañjali's yoga in the medieval Indic world.

7. *Conclusion*

In contrast to the understanding upheld by such non-theistic (or marginally theistic) systems as Pātañjala Yoga and Vaiśeṣika, which regard yoga and its ultimate goal as, respectively, isolation and the establishment of the Soul in itself and as a special connection between the *manas* and the Soul, Śaiva sources emphasize the theistic element by framing yoga and liberation in the sense of union between the Soul and the Lord. This sense is formulated in slightly different ways by distinct Śaiva traditions, depending on the exact nature of the relationship that they envisage between the individual Soul and the Lord.

The Śaiva definitions constitute a departure from Pātañjala Yoga insofar as they emphasize the theistic element; and yet, despite the critical stance upheld by Śaiva authors towards Pātañjala Yoga, one may note a dialectic relationship between those traditions, as well as a significant intertextuality. While the commonality of themes detected in the sources presented in this article highlights a 'shared register' in the domain of soteriology and

[87] The title of the text possibly documents a conflation between the figure of Pātañjala, intended as an incarnation of Śiva (probably a synonym of Agastya), which is widespread in Old Javanese literature, and the Patañjali of the PYŚ, who is never mentioned as such in Old Javanese literature.

[88] This framework does not conform to the 'orthodox' Siddhānta, for an important doctrinal feature of the *Dharma Pātañjala*, which is also reflected in the majority of Old Javanese Śaiva texts, is the view that liberation can be obtained through yoga and not initiation (*dīkṣā*).

yoga that could be the outcome of a gradual evolution and differentiation of a core of 'pre-classical' ideas found in both non-theistic and theistic systems, the gradual rise of status of the PYŚ during the medieval period and its influence on the authors of both revealed scriptures and commentaries can hardly be denied. Elaborating on the parallels between the yoga-influenced *sūtra*s of the VS, Wezler (1982: 666) remarked that 'the theory and practice of yoga had in the meantime become so important and widely accepted that it was deemed a serious defect of any school of thought not to include it in its own tradition.' Adapting these comments to the present case study, I should like to suggest that the mainstream Śaiva attitude towards Pātañjala Yoga was shaped by, and responded to, the rise in importance of this system during the medieval period, so much so that it was deemed a serious flaw not to engage with it — and sometimes even not to include it in one's own tradition.

The instances of intertextuality and reuse identified above, as well as the references — whether polemical or not — to Pātañjala Yoga found in the works of medieval Śaiva exegetes, show that the Pātañjala system assumed a paradigmatic role in the medieval Indian religio-philosophical discourse as the most authoritative system of Yoga not long after its composition. The important status of Pātañjala Yoga across the wider Indic world may also be evinced from the progressive influence of this system on post-10th-c. South Indian Śaiva Siddhāntika sources, which substitute the six auxiliaries of Ṣaḍaṅga yoga with the eight auxiliaries of Aṣṭāṅga yoga, as well as on possibly coeval Sanskrit-Old Javanese Śaiva sources.

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PBh   See *Pāśupatasūtra.*

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The Surprise of Spanda:
An Aesthetic Approach to a Phenomenology of Transcendence (Rāmakaṇṭha ad Spandakārikā 2.6 [1.22/22])

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1. Spanda and the phenomenology of transcendence

The main injunction in the *Spandakārikā* is that 'one should experience for oneself' the transcendent and essential vibration of *spanda*.[1] Due to its immediacy, this experience is a substitute for the necessarily discursive doctrine, or, rather, completes and crowns it. It is the only way for the yogin to have access to the ineffable Absolute (*anākhya*), which, among other names, receives that of *spanda*, the archetypal vibration that the famous formula in *Tantrāloka* [TĀ] 4.184–186a strives to seize, describing it as an

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[1] *svayaṃ tam upalakṣayet*, verse 41d; and *svayam evāvabhotsyate*, in *tadā kiṃ bahunoktena svayam evāvabhotsyate*, verse 43cd [in this first section of the paper, references are given to the unsegmented *mūla* text of the *Spandakārikā*].

While examining Rāmakaṇṭha's *Spandakārikāvivṛti* [SpV], references are given to his division of the *mūla*, whereas references to the corresponding verse in Kṣemarāja's *Spandanirṇaya* and in the unsegmented *mūla* text are given within square brackets, for instance: SpV 2.6 [1.22/22]. While quoting *Spandanirṇaya*, it is the reverse process: references are given to Kṣemarāja's division of the text, and references to Rāmakaṇṭha and to the *mūla* text are given within square brackets (SpN 1.22 [2.6/22]).

'*indefinite*,' that is, 'imperceptible' movement (*kiṃciccalana*).[2] In this sense, it may be regarded, *mutatis mutandis*, as what I would call a 'phenomenology of transcendence,' to adapt the Husserlian theory of 'transcendent phenomenology' to the issues of the Indian system.

In effect, the *Spandakārikā* offer a very subtle analysis, which can arguably be described as precociously phenomenological, of the entire set of empirical phenomena, that is to say of all that presents itself to consciousness, whether it be emotions, cognitive processes or activities in ordinary life. This is not the place to compare the differing approaches of Husserlian phenomenology and the Spanda system. Suffice it to say that they exhibit more differences than similarities.[3]

I shall only emphasize here that Indian analysis would probably object to the Husserlian *cogito* because of its discursive character (*savikalpa*), offering in opposition the experience of transcendent (or *nirvikalpa*) *spanda* that appears when dualizing thoughts (*vikalpa*) — which construct ordinary experiences — are abolished, as we shall see.

This is why non-standard experiences are necessary in order to achieve the realization or the recognition of the absolute (and vibrant) principle of *spanda*. Only they are able to activate absorption in the ultimate nature of Reality, at least at the first stage. What are these non-standard experiences? They may be either, as in verse 22, extreme experiences, hyperesthesia, or experiences that are in the range of aesthetic or sensual enjoyment.[4]

2. Spandakārikā 22 [1.22/2.6]

My analysis of the doctrine focuses on the interpretation of verse 22 of the *Spandakārikā*. It is famous, and even more so is its theme,

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[2] The entire verse reads: *kiṃciccalanam etāvad ananyasphuraṇaṃ hi yat | ūrmir eṣā vibodhābdher na saṃvid anayā vinā ||* 'That [vibration (*spanda*)] which is imperceptible movement, autonomous scintillation, is a wave in the ocean of consciousness. Consciousness cannot be without it.' The entire passage (TĀ 4.182cd–186ab) is relevant to this topic. See Bansat-Boudon 2014. We may notice that, if the Spanda school privileges experience above everything else, later exegetes, those of the Pratyabhijñā, attempt to demonstrate that scriptural tradition and reasoning participate equally in the construction of the doctrine.

[3] I shall elaborate on this in an augmented version of this paper.

[4] See *infra*, p. 77 ff.

which highlights experiential intensity and immediacy:

> *atikruddhaḥ prahṛṣṭo vā kiṃ karomīti vā mṛśan |*
> *dhāvan vā yat padaṃ gacchet tatra spandaḥ pratiṣṭhitaḥ ||*

At the height of anger, or transported by joy, or [desperately] wondering what to do, or launched on a [frantic] run, whatever state one reaches, there 'vibration' is well established.

The verse has scriptural sources, in particular the *Vijñānabhairava* (especially verses 71, 101, and 118, quoted in the *Nirṇaya ad* 1.22[5]). Later exegetic tradition will resume the content, as in *Śivadṛṣṭi* (1.9–10)[6] and *Tantrāloka* 4.182b–186.[7]

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[5] See, for instance, VBh 118: *kṣutādyante bhaye śoke gahvare vā raṇād drute* [var.: *vāraṇadrute*, or: *vāraṇe raṇe*] | *kutūhale kṣudhādyante brahmasattāmayī daśā ||*, 'The condition of Brahmic existence occurs at the beginning and the end of sneezing, in terror and in sorrow, when [hanging] over a precipice, when fleeing from the battlefield, in a moment of curiosity, at the beginning or the end of hunger.'

[6] *Śivadṛṣṭi* 1.9–11cd: *sā ca dṛśyā hṛduddeśe kāryasmaraṇakālataḥ | praharṣā-vedasamaye darasaṃdarśanakṣaṇe || anālocanato dṛṣṭe visargaprasarāspade | visargo-ktiprasaṅge ca vācane dhāvane tathā || eteṣv eva prasaṅgeṣu sarvaśaktivilolatā |*, 'That [the first moment of will (*tuṭi*, in 1.8d)] moreover can be seen in the area of the heart from the moment one remembers something that should be done; at the time of [receiving] delightful news; the moment one sees something frightening; when one sees something unexpectedly; at the time of orgasm and on the event of expressing it; when reading aloud and when running. All of the powers are active in these very occasions' (tr. Nemec 2011: 115–116, with slight modifications). Note that *Śivadṛṣṭi* (1.9–11cd) emphasizes the dimension of surprise characteristic of the *spanda* experience: *anālocanato dṛṣṭe*, 'when one sees something unexpectedly.'

[7] Apart from the four examples given in SpK 22, there are numerous other occasions for the surge of *spanda*. VBh gives several partially overlapping lists, which also share common elements, and of these many are found in other texts as well, such as orgasm (VBh 69 and 70), anger (VBh 101 and 118, SpK 22, ŚD 1. 9), extreme joy (VBh 71, ŚD 1.9, SpK 22), running or escape (ŚD 1.10, SpK 22), dismay (VBh 101 — *moha* —, SpK 22 — *kiṃ karomīti mṛśan* —). What these circumstances have in common is that they are all moments of heightened experience, partaking of surprise. If SpK 22 evokes the onset of certain emotions or sensations, VBh considers both the beginning and the end of the sharpened experience by which consciousness is pierced. For instance, VBh 118 (quoted *supra*, n. 5) treats of the beginning and the end of the sneeze (however, note that SpP *ad* 22 has the variant *krodhādyante* instead of *kṣutādyante*) or the beginning and the end of hunger. This is the issue elaborated in TĀ 4.182cd–183abc, dealing with *sāmānyaspanda*, which occurs just before the famous definition of *spanda* in v. 184, quoted *supra*, p. 74: *hṛdaye svavimarśo 'sau drāvitāśeṣaviśvakaḥ || bhāvagrahādi-paryantabhāvī sāmānyasaṃjñakaḥ | spandaḥ sa kathyate śāstre […]*, 'This self-aware-

As observed in the *Spandasandoha*, verse 1.22 constitutes a tetrad with verses 1.23 to 1.25:[8]

yām avasthāṃ samālambya yad ayaṃ mama vakṣyati |
tad avaśyaṃ kariṣye 'ham iti saṃkalpya tiṣṭhati || 1.23 [2.7]
tām āśrityordhvamārgeṇa candrasūryāv ubhāv api |
sauṣumne 'dhvany astamito hitvā brahmāṇḍagocaram || 1.24 [2.8]
tadā tasmin mahāvyomni pralīnaśaśibhāskare |
sauṣuptapadavan mūḍhaḥ prabuddhaḥ syād anāvṛtaḥ || 1.25 [2.9]

Once he [the yogin] has reached that state [of *spanda* experience], he abides there, and resolves: 'Whatever he [the Lord] says, I will surely do it.'[9] Having that state as their support, both the Moon and the Sun [i.e. the inspired and exhaled breaths], abandoning the domain of Brahmā's egg [i.e. objectivity, the domain of the body], go to rest in the channel of *suṣumnā*, by the upward path. Then, once the Moon and the Sun have dissolved in that Great Sky [the ether of universal consciousness], he [, who experiences that state] as a kind of deep sleep, remains stupefied (*mūḍha*), whereas the one who is no longer covered [by the veil of *māyā*[10]] is fully awakened (*prabuddha*).

Verses 1.22 and 1.23 of this passage represent the speculative aspect of the doctrinal exposition: verse 1.22 surveys the different

ness (or awareness of the Self) within the Heart, into which the entire universe has melted, is present at the beginning of the apprehension of things and at their end. In the Treatise [on *spanda*], it is termed "generic vibration" […].' For other parallel passages to ŚD 1.9–11, see Nemec 2011: 115, n. 115.

[8] SpS (pp. 6–7): […] *yat svarūpābhijñānāya sphuṭayiṣyati atikruddha ityādi anāvṛtaḥ ityantaṃ ślokacatuṣṭayam*, '[…] the tetrad of verses starting with *atikruddhaḥ* and ending with *anāvṛtaḥ* will make it clear in order to lead [the yogin] to the recognition of his own essence.' Note that v. 1.17 [2.1] announces v. 1.22 [2.6]: *tasyopalabdhiḥ satataṃ tripadāvyabhicāriṇī | nityaṃ syāt suprabuddhasya tadādyante parasya tu ||*, 'He who is fully awakened permanently enjoys the undeviating knowledge of the [Self] in all the three states. Others[, partially awakened,] only enjoy it at the beginning and at the end of [each state].'

[9] This passage describes one who fully surrenders to *spanda* against a background of perfect vigilance, and illustrates a major feature of the experience — its paradoxical nature.

[10] See SpS (p. 7): *yat* […] *ślokacatuṣṭayam | paraśaktipātaprakāśadhvastamāyāvaraṇasya tu karālambanaṃ dadaty eva* […], 'That tetrad of verses […] is helpful in allowing the [yogin] for whom the veil of *māyā* has been destroyed by the light of supreme grace to reach the domain of Śiva [i.e. the domain of perfect self-awareness, or *spanda*]'; see also *māyāmūḍhān* in SpS (p. 22).

experiential states, and verse 1.23 provides the content of experience in a direct style and in the first person singular. Verses 1.24–25 are more practical, pertaining to the āgamic yoga, more precisely to the practice of *kuṇḍalinī*.

In Kṣemarāja's *Spandanirṇaya* (11th c.), the context is very clearly that of *jīvanmukti* (or *jīvanmuktatā*), 'liberation in life.' According to *Spandanirṇaya ad* 1.21 [2.5], the hyperaesthesic states described in verse 1.22 [2.6] function for the yogin who is already 'awakened' (*prabuddha*) as an introduction to the supreme experience that will make him into one who is 'perfectly awakened' (*suprabuddha*) — in other words, a *jīvanmukta*:

> He, always intent upon the perception of his own introverted essence, attains, in a short time, even in the state of waking, his own nature, innate, which is that of Śaṃkara himself. Then, that inner nature, which is that of Śaṃkara, emerges of itself, because of which, thanks to his ever-present absorption in it, the 'awakened' one (*prabuddha*) becomes 'perfectly awakened' (*suprabuddha*), that is, becomes liberated while living (*jīvanmukta*). Such is the meaning.[11]

The reasoning is the same in the preamble (*avataraṇikā* [intro.]) of *Spandanirṇaya ad* 1.23–25 [2.7–9], in which Kṣemarāja gives an extremely lucid, even initiatory exposition of the issues in the passage (1.22–25 [2.6–9]), allowing us to see a procedure in two steps — the first contact with *spanda* (which occurs in the states described in 1.22) and the assiduous practice of such an experience are followed, this times in all states, whatever they be, by an absorption in the *spanda*, previously glimpsed, albeit fleetingly. This is what is taught by verses 1.24–25 [2.8–9] in which the practice of *kuṇḍalinī* must be read:

> First of all, by assiduously practising the energy of *spanda* by way of the states mentioned, then, by being continuously attentive to it all through the states, the ever-vigilant one (*satatodyukta*) attains liberation in this life (*jīvanmuktatā*), which consists in permanent

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[11] SpN 1.21 [2.5/21] (p. 39$_{6-11}$): [...] *satatam evāntarmukhasvarūpanibhālanapravaṇo yaḥ sa jāgrad eva jāgarāvasthāsthita eva nijam ātmīyaṃ śaṃkarātmakaṃ svasvabhāvam acireṇādhigacchati tathā asya śaṃkarātmā āntaraḥ svabhāvaḥ svayam evonmajjati yena prabuddho nityoditasamāveśāsādanāt suprabuddho jīvanmukto bhavatīty arthaḥ.*

absorption therein [in the energy of *spanda*]. This is what he [i.e. Vasugupta] is teaching now.[12]

Here Kṣemarāja makes an interesting distinction between the states mentioned in verse 1.22 [2.6], which are the prolegomena of, or propaedeutics to, the experience of transcendent *spanda*, and the totality of states, whatever they be, even if infinitely more ordinary, in which the yogin, with eyes now unsealed, is able to recognize the same supreme reality as that which the hyperaesthesic states described in 1.22 [2.6] had allowed him to be aware of and to feel. There can be no liberation in life except under these conditions.

What is illustrated in verse 1.22 [2.6] is the intrasensitive recognition (*pratyabhijñā* — the term is recurrent in the *Nirṇaya*[13]) of a transcendent reality, that is not, as such, suprasensitive (*atīndriya*, as is said of Dharma, for example), but rather hypersensitive, sensitive throughout, without residue. Moreover, this sudden recognition of the Absolute is felt in the sensitive modality of wonderment.[14] This also explains that the experience may be a pre-condition for experiencing *jīvanmukti*.

Both *jīvanmukti* and hyperaesthesic states are paradoxical forms of existence, and in some way oxymora, in the eyes of the common man at least. Consequently, a conversion of experience into its opposite operates at the heart of logical contradiction itself, as perfectly illustrated by *Śivastotrāvalī* 20.12, through the rhetorical use of a grammatical form, the denominative.[15] And it is only possible because ultimate reality itself is in the range of

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[12] SpN, intro. *ad* 1.23–25 [2.7–9] (p. 41₅₋₇): *evam etāsv avasthāsūktayuktyā prathamaṃ spandaśaktiṃ pariśīlya tadanu tām evānusaṃdadhat sarvāsv avasthāsu taddārḍhyānupraveśamayīṃ jīvanmuktatām āharet satatodyukta ity upadiśati.*

[13] See also SpS quoted *supra*, p. 76, n. 8.

[14] Such a sentiment of wonder is condensed in the practice of *vismayamudrā*, the '*mudrā* of astonishment,' described in *Spandakārikā* 1.11. We observe that, in aesthetic theory, 'astonishment' (*vismaya*) is the permanent feeling (*sthāyibhāva*) which is transformed, in the aesthetic register, into the 'taste' of the Marvelous, the *adbhutarasa*. See *infra*, p. 84, the way Rāmakaṇṭha makes use of aesthetic theory in his exegesis of v. 2.6.

[15] *Śivastotrāvalī* 20.12: *duḥkhāny api sukhāyante viṣam apy amṛtāyate | mokṣāyate ca saṃsāro yatra mārgaḥ sa śāṃkaraḥ ||* 'Where even miseries become pleasure; where even poison turns into ambrosia; where the world of transmigration becomes liberation — that is the path of Śaṃkara.'

experience — a speculative posture that is just as extraordinary as its object.

This is why the doctrine distinguishes between *sāmānyaspanda* and *viśeṣaspanda*, between generic or universal *spanda* and particular or individual *spanda* (or more precisely the infinite diversity of all individual *spanda*s), present at transcendent and immanent levels respectively.

In principle, then — it is correlative to this experiential conception of the Absolute —, there should be no reason why this achievement could not be accessible to everyone: everyone has experienced these extreme situations. However, the texts show that there is an implicit condition of excellence for the aspirant, and this involves competence (*adhikāra*) that is neither social nor ritual, but of a spiritual nature. As observed by the *Nirṇaya* (see *supra*), the aspirant to this achievement is already a yogin, moreover, an 'awakened' yogin whose vocation is to become 'perfectly awakened.'

The emotional and sensory exacerbation described in verse 1.22 [2.6] thus points to the effraction (as sudden as it is fleeting) of the transcendent in the immanent, the irruption of the intrinsic and irresistible energy of generic *spanda* into its empirical 'manifestations,' that is, into the multiplicity of the specific *spanda*s — those intense moments when the subject is at the most extreme point of himself. And it is this same dynamism that, when it reverses itself, leads to the perennial and ever-vibrating experience of itself, in other words to a quivering stasis, imbued with wonder, in which 'liberation in life' is achieved.

Thus, the essential effervescence of the Absolute breaks the thread of discursive thought, triggering a powerful movement of introversion,[16] and allows access to a higher plane of reality which has never ceased to be there as the 'archetype,' of which the states of emotional and cognitive acme are but the empirical concretization. It is the essence of *spanda* to be continually upsurging (*nityodita*)[17] and thus to find itself at the height of extreme situations

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[16] This feature of experience is highly emphasized by Kṣemarāja and Rāmakaṇṭha in their commentary on verse 1.22 [2.6].

[17] The adjective is recurrent in the speculations of non-dualist Śaivism of Kashmir; see, among other examples, Kṣemarāja's *Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya*, *sūtra* 19 (p.

in common experience. Symmetrically, extreme sensations are the indisputable clues of something beyond themselves, that is both their source and principle. The homology cannot be other than complete between *sāmānyaspanda* and *viśeṣaspanda*. It has, then, both a pedagogical and initiating function.

The *Nirṇaya* suggests a metaphor for this effraction characterized by both intensity and suddenness: the seal that is broken to reveal the hidden treasure of *spanda* — a seal that is imposed on it by an indefinite series of dualizing thoughts. This is the most beautiful image of the introduction of *Spandanirṇaya ad* verse 1.22 [2.6]:[18]

> […] *asyodyuktasya balavadālambanavaśoditānāyāsatadanyasakala-vṛttikṣayamayīṣu niyatāsu yāsv avasthāsu spandanidhānam unmudri-tam abhimukhībhūtam āste* […] |

> […] the treasure of *spanda* stands unsealed (*unmudrita*) to him who is determined [to find it], i.e. comes face to face with him, through these particular states where all mental activities other than [the awareness of] that [*spanda*] which has appeared to him thanks to his powerful seizing […] have easily ceased.[19]

In the *Nirṇaya*, this essential idea of effraction is explained primarily by way of two semantic fields: i) that which is constructed around the term *mudrā* (in both its meanings of 'seal' and 'mystical posture') and its denominative *mudrayati* (to be read here, in

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46): *nityoditasamādhilābhaḥ* and its auto-commentary; also auto-commentary *ad* 1 (p. 3): *vyāpakanityoditaparipūrṇarūpā iyam* […], and *ad* 12 (p. 27): […] *nityodita-mahāmantrarūpā pūrṇāhaṃvimarśamayī yeyaṃ parāvākśaktiḥ* […]; *Tantrāloka* 2.4cd: *svabhāva eva mantavyaḥ sa hi nityodito vibhuḥ*, and the quotation in *Tantrā-lokaviveka ad* 8.14: *nityoditaṃ sukhaṃ viddhi nistaraṅgaṃ tu kathyate*; also, Rāmakaṇṭha in his SpV 2.6: […] *nityoditapratiṣṭhitaspandaprakāśaparisphurita-samāpattim unmiṣitum eva prabhavanti*.

[18] Also present (and equally close to the root *truṭ*; see n. 20) in the second *ma-ṅgala* of the *Spandasandoha*, where the extended metaphor (*mudritaṃ … unmu-drya*) is governed by the mystical notion of *mahāmudrā*, and is thus associated with highly esoteric connotations: *caitanyābdheḥ prasarad amṛtaṃ troṭitāyāsatantraṃ sar-vasyāntaḥ sphurad api mahāmudrayā mudritaṃ yat | pūrṇānandapradam atitarām etad unmudrya yuktyā yo 'ntarvaktraṃ rasayati jayaty eṣa vīraḥ kulendraḥ ||*. On *mahā-mudrā*, see *Tantrikābhidhānakośa* 3: 393.

[19] SpN *ad* 1.22 [2.6] (p. 39$_{12-15}$), whose complete text is: *yathāsyodyuktasya ba-lavadālambanavaśoditānāyāsatadanyasakalavṛttikṣayamayīṣu niyatāsu yāsv avasthāsu spandanidhānam unmudritam abhimukhībhūtam āste tā etāḥ prathamam udyogasya viṣayā ity upadeṣṭum āha |*.

unmudrita, intro. *ad* 1.22 [2.6]); and ii) that which is governed by the root *truṭ* (and its variant *tuṭ*), 'break,' 'shatter.'[20]

Both metaphors find their counterpart in yogic practice: on the one hand, corresponding to the image of the broken 'seal,' there is the *bhairavī mudrā*, where one's eyes are wide open, not in order to keep the intensely perceived world at a distance, but to wholly interiorize it, make it one's own in an equally intense way;[21] on the other hand, this element of yogic practice that is the *tuṭipāta*, 'the fall of the first instant [of all sensation],' which, according to the texts, lasts a hundredth of a second.[22] In such a way, suddenness creates suspense, instantaneity duration, effervescence immobility, vertigo equilibrium, and surprise creates the regaining of one's composure. Such is the glory of paradox!

Thus, *sāmānyaspanda*, another name for the all-powerful divine energy — the *svātantryaśakti* which is irresistible power — is in itself both the means and the end. It works (in the form of *icchāśakti*, the energy of will) to make itself known to him who may not know it yet, or who thinks he may not know it.

3. *Spandakārikā 22 and the exegesis of Rāmakaṇṭha [= 2.6]*

But let us return to verse 22 [2.6]:

> *atikruddhaḥ prahṛṣṭo vā kiṃ karomīti vā mṛśan* |
> *dhāvan vā yat padaṃ gacchet tatra spandaḥ pratiṣṭhitaḥ* ||

These emotional and perceptive acmes provide the opportunity and the means by which to achieve a reversal: that to which one was subjugated (are extreme anger and extreme joy not 'passions'?) now liberates. Anger and joy, embodying in their very excess the archetypal effervescence that arouses them, give the yogin the possibility to recognize and experience it, and therefore to free him-

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[20] The *Spandanirṇaya* employs it in the form of a past participle: *truṭita*, especially *ad* 1.11 [1.11/11] (p. 25_{22-23}), where the wonderful experience of recognizing one's own nature as vibrant reality (*spanda*) is described, all of which implies the disappearance of dualizing thoughts (*vikalpa = vṛtti*): [...] *jhaṭiti truṭitasakalavṛttiḥ* [...], '[...] Instantly, all his activities (or thoughts) break [...].'

[21] See the definition quoted in SpN *ad* 1.11 [1.11/11] (p. 25_{17-18}): *antarlakṣyo bahirdṛṣṭir nimeṣonmeṣavarjitaḥ* | *iyaṃ sā bhairavī mudrā sarvatantreṣu gopitā* ||. Thus, the *bhairavī mudrā* also partakes of paradox and oxymoron.

[22] See Bansat-Boudon and Tripathi 2011: 344.

self from nescience. It is the same for extreme dismay, since the deliberation of verse 2.6 [1.22] (to be read in the present participle *mṛśan*), by which the man lost in terror questions himself in vain, is destined to accomplish itself in *vimarśa(na)* — self-awareness.

Of the four exegetes of the *Spandakārikā*, it is Rāmakaṇṭha (also named Rājānaka Rāma) who gives, in his *Vivṛti*, the longest and most profound commentary on verse 22 [2.6]. Rāmakaṇṭha, who claimes to be the direct disciple of Utpaladeva,[23] probably lived between 950 and 1000 CE,[24] thus preceding Abhinavagupta and two other exegetes of the *Spandakārikā*, Kṣemarāja and Bhāgavatotpala (a.k.a. Utpalavaiṣṇava or Utpalācārya), the author of the *Spandapradīpikā*.

For each of the terms in verse 2.6 [1.22] (*atikruddhaḥ/ prahṛṣṭaḥ/ kiṃ karomīti mṛśan/ dhāvan*), Rāmakaṇṭha supplies an interpretation of psychological and factual nature: his example of extreme anger is 'the intense wrath aroused by the sight or the voice of an enemy in a terrible and fierce battle'; his example of intense joy is the exultation one feels at the sight of a loved one thought dead, and who appears suddenly. As for the absolute dismay expressed by *kiṃ karomīti mṛśan*, the example is that of a princeling who, beset by a more powerful king or a furious enemy, does not know what counter-attack to employ. The situation evoked by *dhāvan*, 'running,' is of another order, since it is no longer a question of affects, but of an activity coming from *karmendriya*, an 'organ of action,' here the foot. In this case too other exegetes only read it as a psychological situation (a man who runs away from a mad elephant, for example, in Kṣemarāja), but Rāmakaṇṭha suggests another interpretation, by virtue of which, in accordance with the scheme he has established for the other terms (see *infra*), running represents not only itself but also the categories of action associated with the five *karmendriya*s.

From the outset, Rāmakaṇṭha gives unexpected depth to the different issues evoked in the verse, applying to them the Śaiva

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[23] In the concluding verse of the *Sarvatobhadra*, a commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*, which Rāmakaṇṭha probably composed; on Rāmakaṇṭha, exegete of the *Bhagavadgītā*, see Bansat-Boudon and Törzsök 2018: 39–42.

[24] See Sanderson 2007: 411.

grid of interpretation, of Sāṃkhya origin, that organizes empirical experience in *tattva*s, 'levels of reality.' Such empirical experience begins with *prakṛti*, constituted by *sukha*, *duḥkha* and *moha* (pleasure, pain and delusion), themselves corresponding to the three *guṇa*s, or 'qualities,' *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, respectively. The three following *tattva*s, which proceed directly from the *prakṛti*, are *buddhi*, *manas* and *ahaṃkāra*, 'volitive intellect,' 'mind' and 'ego,'[25] grouped under the heading *antaḥkaraṇa*, the 'inner organ.' From this inner organ are produced, in turn, the five *karmendriya*s, or organs of action, and the five *buddhīndriya*s, or cognitive organs. So, as we have observed, the fourth term of the verse, the present participle 'running,' illustrates an empirical situation pertaining to these organs of action. Further in his commentary on verse 2.6 [1.22], Rāmakaṇṭha says that the *buddhīndriya*s are also indirectly referred to in verse 4.6 [3.4]. The thirteen 'senses' or 'organs' (*indriya*s or *karaṇa*s) are thus to be read under the four terms of verse 2.6 [1.22], which thus suggest the totality of the sensitive experience, but considered in its paroxysmal modality. In doing so, Rāmakaṇṭha shows that there is nothing arbitrary about the enumeration of the empirical perceptions given in verse 2.6 [1.22].

We have no difficulty in understanding the functioning of the tattvic explanation of these affects. Anger, in effect, partakes of both *rajas* and *duḥkha*, joy of *sattva* and *sukha*, dismay of *tamas* and *moha* — all modalities that fall within the activity of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, which perceives them.[26]

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[25] From the point of view of Sāṃkhya and its theory of the *tattva*s, *buddhi* is more than the intellect, it is the locus where volition is formed. Therefore, volition is an essential aspect of the meaning of the term, although it is implied by the cognitive process. As Hiriyanna observes (1993: 286): 'If now the perception is to lead to any action the *buddhi* intervenes and decides upon what action has to follow and issues instructions, so to say, to the proper motor organ (*karmendriya*), the result being either some action or desistence from it. The *buddhi* thus corresponds to the will-aspect of conscious life.' This is the reason why, from the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* to the Trika corpus, *buddhi* is described as *niścaya*, or *adhyavasāya*; see, especially, *Paramārthasāra* 19 and its commentary (Bansat-Boudon and Tripathi 2011: 159–162 and n. 556), and TĀ 1.38b–40 and TĀV *ad loc.*: *adhyavasāyo buddhiḥ.*

[26] SpV *ad* 2.6 [1.22] (p. 71₇₋₈): *duḥkhasukhamohātmaviṣayagrahaṇarūpāntaḥ-karaṇavyāpāra°*. The question the man asks himself in a state of dismay: 'What

Then, refocusing his analysis on the first two terms (*atikru-ddhaḥ, prahr̥ṣṭaḥ*) of verse 2.6 [1.22], Rāmakaṇṭha superimposes a grid of interpretation borrowed from aesthetics on the existing Śaiva-Sāṃkhya explanation. And he does it almost surreptitiously, leaving to the reader, who is a *sahr̥daya* after all, the task of recognizing the main features of aesthetic doctrine in this new stratum of the exegesis. What does he say? The complete text is given in the Appendix; here I shall limit myself to a synthesis.

It is clear in this passage that each qualification — whether anger or joy — ceases to be uniquely self-referential, insofar as they are both valid as a paradigm of a series of four affects in which, once the two sequences are combined, one may recognize the eight 'permanent feelings' (*sthāyibhāva*) of the Indian aesthetic theory,[27] here distributed into these two groups of feelings. Respectively under the headings of *rajas* and *sattva*, these eight *sthāyibhāva*s are determined as either negative or positive. Anger (the *krodha* implied by *atikruddhaḥ*) governs the rajasic tetrad: anger, grief, fear, disgust; joy (the *harṣa* implied by *prahr̥ṣṭaḥ*) governs the sattvic tetrad: joy (standing for *rati*, amorous pleasure), ardor, astonishment, laughter.[28] See the chart below (p. 101).

shall I do?' admirably resumes the cognitive process described in Sāṃkhya. The *manas* seizes the facts of the senses, the *ahaṃkāra* brings them to the knowing subject, and the *buddhi* (volition as much as intellect) takes the appropriate decision. In this precise case, it is *buddhi* which is flawed.

[27] The eight *sthāyibhāva*s are anger (*krodha*), grief (*śoka*), fear (*bhaya*), disgust (*jugupsā*), amorous pleasure (*rati*, here represented by *harṣa*, 'joy'), ardor (*utsāha*), astonishment (*vismaya*), laughter (*hāsa*) which are respectively the emotional substrata of the eight *rasa*s or aesthetic sentiments: the Furious (*rau-dra*), the Pathetic (*karuṇa*), the Dreadful (*bhayānaka*), the Odious (*bībhatsa*), the Amorous (*śr̥ṅgāra*), the Heroic (*vīra*), the Marvelous (*adbhuta*), the Comic (*hāsya*); see the chart below (p. 101).

In French I have opted to translate: le Furieux, le Pathétique, le Terrible, l'Odieux, l'Amoureux, l'Héroïque, le Merveilleux, le Comique. These terms imply the word 'sentiment,' in the aesthetic sense it has in French: we refer to the 'sentiment du Furieux,' the 'sentiment du Pathétique,' the 'sentiment du Merveilleux,' etc., on the model of the 'sentiment tragique' or the 'sentiment comique.'

[28] SpV *ad* 2.6 [1.22]: [...] *krodhaśokabhayajugupsābhedena caturvidhasya duḥkharāśeḥ atikruddhaśabdena upalakṣitatvāt* [...] |, '[...] for, by the word 'extremely angry' the fourfold group of pains is implied, that is, anger, grief, fear and disgust, [...]; and: [...] *harṣotsāhavismayahāsabhedena catūrūpasukharāśer atiprahr̥ṣṭaśabdenopalakṣitatvāt* |, '[...] for, by the word 'extremely happy' the four-

At this precise point Rāmakaṇṭha brings the whole of aesthetic theory into his exegesis. He does it in a veiled manner though, without ever using an aesthetic lexical field. Be that as it may, the introduction of the aesthetic paradigm in the *Vivṛti ad* 2.6 [1.22] is unique in the exegetic tradition of the *Spandakārikā*.

Thus, when he evokes the context of appearance of a particular *sthāyibhāva*, Rāmakaṇṭha describes its possible causes, which the aesthetic doctrine exposed in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, the 'Treatise of theatre' (ca. 2nd c. CE), calls '*vibhāva*s,' 'determinants,' without actually naming them as such.[29] In the tetrad of negative affects, the tiger and the serpent are the *vibhāva*s of fear; the news of the death of a loved one, that of sorrow; and similarly in the tetrad of positive affects, the sight of an object or a being of extraordinary beauty is the *vibhāva* of wonderment; tickling, that of laughter.

Again, Rāmakaṇṭha brings in the *anubhāva*s, 'consequents' or 'effects' of an affect, in his demonstration — still without using the corresponding technical terms. Thus, it would be more correct to say that he introduces them *in absentia*. In fact, when he mentions 'tears, fainting, etc., that manifest grief' (*śokavyañjakāsrupralayā-di*°), it is *only* to highlight that the experience of *spanda* — which seizes the opportunity of this emotional acme — arises *before* the onset of the tears,[30] in other words, before the empirical emotion, whatever it be, extends to its ultimate consequences (or rather breaks up into them) — this small number of external manifestations being sufficiently universal to allow the *Nāṭyaśāstra* to establish a list of them and their respective assignments.

Why then, in this context, do away with the *anubhāva*s? The explanation lies in yogic and mystic practice: the *avataraṇikā* of *Nirṇaya ad* 1.22 [2.6] teaches that pulling away from the empirical quagmire can only be achieved through intense effort (*udyoga*).[31]

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fold group of pleasures is implied, that is, joy, ardor, astonishment and laughter […].' On the distribution of the eight *sthāyibhāva*s and the eight *rasa*s into two groups of four, see also Sathaye 2010.

[29] On the *vibhāva*s, *anubhāva*s and *vyabhicāribhāva*s, see Bansat-Boudon 1992: 111–117.

[30] See *infra*, n. 34.

[31] SpN, intro. *ad* 1.22 [2.6] (p. 39$_{14-15}$): […] *tā etāḥ [avasthāḥ] prathamam udyo-gasya viṣayā ity upadeṣṭum āha*, '[…] the author teaches that the [particular] states [described in the verse] should, first of all, pertain to the domain of an intense

Indeed, seizing the affect precisely when it is at its most intense must coincide with a powerful movement of introversion which instantly (*jhaṭiti*) creates a blissful and wonder-filled stasis in which the yogin firmly establishes himself. (Remember that here the timescale is *tuṭi* or a hundredth part of a second.)

So, as Rāmakaṇṭha observes while commenting on *atikruddhaḥ* of the verse, it is crucial that the emotions described in verse 2.6 [1.22] be seized in the nascent state (*jātamātrakrodhaḥ*).[32] Thus, in the next stage, *vibhāva*s — tears, shouts and so on — are merely 'alterations' (*vikāra, vikr̥ti*) of the state of consciousness resulting from such intense emotions (*tajjanyavikārāvasthāyāḥ*). Therefore, the transcendent *spanda* experience takes place *immediately* (*jhaṭiti*) and *before* (*prāg eva*) any alteration in the emotion that has just occurred.[33]

The same analysis is valid for sorrow (*śoka*), which Rāmakaṇṭha infers from anger (*krodha*):

> Therefore, just as in the case of one who is extremely angry, the one who is extremely aggrieved attains the domain [where *spanda* reveals itself], by hearing, for instance, of the unexpected death of someone dear, i.e. when grief begins to extend its sway, but before this grief is altered by the shedding of tears, etc., that manifest this feeling.[34]

Circumscribed and explained in this way, the experience of *spanda* is pure emotion, free from empirical effects. The climax of a 'mundane' (*laukika*) emotion is the instrument of its transformation into a 'supra-mundane' (*lokottara*) experience, that of generic *spanda*.[35]

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effort (*udyoga*) [on the part of the yogin still partially awakened]'; see *supra*, the complete text quoted in n. 19, in which *udyukta* echoes *udyoga*.

[32] Anger is seized by the aspirant to *spanda* at the very instant it is born in him (*jātamātrakrodhaḥ*); such is the case also for sorrow (*samunmiṣitamātraśokaḥ*).

[33] SpV *ad* 2.6: *yat padam atikruddho gacchet — tajjanyavikārāvasthāyāḥ prāg eva jhaṭiti jātamātrakrodho yat padam* […] *gacchet*.

[34] SpV *ad* 2.6: *tena atikruddhavat aśaṅkiteṣṭajanavināśaśravaṇādinā kāraṇena atiśokāviṣṭo 'pi śokavyañjakāsrupralayādivikr̥teḥ prāg eva samunmiṣitamātraśoko yat padaṃ gacchet*.

[35] Cf. SpN intro. *ad* 1.12–13 (p. 26₁₃₋₁₄): […] *lokottaratāṃ prakaraṇaśarīrasya spandatattvasya nirūpayati*, 'He [the author of the *Spandakārikā*] describes the extraordinary character (*lokottaratā*) of *spanda* (i.e. vibrant Reality) — which is a central theme in this treatise.'

It should be emphasized that Rāmakaṇṭha's aesthetic exegesis makes no mention of the *rasa*s corresponding to the *sthāyibhāva*s. Yet the correspondence is implicit because, in the aesthetic register, the *sthāyibhāva*s can only be accomplished in *rasa*s. In other words, empirical feelings (which, reduced to eight, are already a re-ordering of the human psyche) are to be transformed into aesthetic sentiments; *sthāyibhāva*s and *rasa*s are coextensive, subject to the appropriate process for the transformation of the former into the latter.[36] In the same way the experience of *spanda* is called by (and recognized in) the appropriate treatment to which yogic practice submits ordinary emotions, at least when they are at their highest point.

The homology that is thus established between *spanda* and *rasa* invites us to reflect further on aesthetic experience itself and its doctrine.[37]

[36] On the stages of this process, see Bansat-Boudon 1992a: 145 ff.

[37] Although in a very different register, Kṣemarāja's exegesis is no less the work of a virtuoso. It agrees perfectly with an essential feature of his hermeneutics: the key place accorded to *śakti*, the sovereign Energy, and her many hypostases. Moreover, his *Spandasandoha* is entirely devoted to a review of the many interpretations of *śakticakra*, the 'Wheel of energies,' the subject of the first verse of the SpK. Commenting on verse 1.22 [2.6], the *Nirṇaya* treats examples of sensorial and emotional experience brought to an extreme degree of intensity as the work of goddesses (*devatā* or *devī*), in other words, of *śakti*s. They are goddesses previously unmentioned, who seem to have been forged *ad hoc*, in virtue of the principle that everything is *śakti* — they are neither the goddesses of the senses, *stricto sensu*, nor the *mātṛkā*s, nor the countless others that are well-known and consigned to lists. The *Nirṇaya* thus presents the burst of violent anger (*atikrodha*) as a manifestation, almost an epiphany, of the suitably named *saṃjihīrṣā devatā*, the 'goddess aspiring to destroy,' whose desire to destroy remains nevertheless potential, interiorized, until the occasion for its outburst presents itself, for instance, the sight of an enemy threatening serious injury. Extreme joy (*praharṣa*) is treated in a similar way — for instance, when one sees again the beloved that one had thought lost —, a joy understood as an exteriorization of the *abhilāṣadevatā*, the 'goddess of desire.' As for the frantic desire to escape (*dhāvana*) caused by a furious elephant, for instance, it is to be understood as an exteriorization of the inner activity of another goddess named *udyogadevī*, the 'goddess of intense effort.' The experience of extreme dismay alone (*kiṃ karomi vā mṛśan*) remains without an allegorical goddess, being nonetheless described as the total suspension of other mental activity, in this case, of lucidity and decision-making skills. Thus, the experience of *spanda* is itself fleetingly apprehended in this absolute suspense, be it brief. The suspense inherent in the emotional exacerbation whose consequence is the abolition of mental activity is

4. *Aesthetic experience as a speculative and hermeneutic paradigm*

Now, as Rāmakaṇṭha explains *spanda* by way of aesthetics, I would like to make the symmetrical hypothesis of aesthetics explained through *spanda*.

I shall first refer to the famous *rasasūtra*[38] of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* which teaches that '*rasa* [the aesthetic emotion] is born from the conjunction of the determinants (*vibhāva*), consequents (*anubhāva*) and transitory feelings (*vyabhicāri[bhāva]*),' which leaves out the *sthāyibhāva*s. Why is this? I have already offered a tentative explanation elsewhere[39] but, in this essay, I would like to look at another level of interpretation.

A possible reason why the *rasasūtra* makes no mention of the *sthāyibhāva* is that the *sthāyibhāva* can only be seized in act and in essence during the very brief instant when it is *spanda*, the essen-

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the basis for that other suspense (equally vibratile and effervescent) that is the *spanda* experience. Therefore, according to the *Nirṇaya*, the four hyperesthesias of v. 1.22 [2.6] are manifestations of *śakti*s and condition the access to the state of *spanda*. One still has to get rid of these hyperesthesic states which, though essential steps in the process, are nonetheless parasitic. As soon as he perceives the flash of the *spanda* experience, the accomplished yogin instantly represses anger and dismay, retracting them within himself, just as the turtle retracts its feet into its shell (*kūrmāṅgasaṃkocayuktyā*), so that he abides once and for all in the *spanda* state, experienced as a pulsating and beatific stasis. Likewise, exultation and frantic running, though they are occasions for apprehending that transcendent experience, and though they participate in the symmetric movement of expansion (*mahāvikāsavyāptiyuktyā*), must be gotten rid of as the final hindrances to the yogin's quest for the absolute. Running and exultation abolish themselves in their own expansion, so that the yogin, now commensurate with the universe, effortlessly reaches the effervescent repose in the Self that is the *spanda* experience: *tasmād etad vṛttikṣayapadaṃ saṃcetya jhaṭiti kūrmāṅgasaṃkocayuktyā krodhasaṃśayavṛttīḥ praśamayya mahāvikāsavyāptiyuktyā vā praharṣadhāvanavṛttīr visphāryābhimukhībhūtanijaspandaśaktivimarśavatā yoginā bhāvyam* (SpN *ad* 1.22, p. 40). Anger, jubilation, dismay, distraught running are all occasions for, as well as fleeting indices of the transcendent and durable *spanda* experience. The SpS (p. 22) completes the exposition, recognizing several intense affects (attachment, aversion, anger, etc.) as a 'group of experiences' (*pratyayagrāma*) that are manifestations of a given 'Wheel of energies' (*śakticakra*): *api ca śakticakrasya āgamasaṃpradāyaprasiddhanānādevatāparamārthasya rāgadveṣakrodhavikalpādipratyayagrāmasya,* […] *yo vibhavaḥ* […], 'Again, the Wheel of energies [represents] the group of such experiences as attachment, aversion, anger, dualizing thoughts, etc., which, in reality, are the various deities attested by the agamic tradition […]; of this Wheel of energies, there is power […].'

[38] *Nāṭyaśāstra* 6, *rasasūtra*: *vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisaṃyogād rasaniṣpattiḥ.*

[39] See Bansat-Boudon 1992: 109–111.

tial vibration associated with its cause (*vibhāva*), before physical effects come to pulverize this moment of grace. As is shown in the *Vivṛti*, the *sthāyibhāva* is by nature fleeting, that is momentary,[40] whether its effects annul it, when the experience is that of the ordinary man (tears are a sign that emotion, as such, is no more), or whether, before this breakdown, the yogin takes hold of the vibrant essence of the same *sthāyibhāva* in order to transform it instantly into the enjoyment of the absolute in which he immerses himself, like the spectator, at least for the duration of the performance (and for a few days after it, says Abhinavagupta[41]), within the homological experience of *rasa*.

In the same way as the performance arouses *rasa* in the heart of the spectator, so the practice of emotional acmes allows the yogin to have access to the calm stasis of generic *spanda*. The work of the yogin, unlike that of the actor, is not to dwell on the *anubhāva*s (the effects of the emotion) but to take the intensity of pure emotion away from their inevitability, in order to retain only the archetypal vibration, prolong it indefinitely and establish himself within it. The absorption, exempt of all empirical impurities, of the spectator in the performance, that is, in *rasa*, or of the yogin in *spanda*, is liberation in this life.

As witnesses of experiences that have in common their being *alaukika*, 'extra-ordinary,' the spectator and the yogin are both 'emancipated spectators.'[42] Still, whereas the experience of liberation is acquired once and for all for the yogin — whatever obsta-

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[40] To anticipate a possible objection, let us specify that this description of the *sthāyibhāva* does not contradict its 'permanence.' Indeed, the 'permanence' of the *sthāyibhāva* does not equate to immobility or even durability: the *sthāyibhāva* is 'permanent' in that it is 'fundamental,' i.e. consubstantial to human nature — the psyche described here as eightfold. Yet it may be regarded as 'permanent,' that is, 'stable,' in so far as it is to be distinguished from 'transitory' feelings (*vyabhicāribhāva*) which only pass through it. For the *sthāyibhāva* is by nature the key (in the musical sense of the word) in which the play is set, in whole or in part.

[41] See *Abhinavabhāratī ad Nāṭyaśāstra* 1.107: [...] *bhavat pañcaṣair divasaiḥ sacamatkāratadīyacaritamadhyapraviṣṭasvātmarūpamatiḥ svātmadvāreṇa viśvaṃ tathā paśyan pratyekaṃ sāmājikaḥ* [...], '[...] the spectator thus views every particular through the lens of his own self, [though the spectacle] continues for five or six days, for his attention is now one with his own self, which has entered into the midst of that action with a sense of wonder'; see Bansat-Boudon 2011: 56.

[42] Phrase borrowed from the title of Rancière's book (2008); see Bansat-Boudon 2011: 56.

cles or difficulties may arise from maintaining himself in his body
—, for the spectator it has to be renewed at each performance.

This constant movement back and forth between two experi-
ences that are equally *alaukika* (or *lokottara*) reveals the propensi-
ty of aesthetic experience to function in the Indian system of rep-
resentations, and even more so in the non-dualist Śaivism of
Kashmir, as a hermeneutic and speculative paradigm.[43]

The two experiences share the affinity of their essences.
Nevertheless, on the model of the universal metaphor of 'the
world like a theatre' — where the world is that which is being com-
pared and the theatre that to which it is being compared — the
primary function of aesthetic experience is to give an illustration
of the experience of the Absolute (*spanda* as *rasa*), although both
experiences are of the same nature. By reflection, aesthetic expe-
rience can in its turn be explained through the experience of
spanda, just like theatre can become the tenor and the world can
become the vehicle: theatre as the world in miniature (i.e. *rasa* as
spanda). Yet there is some asymmetry between the terms of the
analogy; no doubt this is because one of them is transcendent and
the other immanent. *Spanda* is the principle of *rasa*, not the
metaphor of it. If *rasa* illustrates *spanda*, *spanda* explains *rasa*.

The *Tantrāloka* (3.208cd–210) and the *Viveka*, its 13th-c. com-
mentary by Jayaratha, offer a typical example of the reversibility
constantly at work in the homology between *spanda* and *rasa*.
Verses 3.208cd–210 explain the notion of *sahṛdaya*[44] — the man
'with heart,' sensitive and with a genuine taste for poetry — in the
speculative context of 'the emitting Energy of the Lord' (*visar-
gaśakti*; 208cd). Every 'perturbation' (*vibhrama*) [of one's ordinary
indifference] comes from this energy, whose essence is felicity
(*ānanda*) (209ab). This also applies both to aesthetic experiences
(such as listening to a melodious song) and sensorial experiences
(the feeling of sandalwood on the skin; 209cd).[45]

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[43] As already pointed out in Gerow 1994.
[44] The theme is taken up again in TĀ 3.239–241ab, in reference to its
antonym, *ahṛdaya.*
[45] TĀ 3.208cd–210: *visargaśaktir yā śambhoḥ setthaṃ sarvatra vartate || (208cd)
tata eva samasto 'yam ānandarasavibhramaḥ | tathā hi madhure gīte sparśe vā canda-
nādike || (209) mādhyasthyavigame yāsau hṛdaye spandamānatā | ānandaśaktiḥ sai-*

In these verses, *sahṛdayatā* is defined as the yogin's ability to free himself from the misconceptions of the Self and to become absorbed in the blissful experience of the Absolute (or supreme principle, or Deity), which *spanda* represents in verse 210ab. In the same vein, the passage establishes the analogy between the *sahṛdaya*-yogin and the *sahṛdaya*-finite being: as is the case for the yogin, so is it for the ordinary man. Even in this world, he, the ordinary man, who is exposed to an aesthetic or simply sensory pleasure, experiences 'in his heart' (*hṛdaye*) the same 'perception of *spanda*-vibration (*spandamānatā*),' that is, the same 'energy of felicity' (*ānandaśakti*) as that which is within the yogin's reach. Therefore, because this experience takes place in the heart, the yogin and the finite being are both equally *sahṛdaya*s, or beings 'endowed with heart.'[46]

Here the metaphysical and mystical experience of *spanda* explains the aesthetic experience, thereby offering a quasi-myth of the origin of the aesthetic concept of *sahṛdayatā*.

Yet, further on in the *Viveka* (*ad* TĀ 3.208cd–210), the exegetic movement reverses itself, and it is aesthetics which provides an interpretative grid for the experience of *spanda*. In order to sub-

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voktā yataḥ sahṛdayo janaḥ || (210), 'In this way, Śambhu's emitting energy (*visargaśakti*) is present everywhere. It alone is the source of every "perturbation" [of one's ordinary indifference — or: "It alone is the source of every effervescence"] (*vibhrama*) whose essence is felicity. Such as is experienced in melodious song or in the touch of [cooling unguents made of] sandal. It is that state of [empathetic] vibration in the heart produced when all indifference has vanished that is said to be the "energy of felicity" (*ānandaśakti*) — and it is due to it that a man is [considered] a *sahṛdaya*, "having a heart" [receptive to felicity].'

[46] This is developed in the *Viveka ad* TĀ 3.208cd–210: *iha khalu yasya kasyacana pramātuḥ, gītādau viṣaye yadā mādhyasthyavigamaḥ tāṭasthyaparihāreṇa tadekatānatā, tadā yeyaṃ hṛdaye viśvapratiṣṭhāsthāne bodhe, spandamānatā tanmayatayā parisphuradrūpatā, saiveyam ānandaśaktir uktā sarvaśāstreṣu abhihitā ity arthaḥ*, 'When the state of indifference has utterly vanished, as when listening to [melodious] song — [and this may happen] to any sentient being whomsoever in this world —, and a state of identification with that [source of felicity] (*tadekatānatā*) is brought about by the disappearance of such impartiality, then, within the heart — the place of awareness whereupon all experience is founded — a state of vibration (*spandamānatā*) is produced such as can only be produced by the lightning flash [of joy accompanying] the [sudden] mergence of the self with the [delightful] object (*tanmayatayā*); this state alone may be called the "energy of felicity" (*ānandaśakti*), and it is this state alone that is rehearsed in all the *śāstra*s. This is the meaning.'

stantiate his interpretation of the *spandamānatā* of verse 210ab, based on the very notion of *tanmayībhāva*, 'identification,'[47] Jayaratha goes so far as to give a veiled aesthetic interpretation of one of the most philosophically dense verses in the Pratyabhijñā, namely *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā* 1.5.14:[48]

> *sā sphurattā mahāsattā deśakālāviśeṣiṇī* |
> *saiṣā sāratayā proktā hṛdayaṃ parameṣṭhinaḥ* ||

> It [dynamic consciousness (*citi*)] is 'scintillation' (*sphurattā*), Great Being (*mahāsattā*), beyond the limitations of space and time, it is that which is said to be the Heart (*hṛdaya*) of the Supreme Lord in so far as it is his essence.

Here is the passage in the *Viveka*:

> […] *bhogasya sukhaduḥkhādyābhāsasādhāraṇyam anaśnuvānā —*

> *sā sphurattā mahāsattā deśakālāviśeṣiṇī* |
> *saiṣā sāratayā proktā hṛdayaṃ parameṣṭhinaḥ* || (ĪPK 1.5.14)

> *ityādinirūpitasvarūpā parisphuradrūpataiva svātantryam iti vimarśa iti ānanda iti ca sarvatraiva udghoṣyate, yanmāhātmyād eva ca jaḍo 'pi nikhilo 'yaṃ janaḥ sacetana ity ucyate, ata eva loke 'py ānandātiśayakāry eva janaḥ sahṛdayaḥ iti prasiddhiḥ* […]

> […] The fact that the experience [of the transcendent principle] shines forth [in the heart], by taking on the form described in [ĪPK 1.5.14]: *'sā sphurattā mahāsattā deśakālāviśeṣiṇī* | *saiṣā sāratayā proktā hṛdayaṃ parameṣṭhinaḥ* ||' — that is, not having the ordinary character of manifestations of pleasure and of pain etc. —, is widely celebrated as 'absolute freedom' (*svātantrya*), 'self-awareness' (*vimarśa*), 'felicity' (*ānanda*), and, through its very powerfulness, all beings, even the insensitive (*jaḍa*), become, it is said, sensitive (*sacetana*). This is why, even in the world, those who are capable of intense felicity are said to be 'endowed with heart.'

The yogin is a *sahṛdaya* in the fullest sense of the term, strengthened by all the esoteric connotations the use of the word 'heart'

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[47] On this notion as employed in the aesthetic register, see Bansat-Boudon 1992a: 145 ff., and 2012: 213 ff.

[48] For a philosophical interpretation of the verse, see Bansat-Boudon 2014.

(*hṛdaya*) implies in a Śaiva context; that is, he is able to accede to a supra-mundane reality. And the *sahṛdaya* of the empirical register is his counterpart in the register of *rasa,* which may be qualified as 'mundane' only from certain points of view. Thus, *sahṛdayatā* also designates the qualification (*adhikāra*) required of one or the other subject.

The two experiences are therefore in a relation of reciprocal analogy. But aesthetic experience, as much in empirical existence as in philosophical discourse, is the more accessible of the two. Because of its accessibility, which the homological experience of the Absolute lacks, it enables one to understand the latter, that is, to grasp a metaphysical truth that has a tendency not to show itself. The energy of felicity associated with the experience of *spanda* is, to quote the *Viveka,* 'perceived with great clarity' in aesthetic process:

> […] *yady api sarva evāyaṃ viśvaprapañca ānandaśaktisphāraḥ tathāpi sphuṭopalambhād atra tasyā evam uktam*

> […] Even if it is true that the entire deployment of the universe is an expansion of the energy of felicity, nevertheless it may be reaffirmed [with these verses] because [in the case of the aesthetic experience implied by melodious songs[49]] [this energy] is perceived with [great] clarity.

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[49] Such songs are referred to in TĀ 3.209cd and in VBh 73, which the *Viveka ad* v. 210 quotes just before ĪPK 1.5.14; here is the complete text of the passage (vol. 2, pp. 200–201): [...] *iha khalu yasya kasyacana pramātuḥ, gītādau viṣaye yadā mādhyasthyavigamaḥ tāṭasthyaparihāreṇa tadekatānatā, tadā yeyaṃ hṛdaye viśva-pratiṣṭhāsthāne bodhe, spandamānatā tanmayatayā parisphuradrūpatā, saiveyam āna-ndaśaktir uktā sarvaśāstreṣu abhihitā ity arthaḥ | yad uktam —*
    gītādiviṣayāsvādāsamasaukhyaikatātmanaḥ |
    yoginas tanmayatvena manorūḍhes tadātmatā || (VBh 73)
iti | bhogasya sukhaduḥkhādyābhāsasādhāraṇyam anaśnuvānā —
    sā sphurattā mahāsattā deśakālāviśeṣiṇī |
    saiṣā sāratayā proktā hṛdayaṃ parameṣṭhinaḥ || (ĪPK 1.5.14)
ityādinirūpitasvarūpā parisphuradrūpataiva svātantryam iti vimarśa iti ānanda iti ca sarvatraiva udghoṣyate, yanmāhātmyād eva ca jaḍo 'pi nikhilo 'yaṃ janaḥ sacetana ity ucyate, ata eva loke 'py ānandātiśayakāry eva janaḥ sahṛdayaḥ iti prasiddhiḥ | yady api sarva evāyaṃ viśvaprapañca ānandaśaktisphāraḥ tathāpi sphuṭopalambhād atra tasyā evam uktam |.

5. *Spanda, rasa and nāṭya: the role of theatre in the constitution of Indian aesthetic thought*

Thus, certain Śaiva texts make *spanda* the speculative principle of aesthetic experience. Dramaturgical treatises retain the traces of it when, as in the 10th-c. *Daśarūpaka* and the *Avaloka*, its commentary, they make a distinction between *nāṭya*, 'theatre,' and *nṛtta*, 'dance.'[50]

The *Avaloka ad Daśarūpaka* (1.9) defines *nāṭya* as a 'vibration' (*avaspandana*), in turn described as *kiṃciccalana* — the very notions at issue in TĀ 4.184ab quoted above (p. 74, n. 2). Such is the meaning denoted by the root *naṭ* (incidentally, the Prakritization of *nṛt*), whereas the root *nṛt* denotes a mere 'extension of the limbs' (*gātravikṣepārtha°*).[51]

This is why, as the commentary points out, the 'vibration' that characterizes theatre makes it the very place of *rasa* (it is *rasāśrayam*) and of the predominance of *sāttvikābhinaya*.[52]

Symmetrically, the role of dance (*nṛtta*), nothing but 'extension of the limbs,' does not contribute directly to the experience of *rasa* but rather introduces beauty into the performance.[53]

It is therefore no surprise that the technical definition of *nāṭya* should use the notion of *spanda*, understood, not just as the recurring *kiṃciccalana* of speculative Śaiva texts, but also as the other form of vibration that characterizes *sattva* in its aesthetic usage.[54]

The reason why, in this world, theatre is the locus *par excellence* for the supra-mundane (*alaukika*) experience of *rasa* is simply that, with *rasa*, theatre achieves the transcendent principle of *spanda*.

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[50] In fact, the *Daśarūpaka* and the *Avaloka* study the ulterior triad — *nṛtya*, *nṛtta* and *nāṭya* —, but here I shall concentrate on examining the couple of opposites *nāṭya/nṛtta*, the only one known to *Nāṭyaśāstra*. On these matters, see Bansat-Boudon 1992: 407–415 (and chart: 409); 1994; 1998.

[51] *Avaloka ad Daśarūpaka* 1.9: [...] *nṛtyam iti nṛter gātravikṣepārthatvenāṅgikabāhulyāt* [...] *nāṭakādi ca rasaviṣayam* [...] *nāṭyam iti ca naṭa avaspandane iti naṭeḥ kiṃciccalanārthatvāt sāttvikabāhulyāt* [...].

[52] *Ibid.* On *sāttvikābhinaya*, see Bansat-Boudon 1992: 117–125, 145–148, and Bansat-Boudon 1991.

[53] See Bansat-Boudon 1992: 408ff and 1994.

[54] On this, see, especially, Bansat-Boudon 1992: 118–125, 148, 183, and *passim*.

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Appendix

Complete text of Rāmakaṇṭha's *Vivṛti ad* SpK 2.6 [1.22/22]

evaṃ prabuddhasyaiva jāgaraturyapadayor upadeśyatve vyava-
sthāpi te sarvaśarīrisādhāraṇajāgradvṛttyantaralīnām eva tāvat
paratattvopalabdhim upadeṣṭum āha —

>   *atikruddhaḥ prahṛṣṭo vā*
>   *kiṃ karomīti vā mṛśan* |
>   *dhāvan vā yat padaṃ gacchet*
>   *tatra spandaḥ pratiṣṭhitaḥ* || 2.6 (1.22/22)

sāmānyaviśeṣabhedena pratiṣṭhitāpratiṣṭhitarūpatvāt spandasya
dvaividhye sthite, upādeyaḥ **pratiṣṭhitaḥ spandaḥ** tatra pade upa-
labhyate iti saṃbandhaḥ | yaḥ pratiṣṭhitaś calatvavyapadeśa-
hetusukhitvādyanityaviśeṣaspandāviṣayatvād aprakampasthitiḥ
svabhāvamātrādhāraḥ sāmānyarūpo mukhyaḥ spandaḥ pratya-
stamitasamastaviśeṣaśakticakraparamātmadharmaḥ, sa **tatra** ta-
smin adhunaiva nirdiśyamāne pade upalakṣaṇīyaḥ | kasmin? **yat
padam atikruddho gacchet** pratyagrakṣatadāruṇopadravadviṣa-

ddarśanādinā tīvratarakopāviṣṭaḥ tajjanyavikārāvasthāyāḥ prāg eva jhaṭiti jātamātrakrodho yat padaṃ yāṃ bhūmikāṃ **gacchet** manasā āsādayet; tathā **atiprahṛṣṭo yat padaṃ gacchet** mṛtapratyutthitaprāṇasamapramadādidarśanādinā prahṛṣṭaḥ prakṛṣṭena parameṇātiśayena hṛṣṭaḥ pramudita ānandanirbharaḥ, tathaiva utpannamātraharṣo yat padaṃ gacchet; tathā **kiṃ karomi iti mṛśan** yat padaṃ gacchet; kruddhena rājñā ripuṇā vā balavatābhiyuktas tatpratīkārāya kartavyaniścayam alabhamānaḥ kevalaṃ **kiṃ karomi** kim upāyam atrāvalambeya — iti pratipattimūḍha eva mṛśan vikalpayan nirālambanacittavṛttir yāṃ bhūmikām adhitiṣṭhet tatra pratiṣṭhitaspandopalabdhir ity arthaḥ etena prakāratrayeṇa duḥkhasukhamohātmaviṣayagrahaṇarūpāntaḥkaraṇavyāpāramayajāgradavasthāviṣayeṇa evaṃvidhāni prakārāntarāṇi saṃgṛhītāni veditavyāni | tena atikruddhavat aśaṅkiteṣṭajanavināśaśravaṇādinā kāraṇena atiśokāviṣṭo 'pi śokavyañjakāsrupralayādivikṛteḥ prāg eva samunmiṣitamātraśoko yat padaṃ gacchet; tathā akasmāt kupitakṛṣṇoragavyāghrādigrāsagocaragamanādinā nimittena atibhītaḥ tathaiva sadyaḥ samudbhūtamātrabhayo yat padaṃ gacchet; tathātyantajugupsāspadapadārthadarśanādihetunā jātamātrajugupso yat padaṃ gacchet, tatrāpi pratiṣṭhitaspandopalabdhiḥ — ity upadiṣṭaṃ bhavati; krodhaśokabhayajugupsābhedena caturvidhasya duḥkharāśeḥ atikruddhaśabdena upalakṣitatvāt | tathā prahṛṣṭavan nijavīryabalasaṃpattisaṃbhāvanādihetunā suduṣkaram api kāryaṃ nirvartayituṃ nirvikalpam eva utsāhamāno jhaṭiti yat padaṃ gacchet; tathaiva adṛṣṭapūrvaparamaramaṇīyādipadārthadarśanādinā sapadi ativismayāviṣṭo yat padaṃ gacchet; tathā kuhanādinā kāraṇena utpannamātrātihāso yat padaṃ gacchet, tatrāpi pratiṣṭhitaspandopalabdhiḥ — ity upadiṣṭaṃ bhavati; harṣotsāhavismayahāsabhedena catūrūpasukharāśer atiprahṛṣṭaśabdenopalakṣitatvāt | tathā kiṃkartavyatāmūḍhavat dūratvādinā dṛṣṭārthaniścayāvadhāraṇābhāvāt saṃśayāviṣṭo yat padaṃ gacchet, tatrāpi pūrvavad upalabdhiḥ — ity upadiṣṭaṃ bhavati; vismaraṇādidaśāsu tattvāpratipattilakṣaṇasya bahuvidhasya moharāśeḥ kiṃkartavyatāmūḍhabhāvena upalakṣaṇāt | evam antaḥkaraṇavyāpārarūpajāgradavasthāśrayaṃ paratattvopalabdhyupāyam abhidhāya, buddhīndriyavyāpārarūpajāgradavasthāśrayasya asya yathā hy artho 'sphuṭo dṛṣṭaḥ (SpK 4.6a [3.4a/36a]) ity atra prasaṅgād vakṣyamāṇatvāt; samprati karmendriyavyāpārarūpajāgradavasthāśrayaṃ taṃ pa-

daṃ pratipādayitum āha — **dhāvan vā yat padaṃ gacchet tatra** iti, tatra tasminn api pade pratiṣṭhitaspandopalabdhiḥ | tatra hi icchāprayatnajñānakriyādivṛttīnāṃ vibhāgāgrahaṇād advayeśvararūpābhivyaktiḥ | tathā hi — dhāvataḥ pratipadaṃ padojjihirṣoddhāraprayatnadeśāvadhāraṇapadavinyāsakriyādiṣu vṛttiviśeṣeṣu satsv eva anavadhāryamāṇavibhāgatvāt asatsv iva saṃvit avibhāgaparasvabhāvamātrapratiṣṭhitā bhavati, tadā paravaśa eva pumān aiśvaraṃ rūpam āviśati | etad api vāgādikarmendriyavyāpāropalakṣaṇārthaṃ veditavyam | tena dhāvadvad aticaturavarṇasvaroccāravyagravāgvṛttir api yat padaṃ gacchet, tathā vīṇāveṇuvādanāditvaritataravyāpāryamāṇakarāṅgulikalāpo yat padaṃ gacchet; tatrāpi pratiṣṭhitaspandopalabdhiḥ — ity upadiṣṭaṃ bhavati; sarvakarmendriyavyāpārāṇāṃ dhāvatpadena upalakṣaṇāt | yathā hy artho 'sphuṭo dṛṣṭa ityādi śloke (SpK 4.6a [3.4a]) buddhīndriyavyāpāragatām etām upalabdhiṃ darśayiṣyati | yady api ca sarvasya prāṇabhṛtaḥ sarvāsu avasthāsu sarvendriyavṛttayo na antareṇa nityoditapratiṣṭhitaspandaprakāśaparisphuritasamāpattim unmiṣitum eva prabhavanti, tathāpi māyāśaktyudbhāvitabhedāvabhāsabalāt nānātvena ullasadbhiḥ anantaiḥ jñānakriyāviśeṣaiḥ vyavadhīyamāna ivāsau pratiṣṭhitaḥ spandaḥ prabuddhasyāpi upalabdhigocaratvaṃ gamayitum aśakya — iti tadupalabdhiyogyāḥ kaścid eva atikruddhatvādayo daśa upāyatvena saṃgṛhya upadiṣṭāḥ | etāś ca prabuddhasya pratyavamṛśyamānāḥ sadyaḥ pratiṣṭhitaspandopalabdhyupāyatāṃ bhajante, na tu anubhūyamānāḥ; sā hi avasthā duḥkhādimayy eva | tato niṣkrāntas tu prabuddha upadeśabalād upajātatādṛśātmasvarūpavivecanakṣamaprajñātiśayaḥ spandatattvam anubhavati; yad anuśīlanaikāgryāt krameṇa suprabuddhapadavīm adhirūḍhaḥ sarvatra anubhaviṣyati — iti |

vivṛtam etat

    tasya ca spandatattvasya

ityādinā vṛttau ||

Chart

Rāmakaṇṭha *ad* SpK 2.6 [1.22/22]

tattvas	Prakṛti & antaḥkaraṇa						Karmendriya			Buddhīndriya
	rajas/duḥkha		sattva/sukha		tamas/moha		pāda	pāṇi	vāc	
	sthāyibhāva	rasa	sthāyibhāva	rasa						
avasthās	*atikruddhaḥ*		*prahr̥ṣṭaḥ*		*kiṃ karomīti mr̥śan*					see SpK 4.6 [3.4/36]
	krodha	raudra	harṣa [= rati]	śr̥ṅgāra			dhāvan	to play an Instrument	to speak/to sing	
	śoka	karuṇa	utsāha	vīra						
	bhaya	bhayānaka	vismaya	adbhuta						
	jugupsā	bībhatsa	hāsa	hāsya						

Kṣemarāja's Poetic Non-dualism:
Examples from his Netratantroddyota

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Raffaele Torella's contribution to the study of Indian philosophy and to non-dualist Kashmir Śaivism in particular deserves more 'recognition' than has been given so far, and therefore this volume in his honour is long overdue. His rootedness in both philosophy and philology has produced some of the deepest and lasting translations, and the growing interest in the philosophy of Pratyabhijñā has found a solid basis in Torella's works. I have personally learnt so much from his writing, and I am particularly grateful for the occasion I had to collaborate with him on Utpaladeva when we were both in residence at the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla. The result of this collaboration was a seminar focusing on 'Utpaladeva, Philosopher of Recognition' (2010), which led to the publication of a volume with the same title (2016). We were both driven by the same urge to make the founder of Pratyabhijñā philosophy known in his own right, and not only as a predecessor of the great Abhinavagupta. To highlight our shared motivation I may quote Torella's summary of Utpaladeva's unique contribution:

> The work of Utpaladeva can be viewed as the very icon of the integration of the rational and emotional sides of man: his extremely

sophisticated philosophical arguments are to be viewed side by side with his passionate mystical poetry. His philosophy is characterized by this unique blend of epistemology, metaphysics, religious experience, linguistic philosophy and aesthetic speculation. Precisely to Utpaladeva do we owe the entrance of aesthetics into philosophico-religious speculation. His concept of *camatkāra* (wondrous enjoyment) marks a higher level of experience, which leaves the reality and beauty of the manifested world intact, but at the same time projects it into a totality whose centre is Supreme Consciousness. This will be later developed by Abhinavagupta into a full-fledged aesthetic system, destined to become the main stream of aesthetical speculation of pre-modern India as a whole.[1]

This humble contribution is an expression of my deep gratitude for his wonderful work and at the same time for his friendship and kindness.

Having spent some years studying the works and commentaries by Kṣemarāja (end of 10th c.-beginning of 11th c.), the illustrious disciple of Abhinavagupta, I had a similar idea in mind, namely that this author, commentator and poet has not received due 'recognition' as an independent thinker[2] and has mostly been presented as a disciple, overshadowed by his great master. Thus, I could re-formulate Torella'sentence by saying that 'we are no longer allowed to consider Kṣemarāja a mere disciple of Abhinavagupta…,'[3] but to give him a due place in the development of Trika, Pratyabhijñā and Krama. One of the best evaluations of Kṣemarāja is by Torella himself who, in the introduction to his Italian translation of the *Śivasūtravimarśinī*, describes Kṣemarāja as 'the most illustrious among the disciples of Abhinavagupta, in the light of the most mature spiritual experience and philosophical speculation of the Śaiva Tantrism.'[4] It is surprising that in the most recent scholarly publication not *on* but *Around Abhinavagupta* not

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[1] Torella 2016: 10.

[2] A strange example is that in his translation of the *Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya* Jaideva Singh even omitted to give Kṣemarāja's name as the author on the title page!

[3] Cf. Torella 2016: 4.

[4] 'Il più illustre tra i discepoli di Abhinavagupta, alla luce della più matura esperienza spirituale e speculazione filosofica del Tantrismo śivaita' (Torella 2013: 11).

a single article is dedicated to Kṣemarāja, although 'around' should also imply 'after'![5]

Certainly, in the context of his commentaries on major Tantras, as well as on the *Śivasūtra* and the *Spandakārikā*, Kṣemarāja is acknowledged as a genial commentator. A recent study by Hamsa Stainton on his commentaries on three important Stotras—*Stavacintāmaṇi* by Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa, *Śivastrotrāvalī* by Utpaladeva, and the Saura hymn *Sāmbāpañcāśikā*—highlights his contribution to this literary genre.[6] The author has effectively brought out the methods used by Kṣemarāja to read these hymns in the light of non-dualism, using the tools of *kāvya* for the sake of an esoteric interpretation.

Here I would like to draw attention to another aspect of his work, which often remains neglected because it is taken for granted, namely the benedictory and concluding verses in any chapter of his works: the *maṅgala* and *saṃgrahaśloka*s. Not many studies have been devoted to this category of 'poetry in context.'[7] However, these verses are often of a highly poetic and philosophical content.[8]

I am presenting only select examples from Kṣemarāja's *Netra-tantroddyota* which illustrate his poetic genius and his hermeneutical method in relation to the text commented upon. Kṣemarāja is clear in his duty to be faithful to the title and topic of the Tantra: *Netra*, the Eye. In his commentary, and poetically in his *maṅgala* and *saṃgrahaśloka*s, he maintains the *ekavākyatā* of the text, the internal consistency. This is laid out in both the Tantra and the commentary on the first *paṭala*, which deal more explicitly with the Eye, including the three Eyes of Śiva.

To start with the *maṅgala*s of the beginning, I will draw attention to verses 3–5. The third is in praise of the guru:

> *yo 'ntar viśvaṃ jhaṭiti kalayann akṣacakreśvarībhiḥ*
> *svātmaikātmyaṃ gamayati nirānandadhārādhirūḍheḥ* |

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[5] Especially since the historical period is mentioned: cf. Franco and Ratié 2016.

[6] Stainton 2018: 339–368.

[7] A great example is Sanderson 2005: 89–148.

[8] See Bäumer, forthcoming.

yaḥ pūrṇatvād bahir api tathaivocchalatsvātmarūpo
    bodhollāso jayati sa guruḥ ko 'py apūrvo rahasyaḥ || 3 ||

That one who perceives the universe within himself in an instant, through the divinities of the wheel of the senses, and who causes it to be one with his own self by elevating [it] to the state of transcendental bliss, and who, likewise, due to his fullness ever manifests externally as his own self: that Guru, the splendour of wisdom, is glorified, who is an incomparable mystery.

The Tantra defines the difference between *sānanda* and *nirānanda* in 21.32cd:

sānandā tu parā śaktir nirānandaḥ paraḥ śivaḥ ||

Kṣemarāja comments on *nirānanda* as follows: *niḥśeṣeṇa mahāsāmarasyaviśrāntyātmā ānando yasya sa nirānandaḥ,* 'he whose bliss fully consists in the nature of repose in the great fusion of essence is the one full of transcendental bliss.'[9] Thus the guru is immediately placed at the level of Śiva.

The fourth *maṅgala* is significant for the philosophical and hermeneutical agenda of the entire commentary which is based on *paramādvaita*:

sarvābhāsavikāsi cinmayamahaḥ svacchasvatantrasphurad
    yad dvaitendhanadāhi yac ca paramādvaitāmṛtenocchalat |
dvaitādvaitadṛgandhakāraharaṇaṃ dhāmatrayaikātmakaṃ
    śaivaṃ netram anugrahāya jagato 'mutraitad uddyotate || 4 ||

Here light will be thrown on the Eye of Śiva for the grace/benefit of the world, which consists of the three luminaries (Sun, Moon and Fire), which unfolds all manifestations, the glory of Consciousness, shining as pure Freedom, which burns the fuel of duality and which continuously manifests through the nectar of supreme non-duality, destroying the darkness of the (conflicting) views of duality and non-duality.

Here he already identifies the Eye of Śiva (singular and without calling it the Third Eye) with Consciousness and Freedom, which

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[9] Ed. M. Kaul Shastri, vol. 2, p. 266.

brings grace to the whole world. The verse contains hints at the content of the first chapter, and to the Tantra as a whole. The action of burning is an allusion to the Third Eye of Śiva burning *kāma*, lifting it into the philosophical context of duality. Among the three actions of the (Third) Eye one finds filling or enlivening with nectar (*āpyāyana*), and enlightening (*prakāśana*), here in the sense of throwing light on everything. The technical term *dhāman*, applied to the three luminaries, Sun, Moon and Fire, also hints at the symbolic association of the three Eyes. Finally, this whole complex symbolism contained in the Eye of Śiva is applied to the overcoming of all dualities, even that between *dvaita* and *advaita*, in the all-encompassing *paramādvaita*. Thus, this verse contains the text and its central symbols in a nutshell.

Maṅgala 5 is the same as *maṅgala* 6 in his commentary on the *Svacchandatantra*, indicating the close relationship of these two Tantras. It contains a *śleṣa*: *abhinavabodhāditya*, meaning both 'the Sun of new insight' and 'the Sun of the consciousness of Abhinava.'

> *abhinavabodhādityadyutivikasitahṛtsarojān me* |
> *rasayata sarasāḥ parimalam asārasaṃsāravāsanāśāntyai* || 5 ||

O you who are filled with the essence [of delight], relish the fragrance of the heart-lotus of mine that has bloomed due to the light of the sun of new insight (or: the sun of the consciousness of Abhinava), in order to pacify the [impure] impressions of this world devoid of essence!

The *saṃgrahaśloka* of chapter one praises the Divine Eye:

> *aśeṣaviśvavaiśvātmyasāmarasyena sundaram* |
> *cidānandaghanaṃ śrīman netram aiśam upāsmahe* ||

We worship the blessed Divine Eye, beautiful with the union of essence between the whole universe and the Universal Self, intensity of Consciousness and bliss.

This summarizes the identification of the Divine Eye with the integrated cosmic consciousness.

The *maṅgala* of the second *paṭala* contains an entire theology of Śiva, moving from cosmic manifestation to pure Consciousness:

aṣṭamūrti viśvamūrti yad amūrti pragīyate |
mantramūrti numo netraṃ tac cinmūrti maheśituḥ ||

We praise the Eye of the Great Lord, [the Eye] which is celebrated as having an eightfold form, as having a universal form, as formless, which is the embodiment of Mantra, the embodiment of Consciousness.

The Eye is identified with Śiva, and in between the cosmic and universal forms lies *mantra*, completing the identifications contained in the first chapter and leading to the content of the second which extends the meaning of the Eye to Mantra, more specifically the Netramantra or Amṛteśamantra. This *śloka* contains an implicit hint at the two aspects of Śiva described in chapter 8, the manifest and the unmanifest—*sābhāsa* and *nirābhāsa* (8.36ab and 8.38)— with Mantra partaking of both.

The *saṃgrahaśloka* of chapter 2 strengthens the identity of the Netramantra with Consciousness and with Śiva himself:

sarvajñatādiguṇaṣaṭkamayāṅgasaṅgi-
    sampūrṇasundaracidekaghanaprakāśam |
niḥśeṣapañcavidhakṛtyakṛd īśanetra-
    mantraṃ numo nikhilamantramaheśam ekam ||

We praise the Mantra of the Divine Eye, the One great Lord of all the mantras, which is the actor of all the five Acts (of Śiva), which is endowed with the six qualities starting with omniscience, and which is full, beautiful, unitary mass of consciousness, and light.

Leaving aside the ritual chapters, I will come to the three chapters on yoga respectively called *sthūladhyāna* (6), *sūkṣmadhyāna* (7) and *paradhyāna* (8). Chapter 6 is devoted to ritual Mantra practice aiming at overcoming all kinds of sufferings, illness, premature death, etc. Thus, the *maṅgala* points to these afflictions and the methods to overcome them:

vyādhyādidaurgatyajarādidoṣa-
    hutāśaśāntiṃ paramāmṛtair yat |
arcāhutidhyānajapādi siñcat
    karoti tan naumi harordhvanetram ||

I praise that higher Eye of Śiva which pacifies the fire of sickness, etc., ill-fortune, old age, and other afflictions by sprinkling the supreme nectar with [the help of] worship, sacrifice, meditation, recitation and so on.

In the context of all the three yoga chapters, *amṛta* plays an important role, referring to the nature of Śiva as Amṛteśa, with all the implications of the nectar or ambrosia of immortality, the Amṛteśamantra being the mediator.

Chapter 7 is specifically on yoga and applies *amṛta* to the constituents of the subtle body. The *maṅgala* reads:

> *cakrādhāraviyallakṣyagranthināḍyādisaṃkulam |*
> *svāmṛtair deham āsiñcat smarāmy ūrdhvekṣaṇaṃ vibhoḥ ||*

I meditate on the higher Eye of the all-pervasive Lord besprinkling with my own nectar the body which is an assemblage of centres, supports, voids, goals, knots, channels, etc.

In the *saṃgrahaśloka* of this chapter, Kṣemarāja concludes the entire practice of the subtle yoga with a poetic description of the dynamic nature of *amṛta*:

> *sūkṣmadhyānasamullāsisudhākallolakelibhiḥ |*
> *plāvayan nikhilaṃ naumi netram uccair maheśituḥ ||*

I loudly praise the Eye of the Great Lord which floods everything with playful waves of nectar arising out of the subtle meditation.

Chapter 8 moves to the supreme yoga or *paradhyāna* which is already placed at the level of pure Consciousness. Hence the *maṅgala* again identifies the Eye with Mṛtyujit:

> *amandānandasandohi spandāndolanasundaram |*
> *svajyotiś cinmahājyotir netraṃ jayati mṛtyujit ||*

Glorious is the Eye, an abundance of intense bliss, beautiful with the movement of vibration, its own light, the great Light of Consciousness, the Conqueror of Death!

The concluding verse of the eighth chapter also gives expression to the application of this yoga to compassion, which had been stressed by the Tantra from the beginning:

cidānandaghanaṃ dhāma śāṅkaraṃ paramāmṛtam |
mṛtyujij jayati śrīmat svāveśenoddharaj jagat ||

Glory to the blessed Mṛtyujit, the luminous abode of Śaṅkara, the supreme nectar of immortality, the one who uplifts the world by absorbing [it] into himself!

The three types of yoga are again referred to in the chapter on Yoginīs (20). Its *maṅgala* gives a key to the entire yoga by playing with the several meanings of *mudrā* and its denominative *mudrayati*:

parasūkṣmādiyogena mudritān api līlayā |
unmudrayat parādvaitaṃ numo netraṃ maheśituḥ ||

We praise the Eye of the Great Lord, who continuously unseals the supreme non-duality even to those playfully imprinted with the supreme, subtle and the other yoga.

Here it is the divine Eye which 'marks' those who are 'imprinted' by the threefold yoga, and the result is the 'unsealing' or revelation of the supreme non-duality. This verse is very significant because it links the practice and mystical experience with the philosophical starting and ending point of *paramādvaita* (cf. *maṅgala* 4 at the beginning of chapter 1).

The final concluding verses of chapter 22 of the *Uddyota* come back to the theme of the Eye in both its organic and esoteric meanings:

yac conmeṣanimeṣayogi nikhilonmeṣādisaṃdarśy api
    yac ca dvaitadṛgandhakāraśamanaṃ pūrṇādvayānanditam |
yac cāṇūn nayati svadhāma mahatas trāsāc ca yat trāyate
    uddyotātma samagraśakti śivayor netraṃ paraṃ tan numaḥ ||

viśvābhāsanataḥ sitaṃ nijarucā raktaṃ tadāmarśanāt
    tatsaṃcarvaṇataḥ sitāsitamalaṃ tadgrāsataś cāsitam |
bhāsācakramayaikyataś ca na sitaṃ naivāsitaṃ nobhayaṃ
    no raktaṃ na ca naitadātma tad idaṃ netraṃ jayaty aiśvaram ||

We praise the supreme Eye of Śiva of the nature of Light [or: which is the essence of (this) *Uddyota*], all-powerful, which leads the bound souls to its own luminous Abode and liberates them from great fear; Blissful with the fullness of non-duality, pacifying

the darkness of the view of duality, connected with the opening and closing of the eyes [i.e., with the unfoldment and withdrawal of the universe,] all the while manifesting the unfoldment and so on of all things.

Glorious is this Divine Eye, which is white because it illumines the universe by its own radiance, is red because it is immersed in the awareness of that, is grey because of internalizing (the universe) with relish, is black because of devouring the impurities, is neither white nor black nor grey nor red nor of any other nature, owing to its oneness with the Circle of the Absolute Light.

Here Kṣemarāja enlarges the analysis of the Eye to its utmost implications, and connects the parts and colours of the (physical) eye with Krama phases of cognition. Alexis Sanderson has commented on this interpretation:

The doctrine of this verse has been imported from the Krama. In fact we have here the central teaching of that cult, that liberation is obtained through the contemplation (i) that the only reality is Consciousness manifesting this cycle of projection of the object, immersion in the object, internalization of the object into the subject, and resorption of the subject, and (ii) that this process in no way sullies the pure, unlocated and timeless Light (*bhāsā*) which is its ground. The association of the Krama's phases of cognition with the colours of the Eye is accomplished indirectly, through the authority of the *Yogasaṃcāratantra*, a text of the esoteric Trika influenced by the Krama. For in a passage of that work quoted in the *Tantrāloka* and developed by Jayaratha in his commentary, an equivalent series of Krama phases is equated in the same way with the variously coloured parts of the human eye.[10]

In conclusion it can be said that Kṣemarāja used poetry with its allusions (*dhvani*) and double meanings (*śleṣa*) to express the connections and identifications made by the Tantra itself in condensed form.[11] He has referred to the symbol of the Eye consistently throughout the commentary, especially the *maṅgalaślo-*

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[10] Sanderson 2006: 55. This quote is followed by a Table showing 'The parts of the eye and the Krama in Kṣemarāja, Yogasaṃcāra and Jayaratha' (p. 56).
[11] See Stainton (2018: 348): 'In poetry, *śleṣa* can demonstrate a non-dualism that theological expositions can only talk about.'

*ka*s, even when the chapter in question did not contain any reference to it. Thus, he has taken *ekavākyatā* in the sense of a connecting thread: the Eye (of Śiva), identified with non-dual Consciousness, with the (Netra) Mantra, and with the Śakti. Every one of these basic elements of the Tantra has a practical side to it (*yogayuktyā*, cf. 1:22ab), as well as a philosophical underpinning and aim: *paramādvaita*.

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Lectio difficilior e creazione poetica: esempi dal Kumārasambhava[*]

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Nell'edizione italiana del *Kumārasambhava* da me curata e recentemente pubblicata nella primavera del 2018 per Marsilio[1], ho seguito il testo offerto e commentato da Vallabhadeva (inizi X sec.)[2], che com'è noto è il più antico commentatore a noi conosciuto, di gran lunga più antico di Mallinātha (XIV sec.)[3], l'altro grande commentatore del poema di Kālidāsa e di altre sue opere. La destinazione del volume mi ha sconsigliato di entrare a livello scientifico nel merito di alcune fra le lezioni più interessanti attestate da Vallabhadeva (e adottate da me), lezioni che meritano un esame più approfondito anche in rapporto a quelle di Mallinātha o di altri commentatori. È appunto il tema di questo contributo, che offro al fraterno amico Raffaele Torella per il suo settantesi-

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[1] Si veda Boccali 2018. In questo articolo, per motivi scientifici di aderenza filologica, sono stati talora leggermente modificati alcuni brevi passi.

[2] Ho seguito in particolare l'edizione di M.S. Narayana Murti in collaborazione con Klaus L. Janert.

[3] Dove lo menziono, leggo il commento di Mallinātha secondo l'edizione di M.R. Kale.

mo compleanno sapendolo raffinato filologo (molto più di me) e al tempo stesso *sahṛdaya*, «dotato di cuore», intenditore finissimo di poesia e d'arte.

Come si vedrà, infatti, le lezioni di Vallabhadeva discusse, a mio parere conservano rispetto a quelle alternative «fresh fragments of Kālidāsa's creation»[4], in altre parole momenti di più alta poesia. Ecco dunque le lezioni indagate, nella successione in cui si presentano lungo il poema:

<div align="center">4.20</div>

iyam etya pataṅgavartmanā
  punar aṅkāśrayiṇī bhavāmi te |
caturaiḥ surakāminījanaiḥ
  priya yāvan na vilobhyase divi ||

Questa donna, giunta per il sentiero della falena,
… ancora mi accoccolerò nel tuo grembo,
prima che dalle scaltre donne degli dèi,
amore mio, tu non sia sedotto in cielo.

Mallinātha e gli altri commentatori in generale presentano nel primo *pāda* la lezione *aham*, «io», anziché *iyam*, «questa». La seconda è manifestamente una *lectio difficilior* e ha lo svantaggio di rendere più ardua la comprensione anche in traduzione, perché il verbo nell'originale è alla prima singolare, non alla terza. È noto d'altra parte l'uso del dimostrativo non solo per enfatizzare il pronome personale, ma addirittura in suo luogo[5]. E infatti Vallabhadeva commenta: *tenāgatyeyam ahaṃ bhavadutsaṅgavartinī bhūyo bhavāmi.* Eppure il testo da me preferito, con *iyam* anziché *aham* scelto invece da altri studiosi, fra i quali David Smith[6] che pure segue in generale le lezioni di Vallabhadeva, mi pare, oltre che sintatticamente del tutto legittimo, poeticamente geniale: travolta dal dolore per l'incenerimento da parte di Śiva dell'amatissimo

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[4] La breve citazione, sulla quale si ritornerà, è tratta da una considerazione più ampia di Dominic Goodall e Harunaga Isaacson (2003: XXXIII sg.).

[5] Si confronti in proposito Speijer 1886, § 273, p. 204, per l'uso del pronome dimostrativo/terza persona per un pronome personale di I persona e § 278, p. 208, per la sua combinazione con un pronome personale.

[6] Si veda Smith 2005: 138.

sposo Kāma, Rati è confusa e parla di se stessa *tout court* in terza persona coniugando però il verbo alla prima. Mi sembra un modo straordinario da parte di Kālidāsa per esprimere la condizione della protagonista, che in quel momento si sente annichilita, come priva di un'individualità e di una volontà. Ricordo, a conforto della scelta, che in altri due passi, le strofe 5.39 e 5.63, chi parla si riferisce a se stesso con la terza persona[7]. In particolare nel secondo passo, la protagonista Umā per modestia parla di sé nello stesso modo non dicendo «io», ma «questa è una persona…»; pur se non drammatico come quello di Rati, anche lo stato di Umā è di forte implicazione emotiva, non per dolore ma per la tensione a conquistare Śiva.

<div align="center">6.36</div>

ta ākāśam asiśyāmam utpatya paramarṣayaḥ |
āsedur oṣadhiprasthaṃ manasā saha mānasāḥ ||

Essi, i supremi veggenti, levandosi a volo
per il cielo scuro come una spada,
fatti di pensiero simultaneamente
          al pensiero
raggiunsero Oṣadhiprastha.

Nel primo *pāda* Mallinātha presenta la lezione *te cākāśaṃ* invece di *ta ākāśam* che non mette conto di discutere in questa sede poiché non incide né sul senso né sulla levatura poetica della strofe; rilevante è invece la sua lezione nell'ultimo *pāda*, *manasā samaraṃha-*

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[7] Questi gli originali e le traduzioni delle due strofe: 5.39, *ato 'dya kiṃcid bhavatīṃ bahukṣamāṃ dvijātibhāvād upapannacāpalaḥ | ayaṃ janaḥ praṣṭumanās tapodhane na ced rahasyaṃ prativaktum arhasi ||* «Perciò oggi, con la curiosità derivata dalla condizione di nato due volte, / ecco questa persona intenzionata a interrogarti, / signora ricca in potere ascetico, sulla tua grande pazienza: / se non è un segreto, gentilmente rispindimi» (parla il giovane e affascinante asceta brahmano, in realtà Śiva sotto mentite spoglie, che vuole mettere alla prova l'amore di Pārvatī); 5.63, *yathā śrutaṃ vedavidāṃ vara tvayā jano 'yam uccaiḥpadalaṅghanotsukaḥ | tapaḥ kiledaṃ tadavāptisādhanaṃ manorathānām agatir na vidyate ||* «Come hai udito, ottimo fra coloro che conoscono i Veda, / questa è una persona ansiosa di innalzarsi alla posizione più alta. / L'ascesi è certamente il mezzo per ottenere ciò: / non si conosce confine ai desideri» (parla Pārvatī, rispondendo all'asceta brahmano).

saḥ, «veloci quanto il pensiero» rispetto alla lezione *manasā saha mānasāḥ* di Vallabhadeva. Mallinātha commenta:

ta iti | manasā samaraṃhaso manastulyavegā<s> te paramarṣayaś ca | pūrvaślokoktaparasamuccayārthaś[8] *cakāraḥ | asivac chyāmaṃ nīlam ākāśaṃ svaṃ praty utpatya oṣadhiprasthaṃ himavatpuram āseduḥ | sadyaḥ prāpur ity arthaḥ ||*

Si dice «Questi»; *manasā samaraṃhasaḥ* ossia «questi hanno velocità pari a quella della mente» e sono i supremi veggenti. La parola *ca* [ossia la congiunzione copulativa] ha lo scopo di aggiungere quanto segue a ciò che è detto nella strofe precedente. Come una spada scuro (*śyāmam*) ossia bruno (*nīlam*) essendosi levati a volo nel loro cielo, raggiunsero Oṣadhiprastha, la città del Himavat. Significa che in un solo momento [oppure: in quel giorno stesso] [la] raggiunsero.

Questo il commento di Vallabhadeva:

manasā nirmitā mānasās te saptarṣayaḥ khaḍganīlaṃ kham udgamyauṣadhiprasthaṃ puram āseduḥ prāpuḥ | manasā saha mana iveti cāturyoktiḥ | yadaiva gamanāya manaḥ kṛtaṃ tadaiva prāpur ity arthaḥ ||

«Creati con la mente» ossia *manasa-* sono i sette *ṛṣi*. Essendo saliti nel cielo scuro come una spada, raggiunsero (*āseduḥ*) ossia arrivarono (*prāpuḥ*) alla suprema Oṣadhiprastha. «Con la mente come la mente» è un'intelligente espressione. Il significato è che «appena il loro pensiero è rivolto all'andare, proprio allora lo ottengono».

La lezione e l'interpretazione di Vallabhadeva sono a mio parere preferibili, più convincenti e soprattutto poeticamente molto più originali. La differenza è sottile, infatti, ma inequivocabile: un conto è dire piuttosto banalmente, seguendo Mallinātha — la sua è certamente una *lectio facilior* —, che i Sette Veggenti viaggiano alla velocità del pensiero, un altro conto invece dire con Vallabha-

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[8] Il testo di Mallinātha nell'edizione Kale ha *pūrvaślokokte parasamuccayārthaś*. La correzione apportata si deve a un felice suggerimento dei Curatori, che davvero ringrazio.

deva che ai Sette Veggenti basta pensarlo per trovarsi a Oṣadhi-prastha: in altre parole, per loro la coscienza dell'intenzione si traduce istantaneamente nell'atto realizzato.

8.36

eṣa vṛkṣaśikhare kṛtāspado
  jātarūparasagauramaṇḍalam |
hīyamānam aharatyayātapaṃ
  pīvaroru pibatīva barhiṇaḥ ||

Signora dalle cosce sontuose, sulla cima dell'albero
presa dimora, cerchio splendente di liquido oro
la luce che svanisce del crepuscolo
sembra che beva il pavone[9].

Nel *pāda* b Mallinātha riporta la lezione *jātarūparasagauramaṇḍa-laḥ*, seguendo la quale il *bahuvrīhi* è concordato con *barhiṇaḥ*, dando luogo in lingua occidentale[10] a:

O thou with plump thighs, this peacock who has taken his position on the top of a tree and whose circular tail is yellow like molten gold, is as it were drinking the lessening sunshine at the close of the day.

La lezione di Mallinātha è seguita anche da Syed[11], la cui traduzione tedesca è conforme a quella inglese di Kale: «… Dieser Pfau… und dessen Rad gelbfarben wie geschmolzene Gold ist, scheint…»; e da Heifetz[12], che traduce più liberamente introducendo in realtà nella versione l'interpretazione:

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[9] Segnalo qui la difficoltà di mantenere in traduzione italiana il fortissimo attacco della strofe con il deittico *eṣa* in un'espressione nominale che non identifica chi o che cosa Śiva stia indicando a Pārvatī e ne lascia la scoperta, come una rivelazione, solo alla fine del testo. Questa struttura, fra l'altro, per quanto non prescritta dai trattatisti, caratterizza spesso i migliori componimenti classici.

Ai miei occhi non del tutto convincente nella resa italiana, un tentativo di traduzione che mantenga la costruzione straordinaria della strofe potrebbe tuttavia essere: «Questo che ha preso dimora sulla cima dell'albero, / cerchio splendente di liquido oro / la luce che svanisce del crepuscolo / sembra bere: signora dalle cosce sontuose, è il pavone».

[10] Kale 1923: 217.
[11] Syed 1993: 77.
[12] Heifetz 2015: 158.

Lady with rich thighs! Where the peacock has settled, / on the height of that tree, his feathers / opening seem to drink the reddish gold / of the sun fading at the end of the day.

Sempre nel secondo *pāda*, nella sua edizione del testo pubblicata a Delhi nel 1962, Suryakanta[13] legge *jātarūparasabarhamaṇḍalaḥ* e Smith, che preferisce questa lezione anziché quella di Vallabhadeva da lui in generale seguito, traduce[14]:

O my lady with swelling thighs, / this peacock who's settled on the treetop, / the circle of his tail liquid gold, / seems to be drinking up / the evening twilight, / as it fades away.

Le tre traduzioni citate dopo quella da me proposta, in ogni modo, appaiono omogenee e non prestano certo il fianco a critiche particolari. E tuttavia la lezione adottata da Vallabhadeva, che perciò ho preferito seguire anche qui, sembra a me rispecchiare un tratto poetico originale, che in qualche modo la lezione di Mallinātha «razionalizza». Innanzi tutto: la lezione di Suryakanta, che presenta *-barha-* anziché *-gaura-*, ancorché forse *difficilior*, toglie forza alla scelta di Kālidāsa di rimandare fino alla chiusura della strofe il termine per «pavone» designato come *barhiṇaḥ*. Ma soprattutto la lezione *-maṇḍalam* anziché *-maṇḍalaḥ* instaura una relazione di coreferenza fra *-maṇḍalam*, appunto, e *-ātapaṃ*, stabilendo un'identificazione metaforica fra il «cerchio splendente di liquido oro» e «la luce… del crepuscolo»; della sua scelta Vallabhadeva sembra essere ben consapevole, visto che rileva nel suo commento: *kecit tu barhiviśeṣaṇam etad āhur*, «alcuni invece dicono che questo sia un qualificante di *barhin-*».

In sostanza: con ogni lezione e relativa traduzione, l'immagine fantastica sottostante al testo è che il pavone sembra sorbire la luce d'oro del sole al tramonto trasformandola nella sua splendente coda a ruota. Adottando la lezione di Vallabhadeva, però, che riflette uno straordinario procedimento allusivo, la coda, pur necessaria all'immagine, non è mai nominata direttamente; l'intenditore di poesia classica la legge tuttavia in filigrana, e quindi

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[13] La lezione di Suryakanta è citata e seguita da Smith 2005: 350.
[14] Smith 2005: 310.

la introduce nella comprensione del testo, grazie al termine per «pavone» scelto dall'autore, cioè *barhiṇa-*, letteralmente «il caudato», derivato appunto da *barha-*, «coda». Se questo modo di intendere il testo, d'altronde ben fondato sulla scelta di Vallabhadeva, coglie nel segno, ci si trova di fronte a una delle strofe poeticamente più geniali dell'intero *Kumārasambhava*, sia per la costruzione allusiva del testo, sia per la sintesi straordinaria delle immagini dove l'identificazione metaforica è affidata all'intuito del fruitore *sahṛdaya*.

Un modo come questo di costruire il significato poetico del testo non è unico nella grande poesia classica; per un esempio analogo si può ricordare la strofe N 8 della *Caurapañcāśikā* attribuita a Bilhaṇa[15]:

> *adyāpi tāṃ maṣṛṇacandanapaṅkamiśra-*
> *kastūrikāparimalotthavisarpigandhām* |
> *anyonyacañcupuṭacumbanalagnapakṣma-*
> *yugmābhirāmanayanāṃ śayane smarāmi* ||

> Oggi ancora, lei, profumo effuso che nasce dall'aroma
> di muschio mescolato a unguento di soffice sandalo,
> gli occhi allettanti dalle ciglia coppia di uccelli
> che l'un l'altra si sbeccuzzano, sul letto ricordo[16].

Qui infatti gli «uccelli», *pakṣin-*, evidentemente necessari alla metafora ciglia/uccelli, non sono nominati esplicitamente, ma evocati per pura assonanza fonetica con *pakṣman-*, «ciglio degli occhi».

8.46

> *siṃhakesarasaṭāsu bhūbhṛtāṃ*
> *pallavaprasaviṣu drumeṣu ca* |
> *paśya dhātuśikhareṣu cātmanā*
> *saṃvibhaktam iva sāṃdhyam ātapam* ||

> Guarda la luce della sera che sembra essersi
> distribuita da sé
> nelle criniere folte dei leoni delle montagne,

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[15] Testo della strofe in Stoler Miller 1971: 18 e 145 (apparato critico).
[16] Tr. di G. Boccali in Boccali 2009: 151.

negli alberi che generano fiori,
nei picchi colorati dai minerali.

Nel *pāda* a Mallinātha legge *bhūbhṛtā* e la traduzione corrispondente suona, ad esempio in inglese [17]: «See, the mountain has himself divided the evening sunshine…»; o in italiano, letteralmente: «Guarda, la luce della sera sembra essere stata distribuita dal monte stesso…»

Naturalmente, la lezione di Mallinātha non presenta problemi dal punto di vista della costruzione e del significato della strofe, tuttavia non sembra a me assolutamente confortata dal contesto. La strofe appartiene infatti alla lunga descrizione del tramonto (8.30-48) che Śiva rivolge a Pārvatī mentre i due sposi stanno adagiati sopra una lastra d'oro sul Monte Gandhāmadana. Ora, in questa mirabile sequenza, non figura mai alcun monte, né in senso generico né precisamente denominato, salvo alla strofe 44 che recita:

> *saṃdhyayāpy anugataṃ raveḥ padaṃ*
> *vandyam astaśikhare samarpitam |*
> *yena pūrvam udaye puraskṛtā*
> *nānuyāsyati kathaṃ tam āpadi ||*

Anche Saṃdhyā ha seguito l'orma venerabile
del sole che sta sulla cima del monte occidentale:
come potrà non andare nella discesa dietro a lui
che prima l'ha posta di fronte a sé nel levarsi?

E così suona la strofe 45 che precede immediatamente quella in discussione:

> *raktapītakapiśāḥ payomucāṃ*
> *koṭayaḥ kuṭilakeśi bhānty amūḥ |*
> *drakṣyasi tvam iti sāṃdhyavelayā*
> *vartikābhir iva sādhu maṇḍitāḥ ||*

Mia bella dalla chioma a riccioli, questi margini
delle nuvole risplendono rossi, gialli, bruni,

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[17] Kale 1923: 218. Anche Syed (1993), Smith (2005) e Heifetz (1985) leggono *bhūbhṛtā* e traducono di conseguenza.

come decorati abilmente con i suoi pennelli
dal crepuscolo (*sāṃdhyavelayā*[18]) al pensiero che tu li vedrai.

L'ultimo soggetto logico, prima di quello della strofe 46 dove soggetto è la stessa Pārvatī, è la luce del «crepuscolo» che seguendo la lezione di Vallabhadeva costituisce invece nella 46 il complemento oggetto sintattico, soggetto logico tuttavia dell'azione di «distribuirsi da sé…» Pare quindi molto più coerente che sia sempre la luce della sera — e non il «monte», menzionato un'unica volta solo due strofe prima, e anche lì non come «autore» di alcuna decorazione pittorica del paesaggio — a «essersi distribuita da sé». Si potrebbe perfino leggere in questa sua manifestazione il tentativo di Saṃdhyā, che ha già tinto le nuvole, di perpetuarsi anche dopo l'ultimo tramonto nei colori delle criniere dei leoni, degli alberi fiorenti, dei picchi rocciosi. Esaminato il testo in termini di tropi, saremmo allora in certo qual modo alla presenza di una *utprekṣā*. E si può aggiungere infine, a corroborare la conclusione sulla indubbia preferibilità della lezione di Vallabhadeva, che anche nell'ultima strofe della descrizione vera e propria, cioè in 8.47, di «monte» non si parla: Śiva descrive infatti alla sposa gli asceti intenti a recitare l'inno vedico al tramonto.

8.52

nirmiteṣu pitṛṣu svayaṃbhuvā
yā tanuḥ sutanu pūrvam ujjhitā |
seyam astam udayaṃ ca gāhate
tena mānini mamātra gauravam ||

Il corpo, amore mio dal bel corpo, che fu un tempo abbandonato
dal Nato da Sé, una volta creati i Padri,
quello si immerge nel tramontare e nel sorgere del sole:
da qui, donna sdegnosa, la mia reverenza per lei[19].

La strofe figura, come pure le due precedenti e le successive qui esaminate, nell'ultimo *sarga* del poema e appartiene alla spiega-

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[18] Glossato da Mallinātha con *saṃdhyay[ā]*.
[19] A rigore si sarebbe dovuto tradurre «per lui», data la concordanza sintattica con «corpo», che ovviamente in italiano è maschile, mentre il sanscrito *tanu-* è femminile. Siccome però il «corpo» abbandonato da Brahmā è la bellissima Saṃdhyā, considerate anche le maliziose implicazioni erotiche del passo, si è preferito tradurre con il femminile «per lei».

zione data da Śiva a Pārvatī, irritata dall'omaggio che lo sposo ha offerto a Saṃdhyā; in seguito questo gesto sarà quotidianamente — qui siamo alla prima volta, i due dèi si sono appena sposati — motivo per Pārvatī di grande gelosia, dato che Saṃdhyā è notoriamente sia il crepuscolo (mattutino e serale) sia al tempo stesso la bellissima dea che personifica la manifestazione naturale. Essa è nata da una tramutazione del corpo lasciato da Brahmā, il Creatore, e quindi dev'essere concepita come sua figlia e come tale onorata.

Non è però questa l'unica ragione a imporre la venerazione di Saṃdhyā — o così almeno sostiene Śiva: il testo di Vallabhadeva presenta la lezione *gāhate*, «si immerge» («affonda in, è assorbito in») che pare una *lectio difficilior*. Alla luce dell'emistichio successivo, a parere mio (Vallabhadeva non aiuta dato che i suoi commenti, nel manoscritto alla base dell'edizione da noi seguita, terminano con la strofe 8.41, «while the mūla text is given up to the end of the eighth Sarga»)[20] il senso è che dopo le sue manifestazioni mattutina e serale, la già divina Saṃdhyā si intride nel sole, a sua volta divino, nei momenti più sacri del suo quotidiano apparire: da qui dunque, a maggior ragione, l'obbligo di venerarla, che perciò non è dovuto alla passione di Śiva per lei, come Pārvatī invece sospetta. Altre lezioni testimoniate, più facili, sono *sevate* (adottata da Smith[21] senza indicazione della fonte), «(Saṃdhyā) si prende cura del tramontare e del sorgere (del sole)» oppure *sevyate* (Mallinātha, che glossa inutilmente con *pūjyate*, e altri) «(Saṃdhyā) è venerata al tramontare e al sorgere (del sole)». Adottando quest'ultima lezione, il testo letteralmente non ha senso, o ne ha uno banalissimo: Śiva si giustificherebbe dichiarando che Saṃdhyā deve essere riverita da lui, perché… lo è («da tutti»? come aggiunge Kale in parentesi nella sua traduzione[22], forse per supplire alla debolezza del significato) «al tramontare e al sorgere (del sole)».

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[20] Narayana Murti in Vallabhadeva's Kommentar 1980: XI.
[21] Smith 2005: 324; mentre nelle note finali (pp. 348-350) dove sono indicate le deviazioni dal testo sanscrito di Vallabhadeva nell'edizione Murti manca qualsiasi riferimento a 52 c.
[22] Kale 1923: 218.

8.86

tau kṣaṇaṃ viśithilopagūhanau
   dampatī calitamānasormayaḥ |
padmabhedapiśunāḥ siṣevire
   gandhamādanavanāntamārutāḥ ||

I venti dei boschi del Gandhamādana,
mosse le onde del Lago Mānasa, maliziosi
      nello scompigliare i loti
dolcemente si presero cura della coppia di sposi
che per un momento avevano sciolto gli abbracci.

Il termine *piśuna-* usato dall'originale nel terzo *pāda* costituisce
una *lectio difficilior* in quanto il suo valore letterale e abituale è
molto più negativo, equivalendo a «traditore, maligno». La mia
interpretazione qui segue quella di David Smith[23] che mi pare
particolarmente felice: «maliciously breaking apart the *padma*
lotuses». Esiste naturalmente anche una *lectio facilior nipuṇa-*
«abile, esperto», adottata da molti: Kale: «skilled»; Syed: «erfah-
ren»; mentre Heifetz traduce liberamente omettendo di rende-
re l'aggettivo[24]. Seguendo questa lezione, in italiano si avrebbe «(I
venti dei boschi del Gandhamādana, …) abili nello scompigliare i
loti…», ma il senso è sicuramente più debole. Anche se non sem-
brano esserci attestazioni di un valore meno negativo di *piśuna-*
nella letteratura in sanscrito, va per giunta sottolineato che l'inter-
pretazione di Smith e mia, aderente al testo di Vallabhadeva, può
essere indirettamente corroborata dall'analogia con l'uso, fre-
quente per esempio in italiano, di termini quali «briccone», «ban-
dito», «brigante», «malandrino» in contesto erotico o scherzoso.
Si deve anche aggiungere che, nel punto in questione, Mallinātha
lapidariamente commenta: *padmabhedanipuṇāḥ | padmabheda-
piśunā iti yāvat | vikāsasūcakā ity arthaḥ*, sembra cioè stabilire una
relazione del tipo: «abili nell'apertura dei loti» ossia «traditori
(maliziosi) nell'apertura dei loti» vale a dire «canaglie (*sūcakā*)
nello spalancare». Se capisco correttamente, tutto questo è
superfluo… visto che Mallinātha intende proprio *-piśunā[ḥ]* nel

[23] Smith 2005: 341.
[24] Si confrontino Kale 1923: 221; Syed 1993: 83; Heifetz 1985: 86.

commentario: bastava allora leggere -*piśunāḥ* senza alcun bisogno di un siffatto giro tortuoso di pensiero!

Non solo: l'interpretazione di Smith e mia sembra attagliarsi perfettamente al seguito del *sarga*, dove la strofe 8.87, immediatamente successiva, recita:

ūrumūlanakhamārgarājibhis
    tatkṣaṇaṃ hṛtavilocano haraḥ |
vāsasaḥ praśithilasya saṃyamaṃ
    kurvatīṃ priyatamām avārayat ||

Śiva il Distruttore, gli occhi presi in quell'istante
dalle file dei segni delle unghie in alto sulle cosce di lei,
trattenne l'amata dall'allacciare
la veste che si era sciolta.

Come già si è detto, il commento di Vallabhadeva si arresta alla strofe 8.41; Mallinātha però, che pure adotta in 8.86 (8.87 nella sua successione) la *lectio facilior nipuṇāḥ*, commenta qui: *ūrumūle nakhamārgarājibhir nakhapadapaṅktibhiḥ | marutā prasāritavastratayā prakāśitābhir ity arthaḥ*, «alla base delle cosce dalle file dei segni delle unghie (*nakhamārgarājibhir*) ossia dalle strisce delle tracce delle unghie (°*padapaṅktibhiḥ*) rese visibili dalla veste fatta aprire dal vento — questo il senso». In questo modo dichiara esplicitamente l'analogia fra l'azione del vento sui loti e quella sulla veste di Pārvatī; il che sembra corrispondere molto meglio a un'intenzione maliziosa che a una mera capacità[25].

Credo che la discussione svolta analiticamente strofe per strofe avalli fuor da ogni dubbio la bontà delle lezioni di Vallabhadeva, talora ricusate anche da David Smith che pure, unico insieme con me fra i traduttori occidentali del *Kumārasambhava*, dichiaratamente ha scelto di seguire il più antico grande commentatore del poema. In tutti i casi esaminati, infatti, cioè in tutti i casi dove le lezioni di Vallabhadeva sono significativamente diverse da quelle

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[25] L'ottavo e ultimo *sarga* del *Kumārasambhava* si chiude in altre quattro strofe con i lunghi anni dell'amore ininterrotto di Śiva e Pārvatī. Sull'interpretazione di questo finale, cfr. da ultimo, con ricchi riferimenti, Tubb 2014: 71-85, in particolare pp. 83 sg.

di altri e soprattutto di Mallinātha, che — ricordiamo — è di quattro secoli posteriore, il testo che ne risulta appare più originale e di più alta levatura poetica. A conclusione della ricerca, non posso perciò che sottoscrivere, citandola per esteso, l'affermazione di Goodall e Isaacson di cui ho già utilizzato una breve frase[26]; essa è riferita alla *Raghupañcikā*, cioè al commento che Vallabhadeva dedica all'altro *mahākāvya* capolavoro di Kālidāsa, ma vale perfettamente anche per la *Kumārasambhavaṭīkā*[27]:

> When we find preserved in the earliest extant commentary readings which might have been considered flawed, we should rejoice that we may be unearthing fresh fragments of Kālidāsa's creation.

Così, a mio parere, strofe come 4.20, 8.36 e 8.86-(87) vanno ricordate, per motivi diversi l'una dall'altra, fra le più alte espressioni dell'intera produzione kālidāsyana. E il loro splendore, altrimenti offuscato o impoverito da altre, risalta proprio grazie alle ardue lezioni presentate e commentate da Vallabhadeva.

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[26] Si veda sopra p. 114 e n. 4.
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The Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha: One Text or Two? One Author or Two?[*]

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The author of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha,* according to one of its introductory verses (4), is Sāyaṇamādhava. Another introductory verse (3) calls him 'Mādhava, the *kaustubha* jewel of Sāyaṇa's milk-ocean.' All this suggests that his name was Mādhava and that his father's name was Sāyaṇa. Indeed, it appears that such compounds in which the father's name occurs first are 'well-known practice.'[1]

There has been much discussion about the identity of this Mādhava, and indeed about the authorship of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha.* The information contained in introductory verses goes against the view that he was the older brother of Sāyaṇa,[2] the famous Vedic commentator: the son of Sāyaṇa cannot be his older brother.

We learn from the second introductory verse of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* that Sarvajñaviṣṇu the son of Śārṅgapāṇi was the

[1] Narasimhachar 1916: 20.
[2] This Mādhava is often identified with Vidyāraṇya, according to some erroneously; Clark 2006: 212–214.

teacher of its author. This same teacher is quoted under the name Sahaja-Sarvajñaviṣṇubhaṭṭopādhyāya in the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy, the final chapter in some editions (see below).[3] Sarvajñaviṣṇu is here presented as the author of a text called *Vivaraṇavivaraṇa.*[4] The *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* quotes the following passage from it: *na cātra pakṣadṛṣṭāntayor ekaprakāśarūpānanvayaḥ śaṅkanīyaḥ | tamovirodhyākāro hi prakāśaśabdavācyaḥ | tenākāreṇaikyam ubhayatrāstīti.*[5] The author of a text called *Ṛjuvivaraṇa*, which comments on the *Pañcapādikā* and its commentary *Vivaraṇa*, is named Sarvajñaviṣṇubhaṭṭopādhyāya in its colophons,[6] and it seems likely that *Ṛjuvivaraṇa* and *Vivaraṇavivaraṇa* are two names for one and the same text.[7]

The evidence provided by the manuscripts presents some difficulties. To quote Narasimhachar (1916: 20):

> In the manuscripts of the *Sarvadarśanasangraha*, the following sentence, which states that *Śânkara-darśana*, having been treated elsewhere, has been omitted here, occurs at the end of *Pâtañjaladarśana*:
>
> *itaḥ paraṃ sarvadarśanaśiromaṇibhūtaṃ śāṃkaradarśanam anyatra nirūpitam ity atropekṣitam*
>
> And the colophon at the end of *Śânkara-darśana*, which runs
>
> *iti śrīsāyaṇāryaviracite sakaladarśanaśirolaṃkāraratnaṃ śrīmacchāṃkaradarśanaṃ parisamāptam*
>
> attributes its authorship to Sâyaṇa. From this we have to infer that *Śânkara-darśana* having been treated of elsewhere by his father Sâyaṇa, Mâdhava omitted to write on it in his work.

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[3] Chapter 11, on Nyāya (ed. Abhyankar p. 250 l. 140), refers in passing to a certain Bhaṭṭa-Sarvajña. Is this the same person?

[4] *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* 16, ed. Abhyankar p. 458 l. 766.

[5] *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* 16, ed. Abhyankar p. 458 ll. 766–768.

[6] The editor calls him Viṣṇubhaṭṭopādhyāya, but to my knowledge he is never referred to under this name; *sarvajña-* is always prefixed to *-viṣṇu*, which suggests that he was known under the name Sarvajñaviṣṇu, with or without the part *–bhaṭṭopādhyāya*. The colophons to his *Ṛjuvivaraṇa* call him *svāmīndrapūrṇapūjyapādaśiṣyasarvaśāstraviśāradajanārdanātmajasarvajñaviṣṇubhaṭṭopādhyāya*, again with *sarvajña-*. These same colophons, incidentally, call his father Janārdana, not Śārṅgapāṇi; both are epithets of Viṣṇu.

[7] Even though I have not yet succeeded in locating the passage that Mādhava quotes in the edition of the *Ṛjuvivaraṇa*. One would expect to find it on pages 36 ff. of the edition, but I do not find it there.

Narasimhachar clearly speaks of manuscripts (perhaps only one, see below) that do contain the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy, even though the beginning and the end of this chapter as read there suggest that it once had a separate existence.[8] Cowell and Gough, the earliest translators of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, used a text that did not even have this final chapter. Their translation finishes with the philosophy of Patañjali (*pātañjaladarśana*), and more specifically with an observation that they translate as follows (Cowell & Gough 1892: 273):

> The system of Śaṅkara, which comes next in succession, and which is the crest-gem of all systems, has been explained by us elsewhere; it is therefore left untouched here.

This translates the first line quoted by Narasimhachar,[9] with this proviso that the words 'by us' do not correspond to anything in the Sanskrit, and appear to disagree with the final colophon cited by Narasimhachar (which ascribes the whole text to Sāyaṇa).[10] Clearly Cowell and Gough did not have the final chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy, along with its final colophon, in their source. Instead they speculate in a note about this final chapter, and guess that it may be the *Pañcadaśī*; a Calcutta Pandit suggested that it might be the *Prameya-vivaraṇa-saṅgraha*. All this shows that neither the translators nor their counselors knew of the existence of this final chapter.[11]

Cowell says the following about the manuscript tradition of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* as it was known to them in the preface of the translation (Cowell & Gough 1892: VII):

[8] Narasimhachar may of course have seen the Ānandāśrama edition, which came out in 1906 and is the first edition to contain the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy. However, this edition has *śrīmatsāyaṇamādhavīye sarvadarśanasaṃgrahe* (p. 171), where Narasimhachar's quotation has *śrīsāyaṇāryaviracite* (without *sarvadarśanasaṃgrahe*!).

[9] The edition by Īśvaracandra Vidyāsāgara has *itaḥ paraṃ sarvadarśanaśiromaṇibhūtaṃ śāṃkaradarśanam anyatra nirūpitam ity atropekṣitam iti*, with *likhitam* instead of *nirūpitam*.

[10] In footnotes to the Ānandāśrama edition (p. 142) and Abhyankar's edition (p. 388), this line is as cited by Narasimhachar, but with *likhitam* for *nirūpitam*.

[11] Not surprisingly, Monier-Williams Sanskrit-English Dictionary, which came out in 1899, states, under *sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*: 'N. of a treatise on the various systems of philosophy (*not including the vedānta*) …' (my emphasis, JB).

> I well remember the interest excited among the learned Hindus
> of Calcutta by the publication of the Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha of
> Mádhava Achárya in the Bibliotheca Indica in 1858. It was original-
> ly edited by Paṇḍit Īśvarachandra Vidyáságara, but a subsequent
> edition, with no important alterations, was published in 1872 by
> Paṇḍit Táránátha Tarkaváchaspati. […] MS. copies of [the
> Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha] are very scarce; and those found in the
> North of India, as far as I have had an opportunity of examining
> them, seem to be all derived from one copy, brought originally
> from the South, and therefore written in the Telugu character.
> Certain mistakes are found in all alike, and probably arose from
> some illegible readings in the old Telugu original.

The edition by Īśvaracandra Vidyāsāgara / Tārānātha Tarkavāca-
spati does indeed *not* contain the chapter on Śaṅkara's philoso-
phy, even though it is based on five manuscripts: two from
Calcutta, three from Benares. Cowell's remarks further suggest
that none of the manuscripts he was acquainted with had this
chapter. Narasimhachar does not tell which manuscript(s) he
consulted, but it is clear from what he says that his version of the
text *did* contain the final chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy.
However, this final chapter presented itself explicitly as a later
addition to a perhaps earlier work, and mentions a different
author: Sāyaṇa rather than Mādhava.

The entry *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* of the *New Catalogus Catalo-
gorum* (Dash 2015: 119) gives the following characterization of the
surviving manuscripts:

> *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha* by Mādhavācārya, but some mss. ascribed to
> Sāyaṇācārya. [A] concise account of 15 philosophical systems, with
> the exception of Vedānta.

It is hard to believe that this characterization is valid for all surviv-
ing manuscripts, for more recent editions than the one used by
Cowell and Gough do contain a final chapter on Śaṅkara's philo-
sophy (see below), and Narasimhachar speaks of one or more
manuscripts that contain that chapter (while mentioning a diffe-
rent author). In fact, the claim in the *New Catalogus Catalogorum*
that 'some mss. [are] ascribed to Sāyaṇācārya' is in agreement
with Narasimhachar's observation.

I am not at present in a position to collect and inspect all the
surviving manuscripts of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*. However, it
will be worth our while to see what Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar

based his edition on. This edition, it may be recalled, dates from 1924 and is at present the one most widely used; it is used and copied in subsequent publications, at the expense of all earlier editions. Most important for us at present is that this edition contains a final chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy. How did this chapter get there?

In his *Prastāvanā*, Abhyankar mentions four sources, which he calls A, B, C and D. A and B are earlier editions, called the Ānandāśrama edition and the Calcutta edition respectively. C and D are manuscripts; Abhyankar found C in the Deccan College in Pune, D belonged to pandits in a place he calls Saptarṣigrāma. Manuscript C did *not* contain the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy. Manuscript D did, but that chapter made the impression of being an independent text (*kiṃ tu tatra pātañjaladarśanāntaṃ granthaṃ samāpya svatantram etal likhitam iva saṃdṛśyate*).[12] That is to say, Abhyankar's two manuscripts resembled in this respect the text used by Cowell and Gough (and therefore the original edition by Īśvaracandra Vidyāsāgara) and the one mentioned by Narasimhachar respectively: the former did not have the final chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy, the latter did, but as if it were a separate text (whatever this may mean; see below). We may assume that Abhyankar's edition presents the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy as an integral part of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* because one of the earlier editions he used did so.

Which were those earlier editions? As we have seen, these are stated to be the Ānandāśrama edition and the Calcutta edition. Since there was to my knowledge only one Ānandāśrama edition, here there is no ambiguity. Unfortunately, according to Potter's bibliography, there are two editions of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* that came out in Calcutta before Abhyankar published his commentary: the one by Īśvaracandra Vidyāsāgara (used by Cowell and Gough, see above) and one by Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara, that came out in 1889. We know that the former of these two editions ended with chapter 15; the same is true of the latter. Both end with the remark we have come across already, viz. (p. 177):[13]

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[12] *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* (ed. Abhyankar), *Prastāvanā* p. 2.
[13] Interestingly, the edition with Hindi translation by Pandit Udaya Narain Sinh (1905) does not have this phrase in the Sanskrit, but does have it in the Hindi translation.

> *itaḥ paraṃ sarvadarśanaśiromaṇibhūtaṃ śāṅkaradarśanam anyatra*
> *likhitam ity atropekṣitam iti |*
> *sampūrṇaḥ |*

Apparently the Ānandāśrama edition is the first one to include the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy.[14] According to the information it provides after the title page, it used one earlier edition (from Calcutta) and five manuscripts. One of these manuscripts (called *gha*), written in a South Indian script (*drāviḍalipi*), also contained the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy, and another one (called *ka*) contained nothing but that. That is to say: only two of its six sources, i.e., two manuscripts, contained the chapter. What is more, manuscript *ka* may not have contained the *Sarva-darśanasaṃgraha* or part thereof, but rather the independent text to which the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* refers (at the end of chapter 15) and which was to become chapter 16 of that text.[15] This means that the Ānandāśrama edition added the chapter on Vedānta on the basis of one single manuscript.

The Ānandāśrama edition adds in a note after the title page that, in editing the final chapter, help has been provided by Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar![16] This is the same Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar who brought out his edition with commentary of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* (already referred to) less than two decades later (in 1924). It can cause no surprise that in Abhyankar's own

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[14] So Sharma 1964: Introduction: 22. (According to Sharma, it is the "only text with Śāṃkara system," but this is of course a mistake, for also Abhyankar's edition, known to Sharma, has that chapter.) Agrawal (2002: VIII-IX, n. 22) enumerates six editions *without* the Śaṅkara system, the last one dating from 1906; and four (five if we take Agrawal's own edition into consideration) that include (or only consist of) that system. All the editions with the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy go back, directly or indirectly, to the Ānandāśrama edition.

[15] As in the case of Abhyankar's manuscript D, one would like to know how manuscript *ka* began. Did it contain the introductory portion that connects it with what precedes? See further below.

[16] *śāṃkaradarśanasya pustakadvayam eva labdham | tasya saṃśodhane phargyusa-nakālejasthasaṃskṛtādhyāpakaiḥ paṇḍitavaryair abhyaṃkaropāhvavāsudevaśāstribhiḥ sāhāyyaṃ dattvopakārabhāreṇarṇitvaṃ nīto 'sya pustakasya prakāśakaḥ |*. Surprisingly, the footnotes to chapter 16 contain numerous variant readings that supposedly occur in manuscript *kha*, occasionally in manuscript *ga*, neither of which should contain this chapter; *gha* does not occur here at all, and *ka* a small number of times. There seems to have been some confusion.

edition that final chapter is closely similar to the shape it has in the Ānandāśrama edition (but with far fewer variants in the notes).

Where does all this leave us? One single manuscript is responsible for the fact that the Ānandāśrama edition includes the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy. Abhyankar used a manuscript that contained this chapter, but observes that the final chapter looks like an independent text. Since Abhyankar collaborated in editing the final chapter of the Ānandāśrama edition, this manuscript may or may not have been identical with the one used for that edition. One further manuscript used for the Ānandāśrama edition contained the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy as an independent text. To my knowledge no new manuscripts have been inspected for subsequent editions.[17]

Without the inspection of further manuscripts, the conclusion we have to draw is evident. Virtually all manuscripts of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* have only 15 chapters. At best only one (!) of the manuscripts consulted for the editions that are now in use — essentially Abhyankar's edition plus a number of copies of this edition — unambiguously gives a text with 16 chapters. The manuscript tradition therefore supports the view that the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* with 16 chapters is a combination of two texts: the first 15 chapters were originally one text, chapter 16 another. It also seems clear that chapter 16 was once an independent text, composed *before* chapters 1–15: the past passive participles in the original colophon of chapter 15 (*nirūpitam* or *likhitam*) barely leave room for doubt. Judging by the introductory verses, chapters 1–15 were composed by (or attributed to) a Mādhava son of Sāyaṇa. Narasimhachar and the entry in the *New Catalogus Catalogorum* give us some reason to think that what became chapter 16 may have been composed by someone else, perhaps Sāyaṇa.

In spite of all this, modern scholars tend to look upon chapter 16 as an integral part of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*. Nakamura (1969: 246) states: 'As the XVIth chapter is closely and consistently linked up with the preceding chapters and the idioms and style

[17] Agrawal's (2002: XII) edition follows the edition by Uma Shankar Sharma (and his translation follows Cowell and Gough [no translation is therefore provided for chapter 16]); Sharma's (1964: Introduction p. 22) edition itself follows Abhyankar, as does Klostermaier's (1999) edition of the final chapter.

of this chapter are similar to those in the preceding chapters, there is a possibility of assuming that this chapter was written by Mādhava afterwards as the additional and concluding one and on that occasion the above-cited sentence [i.e. *itaḥ paraṃ …*] was eliminated to make the whole work consistent.'

Nakamura's suggestion is not very probable. The sentence that he thinks was subsequently eliminated refers to the philosophy of Śaṅkara that had been considered (*nirūpita*), or written about (*likhita*) elsewhere. It refers to a text that existed already when chapters 1–15 were being completed, and had perhaps been written by a different author (e.g. Sāyaṇa). In spite of this, Klostermaier (1997: 151), in his translation of this chapter, 'agree[s] with Hajime Nakamura.' He adds that '[t]here are frequent (implicit) cross-references to former chapters (especially in the polemics against Sāṃkhya and Mīmāṃsā) and it makes use of sources drawn upon before.' Klostermaier does not give a single example of such an implicit cross-reference. The way Śaṅkara's philosophy is presented in chapter 16 involves frequent references to other systems of thought, but this is not the same as 'cross-references to former chapters.'

Also Uma Shankar Sharma accepts that chapter 16 is an integral part of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* (1964: Introduction: 11):

> There are still some scholars who dispute over the question of authorship and even a[u]thentiticy of this system [i.e., Śaṅkara's philosophy] as treated in the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha but no convincing argument is advanced so f[a]r. The style of language and the method of treatment are the same in the Śāṃkara system as in others. Therefore there is nothing in the Śāṃkara-darśana which may go against its validity. It was not proper for an author like Mādhavācārya to omit such a reputed system in a work like this.

The expression 'an author like Mādhavācārya' betrays Sharma's conviction that the author of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* is the famous older brother of Sāyaṇa called Mādhava. This he confirms (but does not try to prove) in the Hindi introduction to his book (*Pūrvapīṭhikā* p. 41). This conviction may have strengthened his belief in Mādhava's authorship of the final chapter, but apart from some general reflections ('style of language and method of treatment') he provides no arguments.

Finally, Madan Mohan Agrawal discusses the question in a footnote, where he repeats the same arguments (2002: VIII, n. 22):

> […] internal as well as external reasons prove that Śāṅkaradarśanam is a part of the original work SDS. It is closely and consistently linked up with the preceding chapters. Its language and style are similar to these of the preceding discussions. There are frequent cross-references to former chapters.

Agrawal then refers to Nakamura 1969 and Klostermaier 1999.

How does the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy relate to the preceding 15 chapters? The answer to this question only adds to the confusion. Its first few pages (in the existing editions, i.e. Ānandāśrama and Abhyankar) explicitly refer back to the preceding chapters; the remainder never does so, even though there was plenty of occasion to do so in its discussion of the various positions it criticizes: Jainism, Yogācāra, Mīmāṃsā, Madhyamaka, Nyāya, etc. We will consider the evidence below. Anticipating its outcome, we can state that the content of the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy is compatible with the view that an originally independent work was adapted in its first pages to its new role as final chapter of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha.*

Let us turn to the evidence. The very first sentence of chapter 16 reads:[18] *so 'yaṃ pariṇāmavādaḥ prāmāṇikagarhaṇam arhati* 'This doctrine of modification (*pariṇāmavāda*) should be censured by those who follow valid means of cognition.' The *pariṇāmavāda* characterizes primarily the philosophy of Sāṃkhya (*sāṃkhyadarśana*) and the philosophy of Patañjali (*pātañjaladarśana*), which are dealt with in the immediately preceding chapters 14 and 15. It seems reasonable to assume that the first line of chapter 16 refers back to those.

The same assumption must be made with respect to a passage that covers 38 lines in Abhyankar's edition (p. 391 l. 16.26 – p. 393 l. 16.63), and explicitly refers back to earlier passages. We will consider the relevant extracts. The first sentence of the passage recalls what had been said before:[19]

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[18] *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* 16, ed. Abhyankar p. 389 l. 1.
[19] *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* 16, ed. Abhyankar p. 391 ll. 26–27.

yad avādi nidarśanaṃ pūrvavādinā kṣīrādikam acetanaṃ cetanāna-
dhiṣṭhitam eva vatsavivṛddhyarthaṃ pravartata iti

Regarding **the example presented by an earlier discussant** to the
extent that milk etc., which are insentient, have the purpose of
making calves grow, even though they are not supervised by some-
thing sentient […]

This cannot but refer back to a sentence in the chapter on
Sāṃkhya:[20]

dṛṣṭaṃ cācetanaṃ cetanānadhiṣṭhitaṃ puruṣārthāya pravartamānaṃ
yathā vatsavivṛddhyartham acetanaṃ kṣīraṃ pravartate […]

Soon after, the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* refers to an earlier discus-
sion, saying:[21]

na ca parameśvarasya karuṇayā pravṛttyaṅgīkāre **prāgukta**vikalpāvasa-
raḥ

The occasion **stated earlier** for [unacceptable] alternatives, if we
accept that the Lord acts through compassion, does not arise.

The discussion referred to occurs, once again, in the chapter on
Sāṃkhya:[22]

yas tu parameśvaraḥ karuṇayā pravartaka iti parameśvarāstitvavādi-
nāṃ ḍiṇḍimaḥ sa garbhasrāveṇa gataḥ | vikalpānupapatteḥ | […]

The assertion of those who accept the existence of the Lord, to the
extent that the Lord acts through compassion, is aborted, because
neither of the following alternatives would be possible. […]

The introduction to the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy refers
back to the chapter on Sāṃkhya on one further occasion. The pas-
sage concerned begins as follows (ch. 16, ll. 14–17):

nāpi śrutiḥ pradhānakāraṇatvavāde pramāṇam | yataḥ — yad agne
rohitaṃ rūpaṃ tejasas tad rūpaṃ yac chuklaṃ tad apāṃ yat kṛṣṇaṃ tad
annasya (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.4.1) iti cchāndogyaśākhāyāṃ tejo-
bannātmikāyāḥ prakṛter lohitaśuklakṛṣṇarūpāṇi samāmnātāni tāny
evātra pratyabhijñāyante |

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[20] *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* 14, ed. Abhyankar p. 328 ll. 117–118.
[21] *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* 16, ed. Abhyankar p. 391 ll. 28–29.
[22] *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* 14, ed. Abhyankar p. 328 ll. 124–125.

Revelation (*śruti*) is no proof (*pramāṇa*) either with regard to the doctrine that Nature is the cause of everything, for the following reason. There is a Vedic statement in the Chāndogya branch of the Sāmaveda: 'The red color of fire is the color of heat, the white, that of water, the black, that of food.'[23] Here the colors red, white and black that are mentioned as belonging to Nature consisting of heat, water and food, are recognized as being the same.

The colors concerned are here called 'the same' (*tāny eva*). But the same as what? Abhyankar's commentary proposes that the three colors —red, white and black — are the same as those mentioned in a Vedic verse quoted in the chapter on Sāṃkhya (ch. 14, ll. 108–111), so that the present passage then refers back to that chapter. The Vedic verse concerned is *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 4.5:

> *ajām ekāṃ lohitaśuklakṛṣṇāṃ*
> > *bahvīḥ prajāḥ sṛjamānāṃ sarūpāḥ |*
> *ajo hy eko juṣamāṇo 'nuśete*
> > *jahāty enāṃ bhuktabhogām*[24] *ajo 'nyaḥ ||*

One unborn male [billy goat], burning with passion, covers one unborn female [nanny goat] colored red, white, and black, and giving birth to numerous offspring with the same colors as hers, while another unborn male leaves her as soon as she has finished enjoying the pleasures.[25]

Abhyankar's proposition is supported by the remainder of the passage in the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, which reads (ch. 16, ll. 17–25)

> *tatra śrautapratyabhijñāyāḥ prābalyāl lohitādiśabdānāṃ mukhyārtha-*
> *saṃbhavāc ca tejobannātmikā jarāyujāṇḍajasvedajodbhijjacatuṣṭayasya*
> *bhūtagrāmasya prakṛtir avasīyate | yady api tejobannānāṃ prakṛter jā-*
> *tatvena yogavṛttyā na jāyata ity ajatvaṃ na sidhyati tathāpi rūḍhi-*
> *vṛttāvagatam ajātatvam uktaprakṛtau sukhāvabodhāya prakalpyate |*
> *yathā asau vāditya devamadhu (Chāndogya Upaniṣad 3.1.1) ityādi-*
> *vākyenādityasya madhutvaṃ parikalpyate tathā tejobannātmikā prakṛtir*
> *evājeti | ato 'jām ekām ityādikā śrutir api na pradhānapratipādikā |*

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[23] *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.4.1.
[24] Olivelle's edition has *bhuktabhogyāṃ*.
[25] Tr. Olivelle 1998: 425.

Because of the superior relative strength of recognition based on Revelation (*śruti*)[26] and because the primary meaning of the words 'red' etc. is here possible, the origin (*prakṛti*) consisting of heat, water and food of the four kinds of living being — born from a womb, from an egg, from sweat or from a sprout — is here ascertained. Even though the origin of heat, water and food, since it has come into being, is not literally (*yogavṛttyā*) established as unborn (*aja*) in the sense of 'it has not been born,' the origin here discussed (*uktaprakṛti*) is yet determined to be unborn since it is conventionally (*rūḍhivṛttyā*) cognized that way. The origin that consists of heat, water and food is 'unborn' (*ajā*), just as the sun is determined to be honey through the Vedic statement that begins with 'The honey of the gods, clearly, is the sun up there.'[27] For this reason, the Revelation that begins with *ajām ekām* does not convey Nature (*pradhāna*) either.

It is clear that once again the introduction to the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy refers back to the chapter on Sāṃkhya.

We can conclude that the introduction to the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy refers back to earlier chapters (or rather: to one earlier chapter) of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*. However, all the sentences discussed occur in the introductory portion of that chapter, which rejects the *pariṇāmavāda*, and extends up to line 63 in Abhyankar's edition (out of a total of 918 lines for the chapter).

I am aware of only one further explicit back reference in the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy, and this one is related to an earlier passage *in the same chapter* (but not in its introduction). It runs as follows:[28]

> *tad anena kṛśo 'haṃ kṛṣṇo 'ham ityādīnāṃ prakhyānānāṃ buddhyā sarūpatākhyānenaupacārikatvaṃ pratyākhyātam | **tadvyāpakabhedabhānāsaṃbhavasya prāg eva prapañcitatvāt** |*

In this way the view has been rejected according to which statements such as 'I am thin, I am black' etc. are metaphorical on

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account of the similarity of what they describe with a mental notion. **Because it has been discussed at length above that the appearance of difference, which is the pervading feature (*vyāpaka*) of [metaphorical attribution], is not possible.**

This refers back to a passage that occurs a few pages earlier in the same chapter:[29]

tathā ca vyāpakasya bhedabhānasya nivṛtter vyāpyasya gauṇatvasya nivṛttir iti niravadyam |

As a result of the absence of the pervading feature, viz. the appearance of difference, there is absence of the pervaded feature (*vyāpya*), viz. secondary usage; this much is unobjectionable.

As I stated earlier, there are no further explicit back references, and we have seen that neither Nakamura nor Klostermaier give any. Abhyankar's commentary refers back to earlier chapters at a few occasions. None of these cases are back references, as the following examples will show. We begin with what appears to be the closest parallel between the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy and earlier chapters.

The chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy rejects the intermediate size of the soul adhered to by the Jainas:[30]

*na cārhatamatānusāreṇāhaṃpratyayaprāmāṇyāyātmano dehaparimā-ṇatvam aṅgīkaraṇīyam iti sāṃpratam | madhyamaparimāṇasya sāvaya-vatvena dehādivadanityatve **kṛtahānākṛtābhyāgamaprasaṅgāt** |*

It is not proper to maintain that we must accept that the self has the size of the body in order to prove the self-awareness (*ahaṃpra-tyaya*) in accordance with the opinion of the Jainas. Because this would result in **the abandonment of what has been done and the addition of what has not been done**, given that what has a body etc. is impermanent on account of the fact that something of intermediate size has parts.

This corresponds to the following passage in the chapter on Jaina philosophy (No. 3):[31]

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[29] *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* 16, ed. Abhyankar p. 409 ll. 193–194.
[30] *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* 16, ed. Abhyankar pp. 410–411 ll. 206–208.
[31] *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* 3, ed. Abhyankar p. 52 ll. 36–42.

*na ca kāryakāraṇabhāvaniyamo 'tiprasaṅgaṃ bhaṅktum arhati | tathā hy upādhyāyabuddhyanubhūtasya śiṣyabuddhiḥ smaret tadupacitaka-rmaphalam anubhaved vā | tathā ca **kṛtapraṇāśākṛtābhyāgamapra-saṅgaḥ** | tad uktaṃ siddhasenavākyakāreṇa —*

*kṛtapraṇāśākṛtakarmabhoga-
    bhavapramokṣasmṛtibhaṅgadoṣān |
upekṣya sākṣāt kṣaṇabhaṅgam icchann
    aho mahāsāhasikaḥ paro 'sau || iti |*

The restriction imposed by causality cannot avoid overextension (*atiprasaṅga*). For example, the mind of the pupil would remember what had been experienced in the mind of the teacher; or it might experience the result of the acts accumulated by the latter. In this way there would be **destruction of what has been done and addition of what has not been done**. This has been stated by the author of the *Siddhasenavākya*:[32]

'Oh that opponent is very daring, since he immediately accepts momentariness while neglecting the shortcomings connected with it: destruction of what has been done, experiencing acts not carried out, the impossibility of existence, of liberation, of memory.'

It is clear from the context that these passages do not refer to each other, in spite of using a similar expression. What is more, there is an important difference between the two: the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy has *hāna* 'abandonment' where the chapter on Jainism has *praṇāśa* 'destruction.' (The same compound, again with *praṇāśa*, occurs in chapter 4, on Rāmānuja's philosophy,[33] and in chapter 11, on Nyāya.)[34]

In passing, attention can be drawn to the fact that the line at the end of chapter 15 that originally may have constituted the end

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[32] Balcerowicz (2001) has convincingly argued that Siddhasena the author of the *Saṃmatitarkaprakaraṇa* is different from the Siddhasena who wrote the *Nyāyā-vatāra* (he calls them Siddhasena Divākara and Siddhasena Mahāmati respectively). The *Saṃmatitarkaprakaraṇa*, he further argues, may belong to an earlier date than the *Nyāyāvatāra*, and was indeed composed before Dignāga, or at any rate without knowledge of his work. The verse cited here is Hemacandra's *Vītarāga-stuti*, v. 18.

[33] *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* 4, ed. Abhyankar p. 114 l. 222: *kṛtapraṇāśākṛtābhyā-gamaprasaṅgaḥ.*

[34] *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* 11, ed. Abhyankar p. 249 l. 129: *kṛtapraṇāśākṛtābhyā-gamau.*

of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* characterizes Śaṅkara's philosophy as *śiromaṇi* 'crest-jewel,' whereas the end of the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy calls it *śirolaṃkāraratna.* The two terms are synonyms, but the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*'s author's preference for the former manifests itself in his use, twice over, of the compound *nāsti-kaśiromaṇi* 'crest-jewel of the *nāstika*' (ch. 1, p. 2 l. 14; ch. 11, p. 255 l. 204).

Elsewhere the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy points out that certain cognitions do not count as cognitions of absence:[35]

> *kiṃ ca nedaṃ rajatam iti bādhakāvabodho nābhāvam avagāhate |*
> *bhāvavyatirekeṇābhāvasya durgrahaṇatvāt |*

> Moreover, an obstructing cognition such as 'this is not silver' does not concern absence, for an absence cannot be grasped as being distinct from an existing entity.

These lines are part of a long presentation of the Mīmāṃsā view of Prabhākara regarding the error of seeing silver where there is an oyster-shell.[36] Abhyankar's commentary sees a parallel with some lines that occur in a section on Advaita Vedānta in chapter 4, on the philosophy of Rāmānuja. Here, too, Prabhākara's view is presented, then rejected:[37]

> *bhāvāntaram abhāvo hi kayācit tu vyapekṣayā |*
> *bhāvāntarād abhāvo 'nyo na kaścid anirūpaṇāt ||*
> *iti vadatā bhāvavyatiriktasyābhāvasyānabhyupagamāt*

> […,] because [Prabhākara] does not accept non-existence as something different from something existing, saying:

> Something non-existing is another existing thing from a certain point of view. There is no non-existing thing that is different from another existing thing, because it cannot be determined.[38]

These two passages deal with the same topic (Prabhākara's rejection of absence as a positive entity), but clearly they do not refer to each other.

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[35] *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* 16, ed. Abhyankar p. 430 ll. 462–463.
[36] This presentation covers lines 16.344–489 in Abhyankar's edition.
[37] *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* 4, ed. Abhyankar p. 94 ll. 57–59.
[38] Cp. *Ślokavārttika*, Autpattikasūtra Nirālambanavāda 118cd: *bhāvāntaram abhāvo 'nyo na kaś cid anirūpaṇāt.*

There is a curious parallel between two passages, one in the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy, the other in the one on Jaimini's philosophy. In the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy we read:[39]

> *tatra prathamam adhikaraṇam athāto brahmajijñāsā iti brahmamī-māṃsārambhopapādanaparam | adhikaraṇaṃ ca pañcāvayavaṃ pra-siddham | te ca viṣayādayaḥ pañcāvayavā nirūpyante |*

> The first topic (*adhikaraṇa*) in this science presents the beginning of the reflection on Brahma (*brahmamīmāṃsā*) with the words: 'Next the desire to know Brahma.'[40] It is well-known that a topic has five parts. Those five parts — object (*viṣaya*), etc. — are now examined.

This passage does not specify which are the five parts (*avayava*) of a topic (*adhikaraṇa*). The parallel passage in the chapter on Jai-mini's philosophy does. Here it is:[41]

> *tatrāthāto dharmajijñāsā[42] iti prathamam adhikaraṇaṃ pūrvamī-māṃsārambhopapādanaparam | adhikaraṇaṃ ca pañcāvayavam ācakṣa-te parīkṣakāḥ | te ca pañcāvayavā viṣayasaṃśayapūrvapakṣasiddhā-ntasaṃgatirūpāḥ | tatrācāryamatānusāreṇādhikaraṇaṃ nirūpyate |*

The two passages clearly resemble each other, so much so that one may wonder whether they have one and the same author; alterna-tively, the author of one knew the other passage, or both passages drew inspiration from an earlier text. For our present purposes it is important to note that the latter passage enumerates the five parts of a topic, whereas the former does not. Does this mean that the passage in the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy refers back to the passage in Jaimini's philosophy? The answer must almost cer-tainly be negative, because an explicit back reference might have been expected, for example: **adhikaraṇaṃ ca pañcāvayavam ity uktam.* We know that the author of the chapter on Śaṅkara's phi-losophy does not hesitate to refer back where this is appropriate. The fact that he does not do so here strongly suggests that this is not a back reference.

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[39] *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* 16, ed. Abhyankar p. 399 ll. 84–86.
[40] This is *Brahmasūtra* 1.1.1: *athāto brahmajijñāsā.*
[41] *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* 12, ed. Abhyankar p. 261 ll. 18–22.
[42] This is *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.1: *athāto dharmajijñāsā.*

[A minor difference in terminology might mistakenly be looked upon as further evidence for difference of authorship. The second of the five *adhikaraṇa*s, in the chapter on Jaimini's philosophy, is *saṃśaya*. In the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy, on the other hand, it is *saṃdeha*. No conclusions can be drawn from this difference, because the chapter on Jaimini's philosophy itself uses *saṃdeha* a few lines after the above enumeration (ch. 12, p. 261 l. 25).]
The chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy mentions, in an example that illustrates an objection, two technical terms — *pīlupāka* "baking of the atoms" and *piṭharapāka* "baking of the pot" — that have their place in the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya philosophy respectively.[43] The procedure designated by the first of these terms is elaborately discussed in the chapter on Vaiśeṣika (ch. 10; *aulūkyadarśana*).[44] But once again, there is no hint that the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy refers back to that passage. The author of that chapter took it clearly for granted that his educated readers were familiar with those terms.
The chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy quotes (ch. 16, l. 162–163) a verse that is also quoted in the chapter 5 (ll. 283–284):

upakramopasaṃhārāv abhyāso 'pūrvatā phalam |
arthavādopapattī ca liṅgaṃ tātparyanirṇaye ||

Interestingly, chapter 5 attributes it to the *Bṛhatsaṃhitā* (*uktaṃ bṛhatsaṃhitāyām*), where I do not succeed in tracing it, while the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy ascribes it to earlier teachers (*pūrvācārya*). In itself this may not be a strong argument in support of different authorship, but it increases the weight of those arguments, if ever so little.
We finally consider a misprint in Abhyankar's edition that might create the impression that the chapter on Śaṅkara's philo-

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[43] *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* 16, ed. Abhyankar p. 400 ll. 95–98: *athocyeta yathā pīlupākapakṣe piṭharapākapakṣe vā kālabhedenaikasmin vastuni pākajabhedo yujyate tathaikasmiñ śarīrābhidhe vastuni kālabhedena parimāṇabhedaḥ |* 'One might say that in one single thing called body there can be difference of size on account of difference of time, just as there can be a difference arising from baking in one single thing (such as a pot) on account of difference of time, whether one accepts baking of the atoms (*pīlupāka*) or baking of the pot (*piṭharapāka*).'
[44] *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* 10, ed. Abhyankar pp. 224–225 ll. 114–124.

sophy refers back to the chapter on Buddhism. We find here:[45]

*nanu mādhyamikamatāvalambanena rajatādivibhramālambanam asad
iti cet — tad uktam |*

The final word of this sentence must clearly be *ayuktam* rather
than *uktam*. This is the reading of the Ānandāśrama edition, and
is confirmed by the immediate sequel, in which two ablatives give
the reasons why the objection here expressed is inappropriate
(*ayukta*). These ablatives are not followed by *iti*, and are not there-
fore the content of what was supposedly said (*ukta*). In spite of
this, the word *ukta* 'said' might suggest to the inadvertent reader
that this line refers back to what had been said in an earlier chap-
ter, preferably the chapter on Buddhism. This is not however the
case. Interestingly, both Klostermaier (1999: 58) and Sharma
(1964: 839) accept Abhyankar's reading *uktam* and try to transla-
te it, though not without difficulty.

We can conclude that, if we remove the introduction to the
chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy, what remains does not refer
back to the earlier chapters and is completely coherent; it also has
an appropriate beginning:[46] *tac ca vedāntaśāstraṃ caturlakṣaṇam*
'This science of Vedānta deals with four topics.'[47] If we assume
that the introductory portion was added by those who turned the
text on Śaṅkara's philosophy into the final chapter of the *Sarva-
darśanasaṃgraha*, we are left with a text on Śaṅkara's philosophy
(chapter 16 minus the introductory portion) that can stand on its
own, and presumably once did so.

We have arrived at the provisional conclusion that the chapter
on Śaṅkara's philosophy minus its introduction was originally a
separate text that was at some point added to the fifteen chapters
of the original *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*. The conclusion is provision-
al, because we do not know for sure what the inspection of thus far
unexplored manuscripts may reveal. But the conclusion is firm
enough to accept it as the so far most likely depiction of historical
reality.

[45] *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* 16, ed. Abhyankar p. 439 ll. 582–583.
[46] *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* 16, ed. Abhyankar p. 394 l. 64.
[47] We may have to look upon the words *tac ca* at the beginning of this sentence
as added by those who added the introductory portion.

In what manner could this conclusion be jeopardized by the inspection of further manuscripts? Among the so far uninspected manuscripts there are no doubt many that contain only 15 chapters, presumably with the concluding sentence reproduced above. There will be some that contain the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* as we find it in Abhyankar's edition, i.e., with a final chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy. Such manuscripts will not jeopardize the position here taken. On the other hand, our conclusion will be strengthened if more manuscripts were to come to light that contain only this final chapter (whether under the title *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* or some other title), preferably without the introductory portion. We know that the Ānandāśrama edition used one such manuscript, but details are hard to obtain after more than a century. The indications given in the edition are far too cursory to provide us with useful information. It is hard to think of manuscript evidence that would weaken our conclusion.

It is possible, as we have seen, that the original chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy had an author different from the author of the original *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*. But who wrote the original *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*?

We know that the introductory stanzas of this text attribute it to Mādhava the son of Sāyaṇa. We further know that his teacher was Sarvajñaviṣṇu, who was also known to the author of the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy.

We know from various sources that Sarvajñaviṣṇu had a son called Cannibhaṭṭa. This Cannibhaṭṭa states in one of his surviving texts that he had composed a work called *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*. A close comparison of Cannibhaṭṭa's surviving works and the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* ascribed to Mādhava has led Anantalal Thakur (1961) to the conclusion that Cannibhaṭṭa was the author of 'Mādhava's' *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*. Among the supplementary arguments he presents, there are these: The second introductory verse of 'Mādhava's' *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* is also found in one of Cannibhaṭṭa's works. And the works have passages and expressions in common. These shared passages and expressions, be it noted, are not found in the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy, so that this argument cannot be used to support the view that Cannibhaṭṭa also composed that chapter. Some of the shared quo-

ted passages, on the other hand, do occur in the chapter on Śaṅkara's philosophy, but this, I submit, carries less weight.

What about the colophons? In both the Ānandāśrama and the Abhyankar editions (and in the editions that copy the latter), each chapter is followed by a colophon that qualifies the *Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha* as *śrīmatsāyaṇamādhavīya*. However, none of the earlier editions have this qualification anywhere. The only exception is the colophon at the conclusion of the first chapter (*cārvāka-darśana*) in the 1858 Calcutta edition by Īśvaracandra Vidyāsāgara; it reads: *iti sāyaṇamādhavīye sarvadarśanasaṅgrahe cārvākadarśanam.* All the other fourteen chapters in this edition omit the specification *sāyaṇamādhavīya*, as do all the chapters in the 1889 Calcutta edition (by Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara Bhaṭṭācārya) and in the edition by Udaya Narain Sinh. We may suspect that Īśvaracandra Vidyāsāgara added this specification after this one chapter on the basis of the information he found in the introductory verses. If so, we can be sure that the qualification *śrīmatsāyaṇamādhavīya* in the Ānandāśrama and Abhyankar editions (and in subsequent editions) are editorial additions.[48] This means that two of the introductory verses are the only reason to ascribe the *Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha* to Mādhava the son of Sāyaṇa.

This confronts us with the following issue. If those two introductory verses are additions, or are somehow incorrectly interpreted, no reason remains to look upon Mādhava as the name of the author of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*. In that case, we only know that the teacher of its author was Sarvajñaviṣṇu, in accordance with the second introductory verse. Since Cannibhaṭṭa was Sarvajñaviṣṇu's son, the claim that Cannibhaṭṭa composed the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* would then to a large extent be supported by that second introductory verse. Indeed, we have seen that this same introductory verse was used in one of Cannibhaṭṭa's recognized works.

Let us have a closer look at the introductory verses. They read:

nityajñānāśrayaṃ vande niḥśreyasanidhiṃ śivam |
yenaiva jātaṃ mahyādi tenaivedaṃ sakartṛkam || 1 ||

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[48] Another editorial addition in these editions is the phrase *atha ...darśanam* introducing each chapter.

I pay homage to Śiva, the seat of eternal knowledge [and] the abode of the highest good (*niḥśreyasa*), owing to whom the earth etcetera have come into being. It is owing to him that this has a maker.[49] (1)

pāraṃ gataṃ sakaladarśanasāgarāṇām
     ātmocitārthacaritārthitasarvalokam |
śrīśārṅgapāṇitanayaṃ nikhilāgamajñaṃ
     sarvajñaviṣṇugurum anvaham āśraye 'ham || 2 ||

Every day I take recourse to my teacher, Sarvajñaviṣṇu the son of Śārṅgapāṇi, who has gone to the other shore of all oceans of philosophy, has satisfied the whole world with things that are suitable to the Highest Self, and knows the entire tradition. (2)

śrīmatsāyaṇadugdhābdhikaustubhena mahaujasā |
kriyate mādhavāryeṇa sarvadarśanasaṃgrahaḥ || 3 ||

The *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* is composed by the noble Mādhava, of great power, the gem of the venerable Sāyaṇa's milk-ocean. (3)

pūrveṣām atidustarāṇi sutarām āloḍya śāstrāṇy asau
     śrīmatsāyaṇamādhavaḥ prabhur upanyāsyat satāṃ prītaye |
dūrotsāritamatsareṇa manasā śṛṇvantu tat sajjanā
     mālyaṃ kasya vicitrapuṣparacitaṃ prītyai na saṃjāyate || 4 ||

That venerable master Sāyaṇamādhava, having studied with great care the difficult treatises of earlier scholars, has explained them for the delight of the virtuous. Let virtuous people listen to it with a mind from which passion has been cast far away. To whom does a garland made of various flowers not bring delight? (4)

The line immediately following these verses is

atha kathaṃ parameśvarasya niḥśreyasapradatvam abhidhīyate |

How can it be stated that the Supreme Lord (*parameśvara*) gives the highest good (*niḥśreyasa*)?

which refers back to verse 1. Verses 2, 3 and 4 come in between this line and the verse it refers back to.

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[49] It is not clear what *this* (*idam*) is. Different interpreters understand it differently: Cowell & Gough (1892: 1) take it as referring to the universe ('in him only has this all a maker'); Ballanfat (1997: 47) thinks it refers to the text of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* ('à lui seul ce qui suit devra d'être accompli').

One is struck by the laudatory and impersonal character of verses 3 and 4 — the only ones that urge us to believe that Mādhava was the author of the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha.* Mādhava is here 'noble' (*ārya*), 'of great power' (*mahaujas*), the 'gem of Sāyaṇa's milk-ocean' (*śrīmatsāyaṇadugdhābdhikaustubha*), a 'master' (*prabhu*). Such verses might easily have come from the pen of someone else, in which case it is not Mādhava himself who claims to have composed the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha.* This other person may have been the real author of that text — who then wanted to express his admiration for Mādhava — or someone else altogether. Either way these verses do not stand in the way of accepting that someone different from Mādhava — perhaps Cannibhaṭṭa — composed the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha,* or at least the first fifteen chapters of this work.

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The dīkṣita's Language.
Vedic Homologies and rūpakas in Jaiminīya-Brāhmaṇa 2.60–64 [1]

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astīti śāśvatagrāho nāstīty ucchedadarśanam |
tasmād astitvanāstitve nāśrāyeta vicakṣaṇaḥ ||

'Exists' implies grasping after eternalism.
'Does not exist' implies the philosophy of annihilation.
Therefore, a discerning person should not rely upon
either existence or non-existence.
(MMK 15.10, tr. Kalupahana 1991: 234)

1. Premise

The whole second Kāṇḍa of the *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa* has not been translated for a long time, except for section 2.334–370 in a German translation by Ryutaro Tsuchida in 1979, and some selected passages in *Das Jaiminīya-Brāhmaṇa in Auswahl* by Willem Caland (1919). This latter anthology includes the translation of JB 2.64, where a rather mysterious phrase, i.e. *vicakṣaṇavatī vāc*, oc-

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curs, but it unfortunately omits the intriguing final portion, which is devoted to the last rites before the ablution of the 'consecrated man' (*dīkṣita*), performed at the end of the solemn consecration introducing to the *soma* sacrifice, so that the general context gets partially lost. The framework of this chapter is in fact a conversation between Keśin Dārbhya, the King of Pañcālas, and a deceased King named Yajñasena, in the form of a golden wild goose who instructs Keśin on consecration (*dīkṣā*). In general, the whole account (JB 2.53–68) is mentioned as *kaiśinī dīkṣā*, because it pertains to Keśin's *dīkṣā*.[2] Only recently, when the present contribution had already been submitted, a new entire translation of the *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa* was published by Ranade (2019).

In Ranade's translation (2019: 623), the phrase *vicakṣaṇavatī vāc* is interpreted differently according to the several contexts as 'conspicuous speech' (twice), 'words which are possessed of distinction,' 'words which are full of distinction,' without further comments. Instead, in Caland's translation (1919: 140) of the first part of JB 2.64, which is grounded on other later parallel Vedic occurrences surveyed below, it is commonly translated as 'an utterance including the word *vicakṣaṇa*,' but, in our opinion, *vāc* as 'utterance' rather than 'language' or 'faculty of speaking, voice' is highly improbable. Thus, the aim of the present paper is to check whether this interpretation of *vicakṣaṇavatī vāc* is actually well-grounded or merely founded on secondarily-invented traditional reworkings of the relevant lexicon and phrases. The method here adopted will include a tentative translation of the JB passages in which the phrase in question occurs and a 'collation' of all the available versions of analogous contexts in which the nominal stem *vicakṣaṇa* occurs. Working with a background hypothesis of internal stratification of the Vedic lexicon, we shall try to combine linguistic and philological patterns and tools, aiming at reconstructing a text with its variants, consolidated — through the action of time, locality and *śākhā* — well before they acquired any written form.

We dedicate this essay to Prof. Raffaele Torella, a scholar who has made philology the *sphragís* of his scientific activity.

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[2] See Sarma 1968: 242; some details were discussed by Kulkarni 2016.

2. Focus on the phrase vicakṣaṇavatī vāc
2.1. The JB occurrence

We shall start from a tentative translation of the JB paragraph, where the phrase occurs in the first sentence *vicakṣaṇavatīṃ vācaṃ vadati*:

[1] JB 2.64: *vicakṣaṇavatīṃ vācaṃ vadati. annaṃ vai vicakṣaṇam. annavatīm eva tad vācaṃ vadati. vicakṣaṇavatīṃ vācaṃ vadati. somo vai vicakṣaṇaḥ. annam u vai somaḥ. annavatīm eva tad vācaṃ vadati. vicakṣaṇavatīṃ vācaṃ vadati. prāṇo vai vicakṣaṇaḥ. tasya vāg eva mithunam. mithunavatīm eva tad vācaṃ vadati. vicakṣaṇavatīṃ vācaṃ vadati. annaṃ vai vicakṣaṇam. annena hīmāḥ prajā vipaśyanti. tata ābhyaḥ prajābhyo 'nnādyaṃ prayacchati.*

He speaks a language characterized by being bright. The food is indeed bright. He actually speaks a language characterized by food. He uses the language characterized by being bright.[3] Soma indeed is bright. Soma is food indeed. He thus speaks a language characterized by food. He speaks a language characterized by being bright. Breath indeed is bright. His [the *dīkṣita*'s] language is indeed a pair.[4] He thus speaks a language characterized by a pair. He speaks a language characterized by being bright. Food indeed is bright. These creatures [offspring and cattle] [can] discern through food. Therefore, he offers proper food to these creatures.

Below we will discuss the reasons behind the specific choices we have made in this translation, which considerably differs also from that proposed by Caland (1919: 140):

In seiner (An)rede füge er (nl. Der zum Somaopfer Geweihte) (das Wort) *vicakṣaṇa* („Ansehnlicher") bei.

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[3] Cf. Kulkarni's (2016: 78) translation: 'language containing distinct words' and Ranade's (2019: 623): 'words which are full of distinction.' Significantly, in *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 2.4.54–55, *khyā-* is taught as the substitute for the verbal base *cakṣ-*, for which the *Dhātupāṭha* (II 7) records the meaning *vyaktāyām vāci* 'a distinct speech.' Kātyāyana explicitly proposes a *vārttika* in order to prohibit this substitution before the suffixes *-as* and *-ana*, for which Patañjali gives *nṛcakṣas* and *vicakṣaṇa* as examples.

[4] Namely, a legitimate and potentially fecund couple (Malamoud 2005: 38).

Caland's translation finds a partial support in a 'commentarial practice'[5] already attested in the Brāhmaṇas and consisting in referring to a Vedic stanza through a noun derived from a word contained in that stanza itself, suffixed by -*vat*. For instance,[6] in the AB *jātavat-* is used both to refer[7] to a stanza which actually contains *jāta*, 'born,'[8] and to refer[9] to a stanza which contains a verbal form derived from the base *jan-*, namely *udajani-* 'was generated.' Nonetheless, neither in [1] nor in the other occurrences of *vicakṣaṇavatī* singled out in the Brāhmaṇas (see below [10], [11], [15]) it is possible to clearly identify a specific portion of Vedic text, unlike the above-mentioned AB examples, where we even find a *pratīka*.

Suffice it to say for the moment that we tentatively and provisionally interpret it by keeping the usual meaning of the affix -*mat/-vat* as taught by Pāṇini in A 5.2.94.[10] As far as the meaning of *vicakṣaṇa-* is concerned, we have chosen the term 'bright' which retains the ambiguity of the original term as both 'being visible, radiant' and 'being clear-sighted, wise' — meanings, as we will see, already attested in the ṚV.

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[5] Lubin (2010: 7) considers this Brāhmaṇa technique as a 'forerunner of later commentarial practice.'

[6] We owe this pair of examples to Palsule 1957: 120; cf. Liebich 1919: 15–17.

[7] AB 5.5.12: *vaiśvānarasya sumatau syāmety āgnimārutasya pratipad, ito jāta iti jātavac caturthe 'hani caturthasyāhno rūpaṃ*, 'Let us enjoy the benevolence of Vaiśvānara' is the introductory verse of the Hymn devoted to Agni and the Maruts. As containing the verbal base *jan-* in 'born from here,' on the fourth day, it is the visibile appearance of the fourth day.'

[8] ṚV 1.98.1: *vaiśvānarásya sumataú syāma rā́jā hí kam bhúvanānām abhiśrī́ḥ | itó jātó víśvam idáṃ ví caṣṭe vaiśvānaró yatate sū́ryeṇa*, 'Let us enjoy the benevolence of Vaiśvānara. He is in fact the king and full glory of the beings. Born from here, he sees distinctly this whole universe, Vaiśvānara aligns himself with the sun.'

[9] AB 1.16.3: *sa yady ekasyām evānūktāyāṃ jāyeta yadi dvayor, athota bruvantu jantava iti jātāya jātavatīm abhirūpām anubrūyād*, 'If he has been born both when only one [Gāyatrī stanza] has been uttered and when two, then, for him who has been born, he should repeat the corresponding stanza containing the verbal base *jan-* [beginning with] 'Let the living beings say.' See ṚV 1.74.3: *utá bruvantu jantáva úd agnír vṛtrahā́jani | dhanaṃjayó ráṇe raṇe*, 'And let the living beings say: "Agni, the Vṛtra-killer, was generated, who is the booty-winner in every battle".'

[10] The *taddhita* derivative stem *vicakṣaṇavat* is formed by applying the *taddhita* affix -*vat* to the stem *vicakṣaṇa* according to A 5.2.94: *tad asyāsty asminn iti matup*, 'The *taddhita* affix -*mat* applies to a nominal stem in place of the sentence "X belongs to Y" or "X exists in Y",' where X is the denotatum of the input, and Y is the denotatum of the output of the rule. Here X is *vicakṣaṇam* and Y is *vāc*.

2.2. The Śrautasūtra occurrences

This complex and ambiguous passage is later given a rigid and somewhat mechanical interpretation in the Śrautasūtras, in which *vicakṣaṇa* becomes 'a term' to be added by the contaminating *dīkṣita* of the *soma* sacrifice after addressing somebody by his proper name; this is one of the features of the *dīkṣita*'s jargon he is supposed to use in order to deal with the danger entailed by his transient status.[11] This interpretation is already found in the most ancient Śrautasūtra, i.e. the *Baudhāyana Śrautasūtra*, where *vicakṣaṇavat* is paired with the term *canasitavat*. The terms *vicakṣaṇavat* and *canasitavat* are thus features of a speech (*vāc*) characterised by *vicakṣaṇa* and *canasita* as honorific forms appended after the personal names or replacing them. The consecrated one is here instructed by the Adhvaryu priest:

[2] BŚS 6.6: *dīkṣito 'si dīkṣitavādaṃ vada satyam eva vada mānṛtaṃ mā smāyiṣṭhā mā kaṇḍūyathā māpāvṛthā* […] *yadi vācaṃ visṛjer vaiṣṇavīm ṛcam anudravatāt* […] *yāni devatānāmāni yathākhyātaṃ tāny ācakṣvātha yāny adevatānāmāni yathākhyātaṃ tāny ācakṣāṇa upariṣṭād vicakṣaṇaṃ dhehi canasitavatīṃ vicakṣaṇavatīṃ vācaṃ vada.* […]

The replacement of *m-* of *-mat* with *v-* is taught in A 8.2.9–11. The occurrence of forms where the input is in fact an adjectival form (as it is here *vicakṣaṇa*) is not impossible though not very frequent: see *nīlavat, bṛhadvat, bhadravat.*

[11] The specific meaning of this *taddhita* as 'containing a given word' (the meaning selected e.g. by Caland 1919: 140), is actually available in Pāṇini's framework, even though never specifically taught. Such a meaning is for example implied by A 4.4.125: *tadvān āsām upadhāno mantra itīṣṭakāsu luk ca matoḥ*, which teaches that when the *taddhita* affix *yat* applies to a nominal stem ending in *-mat* (to derive a name of the brick consecrated by means of a formula including that same stem) *-mat* is zero-replaced. Accordingly, inasmuch as *-mat/-vat* in the specific sense of 'in which there is a word, containing a word' is considered available by default (e.g. *varcasvat* 'in which there is the word *varcas*'), it is zero-replaced when a further derivative affix (*-ya*) applies to the same stem in which *-mat/-vat* is zeroed. Thus *varcasya-* denotes bricks on which the *upadhānamantra* containing the word *varcas* has been recited. Nevertheless, we cannot be sure that any kind of text or utterance can be named after a word contained in that text/utterance. Here for instance, Pāṇini includes a lexical constraint on the affix *-mat/-vat* which is zero-replaced, namely it has to refer exclusively to an *upadhānamantra*. According to Bender (1910: 62), the meaning 'containing the root or word X' — preferably conveyed by *-vat* 'even with words which would phonetically require *mant*' — is 'by its very nature limited to post-Vedic, and very largely to Brāhmaṇa texts,' i.e. more recent than the Vedic Saṃhitās.

You are the consecrated one: use the way of speaking of one consecrated! Speak only the truth, not the untruth![12] Do not smile! Do not scratch yourself! Do not uncover yourself! […] Should you release your voice, let a stanza addressed to Viṣṇu follow it! [...] Pronounce the [utterances] which are gods' names in accordance with how they are named but, after pronouncing the [utterances] which are not god's names in accordance with how they are named, add the word *vicakṣaṇa*! Speak a language characterized by *canasita* and *vicakṣaṇa*!
[... When the time of the fires comes, the Adhvaryu addresses the consecrated one and his wife ...]

dīkṣita vācaṃ yaccha patni vācaṃ yaccheti saṃpreṣya vācaṃ yamayor vrate dohayataḥ [...]

O consecrated one, restrain your voice! O sacrificer's wife, restrain your voice! After this call, the two Vrata-milks of the two who are restraining their voice get milked.
[... Here follows a series of prescriptions concerning the day-time duties of officiants who seem to act and speak on behalf of the consecrated one. The consecrated one returns to the foreground in the evening:]

uditeṣu nakṣatreṣu yajamānaḥ kṛṣṇājinam āsajya pūrvayā dvāropaniṣkramyāgreṇa śālāṃ tiṣṭhan bhūr bhuvaḥ suvar vrataṃ kṛṇuta vrataṃ kṛṇuteti trir vācaṃ visṛjate 'thātithīnām upasthām eti. canasitavatīṃ vicakṣaṇavatīṃ vācaṃ vadati. sa yady u hāmedhyam upādhigacchati taj japaty abaddhaṃ mano daridraṃ cakṣuḥ sūryo jyotiṣāṃ śreṣṭho dīkṣe mā mā hāsīr iti.

After the constellations have arisen, the sacrificer (*yajamāna*), having hung the skin of a black antelope and having gone out of the eastern door, standing in front of the shelter, emits three times the utterance '*bhūr bhuvaḥ suvar*, provide the Vrata-milk! provide the Vrata-milk!' Then he meets the guests. He speaks a

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[12] *satyam* 'truth,' which etymologically is 'that which exists,' conveys the meaning either of 'that which is perceptible' or of 'that which is permanent'; here it is equated with the order of world (*ṛta-*). The earliest hint at such an identification can be read — as underlined by Radicchi (1962: 102) — in ṚV 10.190.1–3: *ṛtáṃ ca satyáṃ cābhī́ddhāt tápasó 'dhy ajāyata* […] ‖ […] *sūryācandramásau dhātā́ yathāpūrvám akalpayat | dívaṃ ca pṛthivī́ṃ cāntárikṣam átho svàḥ*, 'Both truth and reality were born from heat when it was kindled. […] The Ordainer arranged, according to their proper order, sun and moon, heaven and hearth, midspace and sunlight' (tr. Jamison and Brereton 2014: 1660).

language characterized by *canasita* and *vicakṣaṇa*. If he falls into something impure, he murmurs this, 'My mind is unrestrained, my sight is roving around. The sun is supreme among the luminaries, O consecration, do not abandon me!'[13]

In other Śrautasūtras, the two nominal bases *canasita* and *vicakṣaṇa* are provided with a specialised meaning,[14] to address, respectively, a *brahmaṇa*, or a *rājanya* and a *vaiśya*, but the bottom lines of the description remain the same:[15]

[3] BhŚS 10.7.15–18: *canasita iti brāhmaṇam āmantrayīta. vicakṣaṇa iti rājanyavaiśyāv iti vijñāyate. brāhmaṇena caiva kṣatriyeṇa vā vaiśyena vā saṃbhāṣeta. tata evainam anuprayujyeran. yady enaṃ śūdreṇa saṃvāda upapadyetaiteṣām evaikaṃ brūyāt imaṃ nu vicakṣva iti.*

He should address a *brāhmaṇa* by saying '*canasita.*' It is well known that [he should address] a *rājanya* and a *vaiśya* by saying '*vicakṣaṇa.*' He might talk with a *brāhmaṇa*, a *kṣatriya* or a *vaiśya*. They should deal with him from that very place. If a conversation with a *śūdra* should take place, he should say to one of them (*brāhmaṇa*s, *kṣatriya*s and *vaiśya*s): 'Reveal this to him!'

This seems at a first sight to fit quite well with the strict ritual concerns that scrupulously regulate the consecrated one's permitted action and in particular his speech. Infringements of the vow of silence must always be ritually handled and amended. Nonetheless, some features in the Śrautasūtra passages intriguingly sound less ritually oriented than expected. A striking element in text [2] is the indirect link made between the vow of silence and the divine language which both characterize the behaviour of the consecra-

[13] The formula is taken from TS 3.1.1.2.

[14] On the contrary, a very late Śrautasūtra, KŚS 7.5.7 *vicakṣaṇacanasitavatīṃ vācaṃ*, still presents the *dīkṣita*'s speech, interestingly, as a unitary whole without specifying different addressees. Cf. Thite's tr. (2006: 275): '(and he speaks) speech (with the words) *vicakṣaṇa* and *canasita*' with a reference to GB 2.2.23.

[15] Cf. e.g. the generic translation used by Caland and Henry (1906: 21), i.e. 'intelligent' for *vicakṣaṇa* and 'bienvenu' for *canasita*, referred to BŚS, ĀpŚS, MŚS, KŚS and VaitŚS occurrences. The masculine *vicakṣaṇá* can indeed be regularly formed by applying *-aná* to the verbal base *vi-cakṣ-* according to A 3.2.149 to denote an agent who performs the action as habitual disposition, duty or excellence; the neuter noun *vicákṣaṇa* according to A 3.3.115 or A 3.3.117 to form a neuter either as *nomen actionis* or as a *nomen instrumenti et loci.*

ted one. On the other hand, he may use everyday language only [5] in an indirect way: the addition of *canasita* and *vicakṣaṇa* after the utterance of human proper names is supposed to grant a kind of shield to the transparent name (his *pratyakṣanāman* in [4]) and essence both of the addressee and of the consecrated one himself so that his fire-bright speech does no harm to anyone, as underlined in [6].

> [4] MŚS 2.1.2.29: *na pratyakṣanāmnācakṣīta. canasitety arhatā saha saṃbhāṣamāṇo brūyād vicakṣaṇetītaraiḥ.*
>
> He has to talk without using the transparent name; when speaking with a venerable one he should say 'canasita!', with others 'vicakṣaṇa!'
>
> [5] ĀpŚS 12.7–8: *canasitam vicakṣaṇam iti nāmadheyānteṣu nidadhāti. canasiteti brāhmaṇam. vicakṣaṇeti rājanyavaiśye. pariṇayena mānuṣīṃ vācaṃ vadati.*[16]
>
> At the end of the names he adds *canasitam* and *vicakṣaṇam, canasita* [when he addresses] a *brāhmaṇa, vicakṣaṇa* [when he addresses] a *rājanya* or a *vaiśya.* He speaks the human language in a contrived way.
>
> [6] ĀpŚS 10.13.1–2: *agnir vā dīkṣitas tasmād enaṃ nopaspṛśet. na cāsya nāma gṛhṇīyāt.*
>
> The consecrated one is indeed fire. Therefore, none should touch him. None should use his name.[17]

The great emphasis placed on the requirement to stick to the truth in [2] is also found in other Śrautasūtra passages such as [7]

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[16] *pariṇayena* lit. means 'with a circular movement, going round about,' *pariṇaya* is typically taking the spouse around the fire. Thite (2004: 514) translates it as 'politely,' which nevertheless may be accepted as an interpretation of what is in general an indirect, contrived way of speaking. Interestingly, Pāṇini (A 3.3.37) teaches how to form the term *pariṇāya* (with long penultimate syllable) in the domain of *dyūta* 'game, gambling,' in parallel with the term *nyāyaḥ* in the domain of *abhreṣa* 'fitness, propriety.' The idea of a circular, indirect, crooked way of acting is implicit in this term. We furthermore consider that the whole sentence *pariṇayena mānuṣīṃ vācaṃ vadati* is best interpreted in the light of the parallel sentence *parihvālaṃ mānuṣīṃ vācaṃ vadati* in [7].

[17] The same injunction is given in VaitŚS 11.19.

and hardly matches purely ritualistic and purity concerns. As also shown by the prescribed expressions used in [2] to describe the consecrated one's reaction to the contact with impurity, the consecrated one shows some typical features of an inspired and possessed man. Other passages in parallel texts seem to hint at the same background:

[7] BhŚS 10.7.13–14: *sa etad vrataṃ carati. na māṃsam aśnāti na striyam upaiti nopary āste jugupsetānṛtāt. parihvālaṃ*[18] *mānuṣīṃ vācaṃ vadati canasitaṃ vicakṣaṇaṃ vānuṣajan.*

He practises this observance: he does not eat meat; he does not approach a woman; he does not sit on a high seat; he should detest untruth. He speaks the human language stammering, adding either [the word] *canasita* or [the word] *vicakṣaṇa* at the end.

As already seen, the consecrated one's speech, when allowed, pertains to divine language rather than human. This stammering, jaculatory language interspersed by *canasita* and *vicakṣaṇa* seems to mimic another, more esoteric, language, comprehensible to the consecrated one alone, in his trance. Furthermore, in [2] the link between the rise of the asterisms and the allowed use of the

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[18] This term is rare, but in the White Yajurveda School, it occurs once in KŚS 7.5.6 (*parihvālaṃ vadati*) and four times in ŚB(M) 3.2.2.27–29 in an identical formula where *parihvālaṃ* is a gerund form derived from a non-documented verb *pari-hval-* presumably meaning 'to go around crookedly,' and is opposed to the fluent way of speaking the human language that the *dīkṣita* has to avoid: *parihválaṃ vácaṃ vadati ná mānuṣīm prásṛtāṃ*. Thite (1970: 167) commented this ŚB passage by emphasising 'The supranormal life full of religious ecstasy can be seen particularly in the rule according to which the sacrificer, during the *dīkṣā* period, should speak stammering speech.' Thite (2006: 275) translates *parihvālaṃ* in KŚS 7.5.6 as 'falteringly.' The term is also commented by Oldenberg (1988: 287 n. 316), who considers such a simulated inability to speak as a ritual consequence of the 'motif of rebirth' in the *dīkṣā*. On stammering as an effect of the *dīkṣā*, i.e., as 'a senseless, instinctive way of speaking' ('Das Stammeln bei der Dīkṣā gehört in die Kategorie des sinnlosen, triebhaften Redens') in ecstatic experiences, see Hauer 1921: 76. Quite different is Minard's translation (1949: vol. 1, p. 188) of the quoted ŚB sentence: 'voilà pourquoi (le consacré) emploie des circonlocutions, non la langue courante en usage chez les hommes.' As more recently underlined by Heesterman (1993: 148) and Thompson (1996: 152), the *dīkṣita* currently speaks a 'non-human' language. In fact, by entering his *dīkṣā*, the sacrificer temporarily transcends himself to become 'non-human,' and then 'He divests himself of his transcendent ritual persona and reverts again to his normal self.'

faculty of speaking for the *dīkṣita* suggests a fascinating superimposition of the solar image as the creator's icon on the ascetic consecrated man. In the absence of the sun, during the night, the *dīkṣita* plays the role of the sun. He is allowed to speak, but his language is the divine language, made of single effective syllables such as the mystical *vyāhṛti*s (*bhūr bhuvaḥ suvar*) uttered at the beginning of the creation. Again, this feature may be found in other passages, such as the following:

[8] MŚS 2.1.2.27: *nakṣatrāṇāṃ sakāśād iti nakṣatraṃ dṛṣṭvā vācaṃ visṛjate. vrataṃ carata.*

'Because of the visibility of constellations,' thus after sighting a constellation, he releases his voice. 'Prepare (2nd pl.) the Vrata-milk!'

[9] ĀpŚS 10.12.3–4: *sa vāgyatas tapas tapyamāna āsta ā nakṣatrasyodetoḥ. vatsasyaikaṃ stanam avaśiṣyetarān vrataṃ dohayitvā yāḥ paśūnām ṛṣabhe vācas tāḥ sūryo agre śukro agre tāḥ prahiṇvo yathābhagaṃ vo atra śivā nas tāḥ punar āyantu vāca iti japitvā vrataṃ kṛṇuteti vācam visṛjate.*

He (the *dīkṣita*), after restraining his voice, continues practising penance until the rise of a constellation. He releases his voice [by enjoining:] 'Provide (2nd pl.) the Vrata-milk!', after leaving [unmilked] one teat for the calf and making [the milker] milk the other [three teats] for the Vrata-milk, and after muttering [the following formula]:[19] 'May you dismiss the voices of the cattle in the bull, which are at first the sun, at first the blazing one, let them come back here benevolent to us, each according to their share!'

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[19] This *yajus* occurs in MS 1.2.3, where the first singular person of the indicative present *prahiṇomi* 'I am dismissing' occurs instead of the second singular person of the injunctive *prahiṇvaḥ* and the expression *yathābhāgam* is made clear by the final words, as follows: *vāyave tvā varuṇāya tvā rudrāya tvā nirṛtyai tvendrāya tvā marudbhyas tvā*, 'You to Vāyu, you to Varuṇa, you to Rudra, you to Nirṛti, you to Indra and you to the Maruts.' A *pratīka* quotation of this verse is also included in MŚS 2.1.2.27. The powerful image of the great god as a roaring bull (endowed with four horns, three feet, two heads and seven hands), who entered mortals (*vṛṣabhó roravīti mahó devó mártyāṃ ā́ vivéśa*), extolled in ṚV 4.58.3 is plausibly a presupposed background of [9] which helps us equate the *dīkṣita*'s inspired stammering utterances and the Creator's action, which is envisioned as the Solar God's role in allowing men to perceptibly and linguistically discern the several objects of knowledge.

As often happens in the Śrautasūtra, the effort to rationalize and schematize mythic and ritual material at the risk of doing violence to the original texts is quite evident. There is no doubt that, in the Śrautasūtra milieu, our JB passage was also read against such an interpretative background, but this should not prevent us from approaching another, more ancient level of interpretation of the text which may have had a role to play in different times and cultural contexts. As a consequence, the first step to take is to read this Brāhmaṇa passage in the context of Brāhmaṇa literature,[20] assuming some kind of unity first of all at the literary and theoretical level, and secondly within a chronological perspective.

2.3. The Brāhmaṇas of the Ṛgveda School

Indeed, the opposition *vicakṣaṇa* vs. *canasita*, which we have seen in the Śrautasūtras, is not found either in the JB [1] or in AB 1.6 [10] and KB 7.3 [11]. Only in the later Atharvaveda school, namely in GB 1.3.19 and 2.2.3, both terms are involved in a single sentence, but we will return to this in the next paragraph. The AB shows us how consecrated speech, far from being simply ritually pure, is in fact explicitly assimilated to divine language intimately connected with things as they are. No reasons are found to assume that *vicakṣaṇa* here signifies anything else than the quality of seeing and making someone else see reality perspicuously:

> [10] AB 1.6: *ṛtaṃ vāva dīkṣā satyaṃ dīkṣā, tasmād dīkṣitena satyam eva vaditavyam. atho khalu āhuḥ. ko 'rhati manuṣyaḥ sarvaṃ satyaṃ vaditum. satyasaṃhitā vai devā, anṛtasaṃhitā manuṣyā iti. vicakṣaṇavatīṃ vācaṃ vadec cakṣur vai vicakṣaṇam, vi hy enena paśyatīti. etad dha vai manuṣyeṣu satyaṃ nihitaṃ yac cakṣus tasmād ācakṣāṇam āhur adrāg iti. sa yady adarśam ity āhāthāsya śrad dadhati. yady u vai svayam paśyati, na bahūnāṃ ca nānyeṣām śrad dadhāti. tasmād vicakṣaṇavatīm eva vācaṃ vadet, satyottarā haivāsya vāg uditā bhavati bhavati.*

Consecration is the order of the world. Consecration is truth. Therefore, only the truth should be spoken by the consecrated man. Now they say: 'What man is capable of only speaking what is the truth? Gods indeed are clusters of truth. Men are clusters of

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[20] '[...] The parallel texts usually are the best commentary of Brāhmaṇa style texts' (Witzel 1996: 166–167).

untruth.' He should speak a language characterized by being bright. Sight is indeed bright.[21] In fact he discerns (*vi-paś-*) by means of this. Sight is indeed what is established as truth among men. Therefore, they say to him who narrates something, 'Have you seen this?' If he replies: 'I saw [it],' then, they believe him. But if he sees for himself, he does not believe others, even if they were many. Therefore, he should speak a language characterized by being bright. Then the language spoken by him, actually becomes characterized by truth.[22]

The context of the occurrence of *vicakṣaṇavatī vāc* in KB 7.3, just before the section devoted to the so-called Kaiśinī *dīkṣā* as in [1], is quite similar to the AB one, but a sort of magic Abhicāra background also emerges:

[11] KB 7.3: [...] *tad āhuḥ kasmād dīkṣitasyānye nāma na gṛhṇantīty agniṃ vā ātmānaṃ dīkṣamāṇo 'bhidīkṣate tad yad asyānye nāma na gṛhṇanti ned agnim āsīdām eti yad u so 'nyasya nāma na gṛhṇāti ned enam agnir bhūtaḥ pradahānīti. [...] yam dviṣyāt tasya dīkṣitaḥ san nāma grasetaiva tad evainam agnir bhūtaḥ pradahati atha yam icched vicakṣaṇavatyā vācā tasya nāma gṛhṇīyāt so tatra prāyaścittiś cakṣur vai vicakṣaṇaṃ cakṣuṣā hi vipaśyaty eṣā ha tv eva vyāhṛtir dīkṣitavādaḥ satyam eva sa yaḥ satyaṃ vadati sa dīkṣata iti ha smāha tad āhuḥ kasmād dīkṣitasyāśanaṃ nāśnantīti havir eṣa bhavati yad dīkṣate.*

[...] They say: 'Why do others not utter the name of the *dīkṣita*?' He who is consecrating himself, consecrates himself as Agni. This is why others do not utter his name [by considering]: 'Let us not go towards Agni!'. And this is why he does not utter the name of another [by considering]: 'Let me not burn him, since I have become Agni.' [...] He should just swallow the name of a man[23] he hates, while he is consecrated. Thus, having become Agni, he burns him. Moreover, he should utter the name of the man he desires [as a comrade] with a language characterized by being

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[21] This passage also recalls another ritual detail, as suggested by Haug 1863, i.e. the two portions of ghee used in the Pravargya rite, which are called *cakṣuṣī*, i.e. literally 'the two (new) eyes' which the sacrificer symbolically receives to discern the truth.

[22] According to Sāyaṇa's 14th-c. commentary, *satyottarā vāc* means rather that 'the rest of his speech is made true by postposing the term *vicakṣaṇa* to every other word,' a reading evidently influenced by the Śrautasūtras' interpretations. See Keith 1920: 111 n. 3.

[23] Cf. Keith's tr. (1920: 384): 'he should mumble his name.'

bright.[24] He, in that situation, is amending; sight indeed is bright. In fact, he discerns by means of sight. Only the mystical utterance (i.e. *bhūr bhuvaḥ suvar*) is the language of the *dīkṣita*, and it is actually truth. 'He who speaks truth is consecrated,' so he says. They say, 'Why do they not eat the food of the consecrated one?' Since he consecrates himself, he becomes an oblation.

It is interesting to note that in KB 7.10 the pure *taddhita* stem used as an epithet is also found twice. The general context is the purchase of *soma*, but the story of the old contest between Asuras and Devas is first told, at the end of which the winners, i.e. the Devas, anoint Soma as their King. A couple of interesting Vedic equivalences follows. Here *vicakṣaṇa* is a qualifier of the moon and indirectly of *soma*, envisioned as usual as a King:

[12] KB 7.12: [...] *tad asau vai somo rājā vicakṣaṇaś candramāḥ sa imaṃ krītam eva praviśati tad yat somaṃ rājānaṃ krīṇāty asau vai somo rājā vicakṣaṇaś candramā abhiṣuto 'sad iti.*

[...] What is over there is King Soma, i.e. the bright moon. He enters that which has been purchased [i.e. the soma to be pressed]; when he purchases King Soma, [he says]: 'May King Soma, i.e. the bright moon, be pressed!'

2.4. The Brāhmaṇa of the Atharvaveda School

While our JB and the two Brāhmaṇas of the Ṛgveda school ([1], [10], and [11]) use only the term *vicakṣaṇavat*, the GB [13] also uses the term *canasitavat*. Through this artificial addition, paving the way for the opposition in the Śrautasūtras, the meaning of the term *vicakṣaṇavat* is profoundly modified, favouring the shift of the term *vicakṣaṇa* itself towards a pure honorific. As we have seen, even though the authoritative translations of the relevant occurrences in AB, KB and JB take the ritual shift of meaning for grant-

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[24] Cf. Keith's tr. (1920: 384): 'with a clear voice.' In this passage, two uttering modes are contrasted. Keith's translation evidently contrasts a mumbling/chewing pronunciation with a distinct one. Nevertheless, such a meaning as *gras-* to take into the mouth is never attested and the whole context of the text itself goes against this interpretation: on the one hand it is clear from the preceding sentence that the name must not be clearly pronounced, in order not to harm, whereas on the other hand the following sentence explicitly defines the language of the *dīkṣita* as consisting of single mystical syllables (*vyāhṛti*).

ed, nothing compels us to assume that this term is a later Śrauta reworking of the original sense of *vicakṣaṇavat.* It is thus particularly important, in this respect, to scrutinize the testimony of the *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa*, a fairly late Atharvavedic text, which nonetheless has not been aligned with the Śrauta system.[25] There are two occurrences of an identical portion of text, but the context in which the term occurs is significantly different.

In one of the two occurrences, the context is exactly the same as the one drawn by JB, that is, the consecration of the sacrificer before the celebration of the Soma ritual. GB 1.3.19 is explicitly devoted to the specific features that characterize the consecrated one and to the mystic reality behind them. From the beginning in fact, whatever concerns the consecrated one is interpreted through the lens of the dichotomy between two levels of language, i.e. one which perfectly matches reality (*pratyakṣa*) and the other which only indirectly represents it (i.e. *parokṣa*), which is the everyday language of men:

[13] GB 1.3.19: [...] *kasya svid dhetor dīkṣita ity ācakṣate. śreṣṭhāṃ dhiyaṃ kṣiyatīti. taṃ vā etaṃ dhīkṣitaṃ santaṃ dīkṣita ity ācakṣate parokṣeṇa parokṣapriyā iva hi devā bhavanti pratyakṣadviṣaḥ.*

[...] Why is he called *dīkṣita*? He inhabits the highest form of thought. Indeed, they call *dīkṣita*, in an opaque way, the one who

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[25] The first passage here analysed, i.e. GB 1.3.19 is part of the so-called *pūrva-brāhmaṇa* (in five *prapāṭhaka*s), which according to Bloomfield (1899: 101–102) 'shows considerable originality, especially when it is engaged in the glorification of the Atharvan and its priests,' and '(i)ts materials are by no means all of the usual Brāhmaṇa-character,' while the *uttarabrāhmaṇa* (in six *prapāṭhaka*s) 'leaves the impression of a date still later than the *pūrva.*' Bloomfield (1899: 102) maintained that the chronological relations in the redaction of the following three works of the Atharvaveda-School were reversed as compared to the other Vedic Schools, namely the *Kauśika Gṛhyasūtra* was composed before the *Vaitāna Śrautasūtra*, and the latter before the *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa*. The evidence he used was nonetheless discussed and rejected by several scholars (see Patyal 1969: XIV–XX, and bibliography there quoted), so that Gonda (1975: 356) states that 'there can be no doubt that it (= GB) is one of the latest productions of its genre,' but not later that the *Vaitāna Śrautasūtra.* Moreover, according to Gonda (1977: 544–545), all three works might have been a common lore of the Atharvaveda-School, rather than the exclusive property of the Śaunakīya or Paippalāda Schools.

'has been inhabited by the thought' (*dhī-kṣita*),[26] for it is as if the gods were fond of what is opaque and hated what is transparent.[27]

Not only must the real personal name of the consecrated one be concealed, but also his real status as a possessed, inspired man, which must only be hinted at in an indirect way. Significantly, the priests who participate in the *dīkṣā* similarly act as a kind of shield between the consecrated one and the world. In particular [14], the marks of respect he deserves (he is one who does not stand up before others and does not salute) are justified by the presence of specific officiants next to him:

> [14] GB 1.3.19: [...] *ye pratyuttheyā abhivādyās ta enam āviṣṭā bhava-nty atharvāṅgirasas.*

> [...] The *athārvāṅgirasa*s, before whom one must stand up and whom one must salute, become the ones who are intent on him.

The following questions concern what is specifically atharvanic and what is specifically aṅgirasic in the *dīkṣita*'s (ritual) behaviour. Atharvanic is said to be the fact that the *dīkṣita* pours the oblation in/for himself and not in/for others. As to what is proper to the Aṅgiras, the text says:

> [15] GB 1.3.19: [...] *athāsya kim āṅgirasam iti yad ātmanaś ca pareṣāṃ ca nāmāni na gṛhṇāty evaṃ ha tasminn āsād ātmanaś*[28] *caiva pareṣāṃ*

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[26] The many semantic analyses of the word *dīkṣita* in the Brāhmaṇas have been collected and analyzed by Thite (1970), who stresses the different insights on the notion of *dīkṣā* that such analyses convey. Concerning our occurrence, Thite (1970: 167) highlights 'the ecstatic nature of the *dīkṣita*: during the time of the *dīkṣā* the person who has gone through that ceremony goes to a particular religious thought [...]. The present reference [...] gives us the idea of religious ecstasy as a significance of *dīkṣā*.' Thite's interpretation of *dhī* as 'religious thought' rather depends nevertheless on Ṛgvedic data, in our opinion. Deeg (1995: 234) translates *śreṣṭhāṃ dhiyaṃ kṣiyati*, 'Er besitzt den besten Gedanken' and devotes fn. 169, p. 235 to explaining the meaning of the verb *kṣi-* ('to dwell') with acc. 'to possess.' The participle *kṣitaṃ* in the sense of 'consumed, destroyed' is involved in the paretymology of *dīkṣā* in JB 2.54 (see below § 4). It is tempting to assume that the compound *dhīkṣita* in the second part of the present GB paretymology might have meant 'consumed by the [inspired] thought.'

[27] This long-debated topic has recently aroused the interest of Raffaele Torella himself (see Torella 2019).

[28] v.l. *tasminnasādātmanaś.*

ca nāmāni na gṛhyante. vicakṣaṇavatīm[29] *vācaṃ bhāṣante canasita-vatīm*[30] *vicakṣayanti*[31] *brāhmaṇaṃ canasayanti*[32] *prājāpatyam.*[33]

[...] What is there of him which is proper to the Aṅgiras? The fact that he uses neither his name nor the names of others: thus, in fact his name and the names of others are not used there in the vicinity.[34] They speak a language characterized by being bright and well-disposed, they make the *brāhmaṇa*[35] see distinctly, they make [him] well-disposed towards the [vow] dedicated to Prajāpati.[36]

A more schematic and ritualistically-oriented translation could be only one step away, e.g. as follows:

They speak a language which uses *vicakṣaṇa*, which uses *canasita*, they address the brahmin with the word 'insightful' and the descendant of Prajāpati with the word 'gracious.'[37]

This interpretation would fit perfectly with the later Śrautasūtra tradition, except for the inversion of the characteristic of seeing

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[29] v.l. *vicakṣaṇavatī.*

[30] Mitra and Vidyabhūṣaṇa (1872) divide *ca na sitavatīm.*

[31] v.l. *vicakṣyeti.*

[32] v.l. *na ca sayanti.* Mitra and Vidyabhūṣaṇa (1872) divide *ca na sayanti.*

[33] v.l. *prājāpatiṃ.*

[34] A similar question is raised again some lines below with variations, when it is asked why the *dīkṣita* is someone whose food is not to be consumed and whose name is not to be pronounced (by others) *kasya svid dhetor dīkṣito 'nāśyanno bhavati nāsya nāma gṛhṇanti.* Here the reason is found in the fact that he becomes someone who resides in food and resides in the name: those who eat his food eat his sin and those who pronounce his name throw off the sin in his name. The tabu thus concerns principally the persons addressing the *dīkṣita* (notice the plural, *gṛhṇanti*) and not the *dīkṣita* himself and is meant principally to avoid contamination.

[35] Every *dīkṣita* is called *brāhmaṇa* or *brahmán* at the acme of consecration, notwithstanding the specific *varṇa* he pertains to, to lose it at the end (see Thite 1970: 169; Neri and Pontillo 2016).

[36] The translation is based on a phrasal segmentation we owe to Gaastra's 1919 edition, which puts a pause after *canasitavatīm.* The secondary form *prājāpatya* may signify both what comes/descends from Prājapati (typically the warrior class), or what is dedicated to Prājapati, typically either the sacrificial victim (and in particular any sacrificial victim not specifically dedicated to other deities), or some kind of vow (*vrata*) characterised by silence. See TS 2.5.11.4 and TB 2.1.4.6 *yat tuṣṇīṃ tat prājāpatyam.*

[37] Patyal (1969), albeit with a different segmentation of the text, goes in the same direction: they utter the speech containing the word 'discerning,' they pro-

distinctly and being satisfied.[38] Nevertheless, such a translation of the passage, which may be the first in which the opposition between the two terms is found, is not the only one possible and perhaps not even the preferable one. A quick glance at the variants in the reviewed manuscripts and the choices of some editors shows that the passage was also obscure for copyists. Furthermore, many forms in this brief utterance are puzzling: both the causatives are virtually hapax, being used only once again in the parallel, identical passage in GB 2.2.23. They are also morphologically puzzling since they can be derived neither from *vicakṣaṇa* nor from *canasita*: the translation 'address with the word *vicakṣaṇa*/with the word *canasita*' is thus highly interpretative. We have consequently preferred not to take the shift in meaning proper of the Śrautasūtras already for granted, and we have interpreted the two forms as coming from *vi-cakṣ-* and the denominal verbal base *canasya*, respectively, preserving a specific 'causative' meaning for these new formations. This translation has in our opinion some definite advantages, first of all that of maintaining the unity of the language attributed to the consecrated one, here called *brāhmaṇa*, a language that makes him see distinctly and enjoy what is dedicated to Prajāpati. This interpretation, on the other hand, raises the problem of clearly identifying the third person plural to whom such speech is attributed, in contrast with all the other occurrences both in the Brāhmaṇa and in the Śrautasūtra, which clearly identify the agent as being the singular *dīkṣita*. It seems quite clear that here the agents are the Atharvāṅgiras who, as the following passage clearly shows, are making the first call for the Vrata-milk on behalf of the consecrated one himself:

[16] GB 1.3.19: *saiṣā vratadhug atharvāṅgirasas tāṃ hy anvāyattāḥ*

The Atharvāṅgiras are this [language] which gives the *vrata*[-milk] for they have followed it.

claim the speech containing the word 'satisfied,' and address the Brāhmaṇa text connected with Prajāpati with the word 'satisfied.'

[38] Gonda (1986: 154) already noticed that this GB statement is not clear, even though he reads *vicakṣaṇa* and *canasita* as being associated with different interlocutors because BhŚ and ĀpŚ enjoin the former term when addressing a nobleman or a *vaiśya*, and the latter for a brahmin.

This interpretation is further strengthened by the second occurrence of the couple *vicakṣaṇavatī-canasitavatī* which is again attributed to a generic plural, that is, the priests involved in the *soma* pressing, which is outside the context of *dīkṣā*:

> [17] GB 2.2.23: *vicakṣaṇavatīṃ vācaṃ bhāṣante canasitavatīm. vicakṣayanti brāhmaṇam canasayanti prājāpatyam. satyaṃ vadanti. etad vai manuṣyeṣu satyaṃ yac cakṣus [...] tasmād vicakṣaṇavatīṃ vācaṃ bhāṣante canasitavatīm satyottarā haivaiṣāṃ vāg uditā bhavati.*

> They speak a language characterized by being bright and well-disposed, they make the *brāhmaṇa* see distinctly, they make [him] well-disposed towards the [vow] dedicated to Prajāpati. They say the truth. And among men truth is in the faculty of sight. [...] For this reason they speak a language characterized by being bright and enjoyed: their speech becomes indeed pronounced as essentially true.

3. *A glance at the earliest semantic imagery linked to vicakṣaṇa and to the verb vi-cakṣ-*

It is now time to analyse in greater detail what is behind our translation of *vicakṣaṇa* as 'bright' in the complex meaning that encompasses both the notion of being luminous/appearing and illuminating/seeing, watching.[39] To do so, it is important to understand the semantic imagery revolving around this epithet in the literature of the Saṃhitās. Having surveyed all the Vedic occurrences of the term, we will concentrate here on the earliest attestations and present crucial testimonies highlighting different aspects of this complex meaning. The epithet itself, by the way, is far from uncommon at an early stage of Vedic. In the R̥V, *vicakṣaṇa* primarily refers to the sun (R̥V 1.50.8; 10.37.8), but also

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[39] Both these notions are proper to the reduplicated present base *cakṣ-* from *kāś-* recorded in Mayrhofer 1986–2001, *s.v.* as 'leuchten, erscheinen, erblicken, sehen.' These values are attested from the most ancient redactional layers of Vedic literature, see e.g. R̥V 10.5.1 *ékaḥ samudró dharúṇo rayīṇā́m asmáddhr̥dó bhū́rijanmā ví caṣṭe*, 'There is only one water-body, foundation of riches, but he, having many births, peeps out from our own heart,' in contrast to R̥V 10.55.3 *páñca devā́m r̥tuśáḥ saptásapta ‖ cátustriṃśatā purudhā́ vi caṣṭe sárūpeṇa jyótiṣā vívratena*, 'The five [groups] of gods in their proper sequence, seven by seven does he [Indra] variously illuminate with those thirty-four [which are one] light having a single form but performing different actions.'

to the moon together with the sun (ṚV 1.164.12, 8.41.9), to Prajāpati (ṚV 4.53.2), to Agni Vaiśvānara (ṚV 3.3.10), to Indra (ṚV 1.101.7; 4.32.22), to Bṛhaspati (ṚV 2.23.6), and, above all, it is referred to the word *soma* (ṚV 1.112.4; 9.12.4, 37.2, 39.3, 51.5, 66.23, 70.7, 75.1, 85.9, 86.11,19,35, 106.5, 107.3, 5, 7, 16, 10.11.4, 92.15).

Particularly interesting are all those occurrences showing that the term is explicitly used with a meaning that cleverly exploits its semantic ambiguity in passages dealing with the semantic area of sovereignty and, more specifically, of wisdom's pre-eminence. In several hymns, such as [18] dedicated to Sūrya, and in others, such as the ones dedicated respectively to Soma [21], Bṛhaspati [20] and Agni Vaiśvānara [19], the prestigious status of the deity is explicitly evoked together with his enhanced capacity of seeing, which lies at the foundation of leadership itself. The sun [18], riding in the sky during the day, is explicitly assimilated from the very first stanza of the hymn to the 'eye of Mitra and Varuṇa':[40]

[18] ṚV 10.37.8
máhi jyótir bíbhrataṃ tvā vicakṣaṇa bhā́svantaṃ cákṣuṣe-cakṣuṣe máyaḥ |
āróhantam bṛhatáḥ pā́jasas pári vayáṃ jīvā́ḥ práti paśyema sū́rya ||

While you are bringing the great light, O bright one, while you shine, a joy to every eye, may we, the living beings, look upon you while you ascend from the shining vastity, O Sun.

It is thus the moment of the rising of the morning sun that is envisioned here. The translation of *vicakṣaṇa* with 'wide-gazing' (see e.g. Jamison and Brereton 2014: 1437), highlighting the sun's supervision of the whole earth with his celestial eye, is of course perfectly plausible, but we prefer to maintain the polisemy of the text unless the context explicitly points to any one option. In fact, the whole hymn plays on the ambiguity between the luminous light seen from afar, its appearance marking the orderly flow of days, and the divine eye whose ample view from the celestial heights guarantees the orderly development of human activities.

[40] ṚV 10.37.1a: *námo mitrásya váruṇasya cákṣase* 'honour to the eye of Mitra and Varuṇa.'

In other occurrences, the link to an active capacity of vision is, on the other hand, more clearly stated: Agni Vaiśvānara in [17] is extolled as the god who found the celestial light.

[19] ṚV 3.3.10
vaíśvānara táva dhāmāny ā cake yébhiḥ svarvíd ábhavo vicakṣaṇa |

O Vaiśvānara, I enjoy your established conditions,[41] by which you became the one finding the celestial light,[42] O bright one.

Bṛhaspati [20], on the other hand, honoured as the troop leader of all the troops (*gaṇānāṃ gaṇapatiḥ*), the inspired sage-poet of all sages (*kaviḥ kavīnām*),[43] at the beginning of ṚV 2.23, is, some lines below, extolled as the herder of men, a sharp-eyed creator of paths. Moreover, the *kavi*, sage and poet, whose abilities are also to 'discover and carry out the proper measures for ritual,' shows particular links with both the gods physically present at the sacrificial site, i.e. Agni [19] and Soma Pavamāna [21, 22],[44] the god, as we saw, prevalently associated with the epithet *vicakṣaṇa*:

[20] ṚV 2.23.6
tváṃ no gopāḥ pathikŕd vicakṣaṇás táva vratā́ya matíbhir jarāmahe|

[Bṛhaspati] You are our herdsman, who creates paths,[45] who is bright. We gather at your command by means of our thoughts.

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[41] We are following here the interpretation suggested by Renou (e.g. 1955: 21) who considers *dhāmāni* as 'formes en tant que résultant de functions,' also paying attention to the connection with the verb *dhā-*, suggested by Oldenberg (1916: 181). Cf. Gonda's translations as 'statutes, institutions' (Gonda 1963: 194) and as 'locations,' 'places' or 'powers' of a numen (Gonda 1967: 21) and the important criticism of the translation of *dhāman* as 'place'/'Stätte' by Wilden (2000: 169) and against the concept of *dhāman* as a deity's permanent abode in heaven rather than a 'seat,' i.e. 'the place of activity' by Bodewitz (2002: 168). See also Köhler's recent (2016: 164) emphasis on the use of *dhāman* 'for describing the establishment of ritual prescription.'

[42] The epithet *svarvid* is more commonly attributed to Soma and Agni, the two deities physically present in the sacrificial area precisely in their function as path-finders leading to heaven.

[43] On the important finding that in the *Ṛgveda* the term *kaví* is relatively more frequently used with gods than with people and the complex sense of *kavi* referred to Gods as 'Erkenner und Erzeuger von kosmischen oder rituellen Strukturen,' see Köhler 2011: 215, 220.

[44] See Köhler 2019.

[45] Also in the case of Bṛhaspati 'creator of the formula,' the capacity to create paths may be read both at a ritual and a poetic level.

[21] ṚV 9.107.7
sómo mīḍhván pavate gātuvíttama ṛṣir vípro vicakṣaṇáḥ |
tváṃ kavír abhavo devavītama ắ sū́ryaṃ rohayo diví ||

Soma the bountiful is purifying himself, he, the best way-finder, the *ṛṣi*, the inspired, the bright one. You, you became the poet (*kavi*) who most gratifies the gods, you made the sun ascend in heaven/in the sky.[46]

[22] ṚV 9.12.4
divó nābhā vicakṣaṇó 'vyo vāŕe mahīyāte |
sómo yáḥ sukratuḥ kavíḥ ||

In the navel of heaven, in the sheep's fleece, the bright one thrives: Soma, who is a poet of good resolve.

The background here is thus a different kind of vision, not linked to the imagery of sun, brilliance and height (whence the common translation of 'wide-gazing'), but rather to that of *soma* purified through the sheep fleece to make the fluid translucent and at the same time rendering the things through which it flows translucent.[47] Brilliance is still at stake, but is rather another conception of it.[48] The purified and purifying *soma* is an image of the *kavi*[49] and of his relationship with language and reality.[50] In any case, it

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[46] See also ṚV 9.86.11a *pátir diváḥ śatádhāro vicakṣaṇáḥ*, 'Soma lord of the sky, of hundred currents, the bright one' and 19 *vṛ́ṣā matīnā́m pavate vicakṣaṇáḥ somaḥ*, 'The bull of thoughts, the bright Soma, purifies himself.'

[47] Cf. Gonda (1963: 193), who defines the ṚV epithet *vicakṣaṇá* as 'a good example to illustrate the belief in an omniscience which is based essentially on the power of sight; a knowing which comes from, or is intimately connected with, an unusual and supra-normal faculty of seeing,' and distinguishes the so-called 'magical omniscience,' which is ascribed to animals, spirits and exceptional men, from the 'visual omniscience,' which is the specific attribute of deities who are connected with the heavenly realms of light and in particular the sun. Thus, he prefers 'clear-sighted, wise' as the proper meaning of *vicakṣaṇá* instead of 'out-looking' (Gonda 1963: 194).

[48] See Renou 1961: 10: 'De fait il existe au Livre IX nombre d'images ou de qualifiants qui pourraient tout aussi bien se rapporter à Agni [...] sans parler de tel passage où le côté céleste de Soma est conçu comme igné ou solaire.'

[49] Such a capacity is sometimes due to a divine gift (ṚV 1.116.14) and allows the blind to see (ṚV 1.117.17).

[50] This interpretation of the imagery of *soma* is of course far from new. See above all Renou 1955: 25: 'L'image de la pensée "clarifié," décantée (*pu-*) est naturellement empruntée au soma qu'on filtre et qu'on transvase. Tous les

may be expressed as the capacity of seeing through, expressed by a verbal form from the same root *vi-cakṣ-* in [23], where the liquid element plays an important role in the metaphorical imagery:

[23] ṚV 10.177.1
samudré antáḥ kaváyo ví cakṣate márīcīnām padám icchanti vedhásaḥ ||

The sage poets spy it (the divine bird) within the sea; the ritual experts seek the footprint of the light beams.

Later on, the link between the transparency of water and that of words is explicitly affirmed:

[24] JUB 3.35.5
samudre antaḥ kavayo vi cakṣata iti. puruṣo vai samudra evaṃvida u kavayaḥ. ta imām puruṣe 'ntar vācaṃ vicakṣate.

Inside the extension of waters the sage poets see distinctly: thus [it is said]. The extension of waters is indeed the Man, the poets know it: they see distinctly this Word (*vāc*) within the Man.

Finally, both imageries, i.e. the solar and the somic, may intermix in very dense passages, such as the following:

[25] ṚV 9.75.1–2
abhí priyā́ṇi pavate cánohito nā́māni yahvó ádhi yéṣu várdhate |
ā́ sū́ryasya bṛható bṛhánn ádhi rátham víṣvañcam aruhad vicakṣaṇáḥ ||
ṛtásya jihvā́ pavate mádhu priyáṃ vaktā́ pátir dhiyó asyā́ ádābhyaḥ |
dádhāti putráḥ pitrór apīcyàṃ nā́ma tṛtī́yam ádhi rocané diváḥ ||

Well-disposed, he (i.e. *soma*) flows purifyingly towards [his own] dear names,[51] upon which he, the swift one, grows strong. He the lofty one, the bright one, has mounted upon the chariot of the lofty sun that faces in many directions.

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hymnes à *soma* composant le 9e *mandala* transcrivent, de manière plus ou moins apparente, les progrès et les vicissitudes de l'inspiration poétique[...]'; what seems to be additional in passages such as [24] is the immediate link with the parallel imagery of the word (and thought) as light, brightness, another element characterizing Ṛgvedic imagery (cf. Renou 1955: 6). Soma is also functional in poetic inspiration, see Renou 1961: 16: 'le *soma* clarifié clarifie l'inspiration, anime la fonction orale.'

[51] See Renou 1961: 87: '« Nom » comme partie essentielle de l'être [...] notion toute voisine de *dhāman* « structure » (qui reçoit passim l'ép. de *priyá* comme *ṛtá* et comme *náman* ailleurs encore).'

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Tongue of truth (*r̥ta*), he purifies as the dear honey. He is the speaker, the lord of this insight who is never deceived. [Albeit] the son, he establishes the third secret name of his parents upon the firmament of the sky.

Another interesting feature of this passage is the simultaneous presence of *canohita* (lit. 'disposed for fulfilment') and *vicakṣaṇa*, both referred to the God Soma.[52] It is noteworthy that *canohita* is also God Agni in R̥V verses, where his function of conveying the oblation (*havyavah*) is clearly tuned to the property of being *cano-hita* as in R̥V 3.11.2–3: […] *cánohitaḥ | agnír dhiyā́ sám r̥ṇvati || agnír dhiyā́ sá cetati ketúr yajñásya pūrvyáḥ* […], 'well-disposed, through insight, Agni obtains [goods]. Through insight, Agni becomes perceptible, the ancient flag of the sacrifice.' Agni is here invoked under a form in which his strength, by nature fierce and frightening, is converted for the fulfilment of his devotees. The pair *cano-hita* and *vicakṣaṇa*, attributes of Soma, is mirrored in this merger between Agni's being benevolent and the actions performed by his *dhī* 'insight.' It is tempting to assume that such a merger might have been a remote inspiration for depicting the *dīkṣita* in his ambivalent igneous nature.

To the basic meanings encountered so far, it is necessary to add that the verbal base may even develop a causative meaning, i.e. that of illuminating/making someone else see. The oldest testimony of this meaning is, to the best of our knowledge, the following:

[26] VS(M) 10
anyád evā́húḥ sambhavā́d anyád āhur ásambhavāt |
íti śuśruma dhī́rāṇāṃ yé nas tád vicacakṣiré ||

They say that it (i.e. the One) is far different from coming into being, different also — they say — from not coming into being. So we heard from the insightful men who revealed it to us.

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[52] According to Mayrhofer (1986–2001, vol. 2: 528), both the *tatpuruṣa* compound *canohita* 'made inclined to do something' (well-documented in early Vedic literature) and the passive past participle *canasita* 'made gracious, welcome' are derived from the nominal stem *canas* meaning 'pleasure, inclination, fulfilment.'

This passage occurs almost identical in VS(M) 13, where *vidyā* takes the place of *saṃbhava*. The agents involved in the action of revealing are the *dhīra*s, the men endowed with *dhī* 'insight,' who convey a form of wisdom rather than practicing poetic skills. In analogous contexts, this causative value is found in imperative forms from the Brāhmaṇa [27] and Epics ([28]). In the GB, the context is that of the sage Glāya Maitreya who, having lost a wisdom contest, has now become a disciple of Maudgalya:

[27] GB 1.1.32: [...] *taṃ hopetya papraccha kiṃ svid āhur bhoḥ savitur vareṇyaṃ bhargo devasya kavayaḥ kim āhur dhiyo vicakṣva yadi tāḥ pravettha.* [...] *tasmā etat provāca vedāṃś chandāṃsi savitur vareṇyam. bhargo devasya kavayo 'nnam āhuḥ karmāṇi dhiyaḥ.*

[...] Having approached him as a student (Glāya Maitreya) questioned him: 'My Lord, what do the sage poets call "Savitṛ's boon," what do they call "the glory of gods"? Reveal to me [what they call] the insights, if you know them.' (Maudgalya) answered him: 'The Vedas, the metres are Savitṛ's boon, the poets call food "the glory of gods." The insights are the sacrificial actions.'

It is important to point out that the answer to Glāya Maitreya's request is in fact a typical homology of the kind we are used to finding in the Brāhmaṇas and that it is supposed to give access to a deeper and more perspicuous knowledge of reality. This point will find ample discussion in § 4. The shift from the poetic domain to a more ascetic one is even more evident in an Epic occurrence that involves a teacher 'of steady vows' (*saṃśitavrata*), addressed by a pupil in search of the highest good:

[28] MBh 14.35.4
bhagavantaṃ prapanno 'haṃ niḥśreyasaparāyaṇaḥ |
yāce tvāṃ śirasā vipra yad brūyāṃ tad vicakṣva me ||

I resorted to You, being desirous of attaining the highest good; I deferentially implore you, O inspired one (*vipra*), to reveal to me what I ask you.

4. The effective 'words' pronounced by the dīkṣita

It seems quite evident from the present survey of occurrences that the opposition between *canasita* and *vicakṣaṇa* is quite late — since none of the Brāhmaṇas mentions it, with the partial exception of

GB — and similarly, their usage as mere, almost meaningless, honorific terms. The testimony of the Brāhmaṇas lies somewhere between two extremes. On the one hand, the Śrautasūtras show the usage of the two honorific terms seemingly acting as a shield between the consecrated one's language and his interlocutors, so that the *dīkṣita* can be not 'dangerous' like a fire, but rather 'bright' and 'benevolent' as the fire when it is active within the sacrificial area. At the other end of the spectrum, in the earlier Saṃhitās, *vicakṣaṇa* was rather the property of being bright in the sense of the double power of fire, which makes itself seen as well as making other things seen. As an attribute of *vāc*, such power would be that of a language capable of revealing things as they actually are, thus highlighting the god-like, albeit temporary, inspired attitude of the *dīkṣita*.

Consequently, we shall now try to understand whether in our Brāhmaṇa — in particular in JB 2.64 — the real focus of the term *vicakṣaṇavatī* is to emphasise this power rather than the alleged danger of the language used by the consecrated man. Moreover, we shall ponder what kind of power it does consist of. Although the JB is not the earliest Brāhmaṇa text — the Brāhmaṇas of the Ṛgveda School are plausibly the most ancient ones — it is however one of the most conservative in terms of its contents.[53] We shall try to reconstruct this meaning, also using two other important passages (JB 1.18, 50), which Bodewitz (1969) has already high-lighted as peculiar after-death scenes. In both, the focus is on the arrival of the deceased man at the door through which access to the sun becomes possible. In that place, the deceased (indeed his life breath)[54] has to announce himself to the doorkeepers, who are the Seasons.[55] He has to give them 'the correct password' and

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[53] Merely on the basis of the 'ritualistic facts,' Caland (1931: XIX) even (hesi-tatingly) considered the JB older than the other Sāmaveda Brāhmaṇa, i.e. the *Pañcaviṃśa Brāhmaṇa*. On the contrary, the linguistic data — which Caland had also taken into account — persuaded Keith (1932a; 1932b: 699–700) to conclude for the anteriority of the latter. On this last evaluation, see also Renou 1947: 101–102; Parpola 1973: 7; 9–10; Gonda 1975: 348–349.

[54] The concept that the life breath (i.e. *asu* or *prāṇa*) precedes the body dates back to ṚV 10.12.1. See Bodewitz 1973: 58 n. 14.

[55] I.e. the segments of Time, which together constitute the year, here iden-tified with the sun. And sometimes, as underlined by Bodewitz (1973: 122 n. 26), the year is identified with King Soma itself (see e.g. TB 1.6.8).

to use a formula self-evidently aimed at demonstrating that 'he knows that he is not an individual, but identical with the highest god,'[56] in other words, that he shares divine knowledge of reality. This is why he is conscious that he is merely coming from the 'bright one' (*vicakṣaṇāt*) and destined to be temporarily and cyclically part of the world, but capable of becoming light forever in the sun. He comes from the *vicakṣaṇa* and he aims at returning to the *vicakṣaṇa* once more.

> [29] JB 1.18: […]
> *vicakṣaṇād r̥tavo reta ābhr̥tam ardhamāsyaṃ prasutāt pitryāvataḥ |*
> *taṃ mā puṃsi kartary erayadhvaṃ puṃsaḥ kartur mātary āsiṣikta ||*
> *sa upajāyopajāyamāno dvādaśena trayodaśopamāsaḥ |*
> *saṃ tad vide prati tad vide 'haṃ taṃ mā r̥tavo 'mr̥ta ānayadhvam ||*

> […] O Seasons, my seed is produced from the bright one, which is pressed out every half month and which is connected with the ancestors (i.e. *soma* identified with the moon and with seed). You brought this same me in a male agent. From the male agent you sprinkled [me] over a mother.
> To generate something additional, I am being generated as the additional, thirteenth month by the twelvefold [year]. This I know, of this I am sure. So, lead me, O Seasons, to the deathless status!

In JB 1.50, virtually identical to the previous passage, *vicakṣaṇa* occurs twice, since after the word *pitryāvataḥ* the following sentence is inserted to explain what is meant by the 'seed' offered by the Seasons:

> [30] JB 1.50: […= 1.18] *yad ado vicakṣaṇaṃ somaṃ rājānaṃ juhvati tat tat*

> That which they (i.e. the Seasons) offer there (i.e. in heaven) is the bright King Soma.[57]

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[56] Bodewitz 1973: 52, 60 n. 28. At the second step of the after-death path, when the sun himself asks him: *kas tvam asi*, 'Who are you?', the wrong formula — which would eventually condemn the deceased man to be excluded from heaven — is that of the one 'who announces himself by his (personal) name or by his family (name)' ([…] *yo ha nāmnā vā gotreṇa vā prabrūte taṃ*). See JB 1.18 after [29].

[57] See e.g. KauṣUp. 1.5: *sa āgacchati vibhu pramitam. taṃ brahmayaśaḥ praviśati. sa āgacchati vicakṣaṇām āsandīm. […] sa āgacchati amitaujasaṃ paryaṅkam. […] ta-*

The context of these latter occurrences of the nominal stem *vicakṣaṇa* is definitely philosophical, soteriologic and esoteric. A more extended and complex version of this JB after-death scene involving the term *vicakṣaṇa* occurs in KauṣUp. 1.2–6, where the lexicon and the imagery are very close. Moreover, both in the *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* and in the *Śāṅkhāyana Āraṇyaka*, special attention is paid to the feminine nominal stem *vicakṣaṇā* as the name of Brahmā's throne (*vicakṣaṇāsandī*), i.e. the goal of the dead man at the end of the bright *devāyana*-path. In these occurrences of the stem *vicakṣaṇa*, no space is reserved for mere ritual behaviour, and language is strictly involved in a speculative self-presentation that must reflect the deceased's own innermost conviction.

As a matter of fact, even in the ritualized context of the ŚS occurrences (see especially [2], [3], [7]), every specific behavioural rule taught for the *dīkṣita* seems aimed at creating the prescribed secluded context fit for the consecration of the sacrificer and his wife, to place them in an in-between status, which may be interpreted both in terms of death and in terms of coming to life. Death matches the *dīkṣita*'s prescribed silence: his voice is only released when he takes the place of the sun itself. Furthermore, the *dīkṣita*'s 'embryonal' life and language are an image of the Creator's power who through the words makes everything known and thus perceptible, i.e. eventually existing.[58] The crucial early Vedic concept presupposed here is the equivalence between

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smin brahmāste. tam itthaṃvit pādenaivāgra ārohati, 'He arrives at the great hall Vibhu (lit. 'far-extending/all-pervading'). The renown of Brahman penetrates him. He arrives at the throne Vicakṣaṇā. […] He arrives at the couch Amitaujas. (lit. 'almighty, of unlimited energy'). […] On that (couch/throne) sits Brahmā. Knowing thus he ascends it in front with one leg.' (cf. KauṣUp. 1.3). Cf. also ŚĀ 3.5: *taṃ brahmatejaḥ praviśati sa āgacchati vicakṣaṇām āsandīm*, 'The fiery energy of Brahman penetrates him. He arrives at the throne Vicakṣaṇā.' In KauṣUp. 1.5–6, when God Brahmā asks the deceased man who he is, he has also to answer by identifying himself with the God and with the truth: *taṃ brahmāha ko 'sīti. taṃ pratibrūyāt. ṛtur asmi. ārtavo 'smi.* […] *yas tvam asi so 'ham asmīti. tam āha ko 'ham asmīti. satyam iti brūyāt. kiṃ tad yat satyam iti*, 'Brahmā asks him: "Who (*kas*) are you?" He should answer him: "I am a season, I am a descendant of the seasons. […] I am who you are." He (Brahmā) says: "Who (*ka*) am I?" He should say: "That which is the permanent reality".'

[58] 'The hut of the *dīkṣita* constitutes his womb, for the *dīkṣita* is an embryo. It, however, also facilitates his passage from the realm of man to that of the gods.' Cf. Kaelber 1978: 66 on the basis of ŚB(M) 3.2.1.6.

knowledge and creation both envisioned as involving the segmentation of reality. The *dīkṣita*'s prospect of using (albeit only provisionally) God's language and knowledge is perhaps to be understood against the background of the marvellous omniscience and omnipotence attributed to the inspired so-called 'wordsmiths,'[59] e.g. in ṚV 4.26, 10.71 and 10.129. In fact, the *dīkṣita*'s words are *satya* because of his specific vow, as explained both in AB 1.6 [10] (*dīkṣitena satyam eva vaditavyam*) and in KB 7.3 [11] (*sa yaḥ satyaṃ vadati sa dīkṣate*). AB underlines the tight and exclusive interrelationship of the divine nature with truth (AB 1.6: *satyasaṃhitā vai devā, anṛtasaṃhitā manuṣyā iti*). Even more explicit is the following later Brāhmaṇa passage:

> [31] ŚB(M) 1.1.1.4–5: [...] *satyám evá devā ánṛtam manuṣyā̀ idám aham ánṛtāt satyam úpaimī́ti tán manuṣyèbhyo devān úpaiti. sa vaí satyám evá vadet*
>
> [...] And the Gods actually are the truth, and man is the untruth. Therefore, in saying 'I am now entering from untruth into truth,' he passes from mankind to the gods. Indeed, he should only speak what is the truth [...].[60]

Thus, *satya* is commonly out of the reach of human beings, except within the final gnostic salvation and at the time of the *dīkṣā*. Indeed, as in the case of the creative process consisting of the mere segmentation of reality, which only some *kavi*s can achieve, the *dīkṣita*'s words are also necessarily followed by real consequences, generated by these words. For [11] the *dīkṣita*, language and truth itself are identified with the holy *vyāhṛti* (*eṣā ha tv eva vyāhṛtir dīkṣitavādaḥ satyam eva*), which elsewhere is a mystical utterance that creates the worlds. Consequently, the original image of 'visual omniscience' conveyed by *vicakṣaṇa*, which according to Gonda (1963: 193–194) was 'the specific attribute of deities,' is consistently associated with the *dīkṣita*. Therefore, it seems congruous that in our JB passage the *dīkṣita* is explicitly identified with the Sun, i.e.

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[59] I.e. *brahmán, kaví, ṛṣi, vípra*: see Jamison and Brereton 2014: 25–26.

[60] Cf. Kaelber (1978: 66): 'In the womb [...] the *dīkṣita* passes from death to immortality, from untruth to truth, from the impure (i.e. *a-medya*) to the pure (i.e. *medya*).' See also Thompson 1996: 152.

the main author of distinction of the parts, such as light and darkness.

The Sun's generative power — which includes providing people with food — seems to be highlighted by the two equivalences between *vicakṣaṇa* and *anna*, and between *vicakṣaṇa* and *mithuna*.

> [32] JB 2.54: [...] *tad u vā āhur vāg vāva dīkṣito vāg dīkṣā vāg idaṃ sarvaṃ kṣiyati | vāci vāvedaṃ sarvaṃ kṣitam iti vāva tau tat saṃprocāte.*[61]

> [...] Thus, they say: 'Language is indeed the consecrated one, language is the consecration, language consumes all this. These two people explain exactly thus: "All this is indeed consumed in the language".'[62]

The conclusion of the whole JB section devoted to the *dīkṣā* indeed seems to suggest that the so-called Vedic equivalences, the *upāsana*s, which are considered the main target of the Upaniṣads, might have been a crucial feature of the *dīkṣita*'s knowledge. In fact, the esoteric teaching given by Keśin Dārbhya consists of the action denoted by the verb *upa-ni-ṣad-*:

> [33] JB 2.68: [...] *eṣā vai kaiśinī dīkṣā. etāṃ ha keśī dārbhyo dīkṣām upaniṣasāda.*

> This is indeed the Kaiśinī consecration. Keśin Dārbhya indeed explained the equivalences of this consecration.

The root noun matching this verb is the famous *upa-ni-ṣad*: in the epistemic context evoked by this verb the object of worship is in a certain sense replaced by another through a procedure which, according to Acharya's words (2017: 544), constitutes a specific 'genre of Vedic teaching.'[63]

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[61] 'Keśin Dārbhya and the golden bird' are the two agents of the dual verbal form *saṃprocāte.*

[62] Cf. Deeg's tr. (1995: 235): 'in der Rede eben is dies alles vernichtet.'

[63] Even the famous Upaniṣadic *neti neti* is an *ādeśa*, namely an apophatic teaching/replacement of the Brahman. See ŚB(M) 14.5.3.11 (= BĀU 2.3.6): *athā́ta ādeśó neti neti. na hy etásmād íti néty anyat páram asty átha nāmadhéyam. satyásya satyam íti. prāṇā́ vaí satyaṃ, téṣām eṣá satyám,* 'Now the specific instruction [about the Brahman]: "not so, not so." There is nothing beyond this "not": and

[34] ŚB(M) 10.4.5.1: *áthādeśá upaniṣádām. vāyúr agnir íti ha śākāyanína úpāsata ādityo 'gnir íty u haíka āhuḥ.*

Now the specific instruction (*ādeśa*) of equivalences. Indeed, the Śākāyanins maintain that Agni is Vāyu, but some say that Agni is worshipped as Āditya.

Indeed such knowledge, whose object is *r̥ta* itself, which 'defines what a being is or object is and what it does, and it structures the relationships of beings and objects with other beings and objects' (Jamison and Brereton 2014: 22), seems to endow the *dīkṣita* with the ability to recreate it, i.e. to make *satya* real. In order to account for such high knowledge and consequent power over perceptible reality, the language of poets has also to be tuned to such a network of recognized relationships.[64] In our JB section, in the '*upaniṣad*s' taught by Keśin Dārbhya, there are also several equivalences, the most important being the following two, which immediately precede the questioned sentence *vicakṣaṇavatīṃ vācaṃ vadati*. In the first [35], the systematic flux of equivalences starts from identifications of the *dīkṣita* (and parts of his body) with the sun to end with the *puruṣa*-in-the-eye (lit. the orbit):

[35] JB 2.62 *eṣa vāva dīkṣito ya eṣa tapati. sa eṣa indriyaṃ jyaiṣṭhyaṃ śraiṣṭhyam abhi dīkṣitaḥ. tasya ye 'rvāñco raśmayas tāni śmaśrūṇi ya ūrdhvās te keśāḥ. ahorātre eva kr̥ṣṇājinasya rūpam. ahar eva śuklasya rūpaṃ rātriḥ kr̥ṣṇasya. atha yad etan maṇḍalaṃ tā āpas tad annaṃ tad amr̥tam. tasminn etasmin maṇḍale tejomayaś chandomayaḥ puruṣaḥ. sa prāṇas sa indras sa prajāpatis sa dīkṣitaḥ. tad etad dīkṣayaiva saṃgr̥hītam*

The consecrated man is indeed he who gives heat. He is consecrated to power, pre-eminence, excellence. The rays which are turned downwards are the hairs of his beard and his locks are

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this is the name: "something existing in the place of something existing" since that which exists consists of the vital functions, and this [Brahman] exists in the place of them.' Cf. TUp 1.11.4: *eṣa ādeśaḥ. eṣa upadeśaḥ. eṣā vedopaniṣat. etad anuśāsanam. evam upāsitavyam. evam u caitad upāsyam*, 'This is the specific instruction, this is a teaching. This is a Vedic equivalence. This is the instruction. This has to be worshipped in this way.'
[64] See Radicchi (1961–1962: 109) who notices that sometimes 'truth' is not a good translation for *r̥tá*.

those which tend upwards. Day and night are indeed the visible appearance of his black antelope skin. The day is indeed the visible appearance of the white [part], the night that of the black one. Moreover, the orbit [of the Sun] is the waters and food is immortality. In this, which is the orbit, is the *puruṣa* made of shining energy and of metres. This breath is Indra, he is Prajāpati, he is the consecrated man. This is what is gathered by means of the consecration.

In the second [36], the motion goes the other way round starting from the identification with the *puruṣa*-in-the-eye and parts of the eye itself. The two homologies together thus indirectly construct a macro-equivalence between the *puruṣa*-in-the-sun and the *puruṣa*-in-the-eye, between the human and the celestial orbit, and they shed light on the well-known monistic belief in the *puruṣa* that inhabits every human being, i.e. on the Upaniṣadic identity between the macrocosmic all-pervasive unique Brahman and the homologous microcosmic Ātman.

[36] JB 2.63: *udag u yajñīyaṃ karma saṃtiṣṭhate. iti nv adhidevatam. athādhyātmam. ayam eva dīkṣito yo 'yaṃ cakṣuṣi puruṣaḥ. tasya yāny arvāñci pakṣmāṇi*[65] *tāni śmaśrūṇi yāny ūrdhvāni te keśāḥ. yad eva śuklaṃ ca kṛṣṇaṃ ca tat kṛṣṇājinasya rūpam. śuklam eva śuklasya rūpaṃ kṛṣṇaṃ kṛṣṇasya. atha yad etan maṇḍalam tā āpas tad annaṃ tad amṛtam. tasminn etasmin maṇḍale tejomayaś chandomayaḥ puruṣaḥ. sa prāṇas sa indras sa prajāpatis sa dīkṣitaḥ. sa haivaṃvid dīkṣamāṇo yathaivaiṣa etad indriyaṃ jyaiṣṭhyaṃ śraiṣṭhyam abhi dīkṣita evam evendriyaṃ jyaiṣṭhyaṃ śraiṣṭhyam abhi dīkṣito bhavati.*[66]

Turned upwards (to the North), the sacrificial action is successful. It is thus as far as the gods are concerned. As far as the self is concerned, this *puruṣa*-in-the-eye is indeed the consecrated man. The eyelashes turned downwards are the hairs of his beard, and those

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[65] Ehlers 1988: 12 emended *pakṣāṇi* (Vira and Chandra 1954) by replacing it with *pakṣmāṇi*.

[66] The context is more oriented here to a warriors' cultural background. The emphasized goals are definitely secular. The lexicon occurring in this case is crucial in several Vedic versions of the *vrātyastoma* (see Candotti and Pontillo 2015: 169–75). Moreover, Vedic *śreṣṭha*/Pāli *seṭṭha* is recorded as a synonym for the masculine noun *brahmán* in the compound *brahmabhūta* which is assumed to convey a shared ancient warrior-ascetic purpose of immortality (see Neri and Pontillo 2016: 136–139).

turned upwards are his locks. What is white and what is black [in the eye] is the visible appearance of his antelope skin. The white appearance is indeed the white of the eye, and the black the black of the eye. Waters are the orbit and food is immortality. In this, which is the orbit, is the *puruṣa* made of shining energy and of metres. This breath is Indra, he is Prajāpati, he is the consecrated man. He who performs the *dīkṣā* and knows this indeed, in exactly the same way as he who is actually consecrated to [achieve] power, pre-eminence, excellence, is consecrated to [achieve] power, pre-eminence, excellence.

[35] and [36] are indeed two extended homologies, similar to several other Vedic homologies, between ritual features and cosmic entities or natural phenomena, etc. They can be interpreted as a sort of *samastavastuviṣayarūpaka*s ante-litteram,[67] in accordance with Witzel's 1979 thesis, and with fundamental inquiries such as Mylius (1968, 1976, 1977) and Schlerath (1986), which demonstrate the methodical character of Vedic identifications and their systematizing aim. At first the two matching wholes are enunciated, i.e. the *upameya* (the subject of comparison, also defined as 'first term of comparison') and the *upamāna* (the object of comparison, also defined as 'second term of comparison'), here the *dīkṣita* and the sun or (the *puruṣa*-in)-the-eye, respectively, then the listing of the equivalent parts pertaining respectively to the two wholes takes place in a rigorously parallel fashion, targeted on illustrating their *tertium comparationis*. In fact, as already explained by Witzel 1996 (p. 175 n. 23; cf. Witzel 1979), these identifications, which are similes or rather metaphors, 'cover, in the ritual framework only, anything from partial to complete identity of the two entities.' The role of the essence of *upameya* is played by the shape of *upamāna* in the *rūpaka*s, provided that the identity of features to which attention is paid is an object of direct perception, i.e. a *pratyakṣapramāṇa* fruit.

In our JB passage, these two broad *rūpaka*s contribute to establish the specific features of the *dīkṣita*, and above all of his language, beyond any reasonable doubt. At least temporarily, the *dīkṣita* is a god-like being, who distinctly knows beings, objects, and their relationships, and he can affect them. As a consequence, his lan-

[67] Cf. Pontillo 2009.

guage actually clings to reality, and is also capable of enlightening other beings, thus it can consistently be called *vicakṣaṇavatī*.

In following the lexical thread of the terms *vicakṣaṇa/ vicakṣaṇavat*, we hope we have at least partially recovered a more ancient — and closer-to-the-original — semantic layer of JB 2.64, thus providing a small-scale specimen of the specific plot and warp of the JB. This southern, and plausibly redactionally-late, Sāmavedic Brāhmaṇa, in our opinion, may have preserved much more than its mere school affiliation and late age would at first sight suggest, a feature which it shares with other late sources from peripheral cultural areas, such as the Eastern White Yajurveda sources (see [26] and [31]). Indeed, we are persuaded that the nature of this text may be obscured by a reading that relies purely on the later Śrautasūtra paradigms or on a purely Śākhā-confined interpretation: both approaches would oversimplify it.

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Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad
KauṣUp   V.P. Limaye and R.K. Vadekar (eds.), *Eighteen Principal Upaniṣad,* vol. 1. Poona 1958: Vaidika Saṃṣodhana Maṇḍala.

Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa
KB   E.R.S. Sarma (ed.), *Kauṣītaki-Brāhmaṇa*, Wiesbaden 1968: F. Steiner Verlag.

Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra
KŚS   G. U. Thite (ed.), *Kātyāyana-Śrautasūtra. Text with English translation and notes,* Delhi 2006: New Bharatiya Book Co.

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MBh   Vishnu S. Sukthankar, Shripad K. Belvalkar, and Parashuram L. Vaidya (eds.), *The Mahābhārata. For the first time critically edited,* 19 vols. Poona 1933–1971: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

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MMK   See Kalupahana.

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MŚS   *The Mānava Śrautasūtra belonging to the Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā.* (Sri Garib Dass Oriental Series n° 31). Delhi 1985: Sri Satguru Publ. [1961[1]].

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ṚV   N. S. Sontakke and C.G. Kashikar (eds.), *Ṛgveda-Samhitā with a Commentary of Sāyaṇācārya.* 4 vols. Poona 1983[2]: Vaidika Saṃṣodhana Maṇḍala [1933–1951].

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ṚvKh   Isidor Scheftelowitz (crit. ed.) 'Die Apokryphen des Ṛgveda: Khilāni,' *Indische Forschungen* 1 (1906): 1–191.

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ŚB(M)   Albrecht Weber (ed.), *The Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa in the Mādhyandina-
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ŚĀ   Vināyaka G. Āpaṭe (ed.), *Śāṅkhāyanāraṇyakam.* Poona 1922: Ānanda-
           grāma.

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Vaitāna Śrautasūtra
VaitŚS   Visva Bandhu (ed.), *Vaitāna-Śrauta-sūtra with the Commentary called
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           rative data from original manuscripts and other available materials,
           in collaboration with Bhim Dev and Pitambar Datt, Hoshiarpur
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VS(M)   Albrecht Weber (ed.). *Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā in the Mādhyandina and the
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The Emotional and Aesthetic Experience of the Actor. Diderot's Paradoxe sur le comédien in Sanskrit Dramaturgy*

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'Moins on sent, plus on fait sentir'
Diderot, *Le paradoxe sur le comédien*

'Everyone at every minute of his life must feel something.
Only the dead have no sensations.'
Konstantin Stanislavski, *An Actor Prepares*

The figure, role and personal experience of the actor have been the object of practical and theoretical scrutiny across latitudes and cultures since the very beginning of the various dramaturgical traditions across the globe. Famously enough, with regard to the actor's emotional involvement within the enactment of the play, the positions at the two extremes are represented by Diderot's paradigmatic refusal of any affective relation of the actor to the

character he is portraying and by Stanislavski's relentless focus on his complete emotional engrossment within the fictional scenery being performed. Accordingly, Diderot argued that a psychological distance is needed between the performer's mental states and the emotions that the characters are portrayed to experience in the fancied world of drama.[1] On the other hand, Stanislavksi maintained that the actor's mental focus should be directed on an empathetic immersion in the affective states of the portrayed characters.[2]

A similar debate, including extreme positions as well as some bold intermediate stances can be found in Sanskrit dramaturgical sources since the beginnings of their production, although it has received comparatively little attention among modern scholars. This neglect may be due to a conception of the Indian artist that became prevalent at the beginning of the 20th c. with the celebrated studies of Coomaraswamy.[3] On the basis of some late technical treatises on architecture and sculpture, Coomaraswamy argued that the Indian artist should be compared to a detached yogin who contemplates in meditation an idea before transforming it into a devotional image or religious work of art. Such an impersonal process of art production could not possibly involve any interference from the artist's personal emotions, not even from an actor.[4] With these considerations, Coomaraswamy was responding to a critique

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[1] Diderot identifies two sorts of actors, the one that plays from the heart and the one who plays from the intellect. As is well known, Diderot privileged the latter, the actor who does not feel the emotions of the characters while playing a part: 'In my view he must have a deal of judgment. He must have in himself an unmoved and disinterested on-looker. He must have, consequently, penetration and no sensibility; the art of mimicking everything, or, which comes to the same thing, the same aptitude for every sort of character and part' (Diderot 1883: 7).

[2] See, for instance, the following statements in *An Actor Prepares*: 'An actor is under the obligation to live his part inwardly, and then give to his experience an external embodiment' (Stanislavski 1936: 15).

[3] For a recent take on the debate about Indian art in the early 20th c. and the role of Coomaraswamy in it, see Ganser 2018.

[4] See, e.g., Coomaraswamy: '[T]hose principles which have with great consistency governed all other Oriental arts until recently, have also governed dramatic technique. The movements of the Indian actor are not accidentally swayed by his personal emotion; he is too perfectly trained for that. His body, if you will, is an automaton; while he is acting, there is nothing natural... that is to say accidental or inartistic... in his movements or changes of expression. The movement of a single finger, the elevation of an eyebrow, the direction of a glance... all these

of modern theatre advanced by one of his favourite interlocutors, the English theatre director and critic Edward Gordon Craig. In a very influential essay on the history of Western theatre, Craig conceived the idea of the 'super marionette' (*Über-Marionette*), or the actor-puppet completely in control of his mind and body, striving for a mechanical perfection from which all accident, namely the haphazard irruption of emotions or the whimsical display of personality, had to be banned.[5] That the very figure of Diderot was still lingering on the horizon of the critique of modern theatre at the turn of the century is beyond doubt: Craig had read and annotated several times his own copy of *The Paradox of Acting*,[6] the English translation of Diderot's *Paradoxe* that came out in 1883 with an enthusiastic preface written by one of Craig's protégés, the renowned actor Henry Irving.[7] On the other hand, the debate about the actor in the West had prompted Craig to start looking at India for novel models of actoriality with a stronger focus on technique. Craig's conversation with Coomaraswamy in this regard is well documented, but it is perhaps less known that Craig's idea of the Über-Marionette had been also inspired by *The Home of the Puppet Play*, an essay written by the Indologist Richard Pischel, popular in Western theatre circles at the beginning of the 20th c.[8] It was the Indian ideal of the actor as presented in the texts of Pischel and then Coomaraswamy—the detached technician inheritor of a longstanding tradition—that was heralded as a solu-

are determined in the books of technical instruction, or by a constant tradition handed on in pupillary succession' (Coomaraswamy 1913: 123).

[5] The essay in question is 'The Actor and the Über-Marionette,' which was published in *The Mask* in 1908.

[6] Craig even wrote the initials 'Ü-m-' on his copy of the *Paradoxe*, connecting thus his idea of the Über-Marionette with Diderot's words: 'My friend, there are three types—Nature's man, the poet's man, the actor's man. Nature's is less great than the poet's, the poet's less great than the great actor's, which is the most exalted of all. This last climbs on the shoulders of the one before him and shuts himself up inside a great basket-work figure of which he is the soul.' On Diderot's influence on Craig, see Le Boeuf 2010: 105, and n. 29.

[7] In Craig's words, 'the very nearest approach that has ever been to the ideal actor, with his brain commanding his nature, has been Henry Irving' (Craig 1911: 12).

[8] The essay was published in German in 1900 and translated into English in 1902.

tion to the impasse of the debate on the actor's emotions, so persistent in Europe from Diderot to Stanislavski and beyond.[9]

Beyond this briefly outlined historical entanglement, how would Indian authors of dramaturgical texts have responded to the debate about the actor's emotional experience? It must be clarified from the outset that within Indian sources the issue of the emotional contribution of the actor to the performance and its aesthetic result is never conceptualized as a question about the actor's personality and transitory moods interfering with the work of the playwright and the theatre director during the staging of a play. On the contrary, the various opinions on the role of the performer are defended and refuted according to both more narrowly aesthetic and more broadly philosophical arguments concerning the human mind in its emotional make-up and psycho-somatic connections.

In what follows, we will try to pin down some of the main arguments advanced in this regard, starting with the seminal treatise of Bharata, the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, and its close connection to acting practices as testified by its avowed role of technical manual on performance. However, the key figure in our investigation will be Abhinavagupta (10th–11th c.) and his masterful, grand theory of aesthetics. No better way can be conceived to understand his theoretical position than to situate it intertextually against the theories of his predecessors (i.e. Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa), with whom he rarely agrees, and the ideas of some of his loyal followers (i.e. Hemacandra) and staunch adversaries (i.e. Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra).[10] Beyond

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[9] For a history of the debate in the West from classical sources to the beginning of the 19th c., see Vicentini 2012; on the still contemporary importance of the issue of the actor's sensibility, among many others, see the synthesis in Haumesser *et al.* 2008, and on the influence of Diderot and Stanislavski's models of acting on contemporary theatre directors, see Meyer-Dinkgräfe 2005.

[10] We discuss the views of post-Abhinavagupta authors on the actor's experience in Cuneo and Ganser forthcoming. In the history of the conceptions of the actor's experience, a pivotal moment that however lies beyond the scope of the present article is represented by the speculations developed in the second-millennium Bengali Vaiṣṇavism or Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism. In the theories of figures such as Rūpagosvāmin, Jīvagosvāmin and their followers, aesthetics and theology merge in the intentionally paradoxical figure of the actor-devotee-spectator. The boundaries between theatre and life, religious worship and aesthetic delectation, story-world of the characters and real-life of the spectators are completely detonated and then fused together in the human reproduction of Kṛṣṇa's divine play.

our focus on Abhinavagupta's ideas, this historical and philosophical inquiry also aims at tracing the plurality of opinions and their soundness with regard to the various theoretical declensions of the wider aesthetic and metaphysical theories propounded by the various authors.[11] Finally, we will investigate how the very figure of the actor, with his special skills at embodiment and mental control, gets intertwined with theatrical and religious speculations in the works of the masters of non-dualistic Śaivism.

1. *The ABC of rasa aesthetics*

> *na hi rasād r̥te kaścid arthaḥ pravartate*
> Bharata, *Nāṭyaśāstra* 6, prose after 31

Before delving into the various theories concerning the emotional involvement of the actor, it is necessary to survey some features of Sanskrit aesthetic theories,[12] especially with regard to the various understandings of the central concept of *rasa* 'aesthetic emotion' and the issue of its locus (*āśraya*), i.e., the object(s) or the person(s) where it is supposed to be located when it occurs as a consequence of a successful aesthetic process. The only possible starting point is the text of Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra*, the seminal work on Sanskrit dramaturgy, in which the concept of *rasa* features for

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For a now classic introduction to this dramatic change in theatrical theory and practice, see Haberman 1988, which also prompted the present authors to investigate the inner *Erlebnis* of the actor according to Sanskrit authors who do not belong to this intrinsically religious theatrical tradition. For a translation of the *Bhaktirasāmr̥tasindhu*, a seminal work by Rūpagosvāmin, see Haberman 2003, to be read with the cautionary remarks expressed in Graheli 2009. On Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism, cf. also Pollock 2016: 285–310 and Wohlschlag 2018.

[11] Contemporary theory and practice of Indian theatre and dance represents both a potentially invaluable foil and litmus test for the speculations of Sanskrit dramaturgical sources. However, the anthropological and psychological analysis of the lived experience of actors and dancers lie beyond the scope of the present contribution. As an introduction, see Johan 2014, an exhaustive ethnoscenology of Kūṭiyāṭṭam that includes insightful remarks about the emotional experience of the Cākyars and its tight link with their bodily training and socially-embedded experience. An interdisciplinary take on the actor's consciousness in Kūṭiyāṭṭam is Madhavan 2010.

[12] The whole intellectual history of *rasa* is now made available to an English audience through the impressive work of translation and systematisation offered by Pollock 2016, whose bold interpretations often succeed in both finding novel answers and opening up more questions.

the first time as an aesthetic notion.[13] It is endlessly repeated in secondary literature that, according to Bharata's text, *rasa* is the purpose and the organizing principle of any theatrical performance. As briefly stated in the renowned *rasasūtra*[14] and profusely evidenced throughout the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, *rasa* results from the successful combination of all the different elements in the play, and in particular the adequate representation of the emotional situation on the part of the actors.

It is useful to repeat some details of the theory starting with the quotation and translation of the celebrated *rasasūtra*: *vibhāvā-nubhāvavyabhicārisaṃyogād rasaniṣpattiḥ*, namely, '*Rasa* is produced by the union of determinants (*vibhāva*s), consequents (*anubhā-va*s) and transitory states (*vyabhicāribhāva*s).'[15] What Bharata calls *vibhāva*s ('determinants') are the factors that provoke the arousal of an emotion, the elements that determine it in a causal sense. Therefore, they include both the subject and the object of the emotion, as well as the whole constellation of secondary 'environmental' factors or external circumstances, one might say, that stimulate one's emotional sensibility. For instance, in the representation of a scary situation supposed to generate fear, the frightened person, say, the heroine, and the source of fear, say, a snake, are the subject and the object of the emotion, while the stimulating factors are the chilling noises heard in the night, the very fact

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[13] As is the case with most ancient texts from South Asia, the date of the NŚ is uncertain. Scholarly opinions in this regard go hand in hand with arguments about the composite nature of the text. For a detailed summary of the early debate, see Kuiper 1979: 119–120, n. 44. There is a certain agreement among scholars, he concludes, on the 1st or 2nd c. CE as the time of redaction for the older parts, with the exception of Bharata's first translator Manomohan Ghosh, who assigned the text to 500 BCE. Later dates were also proposed: Sylvain Lévi (1902) considered the NŚ a text of the 3rd c. CE of the Scythian/Kṣatrapa period, while Sircar (1974: 22–23) dated it to the Gupta age, not much earlier than the 5th c. CE, when the text was clearly acknowledged by Kālidāsa. According to Pollock (2016: 47), the text was re-edited, and partly rewritten in Kashmir around the 8th or 9th c. CE, at the time when it was first commented upon by Udbhaṭa (ca. 800). As for the evidence of early dramaturgical theory and practice before the NŚ, see the mention of a *Naṭasūtra*s in Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 4.3.110.

[14] NŚ 6, prose after 31, vol. 1, p. 271.

[15] We prefer to hold to these time-honored translations of the 'aesthetic factors' (*vibhāvādi*) rather than following the new terminology proposed in Pollock 2016.

of wandering alone in the wilderness, and so forth. The *anubhāva*s ('consequents') are the consequences, the reactions and the effects or, one might say, the 'symptoms' of an emotion, namely, in the case of fear, both voluntary acts, such as crying for help or running away, and involuntary responses, such as horripilation, change of colour in the visage, etc.[16] The *vyabhicāribhāva*s ('transitory states') are a group of thirty-three transitory and complementary emotional states accompanying and nuancing the stable state or stable emotion,[17] fear (*bhaya*) in our example, such as preoccupation, bewilderment, gloominess, terror, death, etc.[18] According to Bharata's *rasasūtra*, it is the combination of all these elements on the stage that determines the 'production' of *rasa*.

A crucial issue in the history of the concept of *rasa* 'aesthetic emotion' is its relation to the twin concept of *bhāva* 'emotion.'[19] As

[16] By 'involuntary responses' are meant the *sāttvikabhāva*s, which are eight in number and are listed in NŚ 6.22 as paralysis (*stambha*), perspiration (*sveda*), horripilation (*romāñca*), stammering (*svarabheda*), tremor (*vepathu*), change of colour (*vaivarṇya*), tears (*aśru*) and fainting (*pralaya*). For a more extensive discussion of this concept, see Section 5 below.

[17] NŚ 6.17 enumerates eight stable emotions (*sthāyibhāva*): delight (*rati*), amusement (*hāsa*), sorrow (*śoka*), anger (*krodha*), valour (*utsāha*), fear (*bhaya*), disgust (*jugupsā*), wonder (*vismaya*). The term *bhāva* derives from the root *bhū-*, 'to be,' and it is potentially polysemic as it can refer to emotions but also to states of being, dispositions or conditions of any kind. On the wide semantic field covered by the word *bhāva*, see Ali (2004: 185–188) epitomized in this sentence: '[t]he general consensus of both philosophical and aesthetic theory was that *bhāva*s arose within the "mind" or *manas*, an internal "organ" (*karaṇa*) whose function was discriminatory, constructive or analytic (*saṃkalpa*) in relation to sense faculties (*indriya*s). (Ali 2004: 186).' On the possibility to confront modern and contemporary psychological and philosophical theories with Bharata's classification of 'stable' (or 'primary') and 'transitory' (or 'secondary') emotions, see Cuneo 2007 and Pollock 2012a.

[18] The transitory states are listed in NŚ 6.18–21. On a closer inspection, the list is extremely heterogeneous, including what we would call 'emotions,' such as envy (*asūyā*) and shame (*vrīḍā*), as well as 'mental states,' such as remembrance (*smṛti*) and preoccupation (*cintā*), and 'physical or physiological conditions,' such as sickness (*vyādhi*) and even death (*maraṇa*). For a discussion about the inadequacy of translating the word *bhāva* in Bharata simply as 'emotion,' see Malinar 2010: 9–12.

[19] On the untenability of a waterproof divide between emotional and cognitive phenomena both in the Indian context and in general terms, see again Cuneo 2007. For emotions in Indian culture and in a transcultural perspective, see Lynch 1990, Marks and Ames 1995, Torella and Boccali 2007, MacDaniel 2008, Bilimoria and Wenta 2015 (especially the contribution by Torella).

argued in Cuneo 2013, although the precise position of Bharata on the issue is hard to pinpoint clearly, it is a sound simplification to divide the field of the numerous commentators and epigones in supporters of an 'intensification theory,' represented by Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa (see below) and many later authors, and supporters of a 'sublimation theory,' spearheaded by Abhinavagupta (although quite possibly already introduced by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, as argued in Pollock 2010). For the former, *rasa*s are nothing but enhanced *bhāva*s, heightened emotions that can be appreciated fully thanks to the presence of the complete array of determinants, consequents, and transitory states that are meant to accompany the dominant state (*sthāyibhāva*). For the latter, *rasa*s are sublimated or distilled *bhāva*s, somehow less than ordinary emotions. Insofar as they are elicited by a fictional representation, they are apprehended as uniquely generalized specimens of emotions unconstrained by space and time, and therefore savoured in themselves as aesthetic objects, beyond the pale of common feelings of pleasure and pain that are connected with an individual situation.

As already argued in a seminal article by Pollock (1998) and then elaborated by him in 2012b and 2016, the intensification theory is strictly linked to the identification of the locus of *rasa* in the portrayed character—say, Rāma—and its secondary presence in the spectators.[20] On the other hand, the sublimation theory is connected with the revolutionary move from a text-centred understanding of the aesthetic phenomenon to an exclusively viewer/reader-centred conception of the aesthetic experience,

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[20] As argued in Cuneo (2013: 59, n. 28), Pollock's focus on Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa* has possibly overshadowed the importance of the spectators' role and affective response within the *rasa* process, already present and crucial in Bharata's text (and possibly in all his interpreters up to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka). In other words, it was the shift in the ontology of *rasa*—from an intensified to a rarefied emotion—that triggered the epistemological shift, the change of focus towards the spectator's psychological experience to the exclusion of the character, and not vice versa as argued by Pollock (see also n. 42). To be clearer, the 9th-10th-c. Kashmirian revolution in aesthetics is not the inclusion of the viewers/readers in the experience of *rasa*, as they were always part and parcel of such an *Erlebnis*, but the exclusion from it of the characters of the storyworld and the persons in real life, as the ontology of *rasa* changed by way of its sole ascription to the realm of artistic appreciation, a fully-fledgded recognition of the autonomy of the 'aesthetic experience' as completely separated from any other form of consciousness.

which was spawned by the increased focus on the cognitive and responsive aspects of the process of artistic appreciation that developed in 9th-c. Kashmir and held sway over the speculations on drama and poetry in the following four centuries or so.[21]

In addition to these two extreme positions on the locus of *rasa*, the portrayed character on the one hand and the audience on the other, other possibilities have been argued for by Sanskrit authors, not necessarily to the exclusion of other loci. That *rasa* is primarily situated in the dramatic text seems to be a conceivable corollary of a text-centred declension of the *rasa* theory, as it is ultimately the text itself that contains and triggers the *rasa* and must therefore be its primary locus. Although already implicitly present in Bharata's image of the tree as a metaphor for the aesthetic process,[22] it is the reception-centred understanding of the *rasa* theory that highlights how *rasa* begins as an aesthetic experience already in the poet, which becomes its first locus,[23] and is then transferred to the viewer via the text being staged by actors. Within the aesthetic process triggered by a stage performance, the last conceivable option for the locus of *rasa* is the performer. Such option, i.e. the actor's potential participation in the savouring of the *rasa* or, more generally, his emotional involvement in the play, will be the topic of the following sections.

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[21] On these and related issues, see McCrea 2008, the best history of Kashmirian aesthetics to date; Pollock 2001, 2010b, 2012a, 2012b, 2016; and Bronner 2016.

[22] The metaphor of the tree is famously used in NŚ 6.38: *yathā bījād bhaved vṛkṣo vṛkṣāt puṣpaṃ phalaṃ yathā | tathā mūlaṃ rasāḥ sarve tebhyo bhāvā vyavasthitāḥ ||* 'Just as the tree comes from the seed, and from the tree the flower and the fruit, so the *rasa*s are the root, and all the [other] states are established from those.' According to Abhinavagupta, this indicates that the *rasa*s are the aim in theatre, in poetry, and in the cognition of the spectators/readers: the root is the *rasa* belonging to the poet that, like a seed, develops into the poetic text, which is similar to a tree. With regard to the latter, the activities of the actor, consisting in the enactments (*abhinaya*), are like flowers, and the tasting of the *rasa*s by the spectators are the fruits. Hence the whole is pervaded by *rasa* (cf. ABh *ad* 6.38, vol. 1, p. 288).

[23] The *locus classicus* is the account of Vālmīki, the *ādikavi* ('first poet'), who created poetry out of sorrow by watching the sad destiny of two curlews, as narrated in *Rāmāyaṇa* 1.2.16b-18b. The episode becomes paradigmatic with Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka* 1.5 (*krauñcadvandvaviyogotthaḥ śokaḥ ślokatvam āgataḥ*) and Abhinavagupta's *Locana* on it. For a translation of the passage, see Ingalls *et al.* 1990: 113–119.

2. Tracing Bharata's position on the actor and his emotional involvement

As profusely argued in Ganser and Cuneo 2012, the actor has an ambiguous position in the text of Bharata. He is exalted as far as his activity is essential for the production of the drama, but he is socially denigrated as a consequence of the curse pronounced by the seers.[24]

The famed narrative on the origins of theatre illustrates, shapes and somewhat resolves this very ambiguity. After Brahmā's creation of the fifth Veda, i.e. theatre, Bharata and his sons, i.e. the theatre master with his troupe of actors, are entrusted with the divine knowledge and instructed to put it into practice. Their performances are said to utterly please the gods in heaven, who bestow opulent gifts on them and even pronounce eloquent speeches in defence of their art in order to protect it from the assault of a personified group of stubborn obstacles. This state of affairs lasts until the actors start misusing their arts to ridicule the sages, i.e. the incarnation of the cultural establishment and the power structures, and as a result of this they are cursed to become *śūdra*s and be reborn on earth. It is only after accomplishing the necessary expiation that the actors are readmitted into heaven, regaining their original status of *brāhmaṇa*s and leaving theatre and their progeny behind on earth. The generally low status of theatre actors and other kinds of performers, for which this narrative provides an ex-post rationalization, is confirmed by numerous other contemporary sources, such as the *Mānavadharmaśāstra* and the *Arthaśāstra*, as well as some early Smṛtis. As a consequence, scholars argued that the *Nāṭyaśāstra* as a whole, or at least its narrative frame—pregnantly combining the account about the origins of theatre with the curse-and-atonement episode—had been conceived as a direct response to those vilifying opinions about the actors, as well as an attempt at raising the status of dramatic art through the prestige bestowed by its textualization as *śāstra*.[25]

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[24] As mentioned before, the composite nature of the text casts a shadow upon any attempt to trace a precise and all-rounded doctrine within the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. However, the clear signs of a redaction allow a tentative search for coherence and systematicity of thought.

[25] This opinion was first put forward by Kane 1971 [1923]: 22. The whole curse-and-atonement episode is thoroughly analyzed in Ganser and Cuneo 2012,

Apart from bearing the signs of a widespread social criticism towards the performer, the *Nāṭyaśāstra* also contains several passages that eulogize actors, including socially connoted epithets and moral qualities. In the first chapter, for instance, Brahmā asks Indra, hinting at the gods, that 'this Veda named theatre be passed by you to those who are skilful, learned, bold and unwearied' (NŚ 1.20: *kuśalā ye vidagdhāś ca pragalbhāś ca jitaśramāḥ | teṣv ayaṃ nāṭyasaṃjño hi vedaḥ saṃkrāmyatāṃ tvayā ||*), to which the lord of the gods replies that the gods are themselves inapt for theatrical action. Theatre should rather be passed, he continues, to the actors whom he qualifies in praiseworthy words as 'those seers who know the secrets of the Vedas and have fulfilled their vows, capable to receive, maintain as well as perform this [theatre]' (NŚ 1.23: *ya ime vedaguhyajñā ṛṣayaḥ saṃśitavratāḥ | ete 'sya grahaṇe śaktāḥ prayoge dhāraṇe tathā ||*).

To the actors are thus attributed intellectual, ritual, social, moral, and practical skills.[26] But it is especially their skills as technicians of theatre and their mastery over the complexities of the staging craft that are more often thematized across the different chapters of this text. Accordingly, apart from the framing narrative of the origins, couched as a dialogue between Bharata and a group of Ṛṣis, and the questions of the latter giving place to a few excursus about ancillary topics,[27] Bharata's treatise presents itself as a technical and sometimes obscure ensemble of rules, by which the most minute details of the staging process are laid down. The undisputed master of these techniques and addressee of most of the rules about performance, hence the focus of most chapters in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, is the actor. Yet Bharata's actor remains throughout the text a rather elusive figure.

As mentioned above, it is the adequate representation of the emotional situation on the part of the actors that guarantees the successful accomplishment of a theatrical performance. To repre-

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which also contains several quotations on actors and performers from the texts mentioned in this paragraph.

[26] We will come back to such qualities and their implications concerning the actor's experience as interpreted by Abhinavagupta in Section 5.3.2.

[27] For instance, the chapters on the construction of the theatrical building (NŚ 2), its consecration (NŚ 3), and the procedures for the ritual preliminaries preceding a play (NŚ 5).

sent the emotions, the actor disposes of a sophisticated technique that involves four registers of acting, the so-called fourfold *abhinaya*, including a bodily (*āṅgika*), a vocal (*vācika*), a psychophysical (*sāttvika*) and an ornamental (*āhārya*) enactment. As their names indicate, these acting means are differentiated according to the particular medium by which the representative function is carried out: the body, the voice, the *sattva* and the costume.[28] The concept of enactment was closely connected with the dramatic representation of emotions since the first record of its complex expressive codes in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, and some of its categories were indeed fashioned after the catalogue of the stable and transitory states as well as the *rasa*s.[29] The general definition of *abhinaya* is given in NŚ 8.6, following the etymological formation:

> The root *nī-*, preceded by [the prefix] *abhi-*, has the sense of determining the meanings (*artha*) [of the dramatic text] as directly manifested in front (*ābhimukhya*) [of the spectators]. It is called *abhinaya* because it carries (*nayati*) the objects (*padārtha*) [of theatre to the audience]. And it has been called *abhinaya* since it determines the different meanings, according to practice, in association with the twig-limbs (*śākhā*), the bodily limbs (*aṅga*) and the facial expressions (*upāṅga*).[30]

Acting is thus named and defined according to its crucial function in theatre, which is to communicate the textual meanings, prima-

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[28] Cf. NŚ 6.23: *āṅgiko vācikaś caiva hy āhāryaḥ sāttvikas tathā | cātvaro 'bhinayā hy ete vijñeyā nāṭyasaṃśrayāḥ ||*. For the latitude of the term *abhinaya* with respect to the means, as opposed to the narrower Western concept of 'acting' or 'reciting,' see Ganser 2007: 65–67. For a thorough discussion of *sattva*, a term we leave untranslated here, see Section 5.

[29] For instance, out of the thirty-six types of looks (*dṛṣṭi*s) that are classified in NŚ 8.40–44 as part of the *upāṅgābhinaya* ('acting through the secondary limbs'), eight correspond, by a rather artificial parallelism, to the eight *rasa*s, eight to the eight *sthāyibhāva*s, and the remaining twenty to some of the *vyabhicāribhāva*s. As mentioned above, for many authors prior to Abhinavagupta there was no qualitative difference between *bhāva*s and *rasa*s, the latter being just regarded as intensified forms of the former.

[30] NŚ 8.6–7: *abhipūrvas tu ṇīṇdhātur ābhimukhyārthanirṇaye | yasmāt padārthān nayati tasmād abhinayaḥ smṛtaḥ || vibhāvayati yasmāc ca nānārthān hi prayogataḥ | śākhāṅgopāṅgasaṃyuktas tasmād abhinayaḥ smṛtaḥ ||*. In NŚ 8.6c, some manuscripts read *yasmāt prayogaṃ nayati*. However, given Abhinavagupta's insistence elsewhere on the fact that *abhinaya* carries the meanings, the reading *padārthān* can well be preferred here. On the the twig-limbs (*śākhā*), see Bansat-Boudon 1992: 375–376.

rily conceived in terms of emotions, to the audience. For instance, the term *abhinaya* is used as follows in NŚ 1.119, a verse that Abhinavagupta regards as containing the very definition of theatre: 'That nature proper to the ordinary experience, associated with pleasure (*sukha*) and pain (*duḥkha*), is called theatre (*nāṭya*) when it is conveyed through the registers of acting such as the bodily and the others (*aṅgādyabhinaya*).'[31] An even more specific link between the means of representation to be mastered by an actor and the emotions is provided in the definitions of the *bhāva*s in the seventh chapter: 'the states (*bhāva*) [are so called, since] they, associated with the voice, the body and the *sattva*, bring the contents of poetry (*kāvyārtha*) into being (*bhāvayanti*).'[32]

The treatment of the acting techniques and their different registers and combinations covers indeed the largest portion of Bharata's treatise (roughly from the eighth to the twenty-sixth chapter). Besides being described with reference to the various emotions that can be enacted through them, the practical application of the different acting registers and their subdivisions are often grounded in a typology of characters, called *prakṛti* (lit. 'nature'). Male and female characters are broadly divided into superior, middle and lower natures. Characters of different status are assigned different postures for the entrances, as well as different tempos for placing their steps in the codified gaits with which the various characters are supposed to enter and move around the stage. Superior natures like kings and gods, for instance, should walk in a slow tempo with wide steps, whereas the gaits of inferior characters have quick and short steps. The gaits are then declined on the basis of the peculiar emotive situation. The character in love should walk with steps following the tempo and the body gracefully relaxed, his hands regularly following the feet, while going to meet a messenger. But in case of concealed love, his steps will be slow and stealthy, his eyes constantly moving around with apprehension, his body trembling in a faltering gait.[33] The body

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[31] NŚ 1.119: *yo 'yaṃ svabhāvo lokasya sukhaduḥkhasamanvitaḥ | so 'ṅgādyabhinayopeto nāṭyam ity abhidhīyate ||*.

[32] NŚ prose before 7.1: *vāgaṅgasattvopetān kāvyārthān bhāvayantīti bhāvā iti.*

[33] The different gaits (*gati*) and their uses are described in NŚ 12. The gait connected to *śṛṅgārarasa* is described in NŚ 12.40cd–48ab.

was certainly a major vehicle to convey meaning in theatre, and the actor had to undergo a strenuous physical training, including regular body massage with oil and an adequate dietary regime, in order to acquire grace (*sauṣṭhava*) and beauty (*śobhā*) in the bodily movements and limbs necessary for acting.[34] The delivery of speeches is likewise subject to the use of notes and intonations according to the different *rasa*s to be conveyed and the various emotional states. The ornamental acting includes the costume replete with ornaments, but also the painting of limbs, all of which is supposed to help the spectators identify the type of character, its social status and emotive condition.

Along with several qualities such as beauty, knowledge of the rhythms and of emotions, curiosity, etc.,[35] it is the development of a complex code of acting and the stress on exercise and body-mind integrity on the part of the actor that fundamentally match-

[34] The concepts of *śobhā* and *sauṣṭhava*, here tentatively translated as 'beauty' and 'grace' are closely related, as suggested by several verses in the chapter on the *cārī*-movements. These involve mainly the displacements of legs and feet and are used during the physical training (*vyāyāma*) as well as during the performance. Cf. NŚ 10.89cd, 90cd–91ab: *sauṣṭhave hi prayatnas tu kāryo vyāyāmavedibhiḥ || […] śobhā sarvaiva nityaṃ hi sauṣṭhavaṃ samupāśritā || na hi sauṣṭhavahīnāṅgaḥ śobhate nāṭyanṛttayoḥ |* 'The experts in physical training should make an effort with respect to grace. […] All beauty is always based on grace, for a body devoid of grace does not shine either in theatre or in dance.' The definition of *sauṣṭhava*, achieved through physical exercise, is repeated twice in the Gaekwad Oriental Series edition of NŚ (4.60cd–61ab, 10.92cd–93ab): *kaṭī karṇasamā yatra kūrparāṃsaśiras tathā || samunnatam uraś caiva sauṣṭhavaṃ nāma tad bhavet |.* 'When the hips are aligned with the ears, and the elbows, shoulders and head [are aligned with one another], [and] the chest is lifted up, one speaks of "grace".' Bansat-Boudon translates *sauṣṭhava* as 'la grâce des membres' (1992: 264–265, n. 27). From its definition and from the occurrences of this term in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* as observed by Bansat-Boudon, it appears that *sauṣṭhava* refers to a position of the body that appears natural, but is in reality acquired through exercise and requires harmony and equilibrium to be maintained. The utmost embodiment of *sauṣṭhava* is represented by the archer.

[35] See, e.g., NŚ 27.99–100, two verses describing the qualities of an actor, indispensable for the success of a performance: *buddhimattvaṃ surūpatvaṃ layatālajñatā tathā | rasabhāvajñatā caiva vayaḥsthatvaṃ kutūhalam || grahaṇaṃ dhāraṇaṃ caiva gātrāvaikalyam eva ca | jitasādhvasatotsāha iti pātragato vidhiḥ ||.* 'The rule regarding the actor is [that he should have] intelligence, a beautiful appearance, knowledge of tempo and rhythm, knowledge of the *rasa*s and the states, youth, curiosity, [ability to] understanding and retainment [of the teachings], absence of physical defects, and courage in conquering one's fear [of the stage].'

es with the declared status of theatre as an art regulated by the *śāstra*. This also excludes the possibility that acting might be equated to a series of casual and uncontrolled actions, which would render it more akin to religious phenomena of ritual possession. However, in the chapter on *āhāryābhinaya*, in order to describe the importance of the costume for the process of impersonification of a given character, Bharata employs the metaphor of transmigration:

> Just as a living being, having abandoned its own nature [takes on] another body and, resorting to that other body, partakes of that [other] nature, so a man covered with a costume and makeup, achieves the nature of another one, whose costume he has put on.[36]

With several lexical overlaps, an analogous metaphor is again used in the chapter on the distribution of roles, after listing the characteristics that have to be considered by the theatre director for assigning different roles to different actors. These cover mostly bodily features or natural dispositions of the actors, which should correspond as far as possible to those of the role assigned. This general principle, one can assume, is meant to help the spectators identify the characters by way of resemblance with the actors impersonating them.

> Just as a living being, having abandoned his own nature, achieves the nature of another one grounded in another body and resorts to that other nature, in the same way an intelligent [actor], by mentally contemplating 'I am that one' shall adopt another nature by their gestures, consisting in speech, bodily movement and playful behaviour.[37]

Statements such as these show that there is something more about theatrical impersonation than the mere donning of external paraphernalia. An actor has to speak, move and behave just like the character he is impersonating, so that he may take on his nature.

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[36] NŚ 21.89cd–91ab: *yathā jantuḥ svabhāvaṃ svaṃ parityajyānyadaihikam || tat svabhāvaṃ hi bhajate dehāntaram upāśritaḥ | veṣeṇa varṇakaiś caiva chāditaḥ puruṣas tathā || parabhāvaṃ prakurute yasya veṣaṃ samāśritaḥ |.*
[37] NŚ 26.7–8: *yathā jīvat svabhāvaṃ hi parityajyānyadehikam | parabhāvaṃ prakurute parabhāvaṃ samāśritaḥ || evaṃ budhaḥ param bhāvaṃ so 'smīti manasā smaran | yeṣāṃ vāgaṅgalīlābhiś ceṣṭābhis tu samācaret ||.*

The quotes also resonate with another early text that uses the same sort of metaphor, although the other way around, by comparing the transmigrating soul to the actor: the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti.* This work, commonly ascribed to around the 4th–5th c. and close to the *Nāṭyaśāstra* in many a way,[38] features one of the early instantiations of this metaphor:

> For, as an actor displays his body with makeup, so the self produced by action, while performing various kinds of actions, displays its body.[39]

This verse responds to the questions posed to Yājñavalkya in 3.129 about the *puruṣa*, seen as a primordial god who assumes even the lowliest of conditions: 'If he is like that, o Brahman, how can he take birth in evil wombs? How can he, being the Lord, be united with disagreeable natures?'[40] After using the metaphor of the actor to explain how the karmic self displays indeed a body performing different actions (or different bodies, as per the vulgate, cf. n. 39), the passage concludes thus: 'I have described to you the way the self creates the self, the result of the three kinds of actions, even though he remains the lord.'[41] Although the accent here is certainly on the contrast between the *ātman* acting through a body and the *ātman* as the lord, the reference to makeup in *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 3.162, by which the actor displays a different body, reminds

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[38] In the third chapter on expiation, *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 3.112–116 prescribes for the ascetic a kind of yoga that involves the singing of certain songs and the playing of musical instruments, which shares some technical musicological terminology with the *Nāṭyaśāstra.*

[39] *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 3.162: *yathā hi bharato varṇair vartayaty ātmanas tanum | nānārūpāṇi kurvāṇas tathātmā karmajas tanum ||* (tr. Olivelle 2019: 255). The passage has been also translated by Bansat-Boudon, on the basis of a slightly different text, the one of the vulgata: *yathā hi bharato varṇair varṇayaty ātmanas tanum | nānārūpāṇi kurvāṇas tathātmā karmajās tanūḥ ||* « De même que l'acteur colore de couleurs son propre corps, produisant des formes diverses, de la même façon l'*ātman* [produit] des corps issus du *karman*. » (Bansat-Boudon 1992: 395, n. 38).

[40] *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 3.129: *yadi evaṃ sa kathaṃ brahman pāpayoniṣu jāyate | īśvaraḥ sa kathaṃ bhāvair aniṣṭaiḥ saṃprayujyate ||* (tr. based on Olivelle 2019: 247). Olivelle translates *bhāva* as 'mental state,' however it could be understood as 'nature,' as we have translated it in the passages of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* comparing the actor to a transmigrating soul.

[41] *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 3.182: *yathātmānaṃ sṛjaty ātmā tathā vaḥ kathitaṃ mayā | vipākas triprakārāṇāṃ karmaṇām īśvaro 'pi san ||* (tr. Olivelle 2019: 259).

us of the first quotation in *Nāṭyaśāstra* 21.89cd–91ab, with its emphasis on the role-taking that acting involves.

Coming back to Bharata's text and the emotional experience of the actor, the passages exposing the parallel between actor and transmigrating soul highlight the role of acting techniques in taking on a role, by way of the whole sphere of gestures, and not merely the costume. Even a mental component appears to be required in the construction of that 'other' personality. The formula 'I am that' Rāma, Rāvaṇa, etc., which the actor mentally contemplates (*so 'smīti manasā smaran*), suggests that some sort of identification process is taking place, giving rise to a certain degree of ambiguity with regard to the experience of the actor: does the performer possibly lose his own personality, or does he undergo a possession-like phenomenon such as is common to many ancient societies? The continuous accent on technique and the necessity of sticking to the rules, however, pleads for a dismissal of such possibility. Moreover, Abhinavagupta's remarks on these verses insist on the actor's mastery and control over the mind, but at the same time they are reminiscent of the *Yājña-valkyasmṛti* parallel between the self, the Lord and the actor, as we will show in the conclusions.

Another way to go about the issue of the actor's sharing in the emotional sphere of the character (or in that of the poet and the audience) in early dramatic thought would be to look at contemporary examples in the world of Sanskrit poets and playwrights. The latter are believed to have been influenced by dramatic theories—as Kālidāsa's familiarity with Bharata's treatise indicates—although they were most certainly also developing their own viewpoints on drama.[42] A most famous example is the failure of

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[42] In this regard, see Sathaye's study of Kālidāsa's metatheatrical statements about *rasa*. As argued by Sathaye, Kālidāsa might have anticipated and prefigured the aesthetic revolutions of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta, in that he 'seems to have understood the *rasa* experience as involving a bivalent transference of real emotions (*bhāva*s) between artist and audience within the space of the artistic work' (Sathaye 2019: 43–44). In our view, the emphasis that recent secondary literature has laid upon the occurrence of a proper reader-oriented theoretical turn in 9th–10th c. Kashmir might just be slightly overstated (or differently assessed, see n. 20), as the text of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* already clearly entails a focus on the emotional experience of the audience as a necessary requirement for theatrical success (see NŚ 27.61cd–63ab: *yas tuṣṭau tuṣṭim āyāti śoke śokam upaiti ca || kruddhaḥ krodhe bhaye bhītaḥ sa śreṣṭhaḥ prekṣakaḥ smṛtaḥ | evaṃ bhāvānukaraṇe yo*

Urvaśī's performance in the second act of *Vikramorvaśīya*, as the personal feelings of the nymph-actress for king Purūravas intervene and interfere with her performance spoiling the aesthetic effect, despite the audience's previous engrossement in the various *rasa*s (Act 3, interlude: *teṣu teṣu rasāntareṣu tanmayāsīt*). As Sathaye (2019: 47, n. 30) remarks, Urvaśī's state is described as *baddhabhāva*, 'having her feelings tied up with,' or 'fixed upon' Purūravas. Her slip of the tongue, when she pronounces the name of her real-life beloved instead of Puruṣottama, her character's beloved, really answers the question: 'In whom are your feelings absorbed?' (*katamasmiṃs te bhāvābhiniveśa iti?* ibid. n. 29.) Urvaśī is obviously immersed in her own worldly emotions while acting, a mistake so serious that it earns her a curse from Bharata Muni and the banishment to the earth.[43]

To wrap up, although an actor's engrossement in his own worldly passions can invalidate the performance in Kālidāsa's eyes, and it is generally condemned by Bharata as well, the *Nāṭyaśāstra* seems to mantain an ambiguous position with regard to the emotional experience of the actor. While we do learn in detail, chapter after chapter, how a performer is supposed to render an emotive situation by applying the whole spectrum of technical rules, we are never actually told how he is supposed to handle his own emotional sphere and sensibility to impersonate the character in its most intimate sphere. Is he completely absorbed in his role, even from an emotional standpoint, or does he rather tap into his own feelings to empathize with the character? Does he feel what he enacts? Some clues to answer these questions will be investigated later while analysing the concept of *sattva* in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* and its commentary by Abhinavagupta. But first let us have a look at the theoretical speculations on this topic before Abhinavagupta's time.

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yasmin praviśen naraḥ || sa tatra prekṣako jñeyo guṇair ebhir alaṃkṛtaḥ: 'He is considered the best spectator who feels satisfaction when satisfaction is [portrayed], sorrow when sorrow is [portrayed], anger when anger is [portrayed], and fear when fear is [portrayed]. In such a re-creation of the [emotional] states, the man who can penetrate them is to be known as "spectator" in their respect, as he is endowed with these features'). Along these lines, Kālidāsa's view on the shared emotional experience between artist and audience would just confirm and maybe develop a theme already crucial in the NŚ.

43 On this episode, see Bansat-Boudon 1992: 148.

3. *Reconstructing the theory of Lollaṭa, the Stanislavski of medieval India*

Although a number of authors and commentators focused on the text of Bharata before Abhinavagupta (10th–11th c.), none of their works is extant today. Thus, in order to reconstruct their thought and opinions, we need to rely on the limited quotations and paraphrases contained in the *Abhinavabhāratī* and a few later works. One of our foci is possibly one of the earliest among these commentators, Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, a Kashmirian author about whom very little is known.[44] In his most important quotation, he seems to maintain that *rasa* is nothing but an intensified emotion and that it is present both in the portrayed character and in the performing actor: (*tena sthāyy eva vibhāvānubhāvādibhir upacito rasaḥ | sthāyī bhavatv anupacitaḥ | sa cobhayor api anukārye 'nukartary api cānusaṃdhānabalāt—iti* |[45]). 'Therefore, *rasa* is nothing but the stable [emotional state], enhanced by determinants, consequents and so on.[46] It does remain a stable [emotional state], if not enhanced. Furthermore, this[47] is present indeed[48] in both the imitated

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[44] Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, active around 825 CE, composed a number of works, now all lost: a commentary on Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra*, as evidenced by the testimony of the *Abhinavabhāratī*, another work on literary criticism called the *Rasavivaraṇa*, mentioned by Hemacandra (Pollock 2016: 74) and a commentary on the *Spandakārikā*, as credited by Kṣemarāja (*ibid.* pp. 347–348). Beside 'a dozen short citations on technical questions of dramaturgy' (*ibid.* p. 74), Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's position on *rasa* is known from a few passages, all recently translated in Pollock (*ibid.* pp. 76–77).

[45] ABh *ad* 6, *rasasūtra*, vol. 1, p. 272. This is the reference to the second edition, whose text we follow only for this passage, as it features a wording that is probably free from textual additions (see following discussion and n. 49).

[46] As already noted by Gnoli (1968: 27, n. 3), a similar view is held in the *Agnipurāṇa* 339.4: *abhimānād ratiḥ sā ca paripoṣam upeyuṣī | vyabhicāryādisāmānyāt śṛṅgāra iti gīyate ||*. In particular, Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa follows what we called the 'intensification theory' upheald by the ancients (*cirāntanānāṃ cāyam eva pakṣaḥ*: ABh *ad* 6, *rasasūtra*, vol. 1, p. 266), i.e. a view that does not recognise any qualitative or ontological distinction between everyday emotions and aesthetic emotions, but only a quantitative distinction.

[47] Since in Lollaṭa's theory there is only a difference of degree between *rasa* and *bhāva*, and no qualitative distinction, the deictic pronoun can equally refer to *rasa* or *bhāva*. Therefore, in the case of Lollaṭa, the issue is the actor's emotional involvement *tout court*, without any further qualification.

[48] The emphatic meaning of *api* after the dual *ubhayor* cannot be disregarded and simply left untranslated (as in Pollock 2016: 76), as it underlines the fact that the actor too shares in the experience of *rasa*. An alternative and less likely translation would be to understand the expression *ubhayor api* as 'also in both,' which

[character][49] and the imitator [i.e. the actor], thanks to the force of correlation (*anusaṃdhāna*).'

Clearly enough, from the few lines we can ascribe to Lollaṭa, the term *anusaṃdhāna* ('connection,' 'unification,' etc.) represents the theoretical linchpin of his conception of the actor's emotional involvement. The simplest interpretation of this passage is that it stands for the correlation between the actor and the character determined by the performer's mindfulness and concentration on that emotive focus. Gnoli (1968: 26) translates 'realisation' and comments:

> *Anusaṃdhi*—that literally signifies recollection, memory and even something more than this, i.e., consciousness, awareness, reflec-

would mean that *rasa* was understood to have a third, original and somewhat obvious locus. The possibilities would be several (the poet, the poetical text, the real-life character, the character of the story-world, or indeed the audience!), and open to anyone's guess, which would radically change our understanding of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's theory of *rasa*. For instance, on the basis of the enlarged rephrasing by Mammaṭa, Kamimura (1986) argues that Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's theory considers *rasa* an experience shared by character, actor and spectator, which is not impossible *per se* (see again Cuneo 2013: 59, n. 28 and, from a cultural perspective, Ali 2004: 201–206).

[49] All editions of the *Abhinavabhāratī*, most probably following Mammaṭa's paraphrase and the enlarged text given by Hemacandra, add here two crucial words, *mukhyayā vṛttyā*, which might lead to a more univocal interpretation of Lollaṭa's theory, and some more explicative glosses. To a first approximation, the meaning of Hemacandra's passage becomes: 'Furthermore, it is present indeed in both the imitated [character] such as Rāma and the like, in a primary sense, and in the imitating actor, thanks to the force of correlation with the nature of Rāma and the like (*sa cobhayor api mukhyayā vṛttyā rāmādav anukārye 'nukartari ca naṭe rāmādirūpatānusaṃdhānabalāt*).' Kamimura (1986) argues that the expression *mukhyayā vṛttyā* means 'originally,' 'primarily' or 'directly,' denying any reference to *abhidhā* as the linguistic function of denotation, as argued in Sastry 1965–66. Given the divergences among Mammaṭa's commentators, Pollock (2016: 348 n. 172) is non-committal about it: 'It is not clear whether this pertains to reference ('literal sense' [...]) or ontology ('in actual fact' [...]).' In any case, this version of the text points to the character as the primary locus of *rasa* and puts the actor in a clearly secondary and derivative position (this seems to be the understanding of Chattopadhyaya 1977: 178). However, this clear-cut distinction may not go back to Lollaṭa, whose position was possibly more nuanced. In fact, the early partial edition by De (1925), the text of Gnoli (1968), and—most crucially—the manuscripts that contain the sixth chapter (M_1, T_2, T_4, T_6 and T_7) only have the shortest version of the text, which thus seems to be a more reliable witness to Lollaṭa's view. It seems safe to assume that the phrase *mukhyayā vṛttyā* was just a gloss that crept into the text of the *Abhinavabhāratī*, probably based on the passages of Mammaṭa and Hemacandra.

tion, etc. and I have tentatively rendered by 'realisation'—is at the same time the power thanks to which the actor 'becomes' for the time being the represented or imitated personage (e.g. Rāma), feels himself as Rāma, and the faculty through which he nevertheless does not forget his real nature of actor.[50]

On this topic Pandey (1959: 39) remarks:

> The actor identifies himself with the (dramatised?) historical character and, therefore, is able to unify the elements of his experience so as to produce the momental construct which corresponds in every way to that of the original hero.

Pollock (2016: 76) follows the enlarged text of the fourth edition and translates: 'by force of the complete identification with the part.'[51] In the Pratyabhijñā texts, *anusaṃdhāna* is 'the unifying power of the mind which links together a group of *ābhāsa*s by making them subordinated to a predominant one' (Torella 2002: 90). Or, again, Torella (*ibid.*, p. 178, n. 11) elaborates:

> The term *anusaṃdhāna* is used in this school with various meanings. Sometimes it means 'unification, connection' often referring to the unifying function of thought which establishes relations between things (it is then glossed with *ekīkaraṇa*), pervading them with its own dynamism. In other cases […] it has the meaning of

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[50] Gnoli 1968: xviii. This is approximately also the understanding of Hemacandra, who expands the text slightly and reads: *rāmādirūpatānusaṃdhānabalāt.* Another possible and similar meaning, suggested by H. C. Bhatt (personal communication), is 'practice,' that is, the repeated practice of the actor. In a note, Gnoli (1968: xviii) adds: 'According to some later commentators, the meaning of *anusaṃdhāna* is visualization or something like that; cf. Prabhākara, *Rasapradīpa*, Benares 1925, p 23: *anusaṃdhānaṃ ca kavivivakṣitasyārthasya vāsanāpāṭavavaśāt sākṣād iva karaṇam.*' The position of Lollaṭa is restated and rephrased also in Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa.*

[51] On the basis of Kumārasvāmin's *Ratnāpana* (c. 1430), a commentary on Vidyānātha's *Pratāparudrīya* (c. 1320), Filliozat (1963: 332) attributes the *anusaṃdhāna* to the spectator: 'Le *rasa* est cet état émotionnel durable intensifié (*upacita*) par le concours des *vibhāva*, etc. Le porteur du *rasa* est le héros représenté. Le spectateur appréhende l'état émotionnel du héros représenté, sous forme intensifié, c'est à dire sous forme du *rasa*, par la force de la recherche (*anusaṃdhāna*) qu'il fait de ce personnage dans l'acteur qui l'imite.' This interprétation is most probably mistaken, but it is worth repeating that it is difficult to establish Lollaṭa's theory with any absolute certainty.

'intentionality, straining towards a particular objective.' These two levels of meaning may also coexist simultaneously.[52]

To sum up, in our opinion, *anusaṃdhāna* probably indicates both the connection of the actor's focused mind with the character's emotive situation as well as his striving towards the realization of an intense representation of the intended *bhāva*.

Therefore, if we try and synthesize Lollaṭa's conception of the emotional involvement of the actor, it would probably resemble a version of the modern theories based on Stanislavski's ideas about the actor's necessity to train his own emotional capacity to be completely engrossed in the emotional life of the portrayed character and thus have the very same affective experience during the performance.[53] Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's position, tentatively reconstructed here, can be better understood by surveying the opposite theory in the spectrum of possibilities and the arguments raised for and against both conceptions of the actor's experience.

4. *The position of Abhinavagupta, the Diderot of medieval India*

At face value, some crucial passages in the *Abhinavabhāratī* clearly show Abhinavagupta's position with regard to the experience of *rasa* or of any emotional experience for the actor: its complete and utter denial. The actor is considered a mere *pātra*, a vessel, which cannot savour the juice of the *rasa* it contains. The actor is just the means of its transfer: 'And it is for this reason [i.e. because *rasa*s only exist in the world of theatre] that there is no *rasa* in the actor. […] What is in the actor then? He is just the means of savouring […] and this is why he is called vessel. In fact there is no savouring of wine on the part of the vessel, yet it is an instrument for it.' (*ata eva ca naṭe na rasaḥ.* […] *naṭe tarhi kim? āsvādanopayaḥ.* […] *ata eva ca pātram ity ucyate | na hi pātre madyāsvādaḥ, api tu tadupāyakaḥ*).[54]

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[52] The meanings of 'investigation' and 'research' probably derive from the wider semantic field of 'connection,' 'focus' and 'effort.'

[53] On Stanislavski's ideas on the acting process and the actor's emotional involvement, with a view to their reception in contemporary theatre, see Meyer-Dinkgräfe 2005, ch. 3. For a contrastive approach between Stanislavski and traditional Indian acting, especially concerning the place of the actor's personal emotions in acting, see Schechner 2001.

[54] ABh *ad* 6.32–33, vol. 1, p. 289.

Another passage of the *Abhinavabhāratī* gives the psychological and theatrical reason why the actor cannot be experiencing the *rasa* or the *bhāva* as he is acting on stage: 'If the actor had *rasa*s or *bhāva*s, he would be compenetrated with the reality [of the portrayed character] in the case of [representing] death and the like, and an interruption of the [theatrical] tempo and so forth would ensue'[55] (*naṭasya hi rasabhāvayoge maraṇādau tattvāveśo layādibhaṅgaś ca syāt*).[56]

As it is clear from what immediately follows, the critique is directly aimed at Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's conception of the actor's experience: 'According to Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa this is not sound, because both *rasa*s and *bhāva*s are present in the actor on account of his being immersed in the latent impressions [of his own emotions], and because he follows the tempo, etc. by force of the correlation [with the portrayed character]' (*naitad iti bhaṭṭalollaṭaḥ | rasabhāvānām api vāsanāveśavaśena naṭe sambhavād, anusaṃdhibalāc ca layādyanusaraṇāt |*).[57] The term *anusaṃdhi*, a synonym of *anusaṃdhāna* discussed above, must thus refer to an active and con-

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[55] Slightly differently translated into French in Bansat-Boudon (1992: 430): 'Si l'acteur était assujetti à l'expérience du *rasa*, il serait pénétré par des émotions réelles au moment de jouer la mort, etc., et s'ensuivrait une interruption du tempo, etc.'

[56] See also Abhinavagupta's remarks in his commentary on the *Dhvanyāloka* (*Locana ad* 2.4, p. 183): *anukartari tadbhāve layādyananusaraṇaṃ syāt*, '[On the other hand] if *rasa* were to lie in the actor, he would be unable to follow the tempo (*laya*), etc.' (tr. Ingalls *et al.* 1990: 222). This reasoning parallels what Diderot argued for in his famous *Paradoxe sur le comédien*: 'If the actor were full, really full, of feeling, how could he play the same part twice running with the same spirit and success? Full of fire at the first performance, he would be worn out and cold as marble at the third. […] What confirms me in this view is the unequal acting of players who play from the heart. From them you must expect no unity. Their playing is alternately strong and feeble, fiery and cold, dull and sublime' (Diderot 1883: 8). The following would happen to the actor losing his self-control: 'Let a consummate actor leave off playing from his head, let him forget himself, let his heart be involved, let sensibility possess him, let him give himself up to it […] it will be on condition of not breaking through his system of declamation; of not injuring the unity of the performance; otherwise you will say that he has gone mad' (Diderot 1883: 100). Contrast Stanislavski's statement that 'the very best that can happen is to have the actor completely carried away by the play. Then, regardless of his own will he lives the part, not noticing how he feels, not thinking about what he does, and it all moves of its own accord, subconsciously and intuitively' (Stanislavski 1936: 13).

[57] ABh *ad* 6.10, vol. 1, p. 258.

trolled capacity of the actor to correlate his own emotional experience with the portrayed emotions of the characters, including the tempo that characterizes the type of character and his emotive situation.[58] Otherwise, Lollaṭa's reply to the critique concerning the lack of tempo on the part of an artist overwhelmed by emotionality would make no sense.

Despite such a *prima facie* denial of any emotional involvement on the part of the actor in Abhinavagupta's criticism of Lollaṭa, a positive and succinct description of what the actor does and indeed feels is found in the long passage that Abhinavagupta attributes to his teacher of dramaturgy, Bhaṭṭa Tauta. The text is part of a complex reply to the theory of *rasa* as imitation attributed to Śaṅkuka, but it is important for our reasoning as it lists the elements of the internal and external experience of the actor. 'Moreover, thanks to the force of his expertise, that is, thanks to the sympathetic response due to the generalization of the consciousness mode that is brought about by the recollection of his own determinants, the actor merely performs by displaying the consequents and by reciting the poem with the support of the appropriate intonation and so forth. Such is the extent of which he is aware, but he does not have the experience that [what he is doing] is an imitation' (*kiṃ ca naṭaḥ śikṣāvaśāt svavibhāvasmaraṇāc cittavṛttisādhāraṇībhāvena hṛdayasaṃvādāt kevalam anubhāvān pradarśayan kāvyam *ucitakākuprabhṛtyupaskāreṇa* [M₁ KA Gnoli : *upacita˚* Ed.] *pathaṃś ceṣṭata ity etāvanmātre 'sya pratītir na tv anukāraṃ vedayate*).[59]

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[58] See above our remarks on the use of different tempos in the gaits of different characters and their variation according to the emotive situations, as already codified in Bharata's treatise.

[59] ABh *ad* 6, *rasasūtra*, vol. I, pp. 269–270 (the same text is found in the *Kāvyānuśāsana* [KA], *Viveka ad* 2.1, p. 96 in Parikh's edition). The reading of the editions, though less likely, could also be viable: 'with the support of a full intonation and so forth (*upacitakākuprabhṛtyupaskāreṇa*).' Although it is also possible and maybe easier to interpret the three ablatives as separate causes and not as an interconnected chain of reasons, we opted for this harder interpretation, because it allows us to reflect on the function of memory and training. In this reading, the actor's expertise (*śikṣā*) is nothing but the capacity to attune his mind to the emotions to be portrayed. Moreover, such attunement would ensue from a training that consists, among other things, in the recollection of one's own emotional 'determinants' (his own beloved, for example). But this recollection must happen only during training, as the performance would be hindered if it

To fully appreciate the specificity of the actor's experience here outlined, we need to survey Abhinavagupta's understanding of the three-layered path that the spectator must walk to achieve the savouring of *rasa* (*rasāsvāda*).[60] Famously, the first step in the appreciation of an artistic performance is the 'generalization' of the portrayed emotions, the *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*. The emotions become generalized, i.e. devoid of all spatial and temporal characterisation as well as bereft of any reference to a specific individual, be it the historical character, the character of the story-world, the actor, the spectator himself or anyone else.[61] The result of this process is that the emotion is experienced, as it were, in a position of 'unrelatedness,' beyond any actual situational context.[62] Emo-

happened then (see above the example of Urvaśī). In any case, it makes sense that the active work on one's emotional life represents part and parcel of the training that the actor must go through in order to master his body and mind (see later on the crucial missing point that is *sattva*). For a more straightforward rendering, see Bansat-Boudon (1992: 149 n. 348): 'Bien plus, l'acteur faisant voir les *anubhāva* et récitant le texte à l'aide notamment des intonations appropriées, etc., joue seulement grâce à sa technique, grâce au souvenir qu'il a de ses propres *vibhāva* et grâce à la sympathie [qu'il éprouve pour son personnage], laquelle résulte de la généralité du sentiment. Son expérience se limite à cela, et il n'a pas conscience d'imiter.' See also the similar interpretations in Gnoli 1968: 40 and Pollock 2016: 186.

[60] In Abhinavagupta's theory, the aesthetic path actually starts with the poet's *pratibhā*, his inspired genius, which allows him to transform a common emotional experience (*bhāva*) into a generalized object of delectation (*rasa*) and to turn it into poetry (*kāvya*). The most commonly cited definition of *pratibhā* in Abhinavagupta's theory is the following (*Locana ad* DhĀ 1.6, p. 92): *pratibhā apūrvavastunirmāṇakṣamā* 'Genius is [an intellect] capable to create unprecedented objects.' The secondary literature on poetic *pratibhā* is relatively vast. Without any attempt at exhaustiveness, see Sreekantiya 1937, 1980; Krishnamoorthy 1944, 1980–1981; Gonda 1963: 318–348; Sen 1965; Jhanji 2003; Shulman 2008, 2012: 80–108, as well as the recent Fürlinger 2018, although its scope is larger than just the poetical *pratibhā*.

[61] See, for instance, ABh *ad* 6.32–33, vol. 1, p. 289: *deśakālapramāt ̥ rbhedā-niyantrito rasa iti* ('*rasa* is not delimited by the differentiations of space, time and knowing subject').

[62] In Abhinavagupta's own words, ABh *ad* 6, prose after 31, *rasasūtra*, vol. 1, p. 278, such an emotion is experienced by means of 'a cognition devoid of obstacles, different from cognitions full of obstacles such as "I am afraid, he—my enemy, my friend, someone indifferent to me—is afraid," as these are bound by the rise of other ideas such as abandoning[, accepting, or disregarding as indifferent to me], determined as they are by pleasure and pain' ('*bhīto 'haṃ bhīto 'yaṃ śatrur vayasyo madhyastho vā' ityādipratyayebhyo duḥkhasukhādik ̥ rtahānādibuddhya-ntarodayaniyamavattayā vighnabahulebhyo vilakṣaṇaṃ nirvighnapratītigrāhyaṃ*).

tions become as if 'elevated to a different plane of reality, removed from the ordinary world of pleasure and pain and freed from individuation and limitation. The fetters of the various "empirical" selves are temporarily shattered: emotions shine, unconnectedly, in their own generalized essence' (Cuneo 2013: 64).[63]

The second step consists in the *hṛdayasaṃvāda*, the emotional correspondence. The alluring beauty of the representation and the persuasive force of the narrated story induce the emotional involvement of the spectators. They excite their empathy to the highest degree.[64] Albeit aware of the fictional nature of the represented

[63] In Gerow's pithy summary (1994: 187), the issue at stake is that 'we experience, in art, not love for X, but love as such.' A discussion of the cognitive clash and the aesthetic competence that are the psychological and philosophical trigger of *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* is found in Cuneo (2013: 64–66). Famously, Abhinavagupta seems to have borrowed the much-discussed concept of *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. On this pivotal figure, see Pollock 2010 and 2016, whose views should be integrated and emended by David 2016, its rejoinder by Ollett 2016, and Reich 2018, an insightful treatment of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's religious and philosophical affiliation as a Vedāntin.

[64] Abhinavagupta's term probably comes from a verse in Bharata's treatise (*Nāṭyaśāstra* 7.7): *yo 'rtho hṛdayasaṃvādī tasya bhāvo rasodbhavaḥ | śarīraṃ vyāpyate tena śuṣkaṃ kāṣṭham ivāgninā ||*. In Abhinavagupta's works, there seems to be no direct definition of *hṛdayasaṃvāda*, but the term is said to be a synonym of *sahṛdayatva*, 'empathy' (*Locana ad* DhĀ 1.18, p. 155: *hṛdayasaṃvādāparaparyāya-sahṛdayatva°* [...]). We would like to suggest that the *hṛdayasaṃvāda* is the acme of *sahṛdayatva*. The celebrated definition of the 'ideal connoisseur,' the *sahṛdaya*, is translated in Ingalls *et al.* 1990: 70: 'The word *sahṛdaya* (lit. 'having their hearts *with* it') denotes persons who are capable of *identifying* with the subject matter, as the mirror of their hearts has been polished by the constant study and practice of poetry, and who respond to it sympathetically in their own hearts' (*Locana ad* DhvĀ 1.1: *yeṣāṃ kāvyānuśīlanābhyāsavaśād viśadībhūte manomukure varṇanīyata-nmayībhavanayogyatā te svahṛdayasaṃvādabhājaḥ sahṛdayāḥ*). For other similar definitions of *sahṛdaya* as well as *ahṛdaya* and some secondary literature, see Cuneo 2013: 64–65, n. 46. While in poetry the literary connoisseur gains a mirror-like heart thanks to the study of famous works, in theatre the function of 'polishing the mirror' is assigned to a number of elements that are defined as *hṛdya*, lit. 'hearty,' 'pleasant' in the sense of beautiful (*sundara, śubha*) and alluring (*uparañjaka*) as they are also called. These are, famously, the group including instrumental music, vocal singing, and dance, by which even those spectators who might still be under the sway of their own worldly preoccupations can obtain a mirror-like heart and be turned into sensitive spectators, *sahṛdaya*s. See, for instance, ABh *ad rasasūtra*, vol. 1, p. 275: *ahṛdayānāṃ ca tad eva nairmalyādhāyi yatra pratītā gītavādyagaṇikādayo na vyasanitāyai paryavasyanti nāṭyopalakṣaṇāt* 'But for those devoid of sensibility, that (i.e. theatre) alone can confer such a limpidity, in which singing, music, courtesans, and the like do not culminate in evil behavior, since they are features of drama.' See also p. 281: *ātodyagānavicitra-*

story, the spectators cannot but care and be enthralled by what happens on the scene. However, the aloof impartiality offered by the power of generalization allows the audience not to fall completely for the emotional snare of theatrical make-believe. Involvement and detachment are kept in balance in an affective experience bereft of any unreserved abandonment to emotionality.

The third and last step on the path that leads to the appreciation of *rasa* is the complete identification (*tanmayībhāva*) with the narrated emotional situation. The very self of the spectators is temporarily suspended, as if dissolved in the experience of the performance, merged with the subject at hand, fused with the now purified emotion that was the object of representation and has been transformed into pure emotionality without place, time and subject. The complete identification between subject and object cuts the pragmatic-egoistic bonds of the empirical ego and the harness of desire, the cause of all suffering in the real world. Safe distance and total absorption make the aesthetic experience *alaukika*, that is unique and, therefore, completely different from the common worldly experience, as Abhinavagupta never tires of repeating.

In other words, the closely interlinked three steps of the aesthetic process progressively pull away from the common emotional experience of the ordinary man, from the *bhāva*, which is *laukika*, worldly *par excellence*. Proceeding backwards, the experience of an ordinary emotion is, first of all, the response of an embodied individual, aware of himself as an individual (the opposite of 'identification' with the aesthetic object of an artistic experience). Second, the intentional focus of the *bhāva* cannot but be one's own wellbeing, related as it is but also unmistakably detached from the situation of others' wellbeing (the opposite of the emotional peak of empathy). Third, the workaday emotion is always situated

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maṇḍapapadavidagdhagaṇikādibhir uparañjanaṃ samāśritam, yenāhṛdayo 'pi hṛdaya-vaimalyaprāptyā sahṛdayīkriyate, '[…] [Bharata] has resorted to the charming action (*uparañjana*) due to vocal and instrumental music, well-adorned playhouses, courtesans skilful in eloquence and so on, by means of which even a person devoid of any sensibility is turned into a connoisseur by obtaining a limpidity of the heart.' On the role of dance in preparing and furthering the aesthetic experience, see Ganser 2013. For a fuller treatment of the 'psychagogic' effect of the charming elements in theatre, see Ganser forthcoming.

within a determined space, time and cognizing subject, i.e. it is personal, it is particularized (the opposite of generalized).

Therefore, the emotional state of a blissful spectator who is contemplating a dramatic performance immersed in the experience of *rasa* is arrived at by the progressive overturning of the experience of the common man, immersed as he is in pleasure and pain and thus actively intent in the preservation of the former and the avoidance of the latter.[65] The reason for this analysis of some well-known aspects of Abhinavagupta's aesthetics is our contention that the actor's experience should be tentatively situated in a middle position between the two extremes that are the experience of the spectator and the experience of the common man.

In our interpretation of Bhaṭṭa Tauta's passage, whose ideas seem to be wholeheartedly shared by Abhinavagupta, the experience of the actor becomes a unique liminal experience, for which the aesthetic theory seems to offer a relatively detailed conceptualization, but no proper name. Thus, the performer does enjoy the emotional sympathy of *hṛdayasaṃvāda* already built upon the distancing in which the phenomenon of *sādhāraṇībhāva* consists. Nevertheless, thanks to his strenuously achieved *śikṣā* the actor does not move on to the last stage of identification *(tanmayībhāva)*, and thus he does not savour *rasa*.[66] He is still sympathetically engrossed in the performance, but not to the point of losing himself in the aesthetic experience to the detriment of tempo and so on *(layādibhaṅga)* laid out by the poet.[67] As noted

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[65] See ABh *ad* 6, *rasasūtra*, vol. 1, p. 276: 'according to the principle that [everyone] hates to be in contact with pain and is eager to savour pleasure' *(duḥkha-saṃśleṣavidveṣī sukhāsvādanasādaraḥ iti nyāyena)*.

[66] Our current research was kick-started by an intuition of Bansat-Boudon (1992: 150): 'Expérience limitée que celle de l'acteur, souligne encore Abhinavagupta [...], car circonscrite aux deux premières phases du processus esthétique— distanciation et sympathie—, garantes de la vérité de son jeu, quand il est donné au poète et au spectateur d'en connaitre les deux dernières : l'identification *(tanmayībhāva)* et le ravissement *(rasa)* où elle culmine.' However, we will show how the apparent 'limitation' of the actor's experience determines his unlimited freedom.

[67] It is the generalized emotional experience of the poet that remains the 'first mover' of the aesthetic process, and the actor must in principle adhere to the text composed by the playwright. See ABh *ad* 6.38, p. 288: *kavigatasādhā-raṇībhūtasaṃvinmūlaś ca kāvyapurassaro naṭavyāpāraḥ* ('Furthermore, insofar as it is rooted in the generalized consciousness of the poet, the activity of the actor is

above, there is no *rasa* in the actor, and yet the first chapter of the *Abhinavabhāratī* contains an ambiguous passage that seems to point to the actor's emotional engrossment.[68] Since the *tanmayī-bhāva* does not occur, the actor can keep a full control of his emotionality without yielding to the untamed and overwhelming flow of the aesthetic experience.[69] Therefore, the actor seems to remain free from his own emotional engrossment, although his emotional organ, so to speak, is active in the empathy (*hṛdaya-saṃvāda*) with the emotions of the portrayed character, which have reached a generalized state (*sādhāraṇībhāva*). The metaphor of the *pātra*, the cold vessel that is just an instrument to transfer the *rasa*, begins to exhibit its expressive limits. Even if a crucial distance is kept, the heart (*hṛdaya*) of the actor is somewhat part and parcel of the performance.[70] The paradox about the actor's

guided by poetry.') The poet and the spectator have and must have the same experience of *rasa*, as Abhinavagupta often repeats (see again ABh *ad* 6.38, p. 288: *tad evaṃ mūlaṃ bījasthāyinaḥ kavigato rasaḥ | kavir hi sāmājikatulya eva* 'Thus in this way the *rasa* present in the poet is the root, which is, so to say, the seed, for the poet is just like a spectator').

[68] See ABh *ad* 1.44, vol.1, p. 20: *rasānāṃ bhāvo bhāvanā kavinaṭasāmājikahṛdaya-vyāptiḥ* 'The essence of *rasa*s, i.e. their capacity to permeate, is the pervasion of the poet, the actor and the heart of the spectators.' The actor is said to be pervaded by *rasa*, but one may interpret this passage as just pointing to the fact that the actor is the necessary instrument for the transfer of *rasa*.

[69] On the contrary, Abhinavagupta seems to contemplate the possibility that the vocalists might undergo identification with the emotion while deeply engaged in the task of singing. See ABh *ad* NŚ 4.263cd–264ab, vol. 1, p. 173: *gāyatāṃ* [$E_{1(4)}^{pc}$; *gīyadā* $M_1 T_1$; *gīyatā* $E_{1(4)}^{ac}$] *padārthasaṃvādakṛtatanmayībhāvadagdhānāṃ* [conj. ; °*dagdhāyāś* M_1 T_1 $E_{1(4)}^{ac}$; °*baddhāyāś* $E_{1(1)}$ $E_{1(4)}^{pc}$] *ca sphuṭam eva sāttvi-kāṅgatāvalokanāt* (text based on the critical edition in Ganser forthcoming). 'Moreover, one clearly sees that singers, who are consumed as by fire through the identification [with the subject matter] (*tanmayībhāva*) based on the attunement (*saṃvāda*) [of their hearts] with the meaning of the lyrics [expressed in their songs], resort to the *sāttvika* [type of enactment].' Note again the reference to the second step, *hṛdayasaṃvāda*, on which the third one, the *tanmayībhāva*, is based.

[70] The term *hṛdaya*, 'heart' is liable to be misunderstood along the lines of an 'emotivistic' aesthetics, i.e. a theory of art that emphasises the role and the importance of emotions in opposition to reason and knowledge. However, the Sanskrit *hṛdaya* does not convey all the 'emotional' connotations and overtones that the term 'heart' and its cognates in other European languages do. On the contrary, the physical *hṛdaya* is often believed to be the abode of *manas*, the 'mind,' the organ of any mental activity. Otherwise, it is the place of, and a common metaphor for, the self or consciousness. For a survey on the history of this concept, see

emotional experience resurfaces at the very moment when it seemed to be dissolved. The analysis of the passage attributed to Bhaṭṭa Tauta shows that what is at stake is not the presence or absence of emotional involvement in the performer, but the active dimension of the actor's mastery over his own emotions, his capacity to emotionally mould his own consciousness in the service of the performance. Phenomenologically, this faculty already seems to imbue the activation of the first two steps of the aesthetic process which the actor partakes in, but it appears to be even more crucial as it impedes the culmination of the emotional response in a complete identification, in favour of a free, conscious, and only partial identification: the unique emotional experience of the actor.

The following table displays the steps of the emotional experience for the ordinary man, the actor, and the spectator (or possibly the poet). The actor's faculty we have so far mentioned only cryptically finds its name in the table — *sattva*, a crucial concept in Sanskrit dramaturgy, which we are going to analyse in greater depth below.

Ordinary Man	**Actor**	**Spectator**
Immersion in personal experience	Generalization (*sādhāraṇībhāva*)	Generalization (*sādhāraṇībhāva*)
Preoccupation for one's own wellbeing	Emotional correspondence (*hṛdayasaṃvāda*)	Emotional correspondence (*hṛdayasaṃvāda*)
Identification with one's own limited self	Active, partial, and voluntary identification by way of *sattva*	Identification (*tanmayībhāva*)
Ordinary emotional experience	Unique experience of the actor	Aesthetic emotional experience
bhāva	**[no Sanskrit term]**	*rasa*

Muller-Ortega 1989: 25–81. For its significance in Abhinavagupta's philosophical teaching, see Muller-Ortega 1989. For a non-emotivistic and fully cognitive interpretation of Abhinavagupta's aesthetic theory, see Cuneo 2007 (somewhat outdated).

5. *The concept of sattva in Bharata and Abhinavagupta*

> « [L]'acteur doit être sensible—c'est la notion centrale de *sattva*—s'il veut être vrai. Cependant, c'est d'une sensibilité active qu'il s'agit, d'une sensibilité travaillée et maitrisée, d'une sensibilité en quelque sorte distanciée. » Bansat-Boudon (1992: 29)

However revealing the theory of the three steps in the aesthetic experience may be (including the lack of the third step in the experience of the actor), it does not suffice to properly evaluate the performer's sympathetic but still in-control attitude towards the emotional material of the play, and the mechanism regulating it. So far, we have purposefully postponed the treatment of the crucial missing piece in the conception that Bharata and Abhinavagupta have of the actor: the idea of *sattva*. To anticipate some of our conclusions, we aim to argue that this pivotal concept offers the basis for the formulation of a theory of 'detached sensibility,' a somewhat paradoxical middle-ground between Stanislavski's immersion and Diderot's utter dispassion, a form of trained emotionality without emotional involvement.

5.1 *Bharata*

In two famous verses, Bharata affirms that theatre is based on *sattva*, and that acting can be judged excellent, provided it is based on *sattva*:

> The harmonious acting (*sāmānyābhinaya*)[71] is known as born from voice, body and *sattva*. An effort should be made in this respect [i.e. in *sattva*], since **theatre is based on *sattva***. When the acting has an exceeding *sattva*, it is said to be superior; when the *sattva* is average it is medium; and when there is lack of *sattva* it is inferior.[72]

What is this *sattva* on which theatre is based, the preminence of which determines an excellence in acting? As we know it from

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[71] On the concept of *sāmānyābhinaya*, see Bansat-Boudon 1989–1990, and 1992: 341–387, which contains a discussion of the different meanings assigned to this term.

[72] NŚ 22.1–2: *sāmānyābhinayo nāma jñeyo vāgaṅgasattvajaḥ | tatra kāryaḥ prayatnas tu nāṭyam sattve pratiṣṭhitam || sattvātirikto 'bhinayo jyeṣṭha ity abhidhīyate | samasattvo bhaven madhyaḥ sattvahīno 'dhamaḥ smṛtaḥ ||.*

other domains of Indian speculation, the word *sattva* is highly polysemic and can refer to a number of loosely related concepts. As an abstract noun, it is formed on the present participle of the verb 'to be' (*sat*, from the root *as*), and can be literally translated as 'the fact of existing,' thus designating a living being and the life principle itself, or something that is in existence, and thus reality itself. However, with a slight semantic shift, it can also refer to what is good, right and pure, based on one of the core meanings of *sat*[73] as a neuter noun.[74]

It is not an easy task to answer the question of what Bharata meant by the *sattva* of theatre and whether theatrical *sattva* does connect semantically to any or all of the senses just evoked, because of the composite nature of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* and because it is generally not easy to interpret Bharata eschewing Abhinavagupta's commentary. Moreover, our enquiry into Bharata's *sattva* is motivated by the main focus of this article, namely Abhinavagupta's analysis of the actor's experience and its contextualization within the field of dramaturgy and in relation to non-dualist Śaivism. However, we should strive at present to keep Bharata's and his commentator's views as far as possible separate from each other, if only to give full credit to Abhinavagupta's innovative take.

Now, in order to tackle the concept of *sattva* in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* and its use in theatre, we will deal briefly with a constellation of technical terms of dramaturgy, all connected to *sattva*. These are: the *sāttvika-bhāva*s, the *sāttvika-abhinaya*, the *sāttvika-alaṃkāra*s, and the *sāttvatī-vṛtti*.

5.1.1 *Sāttvikabhāva*

The ideal starting point of our unavoidably cursory enquiry is the only passage where Bharata makes some explicit statements about the nature of theatrical *sattva*. The prose passage in question is meant to explain the special status of a group of *bhāva*s that is mentioned for the first time in the summary of theatrical topics,

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[73] Van Buiten 1957: 88 recalls the common meaning of *sattva* as 'goodness' from the adjective *sat* meaning 'good.'

[74] On *sattva* in Sāṃkhya, see, for instance, van Buitenen 1957 and Larson 1979. On the wide semantic spectrum of *sattva* in the medical tradition, see Roşu 1978: 190–191.

squeezed between the list of the thirty-tree transitory states (*vya-bhicāribhāva*) and the four means of dramatic representation or acting registers (*abhinaya*):

> Paralysis, perspiration, horripilation, stammering, tremor, change of colour, tears and fainting. These are the eight known as *sāttvika*.[75]

As their names indicate, they are the *bhāva*s that are *sāttvika*, i.e. related to, based on, originating in, participating in *sattva*, all possible senses contemplated by the adjective formed by the *vṛddhi* of the initial syllable and addition of the secondary suffix *-ika-*. This term evidently covers the whole array of physical symptomatology of emotions that actors across cultures can display on the scene: weeping, sweating, blushing, and the like. As often repeated in the secondary literature, the *sāttvikabhāva*s correspond to the spontaneous and uncontrolled expressions of strongly felt emotions, and their representation on stage has often been understood to require from the actor a process of identification with his role.[76] However, while in ordinary life these bodily symptoms are the signs of strong emotions that escape the control of individuals and reveal their hidden intentions,[77] in theatre they have to be produced by actors at will, according to the requirements of the dramatic situation. This seems to be the point made by Bharata as he explains that the actor needs *sattva* to produce those bodily symptoms, and that is achieved by means of mental concentration:

> On this point it is said: Can the other *bhāva*s be enacted without *sattva* so that we can say that these are the *sāttvika* [*bhāva*s]? It is

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[75] NŚ 6.22: *stambhaḥ svedo 'tha romāñcaḥ svarabhedo 'tha vepathuḥ | vaivarṇyam aśru pralaya ity aṣṭau sāttvikāḥ smṛtāḥ ||*.

[76] For references to a mainstream interpretation in the relatively few works on Indian theatre dealing explicitly with the *sāttvikabhāva*s in Bharata's treatise, see Malinar 2010: 7. As Malinar's analysis reveals, much of the confusion in modern scholarship about the interpretation of the actor's emotional experience was due to a different reading in the prose passage after NŚ 7.93, coupled with a possible ambiguity in Bharata's words themselves, on which see below.

[77] In the Dharmaśāstras the manifestation of this symptomatology stands as a criterion for judging the truthfulness of a witness in a legal case. See Piovano 1997–1998: 648–649. Among the reactions betraying a fraudulent intention on the part of a witness one can clearly recognize some of the *sāttvikabhāva*s listed by Bharata.

answered: Here [i.e. in theatre], indeed, what is known as *sattva* originates in the mind. And it is so called thanks to the concentration of the mind.[78] When the mind is concentrated there is production of *sattva*. And its proper nature, which is characterized by horripilation, tears, change of colour etc.—obtained in accordance with the *bhāva*—cannot be produced by somebody whose mind is absent. Since theatre is a reproduction of the nature proper to the world, *sattva* is required [in it]. What is the paradigmatic example? Here [in theatre], the emotions made of pleasure and pain, brought about through the theatrical convention (*nātyadharmī*),[79] have to be refined by *sattva* in order to become similar [to worldly emotions]. Among those [emotions], how could pain, consisting in crying, be represented by someone not in pain, or pleasure, consisting in rapture, by someone not happy? This alone is his[80] *sattva*, thanks to which [an actor] can show tears or thrills of the hair, be he in pain or happy.[81] On this basis they are defined as *sāttvikabhāva*s. And they are: paralysis, perspiration, horripila-

[78] It would also be possible to read the abstract as containing a *bahuvrīhi*, which would amount to the fact that it is in somebody whose mind is concentrated that *sattva* arises, with a slight change of meaning. The syntax of the sentence might also point to some kind of implicit traditional etymology (*nirukti*) between *sattva* and *samādhā-*.

[79] NŚ 13.70–82 lists two conventions, or manners of performance (*dharmī*, or *dharma*, glossed by Abhinavagupta as *itikartavyatā*), used for representing things on the stage. The first is called *lokadharmī*, the 'worldly convention,' which is the way of enacting things in a realistic fashion or following the way things are in the world. The second is called *nātyadharmī*, the 'theatrical convention,' which involves a greater degree of stylization and dramatization, and follows ways that are proper to theatre. Besides a profuse usage of dance and songs, this convention includes the enactment of female roles by men, or those of old characters by young actors. On *lokadharmī* and *nātyadharmī*, see Bansat-Boudon 1992: 155–169 and Raghavan 1993: 201–241.

[80] The interpretation of the pronoun *asya* is uncertain. We follow the idea of Malinar (2010: 15) that it refers to the actor, but it might also refer simply to 'theatre' or to the 'mind,' with only a slight change of emphasis.

[81] As noted by Malinar, the editions by Ghosh and Unni have a slightly different text at this point: *aduḥkhitenāprahṛṣṭena vāśruromañcau pradarśayitavyau*, which she translates: 'Tränenfluss und das Aufrichten der Körperhaare müssen von einem zur Erscheinung gebracht, der weder unglücklich noch glücklich ist' (Malinar 2010: 15). Accordingly, she interprets *sattva* as the actor's capacity for intense concentration on the dramatic situation, so as to produce physical reactions that are similar to real-life ones, although not authentic: 'In dieser Version des Textes besteht die Kunst des Schauspielers darin, dass er *sāttvika-bhāva*s produzieren kann, ohne die Gefühle zu erleben, die im gewöhnlichen Leben Auslöser für den Tränenfluss etc. sind' (ibid.).

tion, stammering, tremor, change of colour, tears and fainting. These are the eight *sāttvika*[*bhāva*s] (NŚ 7.94).[82]

This all-important but critically controversial passage assigns a special status to a group of states, significantly named *sāttvika* as they require the intervention of *sattva* in order to be visibly manifested as physical reactions on the actor's body. And this *sattva* is produced by the actor through mental concentration, which already suggests an emotional detachment between the actor and the character portrayed: the actor needs mental concentration in order to produce the *sāttvikabhāva*s on his own body, independently from his personal and contingent emotive mood ('be he in pain or happy'), whereas in real life these symptoms are produced spontaneously but only in concomitance with a corresponding emotion (for instance, sorrow can be manifested by tears, and joy can be manifested by horripilation).

In the terse formulation of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, it would be possible to envisage some emotive state intervening between the actor's mental concentration and his display of symptoms such as tears and horripilation, if only because *sattva*, just like emotions, is a product of the mind. Moreover, Bharata does not specify how this mental concentration is carried out practically and what its object is, whether it involves a concentration on the dramatic situation[83] and the emotive condition of the character (as Lollaṭa would have probably interpreted this passage), or on the actor's own emotions as recollected in the phase of training (the stance of Bhaṭṭa Tauta against Śaṅkuka), or on both, one leading to the other: the

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[82] NŚ prose after 7.93: *atrāha kim anye bhāvāḥ sattvena vinābhinīyante yasmād ucyate ete sāttvikā iti? atrocyate—iha hi sattvaṃ nāma manaḥprabhavam | tac ca samāhitamanastvād ucyate | manasaḥ samādhau sattvaniṣpattir bhavati | tasya ca yo 'sau svabhāvo romāñcāśruvaivarṇyādilakṣaṇo yathābhāvopagataḥ sa na śakyo 'nyamanasā kartum iti | lokasvabhāvānukaraṇatvāc ca nāṭyasya sattvam īpsitam | ko dṛṣṭāntaḥ? iha hi nāṭyadharmīpravṛttāḥ* (corr. °*dharmī*°?) *sukhaduḥkhakṛtā bhāvās tathā sattvaviśuddhāḥ kāryā yathā sarūpā bhavanti | tatra duḥkhaṃ nāma rodanātmakaṃ tat katham aduḥkhitena sukhaṃ ca praharṣātmakam asukhitena vābhineyam? etad evāsya sattvaṃ yat duḥkhitena sukhitena vāśruromāñcau darśayitavyau iti kṛtvā sāttvikā bhāvā ity abhivyākhyātāḥ | ta ime—stambhaḥ svedo 'tha romāñcaḥ svarabhedo 'tha vepathuḥ | vaivarṇyam aśrupralaya ity aṣṭau sāttvikā matāḥ ||* (NŚ 7.94).

[83] Cf. Filliozat 1963: 339: 'ce qui permet a l'acteur de pleurer, c'est une activité particulière de sa sensibilité qu'il acquiert dans la concentration de son *manas* sur l'objet a imiter.'

actor concentrates on the emotion pervading a dramatic situation and this activates his own corresponsive emotion by a sympathetic process, which does not however culminate in complete identification (the position we have attributed to Abhinavagupta).[84] In all these possible scenarios, we cannot completely rule out some kind of emotional involvement on the part of the actor. On the contrary, the other option would be to consider it simply a question of technique, requiring a specific tuning of the actor's mind, just as in the enactment of the other *bhāva*s, for which a complete array of techniques—bodily stances and gaits, ways of delivering one's speech with the appropriate accent, voice and the like, conventional costumes and make up—is available to the actor. As we have shown in the previous section, the answer to this question needs to be seen as intrinsically connected with the various aesthetic theories propounded in the history of Sanskrit dramaturgy. But, since in the seminal text of this tradition we do not get a clear-cut version of a precise aesthetic theory, we are bound to tread lightly and tackle the issue from several angles.

The point at stake is that in theatre there is no spontaneous or uncontrolled emotional outburst on the part of the actor, but rather an intentional and controlled activation of *sattva*, through mental concentration (*samāhitamanas*), which allows him to produce the *sāttvikabhāva*s as *voluntary* physical reactions. The principle underlying the need for *sattva* is that theatre is a reproduction of the world (*lokasvabhāvānukaraṇa*), where people are seen crying when they are sad and having goose-bumps when happy.

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[84] Some translations seem to go in the direction of a deeper emotive involvement of the actor, like the one given by Bansat-Boudon (1991: 203), who translates the end of the passage (same version as the text given by Kavi) as follows: 'En pareil cas [celui des *sāttvikabhāva*], le *sattva* consiste en ceci : les larmes [de tristesse] et l'horripilation [de joie] doivent être [respectivement] montrées par quelqu'un de triste ou par quelqu'un de joyeux (*etad evāsya sattvaṃ yat duḥkhitena sukhitena vāśruromāñcau darśayitavyau*).' Such interpretation is indeed possible, as Malinar argued, only with the version of the text given by Kavi and provided one takes the question '*tatra duḥkhaṃ nāma rodanātmakaṃ tat katham aduḥkhitena sukhaṃ ca praharṣātmakam asukhitena vābhineyam?*' as a rhetorical one, implying that one must indeed become actually sad or happy to produce tears or goose-bumps (Malinar 2010: 17). Along similar lines, Raghavan (1981: 36) explained: '*Sattva* means the mental capacity of the actor to identify with the character and his feelings. [....] One who is not truly, or deeply in sorrow cannot shed tears; one who does not feel excitement or fear does not perspire.'

Thus, the actor needs a method to display those symptoms if the dramatic situation demands it. Moreover, these artificially induced physical reactions are in no necessary one-to-one relation with any internal emotional state that may be invariably inferred from their display. Bharata lists a plurality of causes in fact for each of these bodily reactions: tears can be caused by antithetical emotions such as joy and indignation, but also by external factors like smoke, collyrium, yawning, etc.[85] In this case, the *sāttvikabhāva*s are clearly the physical reactions to either emotive or environmental factors, to be displayed by an actor through *sattva*. However, just as in the case of other *bhāva*s, Bharata also lists the actions by which an actor should represent each of them: weeping should be enacted by rubbing the eyes or shedding tears, perspiration by grasping a fan, wiping off sweat, longing for breeze, etc.[86] It is important to remark in this connection that the *sāttvikabhāva*s function just like the other internal states that belong to the characters and are endowed with their appropriate *anubhāva*s or theatrical expressions achieved through the mimetic play of the body and voice, which however does not always coincide with the display of the corresponding external reactions, also called *sāttvikabhāva*s.

From Bharata's description of the *sāttvikabhāva*s, their causes and physical effects, we infer the implicit but important principle that the *sattva* of the actor has to be used to produce tears or other symptoms, even when these are caused by an external cause, for instance smoke. We also deduce that the presence of a *sāttvikabhāva* in the character does not always culminate in the external display of some involuntary symptoms, since to convey such states the actor can also have recourse to a simple action—grasping a fan to show perspiration—instead of mobilizing his own *sattva*.[87]

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[85] NŚ 7.97: *ānandāmarṣābhyāṃ dhūmāñjanajṛmbhaṇād bhayāc chokāt | animeṣaprekṣaṇataḥ śītād rogād bhaved aśru ||*.

[86] NŚ 7.106: *bāṣpāmbuplutanetratvān netrasammārjanena ca | muhur aśrukaṇāpātair āsraṃ tv abhinayed budhaḥ ||*; NŚ 7.102: *vyajanagrahaṇāc cāpi svedāpanayanena ca | svedasyābhinayo yojyas tathā vātābhilāṣataḥ ||*.

[87] The *sāttvikabhāva*s are also listed among the consequents of some *sthāyibhāva*s: tears, stammering, and change of color are listed among the *anubhāva*s of grief, for instance. Bharata also specifies that there are tears due to joy, affliction or jealousy. But, in order to become *anubhāva*s of those emotions, they need to be associated with specific theatrical characters: in a situation entailing sorrow, tears can only be displayed by women and by characters of the inferior type, since superior characters will show endurance in its stead.

The *sāttvikabhāva*s have therefore clearly a double nature: they have a psychic component that functions just as other emotions, endowed with causes and outer expressions, and they are themselves an outer, physical expression of inner states.[88] A possible translation for *sāttvikabhāva* could then be psychosomatic or psychophysical states, since they participate in both planes, the mental and the physical. As the examples of the *sāttvikabhāva*s as internal states or as visible reactions make clear, they are grounded in the character and the dramatic situations imagined by the poet, just like the other states and their symptomatology. However, their external form has to be artfully produced by an actor through the control of his mind. Now, in order to understand how *sattva* affects acting more generally, even outside the production of the *sāttvikabhāva*s, and to highlight the fundamental tension between *sattva* as a feature of the actor and/or a feature of the character, we will now examine the category of *sāttvikābhinaya*.

5.1.2 *Sāttvikābhinaya*

The *sāttvikābhinaya* is one of the four *abhinaya*s, means of dramatic representation or acting registers in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, listed together with bodily (*āṅgika*), vocal (*vācika*), and ornamental (*āhārya*) acting.[89] While specific chapters in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* are devoted to illustrating the technique for the other *abhinaya*s, there is no single chapter to present an exclusive and systematic treatment of the *abhinaya* called *sāttvika*. Therefore, scholarly opinions about what *sāttvikābhinaya* is diverge, ranging from a simple equation with the enactment of the *sāttvikabhāva*s alone, to that of all *bhāva*s and *rasa*s, to a general interpretation of this *abhinaya* as concerning the capacity of the actor to emote, mirroring the whole gamut of possibile interpretations given to the word *sattva* in the crucial passage above.[90] As Bharata states at the beginning of his treatment

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[88] As noted in Kulkarni 2003: 92, 'A careful look at Bharata's treatment of *karuṇa*, *vīra* and *adbhuta* would show that Bharata gives some of the *sāttvikabhāva*s as *anubhāva*s and some others as *vyabhicārin*s. This treatment implies that according to Bharata they partake of both characters—they are both *vyabhicāribhāva*s and *anubhāva*s.' On the dual nature of the *sāttvika*s, see Section 5.2.1.

[89] NŚ 8.10: *āṅgiko vācikaś caiva hy āhāryaḥ sāttvikas tathā | jñeyas tv abhinayo viprāś caturdhā parikīrtitaḥ ||*.

[90] Bansat-Boudon (1992: 146) translates *sāttvikābhinaya* as 'jeu émotionnel.'

of the *āṅgikābhinaya*, the treatment of the *sāttvikābhinaya* is given prior to it, in connection with the *bhāva*s, i.e. in chapter seven.[91] Even in the chapter on the harmonious acting (*sāmānyābhinaya*, NŚ 22), which combines the different acting registers as applied to concrete dramatic situations, we are told that the *abhinaya* produced from *sattva* was treated first, before proceeding to the complex protocol of the harmonious acting produced by the body and voice.[92] One can thus surmise that, in the hierarchy of the types of acting announced at the very outset of chapter 22, by superior acting was specifically intended the *sāttvikābhinaya*, i.e. the acting with an exceeding *sattva*. An allusion to the twofold nature of *sattva*, internal and external, which we have seen to be the foundation of the *sāttvikabhāva*s, may be at the basis of another verse in chapter 22, which follows the stated hierarchy of acting based on *sattva*:

> *Sattva* in its unmanifest form (*avyaktarūpa*) is known as based on the *bhāva*s; through its qualities (*guṇa*) such as horripilation, tears and the like, it is connected to the *rasa*s, according to their locus (NŚ 22.3).[93]

However, the rest of the *sāttvikābhinaya* described as part of the harmonious acting covers mainly a group of ornaments that are said to be produced from *sattva*. In them, *sattva* appears to belong to the character.[94]

5.1.3 *Sāttvikālaṃkāra*[95]

The *sāttvikālaṃkāra*s are a group of twenty 'ornaments' that are said to affect the body in connection with *bhāva*s and *rasa*s. They

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[91] NŚ 8.11: *sāttvikaḥ pūrvam uktas tu bhāvaiś ca sahito mayā | aṅgābhinayam evādau gadato me nibodhata ||*.

[92] This is made clear in NŚ 22.40, at the end of the treatment of the *sāttvika-sāmānyābhinaya*: *sattvajo 'bhinayaḥ pūrvaṃ mayā prokto dvijottamāḥ | śārīraṃ cāpy abhinayaṃ vyākhyāsyāmy anupūrvaśaḥ ||*.

[93] NŚ 22.3: *avyaktarūpaṃ sattvaṃ hi vijñeyaṃ bhāvasaṃśrayam | yathāsthānaraso-petaṃ romāñcāsrādibhir guṇaiḥ ||*.

[94] This ambiguity as to the locus of *sattva*, which we shall explore further, is reflected in Bansat-Boudon's statement: 'Le *sāttvikābhinaya* se définit comme le registre de jeu capable de rendre le *sattva* du personnage grâce au *sattva* de l'acteur' (1991: 202).

[95] The term *sāttvikālaṃkāra* does not appear, to the best of our knowledge, in the treatises of the Nāṭyaśāstra tradition. However, this is a useful expression to talk

are particularly evident in young women, in which they manifest as bodily modifications (*vikāra*) affecting their facial expression and limbs.[96] The first three—*bhāva, hāva* and *helā*—are called 'bodily' (*aṅgaja*) and said to proceed from an embodied condition of *sattva*: *dehātmakaṃ bhavet sattvaṃ sattvād bhāvaḥ samutthitaḥ | bhāvāt samutthito hāvo hāvād dhelā samutthitā* (NŚ 22.6). They are exhibited in the character, a young woman, and produced on her body as modalities of *sattva* (*sattvabheda*).[97] Although the exact significance of the three bodily ornaments is difficult to grasp, they, as well as the other ornaments, seem to be based on the different degrees of a young woman's involvement in the amorous sentiment. Depending on her age and situation, these variously affect her body as well as her behaviour. It is tempting to translate these *alaṃkāra*s as 'coquetries,' which translate theatrically into a play of love and seduction.[98] The remaining ornaments are called 'natural' (*svabhāvika*) and 'effortless' (*ayatnaja*). The former includes flirtatious behaviours connected to a love situation, such as the playful imitation of the beloved by the woman (*līlā*), or the confusion due to love and excitement (*vibhrama*). The latter covers more stable qualities such as beauty (*śobhā*), sweetness (*mādhurya*) or audacity (*prāgalbhya*), which affect the outer behaviour of women and thus lend themselves to theatrical display. Although this is not stated anywhere in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, the *sāttvikābhinaya* required by an actor in order to show the flirtatious behaviour of women, or their natural graces, cannot be equated *tout court* with the display of the *sāttvikabhāva*s, but needs to be intended in a broader way. One may tentatively understand the *sāttvikasāmānyābhinaya* as the harmonious enactment of the *sattva*

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about a group of ornaments (*alaṃkāra*s) related to the temperament of women and men. We borrow it from Bansat-Boudon 1991. Although *sattva* is explicitly mentioned only in relation to the first three *alaṃkāra*s (*bhāva, hāva, helā*), and to the eight *alaṃkāra*s of men, one might safely claim that all of them—i.e. the three 'bodily' (*aṅgaja*), the ten 'natural' (*svabhāvika*) and the seven 'effortless' (*ayatna-ja*) ones—are *sāttvika*, since they are described in the section on the *sāttvi-kasāmānyābhinaya*, as confirmed at the end of this section in NŚ 22.40 (cf. n. 92).

[96] NŚ 22.4: *alaṅkārās tu nāṭyajñair jñeyā bhāvarasāśrayāḥ | yauvane 'bhyadhikāḥ strīṇāṃ vikārā vaktragātrajāḥ ||*.

[97] NŚ 22.7: *bhāvo hāvaś helā ca parasparasamutthitāḥ | sattvabhedāḥ bhavanty ete śarīre prakṛtisthitāḥ ||*.

[98] On the theatricality of the *sāttvikālaṃkāra*s, see Bansat-Boudon 1991: 210–225, drawing on Abhinavagupta's commentary.

of the character rather than the harmonious acting by the *sattva* of the actor.

5.1.4 Sāttvatī

Sāttvatī is the name of one of four *vṛtti*s—'manners' or 'styles,' as they are often translated—along with the *bhāratī*, 'the verbal or vocal,' the *kaiśikī*, 'the gorgeous or graceful,' and the *ārabhaṭī*, the 'dynamic or violent,' whose origin is traced in NŚ 20 to the combat of Viṣṇu with the demons Madhu and Kaiṭabha.[99] The *vṛtti*s are linked to separate moments in this mythical martial combat: the vigorous stepping of Viṣṇu on the earth to the *bhāratī*, his moving around with the bow, full of *sattva*, to the *sāttvatī*,[100] the graceful tying up of his hair to the *kaiśikī*, and the hand-to-hand violent fighting to the *ārabhaṭī*. In theatrical practice they translate into features that concern both particular moments in the storyline of a play, as well as the ways these are represented on stage. With regard to the *sāttvatī*, *sattva* is implicitly given as one of its main features, in the form of a mental quality (*guṇa*), together with other traits such as an excessive excitement and the removal of sorrow.[101] Its further link with some particular *rasa*s—heroism, marvel, and fury—and vehement characters (*uddhatapuruṣa*)[102] suggests that here *sattva* is intended as the character's *sattva*, presumably understood as one of the three *guṇa*s, which determines a certain temperament in male characters. In a similar vein we can also understand the ornaments of men—since there are also eight modalities of *sattva* for men, listed in NŚ 22.33 as beauty, playfulness, grace, firmness, depth, charm, magnanimity, and ar-

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[99] On the *vṛtti*s, see Wright 1963, Bansat-Boudon 1992: 169–180 and 1995, and Lidova 2014.

[100] NŚ 20.12: *valgitaiḥ śārṅgadhanuṣas tīvrair dīptatarair atha | sattvādhikair asaṃbhrāntaiḥ sāttvatī tatra nirmitā ||*. Here *sattva* could be understood as the mental concentration of Viṣṇu, compared to an archer, or as a temperamental attitude connected to vehemence and heroism, as the theatrical *vṛtti* requires, see below. The term *sāttvatī* with geminate 't' is used in most primary and secondary sources. However, *sātvatī* is the form closer to the etymology (*sat-vat* → *sātvata*), as also given by Abhinavagupta (cf. § 5.2.5).

[101] NŚ 20.41: *yā sātvateneha guṇena yuktā nyāyena vṛttena samanvitā ca | harṣotkaṭā saṃhṛtaśokabhāvā sā sāttvatī nāma bhavet tu vṛttiḥ ||*.

[102] NŚ 20.43: *vīrādbhutaraudrarasā nirastaśṛṅgārakaruṇanirvedā | uddhatapuruṣaprāyā parasparādharṣaṇakṛtā ca ||*.

dour[103]—as the outer expressions of an inner temperament, affecting the character's behaviours and actions.

5.1.5 *Bharata's sattva unravelled*

To sum up, as far as Bharata's text is concerned, a certain hesitation remains as to whether we should connect *sattva* with the character or the actor, or both. Or rather, the same term *sattva* is used with different nuances of meaning when it refers to the sphere of real life that encompasses the characters and their fictional world or to the sphere of theatrical acting that encompasses the art and the experience of the actors.

As far as characters and thus human beings in general are concerned, all the theatrical components that have to do with *sattva* pertain to the connection between mental and physical processes. Thus, *sattva* appears to be a universal human component that affects or even determines both the inner temperament and the physical appearance. It can sometimes escape its unmanifest condition and affect the bodily plane: this is the case of the momentary outburst of intensely felt emotions and their manifestation as tears, perspiration, etc., which is normally the affair of unconscious or uncontrolled processes of the order of the *lapsus corporis*.[104] Or it can manifest in the form of a diffused general pattern of behaviour that pervades the body and reveals a certain temperament, mainly a controlled or 'staged' behaviour. It is a kind of middle ground between the affects and their effects, and, as Abhinavagupta explains, it constitutes the necessary bridge between the different planes of an emotion, the unmanifest and the manifest.

For the actors and their performance during a play, conversely, *sattva* is a voluntary product of mental concentration, as

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[103] NŚ 22.33: *śobhā vilāso mādhuryaṃ sthairyaṃ gāmbhīryam eva ca | lalitaudārya-tejāṃsi sattvabhedās tu pauruṣāḥ ||.*

[104] This phrase is borrowed from Pancer 2011, which explores the physiological and bodily expression of emotions in western medieval literature in its twofold dimension of a spontaneous and involuntary display—the *lapsus corporis*—and a voluntary and public one, which the author compares to a performance. These psychophysical expressions, such as tears, smiles, blushing, trembling from rage or fear, are called by Pancer somatic gestures, either involuntary or controlled, which remind one of the *sāttvikabhāva*s.

Bharata tells us. It originates from an effort to display those physical manifestations that in ordinary life escape the individual's control, but that must be rendered on stage in order to reveal the emotional upheavals of a fictional character.[105] To understand how this actor's feat is achieved from a technical point of view, we now shift our attention to Abhinavagupta's commentary.

5.2 Abhinavagupta

As is the case with other elements that look disparate in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, possibly because of the composite nature of this text, Abhinavagupta attempts to reconcile the different uses of *sattva* we have discussed in the previous section. The underlying rationale appears to be, even more explicitly than in Bharata, the twofold nature of theatrical *sattva* as the character's *sattva* and the actor's *sattva*. What Abhinavagupta also achieves is bringing together these different dimensions of *sattva* in a coherent way by introducing a new concept, that of *prāṇa*, by means of which he manages to combine all the other aspects of *sattva* (as temperament, and as a quality of the mind), in a single theory, capable to do full justice to the emotive experience of the actor.

5.2.1 Internal and external sattva

As mentioned above, already for Bharata the *sāttvikabhāva*s possess a dual nature: on the one hand, they are listed as emotional states belonging to the characters and expressed by some actions; on the other, those eight physical symptoms are listed among those very actions that give them outer expression, that is, as consequents of emotions, thereby falling under the sphere of enactment. The *sāttvikabhāva* 'trembling' (*kampa*, a synonym of *vepathu*), for instance, can be caused by cold, fear, joy, fury, touch, and old age, and is expressed by trembling, quivering and shaking.[106]

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[105] In quickly summarising the various aspects of *sattva*, Filliozat (1963: 339) adds a level that we have not touched upon here yet, although it is implicit in the recognition that *sattva* is a universal human component: also the spectators can partake in the *sāttvikabhāva*s as a feature of their emotional response to art. For more on *sattva* in the spectator, see Cuneo and Ganser 2022.

[106] NŚ 7.96cd: *śītabhayaharṣaroṣasparśajarārogajaḥ kampaḥ ||*; NŚ 7.104cd: *vepanāt sphuraṇāt kampād vepathuṃ sampradarśayet ||.*

Abhinavagupta discloses what was latent in Bharata, namely that 'the *sāttvika* [*bhāva*s] partake of both the nature of transitory state and that of enactment.'[107] Besides this twofold dimension of the *sāttvikabhāva*s as mental phenomena (primarily belonging to the character) and bodily signs (theatrically displayed by the actor), Abhinavagupta suggests that there are also intermediate manifestations. With regard to the change of colour, tears, and breaking of the voice, listed first among the consequents of *karuṇarasa* and then again among its transitory states, Abhinavagupta states that the *sāttvikabhāva*s participate in both since they have an inner, mental nature as well as an outer, physical one, although there is no invariable concomitance between the two:

> Change of colour, tears, and breaking of the voice are taken in this passage as mental modes (*cittavṛtti*), whose [inner] nature has been manifested outwardly. To illustrate: there are people who say: 'his throat is full of tears, but there is no water in his eyes.' In fact, as we have already said and as we will state again, these [*sāttvikabhāva*s], such as tears and the others, have been illustrated[, in the summary of the topics of theatre (NŚ 6.22)], between the transitory states and the enactments, so as to show that they partake in the nature of both.[108]

Evidently, the *sāttvikabhāva* 'tears' (*aśru*) here belongs to the character in a particular situation, whose emotional intensity—as well as the inner temperament proper to the role, as we shall see—determine its outer display either as real tears, or just as a lump in the throat. The actor's enactment will conform to this worldly state of affairs, the difference being that, as Bharata already put it, his physical tears are produced through mental concentration, that is to say, they are an artifice. However, we will see that this 'art' requires more than a cold, mechanical technique. So, how does this happen?

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[107] Abh *ad* 6.22, vol. 1, p. 269: *sāttvikā vyabhicārivṛttam abhinayavṛttaṃ copajīvanti.* The equation of the *anubhāva*s—the consequences of an emotion—with the *abhinaya*s—the enactments or stage rendering of these very consequents by an actor—is typical of Abhinavagupta's exegesis.

[108] ABh *ad* prose before 6.62, vol. 1, p. 312: *vaivarṇyāśrusvarabhedā atra bahirudbhinnasvabhāvāś cittavṛttyātmāno gṛhyante | tathā hi vaktāro bhavanti 'aśruṇā pūrṇo 'sya kaṇṭho na ca nayanajalaṃ dṛṣṭam' iti | ete hy aśruprabhṛtayo vyabhicāritvābhineyatvopajīvanāyaiva madhye nirdiṣṭā ity avocāma vakṣyāmaś ca |.*

5.2.2 Sattva as mindfulness

Abhinavagupta explains that this concentration requires a special effort (cf. NŚ 22.1cd: *tatra kāryaḥ prayatnas tu nāṭyaṃ sattve pratiṣṭhitam*) on the part of actors, and not just the mastery of a technique through training, as is required by the other acting media. Abhinavagupta identifies this effort with mental concentration:

> If [theatre] were produced from the voice and body alone, it could be accomplished even without an effort; but this [*sāmānyābhinaya*] is born from voice, body and *sattva*, theatre is based on *sattva*, and *sattva* is issued from the concentration of the mind (*manaḥsamādhāna*). Therefore, it is said that it cannot be accomplished without a superlative effort.[109]

Clearly enough, resounding in the background of the commentator's mind is Bharata's explanation in NŚ 7.94 on how the *sattva* needed to display the *sāttvikabhāva*s is produced by the actor (*manasaḥ samādhau sattvaniṣpattir bhavati*).[110] If *sattva* is presented here as what is issued when the mind is concentrated, in another passage Abhinavagupta glosses *sattva* as that very concentration, using the word *cittaikāgryam*, 'mental intentness,' most likely a synonym of *manaḥsamādhāna*: '*Sattva* means mental intentness, what is produced out of that (i.e. the internal *sāttvikabhāva*s), and also the artifice that consists in the state in which tears and so forth (i.e. the external *sāttvikabhāva*s) ensue. This has to be evaluated according to circumstances' (*sattvaṃ cittaikāgryaṃ tajjanitaṃ ca kṛtakaṃ bāṣpādiprāptyavasthātmakaṃ ceti yathāyogaṃ mantavyam*, ABh *ad* 7.2, vol. 1, p. 340). In all such cases, *sattva* is intended as a qualifier of that type of enactment designated as *sāttvikābhinaya*, the psychophysical acting of which *sattva* is the main instrument.[111]

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[109] ABh *ad* 22.1, vol. 3, pp. 149–150: *yadi vāgaṅgajam eva syāt prayatnaṃ vināpi siddhiḥ syāt, vāgaṅgasattvajo 'sau, sattve ca nāṭyaṃ pratiṣṭhitam, sattvaṃ ca manaḥsamādhānajam | tasmād bhūyasā prayatnena vinā (na) siddhyatīti |*. We do accept what seems to be a conjecture '*(na)*' on the part of the editor.

[110] Bharata's definition and possibily Abhinavagupta's interpretation resonate in the *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* (p. 169): *avahitaṃ manaḥ sattvaṃ tatprayojanaṃ hetur asyeti sāttvikaḥ | mano 'navadhāne hi na śakyanta eva svarabhedādayo naṭena darśayitum |*.

[111] In this connection, see Bansat-Boudon's comment about Bharata's statement that theatre is based on *sattva*, read in the light of the *Abhinavabhāratī*: 'il faut lire : *nāṭyaṃ sattve pratiṣṭhitam* [NŚ XXII 1b] et comprendre: *sāttvike tv abhinaye nāṭyaṃ pratiṣṭhitam*' (Bansat-Boudon 1992: 364 n. 366).

This *sattva* coincides, at the beginning of the process, with mental concentration or intentness, which we can now translate as 'mindfulness.'

According to Bharata, the enactment that excels in *sattva* guarantees a superior performance (NŚ 22.2ab: *sattvātirikto 'bhinayo jyeṣṭha ity abhidhīyate*). Abhinavagupta explains it as the enactment where the *sāttvikābhinaya* prevails over the vocal and the bodily elements, i.e. the enactment that is aptly brought to excellence, to a state of presence before the audience, because pleasure culminates in *rasa* (ABh *ad* 22.2, vol. 3, p. 150: *suṣṭhu samyag abhimukhī-bhāvaṃ sauṣṭhavaṃ nīto bhavati rasaparyantatvāt prīter iti bhāvaḥ*). A performance in which the *sāttvikābhinaya* is less developed than the other two, on the contrary, does not produce an enactment in the fullest sense. Abhinavagupta explains that to enact dramatically means to produce a cognition similar to a direct perception, whose soul is the occurrence of the generalization of the emotion. That is why theatre is said to be based on *sattva*.[112]

Abhinavagupta's explanation of the *sattva* of theatre, characterizing the *sāttvikābhinaya*, draws on a well-known etymology of *abhinaya* as that which brings the objects directly in front of the spectator. In this sense we can understand the *sāttvikābhinaya* as that which communicates the emotions in a particularly intense way.[113] This is achieved through the actor's mindfulness, his privileged instrument for producing the visible signs of those emotions, which renders them vividly present and life-like, triggering the aesthetic experience of the spectator, where the generalization of the emotion (*cittavṛttisādhāraṇatā*, working here as a synonym of *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*), artfully achieved through the enactment, is followed by the sympathetic response and identification of the spectators, culminating in *rasa*.[114]

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[112] ABh *ad* 22.2, vol. 3, p. 150: *yadi tv itarāpekṣayā sāttviko nyūnas tarhi abhinaya-kriyā svarūpeṇāpūrṇā saṃpadyata ity arthaḥ | sāttvikābhāve hy abhinayakriyā nāmāpi nonmīlati | abhinayanaṃ hi cittavṛttisādhāraṇatāpattiprāṇasākṣātkārakalpādhyava-sāyasaṃpādanam iti, ata evoktaṃ sattve nāṭyaṃ pratiṣṭhitam iti|*.

[113] For a close parallel in Kumārasvāmin's commentary on the *Pratāparudrīya*, see Cuneo and Ganser forthcoming.

[114] Another mention of the taxonomy of acting based on the degrees of *sattva* is found in the chapter on acting through hand gestures. It clarifies that the presence of *sattva* depends first of all on the type of scene to be enacted, the actor's mindfulness being only its necessary consequence. See ABh *ad* 9.173.

Let us now move to the other dimensions of *sattva* evoked above and turn to the procedure by which an actor transforms this mental concentration from its unmanifest form to its outer manifestations, tears, orripilation, etc., conceived as its qualities.

5.2.3 Sattva as prāṇa

The explanation of the physiology of *sattva* is found in the commentary on Bharata's verse about the unmanifest *sattva* and its visible symptoms.[115] The link between the internal *sattva* and the external one is in fact explained there in clear terms as the transfer of a purely mental phenomenon (*cittavṛtti*) that ends up pervading also the body.

What Bharata calls *sattva* is this psycho-somatic element that has the capacity to cross the boundaries between inner feeling and outer expression: 'In this [passage] the mental mode itself [resides] on the plane of awareness. Once it is transferred, it ends up pervading also the body. And that very [mental mood that gets transferred] takes the name of *sattva*' (*iha cittavṛttir eva saṃvedanabhūmau saṃkrāntā deham api vyāpnoti. saiva ca sattvam ucyate*, ABh *ad* 22.3, vol. 3, p. 152).[116] The whole difficulty of this passage lies in understanding how a mental mood can move from the psy-

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[115] NŚ 22.3: *avyaktarūpaṃ sattvaṃ hi vijñeyaṃ bhāvasaṃśrayam | yathāsthānarasopetaṃ romāñcāsrādibhir guṇaiḥ ||*.

[116] It is indeed tempting to read *saṃvedanabhūmau* with *saṃkrāntā*, '[the *cittavṛtti*] transferred to the plane of awareness,' were it not for the likely equation of *saṃvedana* with *saṃvit*, the term used immediately thereafter to describe the specifically *initial* condition of the unmanifest *sattva* (later followed by *prāṇa*, and finally the body). The sense would rather require an ablative of provenance, *saṃvedanabhūmeḥ: '[the *cittavṛtti*] transferred from the plane of consciousness [it pervades also the body].' This ablative meaning finds indeed a parallel a few lines below, in a passage that resumes the same position and introduces another type of *sattva* (see below): *saṃvedanarūpāt prasṛtaṃ yat sattvaṃ tad vicāritam, anyat tu dehadharmatvenaiva sthitaṃ sāttvikam* (ABh *ad* 22.3, vol. 3, p. 153). Perceiving the difficulty, Filliozat (1963: 341) seems to take *saṃvedana* as a larger term including a series of mental processes that end up in the body: 'Ce qui est appelé ici *sattva* est cette activité de la sensibilité qui ayant parcouru tout le terrain de la conscience pure pénètre même le corps.' Malinar (2010: 20) understands *saṃvedana* as sensibility, a sort of middle ground between the mental and the bodily. Reaching the plane of *saṃvedana* works here as a sort of *conditio sine qua non* for the mental state to be felt and consciously realized, i.e. to become *sattva* and therefore permeate the body and produce reactions on it.

chic to the physical plane. Here this is equated with a transfer of *sattva*. Abhinavagupta provides an indication when he adds *prāṇa* as a new element:

> In this regard, moreover, the unmanifest *sattva*, not descended from the two planes of consciousness and vital breath, has to be known only on the basis of the chapter on the *bhāva*s (i.e. NŚ 7). And its qualities that have attained the limits of the body—horripilation and the others—have also been stated to some extent there [in the chapter on the *bhāva*s].[117]

The *prāṇa*, or vital breath, functions here as an intermediate element between the mental mood and the bodily manifestation, and *sattva* is said to abide in these three planes and to move between them. The direction is always from a subtle, mental plane, to the physical one, passing through the *prāṇa*. If *sattva* is a mental mood (*cittavṛtti*)—namely an emotional state (*bhāvasaṃśraya*)—that pervades also the body, one may say that the physical reactions to those internal moods are also ultimately emotional in nature. From the point of view of the spectator, the specific emotion of the character can be understood only with reference to a particular *rasa*, since their display alone can be traced to various causes, as pointed out earlier.[118]

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[117] ABh *ad* 22.3, vol. 3, p. 152: *tatra cāvyaktaṃ saṃvitprāṇabhūmidvayānipatitaṃ yat sattvaṃ tad bhāvādhyāsaṃśrayatvenaiva vijñeyam | tasya ca ye guṇā dehaparyantāṃ prāptā dharmā* [Ed. *dharma°*] *romāñcādayaḥ te 'pi tatraivoktāḥ kiṃcit* | Considering that the unmanifest *sattva* should abide on the plane of consciousness alone, in the form of the eight *sāttvikabhāva*s before they turn into their physical attributes, Bansat-Boudon (1991: 204–205) proposes to correct the text and read *saṃvitprāṇa[deha]bhūmidvayānipatitam*, 'Quant au [*sattva*] non manifesté (*avyakta*) qui, [du niveau] de la conscience (*saṃvit*), n'est pas descendu au double plan du souffle (*prāṇa*) [et du corps] […].' We think, instead, that the *avyakta sattva* should include the double plane of consciousness and *prāṇa*, as is known from the chapter on the *bhāva*s. This could be an allusion to a further discussion on *sattva* as *prāṇa* in Abhinavagupta's lost commentary on this chapter. Part of these lost developments might have found their way into Hemacandra's *Kāvyānuśāsana* (see Cuneo and Ganser forthcoming).

[118] See Abhinavagupta's explanation of the compound *yathāsthānarasopetaṃ*: 'The expression "according to the place" (*yathāsthāna*) means "a locus in relation to a *rasa*," as for example, a (superior) man and woman in relation to *śṛṅgāra*, Demons and Dānavas in relation to *raudra*, an inferior character in relation to *bhayānaka*. That *sattva* is accompanied by, i.e. connected with, the various *rasa*s without transgressing that [locus]. In [Bharata's] verse the word *bhāva* [in *bhāvasaṃśrayam*] means "[based on] the chapter on the *bhāva*s".' (*yathāsthānam iti*

The vital breath, although sharing the unmanifest dimension of *sattva*, is set at the frontier between the purely mental and the bodily *sattva*, and allows indeed the communication between the two spheres (ABh *ad* 22.3, vol. 3, p. 153: *cittavṛttirūpaṃ yat sattvaṃ tad bhūkāyasaṃkrāntaprāṇadehadharmatāvaśād bhavad api* […] 'That *sattva*, consisting in a mental mood, exists also on account of its being a property of the body, when *prāṇa* is transferred to the gross body […]'). The specification that *sattva* is, in its first unmanifest stage, a *cittavṛtti* may suggest that a general theory of how emotions assume a physical form is intended here. The term '*cittavṛtti*' is normally used by Abhinavagupta to designate the various states (the *sthāyi-*, the *vyabhicāri-*, and the *sāttvika- bhāva*s) in their outmost generality: emotions in the world and in the fictional world of drama. As we have seen, actual worldly emotions do not belong in the experience of the actor, unless we understand that this emotive state is indeed the first product of mindfulness and itself a form of *sattva* in its subtlest form of *cittavṛtti*.

In any case, from the point of view of the actor, not only is the production of *sattva* a conscious process, achieved through the control of the mind (and hence of his own emotionality), but it is also the result of a 'semi-yogic' technique that involves the conscious control over the breathing processes, the *prāṇa*, in order to obtain the visible signs of the emotions required by the dramatic situation. In the first chapter of the *Abhinavabhāratī*, we find one clear hint to a technique for fixing the *prāṇa* in the body and obtain the visible manifestations of the *sāttvikabhāva*s.

> Should one place the breath between the eye-brows, one has paralysis; tears relate to the eyes; perspiration, in the heart; tremor, in

yasya rasasya yat sthānaṃ, tadyathā śṛṅgārasya (uttamau) strīpuṃsau raudrasya rakṣodānavādiḥ, bhayānakasyādhamaprakṛtiḥ, tadanatikrameṇa raseṣūpetaṃ sambaddhaṃ tat sattvam | bhāvaśabenātra bhāvādhyāyaḥ (uktaḥ), ABh *ad* 22.3, vol. 3, p. 152). This passage clarifies that the internal manifestations of *sattva* are known through their external symptoms only in relation to a certain character and to the whole emotional configuration, here indicated by the word *rasa*. The reference to the chapter on the *bhāva*s shows that the actor should be acquainted with the complex emotional configurations that are determinant for his choice of the right display of the *sāttvikabhāva*s. Chapter seven lists the various *sāttvika-* and *vyabhicāri-bhāva*s appropriate to the *rasa*s (NŚ 7.108–118). Abhinavagupta's interpretation of NŚ 22.3 is a response to a very different understanding of the same passage by Śrī Śaṅkuka and others (ibid. pp. 150–152), partly translated in Pollock 2016: 84.

the anus; horripilation, in the forehead; change of colour, in the face; breaking of the voice, in the throat; fainting, in the interior of the nose.[119]

Interestingly, this verse is not given in connection with the description of acting techniques, but in the commentary on Bharata's verse justifying the teaching of the knowledge of theatre to actors, who are said to be 'seers who know the secrets of the Vedas' (*veda-guhyajñā ṛṣayaḥ*, NŚ 1.23ab). The secrets, explains Abhinavagupta, are those of the inner self, and the ability of actors in this regard consists in their capacity to bring about the psychophysical reactions. Again, their achievement through the *sattva* and the mental effort required from the mind—*sattvaṃ manaḥprayatnanirva-rtyam*—are stressed with regard to the actor's technique of breath control, worthy of a yogin.[120]

The ideal actor is therefore credited to be in complete mastery of his emotionality, including the capacity to turn his mind to any part of the body, via a controlled directionality of the breath, in order to obtain the affective effects that in ordinary life escape one's conscious control. It should moreover be stressed that Abhinavagupta links this capacity of self control, investing the mind and cultivated through the greatest efforts, to the possibility for an actor to achieve the supreme goal of mankind when he states in the same passage: *naṭasyāpi paramapuruṣārthalābho dhāra-ṇādivaśāt.*[121]

5.2.4 Sattva as temperament

We start to get the clear impression that *sattva*, in its threefold dimension of mental mood, breath, and bodily reaction, should actually relate to the character too, or, better even, to the real-life person and, only by reflection, to the fictional character that the actor impersonates on stage.

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[119] ABh *ad* 1.23, p. 17: *nyasyet prāṇaṃ bhruvor madhye stambho bāṣpaś ca cākṣuṣaḥ | svedo hṛdi gude kampaḥ pulako mūrdhni vaktrataḥ | vaivarṇyam svaritaṃ kaṇṭhe pralayo nāsikāntare ||.*

[120] As noted above, the verse of Bharata at the basis of these considerations was among the many eulogistic statements on the actor found in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, for which see Ganser and Cuneo 2012.

[121] ABh *ad* 1.23, p. 17.

There is yet another *sattva*, says Abhinavagupta, which manifests exclusively on the body in the form of 'ornaments of gesture' (*ceṣṭālaṃkāra*), the already mentioned twenty ornaments, or *sāttvi-kālaṃkāra*s, to follow the Sanskrit designation coined by Bansat-Boudon. These are given by Bharata in the chapter on *sāmānyābhi-naya* in the verses on the *sāttvikālaṃkāra*s (NŚ 22.4–6):

> *alaṃkārās tu nāṭyajñair jñeyā bhāvarasāśrayāḥ |*
> *yauvane 'bhyadhikāḥ strīṇāṃ vikārā vaktragātrajāḥ ||*
> *ādau trayo 'ṅgajās teṣāṃ daśa svābhāvikāḥ pare |*
> *ayatnajās punaḥ sapta rasabhāvopabṛṃhitāḥ ||*
> *dehātmakaṃ bhavet sattvaṃ sattvād bhāvaḥ samutthitaḥ |*
> *bhāvāt samutthito hāvo hāvād dhelā samutthitā ||*

> But the ornaments based on *bhāva*s and *rasa*s are known by the experts on theatre as the additional modifications of women during youth, arising on their face and limbs. Among them, the first three are 'bodily,' the successive ten are 'natural,' and the next seven are 'effortless.' These are enhanced by *rasa*s and *bhāva*s. *Sattva* will be centred in the body, from *sattva* arises *bhāva* ('feeling'), from *bhāva* arises *hāva* ('excitement'), and from *hāva* arises *helā* ('passion').

According to Abhinavagupta, these verses introduce a further sense of *sattva* that is part of the gross or manifest *sattva*, and thus differs from the unmanifest *sattva*, the one that travels all the way from the mental plane, passing through the *prāṇa* and attaining the limits of the physical body. First Abhinavagupta recalls the primary meaning of *sattva*, before explaining the *sattva* of the ornaments of gesture:

> That *sattva* in the form of a mental mood, which exists also on account of being a property of the body, when the *prāṇa* is transferred to the gross body (*bhūkāya*), has been described in detail in the chapter on *bhāva*s and in the one on *rasa*s.[122] Why then mentioning this [*sattva*] again? Why should the form of this material *sattva* (*bhūsattva*) be stated? Bharata answers with the fourth

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[122] The compound *bhūkāyasaṃkrāntaprāṇadehadharmatāvaśād* is not straightforward, but we would like to keep *prāṇa* on the side of the unmanifest *sattva*, or as a middle way between the mind and the body. Bansat-Boudon translates differently and reads this passage in support of a twofold materiality that is opposed to the *avyakta-sattva*: 'Bien qu'[on perçoive qu']il existe du fait d'attributs qui, se transférant [du plan de la conscience] à [celui de] ce corps terrestre, relèvent du souffle et du corps […]' (see also n. 117).

verse. The intention is: that *sattva*, which is displaced from the form of consciousness, has already been discussed. But that *sāttvika* that abides as a property of the body alone is different, since it is seen only in superior [characters] that are *sāttvika*. In this regard, superiority for women culminates in the amorous *rasa*, while for men it rests on the valorous *rasa*.[123]

This second form of material *sattva* characterizing the *sāttvikā-laṃkāra*s finds its justification and basis first of all in the *sattva* of superior characters, which Abhinavagupta explains as the predominance of *sattva* over *rajas* and *tamas*, hence as part of the triad of *guṇa*s: 'The ornaments of gesture do not find another support than the form of superior women, made of *sattva*. They are called *sāttvika*, in the first place, since they are not found in bodies affected by *rajas* and *tamas*.'[124] With regard to their primarily physical nature, this is connected in more explicit terms to the lack of an intermediate stage which, in the case of the *sāttvikabhāva*s, was represented by the plane of *prāṇa*: '[The ornaments] arise on their face and limbs, i.e. they consist of mere bodily modifications. Regarding the ornaments of gesture (*ceṣṭālaṃkāra*), in fact, no further form has been indicated, such as an obstruction in the throat on the plane of the internal breath in the case of tears and the other [*sāttvikabhāva*s].'[125] Similarly, that which was the first stage of development for the *sattva* of the *sāttvikabhāva*s, i.e. their nature of consciousness modes, is excluded from the *sāttvikālaṃkāra*s:

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[123] ABh, *avataraṇikā ad* 22.4, vol. 3, p. 153: *cittavṛttirūpaṃ yat sattvaṃ tad bhūkāyasaṃkrāntaprāṇadehadharmatāvaśād bhavad api bhāvādhyāye rasādhyāye ca vitatya nirūpitam iti punaḥ kiṃ tadabhidhānena | kiṃ tasya bhūsattvasya rūpaṃ vaktavyam ity āha alaṃkārās tu nāṭyajñair ityādi | ayam abhiprāyaḥ—saṃvedanarūpāt prasṛtaṃ yat sattvaṃ tad vicāritaṃ | anyat tu dehadharmatvenaiva sthitaṃ sāttvikaṃ, yataḥ sāttvikeṣv evottameṣu dṛśyate, tatra strīṇām uttamatvaṃ śṛṅgārarasaparyantam eva, puruṣāṇāṃ tu vīrarasaviśrāntam |.*

[124] ABh, *avataraṇikā ad* 22.4, vol. 3, p. 153: *na ca sattvamayam uttamastrīrūpaṃ vimucyānyatrāmī ceṣṭālaṃkārā viniveśaṃ labhante | sāttvikās tāvad rājasatāmasaśarīreṣv asaṃbhavāt |.*

[125] ABh *ad* 22.4, vol. 3, p. 154: *vaktragātrajā iti dehavikāramātrarūpā eva paraṃ na hi yathā bāṣpādīnām antaḥprāṇabhuvi kaṇṭharodhādirūpaṃ lakṣyate tathā ceṣṭālaṃkārāṇām |.* We already saw the example of tears stopping in the throat in 5.2.1, when talking about the twofold nature, internal and external, of *sattva*. The example is clearly working on the level of ordinary people/fictional characters, not of the actor, who is not really sad and will rather obtain tears by consciously placing the *prāṇa* in the eyes, as seen in section 5.2.2.

The ornaments of gesture [are stated in this chapter, not in the one on the *bhāva*s or *rasa*s, unlike the *sāttvikabhāva*s,] since they belong merely to the body, and they do not have the nature of mental modes. Saying that "they are the support for the *bhāva*s" means that they enact (*abhinayanti*) the state of delight (*ratibhāva*) in a general form. For they are seen profusely in youth, they are still unmanifest in childhood, and disappear in the old age.[126]

The theatrically displayed *sāttvikālaṃkāra*s thus reveal the characters's *sattva* (their superior status) and hence their fitness for the two main sentiments assigned in Indian theatre to men and women: heroism and love.[127]

Saying that the *sāttvikālaṃkāra*s are not mental moods, yet enact a *bhāva*, amounts to saying that their status is just that of consequents (*anubhāva*s), although of a very special type, since they can be found even in the absence of a determinant (*vibhāva*) that normally provokes the character's emotion. The way the bodily *sāttvikālaṃkāra*s find their first manifestation in the heroine during youth is explained in fact through her *sattva*, which awakens her internal predisposition to love. Abhinavagupta clearly interprets NŚ 22.6ab from the point of view of the character as the awakening, through the *sattva* of the young heroine, of the residual traces of the emotion that manifest on her body in the form of the first three ornaments, while the others need an appropriate *vibhāva* to manifest:

And these [bodily modifications] arise from the sole presence of the body, through a general state of delight, experienced in the previous life [and presently] awakened by the *sattva*. These alone are called *aṅgaja*, i.e. *bhāva*, *hāva* and *helā*. But others appear in the body when it is penetrated by the emotion of delight, which becomes evident on account of the appearance of a particular *vibhāva* appropriate to the present life.[128]

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[126] ABh *ad* 22.4, vol. 3, p. 154: *yata ete kevalam alaṃkārā dehamātraniṣṭhāḥ, na tu cittavṛttirūpāḥ | bhāvasaṃśrayā iti ratibhāvamātram abhinayantīty arthaḥ | te hi yauvena udriktā dṛśyante bālye tv anudbhinnā vārdhake tirobhūtāḥ |.*

[127] As Bhaṭṭa Tauta explains it: *te ca dṛṣṭāḥ santaḥ uttameyaṃ śṛṅgārasamuciteti* […] *na tu lāvaṇyādivad anabhineyā eva śarīravikārā anubhāvā eva* (ABh *ad* 2.4, vol. 3, p. 153) 'When they are seen [on stage] they convey the idea that "this superior woman is fit for love." […] However, unlike charm and other qualities that cannot in any way be an object of enactment, these bodily modifications [that are the ornaments of gesture] are just consequents.'

[128] ABh *ad* 22.6, vol. 3, p. 154: *te ca prāgjanmābhyastaratibhāvamātreṇa sattvo-*

Without delving into the distinctions of the *sāttvikālaṃkāra*s for male and female characters,[129] it should be stressed again that the bodily *sattva*, from which the first ornaments arise, is the *sattva* that has 'reached' the body of women of a superior type, the heroines that are the subject and object of love in Sanskrit drama.[130] From a theatrical viewpoint, this is all that matters. This *sattva* can now be understood as the temperament that determines the behaviour of superior women, marked as it is by coquetries and grace. However, the specification that this *sattva* has attained a bodily condition in certain characters said to be *sāttvika* strongly suggests a transfer of *sattva*, possibly from the mental plane—the *sattva* that predominates in those people less affected by *rajas* and *tamas*—as it shapes their body and behaviours. This *sattva* may also have an inner, unmanifest component,[131] but it is never experienced by the character as an emotion circumscribed to a definite set of causes and effects. On the contrary, it reveals a generalized and innate capacity to feel and display the emotions appropriate to superior natures, a kind of basic sensibility that pervades the whole life in its various ages, just distinguished into a feminine and a masculine type, as Bansat-Boudon notes: 'Avec les *sāttvikālaṃkāra*, au contraire, le corps cesse d'être le vecteur transitoire de l'émotion

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dbuddhena [*sattvād buddhena* E$_{1(4)}$] *dehamātre sati bhavanti, ta evaṅgajā ucyante, tathā bhāvo hāvo helā ca | anye tv adyatanajanmasamucitaviśiṣṭavibhāvānupraveśasphuṭībhavadratibhāvānuviddhe dehe parisphuranti |.* Bansat-Boudon points out the specificity of the first three *alaṃkāra*s as follows: 'Les trois *aṅgaja* : *bhāva, hāva, helā,* se définissent ainsi comme les premières manifestations d'un sentiment qui lentement se fait jour à travers les cœurs et les corps. Au reste, tout le temps qu'il fait l'experience de la triade des *aṅgaja,* le sujet amoureux attend que se presente un objet—un *ālambanavibhāva* dans la terminologie du théâtre—digne de son amour. C'est donc qu'on peut aimer absolument, en l'absence même d'un être à aimer' (Bansat-Boudon 1991: 210).

[129] The only analysis so far attempted is Bansat-Boudon 1991.

[130] ABh *ad* 22.4, vol. 3, p. 155: *dehātmakaṃ bhavet sattvam iti | śarīrasvabhāvaṃ tāvat sattvaṃ saṃbhāvyate uttamaśārīratāṃ prāptam ity arthaḥ |.*

[131] In suggesting the possibility of a twofold dimension of *sattva* in the production of the *sāttvikālaṃkāra*s, although mainly from the point of view of a character, we wish to nuance the interpretation proposed by Bansat-Boudon that the *sāttvikabhāva*s are always on the side of the *avyaktasattva* and the *sāttvikālaṃkāra* on that of the *vyaktasattva* (Bansat-Boudon 1991: 205). However, the focus of the actor's effort might well be the emotional component of a character's *sattva,* on which the actor will eventually calibrate a conscious activation of *prāṇa* while his focus in the *sāttvikālaṃkāra* will be on their display through the various actor's means, with a predominance of the *sāttvikābhinaya.*

pour devenir le lieu où elle s'inscrit durablement, la scène où—
nous y reviendrons—elle est théatrâlement exhibée' (1991: 206).

Following Bansat-Boudon's intuition, whereby the body of the
actress becomes a theatrical scene on which to exhibit the play of
love, it is worth noting that, just as *sattva* is clearly attributed to the
character, so is *abhinaya* in Bharata's definition of *bhāva*, the first
of the three *aṅgajasāttvikālaṃkāra*: *vāgaṅgamukharāgaiś ca sattve-
nābhinayena ca | kaver antargataṃ bhāvaṃ bhāvayan bhāva ucyate ||*
NŚ 22.8 ||. Abhinavagupta interprets *bhāva* as the *alaṃkāra* that
indicates the emotion (again *bhāva*) of the young girl, in the form
of a disposition (*vāsanā*).[132] More crucially, Abhinavagupta inter-
prets the *ca* in *sattvenābhinayena ca* to indicate that the ornament
called *bhāva*, characterized by voice, body movement, colouring of
the face, and *sattva*, becomes a real-life 'enactment,' as it were, of
that emotion still latent in the female character (*caśabda eka
ivaśabdārthe, abhinayatulyo vāgādibhir lakṣito bhāva ity arthaḥ*, ABh *ad*
22.8, vol. 3, p. 156). Being a property of the body, what the *sattva*
of the *sāttvikālaṃkāra* has in common with the *sattva* of the *sāttvi-
kabhāva*s in their gross form—their *anubhāva* aspect of tears,
etc.—is that it enacts an emotional state, even if just a latent and
general 'emotivity,' as if in a theatrical performance. The only dif-
ference, as noted before, is that in theatre the display of women's
coquetries and of sudden emotions is a matter of control and con-
scious effort, always at a distance from real feelings.

5.2.5 *Sattva as guṇa and sattva as mind*

As mentioned before, some very common senses of the term *sattva*
in Sanskrit literature at large include the subtle principle of reali-
ty in Sāṃkhya philosophy and the mind itself, because it is in the
mind that *sattva* as a subtle principle is found in its purest form.
These semantic threads are skillfully woven together by Abhina-
vagupta in the etymological derivation of *sattva* taken up on two
occasions while commenting on the formation of *sāttvatī*, the
'Grand Manner.'

In the chapter on the *vṛtti*s, the *sāttvatī* is explained as the locus
of *sattva*, namely the mind in which *sat* resides: 'The quality rela-

[132] For the text and translation of this passage, see Bansat-Boudon 1991: 215,
n. 53.

ted to that which contains *sat* is the function of the mind. That in which there is *sat* (being), i.e. the *sattva* that is light, is the *sattva* that is the mind. [*Sāttvatī*] is that which concerns it' (ABh *ad* 20.41, vol. 3, p. 96: *sātvato guṇaḥ mānaso vyāpāraḥ | sat sattvaṃ prakāśaḥ tad vidyate yatra tat sattvaṃ manaḥ, tasmin bhavaḥ*). The term *sattva* in the definition of *sāttvatī* was related by Bharata to the *sattvaguṇa*. This probably referred to a characteristic of the character, a valorous hero, rather than of the actor. In this case, *sattva* is given as a synonym of the mind and, as Abhinavagupta explains, the abode of *sat*, or light (*prakāśa*), a significant term in the Pratyabhijñā system. We may interpret it in the light of another gloss of *sat*, always in the explanation of the Grand Manner: '*Sāttvatī*, the Grand Manner, is related to the psychophysical [domain] and consists of the function of the mind. The word *sat* [in the term *sattva* "mindfulness"] means awareness, which consists in clarity.[133] *Sattva* is the place where such [awareness that is *sat*] occurs, i.e. the mind. This [*sāttvatī*] is the [Manner] of such [a *sattva* that is the mind]' (ABh *ad* 1.41: *manovyāpārarūpā sāttvikī sāttvatī | sad iti prakhyārūpaṃ saṃvedanam | tad yatrāsti tat sattvaṃ manaḥ | tasyeyam iti |*). The terms *prakāśa* and *prakhyā* appear together in a passage of the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī* that comments on ĪPK 1.2.8, where the sentient nature of the *buddhi* is maintained against the Sāṃkhya view that the *buddhi* is insentient but reflects the light of the *puruṣa* to cognize its object. There (ĪPVV, p. 150) Abhinavagupta quotes the definition of *sattva* in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* as part of the triad of *guṇa*s (*sattvaṃ laghu prakāśakam*, SK 13), and the one in the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya*, where the *sattva* of the mind is characterized as luminosity (*prakhyārūpaṃ hi cittasattvam*, YBh *ad* 1.2), which is opposed to activity (*pravṛtti*) and stasis (*sthiti*), the characteristics of *rajas* and *tamas* with which *sattva* gets mixed up. Besides confirming the view that *sattva* in the *sāttvatī vṛtti* is intended in the sense of *guṇa*,[134] the interesting point in these inter-tex-

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[133] Bansat-Boudon (1991: 202, n. 13) translates: 'Par 'sat' [il faut entendre] la conscience en tant qu'elle est conscience de soi (*prakhyā*).' Our translation differs in that it takes into account the use of the term *prakhyā* in the definition of *cittasattva* of the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* that Abhinavagupta implicitly borrows here, as shown below.

[134] Independently from the *sāttvatī*, the concept of *sattva* is understood as the *guṇa* of Sāṃkhya in Viśvanātha's *Sāhityadarpaṇa* as he states in his autocommenta-

tual uses of some of the terms related to *sattva* in other traditions is that Abhinavagupta associates it closely with the mind, just as in the case of the actor's *sattva*.

That formidable capacity by which a performer is able to direct the mind, and thereby control his psychophysical production, is not the exclusive appanage of the trained actor. Even a 'common' person can master it, when the quality of *sattva* predominates in his mind. Thus, Abhinavagupta explicitly assigns *sattva* as mental concentration to certain characters who can feign the appropriate emotions at will, even when or precisely because their superior nature makes them immune to the lowest emotive states, such as fear. This is confirmed in a passage that talks about the expression of feigned fear, or fear arisen from *sattva* (*sattvasamuttham* in NŚ 6.71). The discussion revolves around how to interpret this *sattva*: is it the actor's *sattva* or the character's *sattva*? Let us look at Bharata's verses describing the enactment in the *rasa bhayānaka*:

> Fear [is to be enacted] by contractions of the limbs, mouth and eyes, by paralysis of the legs, unsteady glances, agitation, weariness, dryness of the mouth, palpitation of the heart, and horripilation. This should be natural fear. The one arisen from *sattva* has to be enacted in the very same way. However, this feigned [fear] is to be rendered by these same states, [acted out] with graceful gestures.[135]

Abhinavagupta comments:

> [By fear] 'arisen from *sattva*' is intended [the fear] that has its origin in psychophysical intentness (*sattva*), i.e. in mental concentration. Such is the actor's skill, and this is the object of the whole [treatise], according to the Ṭīkākāra. However, this is untrue. All this section [on the *rasa*s] is aimed indeed at the skill of both the actor and the poet, because in the world such words as determinants, consequents, enactments and so forth are not commonly used. Therefore, this is the meaning here: to begin with, this is the natural fear, which pertains to inferior characters, whose nature is

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ry called the *Sudhākara ad* 3.134: *sattvaṃ nāma svātmaviśramaprakāśakārī kaścanāntaro dharmaḥ |.*

[135] NŚ 6.70–71: *gātramukhadṛṣṭibhedair ūrustambhābhivīkṣaṇodvegaiḥ | sannamukhaśoṣahṛdayaspandanaromodgamaiś ca bhayam || etat svabhāvajaṃ syāt sattvasamutthaṃ tathaiva kartavyam | punar ebhir eva bhāvaiḥ kṛtakaṃ mṛduceṣṭitaiḥ kāryam ||.*

pervaded by *rajas* and *tamas*. Moreover, even for those [characters] in whose mind *sattva* predominates, [the fear] arisen from *sattva*, i.e. determined by an effort, can be brought about by these very consequents. However, they are [rendered] with graceful gestures, because [in their case] that [fear] is feigned. The word 'but' suggests the specificity [of this kind of feigned fear].[136]

Following a recognizable pattern, Abhinavagupta builds on the contrast inaugurated by Bharata between a genuinely felt and uncontrolled emotion, such as fear with its involuntary bodily reactions, and a fictive emotion arisen from *sattva*. He qualifies the latter as occasioned by mental intentness, brought about through effort. However, unlike in his previous analyses of the actor's *sattva*, and against the Ṭīkākāra, Abhinavagupta attributes the capacity to feign emotions and their symptoms—including those that are usually the result of a *lapsus corporis*—to the character, and therefore to humans in general. Those superior natures whose minds abound in *sattva* can in fact display the symptoms of an emotion at will if the situation requires it, even if the predominance of the *guṇa* characterized by clarity and awareness would actually make them impermeable to the uncontrolled sway of their intellectual organ, the mind, towards the lowermost emotions. On the contrary, lower natures dominated by *rajas* and *tamas* will be naturally prone to emotions such as fear and their unbridled display.[137]

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[136] Abh *ad* 6.71, vol. 1, pp. 321–322: *sattvasamuttham iti | sattvaṃ manaḥsamādhānaṃ tajjanmakam iti naṭasyeyaṃ śikṣā. sā ca sarvaviṣayeti ṭīkākāraḥ | tad idam asat | kavinaṭaśikṣārtham eva sarvam idaṃ prakaraṇam | loke vibhāvānubhāvābhinayādivyavahārābhāvāt | tasmād ayam atrārthaḥ—etat tāvad bhayaṃ svabhāvajaṃ rajastamaḥprakṛtīnāṃ nīcānām ity arthaḥ | ye 'pi ca sattvapradhānās teṣāṃ sattvasamutthaṃ prayatnakṛtam ebhir evānubhāvaiḥ kāryam | kintu mṛduceṣṭitaiḥ yatas tat kṛtakam | punaḥśabdo viśeṣadyotakaḥ |.*

[137] Abhinavagupta is clear about this point, as he comments in the same passage about another kind of fear, described by Bharata as 'a feigned fear that derives from offending the teacher or the king' (*gurunṛpayor aparādhāt kṛtakaś ca bhayānako jñeyaḥ* || NŚ 6.69cd). ABh *ad loc*, vol. 1, p. 320: *bhayaṃ tāvat strīnīcabālādiṣu vakṣyate | nottamamadhyamaprakṛtiṣu | te 'pi tu gurubhyo rājñaś ca bhayaṃ darśayeyuḥ tadabhāve* [E$_{1(2)}$; *tadbhāve* E$_{1(4)}$] '*pi | evaṃ sutarām uttamatvaṃ bhavati |* 'To begin with, fear will be said to pertain to women, inferior characters, children, etc., and not to characters of middle and superior type. But even these should show fear for the teachers and for the king, even if that [fear] is absent [in them]. In this way, their superior nature results indeed augmented.' The external signs of this feigned fear, continues Abhinavagupta, look genuine to the onlookers, although they are artfully produced. Ibid., pp. 320–321: *anubhāvāś ca*

The parallel is just intimated in the passage, but can now be spelled out: just like actors, noble natures are in control of their *sattva*, i.e. their mental sphere including the emotions that extend up to the limits of the body, through the vital breath. And just like actors, they will not refrain from expressing outwardly the whole spectrum of emotions, but they will render them as on a theatre stage, with a certain grace and detachement, displaying at will and in a controlled fashion the right emotion in the right situation.[138] This reminds us of the ideal of the *sahṛdaya* or *rasika*, the aesthetically sensitive man, whose lack of effort is typically praised by Abhinavagupta and his predecessor Utpaladeva as an expression of 'aristocratic nonchalance,' an attitude that applies even to the spiritual path. Actually, an effort is required by the actor and by the noblest of natures in taming one's mind, just as on a spiritual path. However, the skilfullness lies in concealing this exhertion under a certain elegance of movements, a kind of enacted sensibility characterized by grace.[139] Apart from savouring the world like a theatrical performance, the ideal aristocratic man is also a skilled actor who is performing his role in the world-theatre.

5.2.6 Abhinavagupta's sattva unravelled

To wrap up what we have learned about *sattva* in the grand synthesis of Abhinavagupta, we may say that all the nuances of this highly polysemic term are kept in balance and in tension through the hermeneutical feat that is the *Abhinavabhāratī*. Although no real chro-

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tathā śliṣṭās tatra kriyante loke yena satyata eva bhito 'yam iti gurvādīnāṃ pratītir bhavati | asvābhāvikatvāc ca kṛtakatvam | 'Moreover, in such a case, the consequents are so fittingly produced in the world that the teacher and the like have the cognition: "this one is really afraid." And since it is not spontaneous, [this fear is said to be] fictitious.'

[138] Interestingly, Abhinavagupta also mentions courtesans as an example of individuals displaying fictitious emotions. See ABh *ad* 6.71, vol. 1, p. 322. The difference lies in the grace exhibited by superior natures in the display of the symptoms of the emotions, including the psychophysical reactions such as trembling, paralysis and the like.

[139] To quote Torella's words about the attitude of the 'aristocratic' yogin, '[n]o slow and painful ascent step by step, but only an elegant, powerful and effortless jump is effective. […] The portrait of this very special religious man resembles more and more to that of the Indian ideal gentleman: in both we find an innate gracefulness, elegance, aesthetic resonance, disdain for plebeian efforts, easiness' (Torella 2020: 848).

nology of the semantic shifts can be traced, and no actual genealogy of meanings with a clear origin and linear path can be reconstructed, we can now take stock of what we have achieved so far.

As we have seen, *sattva* is the highest quality of *prakṛti*, the principle of nature in the philosophy of Sāṃkhya. *Sattva* is the epitome of all that is good, pure and luminous, and —somewhat simplifying— it is thus the main constituent of the highest evolute of *prakṛti*, i.e. the mind. Thus, 'mind' becomes one more sense of *sattva*. The etymology of the Sanskrit term crosses the philosophical and psychological routes, and *sat-tva*, the fact of being, the essence, becomes the nature of the mind, its innate temperament, the very character of living beings (*sattva*, again). This innermost essence of the mind is its capacity to understand and feel by changing in accordance to the objects of perception, but also its capacity to direct one's attention and intention towards specific objects without being led astray. It is but a short step from this to self-mastery. The term *sattva* now embraces both the psychological and emotional organ (*manas* or *hṛdaya*) and its faculty of self-mastery, to the point of controlling its state of excitation and activity in both quality and degree. This *sattva* becomes at the same time the origin of intention, the intention itself and the intentness, i.e. the fact of focusing one's attention completely on something: mind and mindfulness. This semantic jumble culminates in theatrical *sattva*, the actor's complete mastery over the mind and its faculties, the ability to feel everything, to conceive everything, and therefore to become and to be everything in 'a free play of its faculties,' to misquote Kant slightly.

The search for a solution to the conundrum of the actor's sensibility has led us well beyond the promised middle-ground between Diderot's glacial dispassion and Stanislavski's fiery enthrallment, beyond a theory that merely accounts for 'a trained emotionality without emotional involvement.' The mastery of the actor's mind over itself elevates the actor far above the persons of high nature, the heroes and noblemen who can partially control their own emotions in the service of moral and social norms. Overcoming the boundaries of societal normativity with his full self-transparency, the actor shines as a figure, a metaphor, or maybe a full-fledged incarnation of the supreme being, the non-dualist lord Śiva, who is pure, free and dynamic self-awareness.

6. Conclusion: the actor as the Lord

> All the world's a stage.
> Shakespeare, *As You Like It*

The ideal actor as conceptualized in Abhinavagupta's theory (or, at least, in our reconstruction thereof) represents a paradigmatically free agent, capable of controlling his actions and emotions completely thanks to his full mastery on the faculty of *sattva,* this sort of performative mindfulness that is the cornerstone of his art. Utterly different from the spectator passively immersed in the beatific contemplation of *rasa* and from the ordinary man constantly under the thrall of the vagaries of pleasure and pain, the actor freely plays. In this crucial intuition,[140] Abhinavagupta's aesthetic theory comes full circle to his philosophical and religious background. In the *theatrum mundi* that is *saṃsāra,* Śiva is the supreme actor. He plays all the roles in his wondrous *krīḍā,* the Play.[141]

The metaphor of the *theatrum mundi* is well known across times and cultures. In the Sanskrit episteme, the metaphor of the universe as an artistic creation, often but not always a dramatic performance,[142] is common in many religious and philosophical domains. The most frequently quoted instance is verse 59 of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* where the *prakṛti* is compared to a female dancer (*nartakī*). The commentator Gauḍapāda clarifies that the text refers to an actress in a theatrical performance, as he mentions the *rasa*s, singing and music, etc.[143]

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[140] Scholars have often highlighted the parallels, the convergences and sometimes the divergences between Abhinavagupta's aesthetic speculation and his synthesis of non-dualistic Śaiva thought. On the convergence between aesthetic experience and mystical experience, and especially on *śāntarasa*, see Raghavan 1967; Masson and Patwardhan 1969, 1970; Bhattacarya 1972; Tubb 1985; Gerow and Aklujkar 1972; Bhattacharya 1976; Gerow 1994; and Timalsina 2020. On larger consonances and dissonances between aesthetics and Śaiva thought, see Larson 1974: 1976; Patnakar 1993; Bäumer 1995, 1997, 2003, 2008; Fernàndez 2001; Cuneo 2016; Wenta 2018; and Torella 2020 and forthcoming.

[141] The double entendre on the word *play* can be allowed to resonate freely in this case. See Bäumer 1995.

[142] On the metaphor of *jagaccitra*, the painted canvas that is the universe, see Cuneo 2016: 46–49.

[143] *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 59 reads: *raṅgasya darśayitvā nivartate nartakī yathā nṛtyāt | puruṣasya tathātmānaṃ prakāśya vinivartate prakṛtiḥ ||.* The relevant portion in the commentary is the following: *yathā nartakī śṛṅgārādirasair itihāsādibhāvaiś* [possibly to be corrected into *ratihāsādibhavaiś*] *ca nibaddhagītavāditravṛttāni raṅgasya*

If the image of the world as a performance is by no means confined to Śaiva texts, it is within Śaiva thought that this metaphor finds its fullest development and seemingly its *raison d'être*, in terms of freedom, creativity, playfulness, detached involvement, joyful marvel, etc. The Sanskrit term *jagannāṭya* is sometimes used to refer to the metaphorical identification of the world and theatre, in which the supreme deity is both the playwright and the actor. For the sake of our argument, we may say that the metaphor has these two varieties, one in which the godhead is compared to the poet/playwright/stage-director and the other where he is compared to the actor. From a cursory survey, the former variety seems to be more common.[144] As an exemplification, we cite Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa's *Stavacintāmaṇi* 59:

> You have initiated the drama of the three worlds,
> containing in its womb the seed of the numerous entities emitted
> [by you].
> Is there any other poet but you, O Destroyer [i.e. Śiva],
> who might be capable of bringing it to its conclusion?[145]

Another famous verse that refers to Śiva as the poet of the *jagannāṭya* is attributed to the lost work of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, Abhinavagupta's predecessor in reshaping Sanskrit aesthetics.

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darśayitvā kṛtakāryā nṛtyān nivartate [...]. Commenting on *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 42, Gauḍapāda compares the subtle body that transmigrates to an actor: *yathā naṭaḥ paṭāntareṇa praviśya devo bhūtvā nirgacchati punar mānuṣaḥ punar vidūṣakaḥ, evaṃ liṅgaṃ nimittanaimittikaprasaṅgenodarāntaḥ praviśya hastī strī pumān bhavati*. This passage is translated in Bansat-Boudon 1992: 457: 'Exactement comme un acteur retiré dans la coulisse en surgit sous la forme d'un dieu, puis d'un homme et, enfin, sous celle d'un bouffon, ainsi le corps subtil, grâce à la connexion entre la cause et l'effet, s'introduit dans une matrice et en surgit sous la forme d'un éléphant, d'une femme ou d'un homme.'

[144] To this same variety we might also ascribe the reverse metaphor in which it is the poet with his absolute power over his subject matter who is compared to a creator god. Cf. the renowned verse found in the *Dhvanyāloka*, *vṛtti ad* 3.42: *apāre kāvyasaṃsāre kavir ekaḥ prajāpatiḥ | yathāsmai rocate viśvaṃ tathedaṃ parivartate ||*, 'In poetry's endless worlds / the poet alone is God; / the universe revolves / according to his nod' (tr. Ingalls *et al.* 1990: 639).

[145] *visṛṣṭānekasadbījagarbhaṃ trailokyanāṭakam | prastāvya hara saṃhartuṃ tvattaḥ ko 'nyaḥ kaviḥ kṣamaḥ ||*. As highlighted in Kṣemarāja's partially lacunose commentary, Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa is playing on the double meaning of some terms such as *bīja* and *prastāvanā*, which have both cosmological and theatrical referents. On these parallels, see Marjanovic 2011: 203–204 and Cuneo 2016: 47 n. 32.

Homage to Shiva, the poet who creates the whole uni-
verse.
Thanks to him, people every moment enjoy the *rasa* of
the world's dramatic performance.[146]

But it is the second variety of the metaphor of *jagannāṭya*, in which
the actor takes centre stage, that interests us here. The *Śivasūtra*
contains four aphorisms (3.9–3.12) that revolve around the paral-
lel between the world of theatre and the world of *saṃsāra*.

3.9   The self is an actor (*nartaka ātmā*)[147]
3.10 The inner self is the stage (*raṅgo 'ntarātmā*)
3.11 The senses are the spectators (*prekṣakāṇīndriyāṇi*)
3.12 Thanks to the power of insight, *sattva* is obtained (*dhīvaśāt
      sattvasiddhiḥ*)

The commentary of Kṣemarāja (11th c.) on these *sūtra*s is a mine of
insightful remarks. The text has been studied and translated sever-
al times.[148] But it is worth mentioning that Kṣemarāja identifies
the *ātman* of 3.9 with Śiva.[149] He also quotes the verse of Bhaṭṭa
Nārāyaṇa cited above, and then concludes the commentary on the
sūtra 3.9 by citing a passage that most probably comes from the
lost *vivṛti* of Utpaladeva: 'When the universe is asleep, only the
supreme Lord, the stage-director of the world-drama is awake.'[150]

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[146] Pollock 2016: 149. ABh *ad* 1, p. 6: *namas trailokyanirmāṇakavaye śambhave
yataḥ | pratikṣaṇaṃ jagannāṭyaprayogarasiko janaḥ ||*.

[147] The term *nartaka* here must refer to the actor, and not a dancer, as some
renderings of the passage suggest.

[148] Two now classic renderings are the English translation (Singh 1979) and
the French one (Silburn 1980). The most reliable is Torella's updated Italian
translation (Torella 2013).

[149] His acting is interpreted as a manifestation of the totality of the states of
consciousness, all of which ultimately rest on the foundation of his truest, con-
cealed nature (*antarvigūhitasvarūpāvaṣṭambhamūlaṃ*). On the recurrence of the
term *avaṣṭambha*, see below.

[150] *Śivasūtravimarśinī ad* 3.9, p. 90: *saṃsāranāṭyapravartayitā supte jagati jāgarūka
eka eva parameśvaraḥ.* This phrase is likely a quotation from the lost *Vivṛti ad Īśva-
rapratyabhijñākārikā* 2.4.19, since the terminological references (*saṃsāranāṭya-, pra-
vartayitā-* and *parameśvara-*) show that this is the passage Abhinavagupta was com-
menting upon in the corresponding portion of his *Vivṛtivimarśinī* (ĪPVV, vol. III,
p. 244): *sa ca bhramo nāṭyatulyasyāparamārthasato 'tyaktasvarūpāvaṣṭambhananāṭaka-
lpena parameśvaraprakāśena pratītigocarīkṛtasya saṃsārasya nāyakaḥ sūtradhāraḥ
pradhānabhūtaḥ pravartayitetivṛtte nāyako vā, yallagnaṃ viśvetivṛttam ābhāti; tata eva
prathamaḥ.* The text, which further illuminates the parallel between the actor and

Kṣemarāja's gloss on 3.10 and 3.11 further explains the metaphor of the world-theatre (*jagannāṭya*) by mobilizing the terms of aesthetic theory such as *rasa* and *camatkāra*, fully meaningful at both the cosmological and the dramaturgical level of interpretation, insofar as Śiva, in the non-dualist understanding of the different levels of manifestation, is at once the playwright, the stage-director, the performer and even the spectator of the world-drama.[151] But it is the last of these *sūtra*s that deserves a detailed treatment as it concerns *sattva*. As a first approximation we translated: 'Thanks to the power of insight, *sattva* is obtained.' Kṣemarāja comments: *dhīḥ tāttvikasvarūpavimarśanaviśāradā dhiṣaṇā tadvaśāt sattvasya sphurattātmanaḥ sūkṣmasya āntaraparispandasya siddhir abhivyaktir bhavati | nāṭye ca sāttvikābhinayasiddhir buddhikauśalād eva labhyate*: 'Insight is the intellectual capacity able to reflectively cognize one's own true and real form. Thanks to this there is the obtainment, the manifestation, of *sattva*, the subtle internal vibration whose essence is refulgence. Furthermore, in theatre it is thanks to the aptitude of the intellect that success in the psychophysical enactment is reached.'[152] Kṣemarāja then connects the previous *sūtra* with the following one (ŚS 3.13) through this crucial line that repeats the definition of *sattva*: *evaṃ sphurattātmaka-*

the supreme Lord, is translated by Ratié (2011: 589): 'Et cette illusion (*bhrama*) [consistant à identifier le corps, etc. avec le sujet] est 'première' [selon Utpaladeva] parce que cette intrigue [théâtrale] (*itivṛtta*) qu'est l'univers (*viśva*) se manifeste en reposant [nécessairement] sur le '*nāyaka*'—c'est-à-dire le directeur de la troupe (*sūtradhāra*) qui, [parce qu'il en est le membre] le plus important, est celui qui met en branle l'action, ou le personnage principal de l'intrigue—du cycle des renaissances (*saṃsāra*), lequel, semblable à une pièce de théâtre (*nāṭya*), devient objet de cognition [alors qu'il n'est] pas réel au sens ultime, grâce à la manifestation du Seigneur Suprême (*parameśvara*) semblable à un acteur (*naṭa*) qui ne cesse pas de reposer dans sa nature propre [tout en interprétant tel ou tel rôle].' Cf. also Bansat-Boudon 2016: 44.

[151] For a full treatment of this passage, see Bäumer 1995: 38–41 and Torella 2013: 210–218.

[152] Singh (1979: 158) observes: 'In the commentary on this *sūtra* also, there is *double entendre* in *Sattva* and *dhī*. *Sattva* in this context does not refer to the constituent of *Prakṛti*, but the throb of the perfect I-consciousness and *dhī* does not mean mere intelligence but *ṛtambharā prajñā*, inward awakening laden with truth. The Yogī realizes the *Sattva* (the light of the essential nature of the Self) through *dhī* (the spiritual intuition), just as the actor can act out the *sattva* (mental state) only through *dhī* (talent).' Our contention is that it is indeed the same *sattva*, the supreme power of the purified mind, which is the mind itself in full control, without the obstructing conditions that are the various unbridled emotional states.

sattvāsādanād eva asya yoginaḥ 'It is by thus obtaining *sattva*, whose essence is refulgence,[153] that such a yogin [obtains the state of freedom].'[154] Hence, the term *sattva* represents the true essence (*sattva*) of the purified mind (*sattva*), which is the consciousness of both the ideal actor in complete control of himself and of the ideal yogin absorbed in a complete non-duality with Śiva.[155]

Within a Śaiva setting, one might easily quote dozens of passages connecting the actor's plane with the tantric, spiritual plane.[156] For example, Törzsök 2016 has drawn our attention to a passage from the *Triśirobhairava*, a lost text quoted by Jayaratha *ad Tantrāloka* 1.136. In the few lines cited by the celebrated commentator, the awakened individual is compared to an actor. As pointed out in Törzsök 2016: 474, an investigation of the image of the actor in tantric sources, the text employs a technical term of dramaturgy, *vibhāva*. The passage reads as follows:

> *samyagbuddhas tu vijñeyaḥ* ……………………… |
> *nānākārair vibhāvaiś ca bhramyate naṭavad yathā* |
> *svabuddhibhāvarahitam icchākṣemabahiṣkṛtam* ||

> 'But one who has right awareness whirls around like a dancer with various forms and conditions, without [being limited by] the [false] creation of his own mind, and beyond volition and happiness.'[157]

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[153] A note by the editor in the printed text of the Kashmir Series explains: *svātantryaśaktivisphuraṇātmanaḥ sattvasya prāpter ity arthaḥ* 'the sense is that what is obtained is the *sattva* that consists of the refulgence of the power of freedom.'

[154] The text in brackets is a rendering of *sūtra* 3.13: *siddhaḥ svatantrabhāvaḥ.*

[155] The text of Bhāskara's commentary is translated in Dyczkowski 1990. Bhāskara interprets these four aphorisms as describing 'la condizione del sé pienamente illuminato e il rapporto in cui esso si pone nei confronti del corpo e in generale dell'attività mentale e sensoriale' (Torella 2013: 217). Here is our rendering of the verses dealing with *Śivasūtra* 3.12: 'When sensory activity, whose objects are sounds, etc., is intent upon the nature of consciousness, it is on it that the intellect effectuates its determinative role. At first it thus become pure, which is called "power of insight." As it is freed from any substratum, it becomes the canvas of being, which is called "attention." Thanks to it the [highest] state of being can be attained. This is what the aphorism has described' (*śabdādiviṣayā vṛttiś cidrūpābhiniveśinī* | *yadā bhavet tadā buddhis tatraivādhyavasāyinī* || *pūrvaṃ bhavaty ataḥ śuddhā saiva dhīśaktir ucyate* | *tyaktāśayatvāt sattvasya bhittiḥ so 'vadhir ucyate* || *tadvaśāt sattvasiddhiḥ syād ata eva nirūpitam* || 3.12 ||).

[156] For instance, see *Tantrāloka* 1.332, quoted and commented by Abhinavagupta in *Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 1.13, examined in Bansat-Boudon 2016.

[157] Tr. Törzsök 2016: 474.

It is certainly possible to interpret at least one more word as a technical term from dramaturgy: *bhāva*, the real-world emotion of the represented character. The awakened person, like the actor, is devoid of any real emotion. The conception of the actor in this passage comes very close to Abhinavagupta's view, to which we can now finally return.

To come full circle, Abhinavagupta himself embraces the theological parallel between the actor and the Supreme Being while commenting on the already discussed passage where Bharata uses the metaphor of the transmigrating soul to talk about the process of impersonification in theatre.[158] Abhinavagupta's gloss explicates the comparison between the actor and the Supreme Lord. First of all, the living being that is none other than a manifestation of consciousness freely takes on different bodies:

> With the first verse, [Bharata] states the purpose of changing [costume and makeup]. Living being means an individual soul, which moreover is a manifestation of the beatitude of consciousness, which is pure, spotless and infinite. Having himself, in the form of freedom, abandoned his own nature, though invariable, he [takes on] another body that is separate, and partakes of that [other] bodily nature, appropriate to the bodily senses, since he has resorted far and wide (*ā=āsamantāt*) and intimately (*upa=samīpe*) to another body, i.e. to that particular body [he has taken on]. The meaning is that he has obtained it by extreme proximity, i.e. by identifying with it.[159]

This passage calls to mind the concept of *saṃsāra* as *theatrum mundi* where Śiva is the supreme actor, impersonating all the roles in his free play. However, this time it is the actor who is equated with the Lord. Similar to the Supreme Self, the actor is attributed the capacity to show by his free will the various appearances (inclu-

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[158] NŚ 21.89cd–91ab: *yathā jantuḥ svabhāvaṃ svaṃ parityajyānyadaihikam | tat svabhāvaṃ hi bhajate dehāntaram upāśritaḥ || veṣeṇa varṇakaiś caiva chāditaḥ puruṣas tathā | parabhāvaṃ prakurute yasya veṣaṃ samāśritaḥ ||.* See above, § 2, n. 36.

[159] ABh *ad* 21.89–90, vol. 3, p. 123: *vartanasya prayojanam āha yathā jantuḥ svabhāvaṃ svam iti | jantur iti jīvātmety arthaḥ, sa ca śuddhanirmalānantacidānandaprakāśaḥ svātantryarūpaṃ svam anapāyinam api svabhāvaṃ parityajyānyad vyatiriktam api daihikaṃ dehabhavaṃ śarīrakaraṇocitaṃ tat svabhāvaṃ bhajate, yato dehāntaraṃ taddehaviśeṣa upa samīpe ā samantāt śritaḥ atinaikaṭyena tadātmavṛttyā pratipanna ity arthaḥ |.*

ding the costume, movements, and mental states) of the characters he plays, without losing his own individuality.[160]

> This is explained as follows: just as the supreme self, although he does not relinquish the light of his own consciousness, shows an individual form affected, as it were, by the mental states appropriate to the cuirass that is the body, so the actor as well, **without relinquishing his foundation in his own individuality**,[161] as he turns into the appearance [of the character] through the [appropriate] movements, etc.—as [the self did with] the body—shows his own self to the audience. [And] since he is intent in such activities as following the rhythm and tempo as the dramatic situation requires, [his own self is] embraced, as it were, by the nature appropriate to that [character]. In the perspective of the audience, there is no idea of 'actor,' for it is the idea of Rāma that is there. This is what [Bharata] shows [with the second verse]. With this same intention [in mind] we have explained the very cognition of [actor] and [character] in the chapter on *rasa*s, etc.[162]

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[160] Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is a forerunner in comparing the *naṭa* to the *brahman*, although his perspective is clearly Vedāntin and as such his vocabulary differs from Abhinavagupta's markedly Śaiva use of notions such as *krīḍā*, *svātantrya*, etc. See ABh *ad* 1.1, vol. 1, p. 5: *yad udāhṛtam avidyāviracitaṃ nissārabhedagrahe yad udāharaṇīkṛtaṃ nāṭyaṃ tad vakṣyāmi | yathā hi kalpanāmātrasāraṃ tata evānavasthitaikarūpaṃ kṣaṇena kalpanāśatasahasrasahaṃ svapnādivilakṣaṇam api suṣṭhutarāṃ hṛdayagrahanidānam* **atyaktasvālambanabrahmakalpanaṭoparacitaṃ** *rāmarāvaṇādiceṣṭitam asatyaṃ kuto 'py abhūtādbhutavṛttyā bhāti* […] 'That is to say, drama is exemplary in enabling us to grasp the barren, dualistic perception produced by our innate nescience. Consider the doings of Rama and Ravana. These are in essence merely imaginary, and precisely for this reason they do not have one single stable form, but rather can all of a sudden produce countless new imaginings. Although they are indeed different from a dream, just like a dream, they can be the source of profound emotional attachment **without giving up their illusory character**. When produced by an actor—and **herein the actor is like the supreme being**—these doings, however unreal, seem as if actually coming into existence out of some source, albeit a nonexistent one […]' (tr. in Pollock 2016: 148). In line with the metaphor of the actor as the supreme being who takes on different roles without abandoning his own nature, we propose to understand the compound **atyaktasvālambanabrahmakalpanaṭoparacita-** (in bold in Pollock's translation) differently, with *svāvalambana* roughly corresponding to our *svāvaṣṭambha*: '[The unreal deeds of Rāma, Rāvaṇa and the like], are **reproduced by actors who, similar to the brahman [the Absolute or Brahmā as creator], have not abandoned their own individuality**.' On the non-dualist Vedānta terminology in this passage, see Reich 2018.

[161] On the term *avaṣṭambha*, see the passage of the ĪPVV in n. 150.

[162] ABh *ad* 21.89–90, vol. 3, p. 124: *etad ukaṃ bhavati—yathā paramātmā svacaitanyaprakāśam atyajann api dehakañcukocitacittavṛttirūṣitam iva svarūpam ādarśayati, tathā naṭo 'pi ātmāvaṣṭambham atyajann eva sthāne layatālādyanusaraṇādyāyogād*

If, in Bharata's formulation, the comparison of the actor with the transmigrating soul was liable to multiple interpretations, including the soul's uncontrolled transition from one form of existence to the other, and the actor's almost possession-like immersion into the character, it is absolutely clear that for Abhinavagupta the actor is in utter control of himself since he never ceases to be rooted in his individuality. The importance of this foundation is again stressed in the commentary on the second passage of Bharata, where a similar vocabulary and imagery is employed:

> Just as a living being, having abandoned his own nature, achieves the nature of another one grounded in another body and resorts to that other nature, in the same way an intelligent [actor], by mentally contemplating 'I am that one' shall adopt another nature by their gestures, consisting in speech, bodily movement and playful behaviour.[163]

Abhinavagupta connects the reasoning on this verse to a previous passage in chapter 21, referring back to the discussion about the actor's emotional involvement with arguments similar to those used for excluding the actor from the abandonement to the experience of *rasa*.

> In order to show the importance of the union with [one's own] foundation, [Bharata] recalls with the first verse the reason given in chapter 21. The construction is: he should adopt another nature, such as the one of Rāma, etc., by means of the costume, etc. By saying 'I am that,' [Bharata] teaches that **the foundation in one's own self should not be relinquished**. Otherwise it is impossible to keep with the tempo, [rhythm,] and so on.[164]

The success of the metaphors connecting the fictional world of theatre and the all too real world of *saṃsāra* with their two protagonists, the actor and Śiva, is well attested in dramaturgical specu-

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*dehasthānīyena vartanādiveṣaparivartane(na) taducitasvabhāvāliṅgitam iva svātmā-
naṃ sāmājikān prati darśayati | prekṣakapakṣe na naṭābhimānas tatra hi rāmābhimāna
iti darśayati. etadāśayenaivāsmābhis tatra tatra pratītir eva vyākhyātā rasādhyāyādau |.*

[163] NŚ 26.7–8: *yathā jīvat svabhāvaṃ hi parityajyānyadehikam | parabhāvaṃ pra-
kurute parabhāvaṃ samāśritaḥ || evaṃ budhaḥ param bhāvaṃ so 'smīti manasā smaran
| yeṣāṃ vāgaṅgalīlābhiś ceṣṭābhis tu samācaret ||.*

[164] ABh *ad* 26.7–8, vol. 3, p. 213: *avaṣṭambhayogasya prādhānyaṃ darśayitum eka-
viṃśatyadhyāyoktaṃ hetuṃ smarayati yathā jīva[t]svabhāvam iti | paraṃ bhāvaṃ
rāmādikaṃ veṣādibhiḥ samācared iti saṃbandhaḥ | so 'smīty anena svātmāvaṣṭambha-
syātyājyatām āha | anyathā layādyanusaraṇam aśakyam |.*

lation, although this is normally considered as a field without any sectarian commitment.[165] This is why they are sometimes relegated to the benedictory verses, of which the *maṅgalaśloka*s from the chapters of the *Abhinavabhāratī* are a typical example. One can quote the opening verse of chapter 25 on the 'variegated acting' where Śiva triumphs as the leading actor in the drama of the world, who skilfully combines the various means of acting into his performance (*vāgaṅgasattvaceṣṭābhinayaprayogaracanacaṇaḥ | saṃsāranāṭyanāyakapuruṣākāraḥ śivo jayati ||*).[166]

The freedom and the capacity of the actor to take up different roles with a mixture of detachment and involvement become the paradigmatic image of the non-dualistic activity of the supreme self, Śiva, in his power to manifest the world and transcend it at the same time. As mentioned above, the notion of 'play' (*krīḍā* and its relatives)[167] is crucial in bringing together the actor and the Lord. Yet another figure, the king, is associated with the same metaphorical configuration. A metaphor in the *Śivadṛṣṭi* may be indicative of the larger context in which the ideal of the playful yet fully in-control actor takes shape. There Śiva's free play is compared to the king-actor's: 'Just as a king over the whole earth, in the joyous and startled intoxication of his sovereignty can play at being a simple soldier, imitating his behaviour, so, in His beatitude, the Lord amuses Himself by assuming the multiple forms of the whole.'[168]

[165] For an example of the productivity of the metaphor of the *theatrum mundi* in later non-dualist Śaiva sources, see Wenta 2018 on Maheśvarānanda's *Mahārthamañjarī*, where many of the quotations from the Śaiva sources reviewed above are rearranged to fit into a theological configuration influenced by the growing cult of Śivanaṭarāja among Cola kings. On the non-confessional and somewhat ecumenical formulation of Abhinavagupta's aesthetic theory, see Cuneo 2016.

[166] Other *maṅgalaśloka*s in the *Abhinavabhāratī* contain the expression *saṃsāranāṭya* and develop the theme further, see the opening verses of NŚ 2, 5 and 36. Later treatises on dramaturgy make the same connection time and again. A well-know example is the *maṅgalaśloka* in the chapter on dance of the *Saṅgītaratnākara*, a text indebted to the *Abhinavabhāratī*: *āṅgikaṃ bhuvanaṃ yasya vācikam sarvavaṅmayam | āhāryaṃ candratārādi taṃ numaḥ sāttvikaṃ śivam ||*. This verse is borrowed by a treatise on dance called *Abhinayadarpaṇa*. On the relationship between the *Abhinavabhāratī*, the *Saṅgītaratnākara* and the *Abhinayadarpaṇa*, see Ganser forthcoming.

[167] Cf. Ali 2008: 84.

[168] Tr. Gnoli 1957: 21; *yathā nṛpaḥ sārvabhaumaḥ prabhāvāmodabhāvitaḥ || krīḍan karoti pādātadharmāṃs taddharmadharmataḥ | tathā prabhuḥ pramodātmā*

This comparison between the highest of lordships, Śiva and the earthly king—both depicted as actors in their free and multifaceted demeanour—should be understood within the hermeneutical background suggested by Ali's analysis of the medieval courtly culture of South Asia. This was the context in which 'courtly' ideals of refinement, playful nonchalance and cultivated spontaneity were conceived, created, reproduced, and extolled through all artistic and cultural creations as the visible sign and the implicit legitimation of aristocratic superiority and highborn lordship itself.[169] In connection with the dimension of playfulness that these ideals entail, Ali speaks of the existence of 'aristocratic body techniques,' which closely resemble those of an actor, covering as they do both 'a sort of physical inclination and behavioural disposition,' characterized by 'exuberant playfulness, mirthful spontaneity, or a charming insouciance' (Ali 2008: 84). This characterization of the aristocratic attitude, including an apparently antithetical constellation of terms—with 'one set indicating the values of majesty, solemnity, and authority, and the other its opposite ease, play, and abandon'—embraces the highest members of the court and the gods in a common 'irenical conception of lordship' (ibid. p. 85). In Śaiva, non-dualistic terms, Śiva is both the greatest aristocrat and the actor *par excellence.*

Now that we are the furthest away from any denigration of the actor's practice, we are ready to draw one last parallel and argue for one last identification: our teacher Raffaele Torella, to whom this article is dedicated, is himself an incarnation of the actor supreme. Playfully and nonchalantly, he takes on different roles: the creative scholar, the meticulous researcher, the generous tea-

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krīḍatyevaṃ tathā tathā || (1.37ab–38). *Krīḍā* is defined by Utpaladeva in his *Vṛtti ad Śivadṛṣṭi* 1.38: *tathā parameśvaraḥ pūrṇātvāt svata ānandaghūrṇitais tair bhūta-bhedātmabhiḥ prakārair evam etat sadṛśaṃ krīḍati | harṣānusārī spandaḥ krīḍā* 'In the same way the highest Lord, due to his fullness plays spontaneously by imitating the ways of the separate beings, having become each of them due to his reeling under the intoxication of bliss. (For) play (*krīḍā*) is the vibration accompanying joy' (tr. Bäumer 1995: 38).

[169] As Cuneo (2013: 260–261, n. 34) argues, quoting Ali 2004: 158, the 'cultural ideal of mirthful behaviour was the symbol of "authority" and "lordship" as such, for the symbolic construction of "power" entailed "an ideological emphasis" on enjoyments and pleasures as the representative marks of "the court's image of itself".'

cher, the strict examiner, the expert cook, the wine connoisseur, the art lover, the pipe smoker, and many more. We have witnessed all these roles and learnt from him that to be a full human being and a true scholar one must behave like an actor, always ready to assume different roles and move across continents and institutions in the guise of a wandering jongleur. Within but also well beyond scholarship, Raffaele Torella taught us that life should be lived with paradoxically detached commitment and care, and with openness to its apparently contradictory aspects, at the same time preserving the strongest *avaṣṭambha* in one's true self in the whirlpool of change.

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Viṣṇu in his Three Abodes. Some Observations about Three-storey and Triple-shrined Viṣṇu Temples in South India[*]

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The cult of a concrete deity, being one of the characteristic features of the Pāñcarātra, an early Vaiṣṇava Tantric tradition of India, had a considerable influence on the development of temple worship in South India. The deity is perceived as the only object of worship, present in his many forms, among them also material representations, which is especially apparent in the concept of the fifth mode of god's existence known as *arcāvatāra*—the real presence in his representations.[1] The idols of god are therefore established in the main shrines of the temples, the *garbhagṛha*s, as well as in the numerous pavilions, the *maṇḍapa*s. Accompanying gods are also installed in the niches on the outer walls of the main shrine, known as *devakoṣṭha*s.

[1] The five modes/kinds of god's presence in the world are: *para, vyūha, vibhava, arcāvatāra* and *antaryāmin.*

While South Indian Śaiva temples are provided with often spectacular examples of sculptures presenting a particular iconographical programme, due to the differentiated forms of Śiva himself and his numerous attendants, appearing in many *devakoṣṭha* niches, some of Viṣṇu's temples have other specific features. Although their *devakoṣṭha*s are often empty, they are provided with many additional shrines of different forms of Viṣṇu as well as his companions, but sometimes they also have more than one Viṣṇu's *mūrti*s in the main shrine. What are the ways to accommodate the various icons? Sometimes they reside in the three-storey shrine, *tritālavimāna*.[2] In South India we find some spectacular examples of such an arrangement. Among them are the Sundara Varadarāja temple in Uttaramērūr, Vaikuṇṭha Perumāḷ temple in Kāñcīpuram, Kūṭal Aḻakar in Madurai and Rājagopālasvami in Maṉṉārkōyil, all established in present-day Tamilnadu. Yet another mode of accommodating different forms of Viṣṇu in a one place of worship is the triple-shrined temple type, which can be found, for example, in the Keśava temple of Somnathpur in Karnataka.

In the theoretical literature on temple architecture there are some notes about the *tritāla* temple features. The description of the construction of such a temple is included for example in the *Mānasāra*, a treatise on architecture that should most probably be dated to around 11th–12th century CE.[3] P. K. Acharya's edition and English translation of the *Mānasāra* provides technical details about this type of construction, but it does not refer to the idea behind it and to the particular ways of establishing god's figures in them. Yet another term associated and correlated with *tritāla* is *aṣṭāṅgavimāna* — eight-fold temple. This type of temple should consist of eight particular elements, namely: 1. *adhiṣṭhāna*, which is a plinth, 2. *pāda*—pillars and the wall, 3. *prastara*—roof, 4. *garbhagr̥ha*—second shrine (sanctum), 5. *kaṇṭha*—neck, 6. *garbha-*

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[2] Some technical details concerning the construction and different types of such temples can be found in chapter 21 of the *Mānasāra*, translated into English by Acharya (Acharya 1980), vol. IV, as well as in chapter 21 of the *Mayamata*, translated into French by Bruno Dagens (Dagens 1970–1976, English tr. 1985).

[3] For the dating of this text, see Ślączka in Czerniak-Drożdżowicz/Ślączka 2016: 120, n. 37. Often dated to 450–550 CE, following Acharya 1980.

gṛha—third shrine (sanctum), 7. *śikhara*—spire, and 8. *stūpi* or *kalaśa*—finial.[4] The presence of three shrines enables to encapsulate three forms of Viṣṇu in one temple — standing, seated and reclining ones.

In the case of Śrīvaiṣṇavas and Pāñcarātrikas, the issue of manifold forms of god is connected with the particular way of perceiving the presence of god in the world.[5] Assuming that Viṣṇu is actually present in his representations, and that the temple is also understood as his body, one can consider his real presence in the three abovementioned forms of seated, standing and reclining positions. It seems that the triple-storey temples exemplify the idea of all-encompassing divinity, which is visible on the two planes. On the first, the religious plane, this idea is expressed by the theoretical concept of the god's presence in all, but especially in the three abovementioned highest forms, representing him in his highest abodes. The other, the 'material' plane, is visible through the concepts, regulated by the prescriptions of religious art. In this perspective, the three forms under discussion, through the three complementary figures of Viṣṇu, exemplify all the possible poses that the godly figures can adopt. When choosing these particular forms — reclining on the milk ocean; standing firmly on earth and measuring the three worlds, or standing before the eyes of devotees, and finally; seated in his Vaikuṇṭha highest abode — Viṣṇu fulfills and completes his three divine activities, encompassing the whole universe. Thus the idea of accommodating them in one holy spot can articulate and underline the idea of encapsulating all the principal activities of god in one.

The complementary aspect of these three figures was observed also by the South Indian religious thinkers and poets, when they speak about these forms as residing in the celestial abode which is Vaikuṇṭha, having its earthly counterpart on the Vēṅkaṭa hill, reclining in the flood and also standing to measure the worlds. Such a vision can be seen in Tirumaṅkai Āḻvār's *Periya Tirumoḻi* (11.5.1), when he says:

[4] The definitions of these terms can be found in Acharya 1995.

[5] More about the concept of god's presence in the idol and the ceremony of installation (*pratiṣṭhā*) in the Vaiṣṇava Pāñcarātra tradition can be found in Czerniak-Drożdżowicz 2017. About the concept of the "body of God," see Hopkins 2002.

In deceit,
He procured three paces of land
From Mahābali and then measured them;
It is he who reclines in the flood,
They say,
It is he who resides in Vēṅkaṭam.
O look, my friend!
He reclines in the flood, he resides in Vēṅkaṭam,
But still,
Behold! He is within the heart of Kalikanṟi,[6]
O cāḷalē![7]

Some devoted poets speak about these different forms in which god is present in some temples as adequate to the heavenly forms of Viṣṇu, and as the epitome of his favour towards his devotees. As Carman and Narayanan remark,[8] in Piḷḷān's interpretation of Nammālvār's *Tiruvāymoḻi,* for example, the presence of Viṣṇu in his reclining representation is more earthly and closer to his *avatāra* manifestations than his presence in his highest abode, which is Vaikuṇṭha. While praising the Lord of Tirumōkūr temple,[9] Piḷḷān speaks mostly about the standing form of Viṣṇu present in this temple. We have to note however that in this temple there are two Viṣṇu's representations — a reclining one and a standing one. Both are understood as the immediate equivalents of the real, highest forms. While commenting on Nammālvār's *Tiruvāymoḻi* 10.1.4, Piḷḷān says:

> To be accessible to the prayers of Brahmā and other deities desiring him, he graciously entered the ocean of milk. Similarly, to become accessible to our prayers desiring him, he graciously entered Tirumōkūr. Come, let us embrace his auspicious feet.

What more, Piḷḷān in his comments on *Tiruvāymoḻi* 10.1.1. suggests that worshipping them in this temple is even more efficient for the devotees' goals than venerating them as residing in heaven:

> There is no other goal than the Lord who has strong arms, with which he long ago vanquished the enemies of the devotees. His

[6] A name of Tirumaṅkai Āḻvār.
[7] Translation by Vasudha Narayanan (Narayanan 1987: 35).
[8] Carman and Narayanan 1989: 90.
[9] Kalamegha Perumāḷ temple, one of the 108 *divyadeśa*s, near Melur in Madurai district.

sacred locks of hair, sacred eyes, sacred coral-like lips, and auspi-
cious body resembling a dark cloud are beautiful and extremely
enjoyable. He graciously stands in Tirumōkūr extending more
affection here than he does even in heaven.

The idea of the three complementary forms inhabiting one holy
spot is exhibited in some particular examples of South Indian
Vaiṣṇava shrines. Two examples of this type of temple construc-
tion belong to the times of the Pallava dynasty, and both were built
in the times of the Pallava king Nandivarman II (r. 730–795 CE).
One of them is the Sundara Varadarāja temple in Uttaramē-
rūr/Uthiramērūr and the other is Vaikuṇṭha Perumāḷ in Kāñcī-
puram.

The Uttaramērūr temple, apart from the three-storey main
shrine, encompasses three more chapels around the main sanc-
tum in the three cardinal directions at the ground level, and three
at the first level. Thus, altogether there are nine forms of Viṣṇu
established in this temple. The main three-storey shrine, on the
ground floor, contains Viṣṇu in his Sundara Varadarāja Perumāḷ
standing form, residing there in the company of three other forms
known as Kalyāṇavardhana, placed to the south, Acyutavardhana,
to the west, and Anūrādhavardhana, to the north. In the shrine
above the ground level Viṣṇu is represented in the Vaikuṇṭha-
varada seated form, which is accompanied by Kṛṣṇa with Arjuna to
the south, Yoga Narasiṃha to the west, and Bhūvarāha with
Lakṣmī to the north. An unusual feature of this Vaiṣṇava temple
appearing on the first floor of the *vimāna* is the presence of Śiva
Dakṣiṇamūrti facing south. On the second floor of the temple
there is a reclining Viṣṇu in the form known as Anantapadma-
nābha or Raṅganātha reclining on Ādiśeṣa.

As for the Vaikuṇṭha Perumāḷ temple in Kāñcīpuram (fig. 1–3),
we owe an elaborate study of this particular shrine to the late
Dennis D. Hudson. In some of his articles as well as in his books,
Hudson presented a hypothesis concerning the iconographical
programme of this temple as well as many details concerning its
history and architectural specificity.[10] While describing the temple,
he refers to the mythological stories mostly found in the *Bhāga-*

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[10] See Hudson 2007, Hudson 2008a, Hudson 2008b, Hudson 2010.

vatapurāṇa, claiming that the temple proposes an intentional iconographical pattern which accords with Pāñcarātrika sources. In this supposed programme, the three forms of Viṣṇu, each established on one of the three storeys, also play a particular role. Hudson supposes that the devotee, entering the temple, was circumambulating the three levels as if they were *maṇḍala*s, walking from the bottom to the topmost part of the temple. Thus, the structure is not incidental, but serves a particular religious purpose.[11]

Hudson writes that according to his knowledge there were some more three-storey shrines built after the Nandivarman's Vaikuṇṭha Perumāḷ temple, namely one in Uttaramērūr, south of Kāñcīpuram, built by 806 CE, which I mentioned above, and one in Kuram, north of Kāñcīpuram, from around 808 CE. Other ones can be found in Madurai itself (Hudson probably means Kūḍal Aḻakar, to which I will refer below) and in Tirukkottiyur, east of Madurai, both constructed in 9th c. CE. One more such shrine was built in 866 CE in Parthavasekharapuram near modern Thiruvananthapuram (i.e. Trivandrum). Hudson points out that their appearance coincides with the activities of the four Āḻvārs, namely Tirumaṅkai in the Pallava realm, Nammāḻvār, Periyāḻvār and Āṇṭāḷ in the Pāṇḍya realm. Tirumaṅkai and Nammāḻvār were active in the 8th century CE, while the other two flourished in the 9th century CE.[12] Hudson argues that the appearance of this type of temple was to some extent connected with the growth of the *bhakti* element as well as with the appearance of particular poems. He refers to the Śaṭakōpan (Nammāḻvār), who in his poem (*Tiruvāymoḻi* 7.6.5.) describes Viṣṇu beginning with the topmost form of Kṛṣṇa standing on earth, then presents Viṣṇu as reclining on the ocean on Śeṣa and being the origin of Brahmā, and finally, seated in his highest abode at the bottom level. He also interprets these three forms as the gross material body (*sthūlaśarīra*), then the reclining subtle material body (*sūkṣmaśarīra*), and finally the pure material body (*śuddhasattva*), respectively.[13]

One can consider these facts with respect to the above-mentioned examples of three-storey temples. In the Vaikuṇṭha Perumāḷ

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[11] See Hudson 2010.
[12] See Hudson 2010: 18.
[13] See Hudson 2010: 25–26.

temple the bottom *garbhagṛha* has its entrance on the opposite side of the main entrance to the last innermost enclosure, namely to the west, and hosts the figure of the seated Viṣṇu—Vāsudeva. The chapel at the bottom level is encircled by a *pradakṣiṇapatha* with sculptured panels on the external wall of the sanctum. Through the stairs on its south, one reaches the first floor. At this level the chapel is provided with a verandah, thus it is possible to circumambulate it and see the sculptured panels. The god's effigy is made of black stone and presents a reclining Viṣṇu. At the topmost level there is only a small chapel without verandah, and the access to this shrine was probably only by ladder. The black standing idol is no longer there. This spectacular and very old example of *tritāla* temple, with its circumambulations at the three levels and, additionally, the finial creating its middle point, is interpreted by Hudson as a *maṇḍala* encompassing the whole divine universe of Viṣṇu as being described in such sources as the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* and some Pāñcarātrika *saṃhitā*s.[14] Here I am not able to analyze the whole iconographical programme and to evaluate Hudson's theory, but I find his insight into some of the Āḻvārs' verses useful, as it addresses the relation of Viṣṇu's three forms with the three domains of his reign concluding that it helps to explain this particular way of structuring some of Vaiṣṇava temples.

Vaikuṇṭha Perumāḷ is one of a few *tritāla* temples that have been more thoroughly studied in their architectural and religious aspects, while the other ones are much less known. One of these lesser known *tritāla* temples can be found in Maṉṉārkōyil (fig. 4–5). The temple is known as Rājagopālasvāmi Kulacēkara Perumāḷ and is located about 5 km from Ambasamudram off the Tenkasi–Kutralam Highway. Maṉṉārkōyil is an island created by the two rivers: the Thamirabarani (Tāmīrabaraṇī) on the south side, and the Ghaṭaṇā on the north side. Its location reminds Śrīraṅgam, also located on an island in-between two rivers: the Kāverī and the Koḷḷiṭam.

Since the temple is not very well known in Indological literature, and to my knowledge there are no secondary sources exclusively devoted to this holy site, apart from some information I col-

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[14] See Hudson 2007, Hudson 2008b, Hudson 2010.

lected during my visit to the temple in February 2018, I am going to present some basic data provided by Orr in her study on the temples of the Cōḻas and the Pāṇḍyas. The temple belongs to the region of Pāṇḍyanāḍu, and, as Orr's research shows, in this region, unlike in Cōḻanāḍu, the number of Vaiṣṇava temples is almost equal to that of Śaiva temples. This applies especially to the Tirunelveli district to which Maṉṉārkōyil belongs. As Orr writes, the temple can be described as the example of the Cōḻa-Pāṇḍya type of temple architecture. Being sponsored by Cōḻa 'viceroys' and Cōḻa 'feudatories,' it incorporates some elements of the style known from the Pāṇḍya country. However, she also reports Dhaky's opinion, according to whom the temple is closer to the Cōḻanāḍu style than to the Pāṇḍyas' one. Orr dates the temple to ca. 1024 CE, and in her opinion it was a Cēra king 'of far south' who sponsored the construction of the temple. He also named it Rājendracōḻa Viṇṇakar in order to honour the Cōḻa king Rajendra I. As Orr writes, the temple reminds those in Tiruvalisaram and in Mūvarkoil, which have specific, so-called *brahmakānta* pilasters; there are no images in the niches on the outer walls, but there is a frieze representing mythical beasts, with *vyāla*s adorning the lower part of the wall; inside the upper shrine, the temple has beautifully carved wooden ceilings. Orr mentions that in her Madurai study-area there are four royal orders issued by the 11th-century Cōḻa-Pāṇḍya viceroys, two of which can be found in the Maṉṉārkōyil. Also in this temple is a royal order of the Cēra king who is supposed to be a builder of the temple.

Of special interest for us is the presence of a three-storey main shrine and three figures of Viṣṇu. The standing one is accommodated on the ground floor, the seated one at the first level, and the reclining one at the second level. As Orr writes and I was able to verify, at the highest, second level, the shrine is provided with a beautifully carved wooden ceiling representing animals (possibly the signs of the Zodiac). The local priest Periya Nambi Narasimha Gopalan claims that this is the place in which Kulacēkarāḻvār achieved his emancipation.

Apart from the very limited information provided by Orr and confirmed during my visit to the temple, some more data can be found on R. Muthusamy's heritage blog, though it is difficult to say how reliable they are. Going back to the association of the tem-

ple with the figure of Kulacēkara Āḻvār, according to Ananda-kichenin (2018) it is not sure that he really was a Cēra king, even though his affiliation with the *koṅku* region (Koṅkunāṭu, the western part of Tamilnadu) could point to his connection with Kerala. Some scholars also linked him with Kerala by identifying Kolli with Keralan Kollam. However, there is no consensus: for example, Hardy points out that Kolli was also the name of some hills located in the district of Tiruccirāpaḷḷi.[15] Thus, we still cannot say anything certain about the identity of Kulacēkara, and there-fore I am inclined to take him simply as one of the Āḻvārs. Nevertheless, his authority was such that he was acknowledged in the name of the temple.

A much later example of the *tritāla* type is the Kūṭal Aḻakar tem-ple in Madurai. In his short study on the temple architecture, Branfoot dates it to the post-13th century, or more precisely to the mid 16th century.[16] The name of the temple refers to the old name of the city, which was Kūṭal, and Aḻakar ('the Handsome One') is one of the local names of Viṣṇu. The temple, which is the main Vaiṣṇava shrine in Madurai, belongs to the 108 holy Vaiṣṇava sites known as *divyadeśa*s and, as it is considered a major religious cen-tre, it possesses its own *sthalapurāṇa* known as the *Kuṭālpurāṇa*. Like many other Vaiṣṇava temples in Tamilnadu, it has a shrine of Viṣṇu's consort, called Maturavallī, to the south and a shrine of Āṇṭāḷ to the north. The temple is characterized by a spectacular *vimāna*, which is of its *gopura* size and is visible from outside the temple, while many later *vimāna*s are small structures hidden in-side the temple complex. One of the reasons of this height is the fact that it contains three *garbhagṛha*s. Viṣṇu at the lowest level is

[15] Hardy 1983: 260. Anandakichenin 2018, Introduction. While concluding, Anandakichenin writes (p. 69): 'My tentative conclusions are that Kulacēkara Āḻvār was a Tamil chieftain belonging to the Koṅku-Cēra clan ruling from Kolli, who wrote solely in Tamil, including the signature *pācuram*s, although many of the pieces of information that he gives about himself seem to be of a hyperbolic nature. He probably lived around the 9th c., a rough contemporary of Periyāḻvār and Āṇṭāḷ. He may possibly have lived *before* Tirumaṅkai, who is aware of more shrines and goes beyond the limits of Southern India.'

[16] Referring to Soundara Rajan (Soundara Rajan 1975: 260–261), and ac-knowledging the fact that there was an earlier shrine in this place, Branfoot disa-grees with Soundara Rajan's dating of the temple to the 8th or 9th century; see Branfoot 2000: 200.

in his seated form together with accompanying Śrīdevī and Bhūdevī. At the middle level, Viṣṇu is standing, and at the topmost one he is reclining. The upper shrines are accessible by a staircase in the *mahāmaṇḍapa*. The flat roof on the first storey has two narrow passageways around the *vimāna*. The image of the standing Viṣṇu on this storey is about three meters high. Among specific features of the Kūṭal Aḻakar is also the presence of a *navagraha* shrine of the nine planetary deities, which in fact is an element typical of the Śaiva temples. The temple is a spectacular example of the 16th-century *tritāla* type, and although the two higher storeys are not often visited by the devotees, the priests worship there twice a day, while in the main lower shrine they perform the usual seven *pūja*s.

The inclusion of different main shrines of different deities in one temple complex is common across Indian temple architecture, for example in connection with the *pañcāyatana* type, characteristic of *smārta* cult, in which five deities, namely Śiva, Viṣṇu, Sūrya, Durgā and Gaṇapāti, appear installed in one temple (*pañcakūṭa*). There are also examples of three-shrine temples (*trikūṭa*) containing three different deities, but I would like to refer here shortly to one more specific example of holy site encompassing three equal shrines, though differently positioned. It is the Keśava temple in Somnathpur (Karnataka), which presents one of the most impressive examples of Hoysala architecture and belongs to the period when this dynasty ruled. More precisely, it was consecrated in 1258 CE by Somanātha Daṇḍanāyaka, who was a general of the Hoysala King Narasiṃha III.

The Somnathpur Keśava temple (fig. 6–7) is an example of *trikūṭa* dedicated exclusively to Viṣṇu.[17] This splendid temple with its three shrines contains the statues of Viṣṇu Janārdana in the northern shrine and that of Kṛṣṇa Veṇugopāla in the southern one. The central shrine used to host the statue of Keśava, which nowadays is missing. All three were standing figures and not immediately connected with the most important and representative ones referring to Viṣṇu in his highest abodes. Thus, here the intention seems, probably, to be different from that observed else-

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[17] About triple temples, see for example Gail 2016.

where and in the case of the Keśava temple it is just multiplying the one and only god by representing him in the three popular forms.

The discussion concerning the meaning of a particular mode of constructing and structuring a Hindu temple, and especially Vaiṣṇava ones, often refers to the modes of conceptualization of this arrangement.[18] One of the possible ways is to look at this structuring process as beginning in the very centre and then developing outwards. If we look at the vertical layout, this would mean that the topmost chapel contains the highest form of the god. However, this is not so obvious and also not necessary: for example, as Hudson argues, in the Vaikuṇṭha Perumāḷ temple, the highest form, residing in the Vaikuṇṭha heaven, is in the bottommost chapel. Regarding and conceptualizing the plan of the temple as a *maṇḍala*, the builders of the temples or, more accurately, of their central portion, supposedly had it in mind, and they projected the same centralized model onto the adjacent enclosures as well as the accretions on the main structure and superstructure.

The multiplied forms of Viṣṇu similarly appear one above another or, differently, side by side even in the other, abovementioned temples. In the case of the *tritāla* type there seems to be a much more elaborate idea behind it, and the forms clearly represent complementary aspects of the god seated, standing and reclining. Conversely, in the case of the *trikūṭa* type the idea underlying it is rather one of multiplication. As is very often observed in the religious art of India, the two aspects, namely the religious one providing the ideology and the material one, determining the rules described in the art manuals, meet and are complementary.

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[18] Indorf 2004; Srinivasan 1990.

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Fig. 1 Kāñcīpuram, Vaikuṇṭha Perumāḷ temple
[photo: Leszek Drożdżowicz]

Fig. 2   Kāñcīpuram, Vaikuṇṭha Perumāḷ temple, seated Viṣṇu in the lower
shrine [photo: Marzenna Czerniak-Drożdżowicz]

Fig. 3 Kāñcīpuram, Vaikuṇṭha Perumāḷ temple, upper shrine
[photo: Marzenna Czerniak-Drożdżowicz]

Fig. 4 Maṉṉārkōyil, Rājagopālaswami temple, wooden roof
of the second-floor shrine [photo: Marzenna Czerniak-Drożdżowicz]

Fig. 5   Maṉṉārkōyil, Rājagopālaswami temple, reclining Viṣṇu
[photo: Marzenna Czerniak-Drożdżowicz]

Fig. 6 Somnathpur, Keśava temple
[photo: Marzenna Czerniak-Drożdżowicz]

Fig. 7   Somnathpur, Keśava temple, Viṣṇu in the Veṇugopāla form
[photo: Marzenna Czerniak-Drożdżowicz]

Rules of Conduct for the Śaivas.
The Intersection of Dharmaśāstra and Śaiva Devotion in the Śivadharmottara [1]

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The study that I present in the following pages is based on my close readings of some portions of the *Śivadharmottara*, an early

Śaiva text whose composition we tentatively place around the 6th–7th century, and of which several crucial aspects still need to be properly clarified. Among these, the one I will address here is its relationship with early Dharmaśāstra literature, which both in my research and in other studies to which I will refer below is emerging as an important source of doctrines, textual borrowings, and general inspiration for the authors of the *Śivadharmottara* and the *Śivadharmaśāstra*. The focus will thus be on the Dharmaśāstra as a source for the composition of parts of the *Śivadharmottara*, but given the high level of intricacy of South Asian textual traditions, some topics will require an incursion into Vaiṣṇava devotional literature and early Śaiva Tantrism. Among the many subjects dealt with in the *Śivadharmottara*, we will mainly focus on the prescriptions centered on the *śivayogin*s, the most important religious figure in the text, which selects them as the main recipients of a wide array of donations and makes them the culmination of an ideal depiction of society. Besides the importance assigned to the *śivayogin*s, their portrayal as ideal recipients also has evident historical implications, as it addresses the issue of the material support given to religious communities and institutions. Therefore, the study of this topic has to be regarded as a further contribution towards the historical reconstruction of the context in which the authors of our texts acted, and the reasons for their composition.

Concerning my approach to textual sources, all the stanzas I quote from the *Śivadharmottara* or from other parts of the Śivadharma corpus are based on the editions that are currently being prepared in the frame of the Śivadharma Project, as specified in the footnotes and the bibliography. Since all these editions are works in progress and subject to change, I have omitted the critical apparatus, but I discuss some relevant variant readings in the footnotes. I made my best to base the following considerations on portions of the texts whose reconstruction can be considered very close to certain. Moreover, my readings from the *Śivadharmottara* and the *Śivadharmaśāstra* are accompanied, whenever relevant, by

the remarks of an anonymous commentator, whose work is preserved in a manuscript in Malayalam script whose transcription and study is also still in progress. Since I wanted to focus on the sources used by the *Śivadharmottara*, this time I avoided too many considerations on how the passages I examine have been transformed in the rich reception of the text, except for some references to the *Haracaritacintāmaṇi*. Therefore, many aspects related to the topic of the present article remain to be studied, and for this reason the reader should not expect any conclusive statements on the subjects that it promises to enlighten, but rather a sequence of connections, ideas, and many questions.

1. *The domestication of Śaiva asceticism in the Śivadharmottara*

The *Śivadharmottara* devotes its fourth chapter, to which the manuscript tradition attaches the title *Satpātrādhyāya,* to the definition of suitable recipients in a ritual donation, and the rejection of unsuitable ones (*apātra*). As a matter of fact, despite permitting access to ritual gifting to a variety of recipients, the *Satpātrādhyāya* constantly remarks the superiority of the *śivayogin*s, who are praised not just as recipients of gifts but also as objects of worship on a par with Śiva. There are two main contexts in which the *Satpātrādhyāya* extols their function as recipients: the *śrāddha* offerings, namely the monthly Smārta ritual consisting in offerings of food to the ancestors, and the guest reception. Therefore, this chapter mainly positions the *śivayogin*s as the recipients of donations of food—and part of the *Satpātrādhyāya* is occupied by a list of permitted food items—along with all the acts of care prescribed for the guest-reception. The contents of the chapter are structured as follows:

> 4.1–21: Identification of the *śivayogin* as the perfect recipient and praise of those who donate to them, who are cleansed of all their sins;
> 4.22–36: List of food items for *śrāddha* offerings;
> 4.37–42: Praise of feeding the *śivayogin*s during a *śrāddha* rite as a way to increase one's own merits and those of the ancestors;
> 4.43–47: Guest reception for *śivayogin*s;
> 4.48–55: Injunctions against defaming the *śivayogin*s;
> 4.56–63: Injunctions against donating to an unfit recipient;
> 4.64– 67: *Yogin*s must not become attached to receiving gifts;

4.68–79: The only person really benefiting from a donation is the donor, who will increase his spiritual merits; he should therefore not select the recipients on the basis of superficial features, but donate to all the suitable ones;
4.80–82: One should donate according to their capabilities, or even just take care of the *yogin*s if they have no food to offer;
4.83–88: The donor should have a respectful attitude and avoid feelings of rage;
4.89–92: List of *Tīrtha*s and sacred places that increase the positive results of donations;
4.93–94: Periods of the year when donations are more auspicious;
4.95–99: The nature of *śraddhā* and its praise.

These topics, as well as some textual borrowings and similarities, suggest that one of the sources of inspiration for the composition of this chapter was possibly the *Manusmṛti*, in particular parts of its chapter 3, dealing with the duties of the householder. After treating the topic of marriage (3.1–66), the *Manusmṛti* devotes the largest part of the chapter to food offerings, both in the frame of the five 'great sacrifices' of the householder (3.67–121), and in the context of *śrāddha* rites (3.122–286). Guest reception (3.94–121), the identification of suitable and unsuitable invitees to the ritual offerings (3.127–186), as well as the correct food and time (3.266–284) for such offerings are other topics to which the text pays considerable attention. Significantly, the *Śivadharmottara* does not describe the procedures of these rituals, as the *Manusmṛti* does, but only prescribes their performance, meaning that other sources were used as authorities on the procedural details. The sole issue that concerns the author of the Śaiva text here is the re-interpretation of some defining aspects of the Dharmaśāstra gifting procedures—the identity of the recipient, the places increasing the merits of donation, the centrality of *śraddhā*—through the medium of Śaiva devotion.

The possibility of establishing a link between the two works, here and elsewhere, is not only revealing of the strategies of textual composition, or the impact of Dharmaśāstra on the formation of theoretical models of society in early medieval religious communities, but it can also significantly help to understand the agenda of the composers of the *Śivadharmottara*, especially when it comes to a topic such as the identification of the *pātra*. As recent studies have highlighted, the Dharmaśāstra 'theory of the gift' has

mainly been a 'theory of the recipient,' since the vast majority of the instructions are given from the point of view of the donees, and very little is dictated concerning the donor.[2] Starting from early times and throughout all the medieval history of literature on the topic of *dāna*, such recipient has been unanimously identified with a male Brahmin conversant with the Veda,[3] reflecting the hierarchical view on society that this literature promotes—a hierarchy which saw the authors of the Dharmaśāstra on top as the receivers of material support. Therefore, when the authors of the *Śivadharmottara* construct their own theory of the recipient with reference to topics and doctrines that are typical of the Dharmaśāstra, and in such a context support the superiority as a recipient of the *śivayogin* who masters the *śivajñāna*, they are *de facto* operating a direct replacement of the Brahmin who knows the Veda. In this way, they promote an alternative view of society in which the *śivayogin* occupies the same prominent position as the Brahmin in the classical Dharmaśāstra conceptualisation, and in which the *śivajñāna* is considered on a par with the Veda, though not replacing it.[4] This intellectual operation can be read in light of an attempt to frame Śivadharma teachings in the context of Vedic orthodoxy, but, considering the importance that material support can have in the survival of a given community, it also suggests a competitive attitude, which was not alien to Vedic orthodoxy either.[5]

The association with salvific knowledge in an eschatological perspective is the main qualification of the Śaiva recipient, to the point that his redemptive powers are inscribed in an artificial etymology of the word *pātra*:

[2] For the role of the *pātra* in the treatises on gift in the Dharmaśāstra tradition, see Brick 2015: 41 ff.

[3] Among the countless examples that could be cited at this point, see *Manusmṛti* 7.85: *samam abrāhmaṇe dānaṃ dviguṇaṃ brāhmaṇabruve | prādhīte śatasāhasram anantaṃ vedapārage ||*; 'A gift to a non-Brahmin brings an equal reward; to a Brahmin by name, a double reward; to one who is advanced in Vedic study, a thousandfold reward; and to a man who has completely mastered the Veda, an infinite reward' (tr. Olivelle 2005).

[4] Note that in ch. 1 the *Śivadharmottara* clearly suggests that the Veda and the *śivāgama* are to be regarded as being on the same level (De Simini 2021: 35 ff).

[5] For instance, Brick (2015: 45) points out that the Dharmaśāstra expressly warns against donating to heretics.

jñānoḍupena yaḥ puṃsāṃ trātā saṃsārasāgarāt |
ajñānāṃ pālanāt trāṇāt tat pātraṃ paramaṃ smṛtam || 4.8 ||

It is traditionally taught that the one who saves ignorant people from the ocean of transmigration with the raft of knowledge, because of protecting (*pā-*), [i.e.] saving (*trai*),[6] is the supreme recipient.

Further on, the *Śivadharmottara* makes our interpretive work easier by expressly contrasting its ideal recipient with the 'twice-borns who know the Vedas,' and hyperbolically stressing this contrast with a shift in number, from a 'multitude' of twice-borns to a single *śivayogin*:

dvijānāṃ vedaviduṣāṃ koṭiṃ sambhojya yat phalam |
bhikṣāmātrapradānena tat phalaṃ śivayogine || 4.10 ||

The fruit that [one obtains] feeding a multitude of twice-borns who know the Vedas, this fruit [is obtained] by merely giving alms to one *śivayogin*.

A similar type of contrastive comparison was used by Manu to identify the best recipient of *śrāddha* rites and guest-reception as the Brahmins who are expert of the Veda, juxtaposed with those who do not have the same mastery (*Manusmṛti* 3.130–131):

dūrād eva parīkṣeta brāhmaṇaṃ vedaparagam |
tīrthaṃ tad dhavyakavyānāṃ pradāne so 'tithiḥ smṛtaḥ || 3.130 ||
sahasraṃ hi sahasrāṇām anṛcāṃ yatra bhuñjate |
ekas tān mantravit prītaḥ sarvān arhati dharmataḥ || 3.131 ||

He should search far and wide for a Brahmin who has mastered the Veda: such a man is the proper recipient of divine and ancestral offerings, and tradition calls him 'a guest.' (130) For when one man who knows the Veda is gratified here, in terms of the Law he is worth all the men ignorant of the Veda who may eat there, be they in their millions. (131) (Tr. Olivelle 2005)

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[6] This etymology is based on *Dhātupāṭha* 1, 1014 (*traiṄ pālane*). I thank Vincenzo Vergiani for making me aware of it.

Conversely, the *Śivadharmottara* identifies the unfit recipient simply with the person who does not possess the *śivayogin*s' knowledge, and donation to him is compared to pouring water into an unbaked clay vessel, sowing a seed in infertile ground, offering oblations into ashes—all images that the *Manusmṛti* too uses to describe the gift to a non-Brahmin.[7]

The *śivayogin*s superiority as a recipient of donations is justified on account of his identification with Śiva. The *Śivadharmottara* bases such identification on his being a *yogin* who is constantly engaged in meditation on Śiva, and has in fact attained union with Śiva as a result of his yoga:

> *jñānine śāntacittāya śivadhyānaratāya ca |*
> *śraddhayānnaṃ sakṛd dattvā sarvapāpaiḥ pramucyate || 4.13 ||*
> *ekaṃ munivaraṃ śāntam īśvarārpitamānasam |*
> *bhojayitvā sakṛd bhaktyā sarvakāmān avāpnuyāt || 4.14 ||*
> *dhyāyamānaḥ śivaṃ yogī bhuṅkte 'nnaṃ satataṃ yataḥ |*
> *tataḥ sākṣāc chivenaiva tad bhuktam aśanaṃ bhavet || 4.15 ||*

Having donated food even only once, with faith, to one who has cultivated knowledge, whose mind is pacified and who delights in the meditation on Śiva, he is liberated from all sins. (13) Having fed even only once, with devotion, a single, excellent *muni*, whose senses are pacified, whose mind is fixed in the Lord, one will fulfil all desires. (14) Since the *yogin* eats food while he is constantly meditating upon Śiva, this food will be eaten by Śiva himself. (15)

This is restated in other parts of the text, where the worship of a *śivayogin* is said to be the equivalent of worshipping Śiva because

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[7] *Śivadharmottara* 4.58–61: *āmapātre raso yadvan naśyate tac ca bhājanam | dānam ajñe tathā nyastaṃ saha pātreṇa naśyate || 4.58 || sadbījam ūṣare yadvad vāpitaṃ niṣphalaṃ bhavet | dānaṃ tadvad apātreṣu vinyastaṃ niṣphalaṃ bhavet || 4.59 || bhasmanīva hutaṃ havyaṃ yathā hotuḥ suniṣphalam | jñānāgnirahite vipre tathā dānaṃ nirarthakam || 4.60 || yathā ṣaṇḍho 'phalaḥ strīṣu yathā gaur gavi cāphalā | brāhmaṇasya tathā janma jñānahīnasya niṣphalam || 4.61 ||;* 'Just like juice is lost in an unbaked clay vessel, as well as the vessel itself, in the same way a gift offered to an ignorant disappears with its receptacle. (58) Just like a good seed will be fruitless if it is sowed in a saline soil, in the same way a gift offered to unfit recipients will be fruitless. (59) Just like an oblation offered into something like ash is entirely fruitless for the sacrifier, so the donation to a Brahmin devoid of the fire of knowledge is without any benefits. (60) Just like a eunuch is fruitless for women, and a cow is fruitless for another cow, so the life of a Brahmin who is devoid of knowledge is fruitless (61).'

the latter is materially present in the body of a *yogin*;[8] once, the text compares the worship of a *śivayogin* to that of all the gods and ancestors.[9]

However, following a line of thought that is already found in the Dharmaśāstra, the *Śivadharmottara* singles out the perfect recipient of donations also for his moral virtues, which find an expression in his detachment from the gifts he accepts and his extreme altruistic behaviour, which motivates him to accept gifts only in order to benefit the donor.[10]

The stress on the *śivayogin*'s detachment from material possessions is all the more striking if one considers that the *Śivadharmo-*

The *Manusmṛti* uses the comparison with an unbaked recipient in order to refer to a Brahmin who is greedy for gifts even from polluted donors (3.179): *vedavic cāpi vipro 'sya lobhāt kṛtvā pratigraham | vināśaṃ vrajati kṣipram āmapātram ivāmbhasi ||*. The idea of pouring an oblation into ashes instead of fire as a metaphor for a useless offering is found several times in chapter 3 of the *Manusmṛti* to describe oblations to ignorant men (3.97: *naśyanti havyakavyāni narāṇām avijā-natām | bhasmabhūteṣu vipreṣu mohād dattāni dātṛbhiḥ*), again to a Brahmin who does not recite the Veda (3.168: *brāhmaṇo hy anadhyānas tṛṇāgnir iva śāmyati | tasmai havyaṃ na dātavyaṃ na hi bhasmani hūyate*), and to a twice-born man who is the son of a remarried woman (3.181cd: *bhasmanīva hutaṃ dravyaṃ tathā pau-narbhave dvije*).

Śivadharmottara 4.59 is reminiscent of *Manusmṛti* 3.142: *yatheriṇe bījam uptvā na vaptā labhate phalam | tathānṛce havir dattvā na dātā labhate phalam ||*. In his commentary on this verse (which is 3.132 in Medhātithi's recension), Medhātithi glosses *iriṇam* with *ūṣaram*. *Śivadharmottara* 4.61 can be compared to *Manusmṛti* 2.158: *yathā ṣaṇḍho 'phalaḥ strīṣu yathā gaur gavi cāphalā | yathā cājñe 'phalaṃ dānaṃ tathā vipro 'nṛco 'phalaḥ ||*. Note that the connection of these images with the Dharmaśāstra worldview is such that the *Śivadharmottara* uses the words *vipra* in 4.60 and *brāhmaṇa* in st. 4.61.

[8] See, for instance, *Śivadharmottara* 4.47: *śivayogiśarīre tu nityaṃ sannihitaḥ śivaḥ | yogīndraṃ pūjayet tasmāt sākṣāt sampūjitaḥ śivaḥ ||*.

[9] *Śivadharmottara* 4.39: *yugapat pūjitās tena brahmaviṣṇumaheśvarāḥ | pitaraḥ sa-rvadevāś ca yo 'rcayec chivayoginam ||*.

[10] See *Śivadharmottara* 4.66: *na hi svārthaṃ samuddiśya pratigṛhṇanti sādhavaḥ | dātur evopakārāya yasmād gṛhṇanti niḥspṛhāḥ ||*; 'The virtuous do not accept gifts for their own sake, since they accept gifts without craving for them, only to the advantage of the donor.' On the altruistic scope of gift acceptance, see *Śivadha-rmottara* 4.72–73: *ihāmutra phalenāpi dātāram anuyojayan | āyāty arthī gṛhaṃ dātuḥ kas taṃ na pratipūjayet || nārthinaḥ syuḥ kathaṃ pūjyā yācamānā dine dine | ye balād apy anicchantaṃ yojayanti naraṃ śriyā ||*; '[It is] in order to bind the donor with good results in this existence and the next that the supplicant goes to the house of the donor. Who would not worship him? (72) How could one not worship supplicants who, begging for alms every day, forcefully procure fortune even to an unwilling man? (73)'

ttara regards the *śivayogin*, qualified as absorbed in the practice of *śivajñāna* or immersed in meditation on Śiva, not just as the recipient of ritual food offerings and *bhikṣā*, but also as the main donee of all the gifts included under the umbrella category of *vidyādāna*, which range from the gift of manuscripts to the administration of big, multi-functional *āśrama*s, to which these figures are attached.[11] Also the twelfth and last chapter of the *Śivadharmaśāstra*, a work that is otherwise mostly concerned with the construction and exaltation of the figure of the lay Śaiva devotee,[12] praises the *śivayogin*s as the utmost recipients, and the text gives a list of everyday objects, including manuscripts and a resting place, one can donate to them.[13] In this chapter, in which, coherently with the aims of the *Śivadharmaśāstra*, the praise of *śivayogin*s is balanced with that of feeding *śivabhakta*s during *śrāddha* rites, we find an expression that is very close to *Śivadharmottara* 4.10, again contrasting the feeding of a Śaiva ascetic (here qualified as a '*muni* who has subdued passions') during *śrāddha*s with that of twice-borns who know the Vedas:

dvijānāṃ vedaviduṣāṃ koṭiṃ saṃbhojya yat phalam |
munaye vītarāgāya bhikṣādānena tat phalam || 12.59 ||

Thus, by focusing solely on the *śivayogin* as the best recipient of all, the *Śivadharmottara* expands on the prevalent lay emphasis of the *Śivadharmaśāstra* while still reflecting a comparable worldview, including the effort of constantly balancing its reception and

Brick remarks how scholars who have worked on gifting procedures in South Asia have often claimed that reluctance to accept gifts is a prominent feature of South Asian theories of the gift. Manu and Yājñavalkya warn the recipients against becoming addicted to donations, and the latter even praises those who reject a gift despite being qualified to it (Brick 2015: 46).

[11] On this see De Simini 2016, in particular pp. 83–226.

[12] On the divinisation of lay Śaiva devotees in the *Śivadharmaśāstra*, see Mirnig 2019.

[13] On donations to the *śivayogin*s in chapter 12 of the *Śivadharmaśāstra*, and the connections that can be established with the *Śivadharmottara*, both for the type of donations addressed to them and the characterisation of their form of yoga, see De Simini 2016: 51 and 208 ff.

interpretation of Dharmaśāstra with the principles and practices of Śaiva devotion.[14]

Further examples of this operation can be found in the initial and concluding stanzas of the *Satpātrādhyāya*, in which the text creates a theoretical frame for its teachings, where the identification of the *śivayogin* as the best recipient is firmly anchored on the principles of the Dharmaśāstra theory of the gift:

athaikabhavikaṃ dānaṃ karmayogaratātmanām |
śatajanmabhavaṃ dānaṃ taponiṣṭhapratiṣṭhitam || 4.1 ||
japayajñābhiyuktebhyaḥ sahasrabhavikaṃ smṛtam |
ābhūtasamplavasthāyi pradānaṃ śivayoginām || 4.2 ||
atyalpam api yad dattaṃ śivajñānārthavedinām |
tan mahāpralayaṃ yāvad dātur bhogāya kalpyate || 4.3 ||
tad dānam alpaṃ bahu vā kiṃcid asti vijānataḥ |
deśakālavidhiśraddhāpātrayuktaṃ tad akṣayam || 4.4 ||
pātre deśe ca kāle ca vidhinā śraddhayā ca yat |
dattaṃ hutaṃ kṛtaṃ ceṣṭaṃ tad anantaphalaṃ bhavet || 4.5 ||
tilārdhamātrakeṇāpi yat pramāṇena dīyate |
satpātre śraddhayā kiṃcit tad bhavet sārvakāmikam || 4.6 ||

A gift for those whose souls delight in the practice of rituals [produces merits] that last for one lifetime; [the merits of] a gift imparted to those who are fixed in ascetic practices are enjoyed for one hundred rebirths. (1) [The result of a gift] to those who are devoted to the practice of mantra-recitation is taught to last for one thousand worldly existences; a gift to the *śivayogin*s will keep [producing its fruits] until the dissolution of existence. (2) If something, albeit very small, is given to those who know the meaning of the *śivajñāna*, this will be of enjoyment for the donor until the great dissolution. (3) Whatever gift, be it small or big, is significant for the learned [*yogin*]; that [gift] that is performed according to the [correct prescriptions about] place, time, procedure, faith, and recipient is undecaying. (4) What is donated, offered into the fire, performed,[15] and offered in a ritual when the recipient, place and time [are correct], according to the [correct]

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[14] Important instances of this dynamic can be found in the reinterpretation of the *āśrama* system expounded in chapter 11 of the *Śivadharmaśāstra*, recently studied in Bisschop, Kafle and Lubin (2021).

[15] Here the Sanskrit commentary suggests to interpret *kṛta* as referring to *tapas*.

procedure and with faith, will bear endless fruits. (5) Something that is donated to a correct recipient with faith, even if it has the size of half a sesame seed, will fulfil all desires. (6)

Verses 4.4–5 mention some of the elements that in Dharmaśāstra literature are known as the 'components' (*aṅga*) of the gift. In the formulation of the *Devalasmṛti*, which has become a *locus classicus* in the medieval digests on *dāna*, these are six and correspond to 'donor, receiver, trust, object to donate, place and time.'[16] The *Śivadharmottara* also counts six, with *vidhi* instead of the donor, but later it expressly states that the components of the gift are four (see *infra*). Similar lists of gift components are also given in early Dharmaśāstra literature, albeit not necessarily labelled as such. A relevant example is that of *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 1.6, but also Manu offers some parallels.[17]

Among these components, *śraddhā* strikes out as one of the most highlighted characteristics of donors in the Dharmaśāstra treatises on gifting.[18] The range of meanings of *śraddhā* in the Dharmaśāstra usually centres on the donor's attitude towards gifting, which he should perform with generosity and lack of envy (*anasūya* is the gloss of Vijñāneśvara on *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 1.203)—hence Olivelle's translation of *śraddhā* as 'spirit of generosity.'[19] Brick (2015: 54) has highlighted how commentators and authors of Dharmanibandhas understand *śraddhā* also as 'a believer's attitude': Hemādri aptly glosses it as *āstikyabuddhi*—a gloss also given

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[16] *Devalasmṛti*, as quoted in *Dānakāṇḍa* 1.11: *dātā pratigrahītā ca śraddhā deyaṃ ca dharmayuk | deśakālau ca dānānām aṅgāny etāni ṣaḍ viduḥ.*

[17] *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 1.6: *deśe kāla upāyena dravyaṃ śraddhāsamanvitam | pātre pradīyate yat tat sakalaṃ dharmalakṣaṇam ||.* A nearly identical verse is quoted by Medhātithi in his commentary on *Manusmṛti* 7.86: *deśakālavidhānena dravyaṃ śraddhāsamanvitam | pātre pradīyate yat tu tad dharmasya prasādhanam.* Note that, content-wise, *Manusmṛti* 7.86 is close to *Śivadharmottara* 4.4: *pātrasya hi viśeṣeṇa śraddadhānatayaiva ca | alpaṃ vā bahu vā pretya dānasyāvāpyate phalam ||.* Verse 7.85 of the *Manusmṛti* gives the above-quoted list of four recipients matched to the gradually increasing reward of the donations offered to them, culminating with the *vedapāraga*, which makes it vaguely comparable to *Śivadharmottara* 4.1. For a list of the 'gift components' in the *Manusmṛti*, one can also look at 3.275: *yad yad dadāti vidhivat samyak śraddhāsamanvitaḥ | tat tat pitṝṇāṃ bhavati paratrānantyam akṣayam ||.*

[18] See Brick 2015: 49 ff.

[19] See Olivelle 2005: 135–136.

by Vijñāneśvara in his commentary on *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 1.6—where the noun *āstikya* marks the contrast with *nāstikya* and the *nāstika*s, the 'deniers' of the validity of the Veda, 'nihilists,' who are often condemned as major sinners in the *Manusmṛti* and other works (see § 2).

The *Śivadharmottara* is seemingly aware of both nuances of this word in this context when it lists five synonyms of *śraddhā,* starting with devotion:

> *bhaktir bhāvaḥ parā prītiḥ śivadharmaikatānatā |*
> *pratipattir iti jñeyaṃ śraddhāparyāyapañcakam || 4.95 ||*

> Devotion, affection, a very friendly attitude, conformity with the Śivadharma, respectful behaviour: these are known as the five synonyms of faith.

Thus, the 'religious' attitude towards the gift that part of the Dharmaśāstra tradition understands as *āstikya* is devotion in the purview of the Śaiva text—to Śiva, and consequently to the *śivayogin*s as his incarnations. The understanding of *śraddhā* is also adapted to a Śaiva context through the reference to the *śivadharmaikatānatā,* the 'condition of being one with the Śivadharma,' which one may understand as respect for the precepts of Śivadharma. The following stanzas keep praising *śraddhā* as crucial for the successful performance of *dāna,*[20] while the last stanza of the chapter even celebrates it as the most important among the components of the gift, which here are said to be only four:[21]

> *śraddhāpradhānaṃ vijñeyaṃ satpātrādicatuṣṭayam |*
> *śraddhā te kīrtitā tasmān nāśraddhas tatphalaṃ labhet || 4.99 ||*

> Faith is the most important element of the four [components of the gift] that start with the suitable recipient: for this reason faith

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[20] *Śivadharmottara* 4.96–98: *śraddhā māteva jananī jñānasya sukṛtasya ca | tasmāc chraddhāṃ samutpādya deyam akṣayam icchatā || yad dānaṃ śraddhayā pātre vidhivat pratipāditam | tad anantaphalaṃ jñeyam api bālāgramātrakam || ārteṣu dīneṣu guṇānviteṣu yac chraddhayā svalpam api pradattam | tat sarvakāmān samupaiti loke śraddhaiva dānaṃ pravadanti tajjñāḥ ||.*

[21] The Sanskrit commentary lists these components as *satpātrasaddeśasatkālasadvidhi°* (fol. 139v3).

has been explained to you. The one who has no faith will not get the the fruit of giving.

Śraddhā is here listed among the characteristics of the gift and, specifically, of the donors' attitude towards the recipient and the act of giving in general, coherently with the Dharmaśāstra context. When it is assimilated to *bhakti* it is in fact regarded by the *Śivadharmottara* as the real foundation of its system. Stanza 4.95 is quoted at the beginning of the commentary on 1.17–22, where *śraddhā* is celebrated, among other things, as the base of the Śivadharma, the sole *pramāṇa* to get access to salvific teachings and obtain union with Śiva, and is said to correspond to every ritual activity, knowledge, liberation, and ultimately everything that exists.[22] By quoting this stanza, the commentator links the notion of *śraddhā* as one of the components of ritual gifting to *śraddhā* in a devotional context, pointing out their identity: *ato 'tra śraddhāśabdena bhaktir ucyate* (fol. 116*r2). This is the remark that follows the quotation of stanza 4.95, with which he opens his commentary on the eulogy of *śraddhā* in chapter 1. As a matter of fact, this eulogy is the real beginning of the *Śivadharmottara*, the first words that the text attributes to Agasti in reply to Sanatkumāra's questions, which function as a concise table of contents at the beginning of the work. The eulogistic stanzas on *śraddhā*, as is also remarked by the commentator, answer Sanatkumāra's first question, namely *kiṃpradhānāḥ śive dharmāḥ,* 'what is the main component of these Dharmic paths that lead to Śiva?'[23]

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[22] *Śivadharmottara* 1.17–22: *śraddhāpūrvāḥ sarvadharmāḥ śraddhāmadhyānta-saṃsthitāḥ | śraddhāniṣṭhāpratiṣṭhāś ca dharmāḥ śraddhaiva kīrtitāḥ || 17 || śrutimātra-rasāḥ sūkṣmāḥ pradhānapuruṣeśvarāḥ | śraddhāmātreṇa gṛhyante na kareṇa na cakṣuṣā || 18 || kāyakleśair na bahubhir na caivārthasya rāśibhiḥ | dharmaḥ samprāpyate sūkṣmaḥ śraddhāhīnaiḥ surair api || 19 || śraddhā dharmaḥ paraḥ sūkṣmaḥ śraddhā jñānaṃ hutaṃ tapaḥ | śraddhā svargaś ca mokṣaś ca śraddhā sarvam idaṃ jagat || 20|| sarva-svaṃ jīvitaṃ vāpi dadyād aśraddhayā yadi | nāpnuyāt sa phalaṃ kiñcic chraddadhānas tato bhavet || 21 || evaṃ śraddhāmayāḥ sarve śivadharmāḥ prakīrtitāḥ | śivaś ca śra-ddhayā gamyaḥ pūjyo dhyeyaś ca śraddhayā || 22 ||.*

[23] Note that, while the commentator and the majority of Northern and Southern manuscripts read *śive dharmāḥ*, here a few Nepalese manuscripts, such as N$^{Ko}_{77}$, N$^{C}_{94}$, N$^{O}_{15}$, along with Naraharinath's edition, attest the reading *śiva-dharmāḥ* or variations thereof, which would result in a *sa-vipula*.

The mention of the *śivayogin* as the most important among four different categories of recipients in the first two stanzas of chapter 4 of the *Śivadharmottara* allows for numerous cross-references both to other chapters of the text and to specific sections of the *Manusmṛti,* as well as to other branches of devotional literature. In chapter 3 of the *Manusmṛti,* within a list of the authorised invitees to an ancestral offering (*pitrya,* 3.127), Manu divides twice-borns into the following categories (*Manusmṛti* 3.134):

> *jñānaniṣṭhā dvijā kecit taponiṣṭhās tathāpare |*
> *tapaḥsvādhyāyaniṣṭhāś ca karmaniṣṭhās tathaiva ca ||*

The correspondence to *Śivadharmottara* 4.1–2 is very close, although, as in other cases, not literal, and expounded in reverse order, as the following table shows:

Śivadharmottara 4	*Manusmṛti* 3
karmayogaratātma	*karmaniṣṭha* (mentioned as fourth)
taponiṣṭhapratiṣṭhita	*taponiṣṭha* (mentioned as third)
japayajñābhiyukta	*tapaḥsvādhyāyaniṣṭha* (mentioned as second)
śivayogin	*jñānaniṣṭha* (mentioned as first)

Despite the order in which these four groups are mentioned in the two texts, the intention is always to stress the superiority of the 'knowledgeable' as recipients. Medhātithi starts his commentary on this stanza by stating that here the text offers 'an account of the divisions of qualifications in order to praise knowledge (*vidyā*) out of all of them, and the praise is [also] addressed to donating to the knowledgeable.'[24] After explaining that the °*niṣṭha*-part of the compounds denotes excellence (*prakarṣa*), he proceeds to explain the *jñānaniṣṭha*s as those 'who have intensively studied the contents of the Vedas and are entirely devoted to this [namely, the exegesis of the Veda]'; *tapas* is explained as the 'ascetical practices such as the *cāndrāyaṇa* fasting,' *svādhyāya* as the self-recitation of the Veda, while *karmāṇi* is a synonym of 'rituals such as the Agni-

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[24] *Manubhāṣya ad* 3.134 (124 according to Medhātithi): *sarvaguṇebhyo vidyāṃ praśaṃsituṃ guṇavibhāgakathanaṃ praśaṃsā ca viduṣe dānārthā |.*

hotra.'[25] According to Medhātithi, in order to become a proper recipient, one has to possess all of these four qualifications and excel in one of them. Therefore, even the group that is simply qualified by the practice of rituals must possess some levels of Vedic knowledge.[26]

At this point, Medhātithi offers a further explanation that he attributes to 'others,' according to which these four groups correspond to the four *āśrama*s: the *jñānaniṣṭha* is the *parivrājaka*, who has renounced active ritual duties and is thus devoted to the knowledge of the self; the *taponiṣṭha* is the *vānaprastha*, the *tapaḥsvā-dhyāyaniṣṭha* the *brahmacārin*, and the *karmaniṣṭha* the *gṛhastha*.[27] The resulting interpretation is thus that only those within the *āśrama* system are entitled to become recipients of these offerings, with the *jñānaniṣṭha/parivrājaka* on top, as they are the sole permitted recipient of the *pitrya*. As the following stanza in the *Manusmṛti* will state, only *jñānaniṣṭha*s are eligible to the *kavya*, which is the ancestral offering, while the offering to the gods (*havya*) can be given to all four groups.[28]

The correspondence between these four categories and those mentioned in chapter 4 of the *Śivadharmottara* is almost complete, if we consider that, as noted above, *śivayogin*s are often qualified by their mastery over and dedication to the *śivajñāna*, and that a

[25] *Manubhāṣya ad* 3.134 (124 according to Medhātithi): *jñāne vidyāyāṃ niṣṭhā prakarṣo yeṣāṃ te jñānaniṣṭhāḥ jñānādhikāriṇaḥ | gamakatvād vyadhikaraṇānām api bahuvrīhiḥ | bhṛśam abhyastavedārthās tatparā evam ucyante | evaṃ sarvatra niṣṭhānteṣu draṣṭavyam | tapaś ca svādhyāyaś ceti dvandvagarbho bahuvrīhiḥ | tapāṃsi cāndrāyaṇādīni svādhyāyo vedādhyayanam | karmāṇy agnihotrādīni |.*

[26] *Manubhāṣya ad* 3.134 (124 according to Medhātithi): *sarva ete guṇāḥ sarveṣu samuccitā iti draṣṭavyāḥ | na hi ekaguṇasadbhāva itaraguṇahīnasya pātratām āpādayati kiṃ tu kasyacit ko 'pi prakarṣa ucyate | yathā ca niṣṭhāśabdaḥ samāptivacanaḥ prakarṣaṃ lakṣayati | tanniṣṭhas tatpara ucyate | sarvaguṇasadbhāve 'pi yadi ekatra prakarṣo 'nye ca guṇāḥ madhyamāḥ tathā ca bhavaty eva pātram | aprakṛṣṭe tv ekasmin sarvaguṇasadbhāve 'pi na pātratāṃ labhante | samuccayaś ca vyākhyāyate yena na jñāna-rahitasya karmānuṣṭhānasadbhāva ity uktaṃ dvitīye |.*

[27] *Manubhāṣya ad* 3.134 (124 according to Medhātithi): *anyais tu jñānaniṣṭhaḥ parivrājako vyākhyāyate | tasya hi ātmajñānābhyāsaḥ karmanyāsena viśeṣato vihitaḥ | taponiṣṭho vānaprasthaḥ | sa hi tāpasa ity ākhyāyate grīṣme pañcatapās tu syāt iti | tapaḥsvādhyāyaniṣṭhāḥ brahmacāriṇaḥ | karmaniṣṭhā gṛhasthāḥ | ataś cānāśramiṇo niṣidhyante |.*

[28] *Manusmṛti* 3.135: *jñānaniṣṭheṣu kavyāni pratiṣṭhāpyāni yatnataḥ | havyāni tu yathānyāyaṃ sarveṣv eva caturṣv api ||.*

reference to them as *śivajñānārthavedin*s is found in the following stanza 4.3. As for the group immediately preceding them, namely the people devoted to the 'ritual self-recitation' (*japayajña*), the absence of a reference to *tapas* makes the similarity with Manu's *tapaḥsvādhyāyaniṣṭha* slightly less precise. However, before examining what the *Śivadharmottara* might intend with *japa*, one has to consider that the word is certainly used as a synonym of *svādhyāya*, the self-recitation of the Veda, in the tradition of the *Manusmṛti*, as the text and Medhātithi's commentary *ad* 3.64–65 (3.74–75 in the edition of the text without Medhātithi's commentary) show. Thus, the *Śivadharmottara* does not seem to go very far from the *Manusmṛti* in the formulation of these four groups of recipients, to the point that one is tempted to wonder if we can apply one of the interpretations given by Medhātithi, associating the four categories of recipients with the four *āśrama*s, also to this passage of the *Śivadharmottara*. If this were the case, the *śivayogin* of the *Śivadharmottara* would correspond to the *parivrājaka* of the Dharmaśāstra tradition, the wandering mendicant who has renounced the ritual fires and lives off alms. This placement within the *āśrama* system would be coherent with the reinterpretation of this system given in chapter 11 of the *Śivadharmaśāstra*, where the *śivayogin* in fact occupies the position that the Dharmaśāstra assigns to the wandering mendicant,[29] and with a similar scheme proposed by chapter 12 of the *Śivadharmottara*.[30]

Unfortunately, the terse commentary on the *Śivadharmottara* does not offer any clue to solve this specific issue, nor are these four groups mentioned together as such anywhere else in the text. However, these four categories turn out to be strongly reminiscent of a doctrine that the *Śivadharmottara* emphasises in other points of the text and that is, again, the reinterpretation of a major Dharmaśāstra teaching, namely that of the five 'great sacrifices' or religious practices (*mahāyajña*). What makes this reference even more relevant here is that the teachings on the *mahāyajña*s were given by the *Manusmṛti* in the same chapter 3, from stanza 3.70

[29] See Bisschop, Kafle and Lubin 2021: 20–24.
[30] See De Simini 2016: 52. Note that here the position of the wandering mendicant is assigned to a *pāśupata*.

onwards: since most of these ritual activities consist in offerings and guest-reception, this doctrine constitutes the main backbone of Manu's treatment of the proper recipient. As observed by Olivelle (2018: 194), the five great sacrifices are used to codify food transactions, and food offerings are indeed dealt with in chapter 3 of the *Manusmṛti*, as well as in chapter 4 of the *Śivadharmottara*. A possible reference to the doctrine of the *mahāyajña*s by the *Śivadharmottara* would therefore be extremely coherent with this context.

A first list of *mahāyajña*s was given in chapter 1, in a short table of contents of the *Śivadharmottara* that lists the topics corresponding to chapters 3 and 4 as follows:

> *karmayajñas tapoyajñaḥ svādhyāyo dhyānam eva ca |*
> *jñānayajñaś ca pañcaite mahāyajñāḥ prakīrtitāḥ || 10 ||*
> *eṣāṃ ca pañcayajñānām uttamaḥ katamaḥ smṛtaḥ |*
> *etadyajñaratānāṃ ca pradāne kīdṛśaṃ phalam || 11 ||*

> The practice of rituals, the practice of ascesis, self-recitation, meditation, and the practice of knowledge: these are known as the five great sacrifices. (10) And which one of these five sacrifices is traditionally known as the best? And of what kind is that fruit [which is obtained] from gifting to those who rejoice in these practices? (11)

The list of four groups of recipients in *Śivadharmottara* 4.1–2 only makes a fleeting reference to these five categories that the *Śivadharmottara* considers *mahāyajña*s, but this is justified by the fact that the subject is already been dealt with at length in the previous chapter, with which chapter 4 is firmly linked. When we read them in the light of *Śivadharmottara* 1.10–11, the first stanzas of chapter 4 and all the contents related to the gift addressed to the knowers of the *śivajñāna* can be regarded as the answer to the second question of 1.11. The first question, as to which one of the five sacrifices is the best, is answered in chapter 3, and the answer is, not surprisingly, the *jñānayajña* (*Śivadharmottara* 3.12–15):

> *atha pūjāgnikāryādyair bhedair bahuvidhaiḥ sthitaḥ |*
> *karmayajñaḥ samākhyātas tapaś cāndrāyaṇādikam || 12 ||*
> *svādhyāyaś ca japaḥ proktaḥ śivamantrasya sa tridhā |*
> *dhyānayajñaḥ samākhyātaḥ śivacintā muhur muhuḥ || 13 ||*
> *adhyāpanam adhyayanaṃ vyākhyā śravaṇacintanam |*

iti pañcaprakāro 'yaṃ jñānayajñaḥ prakīrtitaḥ || 14 ||
uttarottaravaiśiṣṭyaṃ sarveṣāṃ parikīrtitam |
pañcānām api yajñānāṃ jñānadhyānaṃ vimuktidam || 15 ||

Now, what goes by the name of practice of rituals is established in multiple categories such as the *pūjā* or the ritual of fire. Asceticism consists in activities starting with the *cāndrāyaṇa* fasting. (12) And the self-recitation is taught to be the repetition of the *śivamantra*; such [repetition] is of three kinds. What we call practice of meditation (*dhyānayajña*) is the continuous meditation on Śiva. (13) Teaching, studying, explaining, listening and meditating: this is known as the fivefold practice of knowledge (*jñānayajña*). (14) Among all these, what follows is superior to what precedes; out of the five sacrifices, knowledge and meditation (or: meditation based on knowledge, *jñānadhyāna*) [31] bestow emancipation. (15)

Chapter 3 is a complex composition that centres on the figure of the *śivayogin,* and the superiority of his religious practice. The text does not describe any of the yogic techniques that will be the object of chapter 10, but states that, through the cultivation of a form of pure knowledge devoid of conceptual constructions, the *yogin* (also called a *muni* in 3.52 and 3.73, or a *jñānin* in 3.43 and 3.50) can overcome the duality of Dharma and Adharma, and attain the cessation of ignorance and sorrow, which will bring him to emancipation after death. The entire chapter shows a certain ambiguity, both in the text and in the transmission, in the use of the terms *jñāna* and *dhyāna,* as well as the terms *yajña* and *yoga,* sometimes used interchangeably.[32] An example of this is that the

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[31] However, note that this reconstruction is still tentative. The reading *jñāna-dhyānam,* attested elsewhere in this chapter (see 3.52, 3.60–62) and in chapter 10 (10.75) to denote the yogic practice, is only supported by one manuscript, name-ly N_{77}^{Ko}. Another manuscript that partly supports this reading is N_{A12}^{K}, the oldest available manuscript of the *Śivadharmottara,* which is damaged at this place, and allows only to read the last part as °*dhyānaṃ,* making it quite likely that *jñāna-dhyānaṃ* is in fact its reading. Other manuscripts have *dhyānayajñam* (N_{28}^{K}), *dhyā-nayajño* (N_{82}^{K}, N_{94}^{C}, and N_{45}^{C}), and *jñānayajño* (the two Southern ones, G_{43}^{P} and D_{75}^{P}). The confusion between all these compounds, which the chapter uses as synonyms, and the higher complexity of the reading *jñānadhyānam,* might ex-plain the origin of this variation and thus support our choice of *jñānadhyānam.*

[32] Variant readings in this sense are already in the transmission of the verses quoted above. The compound *karmayajñaḥ* in 3.12c is read by N_{A12}^{K}, N_{94}^{C}, N_{45}^{C}, as well as by G_{43}^{P} and D_{75}^{P}, but other medieval Nepalese manuscripts, such as N_{28}^{K} and

word *karmayajña* is attested as *karmayoga* in other stanzas of chapter 3 (3.88) and in the list of donors of *Śivadharmottara* 4.1–2, or that the manuscript tradition attributes to this chapter the same title as chapter 10, namely *jñānayogādhyāya*. While in the list of five sacrifices *dhyāna* is distinguished from the *jñānayajña*, in the following stanzas *dhyāna* and *jñāna* are used as synonyms to refer to the yogic practice conferring liberation that both the *Śivadharmaśāstra* and the *Śivadharmottara* call *jñānayoga*,[33] and to which chapter 3 of the *Śivadharmottara* refers with several other expressions, such as *yogābhyāsa* (3.17), *jñānābhyāsa* (3.34), *jñānadhyāna* (3.52, 3.60–62), *yoga* (3.73), *dhyānayajña*, (3.56–57), *śivayoga* (3.60, 3.78), and *jñānayoga* (3.79 and 3.86). The assimilation of *dhyāna* and *jñāna*, stated several times in the text,[34] presupposes that here *jñāna* is not the knowledge full of conceptual constructions that emerges from the teaching and learning process that constitutes the *jñānayajña* according to the definition of the *Śivadharmottara*, but rather the pure knowledge that the *yogin* develops from that by means of meditation. The use of the verb √*cint* to describe this process in stanza 3.19, as well as the definition of *dhyāna* as *śivacintā* in 3.13, suggests that *cintana*, which is the cusp of the *jñānayajña* in 3.14, is the element that links *dhyānayajña* to *jñānayajña*.

N$^K_{82}$, read *karmayogaḥ* instead, while here N$^{Ko}_{77}$ has a gap. Note that *karmayajñaḥ* does not have substantial variant readings attested in *Śivadharmottara* 1.10.

A very close situation is that of the compound *jñānayajñaḥ* in stanza 3.14d: here N$^K_{A12}$, N$^K_{82}$, N$^C_{45}$, N$^C_{94}$, and the two Southern manuscripts, read the compound as ending in *-yajñaḥ*, while N$^K_{28}$ and N$^{Ko}_{77}$ read *jñānayoga*.

[33] Besides the references in chapters 3 and 10 of the *Śivadharmottara*, we can point at one important passage of *Śivadharmaśāstra* chapter 10 that reads: *trisaptakulajaiḥ sārdhaṃ bhogān bhuktvā yathepsitān | jñānayogaṃ samāsādya sa tatraiva vimucyate || 10.45 || yogād duḥkhāntam āpnoti jñānād yogaḥ pravartate | śivadharmād bhavej jñānaṃ śivadharmaḥ śivārcanāt || 10.46 || ity eṣa vaḥ samākhyātaḥ saṃsārārṇavavartinām | śivamokṣakramopāyaḥ śivāśramaniṣevinām || 10.47 ||.*

The passage is quoted from the edition in preparation by Peter Bisschop, Nirajan Kafle and Csaba Kiss. Note that here the text refers to the practice of *jñānayoga* in the *śivapura* (*tatraiva*) by lay practitioners after they complete the enjoyment of the rewards earned through their meritorious actions on earth. This is not an isolated case, as stanza 2.161 of the *Śivadharmottara* prescribes the same for a performer of *vidyādāna*: *tataḥ kālena mahatā vidyādānaprabhāvataḥ | jñānayogaṃ samāsādya tatraiva parimucyate ||.*

[34] See, for instance, 3.52: *yathā jñānaṃ tathā dhyānaṃ jñānaṃ dhyānaṃ samaṃ smṛtam | jñānadhyānarataḥ saukhyaṃ munir mokṣaṃ ca vindati || 52 ||.*

The topics of this chapter, which has been quoted at times also by non-Śaiva authors,[35] deserve more in-depth considerations, which will form the subject of a separate essay. For the current discussion, it suffices to consider that the *śivayogin* is the main character also of chapter 3, where there is an attempt to frame his emancipatory yogic practice within ritual categories, such as the *mahāyajña*s, which look very different in the classical Dharma-śāstra, but still in a way that shows some connections and possible resemblances with the *Śivadharmottara*. Firstly, it is worth noticing that the five *mahāyajña*s of the *Śivadharmottara* overlap almost per-fectly with the four categories of donors listed in *Śivadharmottara* 4.1–2, and we showed how those, in turn, were inspired by *Manu-smṛti* 3.134. The change in number from five to four is the result of the above-mentioned association between *dhyāna* and *jñāna*—or one could explain the shift from four to five the other way around. The Sanskrit commentator glosses *śivajñānārthavedinām* in stanza 4.3, used as a synonym of *śivayogin*, as *jñānayajñarata* (fol. 138v1). Moreover, some literal parallels may be noted between the basic definitions given in *Śivadharmottara* 3.12–13 for each of the *yajña*s, and those, again rather standard, offered by Medhātithi in his commentary on 3.134/124, such as the mention of the *cāndrāyaṇa*-fasting and of the fire-ritual. While these parallels might not in and of themselves hint at any direct borrowing, since such defini-tions are very common, their occurrence here still corroborates the assumption that the contexts of both texts are close. Things look different once we attempt a direct comparison between the teachings of the *Manusmṛti* and the *Śivadharmottara* on the *mahā-yajña*s.

The five sacrifices of the early Dharmaśāstra tradition are sub-stantially different from those of the *Śivadharmottara*, so one may suspect that here the Śaiva text is simply reusing the 'label' of this ritual category. However, some shared elements of the definitions of *mahāyajña*s in both texts suggest a possible connection. The five

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[35] A verse from this chapter, corresponding to 3.37, is quoted in the *Sekanirdeśa* (st. 11), the work of the 11th-c. Buddhist author Maitreyanātha (a.k.a. Advayavajra), with attribution to a generic *yogādhyāya* (see Isaacson and Sferra 2014, 285 and n. 182). Moreover, verses from chapter 3 are quoted, with attribu-tion, in the *Śvetāśvataropaniṣadbhāṣya* by (pseudo-)Śaṅkara.

*mahāyajña*s of the *Manusmṛti* are daily ritual acts meant for the householder,[36] the performance of which is prescribed to expiate the 'five slaughter-houses' (*pañcasūnā*), which are five places in the house that can accidentally cause death to living beings, and thus be sources of sin for the householder himself. Incidentally, we observe that the *Śivadharmottara*, too, has a list of *pañcasūnā* corresponding to those of the *Manusmṛti*, but while the *Manusmṛti* lists them immediately before the *mahāyajña*s due to their causal relationship, the *Śivadharmottara* does not connect them to the *mahāyajña*s. The Śaiva text lists such causes of sins in chapter 4:

Śivadharmottara 4.20–21	*Manusmṛti* 3.68–69
sammārjanāñjanaṃ toyam agnikaṇḍanapeṣaṇī | sūnāḥ pañca gṛhasthānāṃ nityaṃ pāpābhivṛddhaye || 20 ||	pañca sūnā gṛhasthasya cullī peṣaṇyupaskaraḥ | kaṇḍanī codakumbhaś ca badhyate yās tu vāhayan || 68 ||
śivāgnigurupūjābhiḥ pāpair etair na lipyate | anyaiś ca pātakair ghorais tasmāt sampūjayet trayam || 21 ||	tāsāṃ krameṇa sarvāsāṃ niṣkṛtyarthaṃ maharṣibhiḥ | pañca klptā mahāyajñāḥ pratyahaṃ gṛhamedhinām || 69 ||
Cleansing and anointing [the floor], water [in the pot], fire [in the fire-place], the mortar and the grindstone: the five killings always [contribute] to the increase of sins for householders. (20) Thanks to the *pūjā*s to Śiva, Agni, and the teacher one is not soiled by these sins, nor by other terrible sins; therefore, one should worship [these] three (21).	A householder has five slaughter-houses: fireplace, grindstone, broom, mortar and pestle, and water pot. By his use of them, he is fettered. (68) To expiate succesively for each of these, the great seers devised the five great sacrifices to be carried out daily by householders. (69) (Tr. Olivelle 2005)

The two lists correspond, even though the *Śivadharmottara* changes some of the 'places' listed by Manu into activities or natural elements. In both texts these are causes of sins for the householders, and both offer a solution to that, namely the Śaiva *pūjā* for the

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[36] For an overview of daily rituals, including the *mahāyajña*s, see Lubin 2018.

Śivadharmottara and the daily performance of the *mahāyajña*s for the *Manusmṛti.* The *Śivadharmottara* therefore proceeds with a list of food items to be given to *śivayogin*s, while the *Manusmṛti* expounds the great sacrifices, whose performance is prescribed in the nuptial fire (*vaivāhike 'gnau,* 3.67), daily (3.69), and consists in the offerings to *brahman* (*brahmayajña*), to the ancestors (*pitṛyajña*), to the gods (*devayajña*), to the spirits (*bhūtayajña*), and to men (*nṛyajña*).[37] Three of these—the offerings to ancestors, gods and spirits—take place in the fire, and correspond to libations (*tarpaṇa*), *homa*, and *bali*; the two that do not imply the use of fire are the *nṛyajña*, explained as the reception of guests, and the *brahmayajña*, for which the *Manusmṛti* also gives the definition of 'teaching' (*adhyāpana,* 3.70), 'muttered repetition' (*japa,* 3.74), and 'self-recitation' (*svādhyāya,* 3.75), all activities that have as their object the Vedic text. Medhātithi, commenting upon stanza 3.70 (3.60 in his text), also makes *brahmayajña* a synonym of *adhyayana*, the activity of reciting the Veda.[38]

Manu's five *mahāyajña*s are thus substantially different from the list of the *Śivadharmottara*, but looking into the *Manusmṛti* definitions of the *brahmayajña* one can find elements that are reminiscent of some offerings of the *Śivadharmottara,* such as the *svādhyāya*, corresponding to *japa* in the *Śivadharmottara,* although for the latter it is the repetition of the *śivamantra* rather than the Vedic text; others, such as *adhyāpana* and *adhyayana*—the latter not mentioned by Manu, but introduced by Medhātithi—are part of the *Śivadharmottara*'s definition of the *jñānayajña*. Again, even if the *Śivadharmottara* does not say so explicitly, one can easily deduce that in the case of its *jñānayajña* all these didactic activities were not meant for the Vedic text, but for the *śivajñāna*. The *svādhyāya* of the *Śivadharmottara,* taught to correspond to *japa*, seems thus to be closer to the *japayajña* mentioned by Manu in 2.85–87 in the context of the recitation of Vedic mantras, rather than being the practice of reciting scriptures or portions of them.

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[37] *Manusmṛti* 3.70: *adhyāpanaṃ brahmayajñaḥ pitṛyajñas tu tarpaṇam | homo daivo balir bhauto nṛyajño 'tithipūjanam ||.*

[38] For a history of the development of the Vedic notion of *svādhyāya* as 'self-recitation,' and how all these more 'didactic' activities came to be its synonym at a later time, see Malamoud 1977.

Moreover, in another section of the *Manusmṛti* devoted to *dāna* (4.186–236), Medhātithi explains the expression *brahmada*, the 'giver of the Veda,' a notion that is partly overlapping with that of *brahmayajña*,[39] with the clause *yo 'dhyāpayati vyākhyāti ca*—with *vyākhyā* being another member of the definition of *jñānayajña* given in *Śivadharmottara* 3.14. As for the remaining sacrifices, the three fire-offerings of the *Manusmṛti* could all be comprised under the category of *karmayajña/karmayoga* in the *Śivadharmottara*, although the *pūjā* mentioned in the latter finds no parallels in the *mahāyajña*s of the *Manusmṛti*, just like *tapas* and *dhyāna*, coherently with the idea underlying the great sacrifices of the early Dharmaśāstric tradition, which are only conceived for the daily practice of the householders.

Significantly, some of the changes that we observe in the *Śivadharmottara* are already found in the treatment of the *mahāyajña*s available in the more recent *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* (ca. 5th c.), where these are called the 'great oblations' (*mahāmakha*; see above all 1.100–104).[40] Like the *Manusmṛti*, the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* treats the five great offerings among the daily duties of a householder but, like the *Śivadharmottara*, does not tie their performance to the expiation for the sins deriving from the five 'slaughter-houses.' Moreover, for Yājñavalkya the act of offering libations (*tarpayet*) to ancestors and gods is accompanied by worship (*arcayet*), an action that the medieval commentator Vijñāneśvara explains as a *pūjā*-type of worship of gods' effigies.[41] Furthermore, Yājñavalkya ex-

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[39] For further considerations on *brahmayajña* and *brahmadāna-vedadāna* in early Dharmaśāstra and Purāṇic literature, also with references to *Śivadharmottara* chapter 3, see De Simini 2016: 293 ff.

[40] *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 1.102: *balikarmasvadhāhomasvādhyāyātithisatkriyāḥ | bhūtapitramarabrahmamanuṣyāṇāṃ mahāmakhāḥ || 102 ||*.

[41] *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 1.100: *upeyādīśvaraṃ caiva yogakṣemārthasiddhaye | snātvā devān pitṝṃś caiva tarpayed arcayet tathā || 100 ||*. Commenting upon *arcayet*, Vijñāneśvara writes: *tadanantaraṃ gandhapuṣpākṣataiḥ hariharahiraṇyagarbhaprabhṛtīnām anyatamaṃ yathāvāsanam ṛgyajuḥsāmamantrais tatprakāśakaiḥ svanāmabhir vā caturthyantair namaskārayuktair ārādhayed yathoktavidhinā*; 'Following this (scil. the libations) he should propitiate, following the prescribed procedure, one of the [deities] such as Viṣṇu, Śiva, and Brahmā, according to his desire, with fragrances, flowers, grains of rice, with mantras from the *Ṛgveda*, the *Yajurveda* and the *Sāmaveda* which summon that [deity], or with their proper names in the dative, together with *namaskāra*.'

tends the performance of *japa* to include non-Vedic literature: after bathing, offering libations and worship to gods and ancestors, a householder has to recite (*japet*) 'the Vedas, the Atharvan and the Purāṇas, along with the Itihāsas and the wisdom related to the Ātman, according to one's own capability, in order to accomplish the offering of recitation (*japayajña*).'[42]

Thus, those that the *Śivadharmottara* advertises as its own *mahāyajña*s reflect some developments that have occurred in the early medieval time, to which the composition of the *Śivadharmottara* belongs. At the same time, the *Śivadharmottara*, while still inspired by the Dharmaśāstra, promotes a complete reshaping of this category, which goes from being a label for the daily religious duties of the householders to depicting the whole array of religious paths admitted in the Śaiva society as described by the text, including the liberating path of yoga. Therefore, the five *yajña*s mentioned in chapter 3 seem to reflect the practice of different groups of people (or of people at different life-stages), who are the recipients mentioned in chapter 4 in a hierarchical order that devalues the practice of rituals in favour of the practice of knowledge and yoga. The perspective from which this is written is thus one in which the simplest expressions of the *bhakta*s' devotion are held as essentially inferior to the practice of the *yogin*s, and chapter 3 prepares the ground for justifying the primacy of *śivayogin*s as recipients in chapter 4. Two stanzas from chapter 3 are especially telling in this respect and therefore worth of being quoted in full:

> *karmayajñāt tapoyajño viśiṣṭo daśabhir guṇaiḥ |*
> *japayajñas tapoyajñāj jñeyas śataguṇādhikaḥ || 59 ||*
> *jñānadhyānātmakaḥ sūkṣmaḥ śivayogamahāmakhaḥ |*
> *viśiṣṭaḥ sarvayajñānām asaṃkhyātair mahāguṇaiḥ || 60 ||*

These stanzas establish a sequence of four groups that is parallel to the recipients in chapter 4: here, too, the superiority of one over the other is expressed numerically, and prominence is given to the 'great sacrifice of the *śivayoga*, subtle, which consists in

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[42] *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 1.101: *vedātharvapurāṇāni setihāsāni śaktitaḥ | japayajñaprasiddhyarthaṃ vidyāṃ cādhyātmikīṃ japet ||*.

meditation and knowledge (or: meditation on knowledge, 3.60).'
This confirms the connection between the 'great sacrifices' and
the recipients once and for all, but also establishes another link to
the Dharmaśāstra, since here the text uses the expression *mahāma-*
kha instead of *mahāyajña*, just as Yājñavalkya had done.

We cannot leave this subject without adding a further element
of complication, namely that the doctrine of the *mahāyajña*s as
expounded in the *Śivadharmottara* also shows the clear influence
of the *Bhagavadgītā*. In chapter 4,[43] Kṛṣṇa first introduces himself
as the founder of a lineage of *yoga* teachers, and refers to his
mastery over *yoga* and his repeated interventions to save the earth,
then expounds his doctrine of action (*karmayoga*) based on the
renunciation to the fruits of action in order to stop the retributive
mechanism and attain liberation (4.1–25). The only way to a-
chieve this is through knowledge (*jñāna*), which thus plays here a
crucial soteriological function. Actions, once detached from their
fruits, are equated to *yajña*, all elements of which are said to cor-
respond to *brahman* as the realm of liberation. At this point, the
text makes a list of rituals and ascetic practices (4.25–32) that are
all presented as a form of *yajña*, among which:

> *dravyayajñās tapoyajñā yogayajñās tathāpare* |
> *svādhyāyajñānayajñāś ca yatayaḥ saṃśitavratāḥ* || 28 ||

> There are sacrificers who offer with substances, others with auste-
> rities, others with yoga, others with knowledge and Vedic study—
> ascetics all and strict in their vows. (Tr. van Buitenen 1981)

The list continues until stanza 4.33:

> *śreyān dravyamayād yajñāj jñānayajñaḥ paraṃtapa* |
> *sarvaṃ karmākhilaṃ pārtha jñāne parisamāpyate* ||

> The sacrifice of knowledge is higher than a sacrifice of substances,
> enemy-burner, but all action culminates in knowledge, Pārtha.
> (Tr. van Buitenen 1981)

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[43] For an overview and analysis of the topics of this chapter, see Malinar 2007:
102–108.

The following stanzas up to the end of the chapter (4.42) keep praising the crucial function of *jñāna*, compared to a raft, fire, and a sword, that allows to attain detachment from the fruits of actions and, as a direct consequence, liberation. Many of the contents of this chapter, from the list of various *yajña*s to the crucial role assigned to the *jñānayoga* to cut the bonds of action, as well as the superiority of internalised sacrifice over external ritualism, suggest that also this part of the *Bhagavadgītā* was used by the authors of the *Śivadharmottara* to carve out a place for the *śivayogin* in a landscape that must have seen the converging influence of various strains of religious literature, all reflecting a different understanding of Dharma, ritual and society. The efforts of the Śaiva authors went towards firmly placing this figure against the paradigm of Vedic orthodoxy, which is at once acknowledged and superseded. Further research will have to delve deeper into this network of influences and cross-references, and clarify the level of interdependence that this early Śaiva text established with the prevalent models of its time.

2. Community rules of the Śivadharma between the Dharmaśāstra and the Tantric traditions

Following the lines on the reception of the *śivayogin*s as guests, the *Satpātrādhyāya* devotes some stanzas to the punishments awaiting those who defame them, both actively and as passive listeners, in hell:

> *yoginaṃ ye dviṣanty ajñāḥ sarvapāpeṣv avasthitāḥ* |
> *adhomukhordhvapādās te patanti narakāgniṣu* || 4.48 ||
> *kṛmibhir bhinnavadanās tāpyamānāś ca vahninā* |
> *prapīḍyante vadhair ghorair yāvad ācandratārakam* || 4.49 ||
> *ye śivajñānanirataṃ pradviṣanti manāg api* |
> *paścād bāhukabaddhās te nīyante yamasādanam* || 4.50 ||
> *tatrāgnitaptaiḥ sandaṃśaiḥ prapīḍyorasi pādataḥ* |
> *teṣām utpāṭyate jihvā śataśo 'tha sahasraśaḥ* || 4.51 ||
> *vikathyanti*[44] *mahātmānaṃ ye mūḍhāḥ śivayoginam* |

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[44] All the Nepalese manuscripts consulted for the edition adopt the form *vikathyanti*, with the exception of N_{77}^{Ko}, which changes it into *kimanyanti*; the Grantha manuscript, whose copyist probably tried to make sense of an obscure reading, reads here *vikarttante*. The reading *vikathyanti,* which I have chosen due

te yānti śrotṛbhiḥ sārdhaṃ narakeṣu na saṃśayaḥ || 4.52 ||
ye cāpavādaṃ śṛṇvanti vimūḍhāḥ śivayoginām |
te viśeṣeṇa pacyante narakeṣv āmahīkṣayāt || 4.53 ||
sati śrotari vaktā syād apavādasya yoginām |
tasmāc chrotā tu pāpīyāṃs taddaṇḍaḥ sumahān ataḥ || 4.54 ||
vaktā śrotānumantā ca prayoktā dūṣaṇasya ca |
etaiḥ saṃyujyate yaś ca pañcaite nārakāḥ smṛtāḥ || 4.55 ||

The ignorant who despise a *yogin* are in the condition of having committed all sorts of sins: they will therefore fall headlong into the fire of hell. (48) Having their faces eaten up by insects and being burned by fire, they will be tormented with horrible punishments as long as the moon and stars exist (49). Those who despise, even just a little, one who rejoices in the *śivajñāna* are taken to the palace of Yama with their arms tied behind their backs. (50) Here, having been tormented from the feet up to the chest with red-hot pincers, their tongue is drawn out a hundred thousand times. (51) Those foolish people who badmouth a very noble *śivayogin*, they certainly go to hell, along with those who listen to them. (52) And those foolish people who listen to the defamation of the *śivayogin*s will be especially cooked in hell until the dissolution of the universe. (53) [Since] a person will speak evil of the *yogin*s only if there is someone who listens, the listener is a worse villain than him, and his punishment for this will be very severe. (54) One who defames [somebody] with his words, one who listens to them, one who approves of them, and one who repeats them, as well as those who are their accomplices: these are known as the five types of hells' visitors. (55)

The text prohibits different types of malevolent acts addressed to the *śivayogin*s: from the more emotional 'hatred/hostility' (*dviṣ*) to active defamation, an action expressed through the root √*vikath* and the nouns *vaktṛ* and *apavāda*. The latter will also be used in stanza 4.56 in the compound *pūjāpavāda* to refer to the revilement of the ritual that results from the selection of an inadequate *pātra*.[45] As pointed out above, the role of the active listeners is also

to its wide attestation in the Nepalese manuscripts, is in fact not attested in early literature, as far as I can tell. Naraharinath's edition and the Sanskrit commentary replace it with the better attested *vikatthante*.

[45] *Śivadharmottara* 4.56: *iti yogīndrapātrasya mahābhāgyam udāhṛtam | pūjāpavādaviṣayam apātraṃ śṛṇutādhunā ||*.

strongly stressed. The colourful depictions of the torments of hells that we find in these verses give a foretaste of the style of chapter 7, whose 258 stanzas will be almost entirely devoted to describing the gruesome tortures that different categories of sinners undergo in the hells. Among the people being tormented (and who should expect to experience such torments after death), chapter 7 also lists 'those fools who defame (*nindanti*) a noble teacher who instructs in the Dharma, as well as the Śaiva devotees and the eternal Śivadharma.'[46]

In chapter 7, the notion of 'defamation' is extended to include also the Śaiva devotees and the teachings of the Śivadharma, and is expressed through the verb √*nind* that, just as the noun *apavāda* used in *Śivadharmottara* 4.53–54, can refer to the act of defaming or offending someone or something verbally. The recurring mention of this prohibition shows that this is not a minor point for the *Śivadharmottara*: as a matter of fact, chapter 6 describes three major types of *nindā*—addressed to Śiva (*śivanindā*), to the teacher (*gurunindā*) and to the Śaiva scriptures (*śivajñānasya dūṣaṇam* or *jñānanindā*)—to which other subcategories are added, and considers these to be 'extreme' sins (*sumahatpātaka*), thus classed above the *mahāpātaka*s of the Dharmaśāstra tradition.

The major early Smṛtis do have specific prohibitions about the *nindā* of relevant people and scriptures (in their case, it is mainly the *vedanindā*), and thus might have provided a model for the construction of these categories of *nindā* in the *Śivadharmottara*. On the other hand, Śaiva Tantric scriptures include the same categories of *nindā* mentioned in *Śivadharmottara*'s chapter 6 among a set of eight 'common' rules of behaviour (*samaya*) prescribed for the initiated into a Śaiva community (see Törzsök 2019 and *infra*). This topic thus gives us the chance to explore possible connections between the *Śivadharmottara* and these two major streams of

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[46] *Śivadharmottara* 7.194: *ye nindanti mahātmānam ācāryaṃ dharmadeśikam | śiva-bhaktāṃś ca saṃmūḍhāḥ śivadharmaṃ ca śāśvatam ||*. I quote this stanza from the draft critical edition of chapter 7 currently being prepared by R. Sathyanarayana and Kenji Takahashi. My thanks to the latter for pointing out this reference to me. Among the parallels they note for this passage, the *Śivapurāṇa* (5.10.21) changes *śivadharmaṃ* to *dharmaśāstraṃ*, whereas the *Bhṛgusaṃhitā* (36.109c–110b) turns Śaiva devotees into Vaiṣṇava ones.

scriptures together, and try to assess its position in relation to them.

In comparison to chapters 4 and 7, chapter 6 of the *Śivadharmottara* deals more systematically with the topic of offense and defamation. For it, the text creates the category of the *sumahatpātaka*s, of which six types are said to exist:

ye dviṣanti mahādevaṃ saṃsārārṇavatāraṇam |
sumahatpātakopetās [47] *te yānti narakāgniṣu || 8 ||*
dūṣayanti śivajñānaṃ ye sarvārthaprasādhakam |
sumahatpātakaṃ teṣāṃ nirayārṇavagāminām || 9 ||
ye śivajñānavaktāraṃ vidviṣanti guruṃ narāḥ |
sumahatpātakopetās te yānti narakārṇavam || 10 ||
śivanindā guror nindā śivajñānasya dūṣaṇam |
devadravyāpaharaṇaṃ gurudravyavināśanam || 11 ||
haranti ye ca saṃmūḍhāḥ śivajñānasya pustakam |
sumahatpātakāny āhur anantaphaladāni [48] *ṣaṭ || 12 ||*

Those who despise Mahādeva, the saviour from the ocean of transmigration, charged with an extreme sin, go to the fires of hell. (8) Those who corrupt the Śaiva knowledge, which accomplishes all goals, they too commit an extreme sin, and are headed to the ocean of hells. (9) Those who despise the teacher expounding the

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[47] Note that the manuscripts consulted for the edition unanimously attest the reading *sumahat°* rather than *sumahā°*, here and in the following stanzas. While in the case of stanza 9 one could think of writing *sumahat* and *pātakam* separately and understand *sumahat* as an adjective, the other attestations in these stanzas prove that, at least in stanzas 8 and 12, it is in fact to be regarded as part of a compound. The Sanskrit commentator takes it as a compound, as it is unambiguously proven by his use of the expression *sumahatpātake* in fol. 146r4, while Jayadratha, who only adapts *Śivadharmottara* 6.11–12, and not the immediately preceding stanzas in *Haracaritacintāmaṇi* 30.113–114, changes *sumahatpātakāny* into *sumahāpātakāny*. Naraharinath, too, changes *sumahatpātakopetās* in stanza 8 and *sumahatpātakāny* in st. 12 into *sumahāpātakopetās* and *sumahāpātakāny,* while printing *sumahat pātakam* separately in st. 9.

[48] Here I choose the reading given in N^K_{A12} (with an orthographic mistake, though, as it reads *aṇanta°*), against *anantāni phalāni* of N^K_{82} and N^C_{45}, *iti anantaphalāni* of G^P_{43}, and *ānantaryaphalāni* ('immediate consequences') of N^C_{94}. This could be considered a smoother reading than the one I choose in the current reconstruction, also considering that it is reinforced by the parallel of the *Haracaritacintāmaṇi* (30.114, as per Törzsök's edition in preparation). However, for the time being I prefer the reading that has better support in the Northern and Southern branches of the tradition, and consider the reading *ānantarya°* a scribal improvement.

Śaiva knowledge, charged with an extreme sin, go to hell. (10) The revilement of Śiva, the revilement of the teacher, the defilement of the Śaiva knowledge, the theft of a temple's wealth, the ruin of the teacher's wealth, (11) And those fools who steal a manuscript of the Śaiva knowledge: they call these the six extreme sins, which have endless consequences (12).

In this presentation, we learn that hostility against Mahādeva and the teacher, expressed by the root √*dviṣ* like in chapter 4, is equated to the spoiling (√*duṣ*) of the Śaiva knowledge, and these three actions are considered *sumahatpātaka*s (stt. 8–10). My interpretation of the verb √*duṣ* and the noun *dūṣaṇa* here in the meaning of 'corrupting' or 'defiling' is based on the list of *doṣa*s of the *śivajñāna* and its manuscripts described in *Śivadharmottara* 2.6–12, where these in fact result in a loss of 'purity' (*saṃskāra*) of the teaching and deterioration of the tradition.[49] Following this, in stanzas 10–11 we read that the six *sumahatpātaka*s encompass the *śivanindā*, the *gurunindā*, and again the *dūṣaṇa* of the *śivajñāna,* and then three different forms of theft that affect these three subjects. The mention of √*duṣ* twice, as a verbal root in stanza 6.9a and as a noun in 6.11b, and the more active sense that it might have if one understood it as 'corrupting,' suggest in the first place that the 'hatred' against Mahādeva and the teacher mentioned in stanzas 6.8 and 6.10 makes part of the definition of the *nindā* addressed against them, and that the action of 'despising' Mahādeva and the teacher consists in active malevolence rather than just a mental state. Thus, *dveṣa* may not be regarded as a separate type of sin from *nindā*, especially if we want to stick to the definition of six types of extreme sins—a view that is also shared by the Sanskrit commentator, who identifies two connected triads.[50] At the same time, the actions described in 6.8–12 follow the definition of three types of sinful actions given in stanzas 6.3–7, where

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[49] See De Simini 2016: 128.

[50] Fol. 146r4 *ye dviśantīti pañcabhiḥ atra śivanindāmukhyaṃ sumahatpātakaṃ tatsaṃbandhāt gu<ru>vidyayos tanninde* [5] *api sumahatpātake bhavataḥ evan trividhaṃ sumahatpātakan tribhi<ś> ślokair uktvā punas tatsaṃbandhi dravyāpaharaṇanimittasumahatpātaka<vi>vakṣayā* [6] *pūrvvoktan trayam apaskāralakṣaṇam* (em.; °*lakṣaṇām* Cod., possibly due to attraction to the following *pūjāṃ*, which is however placed after a *daṇḍa* and belongs to the commentary on stanzas 6.13–15).

these had been divided into mental, vocal and bodily (*manovā-kkāyasādhanāḥ*, 6.3). Thus, in the light of the preceding stanzas, the three actions of 'despising,' 'defaming' and 'stealing' could also have been intended to correspond to this tripartite categorisation, like three alterations of the same sin.

The text then goes on listing sins that are equivalent (-*sama*) to each of the three categories because they are addressed against Śiva, the teacher and the Śaiva knowledge, which in this text are said to form a triad and be venerated as such.[51] We thus have a list of sins that are equal to *śivanindā* (6.13–16), which mainly include infractions in the ritual and hostility towards Śaiva devotees (*śivabhaktān dviṣanti ca*, 6.16), sins that are equal to *jñānanindā* (6.17–20)[52]—the use of this compound here makes it clear that it must be understood as a synonym of *jñāna-dūṣaṇa*—and sins that are equivalent to *gurunindā* (6.20–24), such as not doing service to the teacher, not being willing to listen to his teachings, and the like.

Once the text is over with the *sumahatpātaka*s, it carries on with the five *mahāpātaka*s, and it does so using a formulation that is calqued exactly on the definitions found in the early Smṛtis:

Śivadharmottara 6.25	*Manusmṛti* 11.55	*Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 3.227
brahmaghnaś ca surāpaś ca steyī ca gurutalpagaḥ | mahāpātakinas tv ete tatsaṃsargī ca pañcamaḥ ||	*brahmahatyā surāpānaṃ steyaṃ gurvaṅganāgamaḥ | mahānti pātakāny āhuḥ saṃyogaś caiva taiḥ saha ||*	*brahmahā madyapaḥ stenas tathaiva gurutalpagaḥ | ete mahāpātakino yaś ca taiḥ saha saṃvaset ||*

Just like the other points of connection between the *Śivadharmottara* and the early Smṛtis, what we can see here is a strong resemblance rather than a word-by-word correspondence. This stanza is then followed by a list of sins that equal the killing of a Brahmin (6.26–35); sins that equal the drinking of liquor (6.36–39); sins that equal the theft of gold (6.40–41); sins that equal the violation

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[51] The compound *śivavidyāguru* is attested in *Śivadharmottara* 2.15 and 2.176, and is presented as a triad of equivalent members (*yathā śivas tathā vidyā yathā vidyā tathā guruḥ*, *Śivadharmottara* 2.15ab).

[52] These mostly include mishandling the manuscripts of the *śivajñāna*, not respecting the rules of ritual purity when copying or reading it, or spreading a different teaching. For an analysis of this passage and more considerations on this topic in the *Śivadharmottara*, see De Simini 2016: 138–139.

of the teacher's bed (6.42–43); a long list of *upapātaka*s (6.44–61), followed by forty more verses that enumerate further sins that are conducive to hell, but that are not grouped into any specific categories. This chapter serves well as an introduction to chapter 7, on hells and sins, almost forming a textual unit with it.

This is the same sequence in which such topics are treated in chapters 11 of the *Manusmṛti* and 3 of the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*: if we read on after the above-quoted stanzas defining the *mahāpātaka*s, we see that the texts list equivalent sins for each of them, and then go on dealing with the *upapātaka*s (see *Manusmṛti* 11.56–71 and *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 3.227–242). The *mahāpātaka*s and *upapātaka*s are in fact very common notions in the Dharmaśāstra literature, denoting a higher and lesser category of *pātaka*s, literally 'causes of downfall,' sins that cause one to fall off one's caste.[53] In the *Śivadharmottara*'s interpretation this 'fall' seems to have been rather intended as a fall into hells, as hinted at in stanza 6.1 (*athādhaḥ patanāt puṃsām*). Since the *Manusmṛti* and the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* list these sins in chapters on *prāyaścitta*, they then devote long sections to the penances that one must undergo after committing them. The *Śivadharmottara* does not do so, at least not here, as it will then dedicate the entirety of its chapter 11 to the topic of *prāyaścitta*.

The 'equivalences' established for the *mahāpātaka*s, both in the *Śivadharmottara* and in the Smṛtis of Manu and Yājñavalkya, are based on a different principle than those established for the *sumahatpātaka*s. While in the latter case the sins were considered equivalent because they offended the same subject, in the case of the *mahāpātaka*s the connection between the equivalent sin and the main sin category is less straightforward. What we observe in the *Śivadharmottara* is also that the sins mentioned at this point of the text are more generic and not specifically Śaiva, except for the sin of 'abandoning the *śivajñāna*,' listed as an equivalent of drinking liquor,[54] or the damages to the the trees and flowers of the garden of the *śivāśrama*, listed among the *upapātaka*s.[55]

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[53] On the notion of *pātaka* and the Dharmaśāstric taxonomy of sins, especially in relation to *prāyaścitta*, see Brick 2018.

[54] *Śivadharmottara* 6.36: *adhītya yaḥ śivajñānaṃ parityajati mūḍhadhīḥ | surāpānasamaṃ jñeyaṃ tasya pātakam uttamam ||*.

[55] *Śivadharmottara* 6.50: *śivāśramatarūṇāṃ ca puṣpārāmavināśanaṃ | yaḥ pīḍām āśramasthānām ācared alpikām api ||*.

In the context of this discussion on *mahāpātaka*s, both Manu and Yājñavalkya mention the sin of *vedanindā*, a possible model for *jñānanindā* in the *Śivadharmottara*: however, while Yājñavalkya in stanza 3.328 lists *vedanindā* as the equivalent of the killing of a Brahmin, along with the 'excessive blaming' (*adhyadhikṣepa*) of the teachers, the killing of a friend and forgetting the Veda (*adhītasya nāśanam*),[56] Manu mentions *vedanindā* in 11.57 as the equivalent of drinking liquor—just like the *Śivadharmottara* does with the sin of abandoning the *śivajñāna*—while listing in the same category the sins of abandoning the Veda (*brahmojjhatā*), giving false testimony, killing a friend, eating what is forbidden by the *śāstra*s and what is not edible.[57] Vijñāneśvara, commenting upon *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 3.228 in the *Mitākṣarā*, explains the expression *gurūṇām adhyadhikṣepa*, which is very close to the notion of *gurunindā*, as a form of 'groundless accusation,' using a terminology that is reminiscent of the *Gautamadharmasūtra*—to which he refers—where this form of revilement of the teacher was in fact considered equivalent to a *mahāpātaka*.[58] Furthermore, Vijñāneśvara explains *vedanindā* as a form of slandering the Veda (*vedakutsanam*) 'by asserting the erroneous doctrine of nihilism' (*nāstikyābhiniveśena vedakutsanam*), where 'nihilism' is used in the sense of disbelief in the authority of the Veda. Both the use of the term *kutsanam* as a synonym of *nindā* and the association of *vedanindā* with nihilism/disbelief are strongly reminiscent of stanza 4.163 of the *Manusmṛti*, in which Manu states that one must avoid nihilism and *vedanindā* along with the slandering of the gods (*devatānāṃ kutsanam*)—which Medhātithi explains in the *Manubhāṣya ad loc.* as a synonym of *nindā*—*dveṣa*, and other mental states.[59]

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[56] *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 3.328: *gurūṇām adhyadhikṣepo vedanindā suhṛdvadhaḥ | brahmahatyāsamaṃ jñeyam adhītasya ca nāśanam ||.*

[57] *Manusmṛti* 11.57: *brahmojjhatā vedanindā kauṭasākṣyaṃ suhṛdvadhaḥ | garhitānādyayor jagdhiḥ surāpānasamāni ṣaṭ ||.*

[58] *Mitākṣarā ad Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 3.228: *gurūṇām ādhikyenādhikṣepaḥ anṛtābhiśaṃsanam | guror anṛtābhiśaṃsanam iti mahāpātakasāmāni iti gautamasmaraṇāt |.* The quotation is from *Gautamadharmasūtra* 3.3.10.

[59] *Manusmṛti* 4.163: *nāstikyaṃ vedanindāṃ ca devatānāṃ ca kutsanam | dveṣaṃ stambhaṃ ca mānaṃ ca krodhaṃ taikṣṇyaṃ ca varjayet ||.* The connection between *vedanindā* and disbelief is expressed by Medhātithi in the commentary *ad loc.*: *vedapramāṇakānam arthānām mithyātvādhyavasāye nāstikyam.*

In a similar context, Medhātithi remarks the difference between *dveṣa* and *nindā,* which in the *Śivadharmottara* almost seems to vanish, and does so exactly with reference to the sin of *vedanindā.* In chapter 3, Manu mentions a *brahmadviṣ* (3.154, corresponding to 3.144 in the *Manubhāṣya*) and a *vedanindaka* in 3.161 (3.151 in the *Manubhāṣya*) in a long list of people to avoid as unfit invitees (3.150–166).[60] The first compound is explained by Medhātithi as referring both to the Veda and to a Brahmin;[61] in the case of the *vedanindaka,* he specifies that this is different from the *brahmadviṣ* because *dveṣa* denotes a mental attitude (*cittadharma*), while *nindā* is a form of slandering (*kutsana*) 'by means of language that expresses displease against that' (*taduparyaprītiśabdena*).[62]

One more remark by Medhātithi expands the notion of *vedanindā* to encompass all the scriptures acknowledged as a source of Dharma, thus including the Smṛti. He does so in chapter 2, in the context of the famous definition of the accepted sources of Dharma: after stating that the Śruti corresponds to the Veda and the Smṛti to the Dharmaśāstra, and these should never be doubted as Dharma arises from them (*Manusmṛti* 2.10), Manu affirms that if someone doubted them on the basis of treatises on logic (*hetuśāstra*), this person should be excluded as a *nāstika* and a *vedanindaka* (*Manusmṛti* 2.11).[63] The two notions are thus once again presented together; besides connecting *nāstika*s to the authors of the *hetuśāstra*s, Medhātithi argues that the word *vedanindaka* should also be understood to include the Smṛti.[64]

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[60] *Manusmṛti* 3.154 (*Manubhāṣya* 3.144): *yakṣmī ca paśupālaś ca parivettā nirākṛtiḥ | brahmadviṭ parivittiś ca gaṇābhyantara eva ca ||*; *Manusmṛti* 3.161 (*Manubhāṣya* 3.151): *bhrāmarī gaṇḍamālī ca śvitry atho piśunas tathā | unmatto 'ndhaś ca varjyāḥ syur vedanindaka eva ca ||.*

[61] *Manubhāṣya ad* 3.154/144: *brahmadviṭ brāhmaṇānāṃ vedasya vā dveṣṭā brahmaśabdasyobhayārthavācitvāt brahmajño brāhmaṇaḥ smṛtaḥ iti.*

[62] *Manubhāṣya ad* 3.161/151: *nanu ca brahmadviṭśabdenaiva brahmaśabdasyānekārthakatvāt vedanindako gṛhīta eva | naivam | anyā nindā anyo dveṣaḥ | cittadharmo dveṣaḥ taduparyaprītiśabdena kutsanaṃ nindā.*

[63] *Manusmṛti* 2.10–11: *śrutis tu vedo vijñeyo dharmaśāstraṃ tu vai smṛtiḥ | te sarvārtheṣv amīmāṃsye tābhyāṃ dharmo hi nirbabhau || 2.10 || yo 'vamanyeta te tūbhe hetuśāstrāśrayād dvijaḥ | sa sādhubhir bahiṣkāryo nāstiko vedanindakaḥ || 2.11 ||.*

[64] *Manubhāṣya ad Manusmṛti* 2.11: *vedanindaka iti smṛtigrahaṇaṃ na kṛtam | tulyatvenobhayoḥ prakṛtatvād anyataranirdeśenaiva siddham ubhasyāpi grahaṇam ity abhiprāyaḥ |.*

As for *gurunindā,* in the *Manusmṛti* the notion is mentioned among the observances of the *brahmacārin* (*Manusmṛti* 2.200); the latter, similarly to what the *Śivadharmottara* prescribes in the case of the defamation of the *śivayogin* in chapter 4, should neither speak ill nor listen to somebody else defaming the *guru,* otherwise he will get a degraded rebirth as an animal or an insect (2.201).[65]

To sum up, the *Manusmṛti* and the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti,* with parallels in the early Dharmasūtras, know of categories that are very close to the three types of *nindā*s that the *Śivadharmottara* includes under the umbrella of the *sumahatpātaka*s, with the notion of *vedanindā* being given special relevance, as it is included in the same definition of their own scriptural tradition. Considering that chapter 6 of the *Śivadharmottara* deals with this topic in a way that strongly resembles the contents and style of *Manusmṛti* 11.55–71 and *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 3.227–242 on the *pātaka*s, in which both Manu and Yājñavalkya mention more types of such *nindā*s, we can safely conclude that the author of the *Śivadharmottara* willingly composed the disquisition on the *pātaka*s in chapter 6 using these early Smṛtis as their model. The similarity is such that the connection with the Dharmaśāstra must have been not only rather obvious to an audience learned in this scriptural tradition, but was perhaps devised exactly in order to attract such an audience. Furthermore, we can observe that the method employed to 'śaivize' this topic is only slightly different from what they do with the four *āśrama*s: the basic concepts are preserved, but they are either given a Śaiva meaning or something Śaiva is added on top. In this way, the *vedanindā* is turned into the *jñānanindā* or the *śivajñānasya dūṣaṇam,* and the category of the *mahāpātaka*s, which is here accepted literally, is preceded by a higher set of crimes, which solely concern Śaiva matters. In any case, even if they try to implement the teachings of the Dharmaśāstra, we do not seem to find in the *Śivadharmottara* anything that goes against them.

That the contents of *Śivadharmottara* 6.26 onwards were mainly based on the Dharmaśāstra was certainly clear to the reception of

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[65] *Manusmṛti* 2.200–201: *guror yatra parivādo nindā vāpi pravartate | karṇau tatra pidhātavyau gantavyaṃ vā tato 'nyataḥ || 200 || parivādāt kharo bhavati śvā vai bhavati nindakaḥ | paribhoktā kṛmir bhavati kīṭo bhavati matsarī || 201 ||.*

the text that I was able to study so far. For instance, the Sanskrit commentator introduces stanza 6.25 saying that 'now the text expounds the classes of great sinners, as they are established in all treatises' (fol. 147r2 *atha sarvaśāstrasiddhān mahāpātakibhedān āha*). Similarly Jayadratha, in his summary of the *Śivadharmottara* in *Haracaritacintāmaṇi* chapter 30, while still keeping some of the initial stanzas and those in which the *sumahatpātaka*s are defined, completely dismisses the long, less original Dharmaśāstric portion that follows from stanza 6.25, saying that the Great Lord had described many other sins and subcategories of sins in other scriptures, and these 'are not written down here for fear of making this work too lengthy, but they must be known by the wise from various places.'[66]

Now, prohibitions concerning *nindā* against Śiva, the teacher, the scriptures and Śaiva devotees form four out of the eight traditional *samaya* rules attested in the Śaivasiddhānta since its earliest scriptural attestations. Such rules are imparted after the *samaya* rite, which precedes *dīkṣā* and introduces a new member to the community; according to the prescriptions found in several scriptures for Śaiva initiates (such as the *Kiraṇatantra*, the *Parākhyatantra*, or the *Svacchandatantra*), some categories of people are exempted from practicing them.[67] Those include people who were deemed incapable, such as children, the elderly, women, or too busy, like kings. In a recent contribution, Törzsök (2019) has examined the scriptural occurrences of the *samaya*s and made several observations concerning their links with the Dharmaśāstra, as well as the development of such rules in the history of the Tantric traditions. Besides the four rules about *nindā*, the set of eight *samaya*s of the Śaivasiddhānta includes: rules concerning the *nirmālya*, which should not be eaten, touched or stepped over; rules about not accepting food from women who are menstruating or are otherwise impure; rules about not stepping on the shadow of the *liṅga* or any Śaiva sacrificial area. Thus these rules inclu-

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[66] *Haracaritacintāmaṇi* 30.116: *bhedopabhedā eteṣāṃ granthagauravabhītitaḥ | likhyante neha dhīmadbhir jñātavyās te tatas tataḥ ||*.

[67] On the topic of the so-called *nirbījadīkṣā*, namely the initiation that does not bind the initiated to post-initiatory observances, see Goodall 1998: 363 ff, and 2013.

de some that have parallels in the Dharmaśāstra, such as the rule about food being contaminated by impure women,[68] and others that seem to have originated in a specific Śaiva context. An early formulation of these eight *samaya* rules, to which the tradition will add more, is found in the *Nayasūtra* of the *Niśvāsatattvasaṃhitā*, which is useful to quote in full:

> *nandir badhnāti vai śīghraṃ <caṇḍīśaḥ sa>mayāṣṭasu |*
> *yo nindati śivaṃ devaṃ tadbhaktaṃ deśikaṃ tathā || 1.103 ||*
> *nirmālyabhakṣaṇe vāpi balidānapaśor api |*
> *adatte vārtavispṛṣṭaṃ śāstranindāṃ karoti ca || 1.104 ||*
> *liṅgacchāyāvilaṅghī ca caṇḍīśo bandhate bhṛśam |*
> *pratijñāvratam ārūḍhaḥ punas tyaktvā śivaṃ vratam || 1.105 ||*

> In the case of [transgression of] the eight post-initiatory rules of conduct, [it is] Caṇḍīśa [who punishes]. If one reviles the Lord Śiva (i), a devotee of His (ii) or a guru (iii), or in the case of eating the *nirmālya* (iv), or of giving it as a *bali* to a bound soul [or perhaps to a beast?] (v), or if one takes what has been touched by a menstruating woman (vi), or reviles scripture (vii), or steps in the shadow of a *liṅga* (viii), Caṇḍīśa vigorously punishes him/binds. (Tr. by Goodall *et al.* 2015: 429–430)

We have already seen at least four of them in the *Śivadharmottara*, namely all of the *nindā* rules. Coherently with its context, the *Śivadharmottara* conceives them for the entire community and not for the initiated, as none of the Śivadharma texts seem to contemplate any form of initiation for the laity. On this point, as observed by Goodall (2013) and Törzsök (2019), the earliest Śaivasiddhānta Tantras, among which the *Niśvāsa*, as well as Śākta scriptures, do not differentiate between the initiated who should follow the *samaya*s and the initiated who are exempted from them, and thus seemingly understand *samaya*s as applying to the entire community of initiated. This brings us closer to the idea underlying the numerous rules imparted by the Śivadharma texts, meant to be respected by all members of a community, and not just by some.

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[68] Törzsök (2019: 213) points to an identical rule in *Manusmṛti* 4.232, while *Manusmṛti* 5.85 instructs people that touching such women, just like touching a corpse or an outcaste, is contaminating and requires a purificatory bath.

*Samaya*s keep developing, as Törzsök observes discussing their occurrences in the Śākta scriptures: these texts, while retaining some of the Śaivasiddhānta *samaya*s, add more rules that are in keeping with the Dharmaśāstra tradition and are clearly derived from it; at the same time, they also dictate rules of behaviour that are in open disagreement with Vedic orthodoxy, thus marking the more transgressive nature of Śākta Tantrism. For instance, she observes how the *Svacchandatantra*, the *Tantrasadbhāva* and the *Brahmayāmala* have their own versions of the *nindā* rules, which are extended to include also categories of people and scriptures that the Dharmaśāstra tradition intentionally ignored.[69]

Thus, the Dharmaśāstra tradition works as a reference point in the elaboration of many such rules even for the Tantric traditions, both when they want to show their compliance with it, and when they overturn orthodoxy in favour of an alternative ideology. In contrast to this, the Śivadharma seems to have adopted an attitude that can be defined as innovation without contradiction, with the *Śivadharmottara* being especially outspoken on marking its ties to the Dharmaśāstra. However, given the strong connection that the Śivadharma establishes with the Dharmaśāstra, the question arises as to whether the Śivadharma played a role in the formulation of some rules and their adoption into the Śaiva communities, which also opens up the topic of the relationships between the Śivadharma and the initiatory forms of Śaivism.

While finding an answer to these questions might take time and will have to wait until more pieces can be added to our picture, we should further explore the textual evidence and see whether it offers more relevant data on this point. To begin with, it would be important to understand if all the eight *samaya*s mentioned in the *Niśvāsa* and that become standard in the Śaivasiddhānta, both those derived from the Dharmaśāstra and the Śaiva ones, are also attested in the early Śivadharma texts. For the Śaivasiddhānta, it is the Tantric tradition that so far has proven to have more connections with our texts—not surprisingly, given its higher level of orthodoxy. Now, while the four rules on *nindā* are all attested and dealt with in chapter 6 of the *Śivadharmottara* (and partly also in

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[69] Törzsök 2019: 214–221.

chapter 4), to the best of my knowledge the other *samaya* rules about not eating the *nirmālya* or letting anyone else eat it, about avoiding the food touched by a menstruating woman or not stepping in the shadow of the *liṅga*, are not found anywhere in the text. The *Śivadharmottara* does not give any prescriptions on the *nirmālya*, which is in fact never mentioned, while the *liṅga*-cult, which is a major topic in the *Śivadharmaśāstra* and is certainly practiced by the communities depicted by the Śivadharma, does not play a major role in the *Śivadharmottara*. However, once we turn our attention to the *Śivadharmaśāstra*, not only do we find that the *samaya* prescriptions concerning *nirmālya*, food and *liṅga* are there, but they are also presented together, albeit not forming a proper set. This happens once again in chapter 12, which devotes its first half to listing rules of behaviour for the community of the *śivabhakta*s.

After some mixed rules of worship, such as those related to worshipping a *liṅga*, a sanctuary, or other sacred spaces and people—including a *śivayogin*—that one has randomly encountered on the path (12.4–5), some food items to avoid (12.6–8), and prescriptions about doing a *pūjā* at the *tīrtha*s in order to increase one's merits (12.10), the *Śivadharmaśāstra* reads the following:

> *garbhādijanmasaṃskāraśmaśānāntādibhojanam |*
> *rajasvalābhisaṃspṛṣṭaṃ śivabhakto vivarjayet || 12.10 ||*
> *na gobrāhmaṇabhasmāgniliṅgacchāyāṃ padā spṛśet |*
> *na laṅghayīta nirmālyam apsu tiṣṭhed anagnakaḥ || 12.11 ||*
> *dhārayec chivanirmālyaṃ bhaktyā lobhān na bhakṣayet |*
> *bhakṣaṇān narakaṃ gacchet tadvilaṅghya adhogatim || 12.12 ||*
> *na tatra snānapūjādyaṃ pratigṛhṇāti śaṅkaraḥ |*
> *yatra naivedyanirmālyamalabhuk pūjayec chivam || 12.13 ||*

A Śaiva devotee should avoid eating food [in the place where] a rite of passage connected to birth, such as the *garbhādāna*, is taking place, as well as in the proximity of a cremation ground;[70] he

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[70] My translation relies on the commentary, which is however based on a slightly different text: fol. 108v5 *garbhādīti garbhādānādiṣu ca catvāriṃśaṃ saṃskā-*[6]*reṣu varttamāneṣu tasmiṃ gṛhe tadannabhojanaṃ śivabhakto vivarjjayet śmaśānānte śmaśānasamīpe ca bhojanaṃ vivarjjayet.* Clearly, the commentator did not read °*janma*° before *saṃskāra*, which is well attested in the early Nepalese tradition and may denote here all the prenatal *saṃskāra*s, up to birth and *nāmakaraṇa*. He

should avoid the food touched by a menstruating woman.[71] (10) He should not touch with his foot the shadow of a cow, of a Brahmin, of [a heap of] ashes, of the ritual fire, and that of a *liṅga*; he should not step over the *nirmālya*; he should not stay naked in water. (11) [A Śaiva devotee] should preserve the *nirmālya* of Śiva with devotion and not let anyone eat it out of greediness. Having transgressed this [command] by eating [the *nirmālya*], one will go down to hell. (12) Śaṅkara does not accept a ritual bath, a *pūjā*, and the like, in the same place where a person who has fed on forbidden items, such as the oblations offered to Śiva and the *nirmālya*, will worship Śiva. (13)

The text goes on for three more stanzas with similar considerations about the consequences that infringing the *nirmālya* rule will have on the place where this happens, which becomes unfit for worship because Śiva will no longer reside there. After this, we find another by now familiar prescription:

mūrtayo yāḥ śivasyāṣṭau tāsu nindāṃ vivarjayet |
guroś ca śivabhaktānāṃ nṛpasādhutapasvinām || 12.17 ||

One should avoid any offence against those eight *mūrti*s that belong to Śiva, as well as towards the teacher, the Śaiva devotees, the king, the learned people, and the ascetics. (17)

This *nindā* rule, extended to cover also the king, is then followed by other rules about *pūjā*. Its occurrence at this point makes the Śaivasiddhāntic *samaya* list complete, although the *Śivadharmaśāstra* does not identify them as forming an independent group, nor singles them out in any other ways but, perhaps significantly, lists them one after the other.

The *Śivadharmaśāstra* thus knew of all those rules, while the *Śivadharmottara*, as it does for other topics,[72] picks up on some of

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rather gives us the total number of *saṃskāra*s known to him—which is forty, according to a tradition that goes back to the *Gautamadharmasūtra* (see Michaels 2018: 86–87)—a sign that he was probably reading °*sarvasaṃskāra*°, as it is attested in the Southern transmission (see manuscript D_{32}^P, p. 142).

[71] The commentator reads *rajasvalādi*° (fol. 108v6), again like manuscript D_{32}^P, and explains the °*ādi* to mean *aspṛśyāt*.

[72] This is the case, for instance, of topics such as those of the book-cult, the *ṣaḍaṅgayoga*, or the six-syllabled mantra, which are mentioned but not described

them and provides a more detailed treatment. In this case, it attempts to connect the *nindā* instructions back to their original Dharmaśāstric roots, presenting them as the culmination of a world-order now firmly under the Śaiva seal.

3. Conclusion

The overview I attempted in this article has further anchored the composition of the *Śivadharmottara* to three spheres of normative and religious literature that were influential in the early medieval: the Dharmaśāstra, early Vaiṣṇava devotional currents, and initiatory Śaivism. While more data need to be collected and studied in order to answer with confidence the crucial question of the position of the *Śivadharmaśāstra* and the *Śivadharmottara* in this articulated context, I believe that such a study points to some fruitful directions to take and relevant perspectives from which the question can be addressed.

To begin with, one should deepen and broaden the scope of this research in order to further clarify the extent to which the entire *Śivadharmottara* depended on and reacted to the early Dharmaśāstra and the *Bhagavadgītā*, but also with a view to extend this study to further related sources. Just to mention one example, other portions of the *Mahābhārata* that are very dense with Dharmaśāstric teachings should certainly be next in line among the sources to examine for the influence they might have had on the teachings of the *Śivadharmottara*. On the other hand, the composition of the *Śivadharmottara* and its doctrines should also be read in the context of its relationship to the *Śivadharmaśāstra*, a text to which almost the entire manuscript tradition associated it. The related topics of yoga and the centrality of the *śivayogin*s are certainly a point on which the two texts seem to differ, if only for the space that they devote to them—minor in the *Śivadharmaśāstra*, mainly concerned with *bhakta*s, and clearly more central in the *Śivadharmottara*. Was then the *Śivadharmottara* just fulfilling its

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in full in the *Śivadharmaśāstra,* while they receive a detailed account in the *Śivadharmottara.* On the book-cult and the six-syllabled mantra see De Simini 2016 and 2021; a study on chapter 10, which deals with the *ṣaḍaṅgayoga*, is now being prepared by Goodall.

function to complete the *Śivadharmaśāstra*, or does it reflect a change in the society and audience which justifies a choice of different topics, and a higher focus on the ascetics and their practice? And even if we come to the conclusion that the two texts just reflect the same worldview and speak to the same audience, should we imagine a unity of composition—namely, was a 'second instalment' on yoga, punishment of sins and *dāna* to the *śivayogin*s already planned when the *Śivadharmaśāstra* was being composed, or did the need for it arise at a later point, and why? Furthermore, were these two texts meant to be read together, as their manuscript transmission somehow forces us to do and part of the reception has certainly done (see, for instance, the Sanskrit commentary on both works), or were they conceived as independent works? On the basis of the reception of the *Śivadharmottara* in India, we can observe that the text certainly seems to have enjoyed a certain level of independence, an example thereof being its adoption as an *upāgama* into the Śaivasiddhānta tradition, which channeled its introduction to the realm of Tamil Śaivism, where we have so far found no traces of the *Śivadharmaśāstra*.[73]

The *Śivadharmottara*'s dependence on the Dharmaśāstra and its effort to reinterpret its teachings through the lens of Śaiva devotion also raises the question as to how this aspect should be read in the broader context of the Nepalese Śivadharma corpus, in which several important works are emerging as concerned with Dharmaśāstra-style teachings, such as for instance the *Umāmaheśvarasaṃvāda* and the *Vṛṣasārasaṃgraha*. Particularly the latter, in which the topic of internalized sacrifice is prominent and which contains references to most of the key subjects reinterpreted by the *Śivadharmottara* (the *mahāyajña*s, the *āśrama*s, yoga), promises to be a relevant term of comparison, especially in the light of Kiss's observation that this work balances Śaiva, Vaiṣṇava and general brahmanical contents.[74]

In conclusion, our texts and the circumstances of their transmission call for a study that appraises their composition on a par

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[73] The first studies appeared on the Tamil adaptation of the *Śivadharmottara* are Trento 2021 and Nachimuthu 2021, to which I refer the reader for further information.

[74] See Kiss 2021 for a first study and assessment of this work.

with their immediate reception, in a constant oscillation between their past and their future, as the sole way to envision their full historical development.

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Politics and/in the End of Times.
On the Buddhist Reception of the Arthaśāstra

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Non serve a Kissinger Metternich,
se Gromyko ha letto l'Arthasastra
Guido Ceronetti (1927–2018)

Guido Ceronetti, a singular figure in late twentieth-century Italian literature, dedicated a short but penetrating essay to Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* that was first published in *La Stampa* under the title 'Machiavelli dell'India.'[1] Discussing the name Kauṭilya and its meaning ('Crookedness'), Ceronetti noted that, although Kauṭilya had been 'imagined as the powerful minister of a great kingdom, the text only reveals the detachment of a glacial theoretician transforming his science of man into a clear geometric word. Kautilya is a mask. (We have made a mask out of an authentic character, Machiavelli, that equals Kautilya in its common

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translation).'[2] But can *Il Principe* (*The Prince*) and the *Arthaśāstra* (*A Treatise on Political Interest/Profit*) be compared at all, and if yes, does such a comparison further or, rather, jeopardize our understanding of the two works?[3] The answer to these questions might well be a matter of one's mood for the day, however. In their sizes and scopes, their historical and political horizons, their sources and underlying intentions, the two works are so markedly different that any attempt to compare them in a meaningful and fruitful manner seems to be doomed to either triviality or complete failure. At the same time, both *The Prince* and the *Arthaśāstra* are government treatises dealing with political profit by teaching the wise prince[4] (*principe savio*) how to acquire, to organize and—especially—to *keep* political power. Both are descriptive-normative works analyzing and prescribing kings' proper political behavior. In the two works, political interest becomes the object of a rational and almost deductive science in which consequences are shown to derive 'logically' or 'necessarily' from given premises according to rules and formulas, often in the form of disjunctions

[2] '*Immaginato ministro potente di un grande regno, il testo non consegna che il distacco di un teorico glaciale, che trasforma in nitida parola geometrica la sua scienza dell'uomo. Kauṭilya è una maschera.* [...] *(Da noi è diventato maschera un personaggio autentico, Machiavelli, che vale Kauṭilya nel traslato comune).*' On Machiavellism as a mask, see also Boucheron 2017: 11–12. In his youth, Machiavelli (1469–1527) had authored a now lost play entitled *Le Maschere* (*The Masks*).

[3] In what follows, I use '*Arthaśāstra*' (in italics) to refer to the treatise known under this name (of which P. Olivelle distinguishes a 'Kauṭilya recension,' dated to 50 and 125 CE [Olivelle 2013: 29], and a 'Śāstric redaction,' dated to 175–300 CE [Olivelle 2013: 31]), and 'Arthaśāstra' (in roman) to refer to the tradition of political thought to which the *Arthaśāstra* is indebted, and to which it so much contributed. 'Arthaśāstras' (in the plural) refers to Arthaśāstra treatises, notably those Kauṭilya made use of (AŚ 1.1.1: *pṛthivyā lābhe pālane ca yāvanty arthaśāstrāṇi pūrvācāryaiḥ prasthāpitāni prāyaśas tāni saṃhṛtyaikam idam arthaśāstraṃ kṛtam |.* 'This singular Treatise on Success has been composed for the most part by drawing together the Treatises on Success composed by former teachers for gaining and administering the earth.' Tr. Olivelle 2013: 63). Distinguishing between them is often very difficult (in case of doubt, I use 'Arthaśāstra'). On this topic, see Kangle 1986: 5–10 and 42–53, and Olivelle 2013: 6–8 and 25–28.

[4] Note Lévy 1980: 35: '*Machiavel est* [...] *le premier à voir la politique comme un jeu de passions et d'intérêts animant des forces opposées. Et l'on remarquera que dans* Le Prince *il ne s'adresse jamais à la sagesse du prince, mais exclusivement à ses intérêts. Le tyran est un homme à l'esprit confus et qui méconnaît ses intérêts. Le prince sage est une homme qui entend bien ses intérêts.*'

and dilemmas. Both works examine political and strategic reality according to means-ends patterns, constantly calculate threats, losses and profits, discriminate good and bad choices, analyse allegedly objective errors, describe what is useful/expedient and what is detrimental, identify illnesses and remedies, etc., and do not dislike animal metaphors.[5]

Besides the two works' pessimism about human nature,[6] what is perhaps most striking even at the surface level is their insistence on the fact that nothing is prohibited to the prince in order to maintain himself—*mantenere lo stato*. The end justifies the means, an attitude that has often been regarded as cynic and immoral,[7] and that is conspicuous in statements to the effect that, 'if a prince wishes to maintain the state, he is often obliged not to be good,'[8] or that 'it is necessary for a prince who wishes to maintain himself to learn how not to be good, and to use this knowledge or not to use it according to necessity.'[9] In addition to opportunism, political expediency requires duplicity, for 'one sees from experience in our times that the princes who have accomplished great deeds are those who have thought little about keeping faith and who have known how cunningly to manipulate men's minds; and at the end

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[5] Machiavelli's (ultimately Cicero's) fox and lion, *The Prince* [XVIII], p. 60, and [XIX], p. 68. See Skinner 1978: 136, and Skinner 1981: 40 ≈ 2000: 45.

[6] *The Prince* [III], p. 14: 'The desire to gain possessions is truly a very natural and normal thing.' [XVII], p. 58: 'For one can generally say this about men: they are ungrateful, fickle, simulators and deceivers, avoiders of danger, and greedy for gain.' *Ibid.*: 'for men forget the death of their father more quickly than the loss of their patrimony.' [XVIII], pp. 60–61: 'If men were all good, this precept would not be good. But since men are a wicked lot…' [XXIII], p. 82: 'men always turn out bad for you, unless some necessity makes them act well.' See also Skinner 1978: 137 ('deeply pessimistic view of human nature').

[7] For a qualification concerning Machiavelli's alleged conviction that 'the end justifies the means,' see Boucheron 2017: 105–108. Among other things, '*Machiavel explore ces vertus qui font du prince le virtuose sans scrupule de sa propre conservation*' (Boucheron 2017: 59). However, '*sa pensée est* […] *bien plus subversive que l'immoralisme banal des cyniques. Chez lui, la question du mal et du bien est essentiellement adverbiale: le prince n'a pas à faire le bien ou le mal; il fait bien ou mal ce qu'il a à faire*' (Boucheron 2017: 63).

[8] *The Prince* [XIX], p. 67.

[9] *The Prince* [XV], p. 53. Note, however, *The Prince* [VIII], p. 31: 'Still, it cannot be called virtue to kill one's fellow citizens, to betray allies, to be without faith, without pity, without religion; by these means one can acquire power, but not glory.'

they have surpassed those who laid their foundations upon since-rity.'[10] Even worse, Machiavelli encourages moral and religious hypocrisy when he remarks that

> a prince, and especially a new prince, cannot observe all those things for which men are considered good, because in order to maintain the state he must often act against his faith, against charity, against humanity, and against religion. And so it is necessary that he should have a mind ready to turn itself according to the way the winds of Fortune and the changing circumstances command him. And […] he should not depart from the good if it is possible to do so, but he should know how to enter into evil when forced by necessity. Therefore, a prince must be very careful never to let anything fall from his lips that is not imbued with the five qualities mentioned above; to those seeing and hearing him, he should appear to be all mercy, all faithfulness, all integrity, all humanity, and all religion. And there is nothing more necessary than to seem to possess this last quality.[11]

As aptly summarized by Quentin Skinner, then, '[t]he indispensable talent is the ability to counterfeit virtue.'[12]

Each in its own tradition, *The Prince* and the *Arthaśāstra* were indebted to earlier treatises whose teachings about kingship they at least partially subverted. Quentin Skinner has made a strong case that Machiavelli's work must be read in (dis)continuity with the *specula principum* (Mirrors for Princes), a genre of advice-books for princes and courtiers in which rulers regarded as *viri virtutis* (men of virtue) were taught the principles of right governance.[13]

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[10] *The Prince* [XVIII], p. 60.

[11] *The Prince* [XVIII], pp. 61–62.

[12] Skinner 1978: 132.

[13] See Skinner 1978: 113–138 (= chapter 5), Skinner 1981: 21–47; Skinner 2000: 23–53 (= chapter 2). The earlier tradition of advice-books intended for *podestà* and city magistrates 'had […] made use of the far more ancient conceit of holding up a "mirror" to princes, presenting them with an ideal image and asking them to seek their reflection in its depths' (Skinner 1978: 118). For Machiavelli as well as the mirror-for-princes theorists of later Renaissance, 'the concept of *virtù* is […] used to denote the indispensable quality which enables a ruler to deflect the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, and to aspire in consequence to the attainment of honour, glory and fame' (Skinner 1978: 121). However, while he agreed on this, Machiavelli strongly challenged these theo-

Ancient moralists such as Cicero (106–43 BCE) and Seneca (4 BCE–64 CE) had denied that success could ever be achieved independently of morality; according to them, certain qualities (the Platonic wisdom, temperance, fortitude, and justice, strengthened by the Christian qualities of piety, religion, and faith, as well as liberality, clemency, truthfulness, and honesty) defined the *virtus* by which a man (*vir*) could expect to propitiate Fortune in order to secure honor, wealth and glory. The humanist political thinkers who expressed their views in *specula principum* and related treatises were perfectly in tune with these classical ideas, claiming that rationality harmonized with morality and that honesty always was a prince's best politics. In doing so, they were adding weight to the Christian doctrine which denied any contradiction between expediency and moral rectitude, advised the prince not to pursue earthly wealth and honor, and warned that any injustice done in this world would be punished in the Hereafter at the time of the Last Judgment. Machiavelli broke with these precepts while dismissing the prince's 'cardinal virtues' as at least potentially ruinous values, advocating 'anti-values' such as (dis)simulation, hypocrisy and immorality, and remaining entirely silent about eternal punishment. Quite unsurprisingly, *The Prince* was soon to become the target of vitriolic critiques on the part of the morally and religiously conservatives, especially the Roman Catholic Church.

Written in 1513, *The Prince* was published posthumously in 1532 and enjoyed remarkable success within the first twenty-five years of its publication.[14] It took some time until the work came to the notice of the Catholic Church. Already in 1538, cardinal Reginald Pole (1500–1558) saw Machiavelli as a fiendish author; in 1542, the

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rists' view that 'the possession of *virtù* can be equated with the possession of all the major virtues,' and that 'if a ruler wishes to "maintain his state" and achieve the goals of honour, glory and fame, he needs above all to cultivate the full range of Christian as well as moral virtues' (Skinner 1978: 131). According to Skinner, Machiavelli 'agrees that the proper goals for a prince to aim at are those of honour, glory and fame. But he rejects with great vehemence the prevailing belief that the surest way of attaining these ends is always to act in a conventionally virtuous way' (*ibid.*). 'With Machiavelli […] the concept of *virtù* is simply used to refer to *whatever* range of qualities the prince may find it necessary to acquire in order to "maintain his state" and "achieve great things"' (Skinner 1978: 138).

[14] This section is strongly indebted to Lévy 1980: 36–47.

Portuguese bishop Jerónimo Osório (1506–1580) undertook to refute some obviously antichristian passages; ten years later, the Dominican father Lancillotto Politi (1484–1553) mentioned the work among those to be subtracted from the devotees' attention. In 1557, pope Paul IV (1476–1559) commissioned the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith to list all books to be forbidden, which included Machiavelli's entire work. The index was published in 1559 and validated at the Council of Trent in 1564 (Pope Leo XIII discretely removed Machiavelli's name from the *Index librorum prohibitorum* at the end of the 19th c.). From this time on, *The Prince* ceased to be published in Italy and in Spain. However, one of the fiercest attacks on Machiavelli's work came from the French Protestant writer Innocent Gentillet (1535?–1588), a staunch opponent of Catherine de Medici, in a work entitled *Discours sur les moyens de bien gouverner et maintenir en bonne paix un royaume… Contre Nicolas Machiavel Florentin* (1576). Gentillet, who styled himself an 'Anti-Machiavel,' criticized fifty theses extracted from Machiavelli's works or as interpreted by the '*machiavellistes,*' a word that was soon to give the pejorative expressions '*machiavélique*' (1578) and '*machiavélisme*' (1602).[15] Gentillet sided with those who were attached to the primacy of religion and law while criticizing a

> *novateur aux yeux de qui la politique n'est pas réglée par la religion, mais la religion un élément de la politique, et qui est totalement étranger à la notion de droit naturel: pour Machiavel il n'existe qu'un droit positif, et qui lui aussi est subordonné à la politique.*[16]

Towards the end of the 16th century, the Catholic Church again took the initiative against Machiavelli. In his *Della Ragion di Stato* (1589), Giovanni Botero (1544–1617) undertook to criticize the impious author of *The Prince* by conciliating the *raison d'État,* an expression entailing strong Machiavellist associations already at that time, with divine law and consciousness (which Machiavelli was accused of badly lacking). A few years later, Tommaso Bozio

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[15] 'Machiavellist' actually was coined first in England in 1551. The pejorative use of these expressions seems to be derived from the French use, however. See Lévy 1980: 40 and 44.

[16] Lévy 1980: 45.

(1548–1610) published three treatises against Machiavelli, *De imperio virtutis sive imperia pendere a veris virtutibus, non a simulatis, libri duo adversus Machiavellum* (1593), *De Robore bellico, diuturnus et amplis catholicorum regnis, liber unus adversus Machiavellum* (1594), and *De antiquo et novo Italiae statu libri quatuor adversus Machiavellum* (1596). In 1595, the Jesuit father Pedro di Ribadeneyra (1527–1611) published a *Tratado de la religion y virtudes que deue tener el Principe Christiano, para gouernar y conseruar sus Estados contra lo que Nicolas Machiavelo*, which was soon translated into Italian. Machiavelli was presented there as a minister of Satan commissioned to spread his perverse and devilish doctrine in Italy and beyond. To sum up, Machiavelli was accused of subordinating religion to politics and to make natural law second to positive law and the ruler's arbitrariness.

As we have seen, Machiavelli revolutionized and to some extent subverted the teachings of earlier (and contemporary) treatises on kingship and the art of governance. A somewhat similar shift can be observed between the ancient Indian doctrines of kingship as they appear in legal literature (Dharmaśāstra) and in the *Arthaśāstra*. In legal and epic texts, the king is regarded as an embodiment and a paragon of righteousness (*dharma*, also law and duty) and, as such, as the preserver of social and even cosmic cohesion. These normative texts teach a *rājadharma* (duty of kings) the conformity to which makes a king a *dharmarāja*, a righteous king. According to Edward H. Johnston's perceptive analysis,

> the dividing line between the *dharmaśāstra* and the *Arthaśāstra* must be sought in the conception of the ultimate purpose of kingship. According to the former the institution of kingship exists for the maintenance of order and the preservation of the structure of society. The *Arthaśāstra* no doubt pays lip service to this ideal but the essential doctrine underlying the entire work is that a king's sole preoccupation is with his own self-aggrandizement and that in its pursuit he should be restrained by no consideration except those of enlightened self-interest. The originality of the *Arthaśāstra* lies [...] not in the conception of this principle, which was probably already in the air, but in the relentless logic with which all its implications are worked out.[17]

[17] Johnston 1929: 79.

In the *Arthaśāstra* as in *The Prince*, then, the ruler's political interest is subtracted from the theological, cosmological and eschatological framework that had hitherto provided it with meaning and moral justification, and is made autonomous, as it were: the only relevant criterion for judging the actions of the prince is pragmatic, means-end rationality, not conventional morality.

The little we know about the reception of the *Arthaśāstra* suggests that Kauṭilya's work, 'much like Manu's *Dharmaśāstra*, was a big hit, taking the place by storm.'[18] According to Patrick Olivelle, the work's 'strong impact' can be seen in

> Manu himself and his successors Yājñavalkya and Nārada, Vātsyāyana's *Kāmasūtra*, the literary corpus of Kālidāsa, Viśākhadatta's *Mudrārākṣasa*, Kāmandakī's *Nītisāra*, the literary corpus of Daṇḍin, the story tradition (*kathā*) represented by the *Pañcatantra* and its Kashmiri predecessor the *Tantrākhyāyikā*, and last but not least, Bhāruci, the earliest commentator on Manu. The very identification of Cāṇakya as the author of the [*Arthaśāstra*], thus giving it an illustrious pedigree going back to the foundation of the Maurya empire, and its likely close association with the Gupta court show the popularity and influence of this text during the early and mid-centuries of the Common Era.[19]

Quite inexplicably, though, the *Arthaśāstra* manuscript and scholarly tradition almost entirely disappeared from the ninth century onward, only to resurface in the early twentieth century thanks to the discovery of a Sanskrit manuscript in South India. How was the Arthaśāstra perceived as a work and/or as a tradition of political thought? I am not aware of any study dealing especially with this topic, but it seems fairly certain that, in parallel with its strong impact on political theory, the Arthaśāstra was felt by some as morally problematic if not simply indefensible. This was likely the case of the poet Bāṇa (6th–7th c.), who in his *Kādambarī* excoriates wicked and conceited kings 'whose authority is the dreadful treatise of Kau[ṭ]ilya which contains advice mostly of a very cruel nature.'[20] As for Viśākhadatta's (6th c.?) *Mudrārākṣasa*, a play whose

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[18] Olivelle 2013: 51.
[19] Olivelle 2013: 51.
[20] *Kādambarī* 179,5–6: *kiṃ vā teṣāṃ sāmprataṃ yeṣām atinṛśaṃsaprāyopadeśanirghṛṇaṃ kauṭilyaśāstraṃ pramāṇam…* Tr. Kale 1968: 151.

main character is Cāṇakya (alias Kauṭilya and Viṣṇugupta), it is at least ambivalent towards crookedness as a guiding political principle.[21] To be sure, Cāṇakya succeeds in making his adversary, the only slightly less 'Kauṭilyan' Rākṣasa, a minister of the Mauryan king Candragupta. But this strategic success is achieved at the cost of numerous assassinations and public executions, notably that of Candanadāsa who refused to betray Rākṣasa. It is thus certainly not a coincidence if Candanadāsa's righteousness is contrasted with Cāṇakya's crookedness, which the poet quite interestingly makes a hallmark of the Kaliyuga:

> Even in the Kali Age, which bad people like this honourable one [Candanadāsa, VE] is protecting another [Rākṣasa, VE] with his own life, reducing the honour of Śi[b]i to total insignificance;/ This pure one with his good deeds has made even the action of *buddha*s seem 'defiled': here am I [Rākṣasa, VE], for whose sake even he, worthy of honour, has been sentenced to death by you.[22]

The brahmins were by no means the only addressees or actual readers of the *Arthaśāstra*, however. As I hope to make clear in what follows, the Buddhists, too, reacted to this tradition in an interesting and unambiguous way, and this likely in the time in which the *Arthaśāstra* enjoyed its greatest popularity, i.e., during or slightly after the Gupta period.

Buddhist sources have only rarely been taken into consideration concerning the Arthaśāstra. I am aware of only two significant exceptions. In his *Two Studies in the Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya* (1929), E.H. Johnston used the works of Aśvaghoṣa, Āryaśūra and the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*[23] to date Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra*. According to Johnston, Aśvaghoṣa (early 2nd c.) shows no awareness of the latter even if a set of shared neologisms in political theory point to a certain proximity in time; the poet's political ideas 'keep within

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[21] On Viśākhadatta's *Mudrārākṣasa*, see Warder 1977: 264–277 (§§ 1616–1642).

[22] *Mudrārākṣasa* 7.5: *duṣkāle 'pi kalāv asajjanarucau paraṃ rakṣatā nītaṃ yena yaśasvinātilaghutām auśīnarīyaṃ yaśaḥ | buddhānām api ceṣṭitaṃ sucaritaiḥ kliṣṭaṃ viśuddhātmanā pūjārho 'pi sa yat kṛte tava gato vadhyatvam eṣo 'smi saḥ ||.* Tr. Warder 1977: 277; see also Kāle 1968: 259, and note on pp. 339–340.

[23] The future advent of Kauṭilya, Vālmīki, Aśvalāyana, etc., is prophesied in LASū 10.816.

the limits of the *dharmaśāstra*, particularly […] in the form expounded for popular consumption in the *Mahābhārata.*'[24] In contradistinction to this, Āryaśūra (4th c.) is not only aware of the *Arthaśāstra*, but 'deliberately parades his knowledge of it,'[25] as we shall see below. From these and other considerations, Johnston concluded that 'the lower limit for the composition of the *Arthaśāstra* is certainly no later than about A.D. 250,'[26] and could even be earlier if the Pāli parallel's reference to the science of statecraft (*khattavijjā*) could be shown to refer to the *Arthaśāstra*. The second exception is Michael Zimmermann's in-depth study (2000) of the *Bodhisattvagocaropāyaviṣayavikurvaṇanirdeśasūtra*, a Mahāyānasūtra whose sixth chapter deals with the principles of the *rājanīti* and contains a brief critique of the Arthaśāstra.

1. *Mātṛceṭa*

The poet Mātṛceṭa (2th c.), famous for his hymns (*stotra*) to the Buddha, is traditionally regarded as the author of an interesting little work, the *Letter to the Great King Kaniṣka* (Tib. *rGyal po chen po Ka nis ka la spriṅs pa'i 'phrin yig, *Mahārājakaniṣkalekha*).[27] In this possibly early specimen of the 'advice to the king' genre, Mātṛceṭa instructs the great Kuṣāṇa ruler about the nature of righteous governance and the conditions for a prosperous, happy kingdom. As far as I can see, the author does not refer, at least not explicitly, to the Arthaśāstra text or tradition, but exhorts the king to rely on the Dharmaśāstra (Tib. *chos kyi bstan bcos*), and this in an enlightened and critical manner: 'Have the code of laws recited and listen to the way it is explained. Examine the laws you hear and be wise

[24] Johnston 1929: 78; see also Eltschinger 2018.

[25] Johnston 1929: 81. According to Johnston, Āryaśūra's *Jātakamālā* contains four references to political science: in *Jātaka* No. 8 (Maitrībala), v. 14 (see Johnston 1929: 81–82); *Jātaka* No. 9 (Viśvantara), v. 10 (where the prince speaks of 'the *rājaśāstra* in which the path of *dharma* is lost through following *artha*,' Johnston 1929: 82); *Jātaka* No. 31 (*Sutasoma*; see Johnston 1929: 82–83). On *Jātaka* No. 23 (*Mahābodhi*), see below, and Johnston 1929: 83–86.

[26] Johnston 1929: 89. Though not reckoning with different recensions/redactions of the text, Johnston's chronology accords well with Olivelle's (see above, n. 3).

[27] For an edition of the Tibetan text and an English translation, see Hahn 1998: 5–49; for a German translation, see Hahn and Dietz 2008: 33–47.

in your judgments.'[28] A few stanzas later, Mātṛceṭa again appropriates prima facie Brahmanical ideas while advising the king to 'see to it that everyone fulfills his own duty (Tib. *raṅ gi chos*, Skt. *svadharma*), and that all live righteously (Tib. *chos kyis*, Skt. *dharmeṇa*, VE).'[29] Together with its prescriptions concerning *dharma* and *svadharma*, the Dharmaśāstra is regarded as a traditional lore that kings of old, notably the universal monarchs[30] (*cakravartin*, 'wheel-turning monarchs'), took to be authoritative, but whose normativity Mātṛceṭa perceives as declining if not as destroyed (Tib. *ñams pa*). The poet thus invites his addressee to follow in the footsteps of ancient kings and *ṛṣi*s, to renovate their tradition, again in a critical spirit:

> […] in order to protect yourself and others, please apply yourself fully and establish anew the declining tradition of the ancient kings and seers. From the practice of the ancient kings, take whatever is good and put it into practice. But whatever is not appropriate you must revile and abandon. Break the hold of former laws that were enacted in error, even when they exist as of old, and make a new code of law marked by the name of King Kaniṣka.[31]

In particular, kings should not rule in an arbitrary or whimsical manner (*bdag ñid raṅ dgar spyod pa*, MRKL, v. 6c), i.e., independently of the advice provided by treatises, good friends, and wise counsellors, as did a *cakravartin* who thereby triggered his own tradition's decay. Is Dharmaśāstra the only type of normative treatise Mātṛceṭa had in mind while advising Kaniṣka on proper governance? Perhaps not. Quite interestingly, Mātṛceṭa exhorts Kaniṣka to

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[28] MRKL, st. 12 (as edited in Hahn 1998: 10): | *chos kyi bstan bcos gdon bgyi źiṅ* | | *de yi don gyi tshul gson la* | | *gsan pa'i chos rnams rnam dpyad de* | | *dpyad pa la ni mkhas par mdzod* |. Tr. Hahn 1998: 11.

[29] MRKL, st. 35ab (as edited in Hahn 1998: 22): | *kun gyis raṅ gi chos thob ciṅ* | | *chos kyis thams cad 'tsho bar mdzad* |. Tr. Hahn 1998: 23, with 'own duty' for 'own *dharma*,' and 'righteously' for 'according to the law.'

[30] On the *cakravartin*s and their decline, see below.

[31] MRKL, stt. 41–43 (as edited in Hahn 1998: 26): | *de bas bdag gźan bsruṅ slad du* | | *thugs kyis rab tu bsgrims nas ni* | | *gna' rgyar draṅ sroṅ rnams kyi lugs* | | *ñams pa sar par bcos su gcol* | | *gna' yi rgyal po'i spyod pa las* | | *gaṅ dag bzaṅ ba de mdzad la* | | *mi rigs pa ni gaṅ lags de* | | *smad par mdzod la spaṅ du gsol* | | *sṅon gyi bka' khrims skyon chags pa* | | *gna' nas mchis kyaṅ rgyu chod la* | | *rgyal po ka ni skas mtshan pa'i* | | *khrims su bca' ba gsar ba mdzod* |. Tr. Hahn 1998: 27.

refrain from becoming involved in duplicity: 'If you become in-
volved in duplicity and follow nothing but intrigue, then all the
people, the subjects who follow your example, will be polluted.'[32]
This interesting passage is not the only one in Mātr̥ceṭa's letter
into which one is tempted to read Arthaśāstra-like values and prac-
tices. For instance, a king should carefully avoid four types of peo-
ple, 'those who use deceit to cultivate quarrels and strife, who look
down upon the poor, who do not delight in moral beings, and who
distract ascetics from their own vows.' What is striking with stanza
40, however, is its very terminology, for the Tibetan word *gya gyu*,
which Michael Hahn successively translates as 'duplicity' and
'intrigue,' is well attested as a translation of Skt. *kauṭilya*, 'crooked-
ness,' 'duplicity,' 'trickery.'[33] Was, then, the second-century
Buddhist poet Mātr̥ceṭa—granting he is the author of the *Letter*—
aware of, and implicitly criticizing, Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra*, or an
Arthaśāstra tradition of political thinking associated with crooked-
ness and duplicity? If Kauṭilya composed his *Arthaśāstra* some time
between 50 and 125 CE (i.e., very close in time to the date now
generally assigned to Kaniṣka's anointment, i.e., 127),[34] there is
nothing to prevent Mātr̥ceṭa's acquaintance with it. Be that as it
may, the poet's *Letter to Kaniṣka* at least makes it very clear that the
Buddhist elites were not ready to support Arthaśāstra-like ideas
and practices and were prepared to interpret them as a sure sign
of degenerate times.

2. *Āryaśūra*

Jātaka No. 23, the *Mahābodhijātaka* or 'Larger Birth-Story of Bodhi,'
narrates a wandering ascetic's refutation of a set of religio-philoso-
phical opinions and constitutes, for that reason, an important mile-
stone in the history of the Buddhists' philosophical interaction
with the non-Buddhists.[35] To tell the story very briefly, Bodhi, a

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[32] MRKL, st. 40 (as edited in Hahn 1998: 24): | *khyod ni gya gyu la źugs na* | |
gya gyu kho na'i rjes 'braṅs pas | | *skye dbu khyod mdzad rjes 'braṅ ba'i* | | *skye dgu 'di ñams
par 'gyur* |. Tr. Hahn 1998: 25.

[33] See LCh 368a, s.v., and Negi 1993: 516b. Tib. *gya gyu (can)* is also used to
translate Skt. *kuṭila* and *jihma*.

[34] See above, n. 3.

[35] The Tibetan version (JM$_{Tib}$) is found at D *hu* 81b5–88b2, and Dharmakīrti's

learned *parivrājaka*, was held in such esteem by a certain king that the latter's ministers, having become jealous, slandered him and eventually convinced the king to banish him. In his retreat, the ascetic realized that the ministers had been plotting to convert the king to their respective false views (*dṛṣṭi*)—the doctrine of non-causality in the form of 'spontaneism' (*svabhāvavāda*), theism, jainism, annihilationism, and, quite unexpectedly, the science of statecraft (*kṣatravidyā*).[36] Seeing that the king was about to convert to the ministers' evil doctrines, Bodhi magically created a big monkey, stripped it of its skin and went back to the court. There he confronted these doctrines with the death of the monkey, using various arguments (*hetu*) to prove the ministers' views to be self-refuting and/or incapable to satisfactorily account for the immorality of the slaughter. Seeing that he had gained the king's assembly to his views, Bodhi revealed his trick and before leaving delivered a sermon that 'steered the king away from the wrong path of false views and placed him and his assembly on the path of virtue.'[37] The ascetic's (and the *Jātaka*'s) concern is to prove that

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JMṬ, at D *hu* 274b6–288a1. Translations include Khoroche 1989: 153–165 and Meiland 2009: 83–125.

[36] These doctrines are briefly introduced at JM_K 146,8–147,10/JM_M 94,6–98,2; their refutation takes place at JM_K 148,21–152,21/JM_M 102,11–114,26, i.e., JM_K 148,21–149,22/JM_M 102,11–104,24 (*ahetuvādin*), JM_K 149,23–150,20/JM_M 106,1–108,11 (*īśvarakāraṇika*), JM_K 150,21–151,12/JM_M 108,12–110,20 (*pūrvakarma-kṛtavādin*), JM_K 151,13–152,6/JM_M 110,21–112,19 (*ucchedavādin*), JM_K 152,7–21/ JM_M 114,1–26 (*kṣatravidyāvidagdha [amātya]*). As pointed out by Johnston (1929: 85), these five views agree with those of the Pāli parallel of this *Jātaka*, i.e., *Jātaka* No. 528. Although a direct connection between the two seemed improbable to Johnston, this agreement 'shows that they derive from a common original whose purpose was to set out and refute these five heretical views.' For another parallel pointed out by Johnston, see below, n. 42. JM_{Tib} renders *kṣatravidyā* as *rgyal rigs kyi gtsug lag*, i.e., equivalently with *kṣatriyavidyā*; JMṬ D *hu* 279a5 explains *kṣatra-vidyā* with *nītiśāstra* (*lugs kyi bstan bcos*); interestingly, Buddhaghosa (cf. PTSD 556a s.v. *khattavijjā*) provides the very same explanation (*nītisattha*) of the *khatta-vijjā* occurring at DN I.7, where it features among the thirty wrong means of livelihood (*micchājīva*) and pseudo–sciences (*tiracchānavijjā*). In the present context, note also the PTSD's instructive definition of a *khattavijjavādin*: 'a person who inculcates Macchiavellian (sic) tricks.' On the terms *kṣatravidyā / kṣātravidya,* see already MBh II.284,6 on Pāṇini 4.2.60.

[37] JM_K 154,25–155,1/JM_M 122,13–14: *taṃ rājānaṃ dṛṣṭigatakāpathād vivecya samavatārya ca sanmārgaṃ saparṣatkam…* Tr. Meiland 2009: 123; see also Khoroche 1989: 165.

it is our moral views, whether good or bad, that determine our conduct and actions [...]. For when we form concepts based on views, we display them through words and actions. Good views should therefore be fostered but bad views rejected, for they rain down ruin.[38]

Worthy of notice is the ministers' exhortation to persuade the king to disavow his counsellor:

> Your Majesty should not place your trust in this ascetic Bodhi. He is clearly a cunning spy, working for some hostile king. He has learned of Your Majesty's love of virtue and your predilection for righteousness and now uses smooth and false words to lure you into wickedness, reporting your actions to his king. Setting himself up as righteous, he instructs Your Majesty to practice pity exclusively and to feel the misery of shame. He encourages you to adopt a law that conflict[s] with profit and pleasure and that [is] irrelevant to the duty of the *kṣatriya* and entail[s] bad policies. His apparent motivation for exhorting you and telling you how to act is compassion. But he also enjoys a fond friendship with the messengers of other kings. Nor is he unfamiliar with the contents of royal treatises. That is why our hearts are worried about the matter.[39]

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[38] JM$_K$ 153,9–11/JM$_M$ 116,19–118,2 (stt. 58–59ab): *dṛṣṭir naraśreṣṭha śubhāśubhā vā sabhāgakarmapratipattihetuḥ | dṛṣṭyanvayaṃ hi pravikalpya tat tad vāgbhiḥ kriyābhiś ca vidarśayanti || saddṛṣṭir asmāc ca niṣevitavyā tyājyā tv asaddṛṣṭir anarthavṛṣṭiḥ |*. Tr. Meiland 2009: 117–119; see also Khoroche 1989: 163–164. JM$_{Tib}$ D *hu* 87b1–2 (*ri[g]s mthun las ni bsgrub pa'i rgyu dag*) suggests to read *sabhāgakarmapratipattihetuḥ* as '(are) the cause of (our) performance of the corresponding (i.e., good and bad) actions.' Unfortunately, neither JM$_{Tib}$ nor the JMṬ (D *hu* 284b4) is of any help to understand *dṛṣṭyanvayaṃ pravikalpya tat tad vāgbhiḥ kriyābhiś ca vidarśayanti*. I am inclined to translate: 'For [ordinary people,] choosing (BHSD 385b–386b s.v. *pravikalpayati*) this or that (*de daṅ de dag* [...] *brtags na ni*) according to false views (JM$_{Tib}$ with no equivalent of *dṛṣṭyanvayam*), make [them] manifest through words and [physical] actions.'

[39] JM$_K$ 143,18–144,1/JM$_M$ 86,1–12: *nārhati devo bodhiparivrājake viśvāsam upagantum | vyaktam ayaṃ devasya guṇapriyatāṃ dharmābhimukhatāṃ copalabhya vyasanapratāraṇāślakṣṇaśaṭhavacanaḥ pravṛttisañcārahetubhūtaḥ kasyāpi pratyarthino rājño nipuṇaḥ praṇidhiprayogaḥ | tathā hi dharmātmako nāma bhūtvā devam ekāntena kāruṇyapravṛttau hrīdainye ca samanuśāsty arthakāmoparodhiṣu ca kṣatradharmabāhyeṣu āsannāpaneyeṣu dharmasamādāneṣu | dayānuvṛttyā ca nāma te kṛtyapakṣam āśvāsanavidhinopagṛhṇīte priyasaṃstavaś cānyarājadhūtaiḥ | na cāyam aviditavṛttānto rājaśāstrāṇām | ataḥ sāśaṅkāny atra no hṛdayānīti |*. Tr. Meiland 2009: 87, with 'righteousness' for 'morality,' 'law' for 'moral vows,' and 'duty of the *kṣatriya*' for 'kshatriya law'; see also Khoroche 1989: 154–155.

Obviously, there is more to the ministers' exhortation than just an accusation of spying and working for a hostile party. What is at stake are conflicting norms and interpretations of *dharma* that crystallize in the various shades of meaning attached to this word, a central issue already in Aśvaghoṣa's *Buddhacarita*, especially in cantos 9 and 10.[40] Flattering the king's love of virtue and predilection for *dharma*, the ministers suggest that his ethical values conform with profit (*artha*) and pleasure (*kāma*) and are relevant to the *kṣatriyadharma*. This is tantamount to saying that the king's values are in conformity with his own *dharma* (*svadharma*) as a *kṣatriya* and that his behavior is thus entirely respectful of *dharma*. As for the *dharma* advocated by Bodhi, the exclusive practice of compassion and the cultivation of shame, they are said to conflict (*uparodhin*) with the king's. Indeed, Bodhi advertizes altruistic values, urging the king to renounce his *svadharma* whenever his own personal or caste-related interest as a ruler threatens that of his subjects. Needless to say, the ministers are strongly supportive of the king's values and do not propose any criterion to decide over the matter.[41]

The duty of the *kṣatriya* (*kṣatradharma*) and the treatise on kingship (*rājaśāstra*) Bodhi's teachings are said to conflict with likely coincide with the science of statecraft advocated by one of the ministers as his favorite view. It is summarized in the following stanza:

> Seeing that men are the vehicles (*āśraya*) of a king's actions, just as trees are the vehicles of shade, he should seek to acquire a good repute for himself by acting as if with gratitude towards

[40] See Olivelle 2009: xliii–xlix and Brocquet 2015.

[41] Interestingly, the ministers suspect Bodhi's treachery to reflect his acquaintance with the royal treatises (*rājaśāstra*), which is likely true given the mendicant's mastery of 'the method and extent of the world-esteemed sciences' (*lokābhimatānāṃ vidyāsthānānām*) and 'the various arts' (*citrāsu kalāsu*) as he was still a householder (*gṛhastha*); see JM$_K$ 142,13–15/JM$_M$ 82,5–10. As Johnston (1929: 85) suggested, this suspicion certainly reflects these treatises' nefarious reputation for spying, duplicity, and trickery. Whatever the case may be, the ministers are justified in claiming that it is out of compassion (*parānukampin*; *dayā*) that Bodhi, likely on the basis of the Dharmaśāstras he focused upon after turning to mendicancy (*pravrajya*), instructed the king with moral discourses (*dharmyābhiḥ kathābhiḥ*) teaching the path to bliss (*śreyomārga*); see JM$_K$ 143,7–8/JM$_M$ 84,10.

them, so long as there is no advantage to be gained by the policy of making use of them, but (i.e., when there is such an advantage to be gained) they should be employed in his service in the way that cattle are used in the sacrifice.[42]

A king should let his own political interests decide how to deal with his subjects, i.e., either as instruments for his personal fame or as expedients of strictly negligible value. Especially noteworthy is Āryaśūra's brief introduction to this stanza:

> Another who held that in the practices set out in the science of statecraft is to be found the duty of a king, though they are contrary to righteousness as following the crooked ways of political wisdom (*nīti*) and as being soiled by ruthlessness, instructed him thus.[43]

The poet regards the teachings of the science of statecraft as 'following the crooked ways of political wisdom' (*nītikauṭilyaprasaṅga*), 'soiled by ruthlessness'[44] (*nairghṛṇyamalina*), and 'contrary to righteousness' (*dharmavirodhin*). As remarked by Johnston (1929: 84),

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[42] JM$_K$ 147,7–10/JM$_M$ 96,14–17 (st. 21): *chāyādrumeṣv iva nareṣu kṛtāśrayeṣu tāvat kṛtajñacaritaiḥ svayaśaḥ parīpset | nārtho 'sti yāvad upayoganayena teṣāṃ kṛtye tu yajña iva te paśavo niyojyāḥ ||.* Tr. Johnston 1929: 84. For explanations on the translation of this difficult stanza, see Johnston 1929: 84, n. 1. As pointed by Johnston (1929: 85–86), it has a close parallel in *Jātaka* V.240,21–23 (stt. 153–154ab): *yassa rukkhassa chāyāya nisīdeyya sayeyya vā | na tassa sākhaṃ bhañjeyya mittadūbhī hi pāpako || atha atthe samuppanne samūlam api abbahe |.* 'From off a tree beneath whose shade a man would sit and rest / "Twere treachery to lop a branch. False friends we both detest. / But if occasion should arise, then extirpate that tree."' Tr. Cowell 1905: 123–124. The Bodhisattva's introduction to this fifth view (the *khattadhamma*) is worthy of notice (*Jātaka* V.240,8–9): *tvam āvuso mātāpitaro māretvā attano attho kātabbo ti.* 'You, sir, maintain that a man must serve his own interests, even should he have to kill his own father and mother.' Tr. Cowell 1905: 123. For a discussion of these two texts, see Johnston 1929: 86.

[43] JM$_K$ 147,5–6/JM$_M$ 96,11–13: *apara enaṃ kṣatravidyāparidṛṣṭeṣu nītikauṭilyaprasaṅgeṣu nairghṛṇyamalineṣu dharmavirodhiṣv api rājadharmo 'yam iti samanuśaśāsa.* Tr. Johnston 1929: 84, with 'science of statecraft' for 'science of the Kshatriyas,' 'duty' for 'rule of conduct' (second occurrence of *dharma*), and 'righteousness' for '*dharma*' (first occurrence of *dharma*).

[44] Recall that *n(a)irghṛṇ(y)a* also describes the teachings of the *Arthaśāstra* in Bāṇa's *Kādambarī*; see above, n. 20.

> [t]he doctrine thus set out describes so exactly the principles underlying the practices recommended in the *Arthaśāstra*, at any rate as viewed by a hostile eye, as to leave no doubt that that work is referred to here and that we are to see in the expression *nīti-kauṭilyaprasaṅgeṣu* a definite reminder of the author's name.

This assumption is corroborated by Āryaśūra's explicit reference to the Arthaśāstra while introducing Bodhi's refutation at JM$_K$ 152,9/JM$_M$ 114,15: *arthaśāstraparidṛṣṭaṃ vidhim*, 'the method prescribed by the science of (political) interest/profit.' Immediately after this, moreover, Āryaśūra provides yet another, even more telling description of the science of statecraft, a science which, he says,

> allows any act to be performed, good or bad, if it leads to personal advantage. Only after a person has raised himself up should he use his wealth for moral actions.[45]

It is therefore almost certain that Āryaśūra is referring to, and criticizing, Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra*.[46]

The *Arthaśāstra* encourages the king to prioritize his own personal fame and profit irrespective of any moral consideration: all

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[45] JM$_K$ 152,11–12/JM$_M$ 114,6–9 (st. 51): *anuṣṭheyaṃ hi tatreṣṭam arthārthaṃ sādhvasādhu vā | athoddhṛtya kilātmānam arthair dharmaḥ* kariṣyate ||. *dharmaḥ* JM$_M$ (see also Khoroche 1987: 54): *dharmaṃ* JM$_K$. Tr. Meiland 2009: 115; see also Khoroche 1989: 162–163.

[46] Is an advocate of the *Arthaśāstra* entitled to censure Bodhi for slaughtering the monkey? Certainly not, for '[i]f, in gaining profit, we need not consider acting virtuously even toward loving relatives, why blame me for killing the ape for its skin when your teachings morally prescribe it?' The ascetic continues: 'But if this act is reprehensible, being cruel and clearly resulting in pain, why do you follow a system that allows such conduct? If your teaching treats this as a great virtue, what kind of deviance would it view as vice? How insolent are those who despise the world by citing treatises to promote wickedness! If you accept this action is not sinful, as your treatises clearly seem to preach, then I cannot be blamed for killing the monkey if I follow the morals declared by your teachings.' (JM$_K$ 152,14–21/JM$_M$ 114,11–26 [stt. 52–55]: *prayojanaṃ prāpya na ced avekṣyaṃ snigdheṣu bandhuṣv api sādhuvṛttam | hate mayā carmaṇi vānare 'smin kā śāstradṛṣṭe 'pi naye vigarhā || dayāviyogād atha garhaṇīyaṃ karmedṛśaṃ duḥkhaphalaṃ ca dṛṣṭam | yatrābhyanujñātam idaṃ nu tantre prapadyase kena mukhena tat tvam || iyaṃ vibhūtiś ca nayasya yatra tatrānayaḥ kīdṛśavibhramaḥ syāt | aho pragalbhaiḥ paribhūya lokam unnīyate śāstrapathair adharmaḥ || aduṣṭam evātha tavaitad iṣṭaṃ śāstre kila spaṣṭa-thopadiṣṭam | śāstraprasiddhena nayena gacchan na garhaṇīyo 'smi kaper vadhena ||. Tr. Meiland 2009: 115; see also Khoroche 1989: 163.)

acts, including harsh and degrading ones, are permitted as long as they serve the king's selfish interests. But inasmuch as these ideas are refuted by Bodhi, they must be considered false views, for false views 'cannot stand up to examination.'[47] And since they contradict righteousness, Bodhi's dismissal *ipso facto* validates the contrary position, i.e., that righteousness consists in the altruistic pursuit of other people's profit. The right view about the duty of a king—the view that stands up to examination[48]—is therefore that he should *protect* his subjects, and this is the purport of the ascetic's lengthy exhortation to the king in stanzas 58–73. According to him, the duty of a king consists in protecting (*[anu]PĀL, [abhi]RAKṢ*) one's people (*jānapada* [v. 66], *lokāḥ* [v. 73])—one's country (*deśa*), this world (*jagad idam*, v. 64), the earth (*mahī*, v. 65)—in a righteous (*dharmeṇa*, v. 65) and diligent manner (*apramādāt*, v. 65), by way of a fair administration of justice (*rāgadveṣonmuktayā daṇḍanītyā*, v. 73). The king's treasury depends on his protection of the tax-payers—'people in the countryside, the farmers and herdsmen who pay tax,'[49] 'traders and townsmen, who live off buying and selling wares and who help him by paying taxes.'[50] The king must observe righteousness (*dharmaṃ CAR, BHAJ*, v. 64), purify his conduct (*śīlaṃ viśodhayan*, v. 65), put righteousness first (*dharmaṃ purasKṚ*, v. 73) and dedicate himself to the prosperity of his subjects (*śreyaḥprāptau yuktacetāḥ prajānām*, v. 73). This includes increasing one's fame as a giver (*dātṛkīrti*, v. 65), 'be[ing] friendly to all people as one would relatives,'[51] using

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[47] JM$_K$ 155,6–7/JM$_M$ 124,3–4: *mithyādṛṣṭir ananuyogakṣamā*. Tr. Meiland 2009: 125 (Khoroche 1989 does not translate the *Jātaka*'s conclusive statement). JM$_{Tib}$ (D *hu* 88b1) renders *anuyoga* with *rjes su chags pa*, which reflects the first meaning of *anuyoga* in 'Buddhist Sanskrit' (BHSD 326b s.v.: '(1) devotion, addiction, application') rather than to its secondary meaning (BHSD, *ibid.*, '(2) questioning, examination'). Given the context of the *jātaka*, however, 'examination' makes much better sense than 'addiction.'

[48] According to JM$_K$ 155,8/JM$_M$ 124,5, applying to the statement quoted in n. 47: *viparyayeṇa samyagdṛṣṭipraśaṃsāyām iti* |. 'And one should make the reverse statement when praising correct views.' Tr. Meiland 2009: 125.

[49] *kṛṣipradhānān paśupālanodyatān* […] *jānapadān balipradān*, st. 66ac, tr. Meiland 2009: 121; see also Khoroche 1989: 164.

[50] *vicitrapaṇyakrayavikrayāśrayaṃ vaṇigjanaṃ paurajanaṃ tathā* […] *śulkapathopakāriṇam*, st. 67ac, tr. Meiland 2009: 121; see also Khoroche 1989: 164.

[51] *maitraṃ manaḥ kuru jane svajane yathaiva*, st. 65b, tr. Meiland 2009: 121; see also Khoroche 1989: 164. See also below, n. 60.

pleasing words (*tadiṣṭayā girā*, v. 72) and offering wealth (*dhana*, v. 72), refraining from acting 'scornfully toward the good who are virtuous, learned and disciplined,'[52] and abstaining from levying unfair taxes (*adharmyaṃ balim*, v. 70), which would harm the country (*kṣiṇoti deśam*, v. 70). By doing this, the king secures spiritual and material felicities (*dharmārthasukha*, v. 71), heavens (*lokāḥ*, v. 73; *tridiva*, v. 65), pleasure (*sukha*, v. 65), and glory (*yaśas*, v. 65). In addition, 'if [he] act[s] righteously, mankind will mostly incline toward virtue, established on heaven's path.'[53]

Far from simply reflecting Āryaśūra's own personal reflections, these ideas can be traced to fairly old layers of Buddhist literature, in which the protection of fields and people is presented as the very *raison d'être* of kings and kingship. This is best seen in the influential *Aggaññasuttanta*, where the institution of kingship follows upon a brief state of nature (stealing, censure, punishment, lying) among the humans of the first eon.[54] Gathering together, they resolved to elect the most attractive and competent among them to rule and deliver justice against a proportion (one sixth) of their rice. The king was named Mahāsammata because he had been elected by the whole people, a 'warrior' (*khattiya*) because he was the lord of the fields (*khettānaṃ patīti*), and a 'king' (*rājā*) because he pleased his subjects by his righteousness (*dhammena pare rañjetīti*).[55] In his commentary on *Catuḥśataka* 4.2, Candrakīrti (7th c.?) nicely summarizes the issue:

> When people of the first eon began to take what had not been given to them, the majority of the populace paid a man strong enough to protect the fields with wages amounting to one-sixth of their harvested grain. Thus, he came to be called 'a king' because he made the people happy with his work of protecting the fields.

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[52] […] *śīlaśrutayogasādhuṣu* […] *sādhuṣu carann avajñāmalinena vartmanā*, st. 69ac, tr. Meiland 2009: 121; see also Khoroche 1989: 165.

[53] *tvayi ca carati dharmaṃ bhūyasāyaṃ nṛlokaḥ sucaritasumukhaḥ syāt svarga-mārgapratiṣṭhaḥ*, st. 64ab, tr. Meiland 2009: 119, with 'righteously' for 'morally'; see also Khoroche 1989: 164.

[54] See DN III.92–93 and Rhys Davids/Rhys Davids 1921: 87–88.

[55] For an overview and references to recent literature on the *Aggaññasuttanta*, see Eltschinger 2012: 4–11 and 71–81.

From that time on, the people supported every king with wages of one-sixth of the harvest.[56]

3. *Āryadeva and Candrakīrti*

About one century before Āryaśūra, the Mādhyamika philosopher Āryadeva had included an interesting stanza in the fourth chapter of his *Catuḥśataka*, dealing with kings:[57]

Previously the virtuous kings protected society / Just as they protected a son / Now those who rely on the law of the *kaliyuga* / Have made it into a hunting ground.[58]

Catuḥśataka 4.15 obviously refers neither to treatises nor to the Arthaśāstra, and there is in my opinion no compelling evidence that Āryadeva had the *Arthaśāstra* in mind. While introducing the stanza, however, Candrakīrti connects it with treatises:

Objection: Since the ancient kings took the sense of the treatise as authoritative and properly protected a prosperous kingdom, the treatise is a valid authority.[59]

According to this introductory objection, the kings of the past did exactly what Āryaśūra expected any king to do, i.e., to protect (*pariPĀL*) his kingdom (*vasumatī*, Tib. *sa*, 'earth'). The kings of the past owed this exemplary practice to their reliance on an

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[56] CŚṬ 46,10–11 (Sanskrit fragment) and 47,17–22 (continuation in Tibetan): *samudbhūtādattādāne 'pi prāthamakalpike loke kṣetraparirakṣārthaṃ pratibalaḥ puruṣo mahājanena dhānyaṣaḍbhāgavetanena bhṛtaḥ | de ltar de la yaṅ dag par bsruṅ ba'i las kyis skye dgu dga' bar byed pa'i phyir rgyal po źes bsñad do || de nas bzuṅ nas rgyal po thams cad drug cha'i glas skye dgu skyoṅ bar byed de ||.* Tr. Lang 2003: 187.

[57] On this chapter (entitled *ahaṅkāraviparyāsaprahāṇopāya,* 'The Means for Eliminating the Wrong Notion of Egotism,' on kings as paradigmatic cases of egotism), see Lang 2003: 88–108 (introduction) and 186–208 (translation). The Sanskrit fragments and the corresponding Tibetan version have been edited in Suzuki 1994: 44–71.

[58] CŚ 4.15: *putravat pālito lokaḥ purataḥ pārthivaiḥ śubhaiḥ | mṛgāraṇyīkṛtaḥ so 'dya kalidharmasamāśritaiḥ ||.* Tr. Lang 2003: 198, with 'the *kaliyuga*' instead of 'an age of discord.'

[59] CŚṬ 54,9–11: *śāstrārthaṃ hi pramāṇīkṛtya sphītāṃ vasumatīṃ samyak paripāli-tavanto yasmāt purātanā rājānas tasmād api śāstraṃ pramāṇam iti |.* Tr. Lang 2003: 198.

authoritative treatise, and it is by taking the very same treatise as trustworthy that present-day kings are expected to rule. In Candrakīrti's opinion, then, Āryadeva intended to show that the kings and treatises of old had nothing to do with those of the *kaliyuga.* Candrakīrti explains this as follows in his commentary on *Catuḥśataka* 4.15:

> The virtuous universal monarchs, born before the *kaliyuga,* investigated what was proper and improper. They took as authoritative those treatises that agree with righteousness and rejected those that agree with unrighteousness. They abided by the path of the ten virtuous actions. These kings who loved their people protected society just as they would protect a beloved son.[60] But now kings born in the *kaliyuga* rely on the evil nature of their own opinions and are obsessed by their desire for wealth. They take as authoritative treatises that agree with unrighteousness and reject those that agree with righteousness. In this way, these kings who have no compassion devastate this world, just as if it were a hunting ground. Consequently, a treatise associated with harmful practices should not be taken as authoritative.[61]

Fatherly protection of one's subjects also features as the most prominent value of ancient kings' ethics and the surest sign of their conformity with the *dharma,* a conformity which kings of the degenerate *kaliyuga* broke with while relying on their own arbitrary thought (*svacitta*).

The core of Candrakīrti's explanation is borrowed from the *Cakkavattisīhanādasuttanta* of the *Dīghanikāya*(/*Dīrghāgama*), the

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[60] Cf. MRKL st. 36 (as edited in Hahn 1998: 22): | *pha yis bu la ji lta bar* | | *khyod kyis 'khor la byams bgyis pa* | | *bu yis pha la ji lta bur* | | *khyod la żabs 'briṅ dga' bar bgyid* |. 'If you love your retinue as a father loves his son, your subjects will want to please you as a son would please his father.' Tr. Hahn 1998: 23.

[61] CŚṬ 56,1–8: *kaliyugāt pūrvotpannaiḥ pārthivaiś cakravartyādibhiḥ śubhair yuktāyuktaparīkṣakair dharmānukūlaṃ śāstraṃ pramāṇīkṛtyādharmānukūlaṃ parivarjya daśakuśalakarmapratiṣṭhitaiḥ priyaikaputrakavaj jagatpremānugataiḥ pālito lokaḥ* | *sāmprataṃ tu kaliyugotpannaiḥ pārthivaiḥ svacittadaurātmyaparāyattair arthamātratṛṣṇāparair adharmānukūlaṃ śāstraṃ pramāṇīkṛtya dharmānukūlam utsṛjya tathāyaṃ loko niṣkaruṇair udvāsito yathā mṛgāraṇyīkṛta ity ato 'pi nādharmayuktaṃ śāstraṃ pramāṇam iti* |. Tr. Lang 2003: 198, with '*kaliyuga*' instead of 'age of discord,' 'righteousness' for 'virtuous practices,' and 'unrighteousness' for 'harmful practices.'

locus classicus on the topic of the universal monarch (*cakrava-rtin*).[62] In this important *sūtra* the Buddha explains, first in a narrative and then in a prophetic way, how the institution of the *cakra-vartin*s gradually declined due to the negligence of one of the monarchs and to the moral decay of the humans. The *sūtra* ends with an account of the way in which the humans' morality and life-span will grow again until the wheel-turning monarch Śaṅkha eventually arises together with the future *buddha* Maitreya. Here is the *sūtra*'s description of the reign of the first (?) wheel-turning monarch, Daḷhanemi ('Strongtyre'):

> Long, long ago, brethren, there was a sovran overlord named Strongtyre, a righteous king ruling in righteousness, lord of the four quarters of the earth, conqueror, the protector of the people, possessor of the seven precious things. […] He lived in supremacy over this earth to its ocean bounds, having conquered it, not by the scourge, not by the sword, but by righteousness.'[63]

Besides conquering the earth by righteousness alone, this *dhammi-ko dhammarājā* has the capacity to secure the stability of his realm (*janapadatthāvariyapatta*), i.e., again, to protect it. This aspect of the *dharma*-king's righteousness is best expounded in Daḷha-nemi's detailed description/prescription of the 'noble duty of a *cakravartin*' to his eldest son and successor:

> This, dear son, that thou, leaning on righteousness, honouring, respecting and revering it, doing homage to it, hallowing it, being thyself a righteousness-banner, a righteousness-signal, having righteousness as thy master, shouldst provide the right watch, ward, and protection of thine own folk, for the army, for the nobles, for vassals, for brahmins, and householders, for town and country dwellers, for the religious world, and for beasts and birds. Throughout thy kingdom, let no wrongdoing prevail. And what-

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[62] DN III.58–79. For a translation, see Rhys Davids and Rhys Davids 1921: 59–76.

[63] DN III.59: *bhūtapubbaṃ bhikkhave rājā daḷhanemi nāma ahosi cakkavatti dham-miko dhammarājā cāturanto vijitāvī janapadatthāvariyappatto sattaratanasamannāga-to. […] so imaṃ paṭhaviṃ sāgarapariyantam adaṇḍena asatthena dhammena abhivija-ya ajjhāvasi.* Tr. Rhys Davids and Rhys Davids 1921: 60. On the main characteristics of the rule of a *cakravartin*, see Zimmermann 2000: 182–183.

soever in thy kingdom is poor, to him let wealth be given. […]
This, dear son, is the Ariyan duty of a sovran of the world.[64]

Although the *sūtra* does not refer to *śāstra*s,[65] it provides a welcome amplification of Candrakīrti's explanation concerning the virtuous practices of the kings of old, most notably the *cakravartin*s (*cakravartyādi*).

How to explain Āryadeva's and Candrakīrti's reference to the *kaliyuga*? During hundreds of thousands of years, *cakravartin* princes succeeded their *cakravartin* fathers according to a standard procedure. One day, however, a newly anointed king neglected to ask his father about his noble duty as a *cakravartin*, and instead

> [b]y his own ideas, forsooth, he governed his people; and they so governed, differently from what they had been, did not prosper as they used to do under former kings who had carried out the Ariyan duty of a sovran king.[66]

The *cakravartin*'s 'own ideas' (Pāli *samata*, Skt. *svamata*) in the *sūtra* are of course the source of Candrakīrti's *svacitta* (the kings of the *kaliyuga* rule in reliance on their own mind's depravity, *svacittadaurātmyaparāyatta*). To be sure, courtiers and high officials finally managed to teach him the noble duty, but a series of wrong decisions led to the spread of poverty and, from poverty, to the generalization of theft; from theft (*adattādāna*) came killing

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[64] DN III.61: *tena hi tvaṃ tāta dhammaṃ yeva nissāya dhammaṃ sakkaronto dhammaṃ garukaronto dhammaṃ mānento dhammaṃ pūjento dhammaṃ apacyāyamāno dhammaddhajo dhammaketu dhammādhipateyyo dhammikaṃ rakkhāvaraṇaguttiṃ saṃvidahassu antojanasmiṃ bālakāyasmiṃ khattiyesu anuyuttesu brāhmaṇagahapatikesu negamajānapadesu samaṇabrāhmaṇesu migapakkhīsu | mā ca te tāta vijite adhammakāro pavattittha. ye ca te tāta vijite adhanā assu tesaṃ ca dhanam anuppadajjeyyāsi.* […] *idaṃ kho tāta taṃ ariyaṃ cakkavattivattan ti* |. Tr. Rhys Davids and Rhys Davids 1921: 62–63, with 'righteousness' for '(the) Norm.'

[65] In the *Bodhisattvagocaropāyaviṣayavikurvaṇanirdeśasūtra*, the *cakravartin*s are even explicitly said not to rely on *śāstra*s due to their being the embodiments of *dharma* and the immaculate dispositions of their subjects. See Zimmermann 2000: 183.

[66] DN III.64: *so samaten' eva sudaṃ janapadaṃ pasāsati tassa samatena janapadaṃ pasāsato na pubbe nāparaṃ janapadā pabbanti yathā taṃ pubbakānaṃ rājūnaṃ ariye cakkavattivatte vattamānānaṃ.* Tr. Rhys Davids and Rhys Davids 1921: 65.

(*prāṇātipāta*), lying (*mṛṣāvāda*), and slandering (*paiśunya*), and then arose adultery (*kāmamithyācāra*), abusive speech (*pāruṣya*), idle talk (*sambhinnapralāpa*), covetousness (*abhidhyā*), ill-will (*vyāpāda*) and false views (*mithyādṛṣṭi*)—the ten 'evil paths of action' (*akuśalakarmapatha*) whose appearance caused the gradual decrease of human life-span from 80,000 to 500 years. Incest (*adharmarāga*), wanton greed (*viṣamalobha*) and wrong law (*mithyādharma*) further reduced their life-span to either 250 or 200 years. Humans reached a life-span of 100 years as the lack of filial piety to mother and father, the lack of religious piety to holy men, and the lack of regard for the head of the clan arose. Here the Buddha switches from the narrative to the prophetic mode:

> There will come a time, brethren, when the descendants of those humans will have a life-span of ten years. Among humans of this life-span, maidens of five years will be of a marriageable age. […] Among such humans the ten moral courses of conduct will altogether disappear, the ten immoral courses of action will flourish excessively; there will be no word for moral among such humans—far less any moral agent. […] Among such humans, brethren, there will be no [such thoughts of reverence as are a bar to intermarriage with] mother, or mother's sister, or mother's sister-in-law, or teacher's wife, or father's sister-in-law. The world will fall into promiscuity, like goats and sheep, fowls and swine, dogs and jackals. Among such humans, brethren, keen mutual enmity will become the rule, keen ill-will, keen animosity, passionate thoughts even of killing, in a mother towards her child, in a child towards its mother, in a father towards his child and a child towards its father, in brother to brother, in brother to sister, in sister to brother. Just as a sportsman feels towards the game that he sees, so will they feel. Among such humans, brethren, there will arise a sword-period of seven days, during which they will look on each other as wild beasts; sharp swords will appear ready to their hands, and they, thinking This is a wild beast, this is a wild beast, will with their swords deprive each other of life.[67]

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[67] DN III.71–73: *bhavissati bhikkhave so samayo, yaṃ imesaṃ manussānaṃ dasavassāyukā puttā bhavissanti | dasavassāyukesu bhikkhave manussesu pañcavassikā kumārikā alampateyyā bhavissanti.* […] *dasavassāyukesu bhikkhave manussesu dasakusalakammapathā sabbena sabbaṃ antaradhāyissanti dasa akusalakammapathā ativiya dippissanti dasavassāyukesu bhikkhave manussesu kusalan ti pi na bhavissati | kuta pana kusalassa kārako.* […] *dasavassāyukesu bhikkhave manussesu na bhavissati mātā*

With its reference to the reduction of the life-span, the marriage of young girls, the lack of piety and respect, and the mutual enmity and killing, this passage bears striking resemblances with standard Brahmanical descriptions of the *kaliyuga* and would deserve a study of its own (even though, e.g., the seven-day sword interval properly belongs to the Buddhist eschatological repertoire[68]). Besides, it confirms a tendency among early first-millenium Buddhist intellectuals to interpret the canonical narratives of moral degeneration in terms of *kaliyuga*.[69] Whatever its origin and early development, this passage from the *Cakkavattisīhanādasuttanta* sufficiently explains Candrakīrti's allusion to both the *kaliyuga* and the 'hunting ground,' a motif that occurs in an even more explicit way in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* of Vasubandhu (350–430?). In those times, it is said, the human beings behave

> just as a deer hunter nowadays when he sees a deer in the forest. Whatever piece of wood or clod of earth they [manage to] grasp turns for them into a sharp weapon and they deprive each other of life.[70]

Treatises, however, are conspicuously absent from the *sūtra* passage (as they are from Āryadeva's stanza), and I see no obvious rea-

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ti vā mātucchā ti vā mātulānī ti vā ācāriyabhariyā ti vā garūnaṃ dārā ti vā | sambhedaṃ loko gamissati yathā ajeḷakā kukkuṭasūkarā soṇasīgālā | dasavassāyukesu bhikkhave manussesu tesaṃ sattānaṃ aññamaññamhi tibbo āghāto paccupaṭṭhito, tibbo vyāpādo, tibbo manopadoso, tibbaṃ vadhakacittaṃ, mātu pi puttamhi, puttassa pi mātari, pitu pi puttamhi, puttassa pi pitari, bhātu pi bhātari, bhātu pi bhaginiyā, bhaginiyā pi bhātari tibbo āghāto paccupaṭṭhito bhavissati tibbo vyāpādo tibbo manopadoso tibbaṃ vadhakacittaṃ | seyyathā pi bhikkhave māgavikassa migaṃ disvā tibbo āghāto paccupaṭṭhito hoti tibbo vyāpādo tibbo manopadoso tibbaṃ vadhakacittaṃ [...]. dasavassāyukesu bhikkhave manussesu sattāhaṃ satthantarakappo bhavissati, te aññamaññaṃ migasaññaṃ paṭilabhissanti, tesaṃ tiṇhāni satthāni hatthesu pātubhavissanti, te tiṇhena satthena — esa migo esa migo ti — aññamaññaṃ jīvitā voropessanti. Tr. Rhys Davids and Rhys Davids 1921: 70–71.

[68] See AKBh 187,24–188,23 and YBh 32,12–34,3. On the YBh passage and its wider cosmological context, see Kajiyama 2000. On Buddhist apocalypticism and the Buddhist appropriation of the *kaliyuga*, see Eltschinger 2020.

[69] For a similar reinterpretation in the case of ritual violence, see Eltschinger 2017: 372–377.

[70] AKBh 188,3–5: *tadyathedānīṃ mṛgalubdhakasyāraṇyakaṃ mṛgaṃ dṛṣṭvā te yad yad eva gṛhṇanti kāṣṭhaṃ vā loṣṭaṃ vā tat teṣāṃ tīkṣṇaṃ śastraṃ prādurbhavati | te 'nyonyaṃ sattvaṃ jīvitād vyaparopayanti |.* See also YBh 33,15–34,2 and Kajiyama 2000: 187.

son why Candrakīrti cast them into the narrative. Had it become impossible, by his time, to think of political theory independently of normative treatises dealing with either *dharma* or *artha*? Did he regard treatises of that type as a threat to Buddhism? Be that as it may, a similar shift can be observed in Candrakīrti's interpretation of another stanza. In *Catuḥśataka* 4.14, Āryadeva claims, again with no reference to treatises, that 'An intelligent person should not undertake / Every action of the sages, / Since inferior, mediocre, and superior types / Are found even among them.'[71] Here is the Mādhyamika scholar's explanation:

> In this world an intelligent person should not undertake every physical, verbal and mental action of the sages, since even among sages we find inferior, mediocre, and superior types. In this context, a sage is inferior when his treatises explain violence as virtuous behavior. A mediocre sage has doubts: 'It may be so or it may not be so.' A superior sage does not regard violence as virtuous behavior. For this reason, all sages' treatises should not be taken as authoritative. It is wrong to claim that the king who engages in violence because sages prescribe it as his duty does not do anything wrong.[72]

The interesting thing in this connection is not so much Candrakīrti's emphasis on treatises as the political theorist's underlying objection, which is similar to the ritualist brahmin's view of blood sacrifices: in the context of ritual, killing is not killing, or, to put it otherwise, the prescribed character of ritual violence makes it morally unobjectionable.[73] Similarly, 'political' violence is not morally reprehensible as long as it is derived from the authority of a person or treatise, which comes very close to the conception according to which no rational or natural idea of jus-

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[71] CŚ 4.14: *ṛṣīṇāṃ ceṣṭitaṃ sarvaṃ kurvīta na vicakṣaṇaḥ | hīnamadhyamaviśiṣṭa-tvaṃ yasmāt teṣv api vidyate ||.* Tr. Lang 2003: 197.

[72] CŚṬ 50,5–11: *ṛṣīṇām iha kāyavāṅmanasāṃ viceṣṭitaṃ sarvam eva paṇḍitena na kartavyam | yasmād ṛṣiṣv api hīnamadhyaviśiṣṭatvaṃ vidyate | tatra yasya śāstre hiṃsā kāraṇavaśād* dharmo bhavati sa hīnaḥ | yasya syān na syād iti saṃśayaḥ sa madhyaḥ | yasya tv adharma eva hiṃseti sa viśiṣṭaḥ | tasmāt sarveṣāṃ ṛṣīṇāṃ śāstram apramāṇam | tatra yad iṣṭam ṛṣipraṇītena kṣatradharmeṇa hiṃsāṃ kurvato 'pi rājño nāsty adharma iti tan na |.* Tr. Lang 2003: 197. *Note CŚṬ_{Tib} *byed pa'i dbaṅ gis* (*apud* Suzuki 1994: 51, l. 13), suggesting *karaṇavaśād.*

[73] See Eltschinger 2017: 369–372; see also Halbfass 1991: 87–114 (= chapter 4).

tice can be advocated against positive law. It is therefore not the case that 'there is no *adharma* for a king even when he engages in violence on the basis of a political law prescribed by a wise man.'[74] Besides, Āryadeva says, 'Reasons, such as scriptural authority,/ Do not [...] destroy harmful actions.'[75] A king's demerit is not cancelled by the fact that his actions are enjoined by *āgama*s, for, as Candrakīrti explains,

> '[s]o-called reasons for making yourself happy are not found lacking anywhere at all. Even those people who take pleasure in such harmful actions as killing fish and butchering hogs claim that their caste justifies this slaughter of sentient beings. The king believes that punishment is his job and that there is nothing that is nonvirtuous about it. In this way, reasons that are satisfying are created. But the harm of these actions is not destroyed. It is just the same for the king. Since the king mostly engages in harmful actions, he will experience the maturation of that harm in bad rebirths. His heart, overwhelmed by the fire of misery, will break into many hundreds of pieces.[76]

Candrakīrti directs a final argument against the belief that the very fact of being enjoined by scripture neutralizes an action's immorality and its consequences: 'If a king who inflicts harm under scripture's influence/ Does nothing wrong,/ Then why is it not virtuous behavior/ For the liberators from *saṃsāra*?'[77] The so-

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[74] CŚṬ 50,10–11. See above, n. 72. Cf. already Candrakīrti's introductory objection to CŚ 4.14 (CŚṬ 50,1–2): *r̥ṣipraṇītena kṣatradharmeṇa hiṃsāṃ kurvato 'pi rājño nāsty adharma iti.*

[75] CŚ 4.10cd (as edited in Lang 1986: 48): | *luṅ la sogs pa'i rgyu rnams kyis* || *bsod nams min pa'aṅ 'jig yod min* |. Tr. Lang 2003: 193.

[76] CŚṬ_Tib D *ya* 80a3–5: *bdag tu dga' ba bskyed pa'i rgyu źes bya ba ni gaṅ na yaṅ med pa ma yin te* | *ña pa daṅ phag gsod pa la sogs pa sdig pa'i las la dga' ba'i bdag ñid can rnams kyaṅ* | *srog chags gsod pa 'di ni kho bo cag gi rigs brgyud las 'oṅs pa źig ste* | *'di ni skye dgu'i bdag pos 'tsho ba yoṅs su brtags pa yin la* | *'di la chos ma yin pa 'ga' yaṅ med do źes 'di sñam du 'gyur ro* || *de ltar bdag cag yoṅs su mgu ba'i rgyu dag la 'gyur la* | *de dag gi bsod nams ma yin pa la ni 'jig pa yod pa ma yin te* | *de bźin du rgyal po'i yaṅ yin no* || *'di ltar bdag ñid la sdig pa phal che bar blta źiṅ ṅan 'gro dag tu de'i rnam par smin pa mthoṅ ba na de'i sñiṅ mya ṅan gyi mes bcom źiṅ rnam pa brgyar cher 'gas par 'gyur la* |. Tr. Lang 2003: 193.

[77] CŚṬ_Tib D *ya* 80b6–7: | *luṅ gi dbaṅ gis tshe byed pa'i* || *rgyal la sdig pa med na ni* | | *'khor ba sgrol bar byed rnams la* || *ci'i phyir de ltar chos yod min* |. Tr. Lang 2003: 194, with 'the liberators from *saṃsāra*' for 'those who escape from the cycle of death and rebirth.'

called *saṃsāramocaka*s ('liberators from *saṃsāra*') are well-known figures in ancient India's moral debate, most notably around the issue of ritual killing. If their socioreligious identity and origins remain unclear, it seems reasonably clear that the *saṃsāramocaka*s claimed that harming (killing, torturing, etc.) living beings (from insects to bigger animals and humans), hence liberating them from painful existence, is a compassionate and meritorious action.[78] Now, just as the Vedic ritualist cannot simultaneously regard blood sacrifices as morally neutral (= not killing) and condemn the *saṃsāramocaka*'s sinful behavior, the advocate of Arthaśāstra-like political theory and practice cannot subtract the king from his moral responsability and blame the *saṃsāramocaka* for his immorality.

To sum up: according to Candrakīrti, the morally degenerate kings of the *kaliyuga* rule according to their own wicked inclinations and obsessed by their desire for mere profit (*arthamātra*). In their lack of compassion (*niṣkaruṇa*), they plunder/loot (*udvāsita*, Tib. *stoṅ par byas pa*, lit. 'empty') their country (*loka*). As for the political treatises they regard as authoritative, they conform to, and are conducive to, unrighteousness (*adharmānukūla*). Although the treatises referred to remain unnamed, Candrakīrti's allusion to mere profit is strongly suggestive of their identity. In other words, Arthaśāstra-like treatises are the hallmark of the *kaliyuga* by frontally contradicting the exemplary practice of the *dhārmika dharmarāja*s of old—the *cakravartin*s—who ruled righteously and urged their people to adopt the ten proper courses of action. Candrakīrti's conclusion comes very close to Āryaśūra's teaching when he compares evil kings to a foreigner who squeezes an unripe sugar cane:

> A foreign thief squeezed an unripe sugar cane because of ignorance. He just did something that was worthless and unprofitable. Similarly, if the king does not protect those who should be protected, there will be no profit for him in this world or in the next because of his lack of merit. Here we say: The wise compose a treatise/ Which does not differentiate/ Between one's own country and another's/ And which enables the people to be happy.[79]

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[78] See Halbfass 1991: 97–111.

[79] CŚṬ 56,9–14: *yo hi dasyur mohād aparisañjātam ikṣuṃ pīḍayati so 'nartham eva karoti nārthaṃ | tadvad rājā cet pālanīyān na pālayati na tasyaihiko 'rtho na pāratriko*

Considering the *Arthaśāstra*'s overarching concern for circles of friendly and inimical states and its complex interplay of political alliances so as to cause the king to maintain and aggrandize himself, Candrakīrti's appeal to erase any distinction between one's own and others' sounds like an implicit critique of the political model advocated by this treatise.

4. The Bodhisattvagocaropāyaviṣayavikurvaṇanirdeśasūtra

The connection between the *kaliyuga* and the Arthaśāstra is perfectly explicit in the sixth chapter of the *Bodhisattvagocaropāyaviṣa-yavikurvaṇanirdeśasūtra*,[80] which deals with royal ethics/conduct (**rājanīti*, Tib. *rgyal po'i tshul*). There we read:

> [King Caṇḍapradyota] asked: 'What is it to be confused by a wrong law (**mithyādharma*).' [Satyaka:] 'It is to regard [it] as virtuous (**guṇadṛṣṭi*) due to a [false] view that has been ingrained (**parivāsita*) by [one's] adhesion (**adhimukti, *adhimokṣa*) to the [law] called (**sañjñita*) Arthaśāstra, [which is] a counterfeit of the good law (*saddharmapratirūpaka*) created by wicked people during the *kaliyuga*.' [The king] asked: 'Brahmin, which are the treatises (*śāstra*) based on which a righteous (**dhārmika*) king protects [his] subjects (*prajā*)?' Answer: 'Great King, they are [those] treatises in which the antidotes (**pratipakṣa*) against evil desire (**ayuktarāga*), evil aversion (**ayuktadveṣa*), and evil delusion (**ayukta-moha*) are expounded according to [their] nature (**svabhāva*), [their] subdivisions (*vibhāga*), and [their] benefits (*anuśaṃsa*).'[81]

'*puṇyakaraṇāt* | *āha ca* — *svarāṣṭrapararātreṣu na vibhāgakṛto 'tra yat* | *prajā bhavanti sukhinas tac chāstraṃ saṃskṛtaṃ budhaiḥ* ||. Tr. Lang 2003: 199.

[80] On this *sūtra* (alias *Satyakaparivarta*; see Silk 2013: 159–161), see Jamspal 2010 and Silk 2013. Chapter 6 is not included in Guṇabhadra's 5th–c. Chinese translation. But as Zimmermann (2000: 178–180) points out, this does by no means entail that it did not exist by that time, e.g., in the form of an independent work.

[81] *Bodhisattvagocaropāyaviṣayavikurvaṇanirdeśasūtra* P *nu* 60b5–8 (as edited in Zimmermann 2000: 187): *smras pa* | *log pa'i chos kyis 'khor ces bya ba gaṅ yin* | *smras pa* | *don gyi bstan bcos su miṅ btags pa* | *gnod par 'gyur ba daṅ ldan pa* | *dam pa'i chos ltar bcos pa* | *rtsod pa'i dus na skyes bu dam pa ma lags pas bgyis pa la mos pas yoṅs su bgos pa'i lta bas yon tan du lta ba lags so* | | *smras pa* | *bram ze bstan bcos gaṅ la chos daṅ ldan pa'i rgyal pos brten ciṅ skye dgu skyoṅ bar byed pa'i bstan bcos gaṅ yin* | *smras pa* | *rgyal po chen po de ni bstan bcos gaṅ las mi rigs pa'i chags pa daṅ* | *mi rigs pa'i źe sdaṅ daṅ* | *mi rigs pa'i gti mug gi gñen po'i raṅ bźin nam* | *rab tu dbye ba'am* | *phan yon gyi sgo nas bstan pa ste* |. My translation is largely indebted to Michael Zimmermann's (Zimmermann 2000: 187).

What is remarkable in this passage is not only that it explicitly associates the Arthaśāstra with the *kaliyuga*, a link that remained implicit in Candrakīrti's commentary on *Catuḥśataka* 4.15, but also that it regards the Arthaśāstra as a counterfeit of the good law, i.e., of Buddhism. To understand the connection between these three elements, we have to turn to another aspect of Buddhist cosmology and eschatology, the so-called five degenerations or corruptions (*kaṣāya*) that occur towards the end of each sub-eon (*antarakalpa*), when the humans' life-span is comprised between 100 and ten years:[82] corruption of the life-span, corruption of the living being, corruption of the defilements, corruption of the false views, and corruption of the eon. The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* contains an interesting explanation of the five *kaṣāya*s:

> [What is the corruption of the life-span?] For example, nowadays, human beings have a short life: he who has a long life [does not live beyond] one hundred years. [What is the corruption of the living being?] For example, nowadays, living beings mostly do not

[82] Or 'sub-*kalpa*,' according to Nattier 1991: 16, 'subperiod' in Nattier 2008: *passim*, 'devolutionary cycle' and 'evolutionary cycle' in Nattier 2008: 155. See also *Kośa* II.181, n. 1 ('petit *kalpa*'). According to the Buddhist conception of cosmic time, a great eon (*mahākalpa*) is comprised of four successive eons (*kalpa*) that are in turn subdivided into twenty sub-eons: (1) an eon of destruction (*saṃvartakalpa*) consisting of nineteen sub-eons during which the universe gradually empties itself (*śūnyīBHŪ*) and one sub-eon during which the universe is entirely destroyed; (2) an eon of the duration of destruction consisting of twenty sub-eons during which the world remains destroyed (*saṃvṛtta*) and nothing subsists except space (*ākāśa*); (3) an eon of renovation (*vivartakalpa*) consisting of an initial sub-eon during which the universe is created anew and nineteen sub-eons during which it is gradually filled (*āVAS*$_{causative}$); during the latter, the humans' life-span is immeasurably long (*aparimita*); (4) an eon of the duration of renovation consisting of twenty sub-eons during which the renovated (*vivṛtta*) world continues to exist. During its first sub-eon, the humans' life-span decreases from immeasurably long to ten years; each of the next eighteen sub-eons consists of a phase of increase (from 10 to 80,000 years) and a phase of decrease (from 80,000 to 10 years) of the life-span; during the twentieth, the life-span only increases (from 10 to 80,000 years). Buddhist cosmological eschatology is predominantly concerned with the final phase (from 100 to 10 years) of the first nineteen sub-eons of an eon of the duration of renovation. Whereas the motif of the five corruptions relates to the psychological, moral, and physical characteristics of the human beings during the last phase of each degeneration process, that of the three calamities is rather focused on the plagues and miseries accompanying the end of the period.

honor mothers, fathers, monks, brahmins, the heads of the clan; they are not serviceable, they do not perform their duty, they do not see the danger of sin in this world and in the hereafter,[83] they do not offer presents, they do not produce merits, they are not fasting, they do not act morally. [What is the corruption of the defilements?] For example, nowadays, there are (*prajñāyante*) unlawful desires, wanton greeds and various forms of sinful and evil factors including taking the sword and the rod, strife, quarrel, discord, dispute, deceit, cheating, fraud, lying, and wrong laws. [What is the corruption of false views?] For example, nowadays, counterfeits of the good law appear (*prabhūtāni prādurbhūtāni*) which presuppose [one's] reflection on the meaning of a wrong law and lead to the disappearance and to the concealment of the good law. [What is the corruption of the eon?] For example, nowadays, there are numerous famines provoked by a famine-interval; there are numerous illnesses provoked by an illness-interval; there are numerous murders caused by weapons provoked by a war-interval. However, it was not so before.[84]

Although the five corruptions are one of the most typical expressions of Buddhist apocalypticism, they came to be increasingly regarded as coreferential with the Brahmanical motif of the *kaliyuga*.[85] One can thus easily understand why the author/compiler of the *Bodhisattvagocaropāyaviṣayavikurvaṇanirdeśasūtra* took the Arthaśāstra as essentially related with the *kaliyuga*: as a counterfeit of the good law, the Arthaśāstra could be regarded as a manifestation of the corruption of the false views, hence as a hallmark of the

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[83] Note BoBh_Tib D *wi* 134a6–7: *'jig rten 'di daṅ 'jig rten pha rol du kha na ma tho ba rnams la 'jigs par mi lta ba…*

[84] BoBh 252,19–253,12: *tadyathaitarhy alpaṃ jīvitaṃ manuṣyāṇām | yaś ciraṃ jīvati sa varṣaśatam | tadyathaitarhi sattvā yadbhūyasāmātr̥jñā apitr̥jñā aśrāmaṇyā abrāhmaṇyā na kulajyeṣṭhāpacāyakā nārthakarā na kr̥tyakarā nehaloke na paraloke 'vadye bhayadarśino na dānāni dadati na puṇyāni kurvanti nopavāsam upavasanti na śīlaṃ samādāya vartante | tadyathaitarhi yadbhūyasādharmarāgāś ca viṣamalobhāś ca śastrādānadaṇḍādānakalahabhaṇḍanavigrahavivādāśāṭhyavañcananikr̥timr̥ṣāvāda-mithyādharmasaṅgr̥hītā anekavidhāḥ pāpakā akuśalā dharmāḥ prajñāyante | tadyathaitarhi saddharmapralopāya saddharmāntardhānāya saddharmapratirūpakāṇi prabhū-tāni prādurbhūtāni mithyādharmārthasantīraṇāpūrvikāṇi | tadyathaitarhi durbhi-kṣāntarakalpasamāsannāni pracurāṇi durbhikṣāṇy upalabhyante | rogāntarakalpasa-māsannāś ca rogāḥ pracurā upalabhyante | śastrāntarakalpasamāsannāś ca pracurāḥ śastrakāḥ prāṇātipātā upalabhyante | na tu tathā pūrvam āsīt |.*

[85] See Eltschinger forthcoming.

kaliyuga. How is 'counterfeit of the good law' to be understood in the present context?[86] The *sūtra* describes the treatises based on which a righteous king protects his subjects as those that teach an antidote to desire, aversion/hatred, and delusion. Now of course, the treatises in question must belong to, and teach, Buddhism, which can be defined in minimal terms as a therapy against these three basic defilements. Counterfeits of the good law are thus treatises teaching various types of defilements in the form of a king's lustful behavior, harsh punishments, constant warfare, excessive taxes, etc., and disregarding altruistic values such as giving and compassion.

5. Conclusion

As far as I am aware, neither did any ancient Indic religion have anything like an *Index librorum prohibitorum* (even though censorship was practised in various forms), nor was it organized along the line of the Roman Catholic Church with its centralized hierarchy, its monopoly over issues of orthodoxy and heterodoxy, its tentacular networks and its enforcement capacities. To be sure, all denominations—both Brahmanical and Buddhist—dealt in their own specific ways with questions of doctrinal acceptability, but little if anything is known of the institutional aspects, the legitimacy and the modes of diffusion of such anathemas. However, both parties had their symbolic, intellectual and 'spiritual' elites whose opinion was regarded as authoritative and worthy of being emulated and interiorized. There is little doubt that poets and philosophers such as Āryaśūra, Āryadeva, and, to a lesser extent perhaps, Candrakīrti, were considered trustworthy voices at least at the level of their socioreligious environment, and the same can be said, *mutatis mutandis,* of the Mahāyānasūtras even at the time in which they were still representative of (a) minority movement(s). Quite unsurprisingly, the few Buddhist intellectuals whose opinion on the topic we know were unanimous in rejecting the *Arthaśāstra* and *Arthaśāstra*-like treatises, whatever the exact form in which they accessed them. With their subordination of religious

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[86] For a systematic discussion of the ordinary meaning of the term, see Nattier 1991: 65–118.

norms to the king's arbitrariness and selfish interests, their promotion of warfare, military opportunism, harsh punishments and duplicity, these treatises could only be regarded as frontally contradicting the Buddhist values, 'hīnayānistic' as well as 'mahāyānistic'—from the prohibition of killing, stealing, and lying, to altruistic motivations such as giving, benevolence, and compassion. The Buddhists resorted to their own interpretative schemes and reflexes in order to make sense of these repulsive teachings and to situate them on the traditional maps of evil and human degeneration. These resources enabled them to locate the 'arthaśāstric' king in their typologies of human kingship and morality, some of which lent themselves, by their evolutionary nature, to an interpretation in terms of *kaliyuga*. Indeed, like Viśākhadatta and probably other Brahmanical authorities, certain Buddhists at least looked at the Arthaśāstra as a sure sign of the End with its dramatic increase in 'anti-values' such as egotism, pride, hatred, greed, and selfish appropriation. Some thought that it was not too late to oppose these teachings with philosophical arguments; others implicitly called for a return to the virtuous practices of the ancient kings, while still others provided them with a salvational-historical meaning in a resigned way.

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Jātaka V   V. Fausbøll: *The Jātaka together with its commentary, being tales of the anterior births of Gotamo Buddha,* vol. V. London 1891: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co.

Jātakamālā of Āryaśūra
JM_K   Hendrik Kern: *Jātakamālā* (Āryaśūra). *The Jātaka-Mālā or Bodhisattvā-vadāna-Mālā by Ārya-çūra.* Boston 1891: Harvard University Press.
JM_M   Justin Meiland: *Garland of the Buddha's Past Lives, by Arya-shura.* Vol. II. New York: New York University Press, JJC Foundation.
JMṬ   *Jātakamālāṭīkā* (Dharmakīrti). D *hu* 135b1–340a7.

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LASū   Bunyiu Nanjio: *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra.* Kyoto 1956 (1923[1]): Otani University Press.

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MBh II   Franz Kielhorn: *The Vyâkaraṇa-Mahâbhâshya of Patañjali,* vol. II. Bombay 1883: Government Central Book Depot.

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The Pratyabhijñā on Consciousness and Self-consciousness: A Comparative Perspective[*]

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Pratyabhijñā's philosophy is a form of monistic idealism.[1] According to the school, reality consists in the activity of a single, all-pervading element, which is ultimately identified with the individual consciousness of the subject of experience. This basic viewpoint generates several philosophical positions, some of which are high-

[1] Pratyabhijñā's ontological position is better described as 'non-dualism.' However, due to the comparative nature of this article I have decided to stick to the more recognizable label of 'monism.'

ly controversial. It is sufficient to mention the idea that knowledge and consciousness are language-related phenomena, and the notion that external reality is ontologically dependent on the mind. This short essay focuses on a further problematic aspect, namely the thesis that in being aware of an object the subject of the awareness is also conscious of her/himself. In other words, the claim under scrutiny is that consciousness always entails self-consciousness.[2]

The problem with the expression 'self-consciousness' is that it is ambiguous. It can refer to the fact that cognitions or mental states are innately conscious of themselves, a connotation I am going to call 'self-consciousness (1).' But it can also mean that cognitions or mental states come together with the awareness of an endurable self which is the subject of experience. I am going to call this second connotation 'self-consciousness (2).'[3] Self-consciousness (1) has long been debated, by both classical Indian authors and contemporary scholarship: how do we know that we are in a given mental state? By a property of the mental state itself (*svasaṃvedana*) or through another mental state (*parasaṃvedana*) operating on the first? Indian traditions have taken both sides. The Pratyabhijñā — like their main rivals, the Buddhists of the Pramāṇavāda tradition — have adopted the first stance, thus claiming that a cognition is innately self-reflexive. Whatever it is, what is essential to our discussion is that self-consciousness (1) is not a counterintuitive position and can be argued for even without assuming the existence of personhood.[4]

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[2] In accordance with the contemporary view on the issue, I am keeping separated the notions of self-consciousness and consciousness. Self-consciousness or self-awareness is the capacity to entertain introspection, which is one of the several features of mind. Consciousness is much more difficult to define, but very generally speaking the notion refers to that mental state in which one is aware of one's own surroundings.

[3] For the sake of simplicity, I am using the terms 'cognitions' and 'mental states' heuristically and interchangeably. They both indicate the condition that occurs in the mind at the end of the process of acquisition of thoughts, perceptions, desires, etc. For both the Sanskrit equivalent would be *jñāna*, which indicates an episodic state of awareness. If a certain awareness is causally produced by appropriate means of knowledge, then it becomes a *pramā*, namely, a veridical cognition. See Potter 1984.

[4] Self-consciousness (1) was actually introduced into the philosophical debate by the Buddhist Pramāṇavādins, who nevertheless would never accept self-con-

Much different is the situation with self-consciousness (2), which is counterintuitive and much more contentious, for it precisely claims that a mental state implies an awareness of its owner. Is this position tenable? In this article I am going to argue that Utpaladeva's endorsement of self-consciousness (2), though controversial, is defensible. In doing so, I shall discuss the arguments presented by a contemporary philosopher, Uriah Kriegel, and apply his model to the case of the Pratyabhijñā.

1. *The double nature of vimarśa*

Pratyabhijñā's most crucial tenet is possibly the idea that consciousness and knowledge are conceptual activities that are always determinate[5] and language-driven.[6] As I have shown in detail elsewhere,[7] their main claim — on which the grammarian and philosopher Bhartṛhari had a major influence — is that cognitions are conscious in so far as they are the object of a higher-order activity of the mind. Accordingly, the Śaivas distinguish first-order, world-directed mental states, which they simply call 'cognitions' (*prakāśa*, 'light'), from a higher-order activity of mind in which second-order mental states operate on first-order ones. This activity, which they call 'reflective awareness' (*vimarśa/pratyavamarśa/ parāmarśa*), is conceptual and language-based. As it will be clear below, this picture does not entail that second-order mental states objectify first-order ones. The thesis is best epitomized by ĪPK 1.5.11:

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sciousness (2). In fact, the Pratyabhijñā authors claim that self-consciousness (1) always entails self-consciousness (2), but this is another aspect of the story.

[5] See ĪPK 1.5.19: *sākṣātkārakṣaṇe 'py asti vimarśaḥ katham anyathā | dhāvanādy upapadyeta pratisaṃdhānavarjitam ||*.

[6] To better understand the point, it is useful to recall Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description (Russell 1910). The former is an awareness acquired through a direct, sense-based interaction between a person and the object the person is knowing. The latter is instead mediated and judgmental. In opposition to the Buddhists of the Pramāṇavāda tradition, the Pratyabhijñā maintains that all knowledge is descriptive.

[7] For an analysis of the question and Bhartṛhari's influence on the Kashmiri school, see Ferrante 2021: 63–69.

The essential nature of light is reflective awareness, otherwise light, though coloured by objects, would be similar to insentient realities, like a crystal, etc.[8]

If we translate the jargon of the school into more perspicuous words, the stanza would sound as:

The essential nature of cognitions/mental states is reflective awareness. If that were not the case, a cognition would be inert like a crystal.

But why is *vimarśa* the essential feature of *prakāśa*, or, to put it differently, why cannot a cognitive state exist without a high-order conceptual activity? The answer is given in Utpaladeva's short auto-commentary (*Īśvarapratyabhijñāvṛtti*) on the same stanza:

Reflective awareness constitutes the primary essence of light. In the absence of this reflective awareness, light, though objects make it assume different forms, would be merely limpid but not sentient, since there is no savouring.[9]

Repeating again the exercise of translating the text into clearer words we obtain:

Reflexive awareness is the primary essence of consciousness. If there were no reflective awareness, consciousness/cognition would be merely transparent, even if it would retain the ability to assume the form of the contents it is aware of. Why? Because it would lack savouring.

Utpaladeva's answer seems to be that a cognition deprived of reflective awareness would lack 'savouring.' The obvious question is to understand what 'savouring' stands for. In Torella's translation 'savouring' renders the Sanskrit *camatkāra/camatkṛti*, a distinctive term of the school and indeed a troublesome one. Its basic

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[8] *svabhāvam avabhāsasya vimarśaṃ vidur anyathā | prakāśo 'rthoparakto 'pi sphaṭikādijaḍopamaḥ ||*. ĪPK 1.5.11. All translations of the ĪPK and the *Vṛtti* thereon are from Torella 2002.

[9] *Vṛtti* on ĪPK 1.5.11: *prakāśasya mūkhya ātmā pratyavamarśaḥ, taṃ vinā arthabheditākārasya apy asya svacchatāmātraṃ na tv ajāḍyaṃ camatkṛter abhāvāt.*

meaning is 'wonder,' but the Pratyabhijñā authors often gloss it with 'lysis, satisfaction' (*nirvṛti*), 'bliss' (*ānanda*) or, indeed, 'savouring' (*āsvāda*). The main hermeneutical problem with *camatkāra* is that it immediately evokes the aesthetics domain. To make the picture more complex, Abhinavagupta was a leading scholar both in the Pratyabhijñā tradition and in aesthetics. The consequence is that it has become rather commonplace to try to make sense of Pratyabhijñā's *camatkāra* in connection with the *camatkāra* of the *rasa* theorists, that is, with that state of wonder, bliss or rapture one feels during an aesthetic experience. In a sense, this might be true, but only indirectly. I believe in fact that Pratyabhijñā's *camatkāra* has primarily a philosophical connotation, which is strictly related to the way the school conceived consciousness. In order to better understand what I mean, some words on contemporary conceptions of consciousness are called for.

In one of the most influential books on the subject published in the last decades (Chalmers 1996), David Chalmers draws a distinction between contents of mind. States of mind can be analysed in psychological and/or phenomenal terms. A mental state is discussed in *psychological* terms when it is regarded as the causal or explanatory basis for a certain behaviour. It is instead discussed in *phenomenal* terms if it is examined as a consciously experienced phenomenon. Thus, psychologically speaking, mind is characterized by *what it does*, phenomenally speaking by *how it feels*. Consciousness makes no exception, since it has a psychological side consisting of awakeness, introspection, reportability, self-awareness, etc. Yet, all these aspects come along with a phenomenal dimension that corresponds to the 'subjective quality of experience.' In the end, quoting Thomas Nagel's famous definition, a mental state is conscious if there is 'something it is like to be' in that mental state (Nagel 1974). In Chalmers's view the explanation of consciousness's psychological side may pose some technical problems but it is philosophically limpid. This means that there are no insurmountable obstacles to a theory capable of accounting for the psychological aspects of consciousness in purely materialist terms. By contrast, it is much more difficult — the 'hard problem' of consciousness — to explain why consciousness has always a subjective feeling or certain phenomenal qualities that philosophers of mind usually call *qualia*. As Chalmers (1996: 4) puts it:

> When we perceive, think, and act, there is a whir of causation and information processing, but this processing does not usually go on in the dark. There is also an internal aspect; there is something it feels like to be a cognitive agent. This internal aspect is conscious experience.

Now, I believe that Utpaladeva is using *camatkāra* to refer to this subjective dimension of consciousness. He is using it to describe the *qualia*, the 'phenomenal,' the 'what it is like to be' dimension of a cognitive state. Although this subjective aspect remains difficult to pinpoint, it is nonetheless there, present in the mental states of all conscious beings. Utpaladeva describes it metaphorically because it is practically impossible to articulate the notion verbally. This is why he is talking of 'savouring' or 'satisfaction.' As for the basic meaning of *camatkāra* ('wonder') one may argue, again following Chalmers, that the fact that consciousness has a phenomenal aspect is indeed surprising (Chalmers 1996: 5). In principle, it is in fact absolutely legitimate to imagine an entity possessing all the psychological features of consciousness (reportability, self-consciousness, awareness, attention) without their phenomenal counterparts. Such an entity, which contemporary philosophers of mind call *zombie*, corresponds, by and large, to the crystal Utpaladeva is mentioning in his work. The point is that a *zombie* may be metaphysically possible but it is never met in ordinary life where, on the contrary, *qualia* appear always to be associated with conscious experience. For the Pratyabhijñā authors the private dimension of consciousness is the basis of all other aspects of subjectivity: reflective awareness, cognitions and, in the end, the very notion of self. The idea is stated clearly in a passage of the *Vimarśinī* commenting on ĪPK 1.5.13. Here Abhinavagupta is explaining the difference between a conscious being and a non-conscious one. In doing so, he seems to enlist the elements that characterize subjectivity in a hierarchical order:

> A pot does not possess savouring, it itself does not have reflective awareness, it is not evident to itself, nor does it shine without interruption. This is why it said to be unconscious. On the other hand, [a person named] Caitra savours the 'I' in himself because he has the intensity, the impetus, the radiance, and the power [of consciousness], because he possesses reflective awareness, and because he is evident to himself. Having a nature that is so differ-

ent from that of the discriminative cognition 'this,' he [Caitra] manifests itself as connected with innumerable elementary phenomena (*abhāsa*) like blue, yellow, pleasure, pain, their absence, etc. For this reason, we say that Caitra is conscious.[10]

The idea is that 'savouring' (*camatkāra*), that is, the first-person, subjective, private dimension of consciousness is the basis for reflective awareness (*vimarśa*), which is the capacity of having high-order mental states. In turn, these high-order mental states operate on cognitions (*prakāśa*), that is, on first-order mental states engendered by the sensory stimuli. All this leads to the notion of a self (*ātman*) that has an uninterrupted nature, namely, it is extended through time. Schematically, the process is thus the following: *camatkāra → vimarśa → prakāśa → ātman*.

Apart from all this, *vimarśa* has also another connotation, which is evident in ĪPK 1.5.12:

> Precisely for this reason the self has been defined as 'sentience,' meaning by this the activity of consciousness in the sense of being the subject of this activity. It is thanks to sentiency, in fact, that the self differs from insentient reality.[11]

Besides being the basic feature of conscious mental states, as claimed in ĪPK 1.5.11, *vimarśa* is also what characterizes the self and distinguishes it from inert reality. Thus, if we combine the affirmations of these two contiguous stanza, 1.5.11 and 1.5.12, we come up with a picture in which the higher-order activity of mind (*vimarśa*) is at the same time the hallmark of cognitions/mental states (*prakāśa*) and of the self (*ātman*). This leads to the conclusion that all mental states must involve an awareness of the knowing subject or self. In other words, consciousness must entail self-consciousness.[12] The move is clearly understandable if one considers the

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[10] *ghaṭena svātmani na camatkriyate, svātmā na parāmṛśyate, na svātmani tena prakāśyate, na aparicchinnatayā bhāsyate, tato na cetyata iti ucyate. caitreṇa tu svātmani aham iti saṃrambhodyogollāsavibhūtiyogāt camatkriyate, svātmā parāmṛśyate, svātmany eva prakāśyate idam iti yaḥ pariccheda etāvadrūpatayā tadvilakṣaṇībhāvena nīlapīta-sukhaduḥkhatacchūnyatādy asaṃkhyāvabhāsayogenābhāsyate, tataḥ caitreṇa cetyata ity ucyate.* See Iyer-Pandey 1986: 250–251.

[11] ĪPK 1.5.12 *ātmāta eva caitanyaṃ citkriyācitikartṛtā-|-tātparyeṇoditas tena jaḍāt sa hi vilakṣaṇaḥ ||*.

[12] From now on I am using 'consciousness' and 'self-consciousness' technically. Accordingly, 'consciousness' does not indicate the faculty of being subjective-

apologetic tone of the Pratyabhijñā's works, whose primary purpose is to counter the Buddhist skepticism about the notion of self. In the end, Utpaladeva is not trying to establish a theory of consciousness but he aims to prove beyond doubt that personhood has real existence. Yet the move is also philosophically problematic: the thesis that consciousness implies self-consciousness is controversial, for it has a strong idealistic flavour[13] and, even worse, because it implies a conflation of the concepts of consciousness and self-consciousness which most contemporary philosophers are keen to keep apart. They would in fact argue that 'to be conscious of' an event or a thing does not imply 'to be self-conscious of it.' The fact that I am aware of the book I have in front of me does not entail that I am automatically aware of me having the awareness. For being aware of such an awareness requires a further effort of the mind, directed at itself. But normally, the argument goes on, cognitions do not work that way. I usually perceive the book in front of me without being aware of having the perception. The conclusion is that consciousness and self-consciousness are independent phenomena.[14]

Still, the Pratyabhijñā is arguing exactly for the opposite thesis. Utpaladeva claims that a state of awareness, a cognition, always implies self-awareness, that is, the notion of 'I.' He says that when I am conscious of the book in front of me I am also conscious of myself having the cognition, at least to some degree. Is this position absolutely untenable? As we will see below, it is not. In the following section I will describe the ingenious attempt of the philosopher Uriah Kriegel to defend the claim that self-consciousness —

ly conscious of one's own experience but it simply stands for 'cognition' or 'awareness of'. And 'self-consciousness' means 'awareness of (one) self' as the subject of knowledge.

[13] The rejection of idealism in analytic philosophy is still largely based on the work of Moore (1903) and Russell (1912).

[14] An example from Searle: 'Finally, consciousness should not be confused with self-consciousness. There are indeed certain types of animals, such as humans, that are capable of extremely complicated forms of self-referential consciousness which would normally be described as self-consciousness. For example, I think conscious feelings of shame require that the agent be conscious of himself or herself. But seeing an object or hearing a sound, for example, does not require self-consciousness. And it is not generally the case that all conscious states are also self-conscious.' See Searle 2002: 8.

indeed a very circumscribed type of it — is implicit in consciousness.

2. Kriegel's arguments for the presence of self-consciousness in consciousness

Consciousness is an ambiguous concept possessing both *intrinsic* and *relational* modes. The sentence 'Caitra is conscious' is an example of the intrinsic mode. In it we have an intrinsic property attributed to a person.[15] Kriegel defines this condition *intransitive consciousness.* The sentence 'Caitra is conscious of a pot' is on the contrary an example of the relational mode. In it we have a relational property whereby a subject takes something as an object. Such a condition is defined *transitive consciousness.* In addition to that, adopting a scheme introduced by David Rosenthal (Rosenthal 1986) that has become common in contemporary philosophy of mind, Kriegel distinguishes between consciousness belonging to individuals, or *creature consciousness,* and consciousness belonging to mental states, or *state consciousness.* By combining these different aspects, we arrive at the following fourfold classification of consciousness:

1) *intransitive creature consciousness,* e.g. 'Caitra is conscious.'
2) *transitive creature consciousness,* e.g. 'Caitra is conscious of his new pot.'
3) *transitive state consciousness,* e.g. 'Caitra's thought is conscious of his new pot.'
4) *intransitive state consciousness,* e.g. 'Caitra's thought that his pot is new is conscious.'

Kriegel's first move is to prove that creature consciousness ultimately depends on state consciousness. The reason he gives is that in order to be conscious an individual must at least have one conscious mental state. Accordingly, to possess mental states is a requirement for being conscious as persons. The second step is to prove that in the case of state consciousness all transitive mental states depend on intransitive ones. Is all this tenable? Kriegel

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[15] In Kriegel's work the examples are obviously different: he mentions 'Mr Smith' and 'his car.' I have just replaced them with different, Indian names.

argues that that in order to 'be conscious of' one must be 'conscious' beforehand. If that were not the case, we would get stuck in the awkward condition where one can be conscious of something, say a table, both consciously and unconsciously — a fact that looks counterfactual. Therefore, a preliminary conclusion is that the first three kinds of consciousness all depend on the fourth one, namely, all kinds of consciousness entail *intransitive state consciousness.*

Kriegel's next step is to show that intransitive state consciousness depends on some form of self-consciousness. If this is proved to be true, the conclusion is that all kinds of consciousness depend on self-consciousness. That is the thesis that he wants to demonstrate. Kriegel starts by stating that the very same fourfold classification of consciousness is valid for self-consciousness too. Thus we have:

5) *intransitive creature self-consciousness,* e.g. 'Caitra is self-conscious.'
6) *transitive creature self-consciousness,* e.g. 'Caitra is self-conscious of his new pot.'
7*) transitive state self-consciousness,* e.g. 'Caitra's thought is self-conscious of his new pot.'
8) *intransitive state self-consciousness,* e.g. 'Caitra's thought that his pot is new is self-conscious.'

Now Kriegel's crucial claim is that affirmations 7) and 8) describe different states of affairs. In 7) the mental state of a given individual is conscious of possessing a certain awareness; self-consciousness here consists in being conscious of another consciousness: the latter is the content of the former and this is why we talk about a mental state having a transitive property. By contrast, in affirmation 8) self-consciousness does not take consciousness as its content but modifies it in a self-conscious way. Affirmation 8) can be recast more clearly by saying that 'Caitra's thought self-consciously thinks to his new pot.' The difference between transitive and intransitive types of self-consciousness is justified in terms of difference of attention. Kriegel adopts the widely accepted distinction between *foveal* and *peripheral* attention. If we return to the case of consciousness, one is in transitive state consciousness when she/he is focally or foveally attending to her own mental states. By

contrast, one is in intransitive state consciousness, when she/he is attending to something else and is only peripherally aware of the mental state she/he is in. But what is peripheral awareness? It is the condition in which we focus our sensory attention on one thing, yet we are not totally unaware of other phenomena. Think for instance of the case of someone reading a book. Our foveal attention is on the page but at the same time we are also peripherally aware of other sensorial stimuli, such as other objects in our field of vision, the sounds we hear, etc. The question is whether the distinction between foveal and peripheral awareness, which seems so evident in the case of sensory perceptions, is also valid for conceptual contents. Kriegel argues that it is so, by appealing to the example of the truck-driver who, though focused on the road, has meanwhile myriad thoughts she/he is only peripherally aware of. Then, if the distinction between foveal and peripheral attention is legitimate for both sensory and mental experiences, should we make an exception for just one thing, that is, the cognition of the self? Probably not. Hence it is legitimate to differentiate between foveal or transitive self-consciousness and peripheral or intransitive one.

As anticipated, Kriegel's final aim is to show that all consciousness depends on intransitive state self-consciousness. In this regard, he puts forward the following arguments. The first is essentially negative. It is true, he argues, that whenever we look at the sky we are not necessarily self-conscious of our awareness. Yet this affirmation is valid only if we restrict our notion of self-consciousness to the transitive type. In fact, if we conceive self-consciousness in intransitive terms, self-consciousness is always at work, acting as a modifier of all types of consciousness, that is, of all cognitions. The second argument Kriegel advances hinges on the fact that a mental state in order to be conscious must be first-person knowable. Still, first-person experiences are always those we have self-consciously. Hence conscious states, that is the ones produced by cognitions, are intransitively self-conscious. Finally, we must distinguish between *particular* mental states and *type* mental states. Particular mental states cannot be thought of without taking their subject into the picture. In other words, the awareness of our mental states always involves an awareness of ourselves as the subjects of those mental states. Still, it is certainly possible to

make an abstraction by thinking in terms of *type* mental states. For example, we can imagine what is the mental state another person has when she/he is watching the sunrise. Nevertheless, Kriegel argues, this is precisely an abstraction, and normally cognitions do not work in this way: we can make an effort and imagine what is the mental state one has when she/he is watching the sunrise, but we cannot ever know 'what it is like to be' watching the sunrise for the person in question. This is in fact a particular experience that entails intransitive consciousness. Thus, Kriegel's conclusion is that consciousness presupposes self-consciousness, more specifically a certain kind of it, the intransitive state type.

3. Pratyabhijñā's theses reconsidered

Kriegel's model cannot be applied in its entirety to the Pratyabhijñā's case, but it is very helpful to clarify what the Śaiva thinkers have in mind. Let us consider the distinction between *state* and *creature* self-consciousness. The decisive move of the Pratyabhijñā philosophers is to conceive the question of subjectivity in terms of mental states. They claim that any given mental state possesses an ineliminable, phenomenal, subjective dimension. They indicate it with the expression *camatkāra,* a notion that strongly reminds Kriegel's *intransitive state consciousness.* This primary seed of subjectivity is then progressively absorbed into the concepts of self or personhood, that is, *creature consciousness.* The picture is clearly detectable in ĪPK 1.5.17, where Utpaladeva distinguishes the nature of the self (intransitive state consciousness, *camatkāra*) from the notion of 'I' (creature consciousness, *ātman*), with the latter presupposing the former. In other words, it is only because there is an underlying subjective feeling of experience that one can come up with the notion of 'I.'

> The variety of notions such as 'I' etc. does not entail diversity in the nature of the self, because a self is created precisely as he who lends himself to being the object of the reflective awareness 'I,' like action which is expressed by personal endings.[16]

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[16] *nāhantādiparāmarśabhedād asyānyatātmanaḥ | ahaṃmṛśyataivāsya sṛṣṭes tiṅvācyakarmavat ||.* ĪPK 1.5.17.

Equally crucial is the distinction between *intransitive* and *transitive self-consciousness*. Kriegel scheme helps us to better understand the notion which the Śaiva repeatedly stress, namely that a cognition cannot be objectified.[17] The main idea is that all mental states possess both an intransitive and a transitive (e.g. intentional) mode, which occur at the same time. The Pratyabhijñā thinkers are eager to clarify that the intransitive aspect of a mental state can never be the content of another, in force of its absolutely subjective nature. But surely this does not mean that a mental state cannot *transitively* have another one as its content.[18] Therefore, the controversial thesis whereby knowledge involves an awareness of the subject of experience is rationally defensible, and it does not necessarily call for an idealistic standpoint.

It is worth noting, however, that what we have just said does not prove that a self — the notion of personhood endowed with temporal extension — has a real existence. A Buddhist would in fact point out, rightly I think, that the passage from state consciousness to creature consciousness — that is, Kriegel's claim that a person is precisely somebody who possesses conscious mental states — is unwarranted. Nevertheless, this is not a compelling objection to a western viewpoint in which the real existence of personhood has rarely been questioned. For their part, the Pratyabhijñā thinkers would reply that the proof for the existence of a self is provided by the argument from memory. More specifically, by the fact that one needs posit the notion of self in order to explain the existence of coordinated, higher-order cognitions.

4. Final remarks

Using arguments from contemporary philosophy to interpret works and authors that are so distant in space and time can be

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[17] 'He who is the object of reflective awareness "I" on the plane of the present cognizing subject does not have the nature of "this"' (*Vṛtti* on ĪPK 1.5.17: *vārtamānapramātṛbhāve nāhaṃpratyavamṛśyasya prameyatvenedantā*).

[18] If we claim that all our cognitions imply the knowledge of their subject, that is of ourselves, the conclusion is that all that we know is actually our own mind (solipsism). This risk is avoided by restricting the notion of self-consciousness to the intransitive type. On how the Pratyabhijñā authors dealt with this question, see also Ratié 2007.

seen with some suspicion. This is understandable. However, if we want to do justice to the brilliance of South Asian thinkers we must turn to their arguments and simply try to see whether they are sound. This becomes almost necessary when dealing with philosophical positions that are disputable and often counterintuitive, as is the case of some of the statements we have discussed above. Otherwise we should content ourselves with studying these works from a historical point of view, which is for sure a commendable enterprise, but which often does not make explicit how much these thinkers still have to say. The main purpose of this paper is to show that, though hard to swallow, Pratyabhijñā's monistic idealism can be rationally defended. Or, at least, some of the school's tenets can. In particular, Kriegel's arguments show that it is legitimate to argue that cognitions involve self-consciousness (2), as the Pratyabhijñā repeatedly claims. In the end, what these thinkers are contending is that there is an unavoidable presence of the 'I' in all our cognitions and actions. In my interpretation, this presence takes the form of a rarefied version of subjectivity that corresponds to what contemporary philosophers of mind call the *qualia*, that is, the phenomenal, private and qualitative dimension of consciousness. If this interpretation is on the right track, Pratyabhijñā's works are not just historically relevant but also extremely compelling from a purely philosophical perspective.

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'Own-nature' (svabhāva) in the Abhidharma Tradition and in Nāgārjuna's Interpretation*

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1. Introduction

In the field of Nāgārjuna studies it is commonly accepted that the kernel of his thought is the doctrine of 'emptiness' (*śūnyatā*), i.e. the denial of the existence of an 'own-nature' (*svabhāva*) in phenomena and their ultimate constituents (*dharma*s).[1] With respect to this idea, some exegetical questions arise that basically concern: (1) The *object* of Nāgārjuna's negation — that is, what exactly is the *svabhāva* that is being denied? (2) The particular *argument* or arguments through which Nāgārjuna performs his negation; and (3) The *cogency* of these arguments — given that Nāgārjuna's most immediately recognizable opponents/interlocutors are the Sarvā-stivādins, can we grant that his criticism of *svabhāva* is well direct-

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* This contribution is the revised version of Ferraro 2018.
[1] Nāgārjuna himself allows the conclusion that the 'emptiness of all *dharma*s' (*sarvadharmaśūnyatā*) is the very sum of his thought inasmuch as he defines himself — for example, in VV 69 — as a *śūnyatāvādin*, which we can merely understand as 'a person who talks about emptiness' (Huntington 2003: 76), more than as a 'theoretician of *śūnyatā*.' On the other hand, as Saito (2007: 155) points out, in no point in his work does Nāgārjuna refer to himself as a *mādhyamika*, 'a member of the Madhyamaka school.'

ed? (In other words, is this criticism fit to disprove the particular 'own-nature' doctrine upheld by the Sarvāstivāda school?)

The three sections that follow are devoted to these questions.

2. *Svabhāva as 'intrinsic nature.'*
2.1 *Sabhāva/svabhāva in the Abhidharma context*

The word *sabhāva* — i.e. the Pali equivalent of the Sanskrit *svabhāva* — never occurs in the *suttapiṭaka*, and in the whole Theravāda canon appears just once: in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, a text included in the *Khuddaka Nikāya*, but which — as a supplement of the *Vibhāṅga*, that is, one of the seven treatise of the *abhidhammapiṭaka* — must in fact be considered an Abhidharma work. Moreover, in this sole canonical occurrence, *sabhāva* has to be considered a mere equivalent of *attā* (cf. Ronkin 2005: 93): that is to say, a generic meaning if compared to its usages in paracanonical[2] texts, in the *aṭṭhakathā* commentaries and in post-canonical treatises.

A good starting point for an investigation of the more 'technical' usages of the word *sabhāva/svabhāva* in Buddhist literature is the *Milindapañha*, a paracanonical work that dates back to a time — between 100 BCE and 200 CE — possibly not so far from that of Nāgārjuna.[3] In the last three chapters of this scripture,[4] *sabhāva*

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[2] 'Paracanonical' are four texts (see von Hinüber 1996: 76) that do not belong to the original canon — that is, 'the canon agreed on at the first convocation' (Skilling 2022: 210), when 'the original or root recitation (*mūlasaṅgīti*)' (ibid.) of the speeches of the Buddha occurred — but were composed later and inserted in the *manuscript* versions of what Skilling (2022: 214) calls 'inclusive Tripiṭaka': collections of scriptures that, compared to the original canon, contain new writings composed 'in response to changing social, religious, and ritual needs' (as an example of inclusive Tripiṭaka, as regards the Thai context, see the 'painted catalogue' edited and translated by Santi Pakdeekham 2021). These four texts are the *Suttasaṅgaha*, the *Peṭakopadesa*, the *Nettippakaraṇa*, and the *Milindapañha*. Among the *published* versions of the canon (which date back to the end of the 19th c. and the first half of the 20th c.), the Burmese version alone contains all four of these writings, while none of them appear in the Syāmaraṭṭha edition of the Thai version, and only the *Nettipakaraṇa* and the *Peṭakopadesa* are included in the Buddha Jayanti edition of the Sinhala version (I would like to thank Trent Walker and Claudio Cicuzza for their help in drafting this note).

[3] In Ferraro 2011 I examine the possible close parallels between the framework of the first dialogue of the second chapter of the *Milindapañha* and the *incipit* of chapter 24 of the MMK.

[4] The circumstance that all the occurrences of the word *sabhāva* are concentrated in the final part of the *Milindapañha* is a further element in support of the

occurs frequently. However, its usage is not univocal. In fact, following Ronkin 2005, it is possible to distinguish at least four different meanings or semantic nuances, which may be considered paradigmatic for all the occurrences of *sabhāva* in the remaining post-canonical Theravāda literature.

Of these four meanings, the most common, and generic, is that of *nature* 'in its broadest sense' (Ronkin 2005: 105), that is, a usage that is not referring to any particular *dharma* (ibid., p. 106).

A second, more specific, meaning is that which may be assimilated to the notion of *rasa* (literally, 'juice'), which 'figuratively refers to the finest, distilled part of anything' (ibid.). In this sense, 'essence' could be a proper version of this usage of *sabhāva.*

The third meaning, compared to the previous one, is less ontological and more epistemological: *sabhāva* as *lakkhaṇa*, that is, 'defining characteristic' or the property that allows something to be (re)cognized as *that* particular thing.

Finally, Ronkin (ibid., p. 107) points out a fourth sense of *sabhāva* in the *Milindapañha*, which corresponds to expressions like *bhūtaṃ, tacchaṃ* or *tathaṃ*, and which in the *suttas* designates what is 'true' or 'ultimately real,' a usage that seems akin to what Westerhoff (2009: 40–46) calls — in the Madhyamaka context — 'absolute *svabhāva*,' and which could be found in some passages of Buddhapālita (cf. Ames 1986: 316) and Candrakīrti's work,[5] but not in Nāgārjuna.

As already said, the various occurrences of the word *sabhāva* in the remaining paracanonical and Abhidharma scriptures correspond to one or another of these four meanings, which, albeit different, seem to agree with each other. Indeed, all concern what is more proper, characteristic or intrinsic of a given entity or con-

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view of the composite character of this work (see for example Horner 1969: XXI, and von Hinüber 1996: 85–86), whose sections were possibly written in different periods by different authors.

[5] In PsP *ad* MMK 15.2, Candrakīrti assimilates *svabhāva* to the notions of *dharmatā, prakṛti, tatathā* and *tathābhāva*, which, together with other words (like *tattva* and *paramārthasatya*), point to the ultimate truth. Even more explicitly, in *Madhyamakāvatāra* we find verses such as 'the master declared that all things are from the beginning at peace, devoid of any production and, *by virtue of their intrinsic nature*, completely unentangled in suffering' (Candrakīrti, *Madhyamakāvatāra* 112, tr. Huntington, 2007: 170, emphasis added).

cept. Even the fourth meaning, the 'absolute' one, seems consistent with the idea of 'essence,' designating the — empty and dependently co-originated — 'own-nature' of everything. Hence, the semantic differences of *sabhāva* are not alternative or reciprocally contradictory, but merely correspond to more or less particular uses of this notion.

At any rate, during the evolution of the Abhidharma schools, the more specific meanings of *sabhāva/svabhāva* tend to prevail over the more generic ones. Consequently, not only do the occurrences of *svabhāva* in the sense of 'essence' or 'defining characteristic' increase, but also this word starts to designate the 'own-nature' of *dharma*s, that is, the elemental and minimal portions of being to which Abhidharma philosophers reduce reality.

For example, in paracanonical texts like the *Peṭakopadesa* and the *Nettippakaraṇa*, *sabhāva* is used in the sense of 'general characteristic common to a set of *dharma*s and distinguishing them from other such sets' (Ronkin 2005: 98). It is here, therefore, that the concept under investigation eventually gets its 'narrower, more technical sense of own-nature *qua* an individuator' (ibid.): '*sabhāva* is what determines the individuality of a *dhamma* as this particular instant rather than that, and what makes it discernible as such' (ibid.).

It can be observed that Ronkin's latter definition combines the notions of *sabhāva/svabhāva* and *dhamma/dharma* in two different ways: an ontological one, according to which *svabhāva* is what turns a *dharma* into exactly what that *dharma is*; and an epistemological one, according to which *svabhāva* is what allows a *dharma* to be (*re*)*cognized* as that particular *dharma*. These two senses correspond to a development of the second and third meanings of *sabhāva* that we came across in the *Milindapañha* and which became the two directions in which the concept of 'own-nature of *dharma*s' evolved, respectively, in the Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda schools. In fact these two schools have slightly different ways of accounting for the notion of *dharma*, entailing an adaptation and variation in their conceptions of *sabhāva/svabhāva*.

Indeed, in the Sarvāstivāda school a *dharma* is more explicitly described as a *substantial* kind of entity, that is, a *dravyasat*: something that exists in itself and ultimately. On the other hand, in the Theravāda school, a *dharma* is considered more as a 'trope,' i.e., a

'property' of the real, and not as a solid or substantial entity.[6] According to Campbell's definition (1990: 20), a trope is a 'single item' which consists of a single moment of a specific property, such as a particular occurrence of a colour, a sound or a particular taste.

Now, these different manners of conceiving *dharma*s correspond, respectively, to an ontological and epistemological way of understanding and speaking about *svabhāva*. In the first case, the Sarvāstivādin considers the 'own-nature' like *something owned* by the *dharma*, whose existence depends on its *svabhāva*: 'each and every *dharma* is itself unique ... and is identified by its *svabhāva*, which here may be rendered "ontological determinant," for it determines that the *dharma* consists in substantial reality (*dravya*)' (Ronkin 2005: 110). On their side, the Theravādins, because of their conception of *dharma*s as psycho-physical insubstantial *occurrences*, tend to use the notion of *sabhāva* 'for the sake of determining the *dharma*s' individuality, not their existential status' (Ronkin 2005: 111). Thus, what we have is an *epistemological* usage of the concept of *sabhāva*, according to which *sabhāva* is not exactly a characteristic that the *dharma owns*, but what a *dharma is*.

2.2 Svabhāva in the Madhyamaka context

If we look at the occurrences of the word *svabhāva* in the works of Nāgārjuna and his Indian commentators, we notice that the Mādhyamikas basically think about 'own-nature' in the ontological sense recognized in the previous section: *svabhāva* is the 'essence,' 'intrinsic nature' or 'inherent nature' that substantial entities (phenomena and *dharma*s) allegedly *have*.

Actually, in the various passages in which the word *svabhāva* occurs in Nāgārjuna's writings, it refers to something that, from the point of view of his opponents, *belongs* to entities, and defines them: just keeping to the MMK (although the same goes for Nāgārjuna's other *yukti*-corpus writings), we notice that in verses 2 and 10 of the first chapter, in 7.16, and in its several occurrences

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[6] For a more thorough application of the trope theory to the doctrine of *dharma*s, see Ganeri (2001: 99 ff.), Goodman (2004: 393 ff.) and Siderits (2013: 439ff.).

in chapters 13, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24, *svabhāva* is always (sometimes implicitly) the *inexistent* own-nature *of* particular entities.

In these passages what is more often declared empty of *svabhāva* are phenomena or 'entities' (*bhāva*) of ordinary experience, not *dharma*s in particular. However, in Candrakīrti's commentary, *svabhāva* designates the most peculiar characteristic of *elemental substances*: PsP (260.6–7) *ad* MMK 15.1, for example, explains that heat and the color red — which could be the accidental or 'extrinsic characterizations' (*parabhāva*) of things like water or quartz — are the 'intrinsic nature' (*svabhāva*) of, respectively, fire and rubies.[7]

Now, it is clear that these definitions of *svabhāva* are based not so much on a 'tropic' idea of *dharma*s but rather on a substantialist conception, according to which a *dharma* is a *dravyasat* that intrinsically *has* a *svabhāva*, which makes it exactly what it is and nothing else. This justifies the conclusion — widely accepted in the secondary literature — that the polemical target of the Mādhyamikas is the conception of *dharma* and *svabhāva* developed by the Sarvāstivāda school.

The outcome of the first part of this study is, therefore, that the *object* of Nāgārjuna's negation is a notion — found at its early stage in paracanonical literature and developed later in the philosophical environment of the Sarvāstivāda school — that corresponds to what in the Western philosophical tradition is known as 'essence': *that* by which a substance is what it is.[8] Hence, expressions like

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[7] In other words, the Madhyamaka critique of the concept of *svabhāva* is directed both at common sense, which conceives *phenomenal entities* as substances provided with an essence, and at more elaborate philosophical conceptions that ascribe *svabhāva* to *dharma*s. This corresponds to the denial of the self by the Buddha: *anattāvāda* is indeed directed both to the *folk* metaphysics of ordinary people, which conceive things and persons as entities endowed with separate identities, and to the philosophical elaborations by theoreticians of the existence of *ātman*. It is not accidental that, in the only canonical occurrence of the word *svabhāva*, in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, the Buddha declares that things have no *sabhāva*, 'in a way that parallels his saying that they have no *attā*' (Ronkin 2005: 93).

[8] In the Aristotelian tradition the notion of *substance*, which defines the *what is* of a given entity, is distinguished from that of *essence*, which designates the particular characteristic that provides that substance with its peculiar identity. However, Aristotle is not always rigorous and consistent in his use of technical terminology, and the several translations (for example those from Arab to Latin) of

'essence,' 'own-nature,' 'intrinsic nature' or 'inherent nature' are all correct versions of *svabhāva*, while translations like 'own-being' or 'intrinsic existence,' though frequently adopted in contemporary scholarship on Madhyamaka, should be considered — as Siderits (2013: 434, n. 2) warns — improper.

3. Nāgārjuna's anti-svabhāva arguments

When Nāgārjuna denies that entities have an own-nature, he normally resorts to two arguments: (1) If there were an own-nature, it would be uncreated and independent from causes and conditions; nonetheless, *nothing* that exists is uncreated and independent, thus, an own-nature does not exist; and (2) An entity provided with *svabhāva* must be unchangeable; however, *nothing* that exists is unchangeable, thus *svabhāva* does not exist.

3.1 Dependent coarising and absence of own-nature

With regard to argument (1), the first two *kārikā*s of chapter 15 — whose title, according to La Vallée Poussin's edition of PsP is indeed *svabhāvaparīkṣā*, that is, 'Critical examination of own-nature'[9] — of the MMK can be considered to be exemplars:

> MMK 15.1: The rising of an intrinsic nature from causes and conditions is logically unacceptable; [in fact,] an intrinsic nature arisen from causes and conditions would be something factitious.[10]

> MMK 15.2: How could, however, an own-nature be something factitious? Actually, an own-nature is not something *made,* and does not depend upon anything else.[11]

his work are quite divergent from each other, which does not permit us to unquestionably identify the Greek words that respectively correspond to 'substance' and 'essence.' Nonetheless, οὐσία ('something that is') and ὑποκείμενον ('what is underneath') seem more likely equivalent of the first word, while 'essence' (*quidditas*) more frequently corresponds to expressions like tὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (literally, 'what it was to be') or, more simply, τί ἐστί ('what it is [proper of a substance]').

[9] Ye's edition (2011) reports 'Critical examination of Being and Non-Being.'

[10] *na saṃbhavaḥ svabhāvasya yuktaḥ pratyayahetubhiḥ | hetupratyayasaṃbhūtaḥ svabhāvaḥ kṛtako bhavet ||.*

[11] *svabhāvaḥ kṛtako nāma bhaviṣyati punaḥ katham | akṛtrimaḥ svabhāvo hi nirapekṣaḥ paratra ca ||.*

Given that the own-nature is not something produced, everything that is produced should be empty of own-nature. For example, MMK 7.16 mantains:

> Everything that arises in dependence is free from own-nature; therefore, both what is being produced and the same action of producing are free from own-nature.[12]

Based on this basic contention, Nāgārjuna's philosophical aim is to show that all the various notions — all the conceptual underpinnings of the metaphysics he criticizes — analyzed in the different chapters of MMK depend on conditions — to wit, are *produced* — and therefore cannot have an own-nature.

The crucial importance the category of 'causality' has in Nāgārjuna's work is confirmed by the two introductory *kārikā*s of the MMK, where Nāgārjuna pays homage to the Buddha inasmuch as he taught 'the dependent coarising (*pratītyasamutpāda*), auspicious pacification of dichotomical thought.'[13] The law of *pratītyasamutpāda*, according to which everything arises in dependence, is presented by the Buddha as absolutely indispensable for understanding his teaching.[14] Thus, insofar as Nāgārjuna chooses it as the epitome of his magnum opus, he is following a perfectly orthodox path.

At any rate, it could be noticed that the manner in which Nāgārjuna understands and applies the law of dependent coarising, compared to the versions of the same law mantained by other schools, is peculiar. Actually, both in the Pali canon and the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda treatises, *pratītyasamutpāda* is a universal law of *transitive* (or unidirectional) causation according to

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[12] *pratītya yad yad bhavati tat tac chāntaṃ svabhāvataḥ | tasmād utpadyamānaṃ ca śāntam utpattir eva ca ||*.

[13] *pratītyasamutpādaṃ prapañcopaśamaṃ śivam |*. An alternative translation of this passage would be: '[I pay homage to the Buddha, who taught] the *pratītyasamutpāda*, which is peace (*śiva*), pacification (*upaśama*) of dichotomical thought.'

[14] 'One who sees dependent coarising sees the Dharma; one who sees the Dharma sees dependent coarising' (*yo paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passati so dhammaṃ passati; yo dhammaṃ passati so paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passatīti, Majjhima Nikāya* I.3.306, ed. vol. 1, p. 191); see also *Śālistambasūtra* p. 27.

which an event *x* produces an event *y*, which, in its turn, conditions an event *z*. Accordingly, we say that *x* is the cause of *y*; *y* is the effect of *x* and the cause of *z*. Instead, Nāgārjuna's proposal is to understand the *pratītyasamutpāda* as a law of *reciprocal* (or bidirectional) causation, by which *x*, on the one hand, produces *y*, but, on the other, *is produced* by *y*: *x* and *y*, therefore, coarise and co-exist in reciprocal dependence from each other.

It is clear that when Nāgārjuna speaks about dependence of entities, he is thinking in terms of their 'mutual dependence' (*parasparāpekṣikī siddhiḥ*). The basic argumentative approach he follows in his MMK is indeed to check the elements that the ontologies of Abhidharma consider as provided with own-nature and ultimately existent, and to show that each of them is nothing more than a mental construction arising in reciprocal dependence with its conceptual counterpart. Therefore, *dharma*s, far from being real entities, turn out to be ideas which depend on other ideas, in a mental universe devoid of any connection with states of affairs that could be said to be 'real.'

See for example:

MMK 14.5ab: It is depending on another that what is one could be said 'other'; and what is other is not 'other' without the one.[15]

MMK 8.12: The agent ensues depending on the action; the action, depending on the agent. We see no other reason for their occurrence.[16]

MMK 9.5: Somebody is made manifest through something; something, through somebody. How, without something, could somebody be manifest? And how something without somebody?[17]

Frequently, the reciprocal dependence of two or more 'conceptual counterparts' is presented in a less terse and more analytical fashion, as the outcome of a sequence of complex reasonings. For example, in chapter 2 of the MMK (a chapter that Nāgārjuna him-

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[15] *anyad anyat pratītyānyan nānyad ṛte 'nyataḥ |.*
[16] *pratītya kārakaḥ karma taṃ pratītya ca kārakam | karma pravartate nānyat paśyāmaḥ siddhikāraṇam ||.*
[17] *ajyate kenacit kaścit kiṃcit kenacid ajyate | kutaḥ kiṃcid vinā kaścit kiṃcit kaṃcid vinā kutaḥ ||.*

self frequently presents as 'paradigmatic'), it is shown that the *ideas* of 'movement' (*gati* or *gamana*), 'mobile' (*gantṛ*), 'space in which movement occurs' (*gamyamāna* or *gantavya*) and 'stillness' (*sthāna*) arise in reciprocal dependence and do not absolutely correspond to existent-in-themselves *things* or *states of affairs*. The first chapter of the same work had already argued that the notions of 'cause' and 'effect' are reciprocally dependent; the third will show that 'vision,' 'visible' and 'seer' are notions that support one another, and so on.[18]

3.2 Impermanence and lack of svabhāva

The second argument used by Nāgārjuna to show the inexistence of *svabhāva* is that *everything changes*, while what has own-nature should be unchangeable; hence, there is no own-nature. In this sense, very explicit verses are:

> MMK 13.3ab: Because of the experience of transformation (*anyathābhāva*), we establish the lack of own-nature.[19]

> MMK 15.9cd: If [own-]nature existed, would there be alteration (*anyathātvam*) of what?[20]

Nāgārjuna's theory, in short, is that the presence of an essential nature in *dharma*s or phenomena (made up of *dharma*s) not only gives them an identity, but also would freeze or paralyze them in their own being. In other words, an entity endowed with own-nature could not, for example, die or turn into other things. One more verse from MMK confirms this argument:

> MMK 15.8: If being were by [ultimate] nature, then its non existence could not take place. Actually, for an [ultimate] nature, [the possibility of] becoming other (*anyathābhāvo*) is never logically acceptable.[21]

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[18] For a deeper analysis of Nāgārjuna's interpretation of *pratītyasamutpāda* as 'mutual dependence' or 'law of coexisting counterparts,' see Ferraro 2019.

[19] *bhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvam anyathābhāvadarśanāt |.*

[20] *prakṛtau kasya vā satyām anyathātvaṃ bhaviṣyati ||.*

[21] The same idea is expressed in MMK 21.17ab: 'the non-being of real entities existing by own-nature is not logically acceptable' (*sadbhāvasya svabhāvena nāsadbhāvaś ca yujyate |*).

This argument, moreover, allows Nāgārjuna to reply to the accusations that his doctrine of emptiness is heterodox: it is in fact the philosophies that support the existence of an own-nature in *dharma*s — Nāgārjuna argues — that are in contradiction to orthodox Buddhist principles, i.e. the Buddha's teachings. For example, when an opponent, at the beginning of chapter 24 of the MMK, contends that the doctrine of emptiness actually denies the Four Truths of the Buddha's sermon at Benares (see, e.g., *Saṃyutta Nikāya* V.12.1081, ed. vol. 5, pp. 420–424), Nāgārjuna replies that in fact these same truths entail the capacity of entities to transform and become other. If, for example, existential suffering were 'by own-nature,' then its cessation (namely, the object of the Third Truth) would be inconceivable and inadmissible, because:

> MMK 24.23: There is no cessation of a suffering that exists by own-nature. Haunted by [the idea that things have] *svabhāva*, you reject cessation.[22]

Actually, Nāgārjuna does not need very elaborate arguments to show that something with a permanent nature contravenes Buddhist ortodoxy. Indeed, as *Dhammapāda* 277–279 claims, all conditioned *dharma*s, besides being '[a source of] suffering' (*dukkha/duḥkha*) and 'with no self' (*anattā/anātman*), are 'impermanent' (*anicca/anitya*). Therefore, any point of view that mantains or suggests the 'permanence' of conditioned *dharma*s must be inevitably discarded.

To sum up, in order to criticize the existence of an own-nature in things, Nāgārjuna appeals to two bedrocks of Buddhist ortodoxy: the principle of *pratītyasamutpāda* and that of impermanence (*anityatā*) of all phenomena. These two principles are clearly linked: what is independent from causes and conditions has to be necessarily permanent or eternal; and vice versa, we call eternal what has no beginning, that is, lacks any cause. As Nāgārjuna explains:

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[22] *na nirodhaḥ svabhāvena sato duḥkhasya vidyate | svabhāvaparyavasthānān nirodhaṃ pratibādhase ||.*

> MMK 17.22: If action had own-nature, it would undoubtedly be eternal; if so, action would be non-factitious, for what is eternal is not produced.[23]

Let us close this section by observing that if the theories defended by Nāgārjuna's opponents really entailed the existence of something eternal and at odds with the law of *pratītyasamutpāda*, then his arguments would be unquestionable. However, the same opponents — as we will see in the next section — could have more than one objection to this conclusion.

4. *Cogency of Nāgārjuna's anti-svabhāva arguments: is Nāgārjuna's critique a straw man?*

Even though Nāgārjuna declares — for example, in MMK 13.8 or 27.30 — that his philosophical purpose is to criticize and relinquish *all* the *dṛṣṭi*s, that is, the 'metaphysical points of view' of *all* the schools of his time, it seems clear, as we argued in the first section of this contribution, that the main *dṛṣṭi* he reproves in his work is the specific view on *svabhāva* defended by the Sarvāstivāda school.[24] The ontology of this school (which properly consists in the drawing up of lists of *dharma*s provided with *svabhāva*), developed around the second century CE in the region of Greater Gandhara (nowadays, in north-west Pakistan), can indeed be considered — as Bronkhorst (2012: 499) remarks — an actual 'revolution' in the history of Buddhist philosophy that stimulates replies and new reflections which drastically enhance the level of Buddhist and Indian thought. Indeed, the earliest *prajñāpāramitā* theorizations of 'emptiness' only make sense if read against the backdrop of the 'philosophical revolution' of Greater Gandhara (see Bronkhorst 2012: 492). Since there are indications that the first *prajñāpāramitā* writings — and then the Mahāyāna movement

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[23] *karma svabhāvataś cet syāc chāśvataṃ syād asaṃśayam | akṛtaṃ ca bhavet karma kriyate na hi śāśvatam ||.*

[24] Among Nāgārjuna's interlocutors and opponents, besides the Sarvāstivādins, we can recognize the Pudgalavādins, the Sautrāntikas, the Mahāsāṃghikas, the Naiyāyikas, but apparently never the Theravādins, who are the other Abhidharma authors whose reflection on the notion of own nature is currently known.

— originated from this region (ibid.), Nāgārjuna (2nd or 3rd c. CE) could have been the first important Mahāyāna thinker from a different region to dialogue with the Sarvāstivāda philosophy of Gandhara.

Now — as we saw in the first section — the Sarvāstivāda conception of *svabhāva*, more than the 'epistemological' one of the Theravādins, can be likened to what in Western metaphysics is considered the 'essence' (the 'own-nature' or the 'intrinsic nature'), that is, the *quid* that allows a certain thing to be what it is. However, in the second section we saw how Nāgārjuna ascribes to this notion traits of substantiality — such as the fact of eluding the law of *pratītyasamutpāda* and, consequently, the status of being permanent — that suggest an understanding of *svabhāva* in terms of 'own-*being*,' 'inherent *existence*' or 'being *causa sui*.' At this point, the Sarvāstivādins could reply to Nāgārjuna that his critique is nothing more than a *straw man*: that he is attacking them for a conception of *svabhāva* that they do not actually defend. His arguments seem indeed valid just to prove the inexistence of a substantial *svabhāva*, which neither the Sarvāstivādins nor any other recognizable Abhidharma school seem to defend. Thus, if it were the case, maybe Siderits (2013: 448) would be right to surmise that Madhyamaka lacks something like a *master argument* which somehow *proves* that all things are necessarily empty of an *own-nature*.

However, the conclusion that Nāgārjuna would be criticizing a conception of *svabhāva* that his opponents do not uphold — and that he, anyway, has no final arguments to prove the inconsistence of the notion of 'own-nature' they actually support — is moot. Firstly, as said above, we have to consider that the level of theoretical elaboration of the Sarvāstivāda school at the time of Nāgārjuna was quite high: to look for a dialogue with this school based on a distorted and tendentious reading of the concept of *svabhāva* — that is, one of the foundations of its ontology and epistemology — could mean renouncing any credibility from the beginning. Yet, Nāgārjuna seems to be considered a credible interlocutor: his commentators frequently report objections — coming from various philosophical environments, but mostly Abhidharma and Nyāya — showing that the thought of the author of the MMK is indeed taken seriously. Now, in most cases, opponents criticize Nāgārjuna for his alleged nihilism and/or for logical faults possi-

bly inherent to his arguments. However, they never accuse Nāgā-rjuna of blaming them for a conception of *svabhāva* they do not hold. No opponent complains that while by *svabhāva* he means 'essence' or 'own-nature,' the Mādhyamikas ascribe to him the idea of *svabhāva* as 'self-subsistent being' or 'substance existing in itself, not created and eternal.' In other words, opponents never accuse Nāgārjuna's critique of being a straw man, nor disclaim his reading of their particular notion of *svabhāva.*

At this point, in order to avoid the conclusion that Nāgārjuna's critique of Sarvāstivāda philosophy, even if not a straw man, is nonetheless somehow ineffective, we have to think that Nāgārjuna discerns in the *svabhāva* theory some *implicit* features, of which the Sarvāstivādins themselves would be unaware — features that, once elicited, would show that their ontology is in fact in contradiction with the Buddhist 'dogmas' of dependent coarising and the impermanence of *dharma*s.

5. *Implicit attributes in the Sarvāstivāda conception of svabhāva*

One point on which Nāgārjuna's criticism seems more consistent is that while *sarvāstivāda* ontology devotes much thought to the notion of *dharma,* it is quite vague when it comes to the concept of *svabhāva.* In verse 52 of the VV Nāgārjuna urges:

> If the knowers of the nature of *dharma*s speak about [the wholesome own-nature of] the wholesome *dharma*s, this very wholesome own-nature should be explained separately.[25]

The autocommentary (VVv 52) glosses:

> The knowers of the nature of *dharma*s believe that there is [for example] a wholesome own-nature of the wholesome *dharma*s. However this [own-nature] should be illustrated by you separately [i.e. by means of a specific investigation], in terms of 'this is the wholesome own-nature, while these are the wholesome *dharma*s; this is the wholesome consciousness of that, while this is own-nature of that wholesome consciousness,' and so on. But such a separate explanation did not occur.[26]

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[25] *kuśalānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ dharmāvasthāvido bruvanti yadi | kuśalaṃ svabhāvam evaṃ pravibhāgenābhidheyaḥ syāt ||.*

[26] *kuśalānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ dharmāvasthāvidaḥ kuśalaṃ svabhāvaṃ manyante | sa ca bhavatā pravibhāgenopadeṣṭavyaḥ syād | ayaṃ sa kuśalaḥ svabhāvaḥ | ime te kuśalā*

In my view, this passage is of crucial importance for our understanding of the meaning of Nāgārjuna's critique of the Sarvāstivāda theory of *dharma*s (endowed with *svabhāva*). The Sarvāstivādins indeed, surprisingly, do not dedicate any special and detailed explanation of what exactly the 'own-nature' of *dharma*s is. And in paracanonical and Abhidharma texts — recalled in the first section above — where we come across the notion of *sabhāva/svabhāva*, this is always merely presented as the own-nature *of something* (for example, a phenomenal entity, a *dharma* or even reality in-itself). We never come across studies or detailed examinations exclusively devoted to the features of own-nature itself. Now, inasmuch as the 'knowers' — or, we would say, 'specialists' — 'of the own-nature of *dharma*s' (note Nāgārjuna's subtly ironical tone) fail to give us a 'separate' analysis of the own-nature, it is we who have to surmise what the *svabhāva* could be. And this is exactly what Nāgārjuna does in the *kārikā*s 53–56 of the VV, where he tries to elicit what it is necessarily implicit in the notion of *svabhāva*.

The key question is whether *svabhāva* is something conditioned, in the same way as the *dharma*s in which it would inhere, or if it is unconditioned, that is, uncreated. The first option is assessed and discarded in VV 53 (and the VVv thereon):

> For if the wholesome own-nature is conditionally produced, then, this would be the *other*-nature of the wholesome *dharma*s. For how could it be the *own*-nature?[27]

In other words, according to Nāgārjuna, an *own*-nature, by definition, cannot come from *other* natures. For a nature that *derives* from something is an 'other' or an 'extrinsic' nature, that is, a *parabhāva*. This means that heat cannot come from cold, wet or any other nature different from heat itself. Therefore, something which has the power to identify *dharma*s must have, in its turn, an *own* — permanent and unchangeable — identity. Consequently, the only way to conceive of own-nature is that it is not produced, thus, self-subsistent. But this is exactly what makes the Sarvāstivāda

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dharmāḥ | idaṃ tatkuśalavijñānam | ayaṃ sa kuśalavijñānasvabhāvaḥ | evaṃ sarveṣāṃ | na caitad evaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ |.

[27] *yadi ca pratītya kuśalaḥ svabhāva utpadyate sa kuśalānām | dharmāṇāṃ parabhāvaḥ svabhāva evaṃ kathaṃ bhavati ||.*

doctrine of *dharma*s incongruous with Buddhist 'dogmas' of conditionality and impermanence of all things.

Verse VV 54 and its *vṛtti* make this aporia evident: the notion of *svabhāva* can only be independent from causes and conditions; however, an entity of this kind necessarily clashes with the Buddhist 'dogmas' of dependent coarising and impermanence:

> VV 54: If the own-nature of wholesome *dharma*s originated independently from everything, then there would be no practice of religious life.[28]

> VVv 54: If you think that the wholesome own-nature of wholesome *dharma*s arises without depending on anything, and likewise the unwholesome of unwholesome *dharma*s and the indeterminate of indeterminate *dharma*s, thus, there will be no practice of religious life. Why? Because, in this case, there would be rejection of the dependent coarising. And because of the rejection of *pratītyasa-mutpāda*, there would be rejection of the perception of *pratītyasa-mutpāda* (indeed, without *pratītyasamutpāda*, its vision would be logically inadmissible). If there is no perception of *pratītyasa-mutpāda*, there would be no true state of things (*dharma*). For it has been said by the Bhagavān: 'Monks, one who sees the *pratītyasa-mutpāda* sees the Dharma.' Finally, if there is no vision of the Dharma, there would be no practice of religious life.[29]

To sum up, if there were an own-nature, it could only be unconditioned and eternal; but this, first of all, would contradict the law of *pratītyasamutpāda*; secondly, if *dharma*s owned such an eternal nature, they should be fixed and unchangeable, which is against Buddhist doctrine and the practices which require that things can change. As we noticed above and as VVv 54 keeps explaining, the Four Truths themselves — the framework and underpinning of

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[28] *atha na pratītya kiṃcit svabhāva utpadyate sa kuśalānām | dharmāṇām evaṃ syād vāso na brahmacaryasya ||.*

[29] *atha manyase na kiṃcit pratītya kuśalānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ kuśalaḥ svabhāva utpadyate, evam akuśalānām dharmāṇām akuśalaḥ, avyākṛtānām avyākṛta iti, evaṃ saty abrahmacaryavāso bhavati | kiṃ kāraṇam | pratītyasamutpādasya hy evaṃ sati pratyākhyānaṃ bhavati | pratītyasamutpādasya pratyākhyānāt pratītyasamutpāda-darśanapratyākhyānaṃ bhavati | na hy avidyamānasya pratītyasamutpādasya darśa-nam upapadyamānaṃ bhavati | asati pratītyasamutpādadarśane dharmadarśanaṃ na bhavati | uktaṃ hi bhagavatā yo hi bhikṣavaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ paśyati sa dharmaṃ paśyati | dharmadarśanābhāvād brahmacaryavāsābhāvaḥ |.*

the whole Buddhist philosophical building — would be inconceivable if things were permanent.

6. *Conclusion*

The first two sections of this contribution have shown what seems to be an incongruence between the conception of *svabhāva* held by the Sarvāstivāda and the one that Nāgārjuna ascribes to them: indeed, the own-nature conceived by the Sarvāstivādins — in continuity with the uses of this notion in paracanonical literature — merely corresponds to the *quid* that *dharma*s own in order to be what they are. Instead, Nāgārjuna's anti-*svabhāva* arguments seem to refer to a conception of *svabhāva* as an eternal and self-subsistent substance. While the Sarvāstivādins believe that their conception of *svabhāva* does not infringe the Buddhist dogmas of dependent coarising (*pratītyasamutpāda*) and impermanence (*anityatā*) of all things, Nāgārjuna thinks that the Sarvāstivādins' *svabhāva* does violate exactly these two foundations of the Buddha's teaching. Thus, in the first part of the third section we tested the hypothesis that Nāgārjuna's anti-*svabhāva* stance turns out to be a straw man: is it possible to think that he does not understand the Sarvāstivādins' ontology, and thus ascribes to them (and condemns them for) a theory of *svabhāva* they actually do not hold? The second part of this section gave a negative answer to this question. Through an analysis of key passages of VV (and the autocommentary thereon) we discovered that Nāgārjuna detects some implicit but unavoidable features in the Abhidharma conception of *svabhāva*: the few characteristics the Sarvāstivādins assign to the notion of *svabhāva* cannot but imply other characteristics, namely, the 'unconditionality' and 'permanence' of *svabhāva*. This latter turns out to be unthinkable unless as an 'own-being,' that is, as an entity *not created*, therefore *eternal* — two attributes that, against the very intentions of the *svabhāva* theoreticians, contradict the Buddhist principles of absolute conditionality, therefore the impermanence of all things.

Nāgārjuna's critiques of the idea that *dharma*s and phenomena have an own-nature can be interpreted as a more general criticism of the theory — both 'philosophical' and 'common sense' — that things *are* in a certain way and then have a fixed identity: such a conception freezes things in their *alleged* being, inhibiting a pro-

cessual experience of them. Of course, this has 'practical' conse-
quences besides theoretical ones: the ordinary conviction that we
are substantial subjects endowed with a specific 'essence' prevents
any possible approach to ourselves as processual entities capable
of change and evolution.

The most proper theory to stimulate and underpin the progres-
sion on the Buddhist path is definitely not that we are a succession
of *dharma*s provided with a *svabhāva* or a specific identity.
However, the nihilist extreme that we are nothing must be avoi-
ded as well. The Madhyamaka conclusion is that the best way to
conceive ourselves and the world is that we are neither something
nor nothing: that is, an actual *kōan*, which equates to one of the
most powerful theoretical keys — however, not the only one,
because the Buddha's teaching also provides other kinds of doc-
trines, destined for different audiences who are not yet ready to
follow the Middle Path — of Buddhist soteriology.

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The Printing History of Sargas 9 to 17 of the Kumārasambhava

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1. Introduction

Ever since the earliest printed editions of the *Kumārasambhava* comprising seventeen *sarga*s were published in the second half of the 19th c., there has been an ongoing debate on the original extension of the poem. While all scholars agreed on ascribing the authorship of the first seven *sarga*s to Kālidāsa, they have been divided as to the authenticity of the following ten *sarga*s, which in the 19th c. were collectively (and meaningfully) named *uttarakhaṇḍa*, the 'further section.' However, there is a crucial difference between the status of *sarga* 8 and that of *sarga*s 9 to 17. The antiquity of *sarga* 8, as well as its literary merits, have never been in question: it was quoted in works on poetics as early as Vāmana's *Kāvyālaṃkāravṛtti* (8th–9th c.) and was commented upon, together with the preceding seven *sarga*s, by Mallinātha (14th–15th c.). Moreover, *sarga* 8 has always been deemed as being of the same extraordinary literary value as the preceding seven *sarga*s. Rather, the doubts about its genuineness stem from its depiction of the love-making of Śiva and Pārvatī, which, according to some, represents a deplorable violation of poetic appropriateness and a lapse of taste that cannot be reasonably imputed to a literary genius

such as Kālidāsa. The debate can be traced back to as early as Ānandavardhana (9th c.) and Mammaṭa (11th c.) and has continued up to modern times, although today the great majority of scholars take the authenticity of *sarga* 8 for granted. On the other hand, *sarga*s 9 to 17 are totally unknown to the Indian literary tradition. Although the existence of extra *sarga*s had been long postulated by some, who deem the *Kumārasambhava* in 7 or 8 *sarga*s to be incomplete or unfinished, the *editio princeps* of *sarga*s 9 to 17, published in 1866-1867, came somewhat unexpectedly. Although there is general acknowledgement that their literary merit is lower than that of the preceding eight *sarga*s — to the point that many think that they were composed by a mediocre poet — several scholars argue in favour of their ascription to Kālidāsa. These scholars maintain that the love-making of Śiva and Pārvatī described in *sarga* 8 cannot be the end of the poem, and *sarga*s 9 to 17 bring the narration to the exact conclusion they would expect, i.e. the final battle between the armies of the *deva*s and the *asura*s, and the killing of Tāraka at the hand of Kumāra.

The present article deals with the printing history of *sarga*s 9 to 17 of the *Kumārasambhava*. In the following pages, all the different editions of the text that I was able to consult, as well as all the Sanskrit commentaries on them published so far, will be scrutinised. In addition, an overview of their translations into English is provided at the end of the article.

In a (hopefully foreseeable) future, I will undertake an investigation of the manuscript transmission of these *sarga*s. This was the topic I had originally planned for this article, but the study had to be delayed in view of the difficulty to obtain reproductions of the relevant manuscripts, of which there are about a dozen, kept in different collections, public and private, both in India and Europe.

2. *The printing history of sargas 9 to 17 of the Kumārasambhava*

A long gap of almost thirty years separates the *editio princeps* of the first seven *sarga*s of the *Kumārasambhava* from that of the *uttarakhaṇḍa*. The first printed edition of the *Kumārasambhava*, limited to *sarga*s 1 to 7, was published in 1838 in Berlin, with a translation into

Latin. The editor and translator was Adolf F. Stenzler,[1] who, in the Praefatio, surmised that those seven chapters were all that had survived of 22 original chapters.[2] The *Kumārasambhava* in 22 *sarga*s has not yet appeared in print, but in 1866–1867 *sarga*s 8 to 17, at that time collectively called *uttarakhaṇḍa* ('further/latter section'),[3] were published for the first time in eight consecutive issues (Nos 2 to 9) of the *Kāśīvidyāsudhānidhiḥ. The Pandit*,[4] a journal published in Varanasi starting from those years. The edition gives the bare text of *sarga*s 8 to 17, without any variant reading and with sparse annotations marking those series of two or more stanzas which form a grammatical unit (*yugmam, viśeṣakam, kulakam*). In the same issues of *The Pandit* in which the text was published and in one later issue, four articles in Sanskrit dealing with the *uttarakhaṇḍa* appeared.[5] Three of these four articles are signed by

[1] Stenzler, Adolf Friedrich (ed. & tr.), *Kumára sambhava: Kálidásæ carmen sanskrite et latine.* Edidit Adolphus Fridericus Stenzler. Berlin: Printed for the Oriental Translation Fund of Great Britain and Ireland/London: Sold by A.J. Valpy, 1838.

[2] Stenzler A.F., *Kumára sambhava*, cit., p. 1: '[…] nunc Kumarasambhavae capita septem, quae aetatem tulerunt (nam olim viginti duo exstitisse feruntur), iis trado, quibus litterae Indicae cordi sunt atque curae.' The 'tradition that the poem, has not only seventeen but twenty-two Cantos' was still held in 1874 by Shankar Pandit (Paṇḍit, Shankar P. (ed.), *The Raghuvaṁśa of Kālidāsa. With the Commentary of Mallinātha*. Part III. Cantos XIV–XIX. Bombay Sanskrit Series No. XIII. Bombay: Government Central Book Depôt, 1874: 16 n. 2), who strongly advocated the hypothesis that the *Raghuvaṃśa* had also come down to us in an incomplete form (pp. 14–18).

[3] The term *uttarakhaṇḍa* is widely used to refer to *sarga*s 8 to 17 in the editions published in the 19th century (see the Bibliography). It seems to have fallen into disuse in the following century.

[4] On the masthead, the complete name of the journal is: *Kāśīvidyā-sudhānidhiḥ. The Pandit. A monthly Journal, of the Benares College, devoted to Sanskrit literature.* For detailed information about the publication of Sargas 8 to 17 in The Pandit see the Bibliography, Primary Sources, under Viṭṭhalaśāstri 1866–1867. Incidentally, the *Kāśīvidyāsudhānidhi* together with the *Pratnakamranandinī* 'were the first journals published in Sanskrit in India' (Dodson, Michael S., *Orientalism, Empire, and National Culture: India, 1770–1880*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007: 230 n. 127).

[5] Viṭṭhalaśāstrī, 'kumārasambhavottarakhaṇḍavarṇanam,' *The Pandit*, Vol. I, No. 2, 1866, p. 11 (signed *kāśīstharājakīyapāṭhālaye sāṃkhyaśāstrācāryo viṭṭhalaśā-strī*); [without author], 'kumārasaṃbhavottarakhaṇḍavarṇayitr̥paṇḍitān prati lekho 'yam,' *The Pandit*, Vol. I, No. 5, 1866, pp. 65–66 (without signature); Viṭṭhalaśāstrī, 'kumārasambhavottarakhaṇḍopasaṃharaṇam,' *The Pandit*, Vol. I, No. 9,

Viṭṭhalaśāstrī, Professor of Sāṃkhya at the Government College in Varanasi (*kāśīstharājakīyapāṭhālaye sāṃkhyaśāstrācāryo viṭṭhalaśāstrī*). For this reason, I assume him to be the editor of the first edition of the *uttarakhaṇḍa* (hereafter: Viṭṭhalaśāstrī 1866–1867), although this is nowhere explicitly declared.[6] In the first of these four articles, we are informed that this edition was based on two manuscripts, one from Kolkata and one from Vārāṇasī, and that the latter was considered more reliable than the former.[7] The other three articles deal primarily with the authenticity of the *uttarakhaṇḍa* and with the search for literary parallels between the *uttarakhaṇḍa* and other Sanskrit works, although the third provides some additional information about the preparation of this edition.

Further information about the two manuscripts and some details on their provenance are contained in the introduction to what seems to be the second edition of the *uttarakhaṇḍa*, which was edited by Tārānātha Tarkavācaspati Bhaṭṭācārya and appeared in Kolkata just one year after the publication of Viṭṭhalaśāstrī's edition (hereafter: Tarkavācaspati 1868).[8] At first sight, Tarkavācaspati's edition seems to be a replica of the previous one: it gives the

1867, pp. 128–130 (signed *viṭṭhalaśāstrī*); Viṭṭhalaśāstrī, 'kumārasambhavottarakhaṇḍopasaṃharaṇasya śeṣāṃśaḥ,' *The Pandit*, Vol. I, No. 10, 1867, pp. 141–142 (signed *viṭṭhalaśāstrī*).

[6] In this respect, two articles are especially meaningful, both signed by Viṭṭhalaśāstrī: the first (Viṭṭhalaśāstrī, 'kumārasambhavottarakhaṇḍavarṇanam,' cit.), which appears right before the eighth *sarga*, as if it were an introduction to the edition, and the third (Viṭṭhalaśāstrī, 'kumārasambhavottarakhaṇḍopasaṃharaṇam,' cit.), which is placed immediately after the end of the final (i.e. seventeenth) *sarga*, as if it were the concluding chapter of the edition.

[7] Viṭṭhalaśāstrī, 'kumārasambhavottarakhaṇḍavarṇanam,' cit., p. 11 lines 13–17: *tadā caikaṃ pustakaṃ kalikātānagare upalabdham aparaṃ ca vārāṇasyāṃ tayoś ca vārāṇasīsthapustakavartinaḥ pāṭhā yatra śuddhāḥ santi tatra ta eva paripālanārhāḥ kalikātāpustakam tu tatra saṃśayo 'śuddhir vā tatra darśanam arhati*, 'And then one manuscript was found in Kolkata and another one in Vārāṇasī. And of the two, wherever the readings found in the manuscript from Vārāṇasī are correct, there they should be kept [as they are]; but the manuscript from Kolkata deserves to be looked at where there is a doubt or a mistake [in the former].' In the article printed right after the final *sarga*, Viṭṭhalaśāstrī makes similar statements about the different degree of authority he attributed to the two manuscripts and depicts the manuscript from Varanasi as *atijīrṇa-*, 'very dilapidated' (Viṭṭhalaśāstrī, 'kumārasambhavottarakhaṇḍopasaṃharaṇam,' cit., p. 128 lines 1–10).

[8] Sanskrit title page (transcription): kumārasambhavam | uttarakhaṇḍam mahākaviśrīkālidāsakṛtam — gavarṇameṇṭasaṃskṛtapāṭhaśālādhyāpaka śrītārā-nāthatarkavācaspatibhaṭṭācāryyeṇa saṃskṛtam — kalikātānagare śrīyutabhuvana-

bare text without variant readings, and also the indications of *yu-gmam*, *viśeṣakam* and *kulakam* as found in Viṭṭhalaśāstrī 1866–1867. A more accurate reading, however, reveals discernible differences here and there in the text.[9] The edited text is prefaced by a 4-page *vijñāpana* ('communication') in Sanskrit, written by Tarkavāca-spati himself. Most of it deals with the authenticity of the *uttara-khaṇḍa* and gives a summary of its contents, but it also provides information on the sources of this edition. At the beginning, Tar-kavācaspati writes:

> Forty years ago one manuscript was brought from the Southern region by *mārcelasāheva*. When [he] passed away, that manuscript was entrusted to Paṇḍita Śrīyuta Īśvaracandra Vidyāsāgara.[10] Then the manuscript was taken from here [i.e. from Kolkata] [to Varanasi] by the members of the Board of the *Kāśīvidyāsudhānidhi* [i.e. *The Pandit*] and, having collated it (*saṃvādya*) with a manu-script from their province [i.e. Varanasi], it was printed in the pages of the *Kāśīvidyāsudhānidhi*.[11]

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candravasākamahodayasya prārthayā taddvāraiva saṃvādajñānaratnākarayantre 1926 saṃvatsare mudritam. English title page, inserted at the end of the volume (transcription): Kumára sambhava. Uttarakhandam. By Kálidása. (From Canto VIII. to XVII.) Edited by Pandita Tárá Nátha Tarkaváchaspati. Professor of Grammar, Sanscrit College. At the Request of Bábu Bhuvana Chandra Vasáka. Calcutta: Printed and Published by Bábu Bhuvana Chandra Vasáka At the Sangbáda Jnánaratnákara Press. No. 32. Nimtollah Ghaut Street. 1868.

[9] For example, in the first twenty stanzas of *sarga* 13 (Viṭṭhalaśāstrī 1866–1867 vs. Tarkavācaspati 1868): *āśliṣṭagātraṃ / āśliṣya gāḍhaṃ* (13.4b), *parito / harito* (13.7c), *muhūrttaṃ / muhūrttāt* (13.9c), *puro 'ta tat tvaṃ / puro bhava tvaṃ* (13.11a), *puraḥ sara tvam / puraḥsaras tvam* (13.11c), *surātvarālokanakautukena / suratvarā°* (13.12a), *nirucchanaṃ / nirmacchanaṃ* (13.18d). The different number of stanzas counted in the 13th *sarga* in Viṭṭhalaśāstrī 1866–1867 (51) and Tarkavācaspati 1868 (50) is merely due to the different interpretation of an irregular 6-*pada*s stanza (13.19), which is counted as one single stanza in the latter edition (and accordingly marked as *ṣaṭpadam*), but as two separate stanzas in the former (the first four *pada*s labelled as 13.19 and the last two as 13.20).

[10] Īśvaracandra Vidyāsāgara (1820-1891) was a reputed scholar of Bengali and Sanskrit, a social reformer, and one of the leading figures of the so-called 'Bengali renaissance'. He played prominent roles both at the College of Fort William and the Sanskrit College in Kolkata. See Bhattacharya, France, *Paṇḍit Īśvaracandra Vidyāsāgara (Iswarchandra Vidyasagar) (1820-1891): la tradition au servi-ce d'un humanisme moderne.* (Document downloaded in pdf format on 9 March 2019 from: http://ceias.ehess.fr/index.php?1192; quoted with the author's per-mission).

[11] *itaḥ 40 catvāriṃśavarṣāt pūrvvaṃ mārcelasāhevena dākṣiṇātyadeśād ekaṃ pusta-kam āhṛtaṃ tasya ca lokāntaragamane tat pustakaṃ paṇḍita śrīyuta īśvaracandra*

Several details can be gleaned from these few lines. To start with, it seems clear that Viṭṭhalaśāstrī 1866–1867 and Tarkavācaspati 1868 are based on the same two manuscripts, and the discrepancies in the constituted texts derive from different editorial choices. Furthermore, the Kolkata manuscript originally hailed from South India and was brought to Kolkata forty years before the *vijñāpana* was written: since the date of the *vijñāpana* is the same as that of the volume (*saṃvat* 1926, corresponding to 1868 CE),[12] the manuscript must have arrived in Kolkata in 1828 CE.[13] As regards the man who brought the manuscript to Kolkata, *mārcelasāheva*, Sivaprasad Bhattacharyya assumes him to be 'Principal J.H. Marshall.'[14] Bhattacharyya's identification is wrong, since J(ohn) H(ubert) Marshall, the famous archaeologist, was born in 1876 and died in 1958,[15] therefore in 1828 he was still to be born. In all likelihood, *mārcelasāheva*, which presumably stands for 'Marshall Saheb,' is Captain George Turnbull Marshall (d. 1854), who had been in Kolkata since the 1820's and had strong links with both Īśvaracandra Vidyāsāgara, to whom the manuscript was entrusted on *mārcelasāheva*'s death, and Tārānātha Tarkavācaspati.[16] In the same article quoted above, Sivaprasad Bhattacharyya

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vidyāsāgarasamīpe sthitam, tat pustakañ ca kāśīvidyāsudhānidhisabhāsadair ito nītvā svadeśīyapustakena saha saṃvādya kāśīvidyāsudhānidhipatre etat mudritam āsīt (Tarkavācaspati 1868: 1 lines 4–8). The gerund *saṃvādya*, translated as 'having collated,' literally means 'having made [one manuscript] converse [with the other], having compared or matched [one manuscript with the other].'

[12] At the end of the *vijñāpana*, Tārānātha Tarkavācaspati writes: *kalikātā saṃvat 1926 saṃskṛtapāṭhaśālādhyāpaka śrītārānāthaśarmaṇaḥ* (Tarkavācaspati 1868: p. 4, lines 10–11). To be sure, (Vikrama) saṃvat 1926 corresponds to 1869–1870 CE, but the correspondence between saṃvat 1926 and 1868 CE is maintained in the title pages (in Sanskrit and English respectively) of the volume (see n. 8 above).

[13] This date is further confirmed in the *vijñāpana* of a later edition of the *uttarakhaṇḍa* by Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara (see below).

[14] Bhattacharyya, Sivaprasad, 'The Authorship of the Latter Half of the Kumārasambhava,' *Journal of the Asiatic Society. Letters,* Vol. 20, No. 2, 1954, p. 313.

[15] Waldschmidt, Ernst, 'Sir John Marshall', *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft,* Vol. 109, 1959, pp. 16–25.

[16] George Turnbull Marshall was Secretary of the College of Fort William in Kolkata from 1838 to 1852. During the 1820's, he himself had been a student at the College, where he proved to be one of the most proficient scholars. G.T. Marshall was a good friend of Īśvaracandra Vidyāsāgara (1820–1891), whom he held in high esteem. In 1841, Īśvaracandra Vidyāsāgara was appointed the *seristadar* at the College on Marshall's recommendation (Das, Sisir Kumar, *Sahibs and*

asserts that 'Pandit Taranatha Tarkavacaspati, the illustrious com-piler of the dictionary known as *Vācaspatya*, had published from the Samvādajñānākara Press the *KS.* in book-form in 1862, with the cantos 8 to 17 as an appendix.'[17] Thus, according to him, Tārānātha Tarkavācaspati was the editor of the earliest edition of the *uttarakhaṇḍa*, which would therefore have been published four years before Viṭṭhalaśāstrī's edition in the pages of *The Pandit* (1866–1867). Once again, Bhattacharyya's information seems to be inaccurate: the OPACs of the major libraries and Trübner's *Literary Record* agree that an edition of *sarga*s 1 to 7 was published in 1861 by Īśvaracandra Vidyāsāgara (not by Tārānātha Tarkavā-caspati), complemented in 1862 with an appendix containing *sarga* 8, while Tarkavācaspati's edition of the *uttarakhaṇḍa* ap-peared only in 1868.[18] Moreover, it should not be forgotten that Tarkavācaspati, in the *vijñāpana* to his edition, writes about the Varanasi edition, which consequently precedes his own. On the contrary, he is silent about an earlier edition by himself or by Īśva-racandra Vidyāsāgara: there is no doubt that he would have men-tioned it, if it had existed at all, all the more since he had been the pupil of Īśvaracandra Vidyāsāgara and that he obtained a position as Professor at the Sanskrit College through the good offices of his old teacher.[19]

In 1873, a new edition of the *Kumārasaṃbhava* including the bare text of *sarga*s 9 to 17 was published in Mumbai, edited by Bhau Dājī (henceforth: Bhau Dājī 1873). Unfortunately, I was una-ble to consult this work, but its readings are recorded in Surya-

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munshis. An account of the College of Fort William. Calcutta: Orion Publications, 1978, p. 122; Kopf, David, *British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance. The Dy-namics of Indian Modernization 1773–1835.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969, pp. 221–222, 234–235). In 1845, G.T. Marshall also recom-mended Tārānātha Tarkavācaspati for a teaching position at the Sanskrit College in Kolkata (Hatcher, Brian A., 'What's Become of the Pandit? Rethinking the History of Sanskrit Scholars in Colonial Bengal,' *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2005, pp. 713–714).

[17] Bhattacharyya S., 'The authorship,' cit., p. 313.

[18] *Trübner's American and Oriental Literary Record. A Monthly Register of the most important Works published in North and South America, in India, China, and the British Colonies: with occasional Notes on German, Dutch, Danish, French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, and Russian Books*, Vol. 6, Nos 8, 9 (Nos 68, 69), 31 March 1871, p. 131a.

[19] Bhattacharya F., *Paṇḍit Īśvaracandra Vidyāsāgara*, op. cit, pp. 40–41.

kanta's 1962 critical edition of the *Kumārasambhava* (see n. 41 below).

In 1886, twenty years after the *editio princeps*, a new edition of the *Kumārasambhava* including the *uttarakhaṇḍa* was published in Mumbai, edited by Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa Parvaṇīkara and Kāśīnātha Pāṇḍuraṅga Paraba (hereafter: Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886).[20] Over the following seven decades, this edition was reprinted time and again by the Nirṇaya Sāgara Press under the names of different editors,[21] although with few modifications. In all the later editions, the constituted text was left unchanged: the later editors made only negligible changes to the apparatus containing the variants, sometimes to the better (emending typos), more often to the worse (adding new mistakes),[22] made minor editorial addi-

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[20] English title page (transcription): The Kumârasambhava of Kâlidâsa. With The Commentary (the Sanjîvinî) of Mallinâtha (1–8 Sargas) and of Sîtârâma (8–17 Sargas). Edited with various readings by Nârâyaṇa Bhatta Parvaṇîkara and Kâshînâtha Pâṇḍuranga Paraba. Second Revised Edition. Printed and Published by the Proprietor of the Nirṇaya-Sâgara Press. Bombay. 1886. Sanskrit title page (transcription): ‖ śrīḥ ‖ mahākaviśrīkālidāsaviracitaṃ kumārasambhavam | ādito 'ṣṭamasargāvadhi mallināthakṛtayāṣṭamato 'ntāvadhi sītārāmakṛtayā ca saṃjīvinyā sametam | jayapurarājaguruparvaṇīkaropanāmakabhaṭṭanārāyaṇaśarmaṇā kāśīnātha pāṇḍuraṅga paraba ity anena ca pāṭhāntaraiḥ saṃyojya saṃśodhitam | dvitīyaṃ saṃskaraṇam | tac ca śāke 1807 vatsare mumbayyāṃ nirṇayasāgara-yantrālayādhipatinā mudritam |. On the title page this edition is designated as 'second revised edition': however, the first edition, by Kāśīnātha Pāṇḍuraṅga Paraba, was published in 1879 and included only *sarga*s 1 to 8 with the commentary of Mallinātha.

[21] The 3rd edition, edited by Parvaṇīkara and Paraba, was published in 1893. Thereafter eleven more editions followed, edited by Vāsudeva Lakṣmaṇa Śāstrī Paṇśīkara (from the 4th *saṃskaraṇa*, published in 1906, to the 12th *saṃskaraṇa*, published in 1935), and by Nārāyaṇa Rāma Ācārya (who edited the 13th *saṃskaraṇa*, published in 1946, and the 14th, published in 1955).

[22] In the entire 9th and 10th *sarga*s, the only real innovation is one single new variant recorded in Ācārya's edition (*maṇḍalake* for *maṇḍalakaiś*, 9.3d), which was unknown to the previous editions. Most of the discrepancies between the apparatuses in the editions by Paṇśīkara and Ācārya on the one hand, and that in Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886 on the other are mistakes entered by the later editors, such as *prajā tebhyaḥ* for *prajāyante* (10.20c), *puṇyatāriṇi* for *puṇyakāriṇi* (10.36d), *devīṃ dhunīm* for *daivīṃ dhunīm* (10.48a), *tās tam* for *tās tām* (10.51c), and the omission of the variant *iva* in 10.53d. In one case, a mistake in Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886 has been emended in the later editions (*śuśravuḥ* corrected into *śuśruvuḥ*, in the added stanza between 10.58 and 10.59, recorded in the apparatuses). In three cases, it seems that Paṇśīkara and Ācārya deliberately 'improved' the genuine variants recorded in Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886: they have *pruṣṭaḥ* in

tions and added supplementary sections of questionable useful-ness.[23] Since its publication, this edition has served as a sort of vul-gate, at least with regard to *sarga*s 9 to 17: its constituted text (without variants) was reprinted by other publishers,[24] sometimes with the addition of new commentaries and, later, of *anvaya*s and translations into Indian languages, specifically Hindi (see below). Compared to the earlier editions, Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886 dif-fers in some important aspects. For the first time, the text of the *uttarakhaṇḍa* is accompanied by a commentary, and the variant readings are recorded in the footnotes. As for the structure of the edition, the order in which the seventeen *sarga*s are arranged is revealing: first come *sarga*s 1 to 7 with the commentary by Malli-nātha, then *sarga*s 8 to 17 with the commentary by Sītārāma and, finally, *sarga* 8 with the commentary by Mallinātha. Presumably,

place of the original *pruṣaḥ* in 9.17b, *diśaḥ* in place of *diṣṭaḥ* in 9.46a, and *dyusa-tsaṃsadi sādaram* for *dyusadāṃ sadi sādaram* in 10.2b.

[23] For example, Ācārya added the numbers of the Pāṇinian *sūtra*s alluded to in Sītārāma's commentary, as well as question and exclamation marks to the Sanskrit text. Furthermore, both Paṇsīkara and Ācārya added new subsidiary sec-tions to their works. Paṇsīkara appended a list of the incipits of all the stanzas alphabetically ordered (*kumārasaṃbhavaślokānāṃ mātṛkāvarṇakrameṇānukra-maṇī*). On his part, Ācārya inserted two sections in the beginning of the volume: a concordance of similar passages in the *Kumārasambhava* and the *Śivapurāṇa* (*kumārasambhavamahāśivapurāṇayoḥ sāmyanidarśakaḥ saṃdarbhaḥ*), which is of lit-tle use because it lacks the indication of the places where the selected passages occur in the respective works, and a list of the stanzas from Kālidāsa's works quo-ted in śāstric compositions (*kavikulacūḍāmaṇikālidāsakṛtīnāṃ sarvaśāstrasa-mṛddhatvaparicayaḥ*). Ācārya also appended to his edition of the *Kumārasambhava* a list of the incipits of the stanzas (*kumārasaṃbhavaślokānukramakośaḥ*), which looks the same as the one added by Paṇsīkara.

[24] For example, the text of *sarga*s 9 to 17 together with Sītārāma's commenta-ry to *sarga*s 8 to 17 was included without any modification in two 'complete' edi-tions of the *Kumārasambhava* in 17 *sarga*s. The first was edited by Viṭṭhalaśāstrī and published in 1898 in Mumbai by the Gujarati Printing Press, and later repu-blished in Delhi in 1989 and 2005, by Nag Publishers and Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan respectively (see the Bibliography, Primary Sources). The editor, whose name does not appear in the title page but is mentioned in the Introduction (in Sanskrit) as *śāstrīśrī dhuṇḍirājātmajaviṭṭhala°* (p. 1 lines 22–23), is probably the same Viṭṭhalaśāstrī who edited the *editio princeps* of *sarga*s 9 to 17 in 1866–1867. The 1898 edition is worthy of notice in that for the first time it prints the com-mentary by Cāritravardhana on the first seven *sarga*s of the *Kumārasambhava*, cal-led *Śiśuhitaiṣiṇī*. The other edition which 'borrows' the text of *sarga*s 9 to 17 and the commentary of Sītārāma from Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886 was published in 1912 in Chennai by Vāviḷḷa Rāmasvāmi Śāstrulu & Sons.

the underlying assumption is that the *Kumārasambhava* is made of two parts, a *pūrvakhaṇḍa* and an *uttarakhaṇḍa*, and that *sarga* 8 belongs to the latter, together with *sarga*s 9 to 17. As regards the commentary by Sītārāma, it covers the whole *uttarakhaṇḍa* and is the earliest known commentary on *sarga*s 9 to 17. Through the versified introduction, the end-of-section rubrics and, especially, the versified colophon,[25] the author informs us that his name was Sītārāma Kavi, that he was the son of Lakṣmaṇa Bhaṭṭa and Suhīrā, and that he composed the commentary — which he calls a *vivṛti* and a *ṭīkā*, and which he styles *Saṃjīvanī* after the name of Mallinātha's commentary to *sarga*s 1 to 8 — in the 19th century.[26] Last but not least, Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886 is the first edition that gives variant readings of the text of *sarga*s 9 to 17. The readings of the earlier editions (Viṭṭhalaśāstrī 1866–1867 and Tarkavācaspati 1868) are included in this edition, either integrated in the constituted text or recorded as variant readings in the footnotes.[27]

[25] Introduction in Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886: 152; colophon in Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886: 326.

[26] The year of composition is given in the colophon through the word-numeral system of numerical representation (Skt. *bhūtasaṃkhyā*) as *saṃvatsare 'ṅkādripurāṇatulye*, 'in the year equal to "the number 9-mountains-the Purāṇas",' corresponding to 9–7–18. Since in the word-numeral system the order of magnitude of the numerals as a rule increases from left to right, the resulting number is 1879. It is not clear whether the number represents the year according to the Gregorian calendar or to the Vikrama era, in which case it would correspond to 1822–1823 CE. Kunhah Raja assumed that Sītārāma himself was the author of *sarga*s 9 to 17, although it is not clear on what ground he bases his assumption: 'There is a commentary on this latter portion by Sitarama Kavi, it is likely that he himself wrote the text also for this portion' (Raja, C. Kunhan, *Kalidasa. A Cultural Study*. Waltair: Andhra University, 1956: 189 n. 6). On the other hand, Krishnamachariar maintains that Sītārāma 'is older than Śaka 1650,' i.e. 1728 CE, on the basis of the date recorded on a manuscript of a commentary to the *Ghaṭakarpara* ascribed to him (Krishnamachariar, Madabhushi, *History of Classical Sanskrit Literature*. Madras: Tirumalai-Tirupati Devasthanams Press, 1937, p. 118 note 30). Curiously enough — and most probably by mere mistake — Viṭṭhalaśāstrī, in the introduction to his 1898 edition of the *Kumārasambhava*, dates the commentary to the 18th century 'in the Vikrama era': *ayaṃ ṭīkā* [sic] *nirmātā vikramārkāṣṭādaśaśatake kāśîpurīm* [sic] *alaṃcakāra* ([Viṭṭhalaśāstrī (ed.)], *Kalidasa's Kumarasambhava*, cit., p. 4, lines 1–2).

[27] Some readings have been omitted in Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886, possibly because they were deemed unimportant by the editors or just out of carelessness. For example, in the 9th *sarga* the following readings, which are found in both Viṭṭhalaśāstrī 1866–1867 and Tarkavācaspati 1868 (if not otherwise specified),

Moreover, six stanzas unknown to the earlier editions have been included in the constituted text,[28] and a good few readings that are not found in the earlier editions are recorded in the footnotes. In addition, compared to the earlier editions, some verses and stanzas have been rearranged.[29] It is clear that Parvaṇīkara and Paraba not only included the readings found in Viṭṭhalaśāstrī 1866–1867 and Tarkavācaspati 1868 in their edition, but also a-vailed themselves of other sources not taken into consideration in the two earlier editions. Unfortunately, they are totally silent about the manuscripts and printed editions they used and give no information about the provenance of the different readings.[30]

In 1887, just one year after the Mumbai edition by Parvaṇīkara and Paraba, another edition of *sarga*s 8 to 17 was published in Kolkata, edited by Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara Bhaṭṭācārya[31] (hereafter:

are not recorded in Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886: *antarbhavacchadma*° (9.5b), °*ka-mpra*° (9.6b), °*śreṇidhare* (9.25a), *manobhavaḥ* (9.25d, only in Tarkavācaspati 1868), °*āṃbarāmsaḥ* (9.38b [9.39b in Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886]), *purogena* (9.46d [9.47d]), *saraṅgam* (9.49c [9.50c]), *pīḍapīḍaṃ* (9.50a [9.51a]). Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886 does not mention that *pada*s 9.37cd and 9.38ab are omitted in Viṭṭhalaśāstrī 1866-1867 and Tarkavācaspati 1868.

[28] They are: 9.37cd and 9.38ab, 11.33, 12.39, 12.49, 14.40, 16.3.

[29] The verses in stanzas 13.20-22 are arranged in the three editions as follows (Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886 = Viṭṭhalaśāstrī 1866-1867 = Tarkavācaspati 1868): 13.20ab = 13.22ab = 13.21ab, 13.20cd = 13.21cd = 13.20cd, 13.21ab = 13.20ab = 13.19ef (in Viṭṭhalaśāstrī 1866-1867 stanza 13.20 has only two *pada*s, in Tarkavācaspati 1868 stanza 13.19 has six *pada*s), 13.21cd = 13.22cd = 13.21cd, 13.22ab = 13.21ab = 13.20ab, 13.22cd = / = /, 13.23 = 13.23 = 13.22. Stanzas 16.28-37 in Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886 correspond to 16.27, 29, 28, 35, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36 in the two earlier editions. Stanzas 17.29 and 17.30 in Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886 are inverted in the two earlier editions. Stanza 17.45 in Viṭṭhalaśāstrī 1866-1867 and Tarkavācaspati 1868 editions is recorded in the footnotes in the edition by Parvaṇīkara and Paraba, because these editors deemed it an interpolation (*44-45 ślokayor madhye kṣepako 'yam dṛśyate* [...], Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886, p. 321).

[30] However, based on a perusal of the variants recorded in Suryakanta's 'critical edition' of the *Kumārasambhava* (see below), it seems quite probable that among Parvaṇīkara and Paraba's sources there was also Bhau Dājī's edition published in Mumbai in 1873, which I was unable to consult (see n. 41 below).

[31] Sanskrit title page (transcription): kumārasambhavam | aṣṭamasargāvadhi-saptadaśasargaparyyantam | mahākavi-śrīkālidāsa-praṇītam | vi, e, upādhidhāriṇā śrījīvānandavidyāsāgarabhaṭṭācāryyeṇa viracitayāvyākhyayā samalaṅkṛtam | catur-thasaṃskaraṇam | kalikātānagaryyāṃ sarasvatīyantre mudritam | iṃ 1887 |. On the title page this work is described as *caturthasaṃskaraṇam*, 'fourth edition': however, this is presumably the earliest edition by Vidyāsāgara to include *sarga*s

Vidyāsāgara 1887). Vidyāsāgara's edition combines the text in Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886 (without variant readings) with the commentary composed by Vidyāsāgara himself. However, this edition is also clearly connected with that by Tārānātha Tarkavācaspati (1868), who, incidentally, was Vidyāsāgara's father: the graphical similarity is apparent, and the introduction (*vijñāpana*) is almost verbatim the same, except for two major differences. Firstly, the year in which *mārcelasāheva* (i.e. G.T. Marshall) brought the manuscript of the *uttarakhaṇḍa* to Kolkata from South India is now given as an absolute date, *1884 saṃvatsare*,[32] which corresponds to 1828 CE and confirms the relative date given by Tarkavācaspati in his *vijñāpana* (*itaḥ 40 catvāriṃśavarṣāt pūrvvaṃ*, 'forty years ago,' written in 1868 CE). Secondly, in the last lines of the *vijñāpana*, Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara reveals that this edition, as well as the commentary composed by himself 'for the convenience of the students,' were prepared taking into consideration three manuscripts from Nepal that he had accessed directly.[33] Given that the text in Vidyāsāgara's edition is exactly the same as that in Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886, it is not clear what role these three manuscripts really played for the preparation of this edition.

Before the turn of the century, in 1894, the complete *Kumārasambhava* in seventeen *sarga*s was published again in Kolkata, edited by Avināśacandra Mukhopādhyāya (hereafter: Mukhopādhyāya 1894).[34] As far as *sarga*s 9 to 17 are concerned, the text is

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8 to 17, since the third edition, published in 1875, included only the first seven *sarga*s with Mallinātha's commentary.

[32] Vidyāsāgara 1887: 1 line 4.

[33] *nepāladeśāt mayā kumārasambhavasya trīṇi ādarśapustakāni adhigatāni teṣāṃ pāṭhāntarāṇi samyak vivicya aṣṭamasargāvadhi saptadaśasargaparyyantaṃ chātrāṇāṃ sukhabodhāya svaracitayā vyākhyayā samalaṅkṛtya prakāśitam | śrījīvānandavidyāsāgara-bhaṭṭācāryasya* (Vidyāsāgara 1887: 4 lines 3–6): 'I have obtained three exemplars of the *Kumārasambhava* from Nepal. Having duly examined their variant readings, I have published [the text] from the 8th *sarga* to the 17th *sarga*, embellished with a commentary composed by myself for the easy understanding of the students.'

[34] Sanskrit title page (transcription): mahākaviśrīkālidāsaviracitaṃ kumārasambhavam | śrīmallināthasūriviracitayā sañjīvinīsamākhyayā vyākhyayā sametam | saṃskṛtayantrapustakālayādhyakṣeṇa śrīavināśacandramukhopādhyāyena pāṭhāntaraiḥ saṃyojya saṃśodhitaṃ prakāśitañ ca | kalikātārājadhānyāṃ sarasvatīyantre śrīkṣetramohananyāyaratnena mudritam, iṃ 1894 sāla.

just a reprint of Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886, including the variant readings recorded in the footnotes, which are the same in the two editions. However, Mukhopādhyāya's edition deserves to be mentioned because it offers a new commentary on *sarga*s 9 to 17, possibly the clearest and the most useful ever on this part of the work: it is called *Mohinī* and was composed by Kṣetramohana Nyāyaratna, who also acted as the printer of the volume.[35] Unfortunately, the volume has no introduction, and no information about the author of the commentary (or the editor) is provided.

In 1925, a new edition of the text of *sarga*s 9 to 17 was published in Mumbai by Khemrāj Śrīkṛṣṇadās, edited by Govindaśāstrī (henceforth: Govindaśāstrī 1925). Unfortunately, I have been unable to procure a copy of this work, whose readings are however recorded in Suryakanta's 1962 'critical edition' of the *Kumārasambhava* (see n. 42 below).

All the other editions published during the first sixty years of the 20th century were based on (or copied from) Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886. Most of them have already been mentioned above: on the one hand, there are the later, 'revised' editions of Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886 edited by Vāsudeva Lakṣmaṇa Śāstrī Paṇśīkara and, even later, by Nārāyaṇa Rāma Ācārya, published over the years by the Nirṇaya Sāgara Press (see n. 21 above); on the other hand, there are those works that simply copied the text of *sarga*s 9 to 17 together with the Sītārāma commentary from Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886 and incorporated them into editions comprising *sarga*s 1 to 17 of the *Kumārasambhava* (see n. 24 above). Besides these, an edition of the *Kumārasambhava* published in 1923 in Varanasi by Jai Krishna Dass Gupta deserves mention, in that it contains a new commentary on *sarga*s 9 to 17. The volume, edited by Kanakalāla Śarmā Ṭhakkura (henceforth: Ṭhakkura 1923),[36] gives all the 17 *sarga*s with four commentaries: by Cāritra-

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[35] Kṣetramohana mentions his own name in all the end-of-section colophons, e.g.: *iti śrīkṣetramohanakṛtayā mohinīsamākhyayā vyākhyayā sametaḥ śrīkālidāsakṛtau kumārasambhave mahākāvye tārakāsuravadhā nāma saptadaśaḥ sargaḥ* (Mukhopādhyāya 1894: 291). As for his role as the printer of the volume, see the title page in the previous note.

[36] Sanskrit title page (transcription): haridāsasaṃsṛktagranthamālāsamākhya—kāśīsaṃskṛtasīrispustakamālāyāḥ 14 kāvyavibhāge (2) dvitīyapustakam | mahākāviśrīkālidāsaviracitam | kumārasambhavaṃ-mahākāvyam | (ādito 'ṣṭama-

vardhana (*sarga*s 1 to 7), by Mallinātha (*sarga*s 1 to 8), by Sītārāma (*sarga*s 8 to 17), and by the editor himself, Kanakalāla Śarmā Ṭhakkura (*sarga*s 9 to 17). The text of *sarga*s 9 to 17, its variant readings and the commentary by Sītārāma are copied from the edition by Paṇṣīkara, without any deliberate changes but with several typos. Ṭhakkura's commentary is the earliest commentary on the *uttarakhaṇḍa* which leaves out *sarga* 8: presumably, this is revealing of a new tendency that considered *sarga* 8 as part of the *pūrvakhaṇḍa* (i.e. the section of the poem certainly to be ascribed to Kālidāsa) and, consequently, of delimiting the *uttarakhaṇḍa* to *sarga*s 9 to 17.[37]

In 1962, a critical edition of the *Kumārasambhava*, including *sarga*s 9 to 17, was published in Delhi, edited by Suryakanta (henceforth: Suryakanta 1962). On the whole, the edition is based on 23 manuscripts and seven printed editions. However, only 2 manuscripts and 6 printed editions cover *sarga*s 9 to 17. Four of the six printed editions have been described above: Viṭṭhalaśāstrī 1866-1867, Tarkavācaspati 1868,[38] Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886,[39] and

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sargaparyantaṃ mallināthakṛtayā navamasargād ārabhya saptadaśasargaparyantaṃ sītārāmakavikṛtayā ca sañjīvinīvyākhyayā āditaḥ saptasargaparyantaṃ cāritra-varddhanakṛtayā navamasargataḥ saptadaśasargaparyantaṃ maithilaśraki(sic!)nakalālaṭhakkurakṛtayā ca śiśuhitaiṣiṇīvyākhyayā ca sahitam | ṭhakkuro-panāmakaśrīkanakalālaśarmaṇā maithilena saṃśodhitañ ca | tac ca kāśyāṃ — caukhambāsaṃsṛktagranthamālāprakāśaka–śrīyutaharidāsaguptātmaja śreṣṭhija-yakṛṣṇadāsaguptamahāśayena svakīye 'vidyāvilāsa' nāmni yantrālaye mudrayitvā prakaśitam | san 1923.

[37] In support of this supposition is the fact that Ṭhakkura named his commentary *Śiśuhitaiṣiṇī* after Cāritravardhana's commentary, just as Sītārāma before him had named his commentary *Saṃjīvinī* after Mallinātha's. By commenting upon the *uttarakhaṇḍa*, both Sītārāma and Ṭhakkura clearly conceived their works as ideally completing those by their predecessors, but whereas Sītārāma starts his work with *sarga* 8 (even though it had already been glossed in Mallinātha's *Saṃjīvinī*), Ṭhakkura overlooks *sarga* 8 and starts from *sarga* 9, despite the fact that Cāritravardhana's *Śiśuhitaiṣiṇī* covers only *sarga*s 1 to 7.

[38] Apparently Suryakanta erroneously regarded the year of publication '*saṃvat* 1926' (printed on the bottom of the Sanskrit title page) as if it were given according to the Common Era. On the contrary, '*saṃvat* 1926' must be regarded as a year in the Vikrama era, corresponding to 1868 in the Common Era, which is in fact the date of publication given on the English title page at the end of the volume (see n. 8 above).

[39] Suryakanta used a later edition, published by the Nirṇaya Sāgara Press in 1946. Although not stated by Suryakanta, it must be the 13th edition, edited by Nārāyaṇa Rāma Ācārya.

Vidyāsāgara 1887.[40] I was not able to consult two editions used by Suryakanta, namely that by Bhau Dājī, published in Mumbai in 1873,[41] and that by Govindaśāstrī, published in Mumbai in 1925.[42] Suryakanta's work received harsh criticism, especially concerning the edition of *sarga*s 1 to 8.[43] Confining my judgement to *sarga*s 9 to 17, Suryakanta's edition represents a substantial improvement on Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886 (which also records variant readings in an apparatus) in two respects: it is based on a wider range of sources, including the Nirṇaya Sāgara Press edition itself, and — unlike Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886 — it describes its sources in the introduction[44] marking the variant readings in the apparatus with sigla. So far it is the only edition of *sarga*s 9 to 17 to adopt this procedure. In other respects, Suryakanta's edition is clearly defective and, strictly speaking, cannot be called a critical edition: for example, quite a few readings recorded in Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886 (both as constituted text or variant) have been omitted, out of negligence on the part of the editor or, more probably, because of a deliberate choice — that of deciding which readings are worthy of record and which are not.[45]

[40] Suryakanta used a later edition published in 1890, which I was unable to identify.

[41] 'Bhau Dājī: *Kumārasambhava*, edited by Bhau Dājī; offering 8 cantos with Mallinatha's commentary; and the rest bare text; published in Bombay; Śaka Saṃvat 1795; a good work on the whole' (Suryakanta 1962: xxvi). Suryakanta does not mention this edition in the list of the sources on which his edition is mainly based (Suryakanta 1962: xxvi). Thus, apparently it was not crucial for the constitution of the text of *sarga*s 9 to 17.

[42] 'Govindaśāstrī: *Kumārasambhava*, first 8 cantos with Mallinātha's comm. and the latter half bare text; Khemrāj Śrīkṛṣṇadās, Bombay, Śaka Saṃvat 1847' (Suryakanta 1962: xxvi).

[43] Gautam Patel harshly criticised Suryakanta for having disregarded some editions containing important commentaries (Patel, Gautam (ed.), *Mahakavi-kālidāsaviracitaṃ kumārasambhavam. With the Commentary of Vallabhadeva.* Ranip (Ahmedabad): S.J. Shah Parijat Printery, 1986, pp. 88, 92-96). Suryakanta's edition is not even mentioned among the main editions of the *Kumārasambhava* in Lienhard's volume on *kāvya* (Lienhard, Siegfried, *A History of Classical Poetry. Sanskrit – Pali – Prakrit.* A History of Indian Literature, Volume III, Fasc. 1. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1984: 172 n. 52).

[44] Suryakanta 1962: xxiii–xxvi.

[45] For instance, the following fifteen readings recorded in Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886 in the first 30 stanzas of *sarga* 9 have been omitted in Suryakanta 1962: *pārāpatam* (9.1b), *āmandagatim* (9.3b), *trasan* (9.6b), *ataḥ* (9.7a), *tvadanī-kṣaṇena* (9.8c), *parikṣepavivarṇa°* (9.15d), *khinna°* (9.20a), *kampena* (9.20b), *salī-*

After the publication of Suryakanta's work in 1962, no new editions of the text of *sarga*s 9 to 17 nor new Sanskrit commentaries on them have been published. However, three editions of the *Kumārasambhava* have appeared, in which the text and the commentary by Sītārāma, both copied from one of the Nirṇaya Sāgara Press editions, are supplemented with new analysis and interpretation of the text, such as *anvaya*s (syntactical rearrangements of the text), *tippaṇī*s (notes), commentaries and translations in Hindi. The three editions were all published in Varanasi and are admittedly similar to each other.[46] The first, edited by Śeśarāja Sharma Regmi and published in 1987, adds to each stanza the *anvaya*, the translation (*anuvāda*) into Hindi and, occasionally, short grammatical and prosodical remarks (*tippaṇī*s). The second and the third — edited by Sudhākar Mālavīya and by Pradyumna Pandey, and published in 1997 and 2010 respectively — give the *anvaya* and the translation into Hindi, but no *tippaṇī*s.

Summing up, *sarga*s 9 to 17 of the *Kumārasambhava* have been published fairly frequently over the 150 years since the publication of their *editio princeps*, in 1866–1867: I was able to locate 28 editions, quite evenly distributed over time. Most of these editions include the whole *Kumārasambhava* in 17 *sarga*s. Only three editions, all among the earliest ones, contain only *sarga*s 8 to 17 (the then so-called *uttarakhaṇḍa*): Viṭṭhalaśāstrī 1866-1867, Tarkavācaspati 1868 and Vidyāsāgara 1887. However, most of the 28 editions are reprints of previous works with minor additions: restricting the count to those works which are the result of original research, six different editions and four Sanskrit commentaries of *sarga*s 9 to 17 of the *Kumārasambhava* have been published so far. The editions are: Viṭṭhalaśāstrī 1866–1867, Tarkavācaspati 1868, Bhau Dājī 1873, Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886, Govindaśāstrī 1925, and Suryakanta 1962. The commentaries are those by Sītārāma (included in all the fourteen editions published by the Nirṇaya Sāgara Press starting from Parvaṇīkara & Paraba 1886, as well as in other editions which reproduced the *mūla* text and the commentary from

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lam (9.20d), *śreṇivare* and *śreṇikare* (9.25a), *vinīlāṅgulim* (9.26d), *ca* (9.29a), *vilakṣatāṃ sā* and *vilakṣabhāvam* (9.30d).

[46] For the bibliographical references of the three editions, see Bibliography, Primary sources.

the Nirṇaya Sāgara Press editions), by Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara (in Vidyāsāgara 1887), by Kṣetramohana Nyāyaratna (in Mukhopā-dhyāya 1894), and by Kanakalāla Śarmā Ṭhakkura (in Ṭhakkura 1923). These lists show that much of the effort in producing new editions and composing Sanskrit commentaries on *sarga*s 9 to 17 was concentrated over the thirty years following the publication of the *editio princeps* (1866 to 1894), a span during which four (out of six) editions and three (out of four) Sanskrit commentaries were published.

In line with the numbers of the editions and commentaries, three translations into English of *sarga*s 9 to 17 have so far been published, all included in volumes containing not only the transla-tion of the whole *Kumārasambhava* (in 17 *sarga*s), but also those of all the major works by Kālidāsa. The earliest, anonymous (and very little known) translation of *sarga*s 9 to 17 of the *Kumārasambhava* was published in Kolkata in 1901 by the Society for the Re-suscitation of Indian Literature.[47] Next to this, in 1912 comes Ryder's 'translation,'[48] which cannot in fact be counted as a trans-lation, being a synopsis of the content interspersed with the trans-lation of a few stanzas. In more recent times, two translations have appeared, one by Devadhar, published in 1984,[49] and the other by Rajan, published in 1997.[50] Although neither of the translators declares which edition of the text their translation is based upon, this has been ascertained by scrutinising how they rendered spe-cific passages where the constituted text differs in different edi-tions: the translation published in Kolkata in 1901 follows the text

[47] *Kumar Shambhavam or The Birth of War-God. Translated into English. A Poem by Kalidasa*, in *Works of Kalidasa. Translated from the Original Sanskrit into English. 1. Shakuntala, 2. Vikrama-Urvashi, 3. Kumara-Sambhavam, 4. Megha-Duta, 5. Ritu-Samhara, 6. Raghu-Vamsha.* Calcutta: The Society for the Resuscitation of Indian Literature, 1901, pp. 1-138 (each translation has independent pagination).

[48] Ryder, Arthur W. (tr.), *Kalidasa. Translations of Shakuntala, and other works.* London & Toronto: J.M. Dent & Sons; New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1912, pp. 172–180.

[49] Devadhar, Chintaman Ramchandra (tr.), *Works of Kālidāsa.* Edited with an exhaustive introduction, critical and explanatory notes and English translation. Vol. 2: Poetry. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984, pp. 145–265.

[50] Rajan, Chandra (tr.), *The Complete Works of Kālidāsa.* In three volumes. Volume 1. New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 1997, pp. 215–290.

of Tarkavācaspati 1868,[51] the one by Devadhar is based on the text published in the Nirṇaya Sāgara Press editions (although occasionally accepting variant readings in the constituted text),[52] and that by Rajan follows the text published in the Nirṇaya Sāgara Press editions.

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[51] See the translation of 10.4a (on p. 91), where 'water came out of the mouth of the Gods' clearly renders *sravajjalamukhair devair*, found only in Viṭṭhalaśāstrī 1866–1867 and Tarkavācaspati 1868 (all other editions have *vilakṣyamukhair devair* or *vilakṣa°*); 13.4b (on p. 109), where 'embracing his son warmly' translates *āśliṣya gāḍhaṃ* (found in Tarkavācaspati 1868 but not in Viṭṭhalaśāstrī 1866-1867, which reads *āśliṣṭagātraṃ*); and especially 15.7b (on p. 120), where '[many commanders] were waiting there on horse-back' clearly renders *vāhavarān adhiṣṭhitān*, which is a reading exclusive to Tarkavācaspati 1868 (all other editions have *bāhuvarān adhiṣṭhitān*, '[many commanders] standing with their vigorous arms').

[52] As in 10.2b, where Devadhar (who gives the Sanskrit text along with the English translation) prefers *dyuṣadāṃ so 'tisādaram* to *kutsitāṅgaṃ ca sādaram*, the former recorded as a variant and the latter included in the constituted text in the Nirṇaya Sāgara Press editions.

[53] Some editions have title pages in both English and Sanskrit, others only in one or the other language: however, all the records in the bibliography are in English. The transcriptions of the title pages in Sanskrit (where available) can be found in the relevant notes in this article. For those editions whose title page is only in Sanskrit (Vidyāsāgara 1887, Mukhopādhyāya 1894, Ṭhakkura 1923), a rendition of it in English has been put in the bibliography. The entries relating to the editions which I was unable to consult (Bhau Dājī 1873 and Govindaśāstrī 1925) have been included in the bibliography just for the sake of completeness: they contain only the data made available in Suryakanta 1962: xxvi.

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Prajñākaragupta on Pramāṇavārttika 2.1 in the Light of Yamāri's Interpretation

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1. Introduction

Even though Prajñākaragupta is widely recognized as one of the greatest Buddhist philosophers of all times, we know next to nothing about his life, not even in a form of a hagiography. The only piece of information known to me is that he was a lay person (*upāsaka*).[1] According to Stcherbatsky he was 'apparently a native of Bengal,'[2] but I was unable to trace the source of this information. Naudou suggests cautiously that Prajñākaragupta may have been a Kashmiri because his disciple Ravigupta was from Kashmir, but notes that 'references to his [Ravigupta's] Kashmiri origins are always subject to caution.'[3] *The Blue Annals* also associate a certain Ravigupta (Ñi ma sbas pa) with Kashmir, but it is uncertain whether the Buddhist scholar bearing this name who transmitted 'the cycle of Tārā'[4] is identical with Prajñākaragupta's disciple.

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[1] Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya 1990: 296.
[2] Stcherbatsky 1930: 43.
[3] Naudou 1980: 126.
[4] Roerich 1995: 1050 (20a).

Prajñākaragupta's date is equally uncertain. The generally accepted date, 750–810, has been suggested by Motoi Ono.[5] However, this date cannot be considered to be well established. The terminus post quem is provided by Dharmottara (dated 730–790 by Frauwallner and 740–800 by Krasser[6]) to whose work Prajñākaragupta seems to have referred several times.[7] Prajñā-karagupta's terminus ante quem is more problematic. It used to be provided by the Jain philosopher Vidyānandin. However, Trikha has argued convincingly that a later date of Vidyānandin must be assumed, as suggested already by Tatia in 1964, because he quotes from Vācaspatimiśra's *Tātparyaṭīkā*.[8] Thus, Vidyā-nandin's floruit has probably to be assigned to the second half of the tenth century. Consequently, the earliest known reference to Prajñākaragupta's work would occur in the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* of the Nyāya philosopher Bhāsarvajña who probably lived in the first half of the tenth century. Thus, according to our current knowledge, Prajñākaragupta may have lived any time between the end of the eighth century to the middle of the tenth.

In his foundational book *Buddhist Logic*, Stcherbatsky divides Dharmakīrti's commentators into three groups (p. 39 ff.). 'The school of direct meaning' or the 'philological school,' initiated by Devendrabuddhi, explained the literal meaning of the text without going into its deeper implications. The Kashmiri or philo-sophical school founded by Dharmottara presents Dharmakīrti's philosophy as a critical system of epistemology and logic and avoids metaphysical and religious issues. The religious school, however, interpreted the *Pramāṇavārttika* as a commentary on 'the whole of the Mahāyāna Scripture which establishes the existence, the omniscience and other properties of the Buddha, of his so called Cosmical Body' (p. 43). According to Stcherbatsky, Prajñā-karagupta was the founder of this school. Even though it is doubt-ful whether one can really speak of 'schools,' Stcherbatsky's char-

[5] Ono 2000: XI. In note 1 thereon, Ono announces that this dating will be sub-stantiated in the second part of his work, which unfortunately has not yet been published. I therefore rely here on Ono's unpublished dissertation with the same title, submitted to the University of Vienna in 1993.

[6] Krasser 1992.

[7] See Miyo 2013, also for references to previous scholarship.

[8] Trikha 2012: 111, with reference to Tatia 1964: 11 in n. 142.

acterization of the three types of commentaries is appropriate. The author of the most extensive and most important surviving commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* is Prajñākaragupta, and indeed his work highlights the religious dimension of Dharmakīrti's work. In this commentary, he commented on three of its four chapters, the Pramāṇasiddhi, Pratyakṣa and Parārthānumāna chapters, leaving out the Svārthānumāna chapter on which Dharmakīrti himself had written a commentary. Prajñākaragupta's commentary is sometimes called *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* ('Ornament of the *Pramāṇavārttika*'), sometimes simply *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya* ('Commentary on the *Pramāṇavārttika*').[9] Both titles seem to be abbreviations of the full title *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkārabhāṣya* as seen, for instance, in the colophon of the single complete manuscript of the work: *samāptaṃ cedaṃ pramāṇavārttikālaṅkārabhāṣyam iti.*[10]

Although the PVABh is a foundational work in the history of Buddhist philosophy, it has been rarely studied, at least in European languages.[11] Except for my attempt in *Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth* (Vienna 1997), the only other subsequent attempt I am aware of is Shinya Moriyama's *Omniscience and Religious Authority* (Berlin 2014); one should also mention the pioneering work of Motoi Ono, which remains, unfortunately to this day unpublished.[12] The reason for this relative neglect are well-known. The work is vast, difficult and poorly edited.[13] And even though two commentaries on the PVABh survive, the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāraṭīkā* by Jayanta and the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāranibandha*[14] by Yamāri, they were available until recently only in Tibetan and often pose severe problems of understanding.

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[9] Accordingly, in Sanskrit and Tibetan sources Prajñākaragupta is called Bhāṣyakāra (also Bhāṣyakṛt) and Alaṃkārakāra, *Alaṃkāropādhyāya, etc.

[10] See the facsimile in Watanabe 1998, fol. 314v_7.

[11] Numerous important papers on Prajñākaragupta are written in Japanese, and I regret that I am unable to read them. Recently, Prof. Inami has founded a journal dedicated entirely to Prajñākaragupta's work.

[12] Motoi Ono, *Prajñākaraguptas Erklärung der Definition gültiger Erkenntnis*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Vienna 1993.

[13] In his preface to Sāṅkṛtyāyana's edition of the text (PVABh), Altekar says that Prajñākaragupta's commentary has more than 16,200 *śloka*s and that this amounts to almost one sixth of the size of the Indian epic *Mahābhārata*.

[14] On the title of the work, see below.

However, a Sanskrit manuscript of Yamāri's commentary on the first chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra*, on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, has survived and is currently in the process of being edited by a team of scholars at Leipzig University. This commentary, in addition to its original contributions to Buddhist history of philosophy, puts us in a better position than ever before to understand Prajñākaragupta's work.

As could be expected, we know next to nothing about Yamāri's life. It is quite certain that he lived in the first half of the 11th century, and that he was, like Prajñākaragupta, an *upāsaka*,[15] for he had a small family (a wife and at least one son). In the introductory verse to his work, he mentions Jñānaśrī as his teacher, and this led to some disagreement among modern scholars whether he refers to Jñānaśrīmitra (ca. 980) or Jñānaśrībhadra (11th c.) and accordingly, whether he lived in Bihar or Kashmir.[16] Now that we have the Sanskrit text of Yamāri, which quotes several times from Jñānaśrīmitra's work and mentions him by name with an honorific (*mitrapāda*) (ms. fol. 22r_6), we can reasonably conclude that Yamāri was Jñānaśrīmitra's disciple and was active in the Bihar area.

The title of Yamāri's work as it appears in the Tibetan translation is *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāraṭīkā Supariśuddhā*. It seems to echo or to have been inspired by Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā Viśalamalavatī* and at the same time to take a critical stance against Jayanta's *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāraṭīkā*. However, we could find no trace of this title in the Sanskrit manuscript. On the contrary, all the evidence in the manuscript (both the somewhat boastful closing verses and colophon; unfortunately the introductory verse is missing in the Sanskrit manuscript, but the Tibetan translation of it also seems to presuppose *nibandha*) point at *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāranibandha* as the title of Yamāri's work (fol. 207r_{1-2}):

> *na mādṛśāṃ buddhir ihāsti tādṛśī*
> *tathāpi tāṃ ko 'pi samīhate janaḥ |*

[15] Incidentally, so was also Jitāri. It seems that not a few of the prominent Buddhist philosophers at that time were not ordained as monks.

[16] For details, see Matsuoka 2016.

tato nibandho racito mayā karāt
     kṛpāparādhīnatayā na mānataḥ ||
imaṃ nibandhaṃ vidhivad vidhāya
     yat puṇyam āsāditam aprameyam |
tenāstu loko 'dvayadharmadarśī
     yamāriśobhāṃ vikaṭāṃ dadhānaḥ ||

Such an understanding [as displayed] here [in my commentary] does not exist among my peers. Nevertheless, some people long for it. Therefore I composed the *Nibandha* with my own hands in view of (i.e. for the benefit of) others due to compassion, not out of pride. Having properly composed this *Nibandha*, whatever immeasurable merit is brought about by it, let the people holding the great brilliance of Yamāri see [the Buddha's] teaching of non-duality.

Similarly, the colophon reads (fol. 207r_2):

mahāpaṇḍitaśrīyamārivṛddhapādaviracite pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāranibandhe prathamaḥ paricchedaḥ samāptaḥ ||

The importance of the *Nibandha* is twofold. Most of the text consists, of course, of explanations of Prajñākaragupta's work, which are extremely helpful, for the PVABh is often difficult and subtle. Yamāri regularly explains individual words or terms, syntax, and implications and hidden intentions in the PVABh. However, Yamāri's commentary also contains a considerable number of digressions that go well beyond the commented text itself. As examples one may mention the requirements of the introductory statements in a scholarly treatise, where he debates with Arcaṭa, Dharmottara and Kamalaśīla,[17] the unusually lively discussion of the order of chapters in the *Pramāṇavārttika*, reflections on the independence of commentators vis-à-vis the commented text,[18] and so on.

One of the surprising discoveries in studying the Sanskrit manuscript is Yamāri's possible attribution of another work to Prajñākaragupta called the *Vidagdhamaṇḍana*. Yamāri even quotes a verse from it (fol. 14$r_{6–7}$):

[17] See Matsuoka 2019.
[18] See Franco 2018. The division of Dharmakīrti's commentators bears surprising resemblance to that of Stcherbatsky (Franco 2018: 262–263, n. 36).

> *tathā hi — vyaktam ayam ujjvalādiśabdam apahāyānuprāsa-*
> *preyasā prayukta uddhatadhvaniḥ vācakaḥ | mahākaviś cāyam |*
> *āha ca vidagdhamaṇḍane —*
>
> *sarvaśāstrakalāśilpaśuddhīnāṃ nikaṣopalaḥ |*
> *ahaṃ kavitvavaktṛtvakusumaiḥ kusumākaraḥ || iti*

To wit, the following is clear: [in the second *maṅgala* verse,] having avoided words such as *ujjvala* ('glowing') and so on, [Prajñākaragupta] used the signifier with the sound *uddhata* (i.e. the word *uddhata*) because of [his] love of alliteration. And he is a great poet. And he says in the *Vidagdhamaṇḍana*:

> I am the touchstone for [determining] the purity of all sciences, arts and crafts, a flower garden in virtue of the flowers of being both a poet and an expounder.

The author's name is not explicitly mentioned here, but it is clear that in the first part of the above quote Yamāri talks about Prajñākaragupta as the author who uses the word *uddhata* because of his love of alliteration: Prajñākaragupta's verse to which Yamāri refers indeed alliterates ([...] *atyantaśud**dhā**ṃ **dhi**yaṃ **dha**nyānāṃ vida**dhā**tum ud**dha**ta**dhi**yāṃ **dhī**ḥ saṃvide **dhī**yate*). As Yamāri does not change the subject in the next two sentences ('And he is a great poet. And he says […]'; *mahākaviś cāyam | āha ca […]*), the subject of the first sentence remains in force. Further, Yamāri regularly uses the word *āha* ('he says') to introduce Prajñā-karagupta's words he is commenting upon. Therefore, one may tentatively assume the *Vidagdhamaṇḍana*[19] to have been a further work of Prajñākaragupta.[20]

Whatever the case may be, with the discovery of Yamāri's commentary we are now in an incomparably better position to understand Prajñākaragupta's work, re-edit it, translate it and study it. All these are major desiderata for future research on Buddhist philosophy. As a modest beginning, I offer here a translation of the PVABh on *Pramāṇavārttika* 2.1. It is dedicated to my dear friend and colleague of many years, Raffaele Torella for his seventieth birthday. I forego the task of re-editing the text, for the PVABh on

[19] This is not to be confused with the *Vidagdhamukhamaṇḍana* of Dharmadāsa.
[20] For further details on Prajñākaragupta, see Franco 2019.

the first seven verses has already been ably edited by Ono; I only suggest very few corrections in the footnotes. The translation is also indebted to Ono's German translation; as this translation is still unpublished I point out disagreements only in a few important cases. The translation covers pp. 2.8–13.4 of the PVA:[21]

2. Translation

In relation to this, he points out the characteristic of means of valid cognition in general[22]—

A means of valid cognition is a cognition that does not belie [its promise].[23]

A means of valid cognition is a cognition because a valid cognition (i.e. the result of a means of valid cognition) is established when it (i.e. the cognition, *jñāna*) is present; [the means of valid cognition] is non-belying because of the opposite (i.e. because the cognition is not a valid cognition / a means of valid cognition) when it is belying.[24]

For the conjunction between sense and object and so on[25] attain the status of that (i.e. being a means of valid cognition)[26]

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[21] The complete title of Prajñākaragupta's work, as seen in the colophon of its single complete manuscript, seems to be *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkārabhāṣya* (hence the abbreviation PVABh). However, when I specifically refer to Ono's edition, I use PVA.

[22] Yamāri in general includes the meaning of the intention (in dictionaries of Apte and Monier-Williams the meaning of the sentence, but this is certainly not in this meaning here) which varies according to difference in situation or context (*avasthābhedabhinna*), and which later is said to include the Buddha as *pramāṇa*, and the literal meaning of the words, which refers to the two worldly (*sāṃvyavahārika*) *pramāṇa*s, perception and inference. See Y 31r_2: *tad evam avi-saṃvādakatvam eva sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇayoḥ pāramārthikapramāṇasya ca bhaga-vataḥ sādhyasya sāmānyaṃ lakṣaṇam iti sthitam.*

[23] Or swap subject and predicate: a cognition that does not belie its promise is a means of knowledge.

[24] The translation presupposes a different understanding of the syntax than the one proposed by Ono's punctuation, PVA 2.10. Professor Ono kindly told me that he approves of the new interpretation. The Tibetan translation can be read either way: *tshad ma ni mi slu ba can te | de yod na gzal bya grub pa'i phyir ram | slu ba yin na bzlog pa'i phyir ro ||.*

[25] Yamāri (fol. 20v_{3-4}) quotes ŚV, Pratyakṣasūtra 60, to present the position of the opponent:
yad vendriyaṃ pramāṇaṃ syāt tasya vārthena saṅgatiḥ |
manaso vendriyair yoga ātmanā sarva eva vā ||
[26] Y 23v_4: *tattvaṃ pramāṇatvam.*

only inasmuch as they are indicated (or implied – *upalakṣita*) by a cognition that is free from (*vivikta*) belying.[27] For every person who undertakes[28] the investigation of the means of valid cognition aims at a non-belying [means of valid cognition].[29]

[Objection:][30] Non-belying is nothing but the own-form of the cognition that brings about [*arthakriyā*[31]], and when this [cognition] is being cognized as its own-form,[32] that [non-belying] has indeed already been cognized. Therefore, why should it be examined?[33] If, on the other hand, one does not apprehend the own-form [of a cognition], then it would not be a means of valid cognition.[34] However, this position is not acceptable to you [Buddhists].

[Reply:] This is not true. The validity of cognition, or its non-belying, is not at all its own form. Rather,

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[27] That is, only inasmuch as the non-belying cognition indicates or implies that it arises from a contact between sense and object, it can be said that a valid cognition is characterized by such contact. In other words, the primary characterization of valid cognition is non-belying and other qualifications such as the arising from a contact are secondary.

[28] Lit., *-prayuktaḥ* may be rendered as 'connected'; Y 20v_7, however, explains that from the context it has to be understood as *pravṛtta*: *prayukta* [2,13] *iti prakaraṇād pravṛtta ity evārthaḥ*.

[29] Yamāri explains that the aiming at non-belying is subordinate to the aiming of *arthakriyā*: *nanv arthakriyārthī dṛśyate lokaḥ | kim ucyate — avisaṃvādārthī*[2,12]*ti? | kevalam arthakriyārthitvād evārthakriyākāriṇy avisaṃvādārthī bhavan pramāṇam anveṣate.*

[30] The objection presupposes an opponent from the Kumārila school, which is the main target of Prajñākaragupta's criticism throughout the entire discussion here. Even though the term itself does not appear in the present context, it is clear that the opponent attempts to defend the theory of *svataḥprāmāṇya*.

[31] This is my understanding of *sādhanajñāna*. Ono (1993: 6), however, suggests to take it as 'the proving cognition': '(etwas) beweisende Erkenntnis.' If I understand Prajñākaragupta correctly, *arthakriyā* should not be translated as 'purposeful action,' but as the 'accomplishment of the purpose.' In other words, Prajñākaragupta understands the term not as referring to the process or the action itself, but to its intended result. Cf. his immediately following explanation below.

[32] According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, the cognition not directly perceived but inferred through the property of the object *jñātatva*; some Mīmāṃsakas suggest that it is cognized by *arthāpatti*. See Sinha 1958: 199 ff.

[33] In other words, the treatise (*śāstra*) is useless; cf. Y 21r_7: **kiṃ parīkṣate?** *iti parīkṣākṣepeṇa śāstrānupayoga uktaḥ.*

[34] According to Y 21r_7, not only the cognition would not be valid, but there would be no cognition at all, for without the perception of cognitions, there would be no memory of them: *smaraṇasyāpy anavakāśena jñānam eva kiṃcin nāstīti mahājāḍyaprasaṅgaḥ.*

Non-belying is standing firm in respect to the accomplishment of the purpose.[35]

It should not be accepted that this (i.e. the cognition) is a means of valid cognition when nothing but the own form of a cognition is apprehended. What then [should be accepted[36]]? **Action**, (i.e.) the production/accomplishment,[37] of an **object/purpose**[38] such as burning, cooking and so on; **non-belying** is the **standing firm**,[39] (i.e.) not wavering, of this [action]; or [non-belying means] the determination.[40] And this action (i.e. production) of an object is future, not at that time [when the cognition that is a means of valid cognition, the *sādhanajñāna*, arises]. Therefore, the connection with that [future production of an object] is not determined by the mere apprehension of the own-form [of the cognition].[41]

[Objection:] The fact of being connected to that [future production of an object] is nothing but the own form [of the cogni-

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[35] I translate *arthakriyā* according to Prajñākaragupta's understanding without claiming that this translation conveys Dharmakīrti's opinion on this term.

[36] As that whose presence enables something to be called *pramāṇa*; cf. Y 21v_3: *atra praśnaḥ — kiṃ tarhi* [3,10]? *yasmin sati avisaṃvādiśabdapravṛttir iti śeṣaḥ.*

[37] According to Yamāri, this indicates that Prajñākaragupta takes action as a property of the object, unlike Dharmottara, who takes it as a property of the subject. Y 21v_{3-4}: **kriyā niṣpattir** [3,10] *ity anena karmadharmaḥ kriyeti sphuṭayan, na hy ābhyām* (PVin I, 1.10) *ityādiphakkikāyāṃ ṭīkākārasya kartṛdharmatāmataṃ pratikṣipati.*

[38] It is possible that the word *artha* is used here to convey both a thing and a purpose; the same ambiguity is present in the English term 'object,' and if one wishes to retain the ambiguity of the original, 'object' would certainly be a better translation for *artha.* However, the examples of burning and cooking seem to indicate not just an attained object such as fire by inference and water by perception, but also the use one makes of these objects. Therefore, 'purpose' seems to me to convey better Prajñākaragupta's intention.

[39] If I understand correctly, 'standing firm' here is equivalent to or interchangeable with 'non-deviating from' or 'always leading to' *arthakriyā.*

[40] Y 21v_{5-6} explains the alternative in relation to two doctrines: non wavering is used in relation to the doctrine of the existence of external objects, *vyavasthā* in relation to Advaita; in the latter case the accomplishment of an object such as burning and cooking is merely a convention (*vyavasthāmātra*): **sthitir avicalanam** [3,10] *iti bahirarthavāde | **vyavasthā vet**y advaite | tadā hi dāhādinirbhāsajñāne 'rthakriyā vyavasthāmātram.* As Larry McCrea helpfully pointed out, the term *vyavasthāmātra* is often used by Jñānaśrīmitra in the sense of 'conditionally adopted position' (McCrea, personal communication).

[41] See also the discussion in PVA, p. 70, v. 205.

tion]. Therefore, why doesn't [the validity/non-belying consist in] the determination of own nature [of the cognition] alone?

[Reply:] This is not the case.

3. The cognition of a relation that rests on two [relata] does not come from an apprehension of a single form. [Only] when the own form of two [relata] is apprehended, the relation is apprehended.

[Objection:] Then how is the cognition of that [relation] possible at the time when [the cognition] motivates to action?

[Reply:] We shall explain that later on.[42]

[Objection:] If the previous [cognition] is a means of valid cognition when the [posterior] apprehension of the accomplishment of the purpose [takes place, then] the apprehension of the accomplishment of the purpose, in its turn, is either a means of valid cognition or not. That [later apprehension must be] a means of knowledge because without a means of knowledge there is no apprehension of the accomplishment of the purpose. Therefore, from it too, a later (or further) apprehension of the accomplishment of the purpose is looked for. Thus, there is an infinite regress.

[Reply:] This is not better.

4. If a previous [cognition] is means of valid cognition because the later accomplishment of the purpose arises, how is this later [apprehension] not that (viz., a means of valid cognition) due to the arising of the accomplishment of the purpose at that very time?

That towards which the standing firm of the accomplishment of the purpose is transferred (*upakalpita*) by a later [apprehension], that is a means of valid cognition by that very reason (*yāvat*). However, that towards which the [direct] experience of the accomplishment of the purpose [occurs] precisely at that time by [the experience] itself, that is a means of valid cognition all the more so, because it is stated in general[43] that non-belying is standing firm in respect to the accomplishment of the purpose.

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[42] Prajñākaragupta presumably refers to the discussion on *Pramāṇavārttika* 2.5a, when commenting on *prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa*.

[43] That is, in the general characterization of *pramāṇa*; see PVA 2.8.

[Objection:] This accomplishment of the purpose, such as burning and cooking, is also possible in a dream, as well as in a cognition of a yellow conch-shell [by someone who has jaundice, which is false but nevertheless leads to the attainment of the conch shell].[44] But in a cognition which has a word as its object there is no accomplishment of a purpose such as burning and cooking, because there is no accomplishment of purpose neither by [the verbal cognition] itself nor by something else. Therefore, it is correct to say that a cognition that has not been sublated is a means of valid cognition.

[Reply:] This is also incorrect. Because

There is non-belying also in a verbal [cognition] because it makes the intention [of the speaker] known.

'Verbal' means a cognition which has a word as its object. From the word 'also' [one understands] elsewhere too. The meaning is this:

5. By mere apprehension of the own form [of cognition], every cognition would be a means of valid cognition. If [validity] is due to being an unsublated cognition, why isn't this the case for dream etc. too?

The connection to a mere cognition, which arises in a dream and in other cognitions, is common to all [cognitions]. It does not establish a human purpose/aim.

If [you claim that] the fact of being an unsublated cognition [proves a human purpose], that too is indeed common [to dreams etc.].

If [you claim that the cognition in a dream] is sublated by the waking cognition, [we ask] what is this thing called sublation?

6. If [you claim that sublation] is accepted as making known the inexistence of the object [of a previous cognition] by another [cognition, then we answer that] the cognition is engaged with its own object, how can it make known the inexistence [of another object]?

To begin with, the non-existence of the dream cognition or any other cognition is not effected by another cognition because at that time the [the dream cognition] has already perished by it-

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[44] See TS(P) 1324, Hattori 1968: 97, n. 1.53.

self.[45] Nor is a cognition perceived to be sublated when it perishes because one shuts one's eyelids.[46]

[One may claim that] the sublation is the removal of the object by another cognition, characterized as making known the non-existence [of the object of another cognition], but [the cognition which is] engaged with its own object cannot arrange (or contrive) the removal of another object. The property of the cognitions is to prove/establish the own form of their own objects. The removal of the object[47] of another, on the other hand, is the property of the king.

[Objection:] Then how could there be a relation of sublating and sublated [between cognitions]?

[Reply:] In no way whatsoever! Precisely for this reason, to be a means of valid cognition is [the same as] to be non-sublated. Therefore, [the cognition] in relation to which there is no accomplishment of the purpose is not a means of valid cognition.

7. That [cognition] in relation to which the accomplishment [of the purpose] is not known to arise, neither by itself nor by another [cognition], is not a means of knowledge. In reality, there is no difference between dreams and non-dreams.

The so-called difference between dreams and non-dreams is merely everyday practice. In the same manner, the difference between means of valid cognition and non-means of valid cognition [is also merely everyday practice]. This will be explained [later on].[48] And this (?)[49] is not standing firm in relation to the accom-

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[45] This interpretation of sublation seems non-sensical and I doubt that it was held by any real opponent. I assume that it has been raised as a possible, even if highly unlikely, interpretation of an expression such as *jñānasya bādhaḥ*, which is perhaps not precise enough, but nevertheless could only mean that the object of the sublated cognition is sublated, not the existence of cognition itself. Note that such interpretation is also raised by Jayarāśi, see Franco 1987: 122ff.

[46] That is, even when the cognition is not destroyed by itself—Prajñā-karagupta is probably thinking here of a continuous cognition such as the *dhāravāhijñāna* accepted by the Naiyāyikas—but by some external factor, this does not involve sublation.

[47] This is of course a joke and a pun on the word *viṣaya*; the king removes or appropriates himself the domain, i.e. the land property of another person.

[48] Y 22v_3 refers the reader to v. 5c *prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa*. Note that the reading *hi* in PVA 6.2 is puzzling, and the particle should perhaps be deleted; it does not appear in the quotation in Y 22v_3.

[49] I am not sure what 'this' refers to; Ono takes it to refer to the difference between *pramāṇa* and *apramāṇa*.

plishment of the purpose, because there is no non-wavering (or non-deviation). In a dream, the production of an object is based on impressions[50] alone; there is no satisfaction there. However, when it comes to absence of sublation [as a criterion of validity], there is only infinite regress. First, lack of sublation is present everywhere (in all cognitions). But how [does one know] that if there is no sublation at a later time, [there would be] no sublation in relation to that [previous non-sublation] in a still later time?

8. The earlier non-existence of a sublating factor is possible/ arises for every cognition. But why is the later existence[51] of a sublating factor not suspected in this case too?

However, the cognition of a yellow conch shell is not at all a means of valid cognition because one does not obtain the accomplishment of the purpose. If the accomplishment of the purpose is established only for the structure [of the conch shell and not for its color], another cognition is the means of valid cognition, namely inference. To wit,

8a. [One reasons as follows:] Such an appearance (i.e. of the yellow conch shell) is not deprived of a structure because it has been seen elsewhere in this way. Thus, that [cognition that relates the structure of the yellow conch shell to a previous cognition of a white conch shell] is an inference.

The [person] who has never perceived the deviation (i.e. who has never perceived a white conch shell) is indeed led astray because of the deviation in relation to the object as it was intended (i.e. with yellow color). But the one who knows the deviation acts after having deliberated: First, the structure alone is obtained; in relation to the other (i.e. the yellow colour), [there is] doubt or error. Therefore, [there is] an inference in relation to the structure [and] doubt in relation to the other [namely, the colour]. Thus, there are two cognitions, [one is] a means of valid cognition and [the other] a non-means of valid cognition. By this, the cognition of the jewel in relation to the glow of the jewel is explained. And we shall explain [later] in this way.[52]

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[50] I read *vāsanā* instead of *bhāvanā*. See PVA p. 6, n. 2.
[51] I read -*bhāvas*; see PVA p. 6, n. 5.
[52] See Franco and Notake 2014: 22–23.

[Objection:] How is it perceived that these are two [cognitions]?

[Reply:] That too we shall explain [later].

As for the cognition which has a word as its object, it is a means of valid cognition **because it makes the intention [of the speaker] known**. The non-belying [in this case] is only the apprehension of the own nature of the action of the intended object.

9. The accomplishment [of the purpose] in that [verbal cognition] is accepted only as the establishing of the own nature of [the object] to be expressed (lit. to be sung) [by the speaker]. In a picture too, the result/fruit is fully attained by mere seeing [and not by actually obtaining what is depicted in the picture].

Indeed, nothing other than the apprehension of the own nature is perceived as a species of the accomplishment of the purpose in that [verbal cognition].[53] Indeed, the visible (or beauty?) and so on amount to the cognition of their own form. The cognition which has them as an object is not a means of valid cognition for anything else. And merely[54] making known the own nature of the [object] is common to all cognitions. Therefore, it is not introduced as a means of valid cognition that belongs to everyday practice.

10. Therefore, the means of valid cognition whose object is a future thing (i.e. a future *arthakriyā*) has a different object as its domain;[55] it conforms to everyday practice [only] by a superimposition.

Indeed, the person who aims at obtaining a future (or?) different object [from the one that appears in the cognition] aims at enquiring about what is a means of valid cognition and what is not. Just as touch and so on, which have different objects, are not included in the apprehension of the own nature of the visible etc.,[56] in the same manner the future own nature too in reality [is not included in the earlier cognition]. But due to the superimpo-

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[53] The text is uncertain. I follow Y 26r$_2$ in reading *-jātam,* which also accords better with *aparam.* Note that the Tibetan translation does not render this compound, but transliterates it: *artha kre ya dza ti.* This seems to point at the reading *-jāti.*

[54] Read *mātratvam* instead of *mātrakam* ?

[55] I.e. the object of the *sādhanajñāna* and of the *arthakriyājñāna* are different.

[56] For instance, the *arthakriyā* of a visual cognition of water may consist in touching the water by drinking, bathing etc.

sition, the other object [of the past cognition is considered or conceptualized] as one/identical with it. Therefore, by means of that [superimposition] too, the non-belying of a cognition is explained.

However, in a case where that same [own nature][57] is the accomplishment of the purpose, there is no difference of opinion [between us and the opponents]. There, the superimposition on the future own nature as one [with the past own nature] is due to the [past object] being the cause of that [future object]. As for the different object, such as the tangible and so on, [it is superimposed as one with the visible and so on] by the fact that it depends on the same causal complex. Thus, there is no difference [between the two cases.] But in [a cognition] in which a different action of the object than the one intended [appears], e.g., the attaining of the action of the object [that are] the sun rays from a cognition that apprehends water, that is not at all a means of valid cognition. Precisely for this reason, he says **[validity is present] also in a verbal cognition because it makes the intention [of the speaker] known**.

[The particle *api* implies] elsewhere too, in a painting etc. And thus, when one obtains a cloth upon a cognition of a pot, and a cognition of silver when there is a conch shell, there is no validity even indirectly[58] because the non-belying of the intention is absent.

11. Every [verbal cognition] is said to be a means of valid cognition because it makes the intention [of the speaker] known, not only because it arises from a cognition of [an object] of the same kind or of a different kind.[59]

12. The sublating cognition too is of this kind (i.e. established as valid or non-belying) because it stands firm. But in reality, it only arises from a cognition of a dissimilar [object].

13. If the arising of a cognition of a dissimilar [object] is called sublating [cognition], why isn't it correct [to say that] the cognition of cloth sublates the cognition of a pot?

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[57] This is a tentative suggestion. I see no neuter noun (as a referent of *tad*) except *rūpa* or *svarūpa*. Ono, however, assumes *jñāna*.

[58] In PVA 8.15 I read *rajatajñāne paramparayā*.

[59] As an example of an object of the same kind, Yamāri mentions silver (in relation to a conch shell) as an example for an object of a different kind, the pot (in relation to a cloth).

14.[60] If [you claim that] a certain cognition is accepted as sublating because it occurs in the form of 'not' (i.e. that other cognition was not correct or that the object of the other cognition does not exist), [we ask:] from which means of valid cognition does this very cognition in the form of 'not' come?

15. If [you say that there is] a means of valid cognition characterized by absence; from it [comes the cognition in the form of 'not,' then one has to] examine: is it a cognition of the form of another [object],[61] or is it the cognition of non-existence of that[62] [object of the sublated cognition]?

16. If it is the cognition of the form of another [object], [the sublation] would result without distinction.[63] If [sublation] is the cognition of the non-existence of that [object], there would be no relation (*samanvaya*) to [the cognition that has the form] 'of that' (i.e. the form of the object of the sublated cognition).

For absence/non-existence is perceived as its own form. And the own form of the absence is not perceived as being connected to a pot etc. When a pot is apprehended, absence is not [perceived] as being connected to that [pot], because at that time the absence is absent. Indeed, the death of the living Devadatta is not [perceived]. As for the pot which is not being perceived, its being connected to an absence cannot be grasped.

[60] As a subordinate topic to the doctrine of sublation, Prajñākaragupta now digresses into a discussion of absence or non-existence (*abhāva*) as means as well as objects of knowledge. On *abhāva* as a means of knowledge in the Mīmāṃsā, see Bhatt 1962: 341–367. Bhatt distinguishes between Kumārila's view and 'The Bhāṭṭa View in its Revised From' (p. 357 f.). As far as I can see, the salient points of the revised form do not play a role here.

[61] For the first alternative, Yamāri, fol. $27v_2$, quotes ŚV Abhāvapariccheda 11: *pratyakṣāder anutpattiḥ pramāṇābhāva ucyate | sātmano 'pariṇāmo vā vijñānaṃ vānyavastuni ||*. Cf. TS 1649 (= 1648) *iṣyate* instead of *ucyate*, translated in Kellner 1997: 2.

[62] One could take *tasya* and *abhāvasya* together and translate: 'the cognition of that non-existence.' However Y $27v_4$: **tasya vid** *iti vyadhikaraṇe ṣaṣṭhyau*. Absence has to be absence of something, but if this is the case here, why is there no connection e.g., between the presence of a pot and the absence of a pot? Prajñākaragupta seems to argue that absence exists in its own nature and cannot be related to the corresponding presence. A similar argument can be found in the *Tattvopaplavasiṃha* (Franco 1987: 214, 216).

[63] That is, every cognition would be a sublation of all other cognitions. Thus, the cognition of something visible would sublate a cognition of flavour. See Y $27v_4$: **aviśeṣāt prasajyata** [9,11] *iti. yasya kasyacit pratītyā sarvasyānyasya niṣedhaḥ syād*

[Objection:] The cognition [of the connection between a pot and its absence] is like [the cognition of two things] being cause and effect. When the cause is present, the effect arises afterwards. Immediately after that, when the own nature [of that effect] is apprehended, due to the sequence of its (the effect's) apprehension [after the cause], one grasps the relation of cause and effect. In this manner, [one apprehends that] when there is presence, absence [by destruction arises afterwards] and when there is [prior] absence, presence [arises afterwards]. Thus, the apprehension of the relation [between the pot and its absence] arises.

[Reply:] This is not true, because

17. The connection of something to an absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*) is not established. This absence does not [arise] when there is presence and also not the opposite (e.g., the hare's horn neither arises after being absent, nor is it destroyed after being present).

Moreover,

18. The own nature of cause and effect is perceived without that (i.e. without one of the two).[64] But in reality,[65] absence is not perceived without presence.

19. The emptiness of a place [from a certain object] is the same everywhere.[66] The differences between previous absence, [posterior absence,] and so on are completely impossible there [in an empty place].[67]

20. The difference of previous non-perception [from posterior non-perception] and so on should have been perceived by the senses, just as the difference among things is perceived so by perception.

21.[68] If you think that [absence] is perceived by the means of valid cognition [called] absence, [we ask:] the absence of which

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iti rūpadarśane 'pi rasaniṣedhaprasaṅgaḥ. Ono 1993: 18 seems to favour a different interpretation.

[64] Yamāri glosses *tena* with *dvitīyena.*

[65] Yamāri glosses *bhāvataḥ* with *tattvataḥ.*

[66] Yamāri 28v_1 quotes here ŚV, Abhāvapariccheda 8ab = TS 1655ab: *na cāvastuna ete syur bhedās tenāsya vastutā.* See also Kellner 1997: 7.

[67] As a second interpretation, Yamāri 28v_2 suggests that the emptiness of a place is exactly the same at the time of *prāgabhāva* and *pradhvaṃsābhāva.*

[68] Y 28v_5 explains that after criticizing *abhāva* as *prameya,* Prajñākaragupta now expands the criticism to *abhāva* as *pramāṇa.*

means of valid cognition [do you claim to constitute a means of valid cognition] since there is no valid cognition in the cognition [of absence]?

22. If absence is admitted [to exist], why doesn't the cognition that grasps absence [arise] for every absence? Why doesn't [it arise] for the sleeping person in any form/mode?

23. Why isn't this [absence] perceived of anything without the cognition of presence? The causal complex there is exactly the same, if the absence is [also] not determined [there.][69]

24. There is no cognition of absence over and above the thing itself. [Objection:] The cognition [which takes the form] 'this is absent/is not [here]' cognizes the difference [of the absence from the existing thing].

25. [Reply:] Why wouldn't this [cognition] arise from the senses without recollecting [the absent object]?[70] If [you claim that] the cognition of absence arises from the conjunction of the senses and recollection,

26. [then] it would be perception because it follows (or complies with) the presence of the senses.[71] If the sense is engaged with one [object, namely the place], it is not the cause of the cognition of another [object, namely, absence].

27. If the cognition of absence is mental [because it does not depend on the object], how could it be a means of valid cognition? [Objection:] It is means of valid cognition because it does not bely. [Reply:] This means of valid cognition is indeed something else![72]

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[69] Ono 1993: 21 suggests a different interpretation.

[70] As Y $29r_6$ explains, the opponent here suggests that the sense without the object is the cause of the cognition.

[71] Surprisingly, Y $29v_1$ attributes this opinion to Naiyāyikas; I would have expected Mīmāṃsakas.

[72] I try to convey the mocking or sarcastic tone that Y $29v_3$ reads into this statement. On the one hand, the means of cognition arises independently of the object, on the other hand, it is non-belying in respect to that object: *etad upahasati — aparaṃ mānam eva tad* [11,6] *iti | evaśabdo bhinnakramaḥ — aparam eva tat pramāṇaṃ, yad viṣayānapekṣajanmakam api sat tadavisaṃvādaṃ svīkaroti*. As a second alternative, however, Yamāri suggests that the opponent laments (*kākuḥ*) when he realizes that this means of valid cognition is other than absence: *athavā satyam, aparaṃ mānam eva tad yad evam iti kākuḥ*.

28. In relation to an absence that is different [from a thing such as a place], no [cognition] is not-belying. If there is non-belying in relation to [a place] being alone [without the thing whose absence is ascertained], then it (the fact of being alone) is perceived by perception.

29. And this apprehension of [a place] being alone is always without the cognition of absence. The cognition apprehends being alone without penetrating (i.e. being mixed with) something else [called absence].

30. If the apprehension of [a place] being alone is perception, non-belying is possible. Therefore, it is nothing but perception; otherwise, it is non-apprehension/non-perception.[73]

31. [Objection:] How is the cognition of [a place] being alone [possible] without a cognition of absence? [Reply:] That [cognition of absence] too does not arise without the cognition of [a place] being alone. Thus, this is a common [difficulty for both].

32. Or just as absence alone[74] is perceived (or inferred?) without [a further] absence, presence too is so (i.e. the place is also perceived without a further absence). If it is not [maintained to be] so, there would be an infinite regress.

[Objection:] Without the cognition of absence there is no cognition of [a place] being alone.[75]

[Reply:] Without the cognition of [a place] being alone, there is no cognition of absence. Thus, [the difficulty] is the same [in both positions]. Or[76] how is absence alone possible, without another absence? If there too one assumes another absence, there would be an infinite regress. Precisely that (perceptual cognition) inasmuch as it depends on a remembered entity, is non-perception. A cognition that establishes absence is perception.

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[73] Y 29v_7–30r_1 assumes here two kinds of perceivers; for the non-confused it is perception, for the confused it is non-perception, which has the nature of inference: [...] *pratyakṣam evaitat kevalagrahaṇam amūḍhaṃ pratipattāram apekṣyeti boddhavyam* | [...] *mūḍhaṃ tu pratipattāram apekṣya kevalagrahaṇaṃ dṛśyānupalabdhir evānumānarūpā tadvyavahārasādhanīty arthaḥ.*

[74] The argument presupposes that absence is perceived alone, not as mixed with a place.

[75] Yamāri points out that this expands on v. 31.

[76] Yamāri points out that this expands on v. 32.

However, everyday practice of absence arises in relation to a certain thing in conformity to a mnemonic trace, not in relation to another thing. Thus, there is a distinction [in everyday practice among various absent things]. Therefore, it is correct that just as the waking cognition sublates the cognition in a dream, in the same manner, the opposite too is the case due to the grasping of [a place] being alone. This is a correct reasoning.

Therefore [by saying] 'there is validity **also in a verbal [cognition] because it makes the intention [of the speaker] known**' the following has been refuted: 'The hearing cognition would not be a means of valid cognition because it is not connected to the other [cognitions].'[77]

[Objection:][78] What is the use of the Buddha being a means of knowledge since all human aims are established by the means of valid cognition that belongs to everyday practice?

[Reply:] This is not the case.

33. Perception is used for the apprehension of the own form [of things]; inference for the other cases. This will be explained later on.[79] The other [cognitions] are not means of valid cognition.

To begin with, perception is not engaged with the other world and so on because it perceives only the own form. We will explain this later. Inference, however, does not exist without the apprehension of the relation [of concomitance.] And a pervasive relation cannot be apprehended by someone who is not omniscient. The [pervasive] relation is not apprehended by something that has the nature of perception and rests on the apprehension of the own form. If the relation [is said to be] apprehended by inference only, there would be a fault of mutual dependence. However, perception and inference are means of valid cognition only in relation to everyday practice [and] only insofar as they contribute to the proof [of the Buddha as] omniscient, not in any other way. We will establish this later on.[80]

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[77] Cf. ŚV, Codanā, 77ab.

[78] It is not clear whether the following section is intended as the end of the commentary on v. 1 (by returning to the general topic of *pramāṇa*) or the beginning of the commentary on v. 2.

[79] In the chapter on perception; see Franco and Notake 2014.

[80] *Pramāṇavārttika* 2.34 ff.?

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Reconstructing an Episode
in the History of Sanskrit Philosophy:
Arthāpatti in Kumārila's Commentators*

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1. Introduction

According to Mīmāṃsā authors, *arthāpatti* is a distinct instrument of knowledge, leading one to know that, out of a given set of facts, something else is the case. The standard examples of it are 'Caitra, who is known to be alive, is not home,' leading to 'Caitra is outside,' and 'The fat Devadatta does not eat at daytime,' leading to 'Devadatta eats at night.' Mīmāṃsā authors contend, against Naiyāyika ones, that *arthāpatti* is distinct from and cannot be reduced to inference. Bhāṭṭa authors add a distinction between *dṛṣṭa-* and *śrutārthāpatti.* In the first case, one postulates a state of affairs that appeases the seeming impossibility created by the clash among two conflicting pieces of knowledge (in the example, Caitra's being alive and his not being in his habitual

place). In the second case, one postulates a linguistic expression in order to appease the seeming impossibility created by a (logically incomplete) sentence (such as, in the example above 'The fat Devadatta does not eat at daytime,' which requires to be completed by the words 'He eats at night'). Freschi 2021 reconstructs the early history of *arthāpatti*, pointing out the presence of (at least) two distinct currents in Mīmāṃsā, a hermeneutical one focusing on the exegesis of the Veda and an epistemological one focusing more on the philosophical arena were Nyāya authors and Buddhists of the Diṅnāga-Dharmakīrti school were debating logical and epistemological issues. Kumārila is the champion of this second current.

The present article attempts to reconstruct the history of the discussion on *arthāpatti* between the three main commentators on Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika* (henceforth ŚV), namely Uṃveka, Sucarita and Pārthasārathi Miśra.[1] It shows how distant their position can be at times and does justice to their role as autonomous philosophers.

2. *Methodology*

At times the small community of Sanskrit scholars has been made less cohesive by an opposition between a so-called philological and a so-called theoretical approach. The former would focus on critical editions of texts as the only possible starting point for each investigation, the latter would consider editions little more than an antiquarian curiosity and claim that what one needs to do with texts, namely looking at what theoretical tools Sanskrit texts can offer, especially to contemporary discussions, is far more interesting than reconstructing variants. The weaknesses of both views are easily seen. On the one hand, theories based on poorly published texts or on their paraphrases have weak to non-existent bases and are likely to miss the most important innovations of Sanskrit texts, the ones that can only be discovered when one engages with the text, since they are unexpected and do not fit in a ready-made scheme. In fact, a poorly edited text is likely to over-

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[1] Unless explicitly signalled, I will quote Kumārila's text as it is found in Rāmanātha Śāstrī, K. Kunjunni Raja and Thangaswamy 1971.

look or even obliterate exactly these unexpected innovations. On the other hand, critical editions are not works of mathematics and need historical acumen. As discussed elsewhere (Freschi and Keidan 2017), one cannot edit a text without understanding it and one cannot understand a specialist text without understanding (at least in part) its specific topic. A person whose mother tongue is English and who has studied 18th-century calligraphy will still not be in the best position to understand and edit an unpublished English manuscript about astronomy, if she does not know anything about astronomy. She will be inclined to read unknown words as if they were familiar ones and to interpret sentences (e.g. by adding punctuation) in a way that makes sense to her but might be completely wrong.

As a historically trained European scholar, I am convinced that the opposition sketched above needs to be superseded through a focus on the reconstruction of the history of philosophy. In order to reconstruct it, one needs to locate texts in a given context and to be aware of their contents. When it comes to philosophical texts, one needs to understand them taking their philosophical content seriously. In other words, in order to be a good philologist, I am convinced that one needs to be a good historian of philosophy, which, in turn, requires being able to philosophically understand the arguments made by a given text.[2]

The present article is an attempt to use the point of view of the history of philosophy to reconstruct a debate, the one about *arthāpatti*, in a relatively short span of time (8th to 11th c.) within the Bhāṭṭa school of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā.

It will be shown that the debate has specific protagonists, whose distinct personalities emerge even in the case of such a specific topic. Indian philosophy is too often neglected in the European and Anglophone discourse, and one of the reasons for this neglect could be the fact that it seems to be lacking great thinkers. Outsiders look in vain for the 'Indian Aristotle' and

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[2] This is, by the way, the approach Raffaele Torella implicitly taught his students. While critically editing texts, he was deeply interested in and taking account of their broader context (who were they answering to? who quoted them and why?). It took me years to be able to spell out all the good practices I I absorbed since I began to study Sanskrit.

then decide that Indian philosophy is a traditionalist philosophy with no space for original contributions. In fact, insiders know well enough that this prejudice is akin to the one of those who think that 'All Italians (or Chinese or Ethiopians…) look alike.' They do not really look alike, but one fails to detect their distinct traits because one is too used to recognise only the distinctive traits of people looking like oneself. In this sense, studies elaborating on the personality of single philosophers may be an important contribution to the task of overcoming the neglect of (much of) Indian philosophy.[3]

3. History and chronology
3.1. Chronology of the Bhāṭṭa-Prābhākara divide

The section on *arthāpatti* in Kumārila's ŚV is relatively short, as it comprises 88 verses. The first 50 are dedicated to *arthāpatti* in general, i.e., *dṛṣṭārthāpatti*. Verses from 51 to 88 focus on *śrutārthāpatti*.

This section of the ŚV has been commented upon first by Umveka Bhaṭṭa (in his *Ślokavārttikavyākhyatātpāryaṭīkā*, henceforth ŚVVTṬ),[4] then most probably by Sucarita (in his *Kāśikā*, also referred to as *Prakāśikā*) and last by Pārthasārathi (in the *Nyāyaratnākara*).

Although this article focuses on the perspective of Kumārila's school on *arthāpatti*, it will be unavoidable to mention its main interlocutor, namely the Prābhākara school. Prabhākara dealt with *arthāpatti* in a short section of his *Bṛhatī* commentary on the *Śābarabhāṣya*, whereas Śālikanātha dealt with the topic in much more detail in his subcommentary on the *Bṛhatī* (called *Ṛjuvimalā*) as well as in his autonomous treatise on epistemology, the *Pramāṇaparāyaṇa* (included in the *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, henceforth PrP).

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[3] Once again, let me mention that this is what Raffaele Torella did, e.g. in the case of the workshop on Utpaladeva and the ensuing proceedings (Torella and Bäumer 2016). They show Utpaladeva's personality as well distinct from the one of Abhinavagupta. The same applies to his recovery of Vāmanadatta's original elaboration of a Vaiṣṇava monism (see Torella 1994 and Torella 2016). On the pros and cons of applying contextualism as a way to detect the distinct voice of an author, see Ganeri 2008.

[4] The portion of the ŚVVTṬ on *arthāpatti* is unfortunately not completely extant, as it lacks the part commenting on vv. 4–21.

The relative chronology of Kumārila and Prabhākara is still debated, but Yoshimizu's arguments about the former being an older contemporary of the latter (Yoshimizu 1997) seem hard to dismiss. In the context of *arthāpatti*, this hypothesis seems to be confirmed by the fact that the *arthāpatti* section of the ŚV lacks any explicit awareness (for an implicit hint, see Umveka on v. 77, discussed below) of the Prābhākara position on *arthāpatti*, although this is very distinctive. By contrast, post-Śālikanātha Mīmāṃsā authors will spill much ink on especially two topics:

1. Prābhākara authors departing from Śālikanātha state that the *gamaka* 'trigger' in an *arthāpatti* is liable to be doubted. In the standard example, one is not completely sure whether Caitra is still alive, given that he is not found in his usual place. The doubt is appeased by the postulation of his being outside. Later Bhāṭṭa authors state that this cannot be the case, since this doubt would endanger the validity of *arthāpatti* as an instrument of knowledge.

2. Prabhākara himself and all Prābhākara authors refute the distinction between a *dṛṣṭa* and a *śruta* type of *arthāpatti*. They maintain that even in the cases treated as *śrutārthāpatti* by Bhāṭṭa authors, what appeases the seeming impossibility and solves the seeming clash of cognitions is a state of affairs, not its linguistic enunciation.

Why was Kumārila not aware of any pre-Prabhākara 'Prābhākarian' position, as it is the case in the chapter on linguistic communication? And why do his commentators not mention *Prabhākara's* distinct position on *arthāpatti*?

Possibly because of three reasons:

• Unlike in other cases, in this case there was no elaborated Prābhākara-like position on *arthāpatti* before Prabhākara. Kumārila systematised his school lore on *arthāpatti* by doing what he deemed to be right, namely strengthening the criteria for its being an instrument of knowledge.

• Prabhākara's position itself on the topic was far from clear.[5]

• The real hero of the Prābhākara position on *arthāpatti*, namely Śālikanātha, was yet to come.

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[5] Prabhākara's position on *arthāpatti*, as opposed to Śālikanātha's one, is reconstructed in Freschi 2021.

The terms of the Bhāṭṭa-Prābhākara debate on *arthāpatti* may have indeed been set by Prabhākara's commentator, Śālikanātha, who is in general the main responsible for the reception of Prabhākara's thought and is in fact the real inventor of what became to be known as the Prābhākara position on *arthāpatti*.

Nonetheless, a forerunner of a Prābhākara argument can be found in Uṃveka's commentary on v. 77. This contains the argument against the need to postulate a linguistic expression in order to appease the impossibility raised by sentences such as 'The fat Devadatta does not eat at daytime.' The proposed solution is to just postulate the *fact* of eating at night, not the corresponding sentence:

> The negation of eating at daytime for one who is fat is impossible without [his] eating at night, since fatness is the result of eating and, once [eating] is negated at daytime, one apprehends exactly its presence at another time, one does not apprehend the sentence about eating at night. That alone, however, is apprehended by means of *arthāpatti* and made present to one's thought. It is not the case that the comprehension of the sentence meaning is known through *arthāpatti*, because there is no evidence for the fact that one apprehends the sentence about eating at night before apprehending the eating at night.[6]

This position might be traced back to the opponent staged by Kumārila on v. 77ab, who states:

> Why is not the *meaning* postulated that this (fatness) cannot exist without that (eating at night) [instead of postulating the corresponding sentence]?[7]

Thus, one can imagine that, though not aware of Prabhākara's positions, Uṃveka and possibly Kumārila himself (as discussed in Freschi 2021) knew he was innovating at least insofar as he was postulating a specific distinct *śrutārthāpatti*.

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[6] *pīnasya divābhojanapratiṣedho rātribhojanaṃ vinā nopapadyate, bhojanakāryatvāt pīnatvasya divāniṣedhena tasyaivānyatra sadbhāvaḥ pratīyate, na rātrivākyasya. sa eva tv arthāpattyā pratipannas tadbuddhau saṃnidhāpayati, nārthāpattipramitā vākyārthāvagatiḥ; rātribhojanapratīteḥ pūrvaṃ rātrivākyapratipattau pramāṇābhāvāt.*

[7] *etadarthād vinā nāyam ity arthaḥ kiṃ na kalpyate |.* In this article, brackets indicate additions to the Sanskrit text (e.g., '[eating],' that is not present in the original Sanskrit), whereas parentheses indicate explanations (e.g., 'this (fatness)').

Another conundrum regards the relative chronology of the first commentator of Kumārila's, Uṃveka (8th c.?), and the first commentator of Prabhākara's, Śālikanātha (8th c.?), since it is unsure whether one knew the other (a tentative reason for the sequence Uṃveka → Śālikanātha is offered in section 4.4). They are both original philosophers, but no direct reuse of their wording could be detected, neither in their respective works, nor in the work of another quasi-Mīmāṃsā author who lived after Kumārila (and most probably after Uṃveka but at the same time as Śālikanātha), namely Bhaṭṭa Jayanta.[8] In the case of Sucarita and Pārthasārathi, they clearly come after both Uṃveka and Śālikanātha and most probably in this sequence (see, for the relative chronology of all these authors, Kataoka 2011).

3.2. Commentators vis-à-vis Kumārila

As it is customary according to the Sanskrit scholarly etiquette, commentators tend to overall agree with each other, but with some important exceptions, most notably within the *śrutārthāpatti* section. They also all tend to agree with Kumārila's text (albeit offering at times distinct and incompatible interpretations of it). The only exception in this sense is v. 78ab, where Kumārila appears to say that one needs to postulate a linguistic expression (and not just the state of affairs it would convey) in the case of *śrutārthāpatti*, 'because conceptual cognitions apprehend first a linguistic expression' (*savikalpakavijñānaiḥ śabdaḥ pūrvaṃ pratīyate*). This sort of admission of the primacy of language within conceptual cognitions seems to clash with Kumārila's usual attitude, as it risks taking sides with Bhartṛhari on the omni-pervasiveness of language. Thus, all commentators try to find different solutions and attribute this half verse to a prima facie view to be abandoned, though not stating explicitly that they are in disagreement with Kumārila.

The following sections will follow the commentators one by one and then all together on some issues of specific relevance. In

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[8] On the chronology of Jayanta and Śālikanātha, see Graheli forthc. and especially Saxena forthc.

both cases, I will try to convey their individual profile and distinct contribution.

4. Umveka

Umveka, also known as Umbeka,[9] likely lived in the early 8th c. CE. He must have lived after Kumārila and Maṇḍana, whose works he comments upon, and before Kamalaśīla, who in his commentary (*pañjikā*) on Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṅgraha* refers to him as Ubeyaka and paraphrases a passage of his ŚVVTṬ.[10] The date of Kamalaśīla can be better fixed on the basis of Chinese sources (see Introduction to GOS edition) to the latter half of the 8th c. CE.[11] His commentary survives in a single manuscript (edited by S.K. Ramanatha Sastri in 1971), which is only complete up to the end of the *vana* section of Kumārila's ŚV and is also missing a few folios in other sections. Umveka also wrote a commentary on Maṇḍana Miśra's *Bhāvanāviveka*, a work about Mīmāṃsā's philosophy of action. Nothing else is known about him.[12]

4.1 Agenda

Umveka was a philosopher in his own right, as proven by his commentary on the ŚV, by the one on the *Bhāvanāviveka*, and by his fortune also outside Mīmāṃsā (from Kamalaśīla to Jayanta[13]).

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[9] Both names are attested. I favour the first version since it seems more likely that Umbeka developed as an easier reading of the odd Umveka, rather than the other way round.

[10] See Krishnamacharya 1926: 812. The relevant passage by Kamalaśīla is also reproduced in the Preface to Rāmanātha Śāstrī, K. Kunjunni Raja and Thangaswamy 1971.

[11] On the date of Kamalaśīla, see also McClintock 2010: 1–2, fn. 1, discussing also Tibetan sources. There Kamalaśīla is reported to have visited Tibet after Śāntarakṣita's death (reconstructed by Frauwallner as 788).

[12] Some scholars have maintained, on the basis of a colophon in a manuscript of Bhavabhūti's *Mālatīmādhava*, that Umveka was identical to the playwright Bhavabhūti (as Mirashi 1974 argued in his monograph on the playwright). For this and further suggested identifications, see also the Preface in Rāmanātha Śāstrī, K. Kunjunni Raja and Thangaswamy 1971.

[13] An incomplete list of the Buddhist and Vedāntic authors who reused him can be read in the Preface on Rāmanātha Śāstrī, K. Kunjunni Raja and Thangaswamy 1971.

He is clearly an upholder of Kumārila's epistemological stance against the hermeneutical approach to *arthāpatti* (see 1). This is particularly evident when it comes to *śrutārthāpatti*, which is the one more directly relevant for the hermeneutical purposes of Mīmāṃsā authors. For instance, in his commentary on v. 77, Uṃveka is the only commentator to point out again that the whole reflection on *śrutārthāpatti* regards primarily worldly examples such as 'The fat Devadatta does not eat at daytime' rather than Vedic ones. When he does introduce a connection to Vedic exegesis, as in his commentary on v. 62, he does it using a vocabulary that can be acceptable for both exegetical and epistemological purposes and speaks therefore of *liṅga* 'sign' and *pramāṇa* 'instrument of knowledge' (two terms which play an exegetical as well as an epistemological role).

Uṃveka is also the commentator who is most aware of Kumārila's overall project, so that he uses the *arthāpatti* section also in order to reinforce Kumārila's theory of the intrinsic validity of cognitions, his anti-reductionism (i.e. his overall goal to refute the attempts to reduce other instruments of knowledge to inference) and his understanding of the way language communicates meanings. For instance, in his commentary on v. 12 he dedicates time and energy to the failure of the formal reduction of *arthāpatti* to inference, spelling out what could be the locus or the probans and why no option for it works.

4.2 Theory of arthāpatti

Uṃveka offers a short and precise definition of *arthāpatti* at the end of his introduction:

> Something understood which does not make sense otherwise causes one to postulate something else, so that the first thing makes sense in precisely the way that it was cognised in the first place.[14]

That is, unlike in the case of one's understanding that one's touching the tip of the Tour Eiffel (or, in its Indian instantiation, bearing an elephant's herd on the tip of one's finger) was just an

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[14] *avagato 'nyathānupapadyamānaś ca yathaivāvagatas tathaivopapadyamāno yad arthāntaraṃ kalpayati.*

illusion, in the case of *arthāpatti* a later cognition shows that the initial one was indeed true, although it seemed to entail an inconsistency with one's background knowledge.

In his commentary on v. 25, he sums up his account for the impossibility of reductionism: like Kumārila, he also points out that *arthāpatti* does not have the structure of inference. The probans of the alleged inference cannot be the sheer absence from home, because if one were to say that 'Caitra is outside, because he is not home,' there would be overextension to cases such as Caitra's being dead. Nor can the probans be the sheer absence from home qualified by someone's being alive (as in 'Caitra is outside, because of someone's being not home while being alive'), since this could lead us to infer that Yajñadatta, not Caitra, is alive somewhere else. Thus, the only viable probans would be the absence from home of the specific person Caitra who is alive. But at that point, Caitra's being alive would *presuppose* his being outside (since it would be otherwise impossible) and not be its probans.[15]

The same tenet is elaborated in the commentary on v. 30, where Uṃveka repeats that there is indeed an invariable concomitance between the trigger of the *arthāpatti* and the thing it causes to know (e.g. between the absence from home and the being outside).[16] The difference between *arthāpatti* and inference lies in the fact that the invariable concomitance is not epistemically available for the cogniser before they undertake the *arthāpatti*. In this sense, it is quite clear that Uṃveka's *arthāpatti* is not at all an inference to the best explanation (pace Siderits 2020). Rather, *arthāpatti* is as certain as cognitions can be according to Mīmāṃsā. What distinguishes it from inference is the fact that the cogniser is not aware of the invariable concomitance beforehand. Why is it

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[15] *jīvata eva caitrasyaivābhāvaś caitrasya bahirbhāvaṃ sādhayati, anyataraviśeṣaṇāpāye tu na. […] na caitramātreṇa viśeṣitaṃ gamayati, mṛte 'pi bhāvāt. nāpi jīvanamātreṇa, caitrabahirbhāvābhāve 'pi devadattabahirbhāve sadbhāvād ity arthaḥ. ubhayaviśeṣitasya tu gṛhābhāvasya bahirbhāvasādhakatvam, tasya copapattir bahirbhāvāvagatipūrviketi na tadavagatau tasya liṅgatvam.*

[16] *nanv atrāpi gṛhābhāvasya bahirbhāvena niyatatvād avinābhāvenaiva pratipatter anumānatvam evety āśaṅkyāha **avinābhāvitā cātreti**. saty apy atrāvinābhāvitve gṛhāvinābhāvasyaiva pratipādakatvena nānumānatvam ity arthaḥ.*

not known beforehand in the case of Caitra's absence from home, whereas it can be known in the canonical Indian case of inference, i.e., fire and smoke? In his commentary on v. 42, Uṃveka explains that in the case of fire and smoke their invariable concomitance has been repeatedly observed, and it was possible to grasp them completely and notice their absence from *vipakṣa*s, 'dissimilar instances':

> It is correct that the concomitance is grasped because one has repeatedly observed that there is the universal smoke together with the universal fire. For, both [universals] can be grasped entirely in a single place and one does not grasp them in dissimilar instances (e.g. in a lake).[17]

The mention of universals seems to suggest that the point is the fact that universals are clearly implied in the case of inferences, whereas they are not in the case of *arthāpatti*, possibly because *arthāpatti* regards individuals qua individuals.[18]

As for the *śrutārthāpatti* section, Uṃveka assumes a distinct position in his commentary on v. 78. There, he is the only one among commentators mentioning the issue of *bhāvanā* as evidence for the need of *śrutārthāpatti*. He explains that linguistic expressions have a specific way of operating, namely insofar as they cause an action to be. And this causing to be (*bhāvanā*) requires specific complements, such as a person being caused to act and a goal to be achieved. This requires that one postulates also these elements in their linguistic form. The link with *bhāvanā* is suggested as an alternative explanation for the need of a distinct *śrutārthāpatti* once Uṃveka (like all other commentators) has refuted Kumārila's own proposal put forth in v. 78a, namely the reference to the linguistic nature of all conceptual cognitions, as this would contradict Kumārila's subject- and language-independent direct realism. This could be easily read as a confirmation of Uṃveka's complete grasp and endorsement of Kumārila's overall project with the ŚV. Is this perhaps also what the title of his

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[17] *yuktaṃ dhūmatvasyāgnitvena saha bhūyodarśanena sahacāritvagrahaṇam. tayor ubhayor apy ekasmin pradeśe kṛtsnopalabdheḥ, vipakṣe ca darśanābhāvāt.*

[18] On the difference between *arthāpatti* and inference (*anumāna*) being the presence of universal quantificators in the latter only, see Yoshimizu 2020.

commentary (literally 'Gloss on the purport [of the ŚV], which is a commentary on the ŚV') aims to convey?

4.3. Style

Umveka's commentary is at times extremely synthetic. It is clear that its author does not feel compelled to explain Kumārila's verses in all their details (as, on the contrary, Pārthasārathi does). Moreover, Umveka appears at times to favour a dense style in which complicated compounds have a privileged place even when they are not essential. For instance, in his commentary on v. 82 he speaks of how the relation between sense faculty and object cannot be one of 'adequacy' (*yogyatā*) because the adequacy of the sense faculty for its object is understood only *after* having apprehended the object and adds: 'The adequacy is understood at a time successive to the apprehension of the result which is characterised as the apprehension of the visible quality' (*rūpapratipatti-lakṣaṇakāryapratipattyuttarakālaṃ ca yogyatāvagamyamānā*). Similarly, Umveka appears to have a predilection for rare words, like *romaśā* for 'bush' in the commentary on verse 34.

More technically, Umveka alone among Kumārila's commentators uses the verb *pary-ava-sthā-*, or *pary-upa-sthā-*, to refer to the role that a cognition has in 'setting up' another cognition, which is precisely what happens in the case of *arthāpatti* (see his commentary to verse 54, 62, and 72). For instance:

> The sentence about [Devadatta's eating] at night is not known, to begin with, through sense perception, nor through inference, nor through a postulated sentence (different than 'The fat Devadatta does not eat at daytime'). If it (the postulated sentence) could communicate without having a relation (with the only thing we have, namely the heard sentence), then it would communicate without a relation since there is no inferential mark (it could be based on). It is therefore better that the heard sentence is the instrument for knowing (about Devadatta's eating at night), because it is that (heard sentence) which sets up (*upasthāpaka*) the *arthāpatti*.[19]

[19] *evaṃ tāvan na rātrivākyasya pratyakṣatvaṃ nānumeyatvaṃ nāpi kalpyāgamaprameyatvam, kalpyasyāpi sambandhagrahaṇābhāvena tatpratipattau liṅgatvābhāvāt sambandhagrahaṇābhāvena ca pratipādakatve varaṃ śrūyamāṇasyaivārthāpattiparyupasthāpakatvena pramāṇatvam* (ad v. 72).

This use is particularly interesting, because Śālikanātha too uses the same verb, although with less technical a meaning, namely to refer to both the way a cognition leads to a further one and directly to a content (*artha*). What does this tell us about the relative chronology of Uṃveka and Śālikanātha?

4.4 Relation to the other commentators

Uṃveka's dense style might explain at least in part why Sucarita and Pārthasārathi never reuse Uṃveka's comments literally, although at times they appear to be influenced by their contents.

As for Śālikanātha, no specific reuse of his words can be identified, but there are several possible echoes. Since Uṃveka does not at all engage with the idea of doubt in the process of *arthāpatti* (whereas Sucarita examines it thoroughly), it is more likely that Uṃveka predates Śālikanātha.

5. Sucarita

The possibly second commentary on the ŚV is called *Kāśikā*, or sometimes *Prakāśikā*. The title could simply refer to a commentary that 'casts light' (*prakāś-*) on Kumārila's text, or it could refer to a commentary that was composed in the city of Kāśī, or Vārāṇasī. Sucaritamiśra probably lived in the middle of the tenth century.[20] His *Kāśikā* has been partly published on the basis of only one manuscript.[21]

5.1. Agenda and contribution

Sucarita is clearly an independent thinker, who tries to make sense of Kumārila's text without feeling compelled to be limited by the content of the text itself. For instance, as will be discussed below (section 6), Sucarita dares offering three different ways to formalise the absence from home as a quality of the locus (*pakṣa-*

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[20] See the timeline of Kataoka 2011: 112.
[21] Recently, Taisei Shida and Shishir Saxena have undertaken critical editions of further parts of the *Kāśikā*, on the basis of two (Saxena) and seven (Shida) manuscripts, respectively. For a survey of the *Kāśikā* manuscripts, see Shida 2013.

dharma) in his commentary on v. 10, and he distinguishes two working processes for *arthāpatti* in the commentary on v. 46. This does not appear to be done in a polemical way, as Sucarita is always careful (like Uṃveka and Pārthasārathi) not to contradict Kumārila explicitly. He just proceeds in his philosophical way, respecting Kumārila, but feeling more attracted by the argument and by what it needs to make it as compelling as possible.

In the *arthāpatti* section (but the same impression can be gathered by looking at his commentary on other sections, e.g., the *vākyādhikaraṇa* one[22]), Sucarita is the only commentator who deeply engages with Prābhākara ideas. In the case of *arthāpatti* this means that he deals extensively (in the introduction to the whole section, in connection with v. 24, and in his commentary on v. 29) with the problem of whether the being alive of Caitra in the standard example ('Caitra, who is alive, is not at home, therefore he is outside') is ever *doubted.* Prābhākara authors after Śāli-kanātha do in fact think that, by seeing that Caitra is not home, his being still alive is doubted, until one realises that there is an alternative explanation, namely his being outside. Sucarita insists that this solution is rather provoked by the conflict between two contradicting pieces of information, namely his being alive and his being not at home, which need to be both *niścita* 'ascertain-ed,' since no doubtful piece of information can ever lead one to conclude anything — a view that later became the standard reply to the Prābhākara position (see Nārāyaṇa's *Mānameyodaya* and Ci-dānanda's *Nītitattvāvirbhāva*).

However, Sucarita also admits that *arthāpatti* is characterised by a conflict between cognitions, which provokes a further investiga-tion finally leading to the ascertainment of Caitra's being out of his home. The interesting point in this connection is the fact that this further investigation is called *vitarka*, a term that can also be translated with 'doubt,' as it denotes some openness in one's inve-stigation, so that one notices how Sucarita's positions seems to come closer to Śālikanātha's. A similar point is repeated in his commentary on v. 76 on *śrutārthāpatti*, where Sucarita restates that

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[22] For a comparison of Sucarita's and Śālikanātha's positions on sentence meaning, see Saxena 2018.

there must be a stall due to the mutual contradiction (*paraspara-pratighāta*) of two pieces of information, possibly even of two sources of knowledge, given that he says that the fatness in 'The fat one does not eat at daytime' is known through sense-perception. This fits, by the way, with the reading of v. 29 found in the text of the ŚV as represented in Rāmanātha Śāstrī, K. Kunjunni Raja, and Thangaswamy 1971 and presupposed by Pārthasārathi, according to which *arthāpatti* is said to be 'that which entails a contradiction' (*pratighātin*).[23]

Sucarita is also the only one distinguishing among two working procedures within *arthāpatti* (in his commentary on v. 46). In one case, *arthāpatti* is triggered by the fact that two contradictory inferences could take place, and it defeats the wrong one. To elaborate, the two contradictory inferences would be: 1. Caitra is absent from home, because he is present in another place, e.g., the flowerbed in front of me; 2. Caitra is present at home, because he is absent from another place, e.g., the patch beside the flowerbed. In the other case, *arthāpatti* is triggered by the presence of two sets of evidence of equal force and postulates something extra by means of which both sets of evidence are made to make sense.

A further contribution to the topic of *arthāpatti* consists in Sucarita's linguistic interpretation of *śrutārthāpatti.* Already in his commentary on v. 29, Sucarita introduces the term *apekṣā* 'requirement' in connection with what is needed in order to make sense of two initial contradictory statements at the beginning of an *arthāpatti* reasoning. Within the *śrutārthāpatti* section he elaborates on it and appears to consider *apekṣā* in the context of *śrutārthāpatti* as tantamount to *ākāṅkṣā* 'syntactical expectation.' The latter is the syntactical link typically connecting a verb and its complements, e.g., 'cow' and 'bring!,' and is considered by Mīmāṃsā authors as one of the three distinctive marks of a sentence (see Freschi 2020). Sucarita suggests that in *śrutārthāpatti* the feeling of incompleteness the listener experiences is tantamount to what they experience while listening to a sentence and before its completion. For instance, in the commentary on v. 77, an opponent

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[23] The whole verse reads *anyathānupapattau tu prameyānupraveśitā | tādrūpyeṇaiva vijñānān na doṣaḥ pratighātinaḥ ||*. The ŚV text embedded in Sāmbaśiva Śāstrī 1926–1929 reads the last *pāda* as follows: *na doṣaḥ pratibhāti naḥ.*

suggests to appease the incongruity lying at the origin of a *śrutārthāpatti* (e.g., the one between someone's fatness and the fact that it is said that he does not eat at daytime) through a fact (his eating at night), rather than through a sentence ('He eats at night'). The point is well put, and one can easily imagine that seeing a fat man —about whom one has heard that he does not eat at daytime— eating at night would appease one's sense of puzzlement. However, Sucarita replies by sharply interpreting the example in purely linguistic terms and bringing in the concept of *ākāṅkṣā*. He does not yet spell out a further consequence of the introduction of *ākāṅkṣā* in the debate, namely that *śrutārthāpatti* represents also the cognition through which we grasp the linguistic expression 'close!' once the syntagma 'the door' has been heard, but the way for this conclusion has been paved.[24]

Last, Sucarita's contribution to the *arthāpatti*'s debate also consists in his focus on hermeneutics. Like, again, Prābhākara scholars, Sucarita is very much aware of the premises and consequences of the refutation of *śrutārthāpatti* for the hermeneutics of Vedic texts and spells them out at length, especially at the end of his commentary on the section. It clearly appears that Sucarita, unlike Kumārila and, to a lesser extent, Uṃveka, is not shy in letting Mīmāṃsā topics enter the discussion, especially in the case of *śrutārthāpatti*. For instance, in the discussion about v. 78, he clearly states that one needs to postulate a linguistic expression, and not just the corresponding state of affairs, by evoking the case of mantras which need to be adapted to a new context. In their case, the expectation regards a new linguistic expression, not just its meaning.

Sucarita is also the first author to introduce another idea which appears to be extraneous to Kumārila's *arthāpatti* section, namely the reference to people's subjective experience of epistemology (something which could be said to be akin to a socio-

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[24] The example of 'close!' being known through *arthāpatti* once 'the door' has been heard is discussed in Rāmānujācārya's *Tantrarahasya*, chapter 1, section on *arthāpatti*. Rāmānujācārya is a Prābhākara and therefore does not agree with Sucarita's defence of *śrutārthāpatti*, but the fact that he takes into account his position shows how influential it had become and how it had expanded towards linguistics. I am grateful to Malcolm Keating who discussed the topic with me.

anthropology or to a psychology of epistemology). This has a role in his commentary on v. 18, where it is said that the proposed explanation does not correspond to the epistemological experience of common people (*laukika*) and even more clearly in his commentary on v. 29, which contains an explicit defence of the distinct nature of *arthāpatti* based on the consensus of both experts and normal people. Similarly, in his commentary on vv. 31–33 and 35 he refers to the way 'all' people cognise. This attention to the anthropology of epistemology is also shown by Sucarita's reference (in the commentary on v. 78, but also on ŚV *pratyakṣa* 171) to animals and the way they know. According to Sucarita, animals regularly apply instruments of knowledge, including sense perception (and possibly inference and *arthāpatti*), although they cannot apply the *śruta* type, since they do not use language. The seminal idea of Sucarita's discussion about animals is found already in Śālikanātha, who mentions the case of animals as evidence of the fact that there must be non-linguistic conceptual cognitions (and therefore there is no need to postulate a linguistic expression even in the case of *arthāpatti*s leading to a conceptual content). In this regard Śālikanātha quotes a group of verses he attributes to the Vārttikakāra, which already contain the word *tiryañc* 'animal.' The Vārttikakāra is most probably Kumārila, and the verses might come therefore from the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*, which could have been Sucarita's direct source. The verses state that animals also understand *agni* ('fire') as an *artha*, although not as a linguistic expression. Accordingly, animals do not have *śrutārthāpatti* because they lack language. Nothing is said about their further abilities.

Further, Sucarita widens the scope of the discussion by referring to broader problems such as the polemics with the Buddhist thinkers of the Diṅnāga-Dharmakīrti school who uphold *parataḥ prāmāṇya* 'extrinsic validity' (most notably in his commentary on v. 40). Also noteworthy is Sucarita's choice to justify the Mīmāṃsā account of inference through an ontological argument, namely the idea that a sound *vyāpti* 'invariable concomitance' must be tested in a different place (so as to make sure that no accidental condition is altering it) and is grounded in the real nature of the *jāti*s ('universals') involved. In other words, smoke and fire are invariably concomitant because their universals are intrinsically

connected, and this ensures that their concomitance is not merely accidental. Accordingly, a *vyāpti* established in this way needs to be observed only once. Nonetheless, Sucarita immediately recommends to check it 'two to three' or 'two to four' times (commentary on v. 42), possibly as part of his attention to the empirical reality of the process of acquiring knowledge (in which misjudgments are possible). This ontological foundationalism of *vyāpti* is a new addition by Sucarita. Uṃveka seems to remain faithful to the inductive approach for the establishment of *vyāpti*, since in his commentary to the same verse he only speaks of the need for the two concomitant elements to co-occur in one place, so that they can be simultaneously grasped. The problem is however linked with the possibility to perceive universals (see Taber 2017) insofar as, if universals were sense-perceivable, then even a single grasp of the concomitance of fire and smoke could assure one of the concomitance of the two corresponding universals.

5.2 Relation to other commentators

Sucarita was most probably aware of Uṃveka's commentary, although I could not detect any explicit acknowledgement of it. At times, he seems to have been influenced by Uṃveka's approach (e.g., the closing statement of his commentary on v. 39 seems to be nothing but a smoother version of Uṃveka's text, and the same applies to his whole commentary on v. 44, which repeats Uṃveka's points while avoiding his cumbersome terminological choices, and to the commentary on v. 67). But much more frequently he offers original interpretations, and even identifies different partitions within the text, so that it can easily be said that the ŚV *arthāpatti* chapter has a different outlook when examined from Uṃveka's perspective or from Sucarita's.

6. Pārthasārathi

The possibly third commentary on the ŚV is the *Nyāyaratnākara* (henceforth NRĀ) by Pārthasārathimiśra, who probably lived in the early 11th century.[25] Presumably before composing the NRĀ,

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[25] Kataoka 2011: 112. For the text of the NRĀ, see ŚV.

he also wrote the *Śāstradīpikā*, which is an independent commentary on Jaimini's *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra*. He also wrote a commentary on Kumārila's *Ṭupṭīkā* called the *Tantraratna*, and a series of topical essays called *Nyāyaratnamālā*.[26] The latter is modelled on, and responds to, a similar collection of works by the rival Mīmāṃsaka Śālikanātha, namely his *Prakaraṇapañcikā*.

If Pārthasārathi really composed some of all these works before the NRĀ, this could partly explain why the latter is, by contrast, mostly an unambitious, plain commentary whose main purpose is clearly just making the —at times terse— ŚV accessible. Pārthasārathi tends to focus mostly on clarifying Kumārila's text, e.g. by means of explicitly pointing out whether a certain strophe represents a prima facie view or the final one and by making implicit connections explicit. He probably meant his commentary to be a practical tool to read the ŚV, and indeed the NRĀ has been copied far more than Sucarita's and Uṃveka's commentaries, which have been preserved only in one (Uṃveka) or a few (Sucarita) copies.

6.1 Agenda and contribution

Although Pārthasārathi's commentary does not aim at originality, it contains some unexpected twists. For instance, in replying to the objector, who in v. 77 has suggested that the incongruity between two sets of information which lies at the beginning of a *śrutārthāpatti* process could be appeased also through a fact, and not necessarily through a sentence, Pārthasārathi agrees that seeing Caitra eating at night would in fact be enough. This seems to mean that one would not need *śrutārthāpatti* at all, and that a single *arthāpatti* would be enough, but Pārthasārathi then adds that this would not work in a Vedic context. Why not? Pārthasārathi is indeed the only one who stresses the consequences of the refusal of postulating a sentence for Vedic hermeneutics in the context of v. 55. There, Pārthasārathi says:

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[26] The sequence between the works by Pārthasārathi is not clear, and I cannot recall quotations or mentions of the one in the other. Sakai 2015 surmises that Sanskrit authors might have in general first composed independent treatises and later commentaries on influential texts.

viśvajidādiṣu phalādeḥ śābdatvasiddhyarthaṃ śabdakalpanam

> We postulate a linguistic expression in order to establish that, for instance, the fact that the Viśvajit sacrifice has a result is communicated by linguistic communication as an instrument of knowledge.

In other words, one needs to postulate sentences in order for these postulated sentences to convey a meaning which would be then apprehended through language as an instrument of knowledge, just like that of any other Vedic sentence. An unstated (but possibly evident) consequence is the following: if one were to solve an inconsistency by directly postulating a concept, instead of the sentence communicating it, one would end up knowing about, e.g., the Viśvajit's result only through *arthāpatti*, which appears to be a *pramāṇa* weaker than *śabdapramāṇa*, since it lacks its Vedic status. Accordingly, Pārthasārathi's discussion seems to imply that *śrutārthāpatti* is indeed needed only in a Vedic context. The dubitative form is needed, because the Vedic aspect of *śrutārthāpatti* is mentioned at times by Pārthasārathi, but not as often as in Sucarita.

Another instance in which Pārthasārathi appears to make an autonomous original contribution is his commentary on vv. 44–45. These verses discuss the impossibility to ascertain an invariable concomitance and, therefore, the impossibility to interpret *arthāpatti* as a case of *anumāna*. One of the problems in this connection is that it seems impossible to ascertain the absence of a person from each single place in the world. There, Pārthasārathi is the only one suggesting to interpret the invariable concomitance as holding between the presence in one place (e.g. Caitra's house or garden) and the absence from *one* other place, thus avoiding the trap of the impossibility to check one's absence from everywhere else (see below, section 7.2).

6.2 Style and reuse of other commentators

As already observed in Freschi 2008 and Kataoka 2015, Pārthasārathi's NRĀ tends to follow in Sucarita's footsteps and to offer little original insights. Thus, Sucarita's *Kāśikā* (or an oral teaching based on it) was surely a model for Pārthasārathi, who often (e.g. in his commentary on v. 19) reuses its ideas (especially the less

audacious ones) and even its terminology (cf. the reuse of the term *vilakṣaṇasāmagrī* in the commentary on v. 29). A striking example can be found in the commentary on v. 71, where Sucarita has:

> *anyo 'pi taddeśakālādisambandho na rātrivākyena divāvākyasya tatpadārthānāṃ vāstīty āha* — […]

Nor is there another relation through [the fact of being in] the same place, time, etc. between the night-sentence (i.e. 'he eats at night') and the day-sentence (i.e. 'The fat one does not eat at day-time') or its word meanings. This he (Kumārila) says [with …].

And Pārthasārathi:

> *na cāpi taddeśatatkālatvādisambandho divāvākyatatpadārthānāṃ vā rātrivākyenāstīty āha* — […]

Nor is there a relation through the fact of being in the same place, time, etc. between the night-sentence (i.e. 'he eats at night') and the day-sentence (i.e. 'The fat one does not eat at day-time') or its word meanings. This he (Kumārila) says [with …]

The two sentences are almost identical.[27]

It is also often the case that Pārthasārathi does not at all follow Sucarita's brave interpretations, e.g. in the case of Sucarita's attempts to formalise in several ways (all independent of Kumārila) the absence of Caitra from home as the probans of his being outside in the commentary on v. 10. The same occurs in the case of Sucarita's distinguishing (again, independently of Kumārila) two different functioning ways for *arthāpatti* in the commentary on v. 46, and in Sucarita's discussion of animal understanding in the commentary on v. 78.

In some cases, and especially when Pārthasārathi does not want to follow Sucarita (e.g. in the commentary on v. 26 or on v. 30), it could be imagined that Pārthasārathi is rather elaborating on

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[27] The text as it stands is incorrect. It is likely that the text read as in Sucarita (that is, *divavākya*sya* tatpadhārthānāṃ vā*). If the editions were correct Pārthasārati would be repeating Sucarita's *vā* even though it would not make sense in the new version of the text.

Uṃveka's commentary. For instance, v. 55 states that the fact of eating at night cannot be an additional meaning of the sentence 'The fat one does not eat at daytime.' Uṃveka says that this would violate the one-to-one correspondence between linguistic expressions and meanings. Sucarita only focuses on the fact that the sentence is not independently expressive (only its words are). Pārthasārathi combines both points:

> If the sentence were expressive, there would also be the fact that it would have multiple meanings. Nor is the sentence expressive (of any meaning at all).[28]

A similar case occurs at v. 78, which discusses the fact that one needs to postulate a linguistic expression, and not just a state of affairs, in the case of *śrutārthāpatti*. Uṃveka justified this claim by saying that the initial linguistic expression which triggered the whole process needs to have its *bhāvanā* completed. Sucarita rather said that the sentence had expectancy for some further linguistic elements. Pārthasārathi mixes Uṃveka's idea of completion with Sucarita's emphasis on language:

> Since it would be impossible for the sentence as it has been heard ['The fat one does not eat at daytime'] to convey a complete meaning, there is expectancy.[29]

Summing up, in several cases Pārthasārathi appears to have been influenced by Uṃveka's interpretation. Nonetheless, I could not detect any literal reuse of Uṃveka's text.[30]

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[28] *yadi vākyam vācakaṃ syāt, syād apy anekārthatā, na tu vākyaṃ vācakam.*

[29] *yathāśrutasya paripūrṇārthapratipādakatvānupapatter asty ākāṅkṣā.*

[30] A further, indirect evidence of Uṃveka's influence could be the confusion between the reference to Caitra and to Devadatta. Both names can be used as 'John Smith' to refer to a generic individual in Sanskrit literature. The two names are however both found with no reason for the choice of one or the other in Pārthasārathi's commentary. Pārthasārathi could be just misled by the fact that Śabara speaks of Devadatta's absence from home, while Kumārila uses the shorter Caitra. However, Pārthasārathi could also have misunderstood Uṃveka's shift from one name to the other in his commentary on v. 25cd (and then again on vv. 34–35), where the shift is not at all random, since the name Devadatta is used to identify a *sapakṣa* case for Caitra's being outside of home. (The presence of at least a *sapakṣa* is needed according to the definition of a valid inference. It in-

Summing up the situation of Pārthasārathi's sources: Pārthasārathi surely knew Sucarita, but, at least in the *arthāpatti* section, he was not his only source, neither for the ŚV text nor for its interpretation. In most cases, Pārthasārathi's commentary appears to be only a neat exposition of Sucarita's ideas spelled out with more clarity with some added remarks making sense of Kumārila's text more closely and with some further insights, at times coming from Uṃveka, at times probably from Pārthasārathi himself. Thus, Pārthasārathi can be both a pedestrian commentator and reuser of (mostly) Sucarita and a sharp commentator, at times even in nearby sections.

7. Comparing the three commentators on specific topics
7.1 Intrinsic validity

A topic which is very much present in all commentators is that of the intrinsic validity of cognitions, which is closely linked to the justification of the validity of *arthāpatti*. In fact, Kumārila admits that the connection between the *gamaka* 'trigger' of the *arthāpatti* and its probandum is not known beforehand. When the opponent presses him that *arthāpatti* would then have no relation to be based on in order to be valid (v. 79), he replies that validity is not caused by a relation (v. 80), but just by the fact of not having been invalidated (yet) (v. 84).[31]

Taber (1992) has shown that Uṃveka, unlike Pārthasārathi and Sucarita,[32] favoured the idea of an ontological basis for Kumārila's epistemology and was not willing to accept fallibilism as an epistemological solution. However, within this section *all*

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cludes the cases of a locus akin to the one at stake. In the canonical example, the *sapakṣa* includes cases like fire in the kitchen and it is opposed to the *vipakṣa* cases, i.e. a lake).

[31] Due to the lack of a specific invariable connection between the trigger and the thing known, the *arthāpatti* has been compared to abduction and inference to the best explanation, insofar as these also operate without a pre-existing connection between premises and things to be known. However, unlike these two, *arthāpatti* is considered to deliver knowledge, not just likelihood and, as discussed in Yoshimizu 2007 for Kumārila and in Freschi 2021 for Prabhākara and Śālikanātha, it is not open to probabilism.

[32] For Sucarita's account of intrinsic validity, see McCrea 2015–2018; for an overview of the entire debate, see Kataoka 2011.

commentators seem to be more cautious than Kumārila on this issue. Uṃveka (on v. 81) and Sucarita (on v. 79) say that a connection is in fact present, it is just that this cannot or does not need to be grasped. Sucarita stresses (on v. 40) the need of a foundation of inference in the universals at stake, Pārthasārathi ends the section on the non-need of any relation in order to have a valid cognition by saying that there is no need to *grasp* a relation, but that the relation is indeed there.

7.2 Where the commentators do not help (enough): Kumārila on being in one place and not being elsewhere

Kumārila's argument on *arthāpatti* has been masterly reconstructed in Yoshimizu 2007 and Yoshimizu 2020. I can add to these reconstructions the translation cum commentary in Freschi and Ollett 2020. Yet, an element of Kumārila's analysis has so far remained obscure, namely the shift of perspective occurring at v. 35.

Within the whole section, Kumārila seems to operate under the assumption that a living being is either home or outside (this disjunction is made explicit in Pārthasārathi's *Śāstradīpikā*, as discussed in Yoshimizu 2020: n. 16). Whereas Yoshimizu 2020 identifies several elements peculiar to *arthāpatti* in Kumārila's treatment, Kumārila's *explicit* strategy against the reductionism of *arthāpatti* to inference seems to be based primarily on two reasons:

1. there is no way to construe the locus (*pakṣa*), probandum (*sādhya*) and probans (*sādhana*) in a convincing way;

2. although there *is* an invariable concomitance between being alive and not home and being outside, this invariable concomitance is *unknown* at the time of the *arthāpatti* and is only discovered through it (vv. 30–33).

However, in v. 35 the perspective changes. In v. 34 an opponent responds to the objection that there would be no way to grasp the invariable concomitance of being alive and not home and being outside (since there would be too many places to check) by suggesting that there would be a way to grasp the invariable concomitance, namely if one stood on the threshold and saw at the same time a person's absence from home and her being

elsewhere. What is the kind of concomitance that the opponent claims to be able to establish in this way? It could be either 'whenever one is not in one place, then he is somewhere else' or 'whenever one is in one place, then he is not somewhere else.' The former seems to represent the working of *arthāpatti* better. At this point, however, a shift occurs, and the following half-verse deals no longer with the former formulation, but only with the latter. Kumārila can therefore explain that 'whenever he is in one place, then he is not somewhere else' involves a quantification over all other places besides the place where Caitra is and attack this quantification (since no one can check all places).

Here, like at the beginning of the section, the point is the connection between two elements, which are considered by the reductionist opponent to be probans and probandum, namely the absence from a place and the being elsewhere. Their invariable concomitance cannot be established, explains Kumārila, since one would need to check all instances. Why so? Why would not checking A be enough, given that Caitra is either in A or in not-A and the two are mutually exclusive? Because the concomitance has been reformulated as being about the being in one place and the not being elsewhere, for which one should be able to check all instances. Attacking this formulation is clearly easier, but is this the only motivation for the shift? Is Kumārila just clever in his twist? Or did he consider the two logically equivalent because of good reasons? For instance, could the latter formulation be considered as a *vipakṣa*-version of the former?[33] Regrettably not, since the *pakṣa*, or locus, needs to be constant and, therefore, it can only be the living person.

Unfortunately, none of the commentators (and not even Bhaṭṭa Jayanta in his discussion of the topic) shed light on this shift. Nonetheless, they are at least helpful in explaining what is at stake in the new formulation. Uṃveka first explains that the elsewhere one is able to grasp from the threshold is a nearby place, the *romaśā*, possibly meaning the garden.

Pārthasārathi makes the point clear:

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[33] For a short definition of *vipakṣa*, see n. 30.

Now to the person who says that not being at home and being outside can be grasped at the same time even without *arthāpatti*, provided that one stands in the doorway of the house, the following reply can be made: this is indeed the case, but what is at issue here is the absence in every other place on the part of a person who exists in a single place, and since those two attributes (namely, being in one place, and not being in every other place) cannot be grasped at the same time, no inference is possible.[34]

Cases such as the following one explain how much this clarification is needed. Kumārila writes in the following verse:

It is not the case that through non-apprehension the absence of a thing is understood, because one has not gone to those places. For that operates in regard to things which, although distant, do indeed exist.[35]

Umveka explains what is at stake:

Only non-apprehension of things that could be apprehended is a possible reason for their absence, not non-apprehension in general, because that is inconclusive.[36]

In other words, the opponent suggested that we can know about Caitra's absence from anywhere else once we have known of his presence at home and before completing the *arthāpatti* because of absence as an instrument of knowledge (*abhāvapramāṇa*). But Umveka explains that absence works only in regard to what would be fit to be perceived and not in general.

If Umveka is right, Kumārila (and/or Umveka) might have meant v. 34 as a last attempt by the opponent. The *siddhāntin* had already shown that the example by Śabara could be conceived of as an inference, if one were at the housedoor, but it would still fail

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[34] *yas tu vadati vināpy arthāpattyā gṛhadvāri sthityā gṛhābhāvabahirbhāvayoḥ sāhityaṃ gṛhyata iti, sa vaktavyaḥ yady apy evam iha sambhavati tathāpi yad etad ekatra vidyamānasya sarvatrāvidyamānatvaṃ tat sāhityagrahaṇābhāvān nānumānaṃ siddhyati* (Introduction to v. 34).

[35] *naitayānupalabdhyātra vastvabhāvaḥ pratīyate | taddeśāgamanāt sā hi dūrastheṣv asti satsv api* || 37 ||.

[36] *dṛśyānupalabdhir abhāve liṅgam, na tv anupalabdhimātram, anaikāntikatvāt* (ŚVVTṬ v. 37).

to be an inference because it lacks the formal requirements for being conceived as one and because one does not need to know the connection beforehand. By contrast, the opposite case, namely, 'Having seen Caitra in the *romaśā*, you postulate that he is not anywhere else,' cannot be an inference based on absence as instrument of knowledge. Why not? Because absence does only refer to specific places and not to the whole world:

> For, absence is located in endless places, which are different from the place where Caitra is. [The absence] of its correlate presence, [needs to] relate only to a place which is different from the immediately proximate area of the presence of Caitra, which is its correlate. And since there is no comprehension of it [i.e. the absence in endless places] through other instruments of knowledge, it must be based on *arthāpatti*.[37]

8. Conclusion

This short analysis restitutes the vivid picture of three distinct philosophers and the way their unique voices can be distinctly heard even in the commentary genre. Umveka is the author who is more committed to Kumārila's epistemological approach (this-worldly, anti-reductionist and primarily engaged in logical and epistemological issues). He is not particularly interested in being understood by his readers and is not scared by difficult issues. The present analysis has also shown that he probably worked before Śālikanātha and might have influenced him (unless both rely on a common source). Sucarita is the one who is more open to the Prābhākara approach. He dedicates much more time and energy to exegetical problems and Vedic issues and is more ready to open to further topics, from worldly epistemology to animal one. In a tongue-in-cheek way, one could say that Umveka is more of an Analytic philosopher and Sucarita more of a Continental one (but this divide is also often more sociological than substantial). Pārthasārathi's text is closer to a plain commentary. It builds on Sucarita's ideas and possibly also on Umveka's ones and tries to

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[37] *caitrādhiṣṭhitavyatiriktānantadeśagato hy abhāvo bhāvasya sambandhinaḥ saṃnikṛṣṭavyatiriktagata eva. tasya ca pramāṇāntareṇāvagamābhāvād arthāpattipūrvakam* (ŚVVTṬ on v. 35cd).

explain Kumārila's text plainly. Why so? Possibly because Pārtha-sārathi, unlike Uṃveka and Sucarita, had already dedicated separate treatises to Mīmāṃsā epistemology and did not feel the need to repeat his own original ideas here. Nonetheless, at times he too can add original ideas to the discussion. In the section discussed here, this is particularly evident in the two cases I enucleated as particularly crucial, namely the discussion about the infinite *vipakṣa*s in Caitra's being absent from anywhere else and the one on *śrutārthāpatti*.

Going back to the methodological issues mentioned at the beginning, I hope to have shown how a close analysis of texts and topics shows that Indian philosophy is not at all uniform and impersonal. It also shows how doing the effort to take texts seriously and to try to make sense of them philosophically can deliver unexpected treasures, from animal epistemology to the linguistic application of *śrutārthāpatti*.

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Il rapporto di Śāntarakṣita con Bhartṛhari. Edizione critica della Śabdabrahmaparīkṣā e dello Sphoṭavādakhaṇḍana[1]

Paolo Giunta

(Roma)

1. Introduzione

Il rapporto tra il buddhismo, in particolare la tradizione logico-epistemologica stabilitasi a partire da Diṅnāga (c. 480-540)[2], e quella filosofico-grammaticale iniziata da Bhartṛhari (c. 450-510)[3]

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[1] Questo articolo presenta e aggiorna alcune parti della mia tesi di dottorato, scritta sotto la guida di Raffaele Torella (vedi Giunta 2009), che desidero ringraziare per aver indirizzato la mia attenzione al tema qui trattato e per l'incoraggiamento e i suggerimenti da lui ricevuti. Ringrazio inoltre i responsabili delle istituzioni nelle quali ho potuto consultare e raccogliere il materiale manoscritto utilizzato: lo Śrī Hemacandrācārya Jaina Jñānamandira di Pāṭan e l'Ācārya Śrī Kailāsasāgarasūri Jñānamandira – Śrī Mahāvīra Jaina Ārādhanā Kendra di Koba.

[2] Per la datazione di Diṅnāga e degli altri autori buddhisti citati, si fa qui riferimento a Frauwallner 1961. In un contributo recente, Deleanu (2019) riconsidera tutta la questione e propone datazioni diverse; in particolare, c. 430-500 per Diṅnāga e c. 570-640 per Dharmakīrti. Si veda anche Eltschinger 2019a e 2019b.

[3] La questione della datazione di Bhartṛhari non si può considerare conclusa; nonostante molti studiosi siano orientati a collocarlo nel V-VI sec., infatti, le loro argomentazioni non si basano su elementi assolutamente certi e non manca chi propone di collocarlo nel III o IV sec. (ad es. Cardona 1976: 298-299). Qui si fa riferimento alla datazione proposta da Frauwallner (1961: 134-135) e accettata da Subramania Iyer (1969: 2), Seyfort Ruegg (1959: 64) e Nakamura (1955), anche se gli ultimi due pongono Bhartṛhari tra il 450 e il 500.

ha destato e continua a destare l'interesse degli studiosi per diversi motivi: il ruolo importante che entrambe hanno svolto nello sviluppo del pensiero filosofico indiano; le influenze reciproche, avvenute in ambiti e tempi diversi; l'autorità che, a partire da Diṅnāga, alcuni autori buddhisti hanno attribuito a Bhartṛhari, nonostante la sua appartenenza all'ortodossia brahmanica.

Con il *Vākyapadīya* (VP) di Bhartṛhari la grammatica si affranca dal ruolo per così dire «ausiliario», per quanto importante, che fino ad allora aveva svolto nel dibattito filosofico e, configurandosi come vero e proprio sistema, partecipa attivamente allo sviluppo del pensiero indiano. In quest'opera, infatti, il linguaggio non è più soltanto l'oggetto di un'analisi prevalentemente tecnica, ma diventa il fulcro di una coerente riflessione di carattere metafisico, epistemologico e psicologico che permetterà alla grammatica di trovare una trattazione accanto agli altri *darśana* presi in considerazione nel *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha* di Sāyaṇa-Mādhava (XIV sec.).

Purtroppo non è dato sapere se l'innovazione apportata dal VP sia stata opera esclusiva di Bhartṛhari o se, come suggerisce Seyfort Ruegg (1959), e come è verosimile, rappresenti il culmine di un processo interno alla tradizione grammaticale di Pāṇini (c. IV sec. a.C.)[4]. Effettivamente alcuni argomenti filosofici presenti nel VP sono già contenuti in nuce nel *Mahābhāṣya* di Patañjali (c. II sec. a.C.) e sembra che già prima di Bhartṛhari esistessero testi grammaticali che affrontavano questioni non strettamente tecniche (Subramania Iyer 1969: 69). Tuttavia, non essendoci pervenuta alcuna opera appartenente a questa tradizione composta nei circa sei secoli che separano Patañjali da Bhartṛhari, la questione resta aperta[5].

Nonostante questa lacuna, si è comunque tentato di individuare nel VP quegli elementi che potrebbero essere ricondotti all'influenza esercitata da altre tradizioni. Al riguardo, non mancano studi che vedono come possibili fonti ispiratrici di alcune idee espresse nel VP i sistemi filosofici brahmaṇici (in particolare il

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[4] Anche le datazioni di Pāṇini e Patañjali sono ancora oggetto di discussione; qui sono state adottate quelle verso cui è orientata la maggioranza degli studiosi. Su tale questione, si veda Cardona 1976: 260-266.

[5] Per una ricostruzione della tradizione grammaticale pāṇiniana dopo Patañjali, si veda Aklujkar 1981, 1982 e 1991, e Bronkhorst 1983.

Sāṅkhya, il Vaiśeṣika e la Mīmāṃsā)[6], ma l'attenzione è stata rivolta soprattutto al buddhismo, non solo perché sembra essere la tradizione che più delle altre ha contribuito alla formazione del pensiero di Bhartṛhari, ma anche perché è l'unica che, ponendosi al di fuori dell'ortodossia brahmanica, lo ha fatto attraverso un rapporto dialettico. Sul tema non esistono studi monografici e i contributi disponibili, spesso limitati alle competenze specifiche degli autori, non sembrano tener conto gli uni degli altri; nel loro insieme, però, forniscono già una visione generale del rapporto di Bhartṛhari con il buddhismo. Così, se da una parte Hacker (1953), Nakamura (1955, 1973) e Lindtner (1993) ritengono che alcuni termini e concetti utilizzati da Bhartṛhari siano identificabili come prestiti da Nāgārjuna (c. 150-200) e Vasubandhu (c. 350-430, see Deleanu 2006) o, più in generale, dalle tradizioni Madhyamaka e Yogācāra; dall'altra, Nakamura (1972), Bronkhorst (1992, 1996) e Houben (1995) evidenziano come Bhartṛhari faccia riferimento ad alcuni testi buddhisti anche per criticarne le tesi.

Forse, proprio a causa dell'influenza che Bhartṛhari subì da parte del buddhismo, a sua volta il VP influenzò immediatamente alcuni autori buddhisti e continuò a farlo per diversi secoli: se già Diṅnāga, attivo solo pochi decenni dopo Bhartṛhari, cita alcune strofe del VP e scrive un'intera opera, la *Traikālyaparīkṣā*, prendendone in prestito pressoché interamente una sezione, nell'XI sec. *Jñānaśrībhadra, commentando il *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, ne cita e interpreta alcuni passi a sostegno delle proprie idee.

Gli studi al riguardo si sono finora concentrati prevalentemente su Diṅnāga, non solo perché è l'autore che mostra per primo e in maniera più consistente i segni di tale influenza, ma anche perché è l'iniziatore dell'influente scuola logico-epistemologica buddhista. La sua opera più importante, il *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, ha infatti stimolato il rinnovamento e l'arricchimento della maggior parte dei sistemi «ortodossi». Kumārila e Prabhākara (entrambi attivi

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[6] Ad esempio, secondo Bronkhorst (1999), la distinzione tra una forma di suono pura (*prākṛtadhvani*) e una impura (*vaikṛta°*) sarebbe stata ispirata a Bhartṛhari dal Sāṅkhya, in cui i due concetti vengono espressi utilizzando la stessa terminologia. Per un approfondimento del rapporto di Bhartṛhari con gli altri *darśana*, si veda anche Bronkhorst (1989, 1993) e Subramania Iyer (1948-1949; 1969: 69-82).

nel VII sec.) avrebbero composto rispettivamente lo *Ślokavārttika* e la *Bṛhatī* reagendo proprio alle tesi di Diṅnāga (Rani 1982); il rinnovamento del linguaggio tecnico operato da Praśastapāda (V-VI sec.) in seno al Vaiśeṣika sarebbe stato ispirato dal *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (Shastri 1964, Hattori 1972); Uddyotakara (VI sec.) afferma di aver composto il *Nyāyavārttika* con il preciso scopo di reagire alle critiche dei «cattivi logici», primo tra tutti Diṅnāga (Torella 2008: 29). Ed è proprio grazie al dibattito innescato dal *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, che si protrasse fin circa all'XI sec., se oggi possiamo apprezzare la sottigliezza filosofica del dibattito tra autori buddhisti come Dharmakīrti (VI-VII sec.) e brahmanici quali Jayantabhaṭṭa e Vācaspatimiśra (entrambi vissuti nel X sec.).

Sebbene i sistemi elaborati da Diṅnāga e Bhartṛhari partano da premesse diametralmente opposte — il primo ha infatti una visione che si potrebbe definire pluralistica, mentre il secondo una visione olistica del mondo —, la teoria della significazione elaborata da Diṅnāga mostra strette affinità con quella di Bhartṛhari (cfr. Patnaik 1992); ed è proprio nel campo della riflessione linguistica che si possono individuare i segni dell'influenza che il VP ha avuto su Diṅnāga. Sembrerebbe infatti che in Diṅnāga la teoria linguistico-epistemologica dell'*apoha* («esclusione»), l'organizzazione gerarchica delle qualità universali (*sāmānya*) di un oggetto e, infine, l'attribuzione della funzione significante (*vācaka*) all'universale della parola e non alla sua occorrenza particolare siano teorie elaborate a partire dalle idee di Bhartṛhari (cfr. Hattori 1979, 2000; Katsura 1979, 1991; Pind 1991). Diṅnāga utilizza inoltre i concetti di *apoddhāra* («estrazione») e *pratibhā* («intuizione») nello stesso modo e nello stesso contesto in cui li utilizza Bhartṛhari: proprio come Bhartṛhari, anche Diṅnāga afferma che la funzione semantica delle parole si esplica interamente solo all'interno della frase e, quindi, che il significato di ogni singola parola può essere determinato solo a posteriori, attraverso un processo speculativo di «estrazione» dal significato della frase, significato che nella comunicazione ordinaria si manifesta nella mente dell'ascoltatore attraverso un lampo cognitivo, un'intuizione (Hattori 1979).

Tralasciando la questione se anche il primo esponente della corrente *mādhyamikasvātantrika*, Bhavya/Bhāviveka (c. 500-570), sia stato effettivamente influenzato da Bhartṛhari nell'attribuire

all'*āgama* («tradizione») una supremazia sull'*anumāna* («inferenza»), nel VII sec. l'atteggiamento dei pensatori buddhisti nei confronti di Bhartṛhari sembra comunque cambiare. A testimoniarlo è Dharmakīrti, in particolare il suo *Pramāṇavārttika*, formalmente un commento esplicativo al *Pramāṇasamuccaya* di Diṅnāga, ma che di fatto ne innova le teorie, divenendo, insieme ad altre sue opere quali il *Pramāṇaviniścaya* e il *Nyāyabindu*, il testo di riferimento della scuola logico-epistemologica buddhista tanto per i maestri successivi, quanto per gli avversari. Anche se è possibile affermare con certezza che Dharmakīrti conosceva il VP, non è altrettanto facile stabilire se ne sia stato influenzato. Sicuro è che Dharmakīrti assume nei confronti del VP un atteggiamento critico, atteggiamento che si manifesta palesemente nella confutazione alla teoria della significazione linguistica dello *sphoṭa* sostenuta da Bhartṛhari (cfr. Eltschinger 2001), secondo la quale — come è noto — a esprimere il significato di ogni enunciato, in primo luogo della frase, è un'entità unitaria ed eterna che, pur dischiudendosi (√*sphuṭ*) nella mente dell'ascoltatore a partire da una sequenza di suoni (*dhvani*), trascende tale materiale fonico. È pur vero che anche la tradizione buddhista *vaibhāṣika* sosteneva una teoria molto vicina a quella di Bhartṛhari[7] e, quindi, che la critica di Dharmakīrti potrebbe avere costoro come bersaglio, ma le citazioni del VP presenti nei commenti relativi a questa parte del *Pramāṇavārttika* suggeriscono che tale critica sia rivolta proprio Bhartṛhari.

Se dunque Diṅnāga sembra accogliere alcune idee di Bhartṛhari senza assumere un atteggiamento esplicitamente critico, Dharmakīrti testimonia invece che nella scuola logico-epistemologica buddhista del VII sec. si comincia a sentire la necessità di mettere in evidenza come alcuni aspetti del suo pensiero siano inconciliabili con i propri assunti. Tuttavia, non è facile dire se tale necessità sia riconducibile a una vera e propria contrapposizione a Bhartṛhari o piuttosto a dinamiche interne al buddhismo stesso. Infatti, la tendenza di alcuni buddhisti a considerare lo stesso Bhartṛhari un buddhista — tendenza testimoniata dal pellegrino

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[7] Al riguardo è molto esplicito Kamalaśīla, che in TSP *ad* 2712-2713 afferma: *vaibhāṣikā hi kecit padakāyābhidhānena vākyasphoṭam anityatvāj janyaṃ pratipannāḥ.* Sulla teoria linguistica dei *vaibhāṣika*, si veda Jaini 1959 e Cox 1995: 159-171.

cinese I-ching, che soggiornò a Nālanda tra il 675 e il 685[8] — e l'affinità tra la teoria dello *sphoṭa* di Bhartṛhari e quella dei *vaibhāṣika* rendono plausibile l'ipotesi che le prime critiche a Bhartṛhari siano state formulate nell'ambito della disputa tra la scuola logico-epistemologica e quella *vaibhāṣika*.

Sulla base della letteratura in sanscrito pervenutaci, è comunque possibile affermare che i primi autori buddhisti a confrontarsi esplicitamente con Bhartṛhari sono Śāntarakṣita (c. 725-788) e il suo discepolo Kamalaśīla (c. 740-795). A questo confronto sono dedicate le due sezioni del *Tattvasaṅgraha* (TS) e della *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* (TSP) di cui si offre qui una nuova edizione critica, la *Śabdabrahmaparīkṣā* e lo *Sphoṭavādakhaṇḍana*.

Come nel caso di Dharmakīrti, anche le critiche di Śāntarakṣita e Kamalaśīla potrebbero essere ricondotte a dinamiche interne al buddhismo, ma il diverso contesto culturale in cui furono attivi i due autori lascia ipotizzare che siano più verosimilmente il risultato di una diretta contrapposizione a Bhartṛhari.

Nell'VIII sec., grazie a Dharmakīrti, la scuola logico-epistemologica buddhista aveva assunto il suo assetto definitivo e con tutta probabilità gli elementi di origine bhartṛhariana in essa precedentemente confluiti venivano ormai percepiti come sua parte integrante. A questo stesso periodo sembrano risalire anche la *Paddhati* di Vṛṣabhadeva, l'unico commento pervenutoci al primo libro del VP e alla relativa *Vṛtti*, e la *Brahmasiddhi* di Maṇḍanamiśra, la prima opera in cui viene discussa la natura verbale del *brahman* sostenuta da Bhartṛhari. Sebbene alcuni passi del TS e del suo commento sembrino far riferimento a queste due opere,

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[8] Nel resoconto del suo viaggio in India, composto nel 691-692, I-ching (635-713) a proposito di Bhartṛhari scrive: «The author was intimately acquainted with the doctrine of 'sole knowledge' (Vidyāmātra), and has skilfully discussed about the Hetu and Udāharaṇa […]. He believed deeply in the Three Jewels (i.e. *ratnatraya*), and diligently meditated on the 'twofold nothingness' (*śūnya*). […] It is forty years since his death» (tr. Takakusu 1998: 178-180). Sebbene l'opera di I-ching rappresenti indubbiamente una preziosa fonte di informazioni sull'India del VII sec., non deve essere considerata attendibile di per sé, come invece fa Pathak (1893). Secondo quest'ultimo, le informazioni fornite da fonti contemporanee agli eventi narrati devono essere accettate senza riserve; dunque non vi è alcuna ragione per dubitare della fede buddhista di Bhartṛhari e della sua datazione tra il VI-VII sec. Per un esame critico di Pathak, si vedano Sastri 1936, Śarmā 1940, Iyengar 1951 e Brough 1973.

non si può dire con certezza che Śāntarakṣita e Kamalaśīla le cono-scessero, ma esse testimoniano senza dubbio che intorno all'VIII sec. negli ambienti brahmanici era in corso una riflessione sul-l'aspetto metafisico del pensiero di Bhartṛhari che, indirettamen-te, metteva in evidenza come anche le sue idee più prettamente gnoseologiche e linguistiche — in parte condivise anche dai bud-dhisti — fossero inserite in un contesto decisamente brahmanico. Anzi, il fatto che oltre alla *Paddhati* non si sia conservato alcun altro commento «antico» al primo libro del VP sembrerebbe indi-care che tale riflessione aveva raggiunto il suo culmine proprio con Vṛṣabhadeva e, quindi, che nell'VIII sec. anche la tradizione filosofico-grammaticale aveva assunto la forma con la quale la si conosce ancora oggi.

È dunque verosimile che Śāntarakṣita e Kamalaśīla, consapevo-li delle forti affinità che intercorrevano tra la loro tradizione e quella filosofico-grammaticale, abbiano sentito la necessità di met-tersi al riparo dalle eventuali accuse di connivenza con l'ortodos-sia brahmanica. In effetti, Śāntarakṣita e Kamalaśīla si distinguono dagli autori buddhisti precedenti non solo perché sono i primi a far esplicito riferimento al pensiero di Bhartṛhari, ma anche per-ché, per primi, forse anche rispetto alle tradizioni brahmaniche [9], ne criticano in maniera sistematica la metafisica. Nonostante ciò, finora non è stata prestata molta attenzione a questo aspetto del TS e della TSP. La *Śabdabrahmaparīkṣā*, dedicata specificamente alla critica della metafisica di Bhartṛhari, e le citazioni del VP pre-senti nelle due opere, infatti, non sono state oggetto di studi approfonditi. La *Śabdabrahmaparīkṣā* è stata tradotta da Nakamura (1956), ma visto che la sua voluminosa opera non si occupa diret-tamente del rapporto tra il buddhismo e Bhartṛhari, egli si limita ad affermare che Śāntarakṣita critica il monismo incentrato sulla Parola [10]. Le citazioni del VP, invece, sono state studiate da Wayman (1985) e Hattori (1993), ma il primo si limita a segnala-re la presenza di alcune citazioni del VP nella TSP, mentre il

[9] Il primo autore brahmanico a criticare l'aspetto metafisico del pensiero di Bhartṛhari sembrerebbe infatti lo śivaita Somānanda (c. IX-X sec.), che dedica a tale critica l'intero secondo capitolo della *Śivadṛṣṭi* (vedi Gnoli 1959).

[10] Per una breve descrizione e una traduzione italiana della *Śabdabrahma-parīkṣā*, si veda Giunta 2018b.

secondo mostra come il commento di Kamalaśīla ad alcune strofe del VP citate da Śāntarakṣita sia più chiaro di uno dei commenti classici al VP, la *ṭīkā* di Puṇyarāja (c. X sec.).

Come è noto, l'idea che fonda l'intero pensiero di Bhartṛhari e sulla quale si incentra la critica di Śāntarakṣita e Kamalaśīla viene espressa nella prima strofa del VP: il mondo fenomenico non è altro che una manifestazione di un principio unico, eterno e unitario identificato con la Parola (*anādinidhanaṃ brahma śabdatattvaṃ yad akṣaram | vivartate 'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ ||*). Tale affermazione risulta agli occhi di un buddhista del tutto inaccettabile, non solo, o non tanto, perché in essa si ammette l'esistenza di un'entità dalle caratteristiche inconciliabili con gli assunti basilari del buddhismo quali la momentaneità di tutto ciò che esiste e la sua conseguente mancanza di natura propria e, quindi, di unitarietà, quanto piuttosto perché questa entità viene considerata la causa prima di tutto l'esistente, la cui molteplicità e momentaneità viene esperita quotidianamente. La netta contrapposizione tra gli attributi che caratterizzano lo *śabdabrahman* e quelli che caratterizzano invece le entità che da esso derivano rende per i buddhisti logicamente impossibile instaurare qualsiasi tipo di relazione tra i due. Lo *śabdabrahman*, infatti, non può essere considerato né causa materiale, né causa efficiente del mondo, né quest'ultimo può essere considerato un'illusoria manifestazione del primo. Se infatti lo *śabdabrahman* si manifestasse come realtà fenomenica attraverso una sua reale trasformazione (*pariṇāma*), afferma Śāntarakṣita, non sarebbe più eterno; né d'altro canto si può sostenere che esso subisca tale trasformazione senza perdere una sostanziale identità con il mondo fenomenico, poiché la differenza tra le singole entità mondane e quella tra ogni entità mondana e lo *śabdabrahman* dimostrano proprio il contrario. Qualora, invece, lo *śabdabrahman* fosse la causa efficiente del mondo, non solo si presenterebbe come una causa sempre presente e attiva e, quindi, che manifesta continuamente tutti i suoi effetti contemporaneamente, ma poiché tra causa ed effetto deve intercorrere una differenza di carattere ontologico, lo *śabdabrahman* non sarebbe più l'unica entità esistente e quindi non potrebbe più costituire l'essenza di tutto ciò che esiste. Anche considerando il mondo un'illusoria manifestazione (*vivarta*) dello *śabdabrahman*, ossia sostenendo che lo *śabdabrahman*, pur rimanendo indifferenziato, si manifesta agli uomi-

ni come molteplice a causa della nescienza (*avidyā*), non manche-
rebbero le incongruenze. In primo luogo, infatti, Śāntarakṣita fa
notare che poiché gli uomini sono immersi nel mondo dell'illusio-
ne provocata dalla nescienza, non è possibile spiegare come si può
percepire e dunque dimostrare con mezzi umani l'esistenza di
un'entità che trascende tale illusione. Inoltre, visto che all'imper-
manenza delle entità fenomeniche corrisponde l'impermanenza
delle relative conoscenze, se esistesse un'entità unica ed eterna
quale lo *śabdabrahman*, di essa si dovrebbe avere una conoscenza
altrettanto eterna e onnipervadente, il che è in contrasto con
l'esperienza ordinaria. L'eternità e l'unicità attribuite allo *śabda-
brahman*, aggiunge Kamalaśīla, rendono logicamente insostenibile
anche l'ipotesi che esso sia identico alla coscienza e che venga
conosciuto nella sua natura reale soltanto dagli yogin. Infatti,
essendo esso immutabile, non si potrebbe spiegare come sia possi-
bile passare dalla condizione che precede quella degli yogin, in cui
lo *śabdabrahman* si manifesta come molteplice, alla condizione yogi-
ca, dove esso si manifesta invece nella sua reale natura di luce; né,
d'altro canto, qualora si ricorresse all'*avidyā*, quest'ultima potreb-
be essere considerata come identica o distinta dallo *śabdabrahman*,
poiché nel primo caso si sarebbe costretti ad attribuire alla stessa
entità due caratteristiche tra loro in contraddizione, mentre nel
secondo si ammetterebbe l'esistenza di un'altra entità rispetto allo
śabdabrahman.

Nella *Śabdabrahmaparīkṣā*, si fa implicito riferimento anche a
un'altra idea centrale del pensiero di Bhartṛhari, quella secondo
cui ogni attività cognitiva è di natura verbale (VP I.131: *na so 'sti
pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte | anuviddham iva jñānāṃ sarvāṃ
śabdena bhāsate ||*). Nel contesto del capitolo, però, egli interpreta
quanto affermato da Bhartṛhari come una prova avanzata a soste-
gno del fatto che tutte le entità fenomeniche hanno come essen-
za la parola intendendo quest'ultima come mero oggetto conosci-
bile. È Kamalaśīla a inserire VP I.131 nel suo contesto originario
prettamente gnoseologico, intendendo cioè la parola come *modus
operandi* della conoscenza stessa. Come indica lo stesso Kamalaśīla,
però, anche Śāntarakṣita discute questo aspetto del pensiero di
Bhartṛhari, ma nel capitolo del TS dedicato alla definizione della
percezione come mezzo di valida conoscenza, la *Pratyakṣalakṣaṇa-
parīkṣā*.

Come è noto, secondo la scuola logico-epistemologica buddhista la percezione (*pratyakṣa*) è una conoscenza priva di costruzioni concettuali (*kalpanā*), le quali sono a loro volta definite come quelle cognizioni capaci di essere connesse a un'espressione verbale (*abhilāpa*)[11]. Ciò determina una netta distinzione tra due tipi di conoscenza: quella percettiva o non-concettuale (*nirvikalpaka*), assolutamente priva di espressione verbale e il cui oggetto è il particolare (*svalakṣaṇa*); e quella concettuale (*savikalpaka*), caratterizzata invece dall'associazione con l'espressione verbale, che ha per oggetto l'universale (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). Non riconoscendo altro tipo di parola se non quella che, a partire dalla sua effettiva e articolata manifestazione sonora, svolge una funzione significante (*vācaka*), i buddhisti vedono in VP I.131 l'affermazione dell'esistenza di un solo tipo di conoscenza, quello concettuale appunto. Ciò è per loro inaccettabile, poiché equivale a negare la possibilità di un accesso alla realtà «così com'è» che non sia mediato dalla parola, ossia, da un altro punto di vista, a negare lo *status* di mezzo di valida conoscenza (*pramāṇa*) alla percezione. Però, una volta limitata la validità di quanto affermato da Bhartr̥hari al solo ambito del pensiero discorsivo (*vikalpa/kalpanā*), i buddhisti ritengono che le sue teorie gnoseologiche siano pienamente condivisibili.

Passando dall'ambito metafisico e gnoseologico a quello linguistico, Śāntarakṣita non si discosta dall'atteggiamento che già avevano assunto Diṅnāga e Dharmakīrti. Come Diṅnāga, infatti, anche Śāntarakṣita accoglie la teoria della *pratibhā*, ma mentre Diṅnāga e Bhartr̥hari la applicano esclusivamente in riferimento al significato della frase e considerano quest'ultima come un'unità semantica che non può essere ridotta alla somma dei significati delle parole che la compongono, Śāntarakṣita afferma invece che anche le singole parole fanno sorgere nell'ascoltatore una *pratibhā* e, quindi, che il significato della frase è costituito dall'unione dei significati delle parole che la compongono[12]. Come evidenziato

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[11] Cfr. PS I.3c, PVin I.4a, NB I.4, TS 1213a: *pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham*; e PVin 7,7 (= NB I.5): *abhilāpasaṃsargayogyapratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpanā*.

[12] Cfr. TS 1027: *pratibimbātmako 'pohaḥ padād apy upajāyate | pratibhākhyo jhaṭity eva padārtho 'py ayam eva naḥ ||*; e TS 1159cd-1160: *padārthā eva sahitāḥ kecid vākyārtha ucyate || teṣāṃ ca ye vijātīyas te 'pohyāḥ suparisphuṭāḥ | vākyārthasyāpi te caiva tebhyo 'nyo naiva so 'sti hi ||*.

da Hattori (1979: 69-70), questa sorta di allontanamento dalla tradizione è riconducibile all'influenza esercitata su Śāntarakṣita dalle critiche che Kumārila muove alla teoria dell'*apoha* e della frase di Diṅnāga. Per dimostrare come la teoria dell'*apoha* non sia compatibile con l'idea secondo cui la frase è un'unità semantica indivisibile, Kumārila afferma che nel caso di un significato complesso quale quello di una frase non è possibile individuare un contro-significato sulla base dell'esclusione del quale si possa formare il significato della frase. Così Śāntarakṣita è portato ad affermare che il significato della frase è costituito dalla somma delle esclusioni del contro-significato di ogni singola parola che la compone, è cioè indotto a sostenere la stessa teoria della frase sostenuta da Kumārila, quella dell'*abhihitānvaya*, e a conciliarla con la teoria dell'*apoha*.

I buddhisti possono accogliere la teoria della *pratibhā* poiché essa descrive il processo della significazione linguistica da un punto di vista prettamente psicologico, senza chiamare esplicitamente in causa presupposti ontologici e/o epistemologici, a differenza, invece, di quanto accade nel caso della teoria dello *sphoṭa*, che è strettamente connessa ai principi ontologici e gnoseologici del VP[13].

Anche a proposito di quest'ultima teoria Śāntarakṣita resta fedele alla tradizione: la parte *destruens* della sua critica alla teoria dello *sphoṭa* segue infatti l'impianto argomentativo di Dharmakīrti, studiato approfonditamente da Eltschinger (2001, 2007); nella parte *costruens*, invece, Śāntarakṣita si appropria della teoria già esposta da Kumārila nella sezione dello *Ślokavārttika* dedicata appunto alla critica dello *sphoṭa* (*sphoṭavāda* 109, 112-116, 120-121, 135). Egli specifica però che tale teoria è sostenibile soltanto qualora si fondi sugli assunti filosofici buddhisti, e sia, perciò, assimilabile a quella elaborata da Dharmakīrti[14].

Tali, in sunto, i contenuti delle due sezioni del TS e della TSP di cui si presenta qui l'edizione e che offrono un quadro comple-

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[13] Si veda, e.g., Subramania Iyer 1969: 147-180, Sastri 1980: 1-16 e Coward 1980: 11-18.

[14] A tale proposito vedi ancora Eltschinger 2001, 2007. La critica di Śāntarakṣita alla teoria dello *sphoṭa* è stata oggetto di studio da parte di Sara McClintock (2020).

to del modo in cui i buddhisti si sono rapportati ai vari aspetti del pensiero di Bhartᵣhari o, meglio, alle teorie che ne stanno alla base. Esse mostrano come tale rapporto sia articolato per gradi successivi, passando dal netto rifiuto degli assunti metafisici alla parziale accettazione di quelli gnoseologici, fino ad arrivare alla quasi totale condivisione di quelli linguistici. Da Śāntarakṣita in poi, questo sarà il modello a cui faranno riferimento gli autori buddhisti successivi, come testimonia per esempio *Jñānaśrī-bhadra (c. XI sec.)

2. Nota all'edizione

Eccezion fatta per singoli capitoli o porzioni di testo, l'intero TS con la TSP è disponibile a oggi in due edizioni a stampa; la prima pubblicata da E. Krishnamacharya nel 1926 (K), la seconda pubblicata nella sua prima edizione da D. Śāstrī nel 1968 (Ś). Tuttavia, l'edizione di Krishnamacharya tiene conto di un unico manoscritto delle due opere, che corregge o emenda esclusivamente in base alle proprie conoscenze personali. Per quanto riguarda l'edizione di Śāstrī, invece, nonostante egli affermi di aver tenuto conto di tutto il materiale manoscritto disponibile e della traduzione tibetana, è evidente che non ha preso visione diretta del manoscritto utilizzato da Krishnamacharya ma ha considerato l'edizione come una copia fedele di quel manoscritto. In molte occasioni, inoltre, Śāstrī non segnala i suoi interventi, specie quando tenta di colmare delle lacune ritraducendo il testo dal tibetano o sulla base di congetture personali.

Per la nuova edizione delle parti del TS e della TSP oggetto di questo studio, fatta eccezione per le copie moderne conservate a San Pietroburgo (Institut Vostokovedeniya Ran, mss. 213 e 214), si è tenuto conto di tutto il materiale manoscritto oggi disponibile (tre manoscritti del TS, conservati a Jaisalmer, Pāṭan e Koba, e due manoscritti della TSP, conservati a Jaisalmer e Pāṭan), della traduzione tibetana (nelle edizioni di Pechino e sDe dge) e delle due edizioni a stampa di cui si è detto. Nell'apparato critico sono state riportate, assieme ai passi paralleli, alcune citazioni non identificate nelle edizioni precedenti.

I manoscritti utilizzati per la presente edizione sono stati da me descritti in Giunta 2018a. Mi limito qui a riprodurre le sigle impie-

gate e i relativi riferimenti bibliografici per una loro immediata identificazione:

K_K Koba, Ācārya Śrī Kailāsasāgarasūri Jñānamandira – Śrī Mahāvīra Jaina Ārādhanā Kendra, ms. n. 15081.

J_K Jaisalmer, Śrī Jinabhadrasūri Tāḍapatrīya Granthabhaṇḍāra, ms. n. 377.

J_P Jaisalmer, Śrī Jinabhadrasūri Tāḍapatrīya Granthabhaṇḍāra, ms. n. 378.

P_K Pāṭan, Śrī Hemacandrācārya Jaina Jñānamandira, ms. n. 6679.

P_P Pāṭan, Śrī Hemacandrācārya Jaina Jñānamandira, ms. n. 6680.

Le altre sigle utilizzate nel testo critico fanno riferimento alla traduzione tibetana, che ho consultato nelle due edizioni di Pechino (Q) e di sDe dge (D):

D_K *sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Bstan ḥgyur — preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo*, ed. J. Takasaki, Z. Yamaguchi, Y. Ejima, Sekai seiten kankō kyōkai, Tokyo 1977 ss.: De kho na ñid bsdus pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa, n. 4266, tshad ma, ze 1b1-133a6.

D_P *sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Bstan ḥgyur — preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo*, ed. J. Takasaki, Z. Yamaguchi, Y. E-jima, Sekai seiten kankō kyōkai, Tokyo 1977 ss.: De kho na ñid bsdus pa'i bka' 'grel, n. 4267, tshad ma, ze 133b1-'e 331a7.

Q_K *The Tibetan Tripitaka. Peking Edition. Reprinted under the Supervision of the Otani University*, Kyoto, ed. D. T. Suzuki, 168 vols., Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, Tokyo-Kyoto 1955-1961: De kho na ñid bsdus pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa, n. 5764, tshad ma, 'e 1b1-159a2.

Q_P *The Tibetan Tripitaka. Peking Edition. Reprinted under the Supervision of the Otani University*, Kyoto, ed. D. T. Suzuki, 168 vols., Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, Tokyo-Kyoto 1955-1961: De kho na ñid bsdus pa'i bka' 'grel, n. 5765, tshad ma, 'e 159b2-ye 405a7.

Nella preparazione dell'edizione sono stati osservati i seguenti criteri:

◊ l'apparato critico è costituito da due ordini di note: le note che riportano varianti, congetture e correzioni accettate e scartate sono indicate con cifra araba in apice; quelle che riportano citazioni, passi paralleli e possibili fonti del testo sono invece indicate con lettera greca in apice all'inizio e alla fine del passo a cui si riferiscono;

◊   i cambi di foglio (per i manoscritti) e quelli di pagina (per le edizioni a stampa) sono riportati nel margine destro della pagina e indicati nel testo con un asterisco (*) e, nel caso ne siano presenti due sulla stessa linea, con un piccolo cerchio in apice (°);

◊   la numerazione delle *kārikā* del TS è la stessa dell'edizione pubblicata da Śāstrī nel 1968;

◊   il sandhi è stato standardizzato;

◊   la punteggiatura, la divisione in paragrafi e gli *avagraha* sono stati inseriti, spostati o rimossi senza darne conto nell'apparato critico;

◊   i *pratīka* (e le principali parole del testo *mūla*) sono evidenziati in grassetto;

◊   i riferimenti a opere in *sūtra* o *kārikā* sono dati facendo seguire alla sigla del titolo il numero del capitolo (in cifre romane) e il numero del *sūtra* o della *kārikā* (in cifre arabe); per le opere in prosa, invece, alla sigla del titolo viene fatto seguire il numero di pagina e di linea.

3. *Abbreviazioni e simboli*

(…)	indica una lettura incerta dei manoscritti
(ill. ± 00)	indica un passo del testo illeggibile per un numero di *akṣara* pari circa a quello riportato
(lac. ± 00)	indica una lacuna del testo che si estende per un numero di *akṣara* pari circa a quello riportato
[…]	indica l'omissione di una parte del testo citato nelle note
]	nell'apparato critico separa la lezione accettata da quelle non accettate
<…>	nell'edizione indica una parte del testo non presente nei manoscritti disponibili e ritradotta sulla base della versione tibetana
ac	*ante correctionem*
cong.	congettura
em.	emendazione
f./ff.	foglio/fogli
ill.	illeggibile
lac.	lacuna/lacunoso
om.	omissione/omesso
pc	*post correctionem*
r	*recto*
Tib	Tibetano (quando l'edizione di Pechino e quella di sDe dge concordano)
v	*verso*

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Chāndogyopaniṣadbhāṣya di Śaṅkara
ChUpBh   Pandit Jibananda Vidyasagara (ed.), *The Chandogya Upanishad of the Samaveda with the Commentary of Sankaracharya and the Gloss of Ananda Giri*, Sucharoo Press, Calcutta 1873.

Tattvasaṅgraha di Śāntarakṣita
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TS/Ś   D. Śāstrī (ed.), *Tattvasaṃgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalashīla*, 2 vols., Bauddha Bharati Series, Varanasi 1968.

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PVSVṛ   Si veda PV I.

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Śabdabrahmaparīkṣā

*नाशोत्पादासमलीढं ब्रह्म शब्दमयं परम् ।
यत्तस्य परिणामोऽयं भावग्रामः प्रतीयते ॥ (128)

*इति सञ्चक्षते येऽपि ते वाच्याः किमिदं निजम् ।
शब्दरूपं परित्यज्य नीलादित्वं प्रपद्यते ॥ (129)

5 *न वा तथेति ^{α}यद्याद्यः पक्षः संश्रीयते तदा ।
अक्षरत्ववियोगः स्यात्पौरस्त्यात्मविनाशतः^{α} ॥ (130)
अथाप्यनन्तरः पक्षः, ^{β}तत्र नीलादिवेदने ।
अश्रुतेर*पि विस्पष्टं भवेच्छब्दात्मवेदनम्^{β} ॥ (131)

***नाशोत्पादे**त्यादिना शब्दब्रह्मवादिमतमुपक्षिप्य दूषयति ॥

10 तत्र^1 शब्दब्रह्मवादिनो ब्रुवते – पूर्वापरादिदिग्विभागरहितम् ^{2}अनुत्प-
न्नमविनाशि यच्छब्दमयं ब्रह्म तस्यायं रूपादिभावग्रामः परिणाम इति
प्रतीयते, यथोक्तम् –

^{γ}अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम् ।
विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः^{γ} ॥

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^{1}नाशोत्पादेत्यादिना . . . तत्र J_P Ś, cfr. Tib] नाशोत्पादेत्यादिना P_P K. ^{2}पूर्वापरादिदि-
ग्विभागरहितम् J_{Ppc}, cfr. Tib: སྣང་ དང་ ཕུ་ ལ་ སོགས་ པའི་ ཕྱོགས་ ཀྱི་ ཆ་ དང་ བྲལ་] पू-
र्वापरादिग्विभागरहितम् J_{Pac}, पूर्वापरादि (ill.)भागरहितम् P_P, पूर्वापरादिविभागरहितम्
em. K seguito da Ś.

$^{α-α}$यदि . . . °विनाशतः Cfr. HB 18,21-19,2: न प्राङ्नित्यो भूत्वा पश्चादनित्यो भवति ।
किं तर्हि । पश्चादपि नित्यो एव, एकस्वभावत्वात् । स तर्हि भावः स्वभावेन नाशम-
नाविशन् कथं नष्टो नाम, तत्स्वभावविनाशयोरपरस्पररूपत्वात् ।तस्मात्सत्यस्य विनाशे
विनाशस्वभावेन अनेन भवितव्यम्.
$^{β-β}$तत्र . . . °वेदनम् Cfr. NVTPṬ 112,13-17: यदि पुनरिदं शब्दात्मकं रूपादि भवेत्
श्रोत्रजं ज्ञानं शब्दग्राहीति रूपादावपि प्रवर्तेत । अप्रवर्तमानं वा विधुरयति रूपादीनां
शब्दात्मताम् ।अपि च श्रूयमाणशब्दात्मत्वेरूपादीनाम्, तेषामपि श्रवणग्राह्यत्वमित्यन्धो-
ऽपि रूपं गृह्णीयात् । अस्ति हि तस्य श्रोत्रं च शब्दज्ञानं च । एवं बधिरोऽपि शब्दं
गृह्णीयात् । अस्ति हि तस्य लोचनं च रूपज्ञानं च.
$^{γ-γ}$अनादिनिधनं . . . यत = VP I.1.

इति ।^δतत्र ^εआदिरुत्पादः, निधनं नाशः, तदभावादनादिनिधनम्^ε । ^ζअक्षरमित्यकाराद्यक्षरस्य निमित्तत्वात्^ζ ।^ηएतेनाभिधानरूपेण विवर्तो दर्शितः । अर्थभावेनेत्यादिना पुनरभिधेयविवर्तः^η । प्रक्रियेति भेदाः । ^θब्रह्मेति नामसङ्कीर्तनम्^{θ,δ} ॥

5   अस्यैव श्लोकस्यार्थं निर्दिशति ।**नाशोत्पादासमालीढम्** इति नाशो*त्पा-   * Ś 86c
दग्रहणमुपलक्षणम् ।इदमप्यत्र बोद्धव्यम् – 'पूर्वापरदेशविभागरहितमिति' ।
तथाह्यनादिनिधनत्वं पूर्वापरदेशविभागरहितत्वमपि तत्र निर्दिष्टम् ।**शब्द-**
मयम् इति शब्दस्वभावम्, अत एव शब्दस्तत्त्वमस्य शब्दतत्त्वं *तदुच्यते।   * K 68
^κशब्दोऽस्याविपरीतं रूपमित्यर्थः^κ ।^λ**परम्** इति प्रणवात्मकम् ।प्रणवो हि
10 किल सर्वेषां शब्दानां सर्वेषां चार्थानां प्रकृतिः, स च वेदः^λ ।^μअयं तु
वर्णपदक्रमेणावस्थितो वेदस्तदधिगमोपायः, तस्य ^νप्रतिच्छन्दक^νन्यायेना-
वस्थितः^μ ।^ξतं तु परमं ब्रह्मात्मानम्³अभ्युदयनिःश्रेयसफलधर्मानुगृहीता-

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³ब्रह्मात्मानम् em. sulla base di TSP ad TS 151: तं तु परमं ब्रह्मात्मानमभ्युदयनिः-
श्रेयसफलधर्मानुगृहीतान्तःकरणा योगिन एव पश्यन्तीति; e Tib: ८८ས་བ་མཆོག་གི་བདག་
ཉིད་དེ་ནི་ [...] མཆོང་བ་ཉིན་ནོ] ब्रह्माणम् J_P P_P K Ś.

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^{δ−δ} तत्र ... °सङ्कीर्तनम् Cfr. PKM 39,16-19: अनादिनिधनं हि शब्दब्रह्म उत्पादविना-
शाभावात्, अक्षरं चाकाराद्यक्षरस्य निमित्तत्वात्, अनेन वाचकरूपता 'अर्थभावेन'
इत्यनेन तु वाच्यरूपतास्य सूचिता । प्रक्रियेति भेदाः । शब्दब्रह्मेति नामसङ्कीर्तनमिति.
^{ε−ε} आदिर् ... अनादिनिधनम् Cfr. *Paddhati* 2,26-27: आदिः उत्पत्तिः । निधनं
विनाशः ।तच्च द्वयं तत्र नास्तीति.
^{ζ−ζ} अक्षरम् ... निमित्तत्वात् Cfr. VPVṛ 7,2: तच्चाक्षरनिमित्तत्वादक्षरमित्युच्यते; *Pad-*
dhati 7,17-18: तच्चाक्षरनिमित्त्वादिति । ब्रह्माक्षरमित्यभिधीयते । अक्षराणि वर्णा
अकारादयः.
^{η−η} एतेन° ... °विवर्तः Cfr. *Paddhati* 2,20-21: यदक्षरं विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेनेत्यनेन ब्रह्मणः
सकाशाच्छब्दार्थयोरभेदकथनम्.
^{θ−θ} ब्रह्मेति नामसङ्कीर्तनम् Cfr. *Paddhati* 2,19-20: ब्रह्मेति नामकथनम्.
^{ι−ι} पूर्वापरदेशविभागरहितम् Cfr. *Paddhati* 2,19: तत्रानादिनिधनमिति कालप्रदेशकृत-
परिच्छेदाभावप्रकाशनाय; ivi 2,27-3,3: तथा परिच्छिन्नदेशानां भावानां पूर्वापरौ भागौ
लोके आदिनिधनशब्दाभ्यामभिधीयते । आदिमध्यो निधनं वेति तदनादिनिधनश्रुत्या
परिच्छेददेशतापि निषिध्यते.
^{κ−κ} शब्दो ... अर्थः Cfr. *Paddhati* 7,13: शब्दतत्त्वमिति, इदमस्याविपरीतं रूपमिति.
^{λ−λ} परम् ... वेदः Cfr. VPVṛ 38,4: प्रणव एव वेद इत्येके ।स हि सर्वशब्दार्थप्रकृतिरिति;
Paddhati 38,17-19: कोऽसौ वेदो विधाता इत्याह प्रणव इति ।यत्तत्परं ब्रह्मणो रूपम् ।
स हीति ।प्रणवः ।सर्वेषां शब्दानामर्थानां च प्रकृतिः कारणम्.
^{μ−μ} अयम् ... °अवस्थितः Cfr. VP I.5: प्राप्त्युपायोऽनुकारश्च तस्य वेदो महर्षिभिः।
एकोऽप्यनेकत्वमेव समाम्नातः पृथक्पृथक्.
^{ν−ν} प्रतिच्छन्दक° Cfr. *Paddhati* 22,18-19: उपायत्वाच्च तस्य स्वरूपं वर्णयति अनुकार
इति । प्रतिच्छन्दकः.

न्तःकरणाः पश्यन्तीति^ξ ॥

अत्र च प्रमाणयन्ति – ^{φ,ο}ये यदाकारानुस्यूतास्ते तन्मयाः , यथा घटशरावोदञ्चनादयो मृद्विकारा मृदाकारानुगताः पदार्था मृण्मयत्वेन प्रसि-द्धाः^ο । शब्दाकारानुस्यूताश्च सर्वभावा इति स्वभावहेतुः , यतः प्रत्यक्षत एव सर्वार्थानां शब्दाकारानुगमः सिद्धः^φ । तथाहि सर्व⁴ एव प्रत्ययोऽर्थेषूप-जायमानः शब्दो*ऽल्लेखानुगत एवोपजायते । यथोक्तम् –

    ^πन सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते ।

    अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन वर्तते^π ॥

इति । ^ρज्ञानाकारनिबन्धना च वस्तूनां स्वभावप्रज्ञसिः^ρ । अतः सिद्धमेषां शब्दाकारानुस्यूतत्वम् , तत्सिद्धौ च तन्मयत्वमपि सिद्धमेव , तन्मात्रभावि-त्वात्तन्मयत्वस्येति ॥

ते वाच्या इत्यादिना प्रतिज्ञार्थं तावद्दूषयति ॥

अत्र कदाचिच्छब्दपरिणामरूपत्वाद्वा जगतः शब्दमयत्वं साध्यत्वे-नेष्टम् , कदाचिच्छब्दादुत्पत्तेर्वा , यथा ^σअन्नमयाः प्राणा^σ इति ^τहेतौ

[*] J_P 41*r*

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⁴सर्व J_P Ś, cfr. Tib] शब्द P_P K.

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^{ξ–ξ} तं ... पश्यन्तीति Cfr. VPVṛ 24,2-3: यां सूक्ष्मां नित्यामतीन्द्रियां वाचम् ऋषयः साक्षात्कृतधर्माणो मन्त्रदृशः पश्यन्ति; *Paddhati* 24,18-19: अभ्युदयनिःश्रेयससाधनो ध-र्मः: यैः साक्षात्कृतः प्राप्तस्ते धर्मानुगृहीतान्तःकरणास्तां वाचं पश्यन्तीति. Cfr. anche MBhD^{II} 39,25: पुष्पितः फलितश्च । दृष्टादृष्टफलाभ्यामभ्युदयनिःश्रेयसाभ्याम्.

^{φ–φ} ये ... सिद्धः Cfr. VPVṛ 6,1-7,1: तत्तु भिन्नरूपाभिमतानामपि विकाराणां प्रकृत्य-न्वयित्वाच्छब्दोपग्राह्यतया शब्दोपग्राहितया च शब्दतत्त्वमित्यभिधीयते; *Paddhati* 6,19-22: तदिति ब्रह्म । शब्दतत्त्वमभिधीयत इत्यनेन सम्बन्धः । ननु सर्वपरिकल्पातीततत्त्वं तत्कथं शब्दतत्त्वमित्युच्यत इत्याह विकाराणां प्रकृत्यन्वयित्वादिति । विकारा हि प्रकृति-रूपेण अन्विता दृष्टा । यथा शकलकपालामत्रभूषानि रूपादयश्च एते शब्दरूपानुगता दृश्यन्त इति प्रकृतिरूपे ब्रह्मणि शब्दापदेशः.

^{ο–ο} ये ... प्रसिद्धाः Cfr. TS 15: ततस्तन्मयसम्भूतं तज्जात्यन्वयदर्शनात् । कूटादिभेद-वत्त्वं प्रधानमिति कापिलाः; STK 282,4-6: यानि यद्रूपसमनुगतानि तानि तत्स्वभावाव्य-क्तकारणानि यथा मृद्धेमपिण्डसमनुगता घटमुकुटादयो मृद्धेमपिण्डाव्यक्तकारणकाः; YD 249, 6-7: इह येन भेदानां समनुगतिस्तस्य सत्त्वं दृष्टम् । तद्यथा मृदा घटादीनाम्.

^{π–π} न ... वर्तते = VP I.131, che ha भासते invece di वर्तते, variante comunque registrata nell'apparato critico dell'edizione di Rau.

^{ρ–ρ} ज्ञान° ... °प्रज्ञसिः Cfr. *Paddhati* 7,7-10: शब्दोपग्राहितयेति । शब्द उपग्राह्यस्येति शब्दनिबन्धना प्रतिपत्तिस्तस्येति शब्दतत्त्वम् । एतदुक्तं भवति । शब्देन हि तत्परिच्छिद्यते । तस्मिंश्च तत्परिच्छेदके ज्ञाने तद्रूपं सन्निविष्टमिति वस्तुनः शब्दाकारज्ञानोत्पत्तेः शब्द उपग्राही स्वीकर्ता तस्य भवति.

^{σ–σ} अन्नमयाः प्राणा Cfr. ChUpBh ad ChUp 7,4.2: अन्नमया हि प्राणा अन्नोपष्ट-म्भकाः. Cfr. anche ChUp 6,5.4; 6,6.5; 6,7.1; 6,7.6: आपोमयः प्राणः; TaittUp II.1,1: अन्नात्पुरुषः । स वा एष पुरुषोऽन्नरसमयः; MuṇḍUp I.1,8: अन्नात्प्राणो.

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मयङ्विधानात्^τ ॥

अत्र *न तावदाद्यः पक्षः, परिणामस्यैवानुपपत्तेः । तथाहि शब्दा-   * Ś 87c
त्मकं ब्रह्म नीलादिरूपतां प्रतिपद्यमानं कदाचिन्निजं स्वाभाविकं शब्दरूपं
परित्यज्य प्रतिपद्येत, अपरित्यज्य वा । तत्र यदि परित्यज्येत्याद्यः पक्ष
5 आश्रीयते, तदानादिनिधनमित्यनेन वचनेन यदक्षरत्वमविनाशित्वमभ्युप-
गतं तस्य हानिः स्यात्, पौरस्त्यस्वभावविनाशात् ।अथापरित्यज्येत्यन-
न्तरः पक्षः, तदा नीलादिसंवेदनकालेऽप्यश्रुतेर्बधिरस्य शब्दसंवेदनं⁵ प्रा-
प्नोति, नीलादिसंवेदनवत्तद्व्यतिरेकात् । प्रयोगः – ^vयद्यद्व्यतिरिक्तं तत्-
स्मिन्संवेद्यमाने संवेद्यते, यथा नीलादिसंवेदनावस्थायां तस्यैव नीलादे-
10 रात्मा, नीलादव्यतिरिक्तश्च शब्द *इति स्वभावहेतुः^v ।अन्यथा भिन्नयोग-   * K 69
क्षेमत्वात्तत्स्वभावत्वमेवं न सिद्ध्येद्⁶ इ*त्येतदत्र बाधकं प्रमाणम् ॥   * P_P 25v

एतदेव विस्तरेण प्रतिपादयन्नाह –

येन शब्दमयं सर्वं मुख्यवृत्त्या व्यवस्थितम् ।(132ab)

येनेत्यादि । येन यस्माङ्वह्निर्मुख्यत एव शब्दस्वभावं जगदिति वर्ण्यते ॥

15 कस्मादित्याह –

शब्दरूपापरित्यागे परिणामाभिधानतः⁷ ॥ (132cd)

शब्दरूपापरित्याग इति । यदि नाम मुख्यतः शब्दमयमवस्थितम्, ततः
किमित्याह –

अगौणे चैवमेकत्वे नीलादीनां व्यवस्थिते ।
20 तत्संवेदनवेलायां कथं नास्त्यस्य वेदनम् ॥ (133)
*अस्याविित्तौ हि नीलादेरपि न स्यात्प्रवेदनम् ।   * Ś 88_k
ऐकात्म्याद्⁸भिन्नधर्मत्वे भेदोऽत्यन्तं प्रसज्यते ॥ (134)

अगौणे चेत्यादि । एकत्वे नीलादीनाम् इति शब्देन सहेति शेषः ।
तत्संवेदनवेलायाम् इति तेषां नीलादीनां संवेदनावस्थायाम् ।कथं नास्त्य-
25 स्य वेदनम् इति ।*तस्यापि नीलादिस्वभाववदुपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तत्वाद्युक्त-   * Ś 88c
मेव संवेदनमित्यभिप्रायः ॥

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⁵शब्दसंवेदनं J_P P_P Ś] शब्दः संवेदनं em. K.   ⁶न सिद्ध्येत् em. sulla base di Tib
ཨེ་འགྱུར་ཐེ] सिद्ध्येत् J_P, (प्र)सिद्ध्येत् P_P, प्रसिद्ध्येत् K Ś.   ⁷°अभिधानतः J_K P_K Ś]
°अनिधानतः em. K.   ⁸ऐकात्म्याद् J_K K Ś] एकात्म्याद् P_K.

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^{τ–τ}हेतौ मयङ्विधानात् Cfr. AA 4,3.81-82: हेतुमनुष्येभ्योऽन्यतरस्यां रूप्यः ॥ मयट्च.
^{v–v}यद् … स्वभावहेतुः Cfr. PV I.39: स्वभावे अप्यविनाभावो भावमात्रानुरोधिनि ।
तदभावे स्वयं भावस्याभावः स्यादभेदतः; PV I.53cd: तयोरात्मनि सम्बन्धादेकज्ञाने
द्वयग्रहः.

अथास्य वेदनं नेष्यते, तदा नीलादेरपि शब्दस्वरूपवदसंवेदनप्रसङ्गः ।
ऐकात्म्यात् शब्देन सह नीलादीनामेकस्वभावत्वादित्यर्थः । अन्यथा नी-
लादीनां शब्देन सह भिन्नधर्मत्वेऽभ्युपगम्यमानेऽत्यन्तभेदोऽङ्गीकर्तव्यः ॥
कस्मातित्याह –

5　　ˣविरुद्धधर्मसङ्गो हि वस्तूनां[9] भेदलक्षणम् ।
　　नान्यथा व्यक्तिभेदानां कल्पितोऽपि भवेदसौˣ ॥ (135)

विरुद्धेत्यादि[10] । न ह्येकस्यैकदैकैकप्रतिपत्तृपेक्षया ग्रहणमग्रहणं च युक्तम्,
एकत्वहानिप्रसङ्गात् । अन्यथा हि यदि विरुद्धधर्माध्यासेऽप्येकत्वं स्यात्,
तदा घटादीनां यः कल्पित इष्टो व्यक्तिभेदः, सोऽपि न भवेत् । न केवलं
10　ब्रह्मणः स्वरूपभेदो नास्तीत्यपिशब्दः, यतस्तस्य स्वात्मनि व्यवस्थितस्य
नास्ति भेदः, विकारविषयत्वादस्येति सिद्धान्तः । तथाहि न घटाद्यात्मना
तस्यानादिनिधनत्वमिष्यते, *किं तर्हि परमात्मना, घटादयो हि दृश्य-　　* J_P 41*v*
मानोदयव्ययाः परिच्छिन्नदेशाश्चोपलभ्यन्त इति ॥

अयं च – अश्रुतेः स्पष्टं *शब्दसंवेदनं स्यातिति यः प्रसङ्ग उक्तः, स　　* K 70
15　यदि ब्रह्मणो रूपमुपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तिमिष्यते तदा द्रष्टव्यः । यदि पुनः
अतिसूक्ष्ममतीन्द्रियमिति वर्ण्यते, तदायमदोषः । किन्तु नीलादीनामपि
तादृप्यात्तत्स्वरूपवद्ग्रहणप्रसङ्ग इत्ययं दोषो वाच्यः । ततश्चायं नियमो
नोपपद्यते – उदयव्ययवतीमेवार्थमात्रामपरदर्शनाः प्रतियन्तीति ॥

स्यादेतद् – यथा भवतां क्षणिकत्वं नीलाद्यव्यतिरिक्तं नीलादिसंवेदने-
20　ऽपि न संवेद्यते तद्वच्छब्दरूपमिति तदेतदसम्यक् ।ᵖ न हि नीलादिसंवेदने
क्षणि*कत्वं न संवेद्यते, किन्तु गृहीतमपि निर्विकल्पेन चेतसा भ्रान्तिनिमि-　　* Ś 89_c
त्तेन गुणान्तरसमारोपान्न विनिश्चीयत इत्युच्यते ।तेनानुभवापेक्षया तद्गृही-
तमेव, निश्चयज्ञानापेक्षया त्वगृहीतमिति ज्ञानभेदेनैकस्य गृहीतत्वमगृहीत-
त्वं चाविरुद्धमेवᵖ । न चैवं भवतां पक्षे शब्दस्य ग्रहणाग्रहणे युक्ते, सर्वज्ञा-
25　नानां सविकल्पकताभ्युपगमात्, एकेनैव ज्ञानेन सर्वात्मना तस्य निश्चित-
त्वात्, अगृहीतस्वभावान्तरानुपपत्तेः । यथोक्तम् –

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[9]वस्तूनां J_K P_K] बाहूनां em. K seguito da Ś.　　[10]विरुद्धेत्यादि Ś, cfr. Tib] om. J_P
P_P K.

ˣ⁻ˣ विरुद्ध° ... असौ Cfr. PVSVṛ 20,21-23: अयमेव खलु भेदो भेदहेतुर्वा भावानां
विरुद्धधर्माध्यासः कारणभेदश्च । तौ चेन्न भेदकौ तदा न कस्यचित्कुतश्चिद्भेद इत्येकं द्रव्यं
विश्वं स्यात्.
ᵖ⁻ᵖ न ... °अविरुद्धमेव Cfr. PV I.43-45: एकस्यार्थस्वभावस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य सतः स्वयम् ।
कोऽन्यो न दृष्टो भागः स्याद्यः प्रमाणैः परीक्ष्यते ॥ नो चेद्भ्रान्तिनिमित्तेन संयोज्येत
गुणान्तरम् । शुक्तौ वा रजताकारो रूपसाधर्म्यदर्शनात् ॥ तस्मादृष्टस्य भावस्य दृष्ट
एवाखिलो गुणः । भ्रान्तेर्निश्चीयते नेति साधनं सम्प्रवर्तते.

^ωनिश्चयैः¹¹ ।

यन्न निश्चीयते रूपं तत्तेषां विषयः कथम्^ω ॥

इति ।अथ किञ्चिदविकल्पमपि ज्ञानमभ्युपगम्यते, न तर्हि वक्तव्यम् – ^{α'}न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते^{α'} ॥ इति । शब्दाकारानुस्यूत-
5 त्वादिति च हेतुर्न सिद्ध्येत्, ततश्च प्रमाणाभावाच्छब्दात्मकत्वव्यवस्थानं भावानामनिबन्धनमेव स्यात् । किञ्च क्षणिकत्वं भावानां प्रमाणान्तरतः सिद्धेरनुभूतमपि न निश्चीयत इति व्यपदिश्यते । शब्दात्मता तु भावानां कुतः सिद्धा येन साप्येवं व्यवस्थाप्यते ॥

*अपरमपि दूषणमार्गमाह – * P_P 26*r*

10 *प्रतिभावं च यद्येकः शब्दात्माभिन्न¹² इष्यते । * Ś 89_k
सर्वेषामेकदेशत्वमेकाकारा च विद्द्वेत् ॥ (136)
प्रतिव्यक्ति तु भेदेऽस्य ब्रह्मानेकं प्रसज्यते ।
विभिन्नानेकभावात्मरूपत्वाद्व्यक्तिभेदवत् ॥ (137)

प्रतिभावं चेत्यादि । स हि शब्दात्मा परिणामं गच्छन्प्रतिपदार्थं भेदं वा
15 प्रतिपद्येत,¹³ न वा ॥

तत्र यदि न भिन्न इति पक्षः, तदा सर्वेषां नीलादीनामेकदेशत्वं प्राप्नोति । **एकदेशत्वम्** इत्युपलक्षणम् । कालपरिणामव्यापारावस्थावि- शेषाद्यपि ग्राह्यम् । एकाकारा च वित्प्रतिभासः भवेत्प्राप्नोति, सर्वेषां नीलादीनामेकशब्दरूपाव्यतिरेकात् ॥

20 अथ प्रतिव्यक्ति भेदोऽस्य शब्दात्मनोऽङ्गीक्रियते, तदा ब्रह्मणोऽनेकत्वं प्राप्नोति, *विभिन्नानेकभावात्मरूपत्वात् । विभिन्नोऽनेकभावात्मा *अनेकप- * Ś 90_c
दार्थस्वभावः रूपं स्वभावो यस्येति विग्रहः । तद्भावस्तत्त्वम् । एकं च परमब्रह्मोष्यते, अतोऽभ्युपेतबाधा प्रतिज्ञाया इति भावः ॥

दूषणान्तरमप्याह –

25 *नित्यशब्दमयत्वे च भावानामपि नित्यता । * Ś 90_k
तद्यौगपद्यतः सिद्धेः परिणामो न सङ्गतः ॥ (138)

नित्यशब्दमयत्वे चेत्यादि ।नित्यशब्दमयत्वे नित्यशब्दस्वभावत्वे, जगतः शब्दस्वरूपं¹⁴ चेद्भावानामपि नित्यत्वं प्राप्नोति । ततश्च सर्वकालं भावानां शब्देन सह यौ*गपद्यतः सिद्धेः सिद्धत्वात्, परिणामात्मा न प्राप्नोति ।**तद्** * J_P 42*r*

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¹¹निश्चयैः J_P P_P Ś] निश्चयः em. K.   ¹²शब्दात्माभिन्न Ś, cfr. Tib] शब्दात्मा भिन्न K.
¹³प्रतिपद्येत J_P P_P] प्रतिपद्यते em. K seguito da Ś.   ¹⁴शब्दस्वरूपं em.] शब्दस्वरूप
J_P P_P, शब्दः स्वरूपं em. K seguito da Ś.

^{ω–ω} निश्चयैः ... कथम् = PV I.57bd.
^{α'–α'} न ... ऋते = VP I.131ab.

इति तस्मादर्थे,[15] तेषां वा नीलादीनां यौगपद्यं तद्यौगपद्यमिति विग्रहः ॥
अथ यौगपद्यतः सिद्धस्यापि कस्मात्परिणामो न भवतीत्याह –

$^{β'}$एकरूपतिरोभावे ह्यन्यरूपसमुद्भवे ।
मृदादाविव संसिध्येत्परिणामस्तु नाक्रमे$^{β'}$ ॥ (139)

एकरूपेत्यादि । नाक्रमे तु वस्तुनि परिणामः सिद्धोदिति भिन्नक्रमस्तु-
शब्दः । एवं तावत्परिणामकृतं शब्दमयत्वं भावानां न युक्तम् ॥
नापि द्वितीयः पक्षो युज्यत इति दर्शयन्नाह –

$^{γ'}$अथापि कार्यरूपेण शब्दब्रह्ममयं जगत् ।
तथापि निर्विकारत्वात्ततो नैव क्रमोदयः$^{γ'}$ ॥ (140)

*अन्यान्यरूप॰सम्भूतौ[16] तस्मादेकस्वरूपतः ।   * Ś 91$_k$ ° J$_K$ 8r
विवृत्तमर्थरूपेण कथं नाम तदुच्यते ॥ (141)

अथापीत्यादि । एवमपि शब्दस्य नित्यत्वेनाविकारित्वात्ततः क्रमेण कार्यो-
दयो न प्राप्नोति[17] । सर्वेषामविकलाप्रतिबद्धसामर्थ्यकारणाद्युगपदेवोत्पादः
स्यात् । $^{δ'}$कारणवैकल्याद्धि कार्याणि परिलम्बन्ते,[18] तच्चेदविकलं, तत्कि-
मपरमपेक्षेरन्$^{δ'}$येन युगपन्न भवेयुः ॥

*अपि च यदि तस्मादेकस्वभावाच्छब्दात्मनोन्यान्यस्य स्वभावस्यो-   * Ś 91$_c$
त्पत्तिरङ्गीक्रियते, तदा तद्ब्रह्म विवृत्तमर्थरूपेणेत्यत्र सिद्धोत्, $^{ε'}$न ह्यर्था-
न्तरस्योत्पादेन्यस्य तत्स्वभावमनाविशतस्तादूप्येण विवर्तो युक्तः$^{ε'}$ । त-
स्मात्सर्वथापि प्रतिज्ञार्थो नावक*ल्पते ॥   * K 72

शब्दाकारानुस्यूतत्वादिति च हेतुरसिद्ध इति दर्शयन्नाह –

अतद्रूपपरावृत्तमृद्रूपत्वोपलब्धितः ।
कुम्भकोशादिभेदेषु मृदात्मैकोत्र कल्पते[19] ॥ (142)

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[15]तस्मादर्थे J$_P$ P$_K$ Ś] तस्मादित्यर्थे em. K.   [16]अन्यान्य॰ J$_K$ P$_K$ Ś] अन्योन्य॰ em. K.
[17]कार्योदयो न प्राप्नोति J$_P$ P$_P$] कार्यादयो न प्राप्नोति em. K, कार्यादयो न प्राप्नुवन्ति
em. Ś.   [18]परिलम्बन्ते J$_P$ Ś] प्रतिलम्बन्ते P$_P$ K.   [19]अत्र कल्पते em. K seguito da
Ś] अवकल्पते J$_K$ P$_K$.

$^{β'-β'}$ एक॰ ... नाक्रमे Cfr. VN 13,11-13: अवस्थितस्य द्रव्यस्य धर्मान्तरनिवृत्तिर्धर्मा-
न्तरप्रादुर्भावश्च परिणामः.
$^{γ'-γ'}$ अथापि ... क्रमोदयः Cfr. PV II.45ab: नाक्रमात्क्रमिणो भावो नाप्यपेक्षाबि-
शेषिणः; MMK XV.8: यद्गस्तित्वं प्रकृत्या स्यान्न भवेदस्य नास्तिता । प्रकृतेरन्यथाभावो
न हि जातूपपद्यते; MMK XVII.21cd: यस्माच्च तदनुत्पन्नं न तस्माद्विप्रणश्यति.
$^{δ'-δ'}$ कारण॰ ... अपेक्षेरन् Cfr. PV II.226ab: कारणेऽविकले तस्मिन्कार्यं केन निवार्यते;
PVSVṛ 156,14-16: यतो हि भावशक्तेः फलोत्पत्तिः सा अविकला इति न फलवैकल्यं
स्यात् । न हि कारणसाकल्ये कार्यवैकल्यं युक्तम् । तस्य अकारणत्वप्रसङ्गात्.
$^{ε'-ε'}$ न ... युक्तः Cfr. TS 139.

नीलपीतादिभावानां न त्वेवमुपलभ्यते ।
अशब्दात्मपरावृत्तिर्बीजा कल्पनापि तत् ॥ (143)

अतद्रूपेत्यादि । ⁵′न हि भावानां परमार्थेनैकरूपानुगमो[20] अस्ति, सर्वेषां स्वस्वभावव्यवस्थिततया समानजातीयव्यावृत्तस्वभावत्वात् । काल्पनिकं तु
5 विजातीयव्यावृत्तिकृतमेकाकारानुस्यूतत्वमेषां व्यवस्थाप्यते⁵′ । यथा घट-
शरावोदञ्चनादिषु परमार्थतो भिन्नेष्वप्यमृदात्मकपदार्थव्यावृत्तिकृतो मृदा-
त्मा कल्प्यते[21] । तत्र तदपि काल्पनिकमेषां नीलादीनां शब्दाकारानुस्यूतत्वं
न सम्भवति । न हि नीलपितादिषु शब्दरूपमुपलभामहे, अनुपलभमानाश्च
कथमशब्दात्मकव्यावच्छेदकृतं शब्दाकारानुस्यूतत्वं कल्पयामः । तस्माद-
10 बीजेयं कल्पनेत्यसिद्धो हेतुः ॥

यदुक्तम् – ⁿ′सर्वेषामेकदेशत्वमेकाकारा च विद्यवेद्ⁿ′ इति तत्र परमत-
माशङ्कते –

अथाविभागमेवेदं ब्रह्मतत्त्वं सदा स्थितम् ।
अविद्योपप्लवाल्लोको विचित्रं त्वभिमन्यते ॥ (144)

15 **अथाविभागमेवेत्यादि** । अथापि स्यात् – अविभक्तमेव सदा ब्रह्मात्मकं
तत्त्वमविकारि परमार्थ*तोऽवस्थितम् । न तस्य परमार्थेन परिणामः,   * Pₚ 26*v*
किन्त्वविद्यातिमिरोपहतबुद्धिलोचना नीलादिभेदेन विचित्रमिव मन्यन्ते ।
यथोक्तम् –

*,θ′यथा विशुद्धमाकाशं तिमिरोपप्लुतो जनः ।   * Jₚ 42*v* ° Ś 92*c*
20 सङ्कीर्णमिव मात्राभिश्चित्राभिरभिमन्यते ॥
तथेदममृतं ब्रह्म निर्विकारमविद्यया ।
कलुषत्वमिवापन्नं भेदरूपं विवर्तते[22],θ′ ॥
इति । तेन सर्वेषामेकदेशत्वप्रसङ्गो न भविष्यति, तेषामवस्तुरूपत्वात् ।

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[20] परमार्थेनैकरूपानुगमो Jₚ Pₚ K] परमार्थे नैकरूपानुगमो Ś.   [21]कल्प्यते em. K seguito
da Ś] कल्प्ते Jₚ Pₚ.   [22]विवर्तते Jₚ Pₚ] विवर्ततः em. K seguito da Ś.

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⁵′-⁵′ न ... व्यवस्थाप्यते Cfr. PV I.40-41: सर्वे भावाः स्वभावेन स्वस्वभावव्यवस्थि-
तेः । स्वभावपरभावाभ्यां यस्माद्व्यावृत्तिभागिनः ॥ तस्माद्यतो यतो अर्थानां व्यावृ-
त्तिस्तन्निबन्धनाः । जातिभेदाः प्रकल्प्यन्ते तद्विशेषावगाहिनः; PVSVṛ 25,13-19: त-
स्मादिमे भावाः सजातीयाभिमतादन्यस्माच्च व्यतिरिक्ताः स्वभावेन एकरूपत्वात् । यतो
यतो भिन्नास्तद्भेदप्रत्यायनाय कृतसन्निवेशैः शब्दैस्ततस्ततो भेदमुपादाय स्वभावाभेदे अप्य-
नेकधर्माणः प्रतीयन्ते । ते अपि शब्दाः सर्वभेदानाक्षेपे अप्येकभेदचोदनात्तत्त्वलक्षणनिष्ठा
एव भवन्ति । तदेकस्मादपि तस्य भेदो अस्तीति.
ⁿ′-ⁿ′ सर्वेषाम् ... विद्यवेद् = TS 136cd.
θ′-θ′ यथा ... विवर्तते = VPVṛ 13,5-14,2.

संविन्नेदश्च भविष्यति, अविद्योपप्लवकृतत्वात्तस्येति भावः ॥

*तत्रापि वेद्यते रूपमविद्योपप्लुतैर्²³ जनैः ।
ʲʼयन्नीलादिप्रकारेण त्यागादाने निबन्धनम्ʲʼ ॥ (145)   * Ś 92ₖ

तद्रूपव्यतिरेकेण ब्रह्मरूपमलक्षितम् ।
कथं व्युत्थितचेतोभिरस्तित्वेन प्रतीयते ॥ (146)
न तत्प्रत्यक्षतः सिद्धमविभागमभासनात् ।
नित्याद्युत्पत्त्ययोगेन कार्यलिङ्गं च तत्र न ॥ (147)
ᵏʼ,*धर्मिसत्त्वाप्रसिद्धेस्तु न स्वभावः प्रसाधकःᵏʼ । (148ab)   *Ś 93ₖ

तत्रापीत्यादिना प्रतिविधत्ते ॥

*प्रमाणवशाद्धि प्रमेयसत्ताव्यवस्थितिः, न चैवंरूपस्य²⁴ ब्रह्मणः सि-   * K 73
द्धये किञ्चन प्रमाणमस्ति । तथाहि न तावत्प्रत्यक्षतस्तस्य सिद्धिः, न हि
नीलादेर्हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहाराधिष्ठानाद्व्यतिरिक्तमपरं शब्दरूपं²⁵ प्रतिभास-
ते । अप्रतिभासमानं च कथं तद्व्युत्थितचेतोभिर्न्यायमार्गावस्थितैरस्तित्वेन
प्रतीयताम् ॥

स्यादेतत् – ᵠʼस्वसंवेदनप्रत्यक्षत एव तत्सिद्धं, ज्ञानात्मरूपत्वात् ।
तथाहि ज्योतिस्तदेव शब्दात्मकत्वाच्चैतन्यरूपत्वाच्चेतिᵠʼ तदेतत्स्वसंवेदन-

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²³ °उपप्लुतैर् Jₖ Pₖ K] °उपप्लवैर् em. Ś.   ²⁴चैवंरूपस्य Jₚ Pₚ Ś] चैव रूपस्य K.
²⁵शब्दरूपं Jₚ Ś, cfr. Tib] ब्रह्मरूपं Pₚ K.

ʲʼ⁻ʲʼ यन् ... निबन्धनम् Cfr. PV I.171cd-172: स एवार्थस्तस्य व्यावृत्तयोऽपरे ॥तत्कार्ये
कारणं चोक्तं तत्त्वलक्षणमिष्यते । तत्त्यागादिफलाः सर्वाः पुरुषाणां प्रवृत्तयः.
ᵏʼ⁻ᵏʼ धर्मि° ... प्रसाधकः Cfr. PV I.191: नासिद्धे भावधर्मोऽस्ति व्यभिचार्युभयाश्रयः ।
धर्मो विरुद्धो अभावस्य सा सत्ता साध्यते कथम्; PVSVṛ 95,20-96,5, 96,15-18: तत्र
यदि भावधर्मो हेतुरुच्यते । स कथमसिद्धसत्ताके स्यात् । यो हि भावधर्मं तत्र इच्छति ।
स कथं भावं न इच्छेत् । स्वभाव एव हि कयाचिदपेक्षया धर्म इति व्यतिरेकी इव धर्मिणो
निर्दिश्यते । न हि धर्मधर्मिवाचिनोः शब्दयोर्वाच्ये कश्चिद्विशेषो अस्तीत्युक्तमेतत् ।[...] ।
अभावधर्मं तु भावमात्रव्यापिनो अर्थस्य व्यवच्छेदं हेतुं सत्तायां वदतो अस्य विरुद्धो हेतुः
स्यात् । तस्य भावे क्वचिदसम्भवात्भावे च भावव्यवच्छेदस्य भावात्.
ᵠʼ⁻ᵠʼ स्वसंवेदन° ... चेति Cfr. VPVṛ 12,5-6: त्रयीरूपेण तज्ज्योतिः परमं परिवर्तते ।
पृथक्कीर्थप्रवादेषु दृष्टिभेदनिबन्धनम्; *Paddhati ad loc.*: तदिति ब्रह्म ज्योतिरन्तःप्रका-
शः शब्दरूपतया ज्ञानरूपतया च; VP I.18: प्रत्यस्तमितभेदाया यद्वाचो रूपमुत्तमम् ।
यदस्मिन्नेव तमसि ज्योतिः शुद्धं विवर्तते; *Paddhati ad loc.*: यदा शुद्धमपि ब्रह्माविद्यव-
शाज्ज्योतिरात्मना शब्दात्मना विवर्तते शब्दात्मकत्वाज्जगत इत्युत्तरार्धेन विविक्तरूपत्व-
मुक्तम् । अथवा अस्मिन्नेव शरीरे तमसीत्यज्ञानरूपे । ज्योतिः शुद्धमिति । चैतन्यमाह
चैतन्यरूपेणेति विवर्तते; Cfr. anche VP I.132: वागरूपता चेदुत्क्रामेदवबोधस्य शाश्वती ।
न प्रकाशः प्रकाशेत्सा हि प्रत्यवमर्शिनी; VPVṛ *ad loc.*: यथा प्रकाशकत्वमग्नेः स्वरूपं
चैतन्यं वान्तर्यामिणस्तथा ज्ञानमपि सर्वं वागरूपमात्रनुगतम्.

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विरुद्धम् । तथाहि^{μ'}अन्यत्र गतमानसोऽपि चक्षुषा रूपमीक्षमाणोऽनावि-
ष्टाभिलापम्²⁶ एव नीलादिप्रत्ययमनुभवतीति^{μ'} । एतच्च विस्तरेण प्रतिपा-
दयिष्यते । तेन²⁷ यदुक्तम् – न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोक इत्यादि, तदपि
प्रत्युक्तं भवति । तस्मादविभागं शब्दमयं ब्रह्म न प्रत्यक्षतः सिद्धम्, तस्य
तथाभूतस्याप्रतिभासनात् ॥

नाप्यनुमानतः । तथाह्यनुमानं भवत्कार्यलिङ्गं भवेत्, *स्वभावलिङ्गं वा,   * Ś 93c
^{ν'}अनुपलब्धेस्तु प्रतिषेधविषयत्वाद्द्विधावनधिकार एव^{ν'} । तत्र न तावत्का-
र्यलिङ्गम्, नित्यात्कस्यचित्कार्यस्यानुपपत्तेः, ^{ξ'}क्रमयौगपद्याभ्यां नित्य-
स्यार्थक्रियाविरोधात्^{ξ'} । नापि स्वभावलिङ्गमस्ति, तस्यैव ब्रह्माख्यस्य
धर्मिणोऽसिद्धेः । न ह्यसिद्धे धर्मिणि तत्स्वभावभूतो धर्मः स्वातन्त्र्येण
सिद्ध्येत् ॥

अन्यत्तर्हि लिङ्गं भविष्यतीत्याह –

न चैतदतिरेकेण²⁸ लिङ्गं सत्ताप्रसाधकम् ॥ (148cd)

न चैतद् इत्यादि । ^{φ'}स्वभावकार्यव्यतिरेकेणान्यस्य साध्यार्थप्रतिबन्धाभा-
वात्^{φ'} । न चाप्रतिबद्धं लिङ्गं युक्तम्; अतिप्रसङ्गात् ।यदपि च शब्दरूपान्व-
यत्वं भावानामुक्तम्, तदसिद्धत्वादलीकत्वाच्च न शब्दरूपत्वं पारमार्थिकं

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²⁶अनाविष्टाभिलापम् J_P] नाधिष्ठाभिलापम् P_P, नादिष्टाभिलपम् cong. K seguito da Ś.
²⁷तेन J_P P_P] एतेन em. K seguito da Ś.   ²⁸अतिरेकेण P_K K Ś] अव्यतिरेकेण J_K.

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^{μ'–μ'} अन्यत्र ... अनुभवतीति Cfr. PV III.175: अन्यत्र गतचित्तो अपि चक्षुषा रूपमीक्ष-
ते ।तत्सङ्केताग्रहस्तत्र स्पष्टस्तज्जा च कल्पना; VPVṛ 188,6-189,3: तद्यथा त्वरितं गच्छ-
स्तृणलोष्टादिस्पर्शात्सत्यपि ज्ञाने काचिदेव सा ज्ञानावस्था यस्यामभिमुखीभूतशब्दभाव-
नाबीजायामाविर्भूतास्वथार्थोपग्राहिणामाख्येयरूपाणामनाख्येयरूपाणां च शब्दानां प्रत्यर्थनि-
यतासु शक्तिषु शब्दानुविद्धेन शक्त्यनुपातिना ज्ञानेनाक्रियमाण उपगृह्यमाणो वस्त्वात्मा
ज्ञानानुगतो व्यक्तरूपप्रत्यवभासो ज्ञायत इत्यभिधीयते.
^{ν'–ν'} अनुपलब्धेस् ... एव Cfr. NB II.18 (= PVSVṛ 2,19): तत्र द्वौ वस्तुसाधनौ एकः
प्रतिषेधहेतुः; NB II.25: प्रतिषेधसिद्धिरपि यथोक्ताया एव अनुपलब्धेः.
^{ξ'–ξ'} क्रम° ... °विरोधात् Cfr. VN 2,3-4: अक्षणिकस्य क्रमयौगपद्याभ्यामर्थक्रिया-
योगादर्थक्रियासामर्थ्य लक्षणतो निवृत्तमित्यसदेव स्यात्. Cfr. anche HB 4,6-7: यथा
यत्सत्तत्क्षणिकमेव अक्षणिकत्वे अर्थक्रियाविरोधात्तल्लक्षणं वस्तुत्वं हीयते; e HB 19, 11-13:
न च अक्षणिकस्य क्वचित्काचिच्छक्तिः क्रमयौगपद्याभ्यामर्थक्रियाविरहात् ।तस्मादत्सत्त-
त्क्षणिकमेव; PVin II.80,1-2: नैवमक्षणिकस्य, सर्वथासम्भवात् । न हि तस्याक्षणिकस्या-
र्थक्रिया सम्भवति, क्रमयौगपद्यविरोधात्.
^{φ'–φ'} स्वभाव° ... °अभावात् Cfr. PVSVṛ 17,12-13: तस्मात्स्वभावप्रतिबन्धादेव हेतुः
साध्यं गमयति । स च तद्भावलक्षणस्तदुत्पत्तिलक्षणो वा; e PVSVṛ 100,28-101,2:
तस्माद्द्विप्रकारैव वस्तुविषयानुमितिः कार्यलिङ्गा स्वभावलिङ्गा च. Cfr. anche NB II.19:
स्वभावप्रतिबन्धे हि सत्यर्थो अर्थं गमयेत्.

ब्रह्मणः साधयितुमलम् । नाप्यागमात्तस्य सिद्धि, तस्यानवस्थितत्वात् ।
^{o'}यद्यप्यनुपलम्भाख्यमस्ति लिङ्गम्, तत्तु स्वभावहेतावेवान्तर्गतमिति भा-
वः:^{o'} । यद्वा सत्ताप्रसाधकस्य विवक्षितत्वात् । अत एवाह – **सत्ताप्रसाधकम्**
इति ॥

5   अपि च –
^{π'}ज्ञानमात्रार्थकरणेऽप्ययोग्यं ब्रह्म गम्यताम् ।
तदयोग्यतयारूपं²⁹ तद्ध्वस्तुत्वलक्षणमिति^{π'} ।
एतत्प्रतिपादयन्नाह –

^{ρ'}ज्ञानं ज्ञेयक्रमात्सिद्धं क्रमवत्सर्वमन्यथा ।
10   यौगपद्येन तत्कार्यं विज्ञानमनुषज्यते^{ρ'} ॥ (149)
*,^{σ'}ज्ञानमात्रेऽपि नैवास्य शक्यरूपं³⁰ ततः परम् ।   * K 74
भवतीति प्रसक्तास्य वन्ध्यासूनुसमानता^{σ'} ॥ (150)

ज्ञानं ज्ञेयक्रमात्सिद्धम् इत्यादि । *,^{τ'}एतच्च पूर्वमीश्वरपरीक्षायां प्रसाधि-   * J_P 43r
तम्^{τ'} । **ततः परम् इति** ।त्यागादाननिबन्ध*नान्नीलादेः परमन्यदित्यर्थः ।   * Ś 94c
15   यदि वा **तत** इति निगमनम्, **परम्** इति तात्त्विकम् । **वन्ध्यासूनुसमानते**-

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²⁹तदयोग्यतयारूपं J_P P_P] तदयोग्यतया रूपम् K Ś.   ³⁰शक्य॰ cong. K seguito da
Ś] शक्त॰ J_K P_K.

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^{o'–o'} यदि ... भावः Cfr. PV IV.269: कारणात्कार्यसंसिद्धिः स्वभावान्तर्गमादियम् ।
हेतुप्रभेदाख्याने न दर्शितोदाहृतिः पृथक्; PVin III, 303a6: དེ་ལ་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་
ཀྱི་ཁོངས་སུ་འདུས་པའི་ཕྱིར་དཔེར་དཔྱོར་ན་སྟོན་པ་ཧོན་ནོ།.

^{π'–π'} ज्ञान॰ ... ॰लक्षणम् Cfr. PV III.50: ज्ञानमात्रार्थकरणेऽप्ययोग्यमत एव तत् ।
तदयोग्यतयारूपं तद्ध्वस्तुषु लक्षणम्.

^{ρ'–ρ'} ज्ञानं ... अनुषज्यते Cfr. PV II.8ac-9a: नित्यं प्रमाणं न एव अस्ति प्रामाण्याद्वस्तु-
सङ्गतेः । ज्ञेयानित्यतया तस्या अध्रौव्यात्क्रमजन्मनाम् ॥ नित्यादुत्पत्तिविश्लेषाद्; e PVVṛ
ad loc: कस्मात्पुनर्नित्यं प्रमाणं नैवस्त्याह वस्तुनोऽर्थक्रियाकारिणः सतो गतेः ज्ञानस्य
प्रामाण्यान्नास्ति नित्यं प्रमाणं ।अत्रैव कारणमाह ज्ञेयस्य वस्तुनोऽर्थक्रियाकारित्वेनानित्य-
त्वात्तस्या वस्तुसङ्गतेरपि तज्जन्याया अध्रौव्यादनित्यत्वात् ।स्यादेतद् अनित्यविषयमनि-
त्यमेव ज्ञानं केवलं यस्य तज्ज्ञानं स ज्ञाता नित्यो भविष्यतीत्याह ज्ञानस्य नित्यात्
ज्ञातुरुत्पत्तेर्विश्लेषात् । नित्यं हि सदैकरूपं यदि क्रमजन्मनां ज्ञानानामर्जनसमर्थं सकृदेव
तानि कुर्यत्.

^{σ'–σ'} ज्ञानमात्रे ... ॰समानता Oltre al cit. PV III.50, cfr. anche PVSVṛ 149,27-
150,2: ज्ञानमात्रार्थक्रियायामप्यसामर्थ्ये वस्त्वेव न स्यात् । तथाहि तल्लक्षणं वस्त्विति
वक्ष्यामः.

^{τ'–τ'} एतच् ... प्रसाधितम् Cfr. TS 76-77: क्रमाक्रमविरोधेन नित्या नो कार्यकारिणः ।
विषयाणां क्रमित्वेन तज्ज्ञानेष्वपि च क्रमः ॥ क्रमभावीश्वरज्ञानं क्रमिविज्ञेयसङ्गतेः ।
देवत्तादिविज्ञानं यथा ज्वालादिगोचरं.

ति ।[v']न हि वन्ध्यासूनोरवस्तुत्वव्यवस्थायामर्थक्रियासामर्थ्यविरहव्यति-
रेकेणान्यन्निबन्धनमस्ति[v'] ॥

अथेदमुच्यते – [x']तं तु परमं ब्रह्मात्मानमभ्युदयनिःश्रेयसफलधर्मा-
नुगृहीतान्तःकरणा योगिन एव प[*]श्यन्तीति[x'] तदपि नोपपद्यत इति दर्श-

5 यति –

*विशुद्धज्ञानसन्ताना योगिनोऽपि ततो न तत् ।
विदन्ति ब्रह्मणो रूपं ज्ञाने व्यापृत्यसङ्गतेः[31] ॥ (151)

विशुद्धेत्यादि । यदि हि ज्ञाने योगजे तस्य व्यापारः स्यात्, तदा योगि-
नस्तस्य रूपं पश्यन्तीति स्यात्, यावता यथोक्तेन प्रकारेण ज्ञाने तस्य

10 व्यापाराभावादयुक्तमेतत् ॥

स्यादेतत् – न तद्विषयज्ञानोत्पत्त्या योगिनस्तं पश्यन्ति, तद्व्यति-
रिक्तस्य योगिनो योगिज्ञानस्य चाभावात् । किन्तु [ψ']योगित्वावस्थायां
स्वमात्मानं ज्योतीरूपं तत्प्रकाशमानं योगिनस्तं पश्यन्तीत्युच्यते[ψ'] । यद्ये-
वम्, प्रागयोगित्वावस्थायां किं तस्य रूपमिति वाच्यम् । [ω']यदि सदैव

15 ज्योतीरूपम्, तदा तर्हि न कदाचिदयोगित्वावस्थास्ति, सदैवात्मज्योती-

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[31]व्यापृत्यसङ्गतेः, cfr. Tib: བྱ་བ་འབྲེལ་མེད་ཕྱིར་] व्यापृत्य सङ्गतेः K Ś.

[v'–v'] न ... अस्ति Cfr. PV I.166ab: स पारमार्थिको भावो य एव अर्थक्रियाक्षमः;
PVSV$_{\mathrm{r}}$ *ad loc.*: इदमेव हि वस्त्ववस्तुनोर्लक्षणं यदर्थक्रियायोग्यता अयोग्यता चेति
वक्ष्यामः; PVSV$_{\mathrm{r}}$ 149,27-150,2: ज्ञानमात्रार्थक्रियायामप्यसामर्थ्ये वस्त्वेव न स्यात् ।
तथाहि तल्लक्षणं वस्त्विति वक्ष्यामः; PV III.3ab: अर्थक्रियासमर्थं यत्तदत्र परमार्थसत्;
NB I.15: अर्थक्रियासामर्थ्यलक्षणत्वाद्वस्तुनः; HB 3,14: अर्थक्रियायोग्यलक्षणं हि वस्तु;
HB 4,6-7: यथा यत्सत्तत्क्षणिकमेव अक्षणिकत्वे अर्थक्रियाविरोधात्तल्लक्षणं वस्तुत्वं हीयते;
PVin II.80,5-6: तदयं भावो निवृत्तसर्वसामर्थ्यः सत्तालक्षणमतिपतति.
[x'–x'] तं ... पश्यन्ति v. ξ – ξ.
[ψ'–ψ'] योगित्व० ... ०उच्यते Cfr. VPV$_{\mathrm{r}}$ 43,3-5: योऽयं जातवेदा यश्च पुरुषेष्वान्त-
रः प्रकाशो यश्च प्रकाशाप्रकाशयोः प्रकाशयिता शब्दाख्यः प्रकाशः तत्रैतत्सर्वमुपनिबद्धं
यावत्स्थासु चरिष्णु च; *Paddhati ad loc.*: जातवेदा अग्निः तमोऽपनयनादात्मानं परं
च प्रकाशयति । आन्तरो बुद्धिः । सा बाह्यान्घटादीन्प्रकाशयति आत्मानं च स्वयं
विदितत्वात् । प्रकाशाप्रकाशयोरिति । प्रकाशानामेषां त्रयानामप्रकाशानां च घटादी-
नाम् । यतोऽस्य प्रकर्षः । उपनिबद्धुम् । शब्देन द्योतनात् । स्थासु पृथिव्यादि चरिष्णु
मनुष्यादि; VP I.19: वैकृतं समतिक्रान्ता मूर्तिव्यापारदर्शनम् ।व्यतीत्यालोकतमसी प्रकाशं
यमुपासते; *Paddhati ad loc.*: वैकृतमिति ।विकृतौ भवम् ।किं तदित्याह मूर्तिव्यापारद-
र्शनमिति ।मूर्त्याः क्रियायाश्च दर्शनमनुभवस्ते ये समतिक्रान्ताः ।असत्यत्वाद्भेददर्शनस्या-
भेददर्शनेन व्यवस्थिता योगिन इत्यर्थः । तदेतेन विषयभूतविकारप्रत्यस्तमय उक्तः ।
व्यतीत्येति ।परित्यज्य ।आलोकतमसी इति ।विद्याविद्ये ।तदनेनान्तरो भेददर्शनाभाव
उक्तः ।प्रकाशमिति । परं ब्रह्म ।उपासते ।भावयन्ति.

रूपत्वाद्ब्रह्मणः । ततश्चायत्नतः सर्वेषां मोक्षप्रसङ्गः^{ω'} ॥

अथापि स्यात् – ^{α''}यथा भवतां स्वप्नाद्यवस्थासु ज्ञानमद्वयमपि वि-
चित्राकारपरिग्रहेण प्रतिभासते, तथा तद्द्वयमप्यविद्यावशादविशुद्धसन्त-
तीनां तथा प्रकाशत^{α''} इति तदसम्यक् । ^{β''}न हि तद्व्यतिरेकेणान्ये केचिद-
5 विशुद्धसन्ततयः सन्ति, येषां तत्तथा प्रतिभासते^{β''} । ^{γ'',δ''}स्वयमेव तथा
प्रतिभासत इति चेत्, एवं तर्हि मोक्षाभावप्रसङ्गः,^{γ'} सर्वदैव ब्रह्मणोऽद्वय-
रूपप्रतिभासात्मकत्वात्^{δ''} । अस्माकं तु विशुद्धज्ञानान्तरोदयान्मुक्तिर्युज्यत
एव । ^{ε''}न चापि भवतां तद्व्यतिरेकिण्यविद्यास्ति, यद्वशात्तथा प्रतिभासत
इति स्यात्^{ε''} । अव्यतिरेके चाविद्यायास्तद्वशात्तेव तथा प्रतिभासत इति
10 सुव्याहृतमेतत् ॥

^{*,ζ''}अथापि स्यात् – अविद्यावशात्तत्ख्यातीत्य³²नेनाविद्यात्मकत्वमेव   * Ś 95c
तस्य ख्याप्यत इति । यद्येवम्, सुतरां मोक्षाभावप्रसङ्ग एव ख्यापितो
भवति । न हि नित्यैकरूपे ब्रह्मण्यविद्यात्मके स्थिते सति तदात्मिकाया
अविद्याया व्यपगमः सम्भवति, येनाविद्याव्यपगमान्मुक्तिर्भवेत्^{ζ''} । अथ

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³²°वशात्तत्त्वख्यातीति° P_P, cfr. Tib] °वशात्तत्ख्यातीति° J_P, °वशात्त्वख्यातीति° em. K,
°वसान्न ख्यातीति° em. Ś.

^{ω'–ω'} यदि . . . °प्रसङ्गः Cfr. MVBh I.21ab: सङ्क्लिष्टा चेद्भवेन्नासौ मुक्ताः स्युः सर्वदेहि-
नः. Cfr. anche BS 8,16-18: अनादिनिधनत्वे हि नापनेयं नोपनेयं वा किञ्चिदस्ती-
ति तदर्थानि शास्त्राणि तदर्थाश्च प्रवृत्तयो व्यर्थाः स्युः तथाहि विद्यास्वभाव चेत् न
किञ्चिन्निवर्त्यमवास्यं वा स्यातविद्याया अभावाद्विद्यायाश्च भावात्.
^{α''–α''} यथा . . . प्रकाशत Cfr. VPVṛ 8,3-9,1: विवर्तेतेऽर्थभावेन । एकस्य तत्त्वादप्रच्यु-
तस्य भेदानुकारेणासत्यविभक्तान्यरूपोपग्राहिता विवर्तः । स्वप्नविषयप्रतिभासवत्; *Pad-*
dhati 9,10-16: कथं पुनरेकं सद्वस्तुरूपमजहदविद्यमानविभक्तानेकरूपतया प्रत्यवभासत
इत्याह स्वप्नविषयप्रतिभासवतिति । यथा स्वप्नावस्थायां ज्ञानक्षण एक एव भिन्नजातीयाने-
कपदार्थावभासी जायते । न च तस्य स्वरूपभानम् । अनुभवरूपत्वात् । उत्थितस्य च
स्मरणात् । न च ते भिन्नरूपा विषयाकारा बहिः सत्यतः सन्ति । न च तेषामनेकत्वेऽपि
ज्ञानस्यैकत्वविरोधः । न च ज्ञानस्यैकत्वेन तदपि निर्भागं भवति । न चाकाराणामेकत्वम् ।
न च ज्ञानस्य तत्त्वरूपाज्ज्ञेयरूपतया प्रतिभासनादिति.
^{β''–β''} न . . . प्रतिभासते Cfr. BS 11,10-11: ननु जीवापि ब्रह्मतत्त्वाव्यतिरेकादिशुद्धस्व-
भावाः तत्कथं तेष्वविद्यावकाशः.
^{γ''–γ''} स्वयम् . . . °प्रसङ्गः Cfr. MVBh I.21cd: विशुद्धा चेद्भवेन्नासौ व्यायामो निष्फलो
भवेत्.
^{δ''–δ''} स्वयम् . . . °प्रतिभासात्मकत्वात् Cfr. BS 9,7-10: यस्य तु विपर्ययग्रहणमविद्या
[. . .] कस्य च तदिति वाच्यं ब्रह्मणोऽन्यस्याभावात्; ब्रह्मण एवेति चेत् विप्रतिषेधः तस्य
विद्यास्वरूपत्वात्; अविप्रतिषेधे वा केन निवृत्तिः.
^{ε''–ε''} न . . . स्यात् Cfr. BS 9,1: अथाविद्या न ब्रह्मणः स्वभावः अर्थान्तरं ब्रह्मण आपद्येत.
^{ζ''–ζ''} अथापि . . . भवेत् Cfr. BS 8,16-19: अनादिनिधनत्वे हि नापनेयं नोपनेयं वा

व्यतिरिक्ताविद्याङ्गीक्रियते , एवमपि नित्यत्वादनाधेयातिशयस्य *ब्रह्मणः   * K 75
सा न किञ्चित्[33]करोतीति न युक्तमविद्यावशात्तथा प्रतिभासनम् । ततश्चा-
विद्यया सह तस्य सम्बन्धाभावात्संसाराभावप्रसङ्गः । न चापि [η'']सा   * J$_P$ 43v
तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यां *निर्वक्तुं[η'']न शक्यत[34] इति युक्तं वक्तुम् , वस्तुधर्मस्य गत्य-
न्तराभावात् , अन्यथा वस्तुत्वमेव न स्यात् । न चावस्तुवशात्तथा तस्य   5
ख्यातिर्युक्ता , अतिप्रसङ्गात् । तथाभूतस्य चार्थक्रियाकारिणः स्वभावस्या-
वस्त्विति[35] नामकरणे न[36] नोऽस्ति[37] विवादः । अस्माकं तु वितथाभिनि-
वेशवासनैवाविद्या , सा च वासना शक्तिरुच्यते । शक्तिश्च कारणात्मकज्ञा-
नात्मभूतेवेति । तेन पूर्वपूर्वतः कारणभूतादविद्यात्मनो ज्ञानादुत्तरोत्तरका-
र्यज्ञानस्य वितथाकाराभिनिवेशिन उत्पत्तेरविद्यावशात्तथाख्यातिर्युक्ता ।त-   10
स्याश्चाविद्याया योगाभ्यासादसमर्थतरतमक्षणोत्पादक्रमेण व्यपगमात्परि-
शुद्धज्ञानसन्तानोदयादपवर्गप्राप्तिरित्यतो बन्धमोक्षव्यवस्था युक्तिमती । न
त्वेवं भवतां सम्भवति , नित्यैकरूपत्वाद्ब्रह्मणोऽवस्थाद्वयासम्भवात् । एक-
त्वाच्च तस्य ब्रह्मण एकस्य मुक्तौ सर्वेषां मुक्तिप्रसङ्गः एकस्यामुक्तौ सर्वेषाम-
मुक्तिप्रसङ्गश्चानिवार्यः ॥   15

    न चाप्ययोगित्वावस्थायामात्म*ज्योतीरूपत्वेऽस्य किञ्चित्प्रमाणमस्ति   * P$_P$ 27v
प्रसाधकम् । ज्ञानं हि प्रकाशात्मतया स्वसंवेदनप्रसिद्धम् , न त्वेवं शब्दात्मा
सर्वत्र प्रत्ययात्मनि संवेद्यत इति निर्दिष्टमेतत् । अथायोग्यवस्थायामात्म-
ज्योतिष्ट्वमस्य नाङ्गीक्रियते , एवमपि प्रागविद्यमानं तदात्मज्योतिष्ट्वमत्यक्त-
पूर्वरूपस्य ब्रह्मणः पश्चाद्योग्यवस्थायां कुतः सम्भूतमिति वाच्यम् । तस्मा-   20
न्मिथ्याप्रवादोऽयं शब्दब्रह्मवादो भवतामित्यलं बहुना ॥

       *प्रधानपरिणामेन समं च ब्रह्मदर्शनम् ।   * Ś 96$_k$
      तद्दूषणानुसारेण *बोद्धव्य°मिह दूषणम् ॥ (152)   * J$_K$ 8v ° P$_K$ 4v

*प्रधानेत्यादिना पूर्वोक्तं दूषणमार्गमिहाप्यतिदिशति ॥   * Ś 96$_c$
    तत्रैवं दूषणं वाच्यम् –   25

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[33]सा न किञ्चित् J$_P$ Ś, cfr. Tib] सा तत्किञ्चित् P$_P$, सा न तत्किञ्चित् em. K.   [34]न
शक्यत J$_P$, cfr. Tib: ཕྱིར་ དུས་ སོ་] शक्यत P$_P$ K Ś.   [35]°अवस्त्विति em. सुल्ला base di
Tib: ངོ་བོ་མེད་] °अव(स्त्वि)ति J$_P$ P$_P$, °अवस्थीति K Ś.   [36]°करणे न K, cfr. Tib:
ཉིད་ ན་ མེད་] °करणेन Ś.   [37]नोऽस्ति cong. K, cfr. Tib: ཧི་ དོ་ ཨོ ་ བ་ ནི་ [...] མེད་]
नास्ति J$_P$ P$_P$ Ś.

किञ्चिदस्तीति तदर्थानि शास्त्राणि तदर्थाश्च प्रवृत्तयो व्यर्थाः स्युः तथाहि [...] अविद्यास्व-
भावं चेत्तस्य नित्यत्वे पूर्वस्वभावात्यगात्स्वभावान्तरानापत्तेश्च; BS 9,8: ब्रह्मणः स्वभावश्चे-
त्स नित्यः कथं निवर्तेत.

[η''–η'']सा ... निर्वक्तुम् Cfr. VPV_r 9,1-3: मूर्तिक्रियाविवर्तौ अविद्याशक्तिप्रवृत्तिमात्रं तौ
विद्यात्मनि तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यामनाख्येयौ । एतद्धि अविद्याया अविद्यात्वमिति.

[θ″]न शब्दजन्यं तत्कार्यं सत्तातो हेतुविक्तिवत् ।
अतो नाभिमतो हेतुरसाध्यत्वात्परात्मवत्[θ″] ॥
इत्यादि ॥

॥ इति शब्दब्रह्मपरीक्षा ॥

[θ″−θ″] न ... परात्मवत् Cfr. TS 18: न हेतुजन्यं (J$_K$ P$_K$] हेतुजन्यं न K Ś) तत्कार्यं सत्तातो हेतुविक्तिवत् । अतो नाभिमतो हेतुरसाध्यत्वात्परात्मवत्.

Sphoṭavādakhaṇḍana

*अर्थप्रतीतिहेतुत्वम्[1] अनित्येषु हि साधितम् ॥ (2698cd)

*अनित्येषु <**अर्थप्रतीतिहेतुत्वं साधितम्** इत्य् ^{α}अत्यन्तभेदिनोऽप्येते तुल्यप्रत्यवमर्शन^α इत्यादिना । तथा हि>[2] प्रतिपदं भिन्नत्वाद्विशिष्टानु-पूर्वीका[3] अनित्या एव[4] वर्णाः सरो रस इत्यादौ[5] प्रतीतिभेदनिबन्धनं यु-
5 क्ताः,[6] न तु नित्याः, तेषां सर्वत्रैकरूपत्वात्, न चानुपूर्वं[7] तेभ्योऽर्थान्तरम्[8] इत्येतत्सर्वं प्रतिपादयन्नाह –

^{β}यो यद्विवक्षासम्भूतविवक्षान्तरतस्ततः[9] ।
*वर्ण उत्पद्यते तस्य श्रुतिस्तत्समनन्तरम् ॥ (2699)   * Ś 874$_k$
पूर्ववर्णविदुद्भूतसंविन्नातिद्रुतश्रुतिः ।
10 सोऽपेक्ष्य तत्स्मृतिं पश्चात्कुरुते स्मृतिमात्मनि ॥ (2700)
तत्समुत्थापकग्राहिज्ञानानि प्रति जन्यता ।
हेतुता वानुपूर्वीयं वर्णेषु पुरुषाश्रया^{β} ॥ (2701)
अतः प्रतिपदं भिन्ना वर्णा इति परिस्फुटम् ।
*दमो मदो लता ताल इत्यादिक्रमभेदतः ॥ (2702)   * J$_K$ 139r

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[1] $°$हेतुत्वम् em. sulla base di Tib: ཀྱི་ཉིད་] $°$रूपत्वम् J$_K$ P$_P$ K Ś.   [2] अर्थप्रतीति$°$ ...
तथा हि ricostruito sulla base di Tib: མི་རྟག་རྣམས་ལ་དོན་རྟོགས་ (D] རྟོག Q) པའི།ཀུ
ཉིད་བསྒྲུབས་ཟིན་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་མཆོང་བ་ཉིད་དུ་དོགས་པ་ལ།ཡིན་དུ་ཡ་དང་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པས།
སོ།།འདི་ལྟར་] (ill.)ते तुल्यप्र(ill.) J$_P$, (द्वि)ष्टायुगमित्यत्यन्तत्वेऽपि न मन्यते तुल्यप्रत्यय-
ष्ट(lac. ±11) P$_P$, (lac.)अत्यन्तत्वेऽपि न मन्यते तुल्यप्रत्ययष्ट(lac.) K, अर्थप्रतीतिरूपत्वं
साधितमिति सामान्येन प्रतीतावत्यन्ताभेद इति एवं cong. Ś.   [3] प्रतिपदं ... $°$अनुपूर्वीका
cong. Ś sulla base di Tib: ཚིག་སོ་སོ་ཐ་དད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཁྱད་པར་གྱི་གོ་རིམས་ཅན་ཏན་གྱི] J$_P$ ill.,
प्रतिपदं भिन्नत्वानिमित्तमुपद्रोक P$_P$ K.   [4] एव J$_P$ P$_P$, cfr. Tib] om. K Ś.   [5] सरो रस
इत्यादौ J$_P$ cong. K, cfr. Tib] शब्दो रस इत्यादौ P$_P$, मदो दमः सरो रस इत्यादौ em.
Ś.   [6] प्रतीतिभेदनिबन्धनं युक्ताः J$_P$ P$_P$ K] प्रतीतिभेदनिबन्धनयुक्ताः em. Ś.   [7] चानुपूर्वं
J$_P$ P$_P$ K] चानुपूर्व्यं em. Ś.   [8] अर्थान्तरम् em. sulla base di Tib: དོན་གཞན्] J$_P$ ill.,
व्यन्तरम् P$_P$, व्यक्त्यन्तरम् em. K seguito da Ś.   [9] ततः em. K seguito da Ś] स्थितः
J$_K$ P$_K$.

$^{α-α}$अत्यन्त$°$ ... $°$प्रत्यवमर्शन = TS 2611ab.
$^{β-β}$यो ... पुरुषाश्रया Cfr. PV I.302-305: यो यद्वर्णसमुत्थानज्ञानाज्ज्ञानतो ध्वनिः ।
जायते तदुपाधिः स श्रुत्या समवसीयते ॥ तज्ज्ञानजनितज्ञानः स श्रुतावपटुश्रुतिः ।
अपेक्ष्य तत्स्मृतिं पश्चादाधत्ते स्मृतिमात्मनि ॥ इत्येषा पौरुषेय्येव तद्धेतुग्राहिचेतसाम् ।
कार्यकारणता वर्णेष्वानुपूर्वीति कथ्यते ॥ अन्यदेव ततो रूपं तद्वर्णानां पदं पदम् ।कर्तृसंस्का-
रतो भिन्नं सहितं कार्यभेदकृत्.

^γईदृशेन क्रमेणैते त्वर्थभेदोपपादकाः^γ । (2703ab)

यो यद्विवक्षेत्यादि । ^δअयमत्र तावत्समुदायार्थः – वक्तृसन्ताने प्रतिवर्णं तत्समुत्थापकानि ज्ञानानि¹⁰ पूर्वपूर्वसमनन्तरप्रत्ययजन्यानि,¹¹ <ततश्च वर्णाः क्रमवर्तिनो भवन्ति, >¹² ते च श्रोतृसन्ताने¹³ पूर्वपूर्ववर्णग्राहिविज्ञा-नसहकारिणः स्वविषयाभिज्ञानानि क्रमवर्तीनि¹⁴ जनयन्ति साक्षात्, ततश्च पश्चादात्मविषयां¹⁵ स्मृतिं क्रमभाविनीं जनयन्ति *पारम्पर्येण । ततश्च वक्तृ-   * K 720
सन्तानभावीनि स्वसमुत्थापकानि¹⁶ ज्ञानान्यपेक्ष्य¹⁷ तेषां जन्यता, श्रोतृस-
न्तान*भावीनि तान्यपेक्ष्य हेतुता^{18,δ} । सैव तेषामानुपूर्वी, नान्या¹⁹ ।   * J_P 248r
^εकारणकार्यभेदाच्च प्रतिपदं वर्णानां भिन्नस्वभावत्वात्सरो रस इत्यादौ प्रती-

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¹⁰ज्ञानानि J_P cong. K Ś, cfr. Tib] ज्ञातानि P_P.   ¹¹°जन्यानि em. K seguito da Ś,
cfr. Tib] J_P ill., °जन्यापि P_P.   ¹²ततस्...भवन्ति ricostruito sulla base di Tib:
དེ་དག་ལས་ཡི་གེ་རྣམས་རིམ་པ་དང་ལྡན་པར་འགྱུང་སྟེ] J_P ill., P_P lac., विवक्षातो भवन्ति,
ततश्च वर्णाः cong. K seguito da Ś.   ¹³°सन्ताने P_P] (ill.)ताने J_P, °सन्तानि° em.
K seguito da Ś.   ¹⁴क्रमवर्तीनि J_P cong. K Ś] क्रमवर्तति P_P.   ¹⁵आत्मविषयां em.
sulla base di Tib: བདག་གི (D) གྱིས (Q) ཡུལ་ཅན] आवाविषयां J_P, आवाविषर्यीं P_P,
स्वस्वविषयां cong. K seguito da Ś.   ¹⁶स्वसमुत्थापकानि em. K seguito da Ś, cfr.
Tib] स्वसममुत्थापकानि J_P P_P.   ¹⁷ज्ञानान्यपेक्ष्य cong. K seguito da Ś, cfr. Tib]
ज्ञानानापेक्ष्य J_P P_P.   ¹⁸श्रोतृसन्तानभावीनि ... हेतुता cong. K seguito da Ś, cfr.
Tib] श्रोतृसन्तान(ill. ±10)(तु)ता J_P, श्रोतृसन्तानभ(lac. ±2)वान्यत(lac. ±1)हेतुता
P_P.   ¹⁹नान्या cong. K seguito da Ś, cfr. Tib] J_P ill., तान्या P_P.

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^{γ−γ}ईदृशेन...अर्थभेदोपपादकाः Cfr. PVSV_ṛ 161,10-11: स च परस्परसहितं कार्यभेद-
हेतुः.
^{δ−δ} अयम्...हेतुता Cfr. PVṬ ñe 31a3-6: དེ་ཉིད་བསྟན་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ་ཕྱིར་དེ་ལྟར་ན་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་   ཨ་
སོགས་པ་སྟེ ༑ འདིར་ཚང་པ་པོ་གནས་པ་ལ་ཡི་གེ་ཀུན་ནས་སློང་བར་བྱེད་པ་ཀུན་ནས་བསྐྱེད་བར་བྱ   །
བ་ཡི་གེ་སོ་སོ་ན་དང་པ་གི་རིམས་བཞིན་དུ་འགྱུང་བ་ཅན་གྱི་ཤེས་པ་དག་དེ་ཤེས་པ་སྔ་མ་སྔ་མའི་དེ་   མ་
ཐག་པའི་རྐྱེན་གྱིས་སྐྱེད་པར་འགྱུང་ཞིང་ཡི་གེ་རྣམས་བཞིན་དུ་འགྱུང་བ་ཅན་གྱི་ཤེས་པ་དེ་དག་གིས་ཀུང་ཡི་
གེའི་རྣམས་ཚེ་ན་དག་སྐྱེན་པར་བྱེད་པ་འགྱུང་རོ །།ཡི་གེ་རྣམས་བཞིན་དུ་འགྱུང་བའི་ཡི་གེ་དང་གིས་
ཀུན་ཏུ་བའི་རྣམས་པ་ཤེས་པ་རང་གི་ཡུལ་ཅན་གྱི་གི་རྣམས་བཞིན་དུ་འཛིན་བུ་ཉིད་གང་ཨེན་པ་དང༑   རང་
གི་ཡུལ་ཅན་གྱི་གི་རྣམས་བཞིན་དུ་འཛིན་བའི་དང་ཚུལ་ཅན་དོིས་པོ་སྐྱེན་པར་འགྱུང་ཞིང་བཟུང་བས་ཡི་
གི་ལ་དགགས་པ་ཅན་གྱི་དན་གི་རྣམས་བཞིན་དུ་འཛིན་བའི་དང་ཚུལ་ཅན་ཉི་ཀུན་དོ །།བས་ན་ཡི་གི་
རྣམས་ནི་ཀུན་ནས་སློང་བར་བྱེད་པའི་ཤེས་པའི་གི་རྣམས་ལས་གི་རྣམས་བཞིན་དུ་འཛིན་བུ་ཉིད་གང་ཨེན་
པ་དང་རང་གི་ཡུལ་ཅན་གྱི་ཤེས་པ་དག་ག་གི་རྣམས་བཞིན་དུ་ཀྱེན་གང་ཨེན་པ་དེ་ཉིད་གི་རྣམས་   སྒྱ
རྣམས་པར་གནགས་པ་ཨེན་ནོ་ཞེས་བུ་བ་འདི་དེ་བསྔས་པའི་དོན་ཏོ; PVSV_ṛṬ 567,8-13: अयमत्र
समुदायार्थः । वक्तृस्थेन पूर्वपूर्ववर्णसमुत्थापकचित्तेनोत्तरोत्तरवर्णसमुत्थापक चित्तं जन्यत
इति समुत्थापकचित्तक्रमात् । तत्समुत्थाप्यानां वर्णानामुत्पत्तिक्रमः क्रमोत्पन्नैश्च वर्णैः
स्वविषयानि क्रमभावीन्येव श्रोत्रविज्ञानानि साक्षाज्जन्यन्ते । क्रमभाविन्य एव स्मृतयश्च
पारम्पर्येण ततो वर्णानां समुत्थापकज्ञानक्रमाद्या क्रमे कार्यता । स्वविषयज्ञानेषु च या
क्रमेण कारणता सैवानुपूर्वीति व्यवस्थाप्यत इति.

तिभेदो युज्यते,^ε न तु नित्यानाम्, तेषां सर्वदा सर्वत्रैकरूपत्वात् । नाप्यानुपूर्वी तेभ्योऽर्थान्तरभूतेष्टा, अर्थान्तरत्वेऽपि सम्बन्धासिद्धेरित्यभि-प्रायः ॥

^ςअवयवार्थ उच्यते[20] – यो[21] **वर्ण उत्पद्यत**[22] इति सम्बध्यते । यथा
5 सर इत्यादौ[23] सकारादेः परोऽकारादिः <। कुत उत्पद्यत इति **यद्विवक्षा-सम्भूतविवक्षान्तरतस्**^ς **। ततो**>[24] यस्य सकारादेर्विवक्षा यद्विवक्षा, ततः सम्भूतं यद्विवक्षान्तरं तत्तथोक्तम् ।एतदुक्तं भवति – वक्तृसन्ताने पूर्वपूर्वव-र्णसमुत्थापकविवक्षासम्भूतं यदुत्तरोत्तरं विवक्षान्तरम्, *तत उत्तरोत्तरो यो * Ś 874_c
वर्ण उत्पद्यते स स्मृतिं कुरुत इति वक्ष्यमाणेन सम्बन्धः ॥
10 ^ηएवं तावद्वक्तृसन्तानवर्तिवर्णसमुत्थापक[25]ज्ञानक्रमाद्[26] वर्णानाम्
<उत्पत्तिक्रमस्य कार्यत्वं>[27] प्रतिपाद्य श्रोतृसन्तानवर्तिज्ञानं[28] प्रति[29] का-

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[20]°अर्थ उच्यते cong. sulla base di di Tib: ཨན་ ལག་ གི་ དོན་ བརྗོད་ པར་
དུ] °अर्थ(ill. ±4) J_P, °अर्थस्तू(lac. ±3) P_P, °अर्थस्तूच्यते cong. K seguito da Ś.
[21]यो cong. sulla base di Tib: ཡེ་ གེ་ གང་ ཞིག] om. J_P P_P K Ś. [22]उत्पद्यत
cong. K seguito da Ś, cfr. Tib] (उ)(ill. ±2)त J_P, उत्प(lac. ±1)त P_P. [23]यथा
सर इत्यादौ cong. sulla base di Tib: རེ་ ལྟར་ རོ་ ཞེས་ བྱ་ བ་ ལ་ སོགས་ པ་ ལ་ (=*यथा रस
इत्यादौ)] (ill. ±6)दौ J_P, सदा समयत्यादौ P_P, सदा सम इत्यादौ cong. K seguito da
Ś. [24]कुत...ततो ricostruito sulla base di Tib: གང་ ལས་ ཏེ་ གནང་ གི་ བརྗོད་ པར་ འདོད་ པ་
ལས་ བྱུང་ བའི་ བརྗོད་ པར་ འདོད་ པ་ ལས་ ཏེ་ འདིའི་ ཕྱིར་] कु(ill. ±10)सम्(भू)त(वि)(ill. ±4)स्ततः
J_P, (lac. ±11)सम्भूतवितथा(lac. ±3)स्ततः P_P, सकारविवक्षासम्भूतविवक्षान्तरतस्ततः
उत्पद्यते cong. K seguito da Ś. [25]°वर्णसमुत्थापक° cong. K seguito da Ś, cfr.
Tib] J_P ill., °व(lac. ±2)मुत्थापक° P_P. [26]ज्ञानक्रमाद् cong. sulla base di Tib:
ཤེས་ པའི་ རིམ་ པ་ ལས་] J_P ill., °का(lac. ±2)(ग)द् P_P, °विवक्षावशाद् cong. K seguito da
Ś. [27]उत्पत्तिक्रमस्य कार्यत्वं ricostruito sulla base di Tib: སྐྱེ་ བའི་ རིམ་ པ་ འབྲས་ བུ་ ཉིད་ དུ་]
J_P ill., P_P lac., जन्यत्वम् cong. K seguito da Ś. [28]प्रतिपाद्य श्रोतृ° cong. K seguito
da Ś, cfr. Tib] J_P ill., P_P lac. [29]प्रति J_P cong. K Ś] इति P_P.

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^{ε–ε}कारण°...युज्यते Cfr. PVSV_r 161,3-6: स एष वर्णानां भिन्नकार्यकारणभावप्रत्यय-निर्वृत्तिधर्मा भिन्ननिर्वर्तनधर्मा च स्वभावः पुरुषसंस्कारभेदभिन्नः क्रमेत्युच्यते.
^{ς–ς}अवयवार्थ°... °अन्तरतस् Cfr. PVȚ ñe 31a6-7: དེ་ ནི་ ཨན་ ལག་ གི་ དོན་ རྣམ་ པར་ དབྱེ་ བ་
ལ་ སྐྲ་ གང་ སྐྱེ་ བ་ ཞེས་ བྱ་ བར་ རྣམ་ པར་ སྦྱར་ ཏོ་ འདིར་ ན་ ས་ ར་ ཞེས་ བྱ་ བ་ འདི་ ལ་ ཨེ་ གེ་ ས་ ལས་ ཕྱིས་ ཨེ་
གེ་ ཨ་ སྟེ་ བུ་འོ། །གང་ ལས་ སྐྱེ་ ཞེ་ ན་ ཨེ་ གེ་ གང་ ཀུན་ སྐྱོང་ ཞེས་ པ་ ལས་ ཕྱིས་ འདི་ ཞེས་ པ་ ལས་
ཏེ; PVSV_rȚ 567,14-16: सम्प्रत्येव पदार्थो विभज्यते यो ध्वनिर्जायत इति सम्बन्धः ।
यथा सर इत्यत्र पदे सकारात्परोऽकारः । कुतो जयते यद्वर्णसमुत्थानज्ञानाज्ज्ञानतः.

रणत्वं प्रतिपादयति – **तस्येति**[η] । **य**[30] इति यो निर्दिष्टः स सम्बध्यते ।
तस्य श्रुतिरुत्पद्यत इति सम्बन्धः । **समनन्तरम्** इत्यव्यवधानेन[31] ॥

एवं श्रोतृज्ञानहेतुत्वं प्रतिपाद्य [θ]साम्प्रतं स्मृतिहेतुत्वं प्रतिपादयति – **स**
इत्युत्तरोत्तरो वर्णस्तत्स्मृतिं[32] पूर्वपूर्वस्मृतिम्<पेक्ष्य, अनुभवज्ञानात्पश्चादु-
त्तरकालमात्मनि स्वविषये स्मृतिं कुरुते[θ] । कीदृशः सो वर्ण इति **पूर्ववर्ण-**
विदुद्धूतसम्वित् । पूर्वपूर्ववर्णानां विदनुभवः पूर्ववर्णवित् । तेनोद्धूता>[33]
संविदनुभवो[34] यस्य स तथोक्तः । **नातिद्रुतश्रुतिर्** इति [*],'द्रुतश्रुतेः स्मृति-   * P_P 203v
जननासमर्थत्वात्[35],[ι] ॥

[κ]समुत्थापकानि च ग्राहीणि चेति[36] द्वन्द्वः । तेषां वर्णानां तानि वा

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[30]तस्येति । य cong. K seguito da Ś, cfr. Tib] J_P ill., तस्य(lac. ±1)ग P_P.
[31]अव्यवधानेन em. K seguito da Ś, cfr. Tib] अवधानेन J_P P_P.   [32]तत्स्मृतिम् cong. K,
cfr. Tib] स्मृतिं J_P, तु स्मृतिं P_P, तु तत्स्मृतिं Ś.   [33]अपेक्ष्य ... तेनोद्धूता ricostru-
ito sulla base di Tib: དེ་དེ་ཞེས་བུ་བ་སྟེ་ཨེ་གེ་ཕྱི་མ་པོ་དེ། །དྲན་དེ་སྔ་སྔ་མ་ད་ལ་སྟོས་
ནས་ཉམས་སུ་མྱོང་བའི་ཤེས་པ་ལ་ཕྱིས་དུས་ཕྱིས་བདག་ལ་སྟེ་རང་གི་ཡུལ་ལ་དྲན་པར་བྱེད་དོ། །ཅི་
འདྲ་ཞེ་ན་ཨེ་གེ་སྔ་སྔ་མ་རྟོགས་གུང་བའ་] J_P ill., P_P lac.; K, seguito da Ś, conget-
tura: अपेक्ष्य तत्सहकारेणेत्येतत्स्मृतिं स्वस्विषयाम्; e antepone a स इत्युत्तरोत्तरो
ecc. पूर्वेति । पूर्ववर्णानां विज्ञानम्, तेन उद्धूता संवितनुभवो यस्य स तथोक्तः ।
नातिद्रुतश्रुतिरिति । द्रुतश्रुतेः स्मृतिजनतासमर्थत्वात् (॰जनना॰Ś).   [34]संविदनुभवो cong.
K seguito da Ś, cfr. Tib] J_P ill., सन्तिरनुगम॰ P_P.   [35]॰जनना॰ J_P Ś, cfr. Tib]
॰जनता॰ P_P K.   [36]चेति em. K seguito da Ś] तेति J_P P_P.

[η-η]एवं तावद्...तस्येति Cfr. PVṬ ñe 31b3-5: དེ་སྟྲ་རེ་ཞིག་འཆད་པ་པོ་འི་ཀུན་ལ་གནས
པའི་ཀུན་ནས་སློང་བའི་ཤེས་པའི་རིགས་ལས་ཨེ་གེ་རྣམས་གོ་རིམས་བཞིན་དུ་སྐྱེ་བ་བརྗོད་བྱ་ཉིད་ དུ
བསྟན་ནས་ཨེ་གེ་དག་གོ་རིམས་བཞིན་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡང་ཉན་པ་པོ་འི་ཀུན་ལ་གནས་པའི་རང་བཞིན་ཡུལ་ ཅན
གྱི་ཤེས་རྣམས་ཀྱི་གོ་རིམས་བཞིན་ཀུན་འགྱུར་རོ་ཞེས་བསྟན་པའི་ཕྱིར་དེའི་ཁྱད་པར་ཅན་ཞེས་བུ་བ
ལ་སོགས་པ་སྟོས་དེ; PVSVṛṬ 567,21-24: एवं तावद्वक्तृसन्तानस्थस्य समुत्थानज्ञानस्य
क्रमाद्वर्णानां क्रमेणोत्पत्तेः कार्यत्वमुक्तम् ।ते च क्रमेणोत्पन्नाः श्रोतृसन्तानस्थानां स्वविषय-
ज्ञानानां क्रमेण हेतवो भवन्तो ज्ञायन्त इति दर्शयन्नाह । तदुपाधिरित्यादिः.

[θ-θ]साम्प्रतं...कुरुते Cfr. PVṬ ñe 32a2-7: དེ་ཞེས་བུ་བ་འི་ཨེ་གེ་ཕྱི་མའོ། [...] དེ་དུན་
ཞེས་བུ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་སྟོས་པ་གང་དག་ད་ལ་སྟོས་ནས་ཞེས་བུ་བ་ཨེ་གེ་སྔ་མ་པ་འདོ།།ཕྱིས་ནི་ བ
དག་ཉིད་ལ་དྲན་པ་ཉིད་བྱེད་པ་སྟེ་འདག་ཉིད་ རང་གི་ཡུལ་ལ་འབྱུང་བས་དྲན་པ་སྐྱེ་བར་བྱེད་ཅེ་ན་ བ
ར་ བྱིད། །ཞེས་ དེ་ རང་ གི་ ཡུལ་ ཅན་ གྱི་ ཞེས་ པའི་ ཨེ་ གེ་ རྣམས་ གོ་ རིམས་ བཞིན་ དུ་ སྐྱེ་ ཉིད་
བསྐྱེད་དོ; PVSVṛṬ 568,9-17: स इत्युत्तरो वर्णः [...] अपेक्ष्य तत्स्मृतिं पूर्ववर्णस्मृतिम् ।
पश्चादाधत्ते जनयति स्मृतिमात्मनि स्वविषये पारम्पर्येणेति दृष्टव्यम् ।एतेन च स्वविषयाणि
ज्ञानानि प्रति वर्णानां क्रमेण कारणतोक्ता.

[ι-ι]॰द्रुतश्रुतेः... ॰असमर्थत्वात् Cfr. PVṬ ñe 32a3-4: ཉེན་དུ་སྒྱུར་བར་བརྗོད་པ་ན་ཨེ་གེ་རྣམ
པར་དབྱེ་བ་ཡོངས་སུ་བཅད་པ་མེད་དེ་ཕྱིར་གང་ལས་གོ་རིམས་བཞིན་དུ་དྲན་པ་སྐྱེ་བར་བྱེད; PVS-
VṛṬ 568,12-14: अतित्वरितं तूच्चार्यमाणे विभक्तवर्णपरिच्छेदात्कुतः क्रमेण स्मृतिजनन-
मित्यस्य सन्दर्शनार्थमपटुश्रुतिग्रहणम्.

समुत्थापकग्राहीणि तत्समुत्थापकग्राहीणि[37] । पश्चाज् <ज्ञानशब्देन कर्म-
धारयः[κ]> । **तत्क्रियापदं** द्वितीयान्तम् । **प्रति** शब्दः कर्मप्रवचनीयस्तत्सं-
योगात् । **जन्यता हेतुते**ति यथोपपत्तिः । समुत्थापकज्ञानजन्य>[38]ग्राही-
ण्य्[39] अनुभवस्मृतिज्ञानान्यपेक्ष्य[40] हेतुते**ति** <यावत्>[41] ॥

5   एवमानुपूर्वीमर्थान्तरभूतां निराकृत्य वैयाकरणाद्युपकल्पितं ध्वनिभ्यो-
ऽर्थान्तरभूतं वाचकं शब्दात्मानं स्फोटम् <अपि निराचिकीर्षन्नाह>[42] –

अत एव निरर्थेह स्फोटस्यापि प्रकल्पना ॥ (2703cd)
स ह्यर्थप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं शाब्दिकैः परिकल्पितः ।
वर्णा एव च तच्छक्ता इत्यनर्थास्य कल्पना ॥ (2704)

10   **अत ए**वेत्यादि ।*तत्र किमयं स्फोटात्मकः प्रत्यक्षेण सिद्धः, उतादृश्या-   * Ś 875c
नुमानेन; तत्रापि[43] नित्यो वा कैश्चिद्वैभाषिकैः[44] कल्पित इवानित्यो वा;
तथैव कश्चिन्निरवयवी वावयवी वा स्यादिति परीक्षितव्यः ॥
   तत्र न तावत्प्रथमः पक्ष इति दर्शयति[45] –

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[37]तत्समुत्थापकग्राहीणि cong.] J_P ill., तत्स(lac. ±7)ग्राहीणि P_P, तत्समुत्थापकग्राहीणि
इति cong. K, तत्सङ्ग्राहीणि इति cong. Ś.   [38]ज्ञान॰ . . . ॰जन्य॰ ricostruito sulla base di
Tib: ཤེས་པའི་སྐུ་དང་ལས་འཇིན་པའི་འདི་ཉིད་ཤེས་པའི་ཚིག་གཉིས་པའི་མཐའ་ཅན་ཏེ་ཨིན་ནོ །དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཉི་
ལས་ཀྱི་ཚིག་སྟེ་དེ་དང་ལྡན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ །།ཀྱུ་ཉིད་དུ་བསྐྱེད་བྱ་ཞེས་ཇི་ལྟར་འཐད་པར་སྟུག་དཀུན་ནས་སྐྱོ-
ང་ བའི་ཤེས་པ་ལ་ (ལས?) བསྐྱེད་པར་བྱ་བར] J_P ill., P_P lac., तत्पुरुषः कर्मधारयो वा ।
समुत्थापकान्यपेक्ष्य जन्यतेति cong. K seguito da Ś.   [39]ग्राहीण्य् P_P K Ś] J_P ill.
[40]॰ज्ञानान्यपेक्ष्य em. sulla base di Tib:ཤེས་པ་ལ་ལྟོས (ལྟོས Q) ནས] ॰ज्ञान्यनपेक्ष्य
J_P P_P, ॰रूपाण्यपेक्ष्य cong. K, ॰ज्ञानरूपाण्यपेक्ष्य em. Ś.   [41]यावत् cong. sulla base
di Tib: ཇ་ཙིག་གོ] J_P ill., P_P lac. ±4, om. K Ś.   [42]अपि निराचिकीर्षन्नाह cong.
sulla base di Tib: ཡང་དགག་པར་འདོད་ནས . . . སྨྲོས་ཏེ] अ(ill. ±2)राचिकीर्षन्नाह J_P,
अन्येतिसचिकीर्षन्नाह P_P, अद्य निराषिकीर्षन्नाह cong. K, अधुना निराचिकीर्षुराह cong.
Ś.   [43]तत्र. . . तत्रापि cong. Ś sulla base di Tib: དེ་ལ་གསལ་བའི་བདག་ཉིད་འདི་ཇེ་མངོན་སུམ་
གྱིས་གྲུབ (D] མ་གྲུབ Q) བམ་འོན་ཏེ་མི་སྟུང་བའི་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པས་གྲུབ] J_P ill., P_P K lac.
[44]वा कैश्चिद्वैभाषिकैः em. Ś sulla base di Tib: དོན་དེ་ཇེ་སྲུར་ཏུ་བྲག་ཏུ་སྐྲ་པའི་དགའ་ལིག
གིས] (य)था केश्चिद्वैभा(षि)कै J_P, यथा कश्चिद्वैभाविकै P_P, यथा कश्चिद्वैभाषिकै cong. K.
[45]कल्पित॰. . . दर्शयति cong. Ś sulla base di Tib: བདགས་པ་བཞིན་དུ་མི་རྟག་པ་ཨིན་ནེ་བཞིན་
དུ་ཙ་ཤས་མེད་པ་དགའ་ཞིག་གམ་འོན་ཏེ་ཚ་ཤས་དང་བཅས་པ་ཨིན་ཞེས་བདགས་གོ །།ཇ་ལ་རེ་ཞིག་ཕོག་
ས་དང་པོ་ནི་མ་ཨིན་ནོ་ཞེས་བསྟན་པའི་ཕྱིར] J_P ill., P_P lac., (lac.)इति दर्शयति cong. K.

[κ–κ]समुत्थापकानि. . . कर्मधारयः Cfr. PVṬ ñe 32b1: དེ་ནི་དེ་རྒྱུ་འཇིན་སེམས་ཀྱི་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་
སྐྲོས་ཏེ་རྒྱུ་དང་འཇིན་པ་ཞེས་ན་རྒྱས་ཏེ་བཀོད་པའི །།ཨེ་གེ་དེ་དགའ་གི་རྒྱུ་དང་འཇིན་པ་ཞེས་བ་དི་དྲུག་ པའི་
བཤུ་འོའི །།དེས་ན་སེམས་ཀྱི་སྐྲུ་དང་ཕྱུད་པར་གྱི་བཤུ་བ་ནུའི; PVSVṛṬ 568,20-22: तद्धेतुग्राहिचे-
तसामिति । हेतवश्च ग्राहीणि चेति द्वद्वः । तेषाम्वर्णानां हेतुग्राहीणीति षष्ठीसमासः ।
पश्चाचेतःशब्देन विशेषणसमासः.

*,ᵡदृश्यस्याद‍ृष्टितश्चास्य नास्तिताध्यवसीयतेᵡ । (2705ab)

दृश्येत्यादि ।ᵘन हि वर्णेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्तोऽपरो निरवयवः⁴⁶ शब्दात्मा श्रोतुश्चेतसि⁴⁷ प्रतिभासमानः समालक्ष्यतेᵘ ।यत <उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तानुप-लब्धिस्तस्मात्>⁴⁸ प्रत्युत तस्य नास्तितैव⁴⁹ सिद्ध्येत् ॥

5 अथ द्वितीयः पक्षः । तथापि भावधर्मो वा हेतुर्⁵⁰ भवेत्, अभावधर्मो वा, उभयधर्मो वेति विकल्पाः । आद्ये पक्षे स्फोटाख्यधर्मिधर्मो वा हेतुर्भवेत्तदन्यधर्मिधर्मो वा ।ᵛतत्र तस्यैव स्फोटाख्यस्य धर्मिणोऽसिद्धत्वात्त-स्य धर्मस्याप्यसिद्धत्वान्न तद्धर्मस्⁵¹ तावद्धेतुःᵛ ।अन्यधर्मोऽपि न हेतुः, अपक्षधर्मत्वात्, यथा शब्दस्यानित्यत्वादौ साध्ये चाक्षुषत्वम्⁵² ।ᵋअभाव-

10 धर्मोऽपि न भवति, तस्य विपरीतसाधकत्वात्ᵋ ।ᵠउभयधर्मोऽपि न भव-ति, तस्य व्यभिचारित्वात्ᵠ ॥

किन्तु⁵³ स्वभावहेतोर्वा तस्य सिद्धिर्भवेत्, कार्यहेतोर्वा । न तावदाद्यः पक्षः, तस्यातीन्द्रियत्वात्⁵⁴ तत्स्वभावासिद्धेः । सिद्धौ वा व्यर्थो हेतुः

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⁴⁶अपरो निरवयवः cong. Ś sulla base di Tib: ཚ་མེད་པ་གཞན] (परो)(ill. ±3) J_P, (lac. ±3)सकलः P_P, नित्योऽकलः cong. K.   ⁴⁷श्रोतुश्चेतसि cong. Ś sulla base di Tib: ཉན་པ་པོའི་སེམས་ལ] (ill. ±2)चेतसि J_P, श्रोत्रेचेसि P_P, श्रोत्रे चेतसि cong. K. ⁴⁸उपलब्धि...तस्मात् cong. sulla base di Tib: དམིགས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དུ་གྱུར་པ་མ་དམིགས་ པ་དེ་ལས] उप(ill. ±15) J_P, उपलब्धिल(lac. ±7)अभावि॰ P_P, उपलब्धिल(lac.)भावेत् cong. K, उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्यानुपलब्धिस्वभावः तस्मात् cong. Ś.   ⁴⁹नास्तितैव cong.] ना(स्ति)तेव J_P, नास्ति(lac. ±2) P_P, नास्तिता em. K seguito da Ś.   ⁵⁰॰धर्मो वा हेतुर् em. K seguito da Ś, cfr. Tib] J_P ill., धर्म्ये(lac. ±2)हेतुर् P_P.   ⁵¹असिद्धत्वात्...तद्धर्मस् cong. Ś sulla base di Tib: མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར་དེའི་ཆོས་ཀྱང་མ་གྲུབ་ པས་དེ་ལྟ་ན་དེའི་ཆོས་གཏན་ ཚིགས་མ་ཡིན་ཏོ] J_P ill., तथापि व्यति(lac. ±2)मेतद्धर्मस् P_P, असिद्धत्वान्न(lac.) तद्धर्मस् K.   ⁵²शब्दस्य॰...॰चाक्षुषत्वम् em. sulla base di Tib: སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པ་ཉིད་དུ་བསྒྲུབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ལ་ མིག་གིས་གཟུང་བར་བྱ་བ་ཉིད་ལྟ་བུའོ] (ill. ±6)(स्या)नित्यत्वा(दौ)साध्ये J_P, बाहुपदं चय-स्यानित्यत्वादौ साध्ये P_P, बाहुपदं घटस्यानित्यत्वादौ साध्ये cong. K, आनित्यत्वसाध्ये शब्दे चाक्षुषत्वम् em. Ś.   ⁵³किन्तु J_P, cfr. Tib: གཞན་ ཞིང] तस्य P_P, om. K Ś.   ⁵⁴तस्य॰ em. K seguito da Ś] यस्य॰ J_P P_P.

ᵡ⁻ᵡ दृश्यस्य॰... ॰अध्यवसीयते Cfr. PV I.247cd: वाक्यं न भिन्नं वर्णेभ्यो विद्यते अनुप-लम्भनात्.
ᵘ⁻ᵘ न हि...समालक्ष्यते Cfr. PVSVṛ 127,3-4: न हि वयं देवदत्तादिपदवाक्येषु दकारा-दिप्रतिभासं मुक्त्वा अन्यं प्रतिभासं बुद्धेः पश्यामः.
ᵛ⁻ᵛ तत्र...हेतुः Cfr. PV I.191a: नासिद्धे भावधर्मोऽस्ति; PVSVṛ 95,20-96,4:तत्र यदि भावधर्मो हेतुरुच्यते । स कथमसिद्धसत्ताके स्यात् । यो हि भावधर्मे तत्रेच्छति । स कथं भावं नेच्छेत् । स्वभाव एव हि कयाचिदपेक्षया धर्म इति व्यतिरेकीव धर्मिणो निर्दिश्यते.
ᵋ⁻ᵋ अभावधर्मो...विपरीतसाधकत्वात् Cfr. PV I.191c: धर्मो विरुद्धोऽभावस्य; PVSVṛ 96,15-17:अभावधर्मे तु भावमात्रव्यापिनोऽर्थस्य व्यवच्छेदं हेतुं सत्तायां वदतोऽस्य विरुद्धो हेतुः स्यात्.
ᵠ⁻ᵠ उभयधर्मो...व्यभिचारित्वात् Cfr. PV I.191b: व्यभिचार्युभयाश्रयः.

पर्येषणे, यत्तत्स्वभावस्य[55] सिद्धत्वात्तदर्थत्वाच्च प्रयासस्य । नापि द्वितीयः
पक्षः, °अतीन्द्रियेण सह कार्यकारणभावासिद्धेः[56,°] ॥

अथापि स्यात् – [π]यथा श्रोत्रादिज्ञानस्य कादाचित्कत्वेन कारणान्तर-
सापेक्षत्वसिद्धौ सामर्थ्याच्छ्रोत्रादेरिन्द्रियस्य सिद्धिर्भवति,[π] तथात्रप्यर्थप्र-
तीतिं धर्मिणीं कृत्वा वर्णाविशेषेऽपि सरो रस इत्यादावर्थप्रतीतिभेदात्स्फो-
टाख्यं कारणान्तरं कल्पयिष्याम इत्येतदप्यसम्यक्, *वर्णाविशेषस्यासिद्ध-   * J_P 248v
त्वात् । तथाहि साम्प्रतमेव प्रतिपादितम् – वर्णा एव प्रतिपदं भिन्नाः
कार्यकारणभेदादर्थप्रतीतौ समर्था इत्यनर्था कल्पनेति । एवमनुमेयत्वे दोषा
वाच्या इत्यभिप्रायः ॥

अथापि स्यात् – नासावनुमेयः । किं तर्हि, अत्यन्तादृश्य इत्याह –

[ρ]अदृश्यत्वे तु नैवायं लिङ्गवज्ज्ञापको भवेत्[ρ] ॥ (2705cd)

अदृश्यत्वे तु नैवायम् इति । यथा लिङ्गमज्ञातं ज्ञापकं न भवति, तद्वदयम-
पि *स्यात्, अज्ञातत्वात् ॥   * Ś 876c

*,[σ]सत्तामात्रेण तज्ज्ञानहेतुभावव्यवस्थितेः[57] ।   * Ś 876k
तस्य ज्ञापकतेष्टा चेन्नेत्रवत्सर्वदा भवेत् ॥ (2706)
सङ्केतानवबोधेऽपि[σ] वर्णानामश्रुतावपि ।
तज्ज्ञाव्यर्थेषु विज्ञानं शक्तकारणसन्निधेः ॥ (2707)

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[55]यत्तत्° em. K seguito da Ś] यत्त(त्र)° J_P, यत्तत्र° P_P.   [56]°असिद्धेः J_P P_P K]
°सिद्धेः em. Ś.   [57]तज्ज्ञान° J_K P_K, cfr. Tib: दे ञेस ल । तज्ज्ञानं K Ś.

°–° अतीन्द्रियेण... °असिद्धेः Cfr. PVSVṛ 127,11-12: वर्णाविशेषेऽपि वाक्यभेदात्प्रति-
पत्तिभेदः कार्यभेदः स्यात् । सा च काक्यात् । तच्चातीन्द्रियमिति कुतः स्यात्; PVSVṛṬ
462,27: सम्बन्धस्यागृहीतत्वात्.
[π]–[π] यथा...भवति Cfr. PVSVṛ 127,6-9: अन्यासम्भवि कार्यं गमकमिति चेत् । स्यादेत-
त्यदि तेषु वर्णेषु सत्स्वपि तत्कार्यं न स्यात् । न भवति तेषामविशेषेऽपि पदवाक्यान्तरेऽभा-
वादिति चेत् । न । तेषामविशेषासिद्धेः.
[ρ]–[ρ] Cfr. PVṬ je 270a2-3≃PVSVṛṬ 434,23-25: व्यतिरेके भेदेनोपलम्भः स्याद्दृश्य-
स्य । अदृश्यत्वेऽप्यवाचकत्वमगृहीतस्य ज्ञापकत्वायोगात्.
[σ]–[σ] सत्तामात्रेण... °सन्निधेः Cfr. PVSVṛ 127,12-13: सन्निधानमात्रेण जननेऽव्युत्पन्न-
स्यापि स्यात्; PVṬ ad loc.: दे ङुर मे द्गुर न दङ् पो दङ् दढ् पर दग म मछोद् दु ञेद् गुर
थग दे व तछ गुस् दोगस प ञेद् पर द्गुर रो ले गो ने दे ङुर दग थग दे व तछ गुस् दोगस् प
ञेद् पर खस् वेन् दे म तुन् वदे अङ् ञेञेस सु गुर व म तुन् वस कुन् दग लस् दोगस प दङ् ग-
ङ् नो ञुर दे म यिन् नो; e PVSVṛṬ ad loc.: स्यादेतददृश्यमपि तद्वाक्यमिन्द्रियवत्सन्नि-
धिमात्रेण प्रतीतिं जनयति । प्रतीत्यन्यथानुपपत्त्या च वाक्यकल्पनेत्यत आह सन्निधिमात्रेण
वाक्यस्य प्रतीतिजननेऽप्युपगम्यमाने । इन्द्रियादिवद्व्युत्पन्नस्याप्यकृतसङ्केतस्यापि पुंसो-
ऽर्थ प्रतीतिर्वाक्यात्, न च भवति.

अथ सत्तामात्रेण चक्षुरादीन्द्रियवदज्ञातोऽप्यर्थप्रतीतिहेतुर्भवेत् । एवं तर्हि तद्भावि⁵⁸ ज्ञानं सर्वदा भवेत् । तथा सङ्केतग्रहणादिकमन्तरेण तद्भावि ज्ञानं स्यात् । एतदेव **सङ्केतेत्यादिना** दर्शयति⁵⁹ ॥

तत्रोपपत्तिमाह –

5 *,ᵗतथाहि नित्यसत्त्वोऽयं न चापेक्षास्य काचनᵗ । (2708ab) * K 722

तथा हीति । अथापि स्यात् – सङ्केताभिव्यक्त एवासावर्थप्रतीतिहेतुरिष्टः, न सत्तामात्रेण, तेन न भवति यथोक्तदोषप्रसङ्ग *इत्याह – * Pₚ 204r

ᵛध्वनिसङ्केतवर्णैश्च तद्व्यक्तिर्नाप्यदर्शनात् ॥ (2708cd)

ˣज्ञानं *हि व्यक्तिरˣइत्याहुस्तज्ज्ञानं च न⁶⁰ विद्यते । * Pₖ 50r
10 ततो निरर्थिकैवास्य⁶¹ व्यञ्जकस्यापि कल्पना ᵛ ॥ (2709)

ध्वनिसङ्केतवर्णैर् इत्यादि । **अदर्शनाद्** इत्यनुपलब्धेः, अदृश्यत्वेनाभि-मतत्वाच्च । एतदेव **ज्ञानं हीत्यादिना** दर्शयति ॥

स्यादेतत् – भासमानो न लक्ष्यत इत्येतदसिद्धम्, तथाहि पूर्वपूर्ववर्णा-हितसंस्कारायामावृत्तसंस्कारपरिपाकायां⁶² बुद्धौ शब्दोऽकलः प्रतिभासत
15 एवेत्याह –

ᵠनादैर्⁶³ आहितबीजायामन्त्येन ध्वनिना सह ।
आवृत्तपरिपाकायां बुद्धौ शब्दोऽवधार्यते⁶⁴,ᵠ ॥ (2710)
इत्येतदपि तेनात्र निर्निमित्तं प्रकल्पितम् ।
*तस्यामपि न शब्दोऽन्यो भासमानो हि लक्ष्यते ॥ (2711) * Ś 877ₖ

20 **नादेनेत्यादि** । आवृत्तः सञ्जातः सर्वबुद्ध्याहितसंस्कारपरिपाको⁶⁵ यस्यां बुद्धौ सा तथोक्ता । **निर्निमित्तम् इति**, ʷवर्णा एव हि यथानुभवं पश्चात्सङ्-

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⁵⁸॰भावि॰ Jₚ Pₚ K] ॰भाव॰ em. Ś. ⁵⁹दर्शयति Jₚ, cfr. Tib: བསྟན་ཏོ་] (ill. ±1)दर्शयति Pₚ, प्रदर्शयति em. K seguito da Ś. ⁶⁰च न Jₖ Pₖ] न च em. K seguito da Ś. ⁶¹निरर्थिक॰ Jₚpc Ś] निरर्थक॰ Jₚac Pₚ K. ⁶²आवृत्त॰ Jₚ em. K Ś] व्यावृत्त॰ Pₚ. ⁶³नादैर् em. sulla base di TSP 775,15-16] नादेन Jₚ Pₚ K Ś. ⁶⁴अवधार्यते em. sulla base di TSP 775,15-16] अवभासते Jₚ Pₚ K Ś. ⁶⁵॰आहित॰ em.] ॰आहितः Jₚ Pₚ K Ś.

ᵗ⁻ᵗ तथाहि...काचन Cfr. PVSVᵣ 131,7-10: न खल्वेवं नित्यानां शब्दानां कस्मिंश्चित्-त्यतिशयहानिरुत्पत्तिर्वा । तद्यदि तेषां ज्ञानजननः स्वभावः सर्वस्य सर्वदा सर्वाणि स्वविषयज्ञानानि सकृज्जनयेयुः । नो चेन्न कदाचित्कस्यचित्किंचिदित्येकान्त एषः.
ᵛ⁻ᵛ ध्वनि॰...कल्पना Cfr. PV I.262: स्वज्ञानेनान्यधीहेतुः सिद्धेर्थे व्यञ्जको मतः । यथा दीपोऽन्यथा वापि को विशेषोऽस्य कारकात्; PVSVᵣ ad loc e ss.
ˣ⁻ˣ ज्ञानं हि व्यक्तिर् Cfr. PV III.440c₁: ज्ञानं व्यक्तिर्.
ᵠ⁻ᵠ नादैर्...अवधार्यते = VP I.86.

लनाप्रत्ययेन स्मार्तेनावसीयन्त^ω इत्यभिप्रायः ।तथाहि ^{α′}नैवान्त्यवर्णप्रति-
पत्ते*रूर्ध्वमन्यमकलं शब्दात्मानमुपलक्षयामः ।नापि स्वयमयं वक्ता विभा-   * Ś 877c
वयति ।केवलमेवं यदि स्यात्साधु मे स्यादिति कल्याणकामतामूढमतिर-
न्त्यायां⁶⁶ बुद्धौ समाप्तकालः शब्दो भातीति स्वप्नायते^{α′} ।एवं तावन्नित्यप-
क्षे दूषणमुक्तम् ॥

इदानीं नित्यानित्यपक्षयोर्⁶⁷ अपि साधारणं दूषणमनवयवपक्षे प्राह —

जन्यतां व्यज्यतां⁶⁸ वापि ध्वनिभिः क्रमभाविभिः ।
येऽपि स्फोटस्य मन्यन्ते क्रमस्तेषां विरुध्यते ॥ (2712)
*,^{β′}न हि क्रमेण युज्येते⁶⁹ जातिव्यक्ती⁷⁰ निरंशके ।   * J_K 139v K 723
एकरूपाबहिर्भावात्ते स्याताां सर्वथैव हि^{β′} ॥ (2713)

जन्यताम् इत्यादि ।वैभाषिका हि केचित्पदकायाभिधानेन⁷¹ वाक्यस्फो-
टमनित्यत्वाज्जन्यं प्रतिपन्नाः ।**निरंशक** इति निरवयवे वस्तुनि ।**एकरू-**
पाबहिर्भावाद् इति ,एकस्माद्रूपाज्जाताद्व्यक्ताद्⁷² वाजाताव्यक्ताभिमतस्या-
पि रूपस्याबहिर्भावात् ।ते जातिव्यक्ती सर्वस्यैव स्याताम् ।^{γ′}ततश्च
शेषवर्णादिप्रयोगवैयर्थ्यं स्यात्^{γ′} ॥

सावयवपक्षे⁷³ऽपि दूषणमाह —

सांशत्वेऽपि यथा वर्णाः क्रमेणाप्रतिपादकाः⁷⁴ ।
स्फोटांशा अपि किं नैवं किमदृष्टाः प्रकल्पिताः ॥ (2714)

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⁶⁶अन्त्यायां em. K seguito da Ś, cfr. Tib] अत्यायां J_P P_P.   ⁶⁷॰पक्षयोर् J_P em. K
Ś] ॰पक्षेयोर् P_P.   ⁶⁸व्यज्यतां P_K K Ś] व्यज्यताां J_K.   ⁶⁹युज्येते J_K P_K K] युज्येते
em. Ś.   ⁷⁰जातिव्यक्ती em. Ś sulla base di Tib] व्यक्तिजाती J_K P_K K.   ⁷¹पदकाय॰
em.] पदकार्य॰ J_P P_P K Ś.   ⁷²रूपज्...व्यक्ताद् em. sulla base di Tib: श्ने व दऽयःस
गक्षस् यदेॱदॱॱर्ॱॱॱ ॱ णठिगॱ अस] रूपाज्ञाताव्यक्ताद् J_P P_P, रूपाज्जाताद्व्याक्ताद् em. K seguito
da Ś.   ⁷³सावयव॰ J_P P_P K] सावय॰ Ś.   ⁷⁴॰अप्रतिपादकाः J_K ac, cfr. Tib: र्देर् र्ष्ठेर्
श्लेर्] प्रतिपादकाः J_K pc P_K K Ś.

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^{ω−ω} वर्णा...॰अवसीयन्त Cfr. PVSVṛ 119,26-28: यथानुभवं स्मरणात्स्मृतिरपि तत्का-
लैव ।अनुभवस्मरणानुक्रमयोर्विशेषानुपलक्षणत्वाच्च.

^{α′−α′} नैव॰...स्वप्नायते = PVSVṛ 129,13-17, che ha समाप्तकलः invece di समाप्तका-
लः.

^{β′−β′} न हि...सर्वथैव हि Cfr. PVSVṛ 128,21-25: अथ पुनरेकमेव अनवयवं वाक्यम् ।
तत्र ।एकत्वेऽपि ह्यभिन्नस्य क्रमशो गत्यसम्भवात् [PV I.250cd ॥[...]।न ह्योकस्य क्रमेण
प्रतिपत्तिर्युक्ता ।गृहीतागृहीतयोर्भेदात् e PVSVṛ 129,7-9: अनुक्रमवता व्यञ्जकेनाक्रमस्य
व्यक्तिः प्रत्युक्ता ।व्यक्ताव्यक्तविरोधात् ।अवर्णभागे च वाक्येऽसकलश्राविनोऽसकलवाक्यग-
तिर्न स्यातेकस्य शकलाभावात्सकलश्रुतिर्न वा कस्यचित्.

^{γ′−γ′} Cfr. PVSVṛ 134,16-18: क्रमोत्पादिभिर्ध्वनिभागैर्व्यक्तः किल वाचको वक्ति ।तमपि
ते नैव सकृत्प्रकाशयन्ति ।क्रमभावात् ।नाप्येकैव भागः शब्दं व्यनक्ति ।तदन्यवैयर्थ्यप्रस-
ङ्गात्.

सांशत्वेऽपीति । ते हि स्फोटांशाः प्रत्येकमनर्थका वा स्युः, सार्थका वा ॥

^{δ'}प्रथमे पक्षे क्रमभावित्वाद्वुर्णांशवद्⁷⁵ अप्रतिपादकत्वप्रसङ्गः । कल्पितं च वाचकत्वं स्यात्, अतादूप्ये तादूप्यात्^{δ'} । तथाहि ^{ε'}अर्थावानेवात्मा⁷⁶ वाक्यमुच्यते, चावयवाः⁷⁷ स्वयमनर्थकाः, तेषु स आत्मा कल्पनारोपितः स्यात्, माणवकादिषु सिम्हादिवत्^{ε'} । सति च कल्पिते वाचकत्वे वरं वर्णभागा एव सन्तु वाचकाः, किमदृष्टाः स्फोटांशाः कल्प्यन्त इति ॥

अथ⁷⁸ सार्थकत्वं, तदानेककल्पना निरर्थिका । तथाहि ^{ζ'}परिसमाप्तार्थं शब्दरूपं वाक्यम्^{ζ'} इति⁷⁹ ^{η'}प्रत्येकं चेदर्थवन्तोऽवयवाः स्युः, तदा ताव-न्त्येव तानि वाक्यानि जातानीति *नैकोऽनेकावयवात्मा⁸⁰ सिध्यति । एका- * Ś 878c
वयवप्रतिपत्तौ च सत्यां वाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तिप्रसङ्गः^{η'} । यथोक्तम् –

^{θ'}प्रत्येकं सार्थकत्वेऽपि मिथ्यानेकत्वकल्पना ।
एकावयवगत्या च वाक्यार्थप्रतिपद्यवेत्^{θ'} इति ॥

यदुक्तम् – न हि क्रमेण युज्येते जातिव्यक्ती निरंशक इत्यत्र परस्य परिहारमाशङ्कते –

*,^{ι'}जातौ व्यक्तौ कृतायां चेदेकेन ध्वनिना सकृत् । * Ś 878k
नितरां व्यक्तिसिद्ध्यर्थं वर्णानन्यान्प्रयुञ्जते^{ι'} ॥ (2715)

जाताउ इत्यादि । ^{κ'}यद्यप्येकेन ध्वनिना जाति*व्यक्तिर्वा सर्वात्मना स्फोट- * J_P 249v

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⁷⁵वर्णांश॰ em. sulla base di Tib: ཨེ་ཏོ་ཚ་ལས།] वर्णात्म॰ J_P cong. K Ś, वर्णात्स॰ P_P.
⁷⁶एव॰ em. sulla base di Tib: ཏེད༌] एक॰ J_P P_P K Ś. 77च॰ J_P P_P] न॰ cong. K seguito da Ś. 78अथ em. K seguito da Ś] अर्थ J_P P_P. 79इति em. sulla base di Tib: ཚས་སུ་བ་ལས།] उच्यते J_P P_P K Ś. 80अनेक॰ J_P cong. K Ś] अनैक॰ P_P.

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^{δ'–δ'} प्रथमे...तादूप्यात् Cfr. PVSVṛ 127,18-20: अनेकावयवात्मत्वे पृथक्तेषां निरर्थता [PV I.248ab] ।तेऽपि तस्य बह्वोऽवयवाः पृथक्प्रकृत्या यद्गनर्थकाः ।अतदूपे च तादूप्यं कल्पितं सिंहादिवत् [PV I.248cd].

^{ε'–ε'} अर्थावान्...सिंहादिवत् = PVSVṛ 127,21-23, che ha वाक्यं चावयवाः invece di वाक्यमुच्यते चावयवाः e कल्पनसमारोपितः invece di कल्पनारोपितः.

^{ζ'–ζ'} परिसमाप्त॰...वाक्यम् = PVSVṛ 128,3.

^{η'–η'} प्रत्येकं... ॰प्रसङ्गः Cfr. PVSVṛ 128,3-8: ते चावयवास्तथाविधाः पृथक्पृथगिति प्रत्येकं ते वाक्यम् ।तथा च नानेकावयवं वाक्यम् ।एकावयवप्रतिपत्त्या च वाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्ते-रवयवान्तरापेक्षा कालक्षेपश्च न स्यात् । तस्य निष्कलात्मनः क्षणेन प्रतिपत्तेरेकज्ञा-नोत्पत्तौ निःशेषावगमात् । अन्यथा चैकत्वविरोधात्.

^{θ'–θ'} प्रत्येकं...भवेत् = PV I.249.

^{ι'–ι'} जातौ...प्रयुञ्जते Cfr. VP I.84-85: यथानुवाकः श्लोको वा सोढत्वमुपगच्छति । आवृत्त्या न तु स ग्रन्थः प्रत्यावृत्ति निरुप्यते ॥ प्रत्ययैरनुपाख्येयैर्ग्रहणानुगुणैस्तथा । ध्वनिप्रकाशिते शब्दे स्वरूपमवधार्यते ।

स्य कृता, तथापि नोत्तरध्वनिप्रयोगवैयर्थ्यं, तस्य स्पष्टव्यक्त्यर्थत्वात्^{κ′} ।
^{λ′}यथा⁸¹ हि श्लोकः एव पुनः पुनराव*र्त्यमानो व्यक्तीभवति, न च सकृदु-   * K 724
च्चारणात् । ननु⁸² पुनः पुनरावृत्त्या तस्य विशेषान्तरमाधीयते, अथ च
न पुनरावृत्तेर्वैयर्थ्यम्, एवमिहापि नोत्तरध्वनिवैयर्थ्यं भविष्यति^{λ′} ॥

5   एतदेव दर्शयति –

यतो दुरवधारास्य प्रकृतिः सा तथा कृता ।
समानशक्तिकैर्⁸³ वर्णैर्भूयोऽपि व्यज्यते परैः ॥ (2716)

यत इत्यादि । **दुरवधारेति**, अवधारयितुमशक्या ॥

तस्यैवान्यस्य वैकस्य किं नावृत्तौ पुनः पुनः ।
10   व्यक्तिरावर्तते तस्य नन्वेवमविशेषतः ॥ (2717)

तस्यैवेत्यादिना प्रतिविधत्ते । **ननु** इत्यामन्त्रणे ।^{μ′}तस्यैव प्रथमोच्चरितस्य
वर्णस्य, अन्यस्य वा तदन्तर्गतस्य, कस्य*चिदेकस्य⁸⁴ पुनः पुनरावृत्त्या   * P_P 204v
किं नाभिव्यक्तिः क्रियते, न हि तेनापादिता सती व्यक्तिर्नापादिता भवेत् ।
तथाहि तद्व्यक्त्यावर्तनमात्रफलान्युत्तरोत्तरवर्णोच्चारणानि, समानशक्तिकत्-
15   वात्सर्वेषाम् । तच्चावर्तनमेकेनैव पुनः पुनरावर्त्यमानेन कर्तुं शक्यत इति
शेषवर्णोच्चारणवैयर्थ्यम् । नाप्युत्तरोत्तरवर्णानां भिन्नशक्तिकत्वमभ्युपगन्त-
व्यम्, निरंशके *विशेषान्तरस्याधातुमशक्यत्वाद्विशेषान्तर⁸⁵करणासम्भ-   * Ś 879c
वे⁸⁶ भिन्नशक्तिकल्पनावैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गात्^{μ′} ॥

एतच्च सत्याम्⁸⁷ अभिव्यक्तौ सर्वं सम्भवेत्, सैव तु न सम्भवतीति
20   दर्शयन्नाह –

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⁸¹यथा J_P P_P K] तथा em. Ś.   ⁸²ननु J_P P_P Ś] न तु em. K.   ⁸³॰शक्ति॰ J_K Ś]
॰व्यक्ति॰ P_K K.   ⁸⁴कस्यचिदेकस्य P_P K Ś] कस्यचिदेकस्यचिदेकस्य J_P.   ⁸⁵॰अन्तर॰
J_P em. K Ś] ॰अन्तरं P_P.   ⁸⁶असम्भवे em. Ś sulla base di Tib] ॰सम्भवेन्न J_P,
॰असम्भवेन्न P_P, ॰असम्भवे च cong. K.   ⁸⁷सत्याम् cong. K] सताम् J_P P_P Ś.

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^{κ′-κ′} यदि. . . ॰अर्थत्वात् Cfr. SS 88,15-89,1: प्रत्येकमपि तेऽविकलं स्फोटात्मानमभिव्य-
ञ्जन्ति । न चेतरनादवैयर्थ्यमभिव्यक्तिभेदात्.
^{λ′-λ′} v. ι – ι.
^{μ′-μ′} Cfr. *Nyāyaratnākara* 377,23-28: पूर्वैरस्फुटाभिव्यक्तिः परैः स्पष्टोऽभिव्यज्यत
इति चेत्, एवं तर्हि य एव स्पष्टाभिव्यञ्जकास्तैरेव भवितव्यम्, अलं पूर्वैः । अथ
न कुत्रश्चिदप्यन्यानपेक्षा स्फुटाभिव्यक्तिः, किन्तु पूर्वजनितास्फुटप्रकाशाहितसंस्कारस-
हितैरुत्तरोत्तरैः स्फुटाभिव्यक्तिरिति चेत्, एवं तर्हि तैरेव नादैरावर्त्यमानैः शब्दस्फुटाभि-
व्यक्तिसिद्धेर्विजातीयनादाश्रयणवैयर्थ्यम्, व्युत्क्रमेऽपीदृशाभिव्यक्तिसिद्धेः क्रमविशेषादरोऽ-
नर्थकः स्यात्.

*,ᵛ′विषयेन्द्रियसंस्काररूपा व्यक्तिश्च𝜈′ वर्णवत् ।
अस्यापि प्रतिषेद्धव्या तदाभासेऽपि चेतसि ॥ (2718)

                                                                          * Ś 879ₖ

विषयेन्द्रियत्यादि । **वर्णवद्** इति, यथा[88] वर्णेषु विज्ञानजननयोग्यायोग्य-
स्वभावविकल्पेन[89] विषयेन्द्रियसंस्काररूपाभिव्यक्तिर्दृषिता, तथेहापि दूष-
णीयेत्यर्थः । **तदाभासे**[90] **ऽपी**ति स्फोटाभासेऽपि, अयं चाभ्युपगमवादः ।
एतदुक्तं भवति – यदि हि वर्णव्यतिरेकेणापरः स्फोटाख्यः शब्दात्मावभासे-
त, ततोऽस्याभिव्यक्तिः सम्भवेद्, व्यक्तेरुपलब्धिरूपत्वात्, यावता नाव-
भासत इति पूर्वमावेदितम् । अवभासतां नाम, तथापि प्रकृत्योपलभ्यानुप-
लभ्यस्वभावस्योभयथाप्यभिव्यक्तिर्न युक्तेति ॥

     ξ′तस्मात्प्रत्यक्षतः पूर्वं क्रमज्ञानेषु यत्परम्[91] ।
     समस्तवर्णविज्ञानं तदर्थज्ञानकारणम्ξ′ ॥ (2719)

तस्माद् इत्यादिनोपसंहृत्य विनापि स्फोटेनार्थप्रतिपत्तेरुपपत्तिक्रमं दर्श-
यति ॥
     *ननु च क्रमवर्तिनो हि वर्णाः क्रमेणैव चानुभूताः, यथा चानुभवं[92] च   * K 725
स्मरणम्, तत्कथं समस्तवर्णनिर्भासि[93] स्मार्तज्ञानमेकं युज्यते स्फोटमन्त-
रेण, न चाक्रमे ज्ञाने क्रमिणां वर्णानां प्रतिभासो युक्तेत्याशङ्क्याह –

     φ′अन्त्यवर्णे हि विज्ञाते सर्वसंस्कारकारितम् ।
     स्मरणं यौगपद्येन सर्ववर्णेषु जायतेφ′ ॥ (2720)

अन्त्यवर्णे हित्यादि । अनेनैतद्[94] आह – प्रथममनुभवः, ततस्तत्समनन्त-
रभावीनि स्मरणानि यथानुभवं क्रमेणैव जायन्ते, ततः स्मरणेभ्यः उत्तर-
कालं युगपत्समस्तवर्णाध्यवसायि समुच्चयज्ञानमपरं स्मार्तमुत्पद्यते, यथा
परिदृष्टार्थाध्यवसायित्वात् ॥
     *एतच्च सर्ववादिनां प्रसिद्धम्, न मयैव कल्पितमिति दर्शयति –   * Ś 880_c

     *,ᵒ′सर्वेषु चैतदर्थेषु मानसं सर्ववादिनाम् ।   * Ś 880ₖ

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[88]यथा J_P P_P Ś] तथा em. K.   [89]जनन॰ J_P P_P K] ॰जन॰ em. Ś.   [90]॰आभासे J_P
em. K Ś] ॰अभावे P_P.   [91]परम् J_K P_K Ś] पदम् em. K.   [92]च॰ J_P P_P] om. K, व॰
em. Ś.   [93]॰वर्ण॰ em. K seguito da Ś, cfr. Tib] ॰वर्णे J_P P_P.   [94]अनेनैतद् J_P Ś]
अनेनैव तद् P_P, अनेन चैतद् cong. K.

ᵛ′−ᵛ′ विषय॰...व्यक्तिश्च Cfr. VP I.80: इन्द्रियस्यैव संस्कारः शब्दस्यैवोभयस्य वा ।
क्रियते ध्वनिभिर्वादास्त्रयोऽभिव्यक्तिवादिनाम्.
ξ′−ξ′ तस्मात्... ॰कारणम् = ŚV *sphoṭavāda* 109, che ha **यद्वा** invece di **तस्मात्**.
φ′−φ′ अन्त्यवर्णे...जायते = ŚV *sphoṭavāda* 112, che ha **अन्त्यवर्णेऽपि** invece di
अन्त्यवर्णे हि, **पूर्वसंस्कार॰** invece di **सर्वसंस्कार॰** (variante comunque registrata) e
सर्वेष्वन्ये invece di **सर्ववर्णेषु**.

इष्टं समुच्चयज्ञानं क्रमज्ञातेषु सत्स्वपि$^{o'}$ ॥ (2721)

सर्वेषु चेति । **एतद्** इति समुच्चयज्ञानम् ॥
एतच्च युक्त्युपेतत्वादवश्यमभ्युपेयम्[95] इति दर्शयति –

$^{\pi'}$न चेत्तदभ्युपेयेत क्रमदृष्टेषु नैव हि ।
शतादिरूपं जायेत तत्समुच्चयदर्शनम्$^{\pi'}$ ॥ (2722)

न चेद् इत्यादि । यदि हि सर्व*मेव स्मरणं यथानुभवं[96] क्रमेणैव[97] जायते ,
तदा क्रमानुभूतेषु शतादिषु युगपच्छतादिविकल्पो न स्यात् । शतकोट्या-
दिविकल्पानां चोत्पत्तिकाले[98] भेदो न भवेत् ॥

$^{\rho'}$तेन श्रोत्रमनोभ्यां स्यात्क्रमाद्वर्णेषु यद्यपि ।
पूर्वज्ञानं परस्ता*त्तु युगपत्स्मरणं भवेत्$^{\rho'}$ ॥ (2723)

तेनेत्युपसंहरति ॥
यदि एवम् , समुच्चयज्ञानमेवार्थप्रतीतिहेतुः स्यात् , न ते वर्णाः , तेषां
चिरनिरुद्धत्वात् । न चैतद्युक्तम् , यस्माच्छब्दादनन्तरमर्थप्रतीतिर्भवन्ती-
ति[99] आकुमारमेतत्प्रतीतमित्याशङ्क्याह –

$^{\sigma'}$तदारूढास्ततो वर्णा न दूरेऽर्थावबोधनात्[100] ।
शब्दार्थमतिस्[101] तेन लौकिकैरभिधीयते$^{\sigma'}$ ॥ (2724)

तदारूढा इत्यादि । *तस्मिन्समुच्चयज्ञान आरूढास्तदारूढाः । **लौकिकैर्**
इति , स्वार्थे[102] तद्धितविधानम् ॥
नन्वेवमपि , तेषां चिरनिरुद्धत्वादत्यन्तासत्त्वमेवेति कथं तदारोहणम्भ-
वेदित्याशङ्क्याह –

* J$_P$ 249v

* J$_K$ 140r

* K 726

[95]अवश्यमभ्युपेयम् em. Ś] अवश्याभ्युपेयम् J$_P$ P$_P$ K.   [96]°अनुभवं J$_P$ em. K Ś]
°अनभवं P$_P$.   [97]°एव J$_P$ P$_P$] °एवं em. K seguito da Ś.   [98]°काले em. K seguito
da Ś, cfr. Tib] °कालो J$_P$ P$_P$.   [99]भवन्तीति J$_P$ P$_P$ Ś] भवतीति em. K.   [100]दूरेऽर्थ°
J$_K$] P$_K$ ill., दुरार्थ° em. K seguito da Ś.   [101]अर्थ° J$_K$ P$_K$ Ś] अथ em. K.   [102]स्वार्थे
J$_P$ P$_P$] स्वार्थ° em. K seguito da Ś.

$^{o'-o'}$ सर्वेषु…सत्स्वपि = ŚV *sphoṭavāda* 113, che ha चैवमर्थेषु invece di चैतदर्थेषु
(lezione comunque accettata in ŚVTṬ) e क्रमज्ञानेषु invece di क्रमज्ञातेषु (variante
comunque registrata in ŚVTṬ).
$^{\pi'-\pi'}$ न चेत्…°दर्शनम् = ŚV *sphoṭavāda* 114, che ha तदभ्युपेयेत invece di
तदभ्युपेयेत, variante comunque registrata in ŚV e accettata in ŚVTṬ.
$^{\rho'-\rho'}$ तेन…भवेत् = ŚV *sphoṭavāda* 115.
$^{\sigma'-\sigma'}$ तदारूढास्…अभिधीयते = ŚV *sphoṭavāda* 116.

आकारवति विज्ञाने सर्वमेतच्च युज्यते । (2725ab)

आकारवतीत्यादि । निराकारे कस्मान्न युज्यत इत्याह –

अन्यथा हि विनष्टास्ते भासेरन्स्मरणे कथम् ॥ (2725cd)

अन्यथा हीत्यादि । ततश्च यदेतद् ᵗ′अन्त्यवर्णे हि विज्ञातᵗ′ *इत्यादि- * Ś 881ᶜ
5 ना कुमारिलेन स्फोटवादिनं प्रति समुच्चयज्ञानं वर्णितम्, तदस्मन्मत एव
*युज्यते, न तु भवतां मीमांसकानां निराकारवादिनां मत इत्युक्तं भवति ॥ * Pₚ 205r

*अथ वर्णास्तिरोभूतव्यक्तयो विदिताः पुरा । * Ś 881ₖ
स्मर्यन्तेऽवस्थिता एव न स्पष्टाभप्रसङ्गतः ॥ (2726)

ननु च मीमांसकानामपि युज्यत एव, न हि तेषां मतेन वर्णा विनष्टाः,
10 येन न भासेरन् । किं तर्हि, तिरोभूताभिव्यक्तयः सन्त्येवेति[103] एतद्
अथेत्यादिनाशङ्क्यो नेत्यादिना परिहरति ॥
यदि हि त एव वर्णाः पूर्वमनुभूताः सन्तः पश्चात्तिरोभूतव्यक्तयः समुच्च-
यज्ञानेन गृह्येरन्, तदात्मानुभवज्ञानवत्[104] तत्समुच्चयज्ञानं स्पष्टाभं प्राप्नो-
ति, आकारस्य बाह्यगतत्वात्तस्य चैकरूपत्वात् । किञ्च यदि तिरोभूतव्य-
15 क्तयः, कथं भासेरन्, व्यक्तेरुपलब्धिस्वभावत्वात् ॥
अपि च यद्यतीतस्यावस्थितिः सम्भवेत्, तदैतत्[105] स्यात्, यावताती-
तस्यावस्थित्यभावादेव न युक्तं तस्य प्रतिभासनमिति दर्शयति –

अपास्ता च स्थितिः पूर्वं (2727a)

अपास्ता चेत्यादि । **पूर्वम्** इति त्रैकाल्यपरीक्षायाम् ॥
20 अत्रैव बाधकं प्रमाणमाह –

तत्स्थितौ स्मरणं भवेत् ।
वर्णानुभवविज्ञानकाल एवैकहेतुतः ॥ (2727bd)

तत्स्थिताउ इत्यादि । वर्णानुभवज्ञानकाले स्मरणोत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गो बाधकं प्र-
माणम् । **एकहेतुत** इत्यभिन्नकारणत्वात् ॥
25 अत्र शाब्दिकाश्चोदयन्ति – यद्येको नास्ति स्फोटाख्यः शब्दात्मा,
तत्कथं गौरित्येकाकारा गोशब्दे बुद्धिर्भवतीत्यत आह –

*,ᵛ′गौरित्येकमतित्वं तु नैवास्माभिर्निवार्यते । * K 727

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[103]एवेति em. K seguito da Ś] एवेत्येवेति Jₚ Pₚ. [104]°ज्ञानवत् Jₚ *ac* em. K Ś] °ज्ञानेवत् Jₚ*pc*, °ज्ञाने यत् Pₚ. [105]सम्भवेत्तदैतत् Jₚ em. K Ś] सम्भवेतदैतत् Pₚ.

ᵗ′⁻ᵗ′ अन्त्यवर्णे हि विज्ञात = ŚV *sphoṭavāda* 112a. V. φ′ − φ′.

तद्ग्राह्यैकार्थताभ्यां च शब्दे स्यादेकतामतिः:$^{\nu'}$ ॥ (2728)

गौर् इत्यादि । एका मतिरस्येत्येकमतिः, तद्भावस्तत्त्वम् ।**तद्ग्राह्यैकार्थता-
भ्यां चेति** । तया एकया बुद्ध्या ग्राह्यस्तद्ग्राह्यः, एकोऽर्थः प्रयोजनं यस्य स
तथोक्तः, तद्ग्राह्यश्चैकार्थश्चेति द्वन्द्वः, तयोर्भावौ^{106} तद्ग्राह्यैकार्थते, ताभ्यामु-
5 च्यते^{107} । एतदुक्तं भवति — *एकबुद्धिग्राह्य -त्वादेकसास्नादिमदर्थद्योतक-   * Ś 882$_c$
त्वाच्चैको^{108} गोशब्द उच्यत इति ॥
   एकमतित्वं च न सर्वत्र सिद्धमिति दर्शयति —

*,$^{\chi'}$शैघ्र्यादल्पान्तरत्वाच्च गोशब्दे सा भवेदपि ।   * Ś 882$_k$
देवदत्तादिशब्देषु स्पष्टो भेदः प्रतीयते$^{\chi'}$ ॥ (2729)

10 **शैघ्र्याद्** इत्यादि । शैघ्र्याद्द्रुतोच्चारणात् । अल्पान्तरत्वम्^{109} स्वल्पवि-
च्छेदत्वम् । **सेति** एका मतिः । देवदत्तादिपदेषु^{110} तु प्रतिवर्णांशा ध्वन-
यः^{111} स्फुटतरं विच्छेदेन प्रतीयन्त इति पक्षैकदेशासिद्धमेकमतित्वम् ॥

$^{\psi'}$वर्णोत्था चार्थधीरेषा तज्ज्ञानानन्तरोद्भवात् ।
येदृशी^{112} सा तदुत्था हि धूमादेरिव^{113} वह्निधीः:$^{\psi'}$ ॥ (2730)

15 **वर्णो***त्थेत्यादिना प्रमाणयति ।प्रयोगः — या बुद्धिर्यद्विज्ञानानन्तरमुद्भावि-   * J$_P$ 250r
ता,^{114} सा तत्समुत्थिता पारम्पर्येण, यथा धूमादिलिङ्गज्ञानाद्वह्न्यादिलि-
ङ्गिधीः । वर्णविज्ञानानन्तरभाविनी चार्थधीरिति स्वभावहेतुः । कार्यता-
व्यवहारश्चात्र साध्यते, तेन साध्यसाधनयोर्भेदः ॥
   असिद्धत्वमस्य परिहरन्नाह —

20 न वर्णभिन्नशब्दाभज्ञानानन्तरभाविनी ।
अर्थधीर्वेद्यते^{115} तेन नान्यः शब्दोऽस्ति वाचकः ॥ (2731)

न वर्णेत्यादि । वर्णेभ्यो भिन्नो यः शब्दात्मा तदाभं यज्ज्ञानं तदनन्तरभा-

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^{106}भावौ em. K seguito da Ś, cfr. Tib] भावा J$_P$ P$_P$. ^{107}उच्यते J$_P$ P$_P$ Ś] om. K.
^{108}चैको J$_P$ em. K Ś] चेको P$_P$. ^{109}अल्पान्तरत्वम् em. K seguito da Ś, cfr. Tib]
स्वल्पान्तरत्वम् J$_P$ P$_P$. ^{110}°पदेषु em.] °पदे J$_P$ P$_P$ Ś, °परे em. K. ^{111}प्रतिवर्णांशा
ध्वनयः cong.] प्रतिवर्णांसा(ध्व)नया J$_P$, प्रतिवर्णंशा(क्ष)नया P$_P$, प्रतिवर्ण ध्वनयः cong.
K, प्रतिवर्ण शाब्दध्वनयः em. Ś. ^{112}येदृशी P$_K$ K Ś] यादृशी J$_K$. ^{113}इव J$_K$ P$_K$] एव
em. K seguito da Ś. ^{114}उद्भाविता em. K seguito da Ś] उद्भावितं J$_P$ P$_P$. ^{115}वेद्यते
J$_K$ P$_K$] विद्यते em. K seguito da Ś.

$^{\nu'-\nu'}$ गौर्…एकतामतिः = ŚV *sphoṭavāda* 120.
$^{\chi'-\chi'}$ शैघ्र्याद्…प्रतीयते = ŚV *sphoṭavāda* 121, che ha स्फुटो invece di स्पष्टो.
$^{\psi'-\psi'}$ वर्णोत्था…वह्निधीः = ŚV *sphoṭavāda* 135, che ha वार्थधीर् invece di चार्थधीर्
e °उद्भवा invece di °उद्भवात्.

विनी न वेद्यते[116] ।किं तर्हि, वर्णविज्ञानानन्तरभाविनी[117] ।अतो नासिद्धो हेतुः ।अनेन चोपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्यानुपलम्भादभावव्यवहारोऽपि दर्शि- तः ॥

नाप्यनैकान्तिक इति दर्शयन्नाह –

5 कार्यताव्यवहाराङ्गं सर्वत्रैव विनिश्चितौ ।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ हि व्याप्तिस्तेनेह निश्चिता ॥ (2732)

कार्यतेत्यादि ।*कार्यताव्यवहारस्याङ्गं कारणम्, किं तद् **अन्वयव्यतिरे- *K 728 काउ इति** ।सामा*नाधिकरण्येन[118] सम्बन्धः ।तदन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधा- *Ś 883c यित्वमात्रमेव तत्कार्यताव्यवहृतेरङ्गम्, नान्यत् ।अतः कार्यताव्यवहारस्य
10 निमित्तान्तरासम्भवो बाधकं प्रमाणमिति सिद्धा व्याप्तिः ॥

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[116]वेद्यते JP PP] विद्यते em. K seguito da Ś.   [117]वर्ण॰ em. K seguito da Ś, cfr. Tib] वर्णे JP PP.   [118]सामान॰ em. K seguito da Ś] सामान्य॰ JP PP.

Appendice
Elenco delle citazioni del VP nel TS e nella TSP[1]

1. Le citazioni del VP nel TS

TS 886 = VP II.119
asty arthaḥ sarvaśabdānām iti pratyāyyalakṣaṇam |
apūrvadevatāsvargaiḥ samam āhur gavādiṣu ||

TS 887 = VP II.126
samudāyo 'bhidheyo vāpy[2] avikalpasamuccayaḥ |
asatyo vāpi saṃsargaḥ śabdārthaḥ kaiścid ucyate[3] ||

TS 888 = VP II.127
asatyopādhi yat satyaṃ tad vā śabdanibandhanam[4] |
śabdo vāpy abhijalpatvam āgato yāti vācyatām ||

TS 889 = VP II.128
so 'yam ity abhisambandhād rūpam ekīkṛtaṃ[5] yadā |
śabdasyārthena taṃ śabdam abhijalpaṃ pracakṣate ||

TS 890 = VP II.132
yo vārtho buddhiviṣayo bāhyavastunibandhanaḥ |
sa bāhyaṃ vastv[6] iti jñātaḥ śabdārthaḥ kaiścid iṣyate[7] ||

TS 891 = VP II.117
abhyāsāt pratibhāhetuḥ sarvaḥ śabdaḥ samāsataḥ[8] |
bālānāṃ ca tiraścāṃ ca yathārthapratipādane ||

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[1] Nelle abbreviazioni usate per i riferimenti al VP, R indica l'edizione critica di Rau, I l'edizione di Iyer (Deccan College, Poona 1966) e Śa quella di Śarmā (Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, Varanasi 1980).

[2] *abhidheyaḥ syād* I

[3] *iṣyate* R I Śa

[4] *°nibandhanām* R

[5] *ekakṛtaṃ* I

[6] *bāhyavastu* I Śa

[7] *śabdārtha iti gamyate* R, *śakyārthaḥ kaiścid iṣyate* I (I registra anche la variante *śabdārthaḥ kaiścid iṣyate*)

[8] *sarvaḥ śabdo 'paraiḥ smṛtaḥ* R, *śabdaḥ sarvo 'paraiḥ smṛtaḥ* I Śa

TS 1459 = VP I.32
avasthādeśakālānāṃ bhedād bhinnāsu śaktiṣu |
bhāvānām anumānena prasiddhir atidurlabhā ||

TS 1460 = VP I.33
vijñātaśakter[9] apy asya[10] tāṃ tām arthakriyāṃ prati |
viśiṣṭadravyasambandhe sā śaktiḥ pratibadhyate ||

TS 1461 = VP I.34
yatnenānumito 'py arthaḥ kuśalair anumātṛbhiḥ |
abhiyuktatarair anyair anyathaivopapādyate ||

TS 2710 = VP I.86
nādair[11] āhitabījāyām antyena dhvaninā saha |
āvṛttaparipākāyāṃ buddhau śabdo 'vadhāryate[12] ||

2. Le citazioni del VP nella TSP

TSP *ad* 128-131 = VP I.1
anādinidhanaṃ brahma śabdatattvaṃ yad akṣaram |
vivartate 'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ ||

TSP *ad* 128-131 = VP I.131
na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte |
anuviddham iva jñānaṃ sarvaṃ śabdena vartate[13] ||

TSP *ad* 878 = VP II.422
anyathaivāgnisambandhād dāhaṃ dagdho 'bhimanyate |
anyathā dāhaśabdena dāhārthaḥ samprakāśyate[14] ||

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[9] *vijñāta°* J$_K$ P$_K$ K] *nirjñāta°* Ś, *nirjñāta°* R I (R registra anche la variante *vijñāta°*)

[10] *dravyasya* R I

[11] *nādair* em. sulla base di TSP 775,16-17] *nādena* J$_K$ P$_K$ K Ś, *nādair* R I

[12] *avadhāryate* em. sulla base di TSP 775,16-17] *avabhāsate* J$_K$ P$_K$ K Ś. *avadhāryate* R I

[13] *bhāsate* R I (R registra anche la variante *vartate*)

[14] *dāhārthaḥ sampratīyate* R, *dāhādyarthaḥ pratīyate* I Śa

TSP *ad* 1131 = VP III.1.11
arthajātyabhidhāne 'pi sarve jātyabhidhāyinaḥ |
vyāpāralakṣaṇā yasmāt padārthāḥ samavasthitāḥ ||

TSP *ad* 1215 = VP I.129
itikartavyatā loke sarvāśabdavyapāśrayā |
yāṃ pūrvāhitasaṃskāro bālo 'pi pratipadyate ||

TSP *ad* 1225 = VP III.1.12
jātau padārthe jātir vā viśeṣo vāpi jātivat |
śabdair apekṣyate yasmād atas te jātivācinaḥ ||[15]

TSP *ad* 2299-2300 = VP III.9.1
vyāpāravyatirekeṇa parimāṇam[16] kriyāvatām |
nityam ekaṃ vibhu dravyaṃ kālam eke pracakṣate[17] ||

TSP *ad* 2309-2311 = VP I.86
nādair āhitabījāyām antyena dhvaninā saha |
āvṛttiparipākāyāṃ[18] buddhau śabdo 'vadhāryate ||

TSP *ad* 2667 = VP I.179
ambāmbeti[19] yathā bālaḥ śikṣyamāṇaḥ prabhāṣate[20] |
avyaktaṃ tadvidāṃ tena vyakter[21] bhavati niścayaḥ ||

TSP *ad* 2667 = VP I.180
evaṃ sādhau prayoktavye yo 'pabhraṃśaḥ prayujyate |
tena sādhuvyavahitaḥ kaścid artho 'numīyate[22] ||

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[15] K om.
[16] *parimāṇaṃ* J$_P$ P$_P$] *parimāṇa°* em. K seguito da Ś, *parimāṇaṃ* R I
[17] In R e I i *pāda* b e d sono invertiti.
[18] *āvṛttaparipākāyāṃ* R I
[19] *ambāmbeti* J$_P$ Ś] *avāśveti* PP, *gavāśveti* cong. K, *aṃbvaṃbv iti* R (R registra anche la variante *ambāmbeti*)
[20] *śikṣamāṇo 'pabhāṣate* R, *śikṣamāṇaḥ prabhāsate* I
[21] *vyaktau* R, *vyakte* I (R registra anche la variante *vyakter*)
[22] *artho 'bhidhīyate* R I

A Glimpse of Classical Saiddhāntika Theology in a Cambodian Epigraph: A Fresh Edition and Translation of the Sanskrit Śaiva Hymn K. 570 of Banteay Srei

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My first encounter with Raffaele Torella was as an examiner at my doctoral viva in Oxford in 1996, where he offered, as expected, valuable criticisms and comments. After that was over, since he had been broadly appreciative, I felt emboldened to invite him to dinner the following day, which enabled me to see another side of him than that of the renowned Sanskritist and connoisseur of such subjects as Śaiva thought. For what I remember chiefly about the evening was that soon after he arrived he delivered a sensuous encomium of my brother's curvaceous viola da gamba. Over the subsequent years we meet at the occasional conference and have maintained vicarious contact through his many wide-roaming students. One particularly stimulating article of his spurred me to produce a sort of rejoinder, when I chanced upon further evidence that enabled a refinement of the picture that he had drawn up of the mesoteric *tattva*s of the Mantramārga, namely his 'The *kañcuka*s in the Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava Tantric Tradition: A Few Considerations between Theology and Grammar' (Torella 1998), but that rejoinder has recently been published (Goodall 2016) and so cannot be offered for this volume. Instead, the following piece, about a short epigraphic text that bears witness to the broad reach

of one part of the Śaiva tradition that Raffaele Torella has spent much of his life studying and expounding, is offered in his honour.

Presented below is a fresh edition and translation, followed by notes, of an eleven-verse Sanskrit hymn to Śiva from a 10th-c. inscription from one of the most beautiful Śaiva temples ever constructed, Yajñavarāha's jewel-like temple of Tribhuvanamaheśvara at Īśvarapura or, as it is known today, Banteay Srei, in Cambodia. So much about the iconography, architecture and dating was misunderstood or still unknown at the time of the first book-length study (Parmentier, Goloubew & Finot 1926) of the temple, and although publications have appeared that have brought our understanding of some aspects of the foundation more nearly up-to-date, such as Bourdonneau 1999 for the iconography, much more could and should be said about the epigraphic corpus of Banteay Srei (K. 568–575, K. 842, K. 869, and the closely related inscriptions K. 619–620 and K. 662) and all the clues it offers for Cambodian history. Several improvements can now be proposed to the readings and interpretations of the other inscriptions, but these will have to appear in subsequent publications, currently being prepared by a team of scholars.[1] What is unusual about the Sanskrit text of the inscription presented in this article (K. 570) is that it contains no allusions to Cambodian temporal power: it appears to be purely a hymn of praise to Śiva. It is therefore of no particular interest for the reconstruction of event-driven political history and appears to have been somewhat cursorily edited and translated into French. The fragmentary text in Khmer that follows it, which begins with the *śaka* date 891, in other words 968 CE, refers to donations made in the name of Jayavarman V and Rājendravarman and has been more carefully scrutinised by Cœdès, in IC I, pp. 144–147. On the face of it, the Sanskrit and Khmer texts of K. 570 could be supposed to have nothing to do with one another, and yet they appear to have been deliberately

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[1] In 2019, for instance, the seminar conducted at the EHESS in Paris by Éric Bourdonneau, Grégory Mikaelian, Joseph Thach ('Langue, histoire et sources textuelles du Cambodge ancien et moderne') was devoted to the study of a part of this corpus.

conceived to appear together on the same stone, whose position at the outer entrance of the temple, perhaps the innermost point to which most visitors would have had access,[2] seems to be a significant one. Further reflections on this position and on the way in which the Sanskrit and Khmer texts interact may be found in Bourdonneau (2020). The present article will only treat of the Sanskrit text, in which several readings can be improved, some of them because of an extra missing sliver of inscribed stone that must have been discovered and set in place at some time after the EFEO estampages were made. Other than that its edited text was palpably improvable, what made K. 570 especially intriguing to me is that it alludes to theological debates in a manner that is so abstruse that it is arguable that a couple of its stanzas (II, III and perhaps VI, if I have grasped its meaning correctly) can only really be understood if one has read the discussions of some of the later of the pre-10th-c. Siddhāntatantras, in particular the *Kiraṇatantra* and *Parākhyatantra.*

That such works should have reached Cambodia by the 10th century is not in itself surprising, since we have plentiful evidence, for instance, of Śaiva initiation names ending in °śiva from the Khmer epigraphical record,[3] and we know of allusions to particular Saiddhāntika scriptures. But such hitherto discovered references, even when they are found in inscriptions of later centuries, have all been to scriptures that seem more archaic than the *Parākhyatantra* and the *Kiraṇatantra,*[4] namely the *Sarvajñānottara,*

[2] While we know of several post-12th-c. South Indian works that lay down the rules about the different points in the Chola-period temple-city to which different social groups had access (one minor, pseudepigraphal text on the subject has been edited and translated by Filliozat in 1975, who at the time was inclined to believe the text's claim to have been produced by the 10th-to-11th-c. Kashmirian theologian Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha), the ground-realities in the 10th century among the Khmers are less clear.

[3] For a discussion of initiation-names of the Mantramārga in Khmer inscriptions, see Goodall 2015: 21ff. For the earliest evidence thus far spotted of the spread of the Mantramārga to Khmer-speaking territory, in the form of an allusion to an 8th-c. royal initiation, see Goodall 2012: 354–355, about a century later than the earliest known allusion to a royal initiation in Campā, for which see Goodall and Griffiths 2013: 429 and 432–433.

[4] For an account of the Saiddhāntika canon that is, at least to some extent, chronologically nuanced, see the long preface to Goodall 2004.

the *Guhyasūtra* of the *Niśvāsa*[5] and, from the foundation inscription of Banteay Srei itself, the *Pārameśvaratantra.*[6] Conversely, for certain scriptures that appear to have had a huge impact in various parts of India, such as certain recensions of the *Kālottara*,[7] we find no clear evidence of their having been used and studied at all by the Khmers.

Of course it is perfectly possible that such scriptures were widely read among the Khmers too and that they have simply left no detectable trace in the inscriptions hitherto brought to light. Nonetheless, the picture that might seem to have emerged from the epigraphical evidence known thus far was of a relatively conservative (seen in terms of developments in *paddhati*s and commentaries produced in India) form of the Saiddhāntika religion among the Khmers, one that drew upon old scriptures that were no longer of the first importance to Indian theologians and liturgists. For the *Niśvāsa*, *Pārameśvara* and the *Sarvajñānottara* are relatively little quoted as authorities (compared for instance with the *Mataṅgapārameśvara*, *Mṛgendra*, *Kiraṇa*, and *Parākhya*) by Indian Śaiva authors from the tenth, eleventh and twelfth centuries. The *Niśvāsa* and *Pārameśvara* appear indeed never to have received commentaries in this period.[8] The *Sarvajñānottara* evidently did receive commentaries, one of which survives, by the 12th-c. South Indian exegete Aghoraśiva, but this is arguably not because it had never been superseded by scriptures that were theologically or otherwise more up-to-date, but rather for exactly the opposite reason: the *Sarvajñānottara* propounded a central doctrine that had long been definitively abandoned by Saiddhāntika thinkers, namely a form of ontological non-dualism, and it seems therefore to have been commented upon by Aghoraśiva precisely so that he could subvert its teachings by showing that every passage of the scripture that seemed to support out-of-date theological positions

[5] See Sanderson 2011: 7–8, fn. 5.

[6] For the most recent discussion of the reference in K. 842 to the *Pārameśvaratantra*, see Goodall 2017: 136–138.

[7] For the considerable importance enjoyed by the two-hundred-verse recension of the *Kālottara* in the systematisation of Saiddhāntika ritual, see Sanderson 2004: 358.

[8] See the discussion in Goodall, Sanderson, Isaacson et al. 2015: 70–71.

could be shown to bear another interpretation in line with classical doctrine.[9]

Now although neither of them has as yet been fully edited, both the *Sarvajñānottara* and the *Niśvāsa* have survived to the present day and we can know what they contain. Only parts of the old *Pārameśvara* have been transmitted to us, thanks to the 9th-c. Nepalese manuscript kept in the Cambridge University library,[10] and the 12th-c. *Prāyaścittasamuccaya* of Hṛdayaśiva,[11] which incorporates some chapters of the scripture. Judging from the *Niśvāsa* and the *Sarvajñānottara* and from what survives of the *Pārameśvara*, it is clear that a form of the Śaiva religion based just on these sources would be different in important ways from the classical Śaivasiddhānta of the tenth to twelfth centuries as formulated by Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha, Bhoja, Somaśambhu, Aghoraśiva and his immediate disciples. For those scriptures, for instance, appear not to have firmly settled on a dualist doctrine, and they do not make reference to what became a central tenet of the system for theologians, namely the idea that an ontologically distinct impurity (*mala*) blocked the potentially infinite powers of knowledge and action of every soul other than Śiva.[12] The testimony of K. 570, however, suggests that the Khmers, from at least the 10th century, did not just have such archaic scriptures on which to base their notions of the doctrines and practices of the Śaivasiddhānta. In the annotation below, a few echoes in K. 570 of the *Parākhya* and *Kiraṇa* have been pointed up. In some cases, the echoes in question could well be reverberating from other sources too: the image of one moon reflected on many and various watersurfaces, for example, which we encounter in stanza IX, is indeed found in the *Parākhya*, but also in the *Raghuvaṃśa*, the *Haravijaya* and other Cambodian inscriptions, as we note below. But stanzas II and III contain something more distinctive: a dualist argument

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[9] Some discussion of this may be found in Goodall 2006.

[10] MS Add. 1049: https://cudl.lib.cam.ac.uk/view/MS-ADD-01049-00001/1.

[11] A transcription of this work is published as an appendix to Sathyanarayanan 2015.

[12] For a more detailed account of the archaic features of the teachings of the *Niśvāsatattvasaṃhitā*, see Goodall, Sanderson, Isaacson, et al. 2015: 30–66. The absence of *mala*, both in the *Niśvāsa* and in other early scriptures, including the *Sarvajñānottara*, is mentioned there on pp. 40–42.

for the proof of a creator god, which could incidentally also have come from other sources, but expressed here in a convoluted manner that calls to mind the ways in which this proof is presented in the *Kiraṇa* and *Parākhya.*

A further consideration makes this short composition seem typical of the classical Śaivasiddhānta: whereas hymns to the divine naturally enough often take the form of emotional poetic effusions, the few surviving pre-12th-c. *stotra*s of the Śaivasiddhānta[13] tend to be pieces of rather dry catechesis, furnishing their users, for instance, with mnemonic versification that helps them remember a sequence of rituals, like Jñānaśambhu's *Śivapūjāstava,* or a sequence of visualisations for daily worship, like Aghoraśiva's *Pañcāvaraṇastava* or Trilocanaśiva's *Dhyānaratnāvali,*[14] or, perhaps most tedious of all, distortive exegesis of the numinous and mysterious words of an ancient mantra to make them encoded with established doctrines, like Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha's *Vyomavyāpistava.* In such compositions, we typically encounter neither the elegant wit nor the emotion of, for instance, Utpaladeva's *Śivastotrāvali.* One reason for this dryness, it seems to me, is built into the religion: the usual means for religious advancement are all of extremely limited soteriological value. Knowledge acquired through meditation, moral rectitude, piously motivated acts that help others, any signal manifestation of devotional fervour, including fasting, pilgrimages, participation in festivals — all these may produce merit (*puṇya*), but it is ultimately only one ritual, that of initiation (*dīkṣā*), that makes salvation possible. Even though a place is found in the Śaivasiddhānta for all the above-mentioned religious phenomena and activities, their importance is inevitably diminished by this almost mechanistic model, which much of the Saiddhāntika literature of the tenth to twelfth centuries is devoted to setting out and defending. It is therefore not wholly surprising that the Sanskrit *stotra* of K. 570 should belong to a didactic school of hymn-writing, in which each stanza scores some theological

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[13] Such hymns as survive are alluded on the first page of the introduction to Goodall et al. 2005.

[14] In appendix to their first edition of the last of these texts, R. Sathyanarayanan and S.A.S. Sarma (2012) have usefully gathered together the various hitherto published Saiddhāntika *stotra*s.

point, for Yajñavarāha, the founder of the temple, was clearly a Saiddhāntika.[15]

The door-jamb on which K. 570 is inscribed is situated on the Southern side of the second door frame (as one approaches the temple) of an outer *gopura* along the Eastern approach to the temple. Its location is indicated by Finot (1926: 69) by a '1' on the schematic plan of the *gopura* that he has given as Figure 14.[16] Since the door-frame is narrow and gives access to the temple, which appears to receive hundreds of tourists a day, my inspection of it on the only occasions when I was able to spend time examining it,[17] seemed to be constantly interrupted by visitors entering and leaving. Naturally, they were oblivious to its content and significance, and I overheard several being told that the text was in Pali, a myth that I have also heard repeated by misinformed guides about the Sanskrit inscriptions at Mahabalipuram.

Edition and Translation of K. 570

The text here constituted is based on the edition of Louis Finot (1926: 71–74) and on the examination of the door-jamb *in situ*, as well as of various photographs of the door-jamb and of photographs of the estampages of the EFEO grouped under the number n. 421. I first attempted to edit and annotate the text in January 2012, at the suggestion of Gerdi Gerschheimer, in order

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[15] This is revealed not just by the mention of the *Pārameśvara* appearing in K. 842, to which I have referred above, but also by a punning allusion to *mantroddhāra* in the opening verses of K. 842, which I shall attempt to explain in annotation to a forthcoming edition and translation of the contemporary foundation inscription of the eastern Mebon temple (K. 528), which also begins with a pun-veiled allusion to *mantroddhāra*.

[16] As Cœdès points out (IC I, p. 144), the Khmer text of K. 570 continues below this on the same door-jamb and is not engraved on the opposite (northern) door-jamb, as Finot's figure 14 erroneously indicates. Cœdès also alludes (*ibid.*) to the fact that K. 570 had been set back in its place after having been moved for a while to the Museum in Phnom Penh.

[17] The first time I examined it was as a total novice to Khmer epigraphy in 2003 and the second time was in January 2017, when I was fortunate to be in the agreeable and extremely informative company of Éric Bourdonneau, Olivier Cunin and Grégory Mikaelian.

to present it in the seminar jointly chaired by him and by Claude Jacques at the École pratique des hautes études as part of the project 'Corpus des inscriptions khmères.' I am grateful to both of them and to the participants in the seminar for their contributions to the understanding of the text. The single and double *daṇḍa*s added by Finot (*passim*) have been removed, since they appear to be editorial additions. Majumdar also included this inscription in his anthology (1953: 280–281) and a couple of his conjectures have been mentioned in the apparatus below; but, since he does not offer a translation or a discussion of how he interpreted the text and did not consult estampages or the inscription itself, it did not seem useful to note systematically every point of detail in which his text diverges from ours. Note that the edition below does not include the conclusion of the inscription, which is in Khmer and which has been edited and translated by Cœdès (IC I, pp. 144–146).

In the edition below, I have followed the conventions of the CIK project in placing partially legible syllables within round brackets and syllables that I have supplied that are not legible (but that may once have been) within square brackets. The sequence '(dh/v)' indicates that one might read 'dh' or 'v'. I have not explicitly transcribed the *virāma*-marks (at the end of IVb, for instance, I could have transcribed 'jagat_' instead of just 'jagat'), because there seemed to be nothing to be gained from doing so in this particular inscription, since no part of it is in Khmer, whose orthographic latitude may make recording such a detail potentially worthwhile. Following a suggestion of Vincent Tournier, I have employed a diamond symbol (◊) to indicate the space consistently left after each odd-numbered *pāda*: one advantage of this convention is that it allows one to distinguish the engraver's spacing, which emphasises metrical structure, from word-spacing, which has of course been introduced by the editor.

I. [*pāda* a, *ma-vipulā*: ˘ – ˘ – – / – – ˘ ; *pāda* c, *ma-vipulā*: – – ˘ – – / – – –]

(1)   vivicya bhedaṃ paśyanti ◊ yayor dhyānadṛśo niśa(m)
(2) agnyuṣṇatāvad bhūyāstāṃ ◊ śivaśaktī śivāya vaḥ

  • a. bhedaṃ] chedaṃ Finot; cedaṃ Majumdar   • b. niśa(m)] niśam Finot

May Śiva and Śakti bless you (*bhūyāstāṃ … śivāya vaḥ*), the difference between which, which is like the relation of Fire and Heat, [only] those who see through their meditation, constantly perceive;

II.
(3) ācaitanyād upādāna◊kālāvyaktas(va)karmmaṇā[m]
(4) janmanā jagatāṃ karttā◊numito yaś cidācitaḥ

> • b. °kālāvyaktasvakarmmaṇā[m]] °kālāvyaktas svakarmmaṇā Finot
> When one examines the stone today, there really appears never to have been a final *m*, but cf. IIIb below: in any case, sense prompts us to imagine that the author intended one. There are a few other cases below of missing final *visarga*s or missing final letters with *virāma*s (IIIb, Vb, VIb, VIIIb): could the text have been copied from an exemplar in which these details were noted with a convention that confused the stone-cutter?

…[Śiva,] who is inferred to be the Creator imbued with consciousness (*cidācitaḥ*) since the [ultimate] material cause, [namely *māyā*,] time, the unmanifest, [which is *prakṛti*, the material cause of the Sāṅkhyas] and [the retributive force of souls'] own actions are [all] insentient (*ācaitanyāt*), because creatures [that make up the universe] come into being;

III.
(5) kartṛtve yugapan nānā◊kāryyotpādasya darśanā[t]
(6) nityānuttarasarv(v)ārthaṃ ◊ yasya j(ñ)ānam asādhanam

> • b. darśanā[t]] darśanān Finot
> As in IIb, the stone looks as though it never had a final letter here, and yet there is perhaps a trace of a *virāma*, and Finot reports a final *n*., so perhaps the stone has worn in an unexpected way just at this point
> • cd. °sarv(v)ārthaṃ yasya j(ñ)ānam] °sarvārtthaṃ yasya j[ñ]ānam Finot
> The body of the *ñ*, below the *j*, is no longer visible because of a break in the stone, but its tail folds underneath and round the letter and the top of this tail is visible in front of the *j* (unless one assumes it to be the mark of a long *ā* attached to the previous letter, thus yielding the reading yasyāj[ñ]ānam, which would be difficult to interpret). For an example of a *jña* the tail of whose *ña*

folds around the letter in this way, see *°lipijña°* in stanza XXI of K. 842, estampage n. 1090 of the EFEO, line 21.

…[and yet] whose [power of] knowledge, which is eternal, unsurpassed, omniscient, cannot be the [sole] instrument for Him to be the creator [of the universe], because [otherwise] we would observe the arising in a simultaneous way of [all] the various effects [making up the universe];

IV.
(7) kṣityādibhiḥ prasiddhābhi◊s tanubhis tanvatā jagat
(8) uccaiḥ kāraṇatā khyātā ◊ yenānakṣara(m ā)tmanaḥ

> • b. jagat] ja[gat] Finot • c. khyātā] °khyātā Finot • d. yenānakṣara(m ā)tmanaḥ] yenānakṣaram – ˘ – Finot
> The last syllables of *pāda*s b and d are now plainly visible (in 2016) on a fragment of stone that must have been missing when EFEO estampage n. 421 was made, upon which Finot based his edition of the text (thus Finot 1926:70).

…who, sustaining the universe with his well-known 'bodies,' consisting of earth and the others, has proclaimed loudly, [but] without syllables, the fact of his being the Cause;

V.
(9) śaktiśaktimator vyaktaṃ ◊ bhedābhedau prada(rśa)ya[n]
(10) * d(dh/v)ā yo dhatta saṃpṛkta◊m ekaṃ strīpuṃsayor vvapuḥ

> • b. prada(rśa)ya[n]] conj. Gerschheimer; pradā[ya] .. Finot
> In fact Gerdi Gerschheimer proposed the conjecture *prada-*[*rśayan*] on the strength of the syllables *prada*, which are all that can be read from EFEO n. 421 at this point, but the extra fragment of stone referred to above *ad* IVb and IVd allows one partly to confirm his emendation.
> • c. * d(dh/v)ā yo] .... yo Finot

…who, clearly showing the difference and the non-difference between Śakti and the Possessor of Śakti, [created ([*vaddhv*]*ā*) and] bore one body of woman and man conjoined;

VI.
(11) a(nādya)ntapratidvanddvai◊r yyasya dharmmādibhir yutā
(12) vaśi[tā]diguṇān santaḥ ◊ smaranti smaranigrahāt

• a. a(nādya)ntaprati°] .... antaprati° Finot • b. yutā]
Understand: yutān or yutāḥ. (No mark is visible on the stone.)
• c. vaśi[tā]°] vaśitā° Finot

…endowed with whose properties of Dharma and the others,
[namely Jñāna, Vairāgya and Aiśvarya,] for which there is no
beginning, no end, and no opposites [of Adharma, Ajñāna,
Avairāgya and Anaiśvarya], Great Persons (*santaḥ*) remem-
ber(/meditate upon [and so finally attain]) the qualities begin-
ning with [the power of] controlling others (*vaśitādiguṇān*),
because of [His] curbing of Kāmadeva (/because of their curbing
of passion);

VII.
(13) mathi[tā]bdhes sudhān datvā ◊ parebhyaḥ pivato viṣa(ṃ)
(14) yasya [mṛ]tyor asadbhāvo ◊ vidvadbhir anumīyate

• b. viṣa(ṃ)] viṣam Finot

…the impossibility of whose death the wise infer, since he drank
the poison from the churned ocean, after giving the nectar to
others;

VIII. [*pāda* a, *ra-vipulā*: – – ˘ – – ˘ ˘ –]
(15) vāgbeṣacāritraguṇā◊n svīkṛtyāvayavais sthitā
(16) yasya sarvvātmano [']nyonyaṃ ◊ vivadante [']lpavuddhayaḥ

• a. °cāritra°] °caritra° Finot • b. sthitā] Understand: sthitāḥ
or sthitān? (No mark is visible on the stone.)

…adopting [particular] speech, dress, conduct and characteristics
that belong with (*sthitān*) [particular] aspects/parts of whom, who
[in fact] has all things as His nature, people of little intellect dis-
pute among themselves;

IX.
(17) dṛṣṭādṛṣṭ(ā)rthavidyānāṃ ◊ ya ekaḥ prabhavaḥ paraḥ
(18) vikalpa(bh)edād bhinnānāṃ ◊ sarvvāpām iva candramāḥ

• a. dr̥ṣṭādr̥ṣṭ(ā)°] dr̥ṣṭādr̥ṣṭā° Finot   • c. vikalpa(bh)edād]
vikalpa[n n]o dād Finot; vikalpa(bhe?)dād Majumdar
The reading of Finot looks perhaps more plausible in the EFEO
estampage n. 421 than on the stone itself.

…who is the one supreme source [shining forth out] of authorita-
tive texts that teach matters that are visible and beyond sight, and
that are [only] differentiated in accordance with differences of
conception, just as the moon [appears in the reflections] of all
water-bodies;

X.
(19) sārtheneśva[ra]nāmnaiva ◊ kr̥tsnān aspr̥śatāparān
(20) yatsvāmitva[m asa]ndigdhaṃ ◊ khyāpitaṃ bhavacāriṇām

…whose overlordship (*yatsvāmitvam*) is proclaimed beyond doubt
to those who move about through existence (*bhavacāriṇām*) sim-
ply by his name 'Īśvara,' [a name] with [its full] meaning (*sārthe-
na*), and which applies to no others;

XI. [*pāda* a, *na-vipulā*: – – – – ˘ ˘ ˘ ˘]
(21) jīyāt sa [ś]r[ītri]bhuvana◊maheśvara itīritaḥ
(22) kr̥ttivāsāḥ kr̥[tāv]āso ◊ liṅgamūrttiś cirād iha

• a. jīyāt] (Majumdar); jiyāt Finot   • c. kr̥[tāv]āso] kr̥[ṣṇav]āso
Finot; kr̥(tsna)vāso Majumdar

…may He, the animal-skin-clad, long be victorious having made
his dwelling here, taking form in the *liṅga*, [where He is] pro-
claimed as Śrī Tribhuvanamaheśvara!

Annotation

Stanza I

Both stanzas I and V allude to the view that Śiva and his Śakti are
ontologically inseparable. This notion is alluded to in a range of
Śaiva works, both Saiddhāntika and non-dualist. We find it, for
instance, in Sadyojyotiḥ's *Tattvasaṅgraha*, stanza 52 (in the edition
of Filliozat):

> *atra ca śaktidvitayaṃ bodhadhyānāya siddhaye gaditam |*
> *mūrtis tadvāṃś ceti ca leśād uktiś ca śaktiśaktimatoḥ ||*

Filliozat's translation (1988: 156) is as follows:

> Et dans cette [doctrine] le couple d'Essences [Śiva et sa Puissance] est mentionné pour la connaissance et la méditation en vue de la réalisation [du but de l'Âme] ; «~corps, possesseur du corps~» est une dénomination en bref de la Puissance et de son possesseur.

It is also to be found in Somānanda's *Śivadṛṣṭi* (3.2c–3):

> *na śivaḥ śaktirahito na śaktir vyatirekiṇī ||*
> *śivaḥ śaktas tathā bhāvān icchayā kartum īhate |*
> *śaktiśaktimator bhedaḥ śaive jātu na varṇyate ||*

> Śiva cannot be devoid of Śakti, nor can Śakti be separate [from Śiva]: Śiva is empowered [with Śakti] and thus strives to create entities by [nothing more than His] desire. In Śaiva [thought], a difference between Śakti and the Possessor of Śakti cannot be described.

One more text is worth quoting from that expresses this idea, namely the *Vijñānabhairava* (18–19b), since, as in the inscription, it compares the relationship between the two as like that between fire and heat:

> *śaktiśaktimator yadvad abhedaḥ sarvadā sthitaḥ |*
> *atas taddharmadharmitvāt parā śaktiḥ parātmanaḥ ||*
> *na vahner dāhikā śaktir vyatiriktā vibhāvyate |*

> Since there is always no difference between Śakti and the Possessor of Śakti, therefore the Supreme Power belongs to the Supreme Soul by a relation of property and its property-bearer. The power [of fire] to burn cannot be conceived of in dissociation from fire.

Perhaps, apart from the allusion here to the Śaiva view that Śiva and Śakti are ontologically inseparable, there is also an allusion to a Vaiśeṣika notion of the cognition of yogins (*yogipratyakṣa*) according to which yogins may perceive such normally impercep-

tible things as the inherence relation (*samavāya*) between a property (here 'heat') and the substance in which it inheres (here 'fire'). See Isaacson 1993 (quoted by Torella 2012) for a translation of the relevant passage of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya.*

In that case, this would be a joke on more than one level, since Saiddhāntika thinkers do not follow Vaiśeṣikas in positing the existence of *samavāya* any more than they believe in an ontological difference between Śiva and Śakti. Both stanza I and stanza V arguably leave the innocent reader in doubt as to whether or not *śakti* and *śaktimān* (or *dharma* and *dharmin*) can at some level be distinguished.

Stanza II

This stanza contains a common proof of the existence of a creator god: the various other factors that are sometimes posited to be causes that might account for the production of the universe are insentient, whereas, since the universe is a complex entity, a sentient being must be posited to account for its ordered nature. Among Śaiva scriptures, we find this position set out, for instance, in *Parākhyatantra* 2.2–3:

> *mūrtāḥ sāvayavā ye 'rthā nānārūpaparicchadāḥ |*
> *sthūlāvayavaśiṣṭatvād buddhimaddhetupūrvakāḥ ||*
> *ato 'sti buddhimān kaścid īśvaraḥ samavasthitaḥ |*
> *pratipannaḥ svakāryeṇa dṛṣṭenātrānumānataḥ ||*

> All things that are endowed with form, that are made up of parts, that have various forms, because they are distinguished by having gross parts, must necessarily depend on a sentient cause.
> Therefore, there exists some sentient [cause]. [And that is] proved to be the Lord. He is known, according to this system (*atra*), by inference, because of His effects, which we directly experience.[18]

I have assumed *cidācitaḥ* in stanza II to mean 'sentient' — literally 'filled with (*ācitaḥ*) consciousness (*cid°*)' —, and so to be the equivalent of *buddhimān* in *Parākhya* 2.3.

For a rejection, on the grounds of its sentience, of the possibility that the retributive force of individual souls' past actions might

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[18] Tr. Goodall 2004: 165–166.

account for creation, we may turn once again to the *Parākhyatantra* (2.12), refuting the view that the universe was ever not the way it now is:

> *kṣiter evaṃvidhaṃ rūpaṃ na kadācid anīdṛśam |*
> *tanvādeḥ kāraṇaṃ karma; kalpitena matena kim ? ||*

> The form of the earth is thus; it was never not thus. The cause of bodies and such (*tanvādeḥ*) is [the retributive force of] past action. Why trouble with some artificial theory (*matena*)?[19]

We may compare this also with *Kiraṇatantra* 3.12, which could be one of the passages echoed with *ācaitanyāt*:

> *sthūlaṃ vicitrakaṃ kāryaṃ nānyathā ghaṭavad bhavet |*
> *asti hetur ataḥ kaścit. karma cet ? na hy acetanam ||*

> [The universe is] gross, diverse, [and therefore] an effect, like a pot. It cannot be otherwise. And so there exists some [instigating] cause. What if it is *karman* [that is the cause of the universe]? No, because [*karman* is] insentient.[20]

As for the noun *ācaitanya*, formed from *acetana* with *vṛddhi* of both the first and the second syllable, this is common in Śaiva works from those of the 7th-c. thinker Sadyojyotiḥ onwards. An example occurs, for instance, in Sadyojyotiḥ's *Mokṣakārikā* 135ab:

> *ācaitanyaṃ kathaṃ cānye kaivalyaṃ mokṣam ūcire |*

> How can some claim that absence of sentience is the state of isolation that is liberation?

Finot's attempt at a translation of this and the following stanza (1926: 73) demonstrates how obscure this inscription may appear to someone not exposed to such above-quoted Saiddhāntika literature:

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[19] Tr. Goodall 2004: 169–170.
[20] Tr. Goodall 1998: 273, 278.

Lui qui, à prendre pour point de départ l'Intellect, est indéterminé par son action propre, du point de vue de la matière et du temps ; qui, condensé par la pensée, est inféré comme agent par suite de la naissance des mondes ;

Lui dont la connaissance, dans son rôle d'agent, issue du spectacle de la production simultanée des divers effets, est stérile pour tous les buts éternels et transcendants ; …

Stanza III

With this stanza, the same line of argumentation is expanded upon in a way that suggests more strongly an indebtedness to the latest of the pre-10th-c. Saiddhāntika scriptures such as the *Kiraṇatantra* and the *Parākhyatantra*, since the stanza would arguably be hard to understand without laying it beside them. We may take first *Kiraṇatantra* 3.9c–11d:

vaikaraṇyād amūrtatvāt kartṛtvaṃ yujyate katham? ||
yathā kālo hy amūrto 'pi dṛśyate phalasādhakaḥ |
evaṃ śivo hy amūrto 'pi kurute kāryam icchayā ||
icchaiva karaṇaṃ tasya yathā sadyogino matā |
śalyākṛṣṭikaro dṛṣṭo hy akṣahīno 'pi karṣakaḥ ||

How is it possible for Him to be a creator, since He lacks the means and is not embodied? [No,] because just as time, although it is not embodied, is known from experience (*dṛśyate*) to bring about results, so too Śiva, although He is not embodied, produces effects by His will. Will alone is His instrument, just as [will] is held [to be the instrument] of a true yogin. Although it is devoid of senses, a magnet is observed to draw out [iron] splinters.[21]

Further verbal echoes (of the words *kartṛtve yugapan nānākāryyotpādasya*) may be discerned in the development of the same argument in the *Parākhyatantra* 2.20–21:

pratoda uvāca —
kiṃ kramād yaugapadyād vā bhavet kāryam iha sthitau |
ānantyān na kramo dṛṣṭo yaugapadye 'py asambhavaḥ ||
prakāśa uvāca —

[21] Tr. Goodall 1998: 270, 272–273.

kartur yat kāryakartr̥tvaṃ kāryotpattyā pratīyate |
na kāryaṃ kāraṇābhāvād iti me niścitā matiḥ ||

Pratoda spoke:
Does this effect [that is the universe] come about at a particular point in time or [all] at once in creation (*sthitau*), according to your system (*iha*)? Because [God is supposed to be] infinite [in time], no sequence [in the arising of effects should be] seen; and also if [you maintain that effects are generated] all at once, it is impossible [since it contradicts what we observe].
Prakāśa spoke:
That a creator creates effects is known by the arising of the effects. An effect does not arise without a cause. That is my certain opinion.[22]

I am grateful to Isabelle Ratié for having corrected my interpretation of this stanza. As she observed to me in correspondence (of 9 March 2019), *yugapat* seems to allude to the first part of the classical dilemma used by the Buddhists (echoed in the *Parākhya*) against the proof of Īśvara: if God is eternal and unchanging, he must surely create all effects simultaneously, since there is no reason for any of them to arise before or after the others, but this contradicts experience, since we observe that the various effects in the universe do not occur all at once. And so God's immutable power of knowledge cannot be the sole cause of creation.

Stanza IV

This stanza makes use of an idea that has been much used in invocations since the *Ābhijñānaśākuntala*, namely the notion that the universe is sustained by the five elements, along with the sun, moon and the sacrifice or sacrificer. This formulation is particularly close to that of the foundation inscription of the eastern Mebon temple, K. 528, stanza IV:

yenaitāni jaganti yajvahutabhugbhāsvannabhasvannabhaḥ-
　　kṣityambhaḥkṣaṇadākarais svatanubhir vyātanvataivāṣṭabhiḥ |
uccaiḥ kāraṇaśaktir apratihatā vyākhyāyate nakṣaram
　　jīyāt kāraṇakāraṇaṃ sa bhagavān arddhenducūḍāmaṇiḥ ||

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[22] Tr. Goodall 2004: 171–172.

May the Lord be victorious, Cause of causes, whose crest-jewel is the crescent moon, who proclaims (*vyākhyāyate*) loudly (*uccaiḥ*), [though] without syllables (*anakṣaraṃ*), his untramelled (*apratihatā*) power as Cause in as much as he sustains (*vyātanvatā*) [all] these creatures [that make up the universe] through his eight 'bodies' (*tanubhiḥ*), [namely] sacrificer, fire, sun, wind, ether, earth, water, moon.[23]

This close echo need not, of course, lead us to conclude that one and the same poet was involved, since the author of K. 570 may simply have been imitating K. 528. But it is suggestive, and there are other echoes to be found between the more pronouncedly Śaiva verses in the Mebon inscription and another epigraph in Banteay Srei, namely the foundation inscription K. 842, whose opening pair of verses echoes the opening of the Mebon, as I shall explain at greater length in my forthcoming fresh edition and translation of K. 528 (Goodall forthcoming), and whose fourth verse occurs also as stanza 173 of K. 528. It is not inconceivable that all three inscriptions (K. 570, K. 842 and K. 528) should have been produced by Yajñavarāha, but it cannot be ruled out that whoever composed the Sanskrit texts of K. 570 and K. 842 might simply have studied and been influenced by K. 528.

Stanza V

The translation assumes the word *vaddhvā* where the stone is damaged, which is perhaps conceivable, but what is visible looks perhaps most like – *ddhā*, without a further subscript *v*.

Apart from other resonances, some of which have been pointed up in the annotation to the opening stanza of the inscription, this stanza alludes of course to the resoundingly famous opening of the *Raghuvaṃśa* (1.1):

vāgarthāv iva sampṛktau vāgarthapratipattaye |
jagataḥ pitarau vande pārvatīparameśvarau ||

For the success of [this composition of] words and meanings I venerate the parents of the universe, Pārvatī and Parameśvara, entwined together like word and meaning.

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[23] See the edition and translation of K. 528 in Goodall 2022.

Stanza VI

If this stanza has been correctly interpreted, which is far from certain, there may be a further allusion to a doctrine that we find in the *Parākhyatantra*. For where it is more typical to describe the properties of god in other ways, for instance as being six divine characteristics that find expression in Śiva's six *aṅgamantra*s (a view put forward, for instance, with quotations, in Trilocanaśiva's commentary on the opening of the *Somaśambhupaddhati*, see S.A.S. Sarma's forthcoming edition), the *Parākhyatantra* (15.62–68) instead speaks of Śiva (and of the perfected soul) as possessing qualities that are transcendent forms of Dharma, Jñāna, Vairāgya and Aiśvarya (*saddharma, sajjñāna*, etc.), these being usually the names of the four positive properties of the individual soul's intellect (the *buddhidharma*s), with the other four *buddhidharma*s being their opposites (*pratidvandva*).

Stanza VII

This refers to Śiva saving the universe from the Kālakūṭa poison by swallowing it, a myth that is alluded to in *Kiraṇatantra* 1.4.

Stanza VIII

If we were to understand *sthitāḥ*, instead of *sthitān* (where the stone really seems to have *sthitā*), then perhaps we could understand as follows:

> …adopting [particular] speech, dress, conduct and characteristics, remaining (*sthitāḥ*) [dressed with particular] aspects/parts of whom, who [in fact] has all things as His nature, people of little intellect dispute among themselves;

In either case, we assume that the stanza alludes to the imitation of various divinities' supposed forms, which is a common form of religious observance (*vrata*) in classical Indian religions.

Stanza IX

This is certainly not a straightforward stanza, since the parallelism is not strict: the reader is not supposed to understand that Śiva being the source of all scriptures is parallel to the moon being the

source of all water-bodies. What we assume to be meant is rather that the one god Śiva, as the source of all scriptures, however different they may appear to be, can be known in some fashion through those teachings, in spite of the differences in conception that make those scriptures seem mutually incompatible, just as the one moon can be seen reflected variously in the surfaces of an infinite number of different water-bodies. This might make the moon seem both plural and various, according to the varying degrees of stillness or turbidity of the water-bodies in which its reflection appears, but we know it to be in fact one.

Here there is once again an echo of Kālidāsa, for we find a similar image in *Raghuvaṃśa* 10.67:

> *vibhaktātmā vibhus tāsām ekaḥ kukṣiṣv anekadhā |*
> *uvāsa pratimācandraḥ prasannānām apām iva ||*

> The all-pervading Lord, though one, divided himself into many and dwelt in their wombs, as the reflection of the moon divided within patches of clear water.[24]

But the poet might also have been influenced by this passage of the *Parākhyatantra* 1.42–43b:

> *pratoda uvāca —*
> *eka eva sthito vettā dehe dehe svakarmataḥ |*
> *ekadhā bahudhā caiva dṛśyate jalacandravat ||*
> *prakāśa uvāca —*
> *cidrūpatvāt tadekatvaṃ tadbhedo bhinnabhogataḥ |*

> Pratoda spoke:
> [But perhaps] there exists only one knower, [situated] in various bodies, in accordance with his past actions. He appears both as one and as many, like the moon [reflected] in [rippling] water.
> Prakāśa spoke:
> In as much as [all are] of the form of consciousness they are one; [but] they are divided because of their various experiences.[25]

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[24] From the forthcoming translation of Csaba Dezső, Dominic Goodall and Harunaga Isaacson.

[25] Tr. Goodall 2004: 151.

Furthermore, we should note that the image of the one moon appearing in reflections of the surfaces of different water-bodies occurs in other Cambodian epigraphs, for instance in K. 225, a Buddhist inscription of the end of the 10ᵗʰ century, whose opening stanza reads (IC III, p. 67):

> *yo py eko bahudhā bhinno v[i]neyāśanurodhataḥ |*
> *śaśīva naikanīrasthavimvo* [26] *vuddhas sa pātu vaḥ ||*

Cœdès translates (IC III, p. 68):

> Que Celui qui pour satisfaire les désirs de ses adeptes, bien qu'étant unique, se divise en plusieurs comme la lune se reflétant dans plusieurs eaux, que le Bouddha vous protège.

Cf. also K. 254 of 1051 CE, stanza II (IC III, p. 182):

> *abhivyākto* [27] *yayāpy eko dṛśyate nekadhā śivaḥ |*
> *candraḥ pratimayevāvyāt sā śaktiś śāmbhavī jagat ||*

Cœdès translates (IC III, p. 187):

> Cette énergie, (nommée) Çāmbhavī, protège le monde, elle par qui Çiva, bien qu'unique, est vu dans ses diverses manifestations, comme la lune par son image.

The same image is also similarly deployed in Ratnākara's *Hara-vijaya* (6.45–46):

> *śaśimaṇḍalaṃ jalataraṅgasaṃhati-*
>   *pratibimbitaṃ hara jalāśaye yathā |*
> *drumapallavodavasitāntarāśrayas*
>   *tapanātapo nipatitaḥ kṣitau yathā ||*
> *gaganaṃ yathā sthitam ulūkhalādiṣu*
>   *sphuṭam eka eva sakalādbhutasthitiḥ |*
> *pratipadyate bahuvidhatvam āśraya-*
>   *pratisaṃkramād avikṛtas tathā bhavān ||*

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[26] Cœdès here reads (IC III, p. 67) *naikanira°*, but, in spite of damage to the top of the letter, the EFEO estampage n. 321 seems to allow the possibility of reading the required *naikanīra°*.

[27] Cœdès here (IC III, p. 182) proposes that we correct to *abhivyakto.*

Just as the orb of the moon is reflected on the multitudes of waves of water in a lake, o Hara, just as the light of the sun falls on the ground by passing [divided] through the interstices in a house formed by the leaves of a tree, just as ether finds itself [circumscribed] in mortars and such like [vessels], so too You, Your condition being the most extraordinary of all, [although] clearly just One, are perceived as manifold, [although You are in fact] unchanged, because of your passing into several loci.[28]

We should note that the image of the moon multiplied in its reflections is not used here as it is commonly used elsewhere, namely to support a non-dualist ontology, but instead as an image of how Śiva shines out, differently distorted, from every scriptural authority.

For the claim that Śiva is ultimately the source of all authoritative writing, see for example the account of different branches of literature emanating from Śiva's five faces given in the *Niśvāsamukhatattvasaṃhitā*:

vedadharmmo mayā proktaḥ svarganaiśreyasaḥ paraḥ |
uttareṇaiva vaktreṇa vyākhyātaś ca samāsataḥ || 4.41
ādhyātmikaṃ pravakṣyāmi dakṣiṇāsyena kīrttitam |
sāṃkhyañ caiva mahājñānaṃ yogañ cāpi mahāvrate || 4.42
[…]
I have taught the *dharma* [prescribed in] the Veda which is excellent (*paraḥ*) which leads to heaven and the highest good (*svarganaiśreyasaḥ*). I have explained [all this] in brief, specifically (*eva*) with [my] Northern face (i.e. Vāmadeva).
[Now] I will teach the [*dharma*] called *ādhyātmika* with [my] Southern (Aghora) face: [namely] the great science of the Sāṅkhya, as well as Yoga, O you who observe the *mahāvrata*.[29]

atimārggaṃ samākhyātaṃ dvihprakāraṃ varānane || 4.131
pūrveṇaiva tu vaktreṇa sarahasyaṃ prakīrttitam |
[…]
I have taught the *atimārga* in two forms, O beautiful-visaged one! Through the Eastern face I have taught this along with the secret. What further can I teach, O great goddess, O supreme deity?[30]

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[28] Translation somewhat adapted from that of Pasedach 2017: 142–143.
[29] Tr. Kafle 2015: 268.
[30] Tr. Kafle 2015: 289.

adhunā tad ato viprās saṃvādam umayā saha |
īśvarasya tu devasya mantramārgaṃ vyavasthitam || 4.134
pañcamenaiva vaktreṇa īśānena dvijottamāḥ |
mantrākhyaṃ kathayiṣyāmi devyāya gaditam purā || 4.135

Now then, O Brahmins, I shall tell [you] the discourse of the god Śiva (*īśvarasya*) with Umā, called Mantra, which is settled as the *mantramārga* [and] which was formerly related to Devi by the fifth Īśāna face, O best of Brahmins![31]

In a different spirit, a work called *Jñānatilaka*, which, judging from the vocative address to Ṣaṇmukha, may have been a scripture that affiliated itself to the *Kālottara*, is quoted by Umāpati in his *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* (pp. 239–240) to justify the proposition that the contradictions between the different teachings ascribed to Śiva are unproblematic because Śiva taught different levels of 'truth' in accordance with the capacities and expectations of his listeners:

krauñcādiṣu suraiḥ sarvaiḥ mahāmāyāvimohitaiḥ |
r̥ṣibhiś caiva bhogārthair mokṣamārgaparāṅmukhaiḥ ||
pr̥ṣṭo 'haṃ tatra mantrāṇi tapaścaryāvratāni ca |
siddhāntamantravādāṃś ca te 'pi tantrāṇy anekadhā ||
anekabhedabhinnaṃ tu dvaitaṃ pārvatinandana |
tathā hy advaitam apy anye dvaitādvaitaṃ tathāpare ||
pr̥cchakānāṃ vaśenaiva proktaṃ śāstram anekadhā |
sādhanāni vicitrāṇi mantrāṇāṃ mantrajātayaḥ ||
yo yat pr̥cchati bhāvena tasya tat kathayāmy aham |
kim anyat pr̥cchamānasyānyat kathayāmi ṣaṇmukha ||
mayā vimohitāḥ sarve cānekaiḥ śāstrasaṃgrahaiḥ | iti |

On mountains such as Mount Krauñca, I have been asked by all the gods, deluded because of cosmic illusion, and by sages desirous of [supernatural] enjoyments,[32] turning their faces from the path of liberation, for mantras and for ascetic practices and religious observances, and for settled doctrines and ways of casting

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[31] Tr. Kafle 2015: 289.
[32] When this passage is quoted in Goodall 2006, along with some of Umāpati's introduction to it (p. 111) and with a French translation (p. 101), *bhogārthair mokṣamārgaparāṅmukhaiḥ* is taken instead to mean 'turned away from the path leading to liberation by the objects of the senses' ('détournés de la voie qui mène à la délivrance par les objets des sens'), which now seems to me less likely.

spells.[33] They in turn (*te 'pi*) [received] various sorts of scriptures: [some received a message of] duality, [in which reality is] divided up into many divisions, o Son of Pārvatī; others non-duality; and others again duality-cum-non-duality. In accordance with the capacity of the askers I taught scripture in various ways, [involving] various sorts of power-seeking practices and mantra-inflections for mantras. To each person I teach what they ask in accordance with that person's disposition (*bhāvena*). Can I teach any one thing to someone when they expect quite another, o Ṣaṇmukha? I have deluded everyone with various compositions of scripture.

Stanza X

There seems to be an allusion here to *Raghuvaṃśa* 3.49, in which Indra lays exclusive claim to the name Śatakratu ('Of a hundred rages/sacrifices'), mentioning that Puruṣottama similarly belongs only to Viṣṇu, and that Īśvara, or rather Maheśvara, belongs only to Śiva:

> *harir yathaikaḥ puruṣottamaḥ smṛto*
> *maheśvaras tryambaka eva nāparaḥ |*
> *tathā vidur māṃ munayaḥ śatakratuṃ*
> *dvitīyagāmī na hi śabda eṣa naḥ ||*

> Just as Viṣṇu alone is remembered as 'Best of Souls,' and the three-eyed Śiva is Maheśvara, noone else, so too sages know me to be 'Of a hundred sacrifices': this expression of mine applies to no other person.

Stanza XI

A passage that the 16th-c. South Indian writer Appayadīkṣita presents as a quotation of the *Śivapurāṇa* speaks of how one should visualise Śiva within a *liṅga*, where he takes residence in spite of being omnipresent, and this is explained using, as here, the expression *kṛtāvāsaḥ* ('having made his dwelling [here]'), but once again with a play upon the word, in this case effected by following it with the word *sarvavāsaḥ* ('who wears all forms/dwells in

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[33] I was, and still am, suspicious about whether this half-line has been transmitted and therefore did not translate it in Goodall 2006: 101.

everything'). The purported quotation begins (p. 65) with the five following half-lines, which I have not been able to locate in the various voluminous bodies of text that ascribe themselves to the *Śivapurāṇa*. They may serve here as a commentary on the expression *liṅgamūrttiḥ*.

> *liṅge sadāśivaṃ dhyātvā niścalenāntarātmanā |*
> *aṣṭatriṃśatkalānyāsaṃ kṛtvā svasyāṃ tanau yathā ||*
> *abhyarcya gandhapuṣpādyais tyaktvā liṅgātmatāmatim |*
> *tasyāṃ mūrtau mūrtimantaṃ śivaṃ paramakāraṇam ||*
> *prāṇasthānaṃ sadeśasya cintayed ambayā saha |*

> One should visualise Sadāśiva in the *liṅga,* as the immovable inner soul, by placing [there] the thirty-eight [mantra-]divisions [that make up his mantra-body], just as [one earlier placed them] on one's own body. One should venerate Śiva, the Supreme Cause, as embodied in that 'body,' using fragrant unguents, flowers and the like, after abandoning the notion of its being [nothing but] a liṅga. One should think of it as the locus of the life-breath of Sadāśiva, together with the Mother.

There follow (as though they all formed one quotation) another twenty-one verses, many of which occur in different places in the second chapter of the first half of the *Vāyavīyasaṃhitā,* ascribed to the *Śivapurāṇa.* We skip here the next four of them, all about how Śiva is to be thought of in this context, as well as the concluding sixteen, and we turn to the verse that furnishes the relevant word-play (p. 66), which is also one of the verses to be found in the *Vāyavīyasaṃhitā*:[34]

> *sarvoparikṛtāvāsas sarvavāsaś ca śāśvataḥ |*
> *ṣaḍvidhādhvamayasyāsya sarvasya jagataḥ patiḥ ||*

> The Lord of this entire universe, which consists in the six-fold [cosmic] path,[35] has made His dwelling above all, and [yet] dwells in all, eternal.

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[34] *Vāyavīyasaṃhitā* Pūrvabhāga 2.52. For the numbering, I follow here the appendix of Barois 2012, which usefully collates the readings of two earlier editions that have different chapter-divisions and therefore different verse-numbering. Both those editions read *sarvavit* here in place of *śāśvataḥ*.

[35] For the six paths into which the cosmos may be divided, see, e.g., *Tāntrikā-bhidhānakośa* III s.v. *tattvādhvan* and *padādhvan*.

Bibliography

Some of the items in this bibliography are not named in the text above, but they have in fact been referred to here in as much as they give editions and translations of inscriptions that I have consulted and mentioned. Thus, I have used Finot 1925 for K. 528. Others appear in the *Inscriptions du Cambodge* (IC) of Cœdès, whose eighth volume furnishes a concordance from which it can be determined where the various inscriptions published before that eighth volume have appeared.

Primary sources

Kiraṇatantra
        See Goodall 1998.

Tattvasaṅgraha of Sadyojyotiḥ
        See Filliozat 1988.

Niśvāsamukhatattvasaṃhitā
        See Kafle 2015.

Parākhyatantra
        See Goodall 2004.

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Fig. 1
General view of the 10ᵗʰ-c. temple of Tribhuvanamaheśvara (Banteay Srei)

n. 421 / K. 570

Fig. 2
EFEO photograph of inked estampage no. n. 421 of K. 570 (EFEO, Paris)

Fig. 3
Photograph taken in January 2017 of a detail of K. 570, showing the slither of stone that was missing when the EFEO estampage (see Fig. 2) was produced (Photo: Dominic Goodall).

Predestination of Freedom in Rūpa Gosvāmin's Theology of Devotion

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1. Introduction

In a theology of merited grace, God's action operates from outside and has a merely admonishing and suasive role, rather than being irresistibly persuasive from within. Conversely, if grace is considered to be unmerited and predestined, God bestows it gratuitously, produces ineluctable approval and moves the desire for freedom of the elected ones, who are causelessly chosen by God. Merited grace implies free will, so rational theology cannot escape the aporetic dilemma of predestination and will. A denial of human will in favour of predestination, although consistent with the acceptance of God as the supreme will, clashes with the subjective experience and praxis of human choices. An opposite stance that magnifies the power of free will, by contrast, is liable to the charge of elevating human beings to the level of God.

   The aporia also emerges from the theology of the authors discussed in this paper, who believe that in this world souls are trapped in a cycle of rebirths, since beginningless time. By definition, nobody has the means to lift themselves autonomously from this cycle, without the intervention of God's grace. And yet, since spirituality is a devotional relation with God, and since such devo-

tion is ultimately spontaneous love, it cannot be forced upon anyone and must freely pour from the soul.

The writings of Rūpa Gosvāmin and Jīva Gosvāmin (15th–16th c. CE) are the theological foundations of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism. This monotheistic religion is a brand of Vaiṣṇavism (devotion to Lord Viṣṇu) founded by Caitanya Mahāprabhu (1486–1533 CE) in Bengal, and accordingly known as 'Gauḍīya,' from Gauḍa, i.e. the region name of Bengal in the Sanskrit language. Caitanya advocated devotion to God, namely Kṛṣṇa understood as Viṣṇu in his supreme aspect, as the perfect form of religion. Rūpa was a direct disciple of Caitanya. His most influential work is the *Bhakti-rasāmṛtasindhu* (BhRAS), in which he interpreted the Vaiṣṇava tenets found in scriptures, particularly in the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* (BhP) through the aesthetic canon of *rasa* poetry and dramaturgy that reaches back to Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra*. The BhRAS is an influential treatise that contains fundamental hints on the issue of predestination and freedom of grace, as understood and practised in Caitanya's movement.[1]

Jīva, Rūpa's nephew and disciple, wrote commentaries on Rūpa's major works, including the *Durgamasaṅgāmaṇī* (DS) to the BhRAS. Jīva's scholastic achievement is the monumental *Bhāgavatasandarbha*, also known as *Ṣaṭsandarbha,* 'the Six Sandarbhas,' which was destined to become the *summa theologiae* of the Gauḍīya *bhakti* movement. The BhRAS, the DS and the *Sandarbha*s are the main sources for the present analysis.

In his study of Rūpa's theology, Haberman (1988) has already touched upon some of the issues discussed in the present paper. Most importantly, he has treated the BhRAS as a manual on *sādhana* (spiritual exercise) for practitioners and has concluded that Rūpa's is a theology of free will, rather than one of unmerited grace. Haberman (1988: 62) has also taken issue with Rudolf Otto's interpretation of *bhakti* as a religion of unmerited grace akin to Lutheranism (Otto 1930: 29–40).

In *bhakti*, indeed, divine grace appears as the predominant factor. The worshipper endowed with *bhakti* is by definition surren-

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[1] The BhRAS has been translated into English and studied in Haberman 2003. For a review of Haberman's book, see Graheli 2009.

dered, has no claim for independence, is God's slave (*kiṅkara*) and his deeds are moulded after God's will. At first sight, the combined weight of God's grace and of the *karman* doctrine render the human being akin to a puppet in God's hands, either controlled by his illusory potency, when plagued by material conditioning, or directly subdued to him, when spiritually emancipated.

With good reason, Haberman argued that this interpretation overlooks some of the peculiarities of Gauḍīya *bhakti*, and particularly of its practice. Grounded in his own pre-judgements,[2] indeed, Otto targeted specific aspects of *bhakti*, while engaging in a dialogue between Lutheranism and *bhakti* and thus emphasising the aspect of unmerited grace.

In this paper I am attempting a defence of both angles, which are both present in the Gauḍīya sources, so that neither Otto nor Haberman are actually wrong. I will also try to show how this ambivalence found in Rūpa and Jīva's theology is not so different from the one detected in Augustine's writings.

2. The ontological level

In Gauḍīya theology spiritual emancipation is equated to devotional love (*bhakti*), the relation between God and his worshipper (*bhakta*). What is *bhakti*? Who is the *bhakta*? Who is God?

2.1 The triune God: Bhagavān, Paramātma, Brahman

God is defined in BhP 1.2.11 as the non-dual, absolute principle, known as *brahman*, *paramātmā*, or *bhagavān*.[3]

Jīva used this BhP passage as the axis of his theological argumentation, which is grounded on the paradox of a simultaneous unity and trinity of the divine principle, or more in general on the simultaneous difference and non-difference of various aspects of God and his potencies.[4]

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[2] In the Gadamerian sense of unavoidable prejudices (Gadamer 2000: 561), '›Vorurteil‹ heißt also durchaus nicht notwendig falsches Urteil […].'

[3] *vadanti tat tattvavidas tattvaṃ yaj jñānam advayam | brahmeti paramātmeti bhagavān iti śabdyate ||*.

[4] For details on the Gauḍīya doctrine of paradoxical difference and non-difference (*acintyabhedābheda*), see Graheli 2007: 183–186. A different interpreta-

◊ *Brahman* is the impersonal aspect, pure spiritual existence (*cinmātrasattā*).

◊ *Paramātma* is the omnipresent personal aspect (*pumān puruṣaḥ sarvāntaryāmī*). He neutrally guarantees the efficiency of karmic retribution as witness (*upadraṣṭr̥*) and enjoiner (*anumantr̥*) (PSan, *anuccheda* 1).[5]

◊ *Bhagavān* is the supreme person in his full-fledged form, namely Śrī Kr̥ṣṇa according to Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas (see SSV ad TSan, *anuccheda* 8).

2.2 Three potencies of God: inner, outer, marginal

Bhagavān has three potencies, inner (*antaraṅgā*), outer (*bahiraṅgā*) and marginal (*taṭasthā*).[6]

◊ The inner potency is the internal and supreme power of Bhagavān, by which he exists in his eternal form, manifestations, and activities.[7]

◊ The outer potency is defined in PSan, *anuccheda* 48, as the cause of the creation of the world called *māyā*, the illusory potency (*jagatsr̥ṣṭyādikāriṇī māyākhyā śaktiḥ*). Here Gauḍīya authors, following the BhG and the BhP (e.g. BhP 11.24.1), resort to Sāṅkhya philosophy and understand *māyā* as both an instrumental and material cause. The first is explained in terms of the three stable, kinetic, and passive forces, the three *guṇa*s called *sattva, rajas* and *tamas*. The second is the evolution from the latent form of nature (*prakr̥ti*) to concrete matter in all its differentiated forms.[8] Gauḍīya authors repeatedly stress how Bhagavān,

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tion can be found in Gupta 2007. On the impact of the doctrine, see Dimock and Stewart 1999: 116, 119.

[5] *tatropadraṣṭā paramasākṣī anumantā tattatkarmānurūpaḥ pravartakaḥ.*

[6] See BhSan, *anuccheda* 14: *śaktiś ca sā tridhā antaraṅgā bahiraṅgā taṭasthā ca.* This classification is already found in VPu 6.7.61, an often quoted stanza where they are called, respectively, 'supreme' (*parā*), 'nescience' (*avidyā*) and 'knower of the field' (*kṣetrajñā*), as well as in BhG and other mainstream Vaiṣṇava literature.

[7] BhSan, *anuccheda* 14: *tatrāntaraṅgayā svarūpaśaktyākhyayā pūrṇenaiva svarūpeṇa vaikuṇṭhādisvarūpavaibhavarūpeṇa ca tad avatiṣṭhate.*

[8] PSan, *anuccheda* 49: *tasyā māyāyāś cāṃśadvayam. tatra guṇarūpasya māyākhyasya nimittāṃśasya dravyarūpasya pradhānākhyasyopādānāṃśasya ca parasparaṃ bhedam.* See also BhSan, *anuccheda* 14.

> whose natural potency is the internal one, is by definition
> never touched by the external potency.[9]

◊   The marginal potency is defined in PSan, *anuccheda* 48,
    where it is labelled 'marginal' exactly because, from its
    position at the margin, it can potentially partake of the
    bliss of the internal potency, or it can be covered by the
    external potency. The countless individual beings (*jīvas*)
    are all part of this marginal potency and are of two kinds:
    those who are eternally and favourably disposed towards
    Bhagavān (*bhagavadunmukha*), blessed by his internal
    potency, and those who are turned away from him, sub-
    dued by the external potency.[10]

2.3 The definition of bhakti, the essence of the internal potency

Ontologically, *bhakti* is the essence of the internal potency of Bha-
gavān.[11] It manifests into a reciprocal relation of love between
Bhagavān and his worshipper, so both Bhagavān and his *bhakta* are
said to be characterised by *bhakti*.[12]

2.3.1 Intensional definition

Rūpa Gosvāmin begins his BhRAS 1.1.11, by providing an inten-
sional definition of *bhakti*. The purpose is to allow the practition-
er to distinguish's recognition of *bhakti* from what is not *bhakti*:

> Free from further motives, not straying into paths like knowledge
> and rituals, the steady vocation of acting for Kṛṣṇa is the supreme
> *bhakti*.[13]

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[9] E.g. see PSan, *anuccheda* 90, *svarūpaśakter antaraṅgatvād bahiraṅgāyā māyāyā guṇaiḥ sattvādibhis tatkāryaiḥ sthāpanādilīlābhiś ca nāsau spṛśate.*

[10] *atra prathamo 'ntaraṅgāśaktivilāsānugṛhīto nitya bhagavatparikararūpaḥ* […] *aparasya tat parāṅmukhatvadoṣeṇa labdhacchidrayā māyayā paribhūtaḥ saṃsārī.*

[11] See BhaktiSan, *anuccheda* 92: *paramasārabhūtāyā api svarūpaśakteḥ sārabhūtā hlādinī nāma yā vṛttis tasyā eva sārabhūto vṛttiviśeṣo bhaktiḥ,* and *bhakteḥ svarūpaśaktisārahlādinīsāratve ca.* See also DS 1.2.2: *bhagavacchaktiviśeṣavṛttiviśeṣatvena* […].

[12] *bhaktir bhagavati bhakte ca nikṣiptanijobhayakoṭiḥ sarvadā tiṣṭhati. ata evoktaṃ bhagavān bhaktabhaktimān iti.*

[13] *anyābhilāṣitaśūnyaṃ jñānakarmādyanāvṛtam | ānukūlyena kṛṣṇānuśīlanaṃ bhaktir uttamā ||.*

The stanza, Jīva explains, covers both the essence and the contingent aspects of *bhakti*, both required for the sake of its unambiguous definition. The essential feature is described by the expression 'steady engagement in Kṛṣṇa's favour,' while the contingent aspects are mentioned in the first half of the stanza, 'free from further motives,' etc. Such 'further motives' include even the desire for salvation, since even this drive is selfish and as such incompatible with the spirit of *bhakti*.

2.3.2 Extensional definition

Rūpa provides a taxonomy of types of *bhakti*, listed in ascending order (BhRAS 1.2.1):

> *bhakti* is said to be of three types: devotional exercise (*sādhana*), devotional emotion (*bhāva*) and devotional love (*preman*).[14]

The highest stage of *bhakti* is called devotional love (*preman* or *premabhakti*), which is a development of the intermediate stage of devotional emotion (*bhāvabhakti*), in turn a result of a propedeutic stage of devotional practice (*sādhanabhakti*).

Jīva comments that the classification can also be made from another perspective (DS 1.2.1):

> *bhakti* should be understood as twofold: as an instrument (*sādhana*) and as a goal (*sādhya*). […] The latter has an emotional, deeply felt nature (*hārda*), and is called '*bhakti*' just like the former, as in the eleventh book (BhP 11.3.31): 'With *bhakti* produced by *bhakti*, he experiences ecstatic symptoms […].'[15]

In other words, *bhakti* can be understood in terms of both means (*sādhana*) and effect (*sādhya*). The two higher stages in Rūpa's classification — devotional emotion (*bhāva*) and love (*preman*) — are both effects of the spiritual practice, the pragmatic dimension of *bhakti*.

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[14] *sā bhaktiḥ sādhanaṃ bhāvaḥ premā ceti tridhoditā* |. Rūpa envisioned further subdivisions of *bhāva* and *preman*, which he analysed in a later work, the UNM.

[15] *bhaktis tāvad dvividhā sādhanarūpā sādhyarūpā ca. tatra prathamāyā lakṣaṇaṃ bhedāś ca vakṣyante, dvitīyā tu hārddarūpā, sāpi bhaktiśabdenocyate. yathaikādaśe "bhaktyā sañjātayā bhaktyā bibhraty utpulakāṃ tanum" iti.*

3. The pragmatic level
3.1 Definition of devotional exercise

Rūpa defines devotional exercise as follows (BhRAS 1.2.2):

> 'Exercise' (*sādhana*) means performance (*kṛtisādhyā*), capable of producing devotional emotion (*sādhyabhāva*).
> 'Capable of producing' means capable of manifesting the eternally perfected emotion (*bhāva*) in one's heart.[16]

Jīva comments how the distinctive characteristic of practice is sense control, thus suggesting the requirement of an act of will.

Incidentally, Rūpa also provides an important sub-classification of devotional exercise: '*bhakti* by scriptural injunctions (*vidhi*)' (*vaidhibhakti*), and *bhakti* by a spontaneous drive coming from within, called 'conforming to the sentiment of those possessing mature devotional love' (*rāgānugabhakti*). This distinction is a peculiarity of the Gauḍīya theory and praxis. In this article I will not deal with *rāgānugabhakti* any further, however, because it would not serve the purpose of clarifying the issue at hand.[17]

An injunction can be actualised only under the condition that the recipient of the injunction is eligible for the performance. Hence the definition of the minimum qualification for this performance becomes the next logical step. Furthermore, it may also serve a purpose in the discourse around the aporia of freedom and predestination: one may argue that *bhakti* is a gift of God, but human beings need to be eligible for receiving it. What is then the basic qualification to engage in *bhakti*?

3.2 Definition of eligibility

Rūpa discusses at length the qualification for *bhakti* using the standard term *adhikāra* which, when used in relation to the eligibility of a candidate to perform the enjoined activity, has two specific acceptations, namely competence and moral responsibility. Closely related to competence, there is also a question of accessi-

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[16] *kṛtisādhyā bhavet sādhyabhāvā sā sādhanābhidhā | nityasiddhasya bhāvasya prākaṭyaṃ hṛdi sādhyatā ||*.

[17] The distinction between *vaidhī* and *rāgānugā* is discussed in detail in Haberman 1988.

bility. Simply put, *bhakti* may only be accessible to those who are competent to perform it.

In this regard, the discussion of the impact of social status on the accessibility to *bhakti* is particularly relevant. Rūpa explicitly states that '*vaidhibhakti* is a routine prescription (*nitya*) applicable to all, regardless of social class (*varṇa*, such as *brāhmaṇa*) or stage in life (*āśrama*, such as *brahmacarya*).'[18]

Elsewhere (BhRAS 22), however, Rūpa states that all mankind (*nṛmātra*) possesses the qualification for *bhakti*, without additional conditions of age, gender, caste, etc.

There are different levels of eligibility, a taxonomy derived from BhP (for instance 11.2.44) and ultimately broken down into three levels: topmost (*uttama*), medium (*madhyama*) and lower (*kaniṣṭha*). The three levels are defined according to the quality of belief (*śraddhā*) and to external symptoms and behaviour. This classification seems to have the pragmatic purpose of allowing for the judgement of one's own or someone else's level of *bhakti*: weaker or stronger faith can be actually judged only through introspective analysis, while one's external demeanour may enable others to judge the level of their own *bhakti*. The description and examination of the *adhikāra* in BhRAS may therefore have two main purposes: to enable a *bhakta* to introspectively recognise the level of his progress and to set guidelines for the recognition of the level of *bhakti* in others, for instance in the quest for a spiritual guide. However, since in the BhRAS the examination of *adhikāra* occurs in the section on *sādhanabhakti*, an intermediate stage in between piety and true spirituality, this distinction of three *adhikāra*s seems to serve an introspective, phenomenological purpose.

For the present purposes, the recipient of the status (*adhikāra*) for *vaidhibhakti* is the most relevant:

> If by some great fortune this faith in spiritual practice has originated, someone not too attached, nor too detached, is said to meet the requirements for *vaidhibhakti*.[19]

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[18] *ity asau syād vidhir nityaḥ sarvavarṇāśramādiṣu* […] (BhRAS 1.2.9).
[19] *yaḥ kenāpy atibhāgyena jātaśraddho 'sya sevane | nātisakto na vairāgyabhāg asyām adkhikāry asau ||* (BhRAS 1.2.14).

Rūpa illustrates the same by an example from the BhP 11.20.8, where Kṛṣṇa tells his dear confident Uddhava (cit. in BhRAS 1.2.15):

> The person possessing this faith, generated and yet causeless, in my deeds and tales, when not too detached or attached, will have *bhaktiyoga*, the source of perfection.[20]

Faith, *śraddhā*, is thus a necessary condition for *bhakti*. The use of the term *yadṛcchā*, 'causeless' or 'for whatever reason' is noteworthy. The word is used to indicate an event taking place without explainable causes, and it is often found in Gauḍīya literature in relation to the aetiology of *bhakti*. It is also frequently used in the BhP,[21] as well as in the BhG (2.32, 4.22), where Śrīdhara glosses it as *aprārthitam*, 'not requested,' and Madhusūdana as *svaprayatna-vyatirekeṇa*, 'unrelated to one's effort.' Kṛṣṇa's statement to Uddhava is also quoted and paraphrased by Jīva, who paraphrases the term *yadṛcchayā* as 'rising through the fortune generated by association with and the mercy of those who possess a *bhakti* relation with the supremely independent God.'[22]

Elsewhere, Jīva glosses it as 'independently, not by other causes.'[23]

And in this specific application, he writes that it means 'according to the desires of saintly people' (*sadicchānusāreṇaiva*). This means that even the initial belief, which may not yet be considered full-fledged *bhakti*, is regarded as a gift of God obtained through the agency of saintly people.

3.3 Belief, faith, and bhakti

Jīva maintains that this preliminary belief (*śraddhā*) is not part of *bhakti*, but rather a condition for the eligibility for *bhakti*.[24]

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[20] *yadṛcchayā matkathādau jātaśraddhas tu yaḥ pumān | na nirviṇṇo nātisakto bhaktiyogo 'sya siddhidaḥ ||.*

[21] In the BhP cf. 1.19.25, 2.5.21, 3.27.81, 4.25.20, 5.5.35, 6.20.19, 7.1.35, 8.19.2, 9.2.12, 10.3.27, 11.8.2.

[22] BhaktiSan, *anuccheda* 170: *kenāpi paramasvatantrabhagavadbhaktasaṅgatatkṛpājātamaṅgalodayena.*

[23] BhaktiSan, *anuccheda* 181, while commenting on *ta ekadā nimeḥ satram upajagmur yadṛcchayā* (BhP 11.2.24): *yadṛcchayā svairatayā na tu hetvantaraprayuktety arthaḥ.*

[24] BhaktiSan, *anuccheda* 171: *tasmāt śraddhā na bhaktyaṅgaṃ kintu karmaṇy arthisamarthavidvat tāvad ananyatākhyāyāṃ bhaktau adhikāriviśeṣaṇam eveti.*

It is thus considered a preliminary qualification, consistently with the model proposed by Rūpa in BhRAS 1.4.8–9:

> From belief at first, to the frequentation of saintly people, to engagement in worship, to the discontinuation of unworthy acts, to unfaltering faith, and to relish, and further to attachment, to emotion, to the dawn of love. In the practice of devotional love this shall be the progression of its manifestation.[25]

Commenting on this passage, Jīva explains that the first *śraddhā* means 'belief (*viśvāsa*) in the meanings of scriptures, understood in association with saintly people.' This is also reiterated elsewhere (DS 1.2.17), where he explains that such a belief in the purport of scriptures is the first cause of *bhakti*.[26]

There is a rational sphere in which belief, defined in these terms, needs to be considered. The concept of belief has an obvious impact on a system's epistemology, especially if the system aims at a rational theology. The epistemology of the Gaudīya Vaiṣṇavas — discussed in detail in the first half of Jīva's TSan — admits three sources of knowledge: perception, inference, and verbal testimony. Within the domain of theology, verbal testimony consists of the statements found in the accepted sacred scriptures, which should be studied under the tutelage of living spiritual authorities. Of the three all-encompassing disciplines of grammar (*vyākaraṇa*), hermeneutics (*mīmāṃsā*) and epistemology (*nyāya*), the influence of the third one is here evident. Jīva's 'belief in the meanings of scriptures' should be understood within this wider epistemological framework.

Anyway, Rūpa's system is exegetically deduced and justified. Each and every step in his presentation is supported by quotation from scriptures regarded as authoritative in his tradition, mainly the BhP. Gaudīya writers, indeed, envision most of their writings

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[25] *ādau śraddhā tataḥ sadhusaṅgo 'tha bhajanakriyā | tato 'narthanivṛttiḥ syāt tato niṣṭhā rucis tataḥ || athāsaktis tato bhāvas tataḥ premābhyudañcati | sādhakānām ayaṃ premnaḥ prādurbhāve bhavet kramaḥ ||.*

[26] *pūrvaṃ śāstrasya śāsanenaiva pravṛttir ity uktatvāc chāstrārthaviśvāsa evādhikāraṇaṃ labdham. ataḥ śraddhāśabdas tatra prayuktaḥ. tasmāc chāstrārthaviśvāsa eva śraddheti.*

as an exegesis of the BhP, which is, in turn, considered as the eso-
teric exegesis of the *Brahmasūtra* and, ultimately, of Aupaniṣadic
and even Vedic scriptures. Furthermore, in Rūpa's works, and
even more so in Jīva's, there is a deliberate attempt to establish an
epistemologically justified theology. Notwithstanding the impor-
tance of the *acintyabhedābheda* doctrine (see Section 2.1 above),
Gauḍīya authors are not advocating irrationality or fideism. The
very style of presentation of the BhRAS, where Rūpa never fails to
provide scriptural evidence for each of his tenets, and the TSan
presentation, where Jīva bases his treatise on the epistemology of
verbal testimony, all betray the intention of establishing a rational
system in support of the super-rational, super-natural essence of
bhakti.

Elsewhere (BhaktiSan, *anuccheda* 153) Jīva also adds that a sin-
cere heart is a necessary factor in the successful exercise of *bhakti.*
As a counterexample he cites the example of wicked people, such
as Duryodhana, whose offerings were never accepted by Kṛṣṇa,
despite the priceless value of the offered items.[27]

At this stage in the present discussion the causation of *bhakti*
has been traced back to a sincere belief in the candidate's heart.
And yet, can belief and sincerity be at all exercises of freedom?
From a moral perspective, why should anyone be held account-
able for lack of belief, unless human effort is a factor in the devel-
opment of this belief? If sincere belief is also God's gift, why is it
bestowed only to selected individuals?

3.4 The subversion of the cosmic order

Rūpa's and Jīva's views on merited or unmerited grace may be fur-
ther clarified in the context of their ideas on karmic retribution.[28]

Human action is considered the necessary condition of the
cycle of rebirths (*saṃsāra*), a realm of delusion (*māyā*) in which

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[27] *ata eva kuṭilātmanām uttamam api nānopacārādikaṃ nāṅgīkaroti bhagavān yathā dūtyāgato duryodhanasya.*

[28] For a history of the concept of *karman,* throughout the evolution of the philosophical systems, see Halbfass 1992: 292–293. For a thought-provoking study of the teleology of *karman,* particularly relevant to the present paper, see Bronkhorst 2000.

souls wander, while turning away from God, from beginningless time (*anādibahirmukha*).[29]

Under the spell of *māyā*, living beings identify with their material body[30] and remain oblivious of their true spiritual nature of God's servants. In the first chapter of BhRAS *bhakti* is explained as the spiritual force that takes care of every negativity (*kleśa*) and bestows every result of piety (*śubha*). Bad and good deeds, as well as the fluctuations from distress to happiness generated by these respective deeds, occur in a beginningless chain of causes and effects. The BhRAS is not advocating the performance of *bhakti* to achieve permanent happiness or to remove distress. The idea, rather, is that without *bhakti* these two aims are pointless, because they do not help overcoming *māyā*. Conversely, with *bhakti* material happiness and absence of distress become trivial and easily reachable by-products.

This fate of bondage, my illusory power, is inescapable. Only those who approach me shall cross over the world of illusion.[31]

In BhRAS 1.1.19–20, the negative aspects afflicting those trapped in the cycle of births are listed as threefold:

1.   evil (*pāpa*);
2.   the cause (*bīja*) of evil;
3.   nescience (*avidyā*).

Rūpa exemplifies the *bhakti*'s power to cancel evil by quoting BhP 11.14.19:

> As well-kindled fire thoroughly burns fuel to ashes, so, dear Uddhava, *bhakti* directed to me erases every sin.[32]

Bhakti has a primary purpose, namely, satisfying the Lord, and the annihilation of evil is just a side-consequence of the process, much like the primary purpose of fire is cooking food, etc., while its incidental result is the incineration of wood.

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[29] *tanmāyayāvṛtasvarūpajñānānāṃ tayaiva sattvarajastamomaye jaḍe pradhāne racitātmabhāvānāṃ jīvānāṃ saṃsāraduḥkham.*

[30] *dehādyahaṃkārataḥ*, BhaktiSan, *anuccheda* 2.

[31] *daivī hy eṣā guṇamayī mama māyā duratyayā | mām eva ye prapadyante māyām etāṃ taranti te* || BhG 7.14.

[32] *yathāgniḥ susamṛddhārciḥ karoty edhāṃsi bhasmasāt | tathā madviṣayā bhaktir uddhavaināṃsi kṛtsnaśaḥ* ||.

As for the causation of evil, Rūpa depicts the following sequence (BhRAS 1.1.23, see also BhaktiSan, *anuccheda* 129):

◊   non-fructified evil (*aprārabdhaphalam*);
◊   heaped evil (*kuṭa*);
◊   proximate cause of evil (*bīja*), i.e., mental dispositions;
◊   evil.

Jīva (DS 1.1.23) observes that this progression does not point to a starting point, because even the first item of the chain should be considered on the one hand as beginningless, and on the other hand as endless, since it triggers further and endless reactions.[33]

Nescience is the essence of *māyā* and the third form of distress listed by Rūpa (BhRAS 1.1.26, quoted from the *Padmapurāṇa*):

> Devotion to Hari, unmatched, and attended by every other science, swiftly burns down all nescience, just as a forest fire with snakes.[34]

The process is beginningless, and as such it is a natural feature inherent in the material condition. It is not plausible to hold the individual human beings accountable for it, because the system of karmic retribution is presented as a natural order that can only be upset by the impact of a spiritual potency, i.e., *bhakti*, which by definition cannot be under the control of the materially bound souls.

While commenting on these dynamics of evil described by Rūpa, Jīva (DS 1.1.25) accounts for this process of annihilation of nescience by quoting from BhP 1.2.17–20:

> From within, the well-wishing Lord shakes the vices of sincere believers. Once vices are almost destroyed by steadily serving the Lord's people, this *bhakti*, devoted to this Lord glorified as supreme, becomes unflinching. At this point one's consciousness,

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[33] *aprārabdhaphalaṃ na prārabdhaṃ kūṭatvādirūpakāryyāvasthatvaṃ yena tat. taccānādisiddham anantam eva.*

[34] *kṛtānuyātrāvidyābhir haribhaktir anuttamā | avidyāṃ nirdahaty āśu dāvajvāleva pannagīm ||.* Rūpa quotes this verse from the *Padmapurāṇa*, but I could not find it in the printed editions available to me, namely Nag Publishers, Delhi 1984, and Gita Press, Gorakhpur 1982.

not anymore pierced by passion and apathy, by desire and greed, and so on, can settle in virtue. With an appeased mind, by the communion of *bhakti* with God, free from attachment, the knowledge of one's Lord's essence arises.[35]

One can easily see the parallel between the description and the model of *bhakti* causation proposed by Rūpa in BhRAS 1.4.8–9 (see Section 3.3 above).

4. Augustine's parallel

In his theology Augustine contemplates a natural order that can be only altered by the revelation of the Absolute.

> The theology of grace is nothing but the application of this theology of the paradoxical divine omnipotence to the inner aspect of converted desire.[36]

Moreover, according to Lettieri (2001: 613), Augustine defends free will only to hold human beings responsible for evil, while freedom in goodness is entirely God's, just as it happens in Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava literature.

There is also a resonance with a different and less known view proposed by Augustine, the *other* Augustine, as characterised in Lettieri 2001: 609:

> The *other* Augustine admits that salvation does not depend on the approval given by human will to the suasive *vocatio* of God, but [it rather depends] only on the divine *vocatio effectrix bonae voluntatis*. […] While acting through a total reversal of human logic, God predestines and converts obstinate sinners (Saul), […] while he neglects men of high doctrine, chaste people, the *oratores*. […] Augustine has changed his fundamental theological *intentio*: from the apology of human freedom and of the ontotheological order

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[35] *hṛdy antaḥstho hy abhadrāṇi vidhunoti suhṛt satām | naṣṭaprāyeṣv abhadreṣu nityaṃ bhāgavatasevayā | bhagavaty uttamaśloke bhaktir bhavati naiṣṭhikī || tadā rajastamobhāvāḥ kāmalobhādayaś ca ye | ceta etair anāviddhaṃ sthitaṃ sattve prasīdati || evaṃ prasannamanaso bhagavadbhaktiyogataḥ | bhagavattattvavijñānaṃ muktasaṅgasya jāyate ||.*

[36] 'La teologia della grazia non è, allora, che l'applicazione di questa teologia della paradossale onnipotenza divina all'interiorità del desiderio convertito' (Lettieri 2001: 612).

guaranteed by God's grace, he has moved to the apology of the omnipotent, unconditional freedom of God.[37]

5. *Conclusion*

Rūpa and Jīva propose a two-tiered explanation of the aetiology of *bhakti* realisation, an ontological and a practical one. It is ultimately true that *bhakti* can only be bestowed by the will of God. This is, therefore, the sufficient cause of *bhakti*, because no human endeavour can be considered a necessary cause. At a practical level, however, Rūpa and Jīva encouraged their readers to strive for *bhakti*. Yet, even ontologically, the issue has an aporetic nature that is well depicted in many paradoxes expressed in their poetical writing. Love cannot be true love when it is forced upon someone. Consequently, on the side of human beings, the free choice to love God must be somewhat accepted by Rūpa and Jīva. There is paradigm shift of sorts, from anthropocentric to theocentric and vice versa: when they *prescribe* spiritual exercise, Rūpa and Jīva adopt an anthropocentric perspective in which humans are responsible of their destiny, but when they *describe* God and God's *bhakti*, they shift to a theocentric view, in which only God can be considered fully independent.

Rūpa and Jīva want both human effort and divine grace to be necessary causes of *bhakti*, not sufficient ones. Jīva explicitly tries to solve the issue by drawing a line between *sādhanā* and *sādhyā* forms of *bhakti*, the first depending from human effort and the second situated within the domain of grace. Just like Augustine's theology, the theology of *bhakti* unfolds as

> a dialectics between theological *quid* and *quo modo*, between the ontotheological level and the charismatic and eschatological event, between human and divine freedom, between order and

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[37] 'L'*altro* Agostino confessa che la salvezza non dipende più dal consenso dato dalla libertà umana alla *vocatio* suasiva di Dio, ma soltanto dalla divina *vocatio effectrix bonae voluntatis*. […] Operando secondo un totale rovesciamento della logica umana, Dio predestina e converte peccatori ostinati (Saulo), […] mentre abbandona gli uomini di alta doctrina, le persone caste, gli *oratores*. […] Agostino ha mutato la sua fondamentale *intentio* teologica: dall'apologia della libertà umana e dell'ordine ontoteologico garantito dalla grazia di Dio, è passato all'apologia dell'onnipotente, incondizionata libertà di Dio […].'

anarchy. […] the *quid* refers to the level accessible through the natural and rational path, while the *quo modo* refers to the extraordinary Act, to the rationally paradoxical event […].[38]

On these matters, Rūpa's final advice is to rely on the inner experience of devotion. As he declares in BhRAS 1.1.44, reason has limits when it comes to such issues:

It is through taste, even a tinge of it, that *bhakti* is known in its reality.
Reasoning, instead, wants a foundation. Alone, it will never do.[39]

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[38] '[...] una dialettica tra *quid* e *quo modo* teologico, tra piano ontoteologico ed evento carismatico-escatologico, tra ambito della libertà umana e ambito della libertà divina, tra ordine ed anarchia [...] il *quid* allude al piano accessibile per via naturale e razionale [...] il *quo modo* allude all'Atto del tutto straordinario, all'evento razionalmente paradossale [...]' (Lettieri 2001: 621).

[39] *svalpāpi rucir eva syād bhaktitattvāvabodhikā | yuktis tu kevalā naiva yad asyā apratiṣṭhatā ||*.

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A Few Notes on a Newly Discovered Manuscript of the Śivadharma Corpus[1]

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1. Introduction

This paper aims at 1) reporting of a hitherto unknown manuscript of the Śivadharma corpus; 2) presenting a working hypothesis regarding the order of inclusion of titles in the Śivadharma corpus; and 3) and some thoughts about a possible model regarding the way in which the changes to the text crept into different transmissions.

2. The Śivadharma corpus

The Śivadharma corpus[2] consists of a set of Sanskrit texts most often transmitted together, comprising two major groups of texts. The first group consists of texts whose title start with the word *śivadharma*. The first two of these are:

[2] There is a rapidly growing body of literature on the Śivadharma corpus. For an overview of the research history, see De Simini and Kiss 2021.

1   the *Śivadharmaśāstra* (henceforth ŚDhŚ)
2   the *Śivadharmottara*(*śāstra*?) (henceforth ŚDhU)

Manuscripts of these two works are found in South India as well as in Nepal. In Kashmir, we are aware of the existence only of manuscripts of the ŚDhŚ, but there is a high likelihood that the ŚDhU was also known in the region because of the significant reuse of its text in the *Haracaritacintāmaṇi* composed in Kashmir (De Simini 2016: 66 ff).

There is another text whose title contains the word *śivadharma*:

3   the *Śivadharmasaṃgraha*

This text often accompanies the first two, but so far we only know it from Nepalese manuscripts.

There are more texts transmitted together with the above three in Nepal. They are:

4   the *Umāmaheśvarasaṃvāda*
5   the *Śivopaniṣad*
6   the *Uttaromāmaheśvarasaṃvāda**[3]
7   the *Vṛṣasārasaṃgraha*
8   and the *Dharmaputrikā*

Furthermore, a work called the *Lalitavistara* accompanies the corpus in one manuscript.[4] Also, the *Śāntyadhyāya*, the sixth chapter of the ŚDhŚ, is often transmitted independently.[5]

3. The Munich manuscript

In an office of the project 'Buddhist Manuscripts from Gandhāra' of the Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich, Germany, there are a number of palm-leaf manuscript bundles of unknown provenance. Dr. Gudrun Melzer, a member of the project, inspected

[3] See below for the title of this work.
[4] On this text, see De Simini and Mirnig 2017.
[5] See Bisschop 2018 for a study of this part. For manuscripts that transmit only this chapter or those that transmit this chapter along with other excerpts, see Bisschop 2018: 189 ff.

the manuscript leaves stored in a file cabinet in her office. According to her, loose leaves from various manuscript bundles were kept in a box. She identified different bundles and ordered the leaves accordingly. There is no reliable documentation on the provenance of those leaves, but apparently they came from one private collector at some point in the late 20th c.

As far as we could tell, much of those leaves originate from Nepal, but not all. Some are written in Grantha script and possibly form a separate bundle. Melzer noted that about 250 folios, written in two scripts typical of 9th- and 10th-c. Nepal form one bundle. There were mentions of *śivadharma* in those leaves. They do form a Śivadharma Ms that must have consisted of seven titles (more on this later), the most typical set found in Nepalese manuscripts of the corpus.[6]

This Śivadharma Ms consists of two major parts, easily distinguishable by different hands: one that appears to be produced in 9th-c. Nepal (fig. 1),[7] and another seemingly from a century or so later (fig. 2).

3.1 *The first part with the 9th-c. script*

The first part that appears to be from the 9th c. currently consists of 133 folios. There are two folios each numbered 30 to 39. Thus, we have a sequence of folios numbered 28, 29, 30, 31, 32… 38, 39, 30, 31, 32… 39, 40, 41… The scribe wrote 30 again when he should have written 40 after the first 39. This mistake was probably induced by the fact the first folio numbered 39 (39_1) contained the end of the *Śivadharmaśāstra*, the first item in the bundle. The *Śivadharmottara* starts on the second folio numbered 30 (30_2).

We do not have the folios numbered 81 to 121. Folio 80 contains the text near the end of the *Śivadharmottara* (middle of 12.269b of the published edition, Naraharinath 1998). Folio 81 should have had the ending of the *Śivadharmottara* (the published

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[6] On various manuscripts transmitting the Śivadharma corpus from Nepal, see De Simini 2016.

[7] Cf. the script, e.g., with that of dated Nepalese manuscripts of the *Skandapurāṇa* (NAK 2–229) and the *Suśrutasaṃhitā* (Kesar Library 699). See Harimoto 2011.

edition ends with 12.273). The next extant folio, numbered 123, shows the beginning of the *Umāmaheśvarasaṃvāda* on the *recto*.[8] In all likelihood, the missing 41 folios (81 to 122, assuming that there were no skips or repetitions in the foliation) recorded the *Śivadharmasaṃgraha*, because the title usually follows the *Śivadharmottara* in Nepalese manuscripts of the Śivadharma corpus.

Folio 151 *recto* contains the ending of the *Umāmaheśvarasaṃvāda* and the beginning of the *Śivopaniṣad* on line 3. The end of the latter work is on folio 168.

3.2 The second part by a later hand

The next set of folios making up this Śivadharma Ms consists of three titles: the *Uttaromāmaheśvarasaṃvāda** (24 folios), the *Vṛṣasārasaṃgraha* (50 folios), and the *Dharmaputrikā* (11 folios). We do not know the original order of these three works because each section starts with folio 1. Moreover, even though these three titles appear to be written by the same hand (probably somewhat later than the first part), there is no certainty that these folios were produced to complement the first part. The current situation of the Munich leaves suggests that the second part was produced to complement the first, but we cannot exclude that this part of the Śivadharma corpus was originally preceded by a part written in the same or similar hand. In other words, we cannot exclude that the second part was taken from another complete Śivadharma corpus in order to supplement the considerably older first part.

3.3 The Dharmaputrikā portion of the second part

There is something unique about the *Dharmaputrikā* portion of the second set of the Munich manuscript: the chapter (*paṭala*) that usually comes as the sixth was initially completely skipped but appears as the seventeenth at the end. Apart from the different arrangement, the text seems quite close to the text of the *Dharmaputrikā* in other manuscripts. It is likely that chapter 6 was initially skipped by mistake because the text of the usual 7th *paṭala* fol-

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[8] This is an exception. A common custom is to start a new text on the verso of a folio, leaving the very first visible side of a bundle empty.

lows that of the 5th, and even though the chapter comes as the 6th, the text of the 7th concludes saying that the chapter is the 7th (7v of the *Dharmaputrikā*).[9]

3.4 Stray folios

A few stray folios are included in the bundle. One folio contains a portion of the *Śivadharmaśāstra*, corresponding to 11.12–44b of the published edition. The physical dimensions of the folio are identical with those of the other folios, but the script appears slightly younger than even the script in the second part of the corpus. Paleographically this folio appears to come from 11th- or 12th-c. Nepal. We are not aware of another manuscript of the corpus written in the same script that is missing this particular folio. That is, this folio does not appear to be from any known manuscripts of the corpus.

Furthermore, there are also the first two folios of the *Śivadharmaśāstra* (and hence possibly of the whole corpus). Since this portion of the text is found in the first major set of the Munich manuscript, these two folios do not form part of it. The hand is also different from that of the stray folio described just above. Thus, the two folios come from yet another Ms. that we may not be aware of. It is not a surprise, but the existence of these two folios indicates how popular the *Śivadharmaśāstra* was. There must have been many more copies of it that we do not and will never know. The folios are damaged at the edges, to the extent that the readings on the first line are affected. The right-hand edge of the folios is also broken off, with loss of some letters. The hand appears to change on the first line of the second folio. Still, the two hands belong to the same time period. Paleographically, the two folios can be ascribed to the 12th or the 13th c.

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[9] One imaginable scenario is that the scribe finished copying the 5th *paṭala* and had a break or finished a day's work. When he came back to work on the manuscript, he saw he had finished the fifth and looked for the 6th *paṭala* in his exemplar. He saw the end of the 6th *paṭala* in his exemplar and started to copy the text *following* the rubric whereas he should have looked for the end of the 5th *paṭala* and continued copying. When he finished copying the whole *Dharmaputrikā*, he realized his mistake and supplied the 6th *paṭala* at the end, calling it chapter 17.

The bundle also includes a stray folio from a *Niśvāsaguhya* manuscript, probably produced in the 9th c.

From this manuscript, we gain some insight into the formation of the Śivadharma corpus in Nepal.

4. Towards the formation of the corpus
4.1 Addition of the Umāmaheśvarasaṃvāda and the Śivopaniṣad

When we look across the manuscripts of the Śivadharma corpus preserved in Nepal,[10] we start to discern a pattern in terms of constituting textual pieces and their orders. In many older manuscripts, the *Śivadharmaśāstra*, the *Śivadharmottara* and the *Śivadharmasaṃgraha* appear in this order (N^K_{82}, N^O_{15}, N^K_3, N^K_7, N^L_{16}, N^K_{11}, N^C_{94}, N^C_{45}, N^K_{25}, N^K_{57}, N^K_{28}, etc.).[11] There are manuscripts that have only these works (N^K_{12}), which tend to behave like a unit. Exceptions (manuscripts that miss one or two of the three) exist, but they seem to do so for a reason, such as that one portion which was originally part of the bundle was taken out (possibly for study purposes) or only one of the three was copied, again, in order to study that particular work. On the other hand, the *Śivadharmaśāstra* and the *Śivadharmottara* were transmitted outside Nepal.[12] Although there is a question about the provenance of the *Śivadharmasaṃgraha* — whether it is unique to the Nepalese Śivadharma corpus or it was also known outside Nepal — these three clearly form an early group, hence it seems most natural to consider that the *Śivadharmasaṃgraha* was integrated into the corpus before other works.

Unfortunately, the Munich manuscript is missing the *Śivadharmasaṃgraha*, but the existing folios and folio numbers (81 to 121 missing) suggest that the folios containing it were taken out of the bundle at some stage.

The *Umāmaheśvarasaṃvāda* and the *Śivopaniṣad* are included in the part written in the older script. For this reason, we can be rea-

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[10] See De Simini 2016 for the components of the corpus and manuscript evidence of it.

[11] See Appendix 1 for the sigla. Most of the manuscripts referred to here are older palm-leaf manuscripts. There are more paper manuscripts than I mention in this section.

[12] See De Simini 2016: 276 ff. for the materials outside Nepal.

sonably certain that these two works had already been integrated into the corpus in the 9th c.

The explicits of the two works give us glimpses into how the corpus was formed. The *Umāmaheśvarasaṃvāda* has the following explicit:

fol. 151r1
bhagavato gītapurāṇe • dharmaguhyamanuṣyamokṣaṇaṃ umāmaheśvarasaṃvāda ekaviṃśatimaḥ parisamāptaḥ || || || [r2]

ekānekavimuktarūpam atulan niṣkiñcanaṃ śāśvataṃ
  bhāvābhāvavicāravasturahitaṃ sāṅgaḥ (!) pra<ve>śāntātmakaṃ
vāksaṃvādaguṇāguṇavyapagatañ cākāśadhātūpamaṃ
  taṃ saṃsārikadoṣajālarahitaṃ vandadhvam ādyaśivam ||

śrīpaśupatinivāsinā paramaśivā || || || [r3] rādhyatamamāheśvareṇa
suvarṇṇacandreṇa śivadharmmacatuḥkhaṇḍo lekhāpitvā śivabhaṭṭā-
rakāya pratipāditam iti mātāpitṛpūrvvaṅgamā sakalasatvānāñ ca
svargāpavarggam prāpnuvann iti ||

The 21st chapter of the *Umāmaheśvarasaṃvāda* […][13] is complete.

You must salute Śiva the beginning, whose nature is free from one or many, who is unparalleled, devoid of anything, permanent, free from matters that are subject to analyses of being or not being, perfect, peaceful by nature, beyond speech, agreement, merits or demerits, comparable to the element space, free from the net of the faults that make one reincarnate.

[This manuscript] of the Śivadharma consisting of four parts was presented to Śivabhaṭṭāraka [God Śiva or someone whose rank is Śivabhaṭṭāraka], having been commissioned by a resident at Śrī Paśupati, Suvarṇacandra, a Māheśvara [devotee of Śiva], most favoured by the supreme Śiva, acquiring heaven and liberation for all the ancestors [of Suvarṇacandra] and all the beings.

Some notes on the interpretation are due. First, the verse is in the Śārdūlavikrīḍita meter. The author appears to be versed in Śaiva

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[13] The initial part of the explicit *bhagavato gītapurāṇe dharmaguhyamanu-ṣyamokṣaṇaṃ* is intentionally left untranslated. For the correct title of this chapter and its significance, see De Simini 2017: 531–532.

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theology and the śāstric discourses on the nature of god to some degree. Yet the composer of the verse does not appear to be able to express intricate thoughts in sophisticated poetry. The verse is rather mundane and simple. It is especially monotonous in the use of the words that denote Śiva's lack of certain properties. Some terms in the colophon, *paramaśivārādhyatamamāheśvara* and *śivabhaṭṭāraka*, make me wonder whether they denote ranks of priests at the temple or, in the case of Śivabhaṭṭāraka, even the ruling king who was seen as a reincarnation of Śiva. Also, the use of the word *sattva* to refer to living beings is Buddhistic. It might be an indication that in this period the same group of scribes was involved in the production of manuscripts of both Hindu and Buddhist works in the Kathmandu valley.

Besides the above general remarks, the colophon provides some significant information:

1 the manuscript was commissioned by a resident of the so-called Paśupatinātha temple;
2 when this colophon was written, the Śivadharma corpus was considered to consist of four parts. They should naturally be the *Śivadharmaśāstra*, the *Śivadharmottara*, the *Śivadharmasaṃgraha*, and the *Umāmaheśvarasaṃvāda.*

The question arises whether this entire colophon was in fact copied from its exemplar because apparently the production of the manuscript continued even after the colophon was written. The word *iti* at the end of the colophon might indicate that the scribe of *this* manuscript wanted to convey that the preceding lines were something he had before his eyes. An alternative possibility would be that the following text was added after the manuscript had already been delivered to the party that commissioned it. However, this does not appear to be the case. The handwritings of the colophon and the following text appear identical from the sizes and shapes of the letters to the thickness of the ink or the line width (these elements could change even on the same day when a scribe is working on the same manuscript if the ink supply changes or the pen is replaced). It appears that the same person kept writing the text of the *Umāmaheśvarasaṃvāda* and the *Śivopaniṣad* on the same folio on exactly the same occasion.

Then, the *Śivopaniṣad* ends as follows:

168v3: *iti śivopaniṣadi śivācārādhyāyaḥ saptamaḥ paṭalaḥ samāptaḥ ǁ samāptaṃ caitac chāstrapañcakhaṇḍaśivārādhanaprakaraṇaṃ candasā ślokānuṣṭubhena ṣaḍsahasrasaptaśatādhikeneti ǁ✳✳✳ǁ✳✳✳ǁ✳✳ ✳✳ǁ✳✳✳✳ǁ✳|*

Thus ends the seventh part called the chapter on Śiva conducts of the Śiva Upaniṣad. Also, this marks the end of this teaching (*śāstra*), a work on the worship of Śiva, consisting of five sections, whose length is equivalent to 6700 *śloka*s (214,000 syllables).

Again, this colophon conveys important information. The most significant is that the *śāstra*, presumably the one recorded in the manuscript — from folio 1 to up to folio 168 — consists of five works. It should be recalled that at the end of the *Umāmaheśvara-saṃvāda*, the Śivadharma was said to consist of four parts (*khaṇḍa*s), and the colophon showed some signs of being copied from an earlier manuscript. What these two colophons tell us is that the *Śivopaniṣad* was added to the corpus after the *Umāmaheśva-rasaṃvāda*.

Since the first major part of the Munich manuscript ends with the *Śivopaniṣad*, we are in the position to postulate the following regarding the expansion of the Śivadharma corpus:

1. the *Śivadharmaśāstra* and the *Śivadharmottara* were composed outside Nepal (they were known outside Nepal) and kept being modified even after their first reception in Nepal (more on this below);
2. we still do not know the provenance of the *Śivadharmasaṅgraha*, but it formed a group with the previous two. It seems reasonable to assume that its composition (not just the addition to the corpus) postdates the initial composition of the two;
3. the *Umāmaheśvarasaṃvāda* (UMS) was added following the above;
4. then the *Śivopaniṣad* (ŚU) was added to the corpus;
5. the above two events happened by the beginning of the 10th c. because the production of the Munich manuscript is unlikely to be later than that.

At this point, there is only scant evidence to surmise the order and dates of the composition and addition of the remaining components, i.e., the *Vṛṣasārasaṃgraha* (VSS), the *Dharmaputrikā* (DhP)

and the *Uttaromāmaheśvarasaṃvāda** (UUMS), of the corpus. We might still try to draw a tentative picture based on the available facts.

Among the manuscripts that record these auxiliary texts (UMS, ŚU, UUMS, VSS, DhP), the majority of the palm-leaf manuscripts number all the folios in a continuous sequence. They do not reset the folio number to 1 every time a new text starts. The only exceptions are the second part of the Munich manuscript, which is the topic of this article, and another, N_{82}^K (De Simini 2016). These two number their folios of the auxiliary texts from one, making it impossible to know in what order they were copied. In this regard, note that N_{82}^K resets the folio number to 1 even when it starts the *Śivadharmottara* or the *Śivadharmasaṃgraha*, while the foliation of the Munich manuscript is consecutive up to the end of the *Śivopaniṣad*.

So, if we make a table of manuscripts and their constituting texts in the order in which they appear in the manuscript, we can observe the following:

1   the majority of manuscripts have the UUMS, the VSS, and the DhP in this order (N_{15}^O, N_{107}^K, N_3^K, N_{16}^L, N_{57}^P);
2   there are two manuscripts that simply lack the DhP, and hence the UUMS and the VSS show up in the same order as above;
3   there are no manuscripts that have only the DhP without the VSS; in other words, when a manuscript contains the DhP, the VSS is always there;
4   however, the opposite is possible: i.e., there are manuscripts that have the VSS but not the DhP;
5   when both appear, the VSS always precedes the DhP (occasionally, other components may intervene between the two);
6   even when a manuscript does not have the VSS (and hence the DhP: see above), the UUMS can be present; i.e., there are manuscripts that have the UUMS but neither the VVS nor the DhP.

What these data suggest is that the UUMS, the VSS and the DhP were included into the corpus in this order. This hypothesis must be tested through philological examinations. To conclude this section, I should again emphasize that the time of the inclusion of a work into the corpus does not necessarily reflect the age of its composition.

4.2 What is the Uttaromāmaheśvarasaṃvāda?

I have been using the title *Uttaromāmaheśvarasaṃvāda** in this article for the work that is variously titled in the manuscripts. In fact, this title never appears in any of the witnesses. The titles of this component of the corpus found in the manuscripts are:

> *ity umottare mahāsaṃvāde* (N^P_{57}, N^O_{15}, etc.)
> *ity uttarottare mahāsaṃvāde* (N^K_{52}, N^K_{7}, Munich, etc.)
> *iti uttarottare umāmaheśvarasaṃvāde* (N^K_{3})

All these titles do not seem very meaningful. The name *Uttarottaramahāsaṃvāda* — as two words: *uttarottaraḥ mahāsaṃvādaḥ* — is the most frequently attested. For convenience, since all the variations contain the elements *u…u…m…saṃvāda*, in the following I will use the abbreviation UUMS.

Now, let us look at the title found in the Paris manuscript (N^P_{57}). The ending of the first chapter of this text in that manuscript reads *ity umottare mahāsaṃvāde…* instead of the more common *uttarottare*. This title does not convey any meaning, but this reading reminds us of another component of the corpus, the *Umāmaheśvarasaṃvāda* (UMS). The colophon that more directly recalls that part of the corpus is the one found in N^K_{3}. Apart from the repeated *uttara*, the colophon explicitly refers to the title *umāmaheśvarasaṃvāda*. One plausible explanation is the change from *uttaromāmaheśvarasaṃvāda* to *uttarottara maheśvarasaṃvāda* to *uttarottara mahāsaṃvāda*. That is, by changing from *uttaromā* to *uttarottara* and dropping °*īśvara*°, we get *Uttarottaramahāsaṃvāda*.

The idea that the originally meant title might have been *Uttaromāmaheśvarasaṃvāda* ('the latter *Umāmaheśvarasaṃvāda*') seems likely if we consider the content: first of all, the text is a conversation between Umā and Maheśvara, where the former asks the latter to teach *dharma* (right) and *adharma* (wrong) (1.1). In the UMS, Umā asks Maheśvara to teach her 'all the *dharma*s' (1.9). Also, as Kafle (2022) points out, the two texts share many topics.

In fact, about 300 two-*pāda śloka* lines of the text are shared between the UMS and the UUMS, many with some variations.[14] The

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[14] These observations rely on the electronic texts of the UMS and the UUMS prepared on the basis of Naraharinath 1998. The e-text of the UMS was prepared

UMS contains about 2600 lines, while the UUMS consists of about 2000 lines. Thus, more than 10% of the text of the UMS or about 15% of the text of the UUMS are shared between the two. While being shorter, when the UUMS expounds the same topics as the UMS, it is more elaborate. A possible explanation is that the UUMS is meant to be an improved or reworked version of the UMS, and hence the 'latter conversation between Umā and Maheśvara' (*Uttaromāmaheśvarasaṃvāda*). We know through the Munich manuscript that the UMS had already become part of the corpus when the manuscript was copied in the 9th-c. script, and the corpus did not contain any other text after it. It follows that the UUMS was composed as an improved version of the UMS after the 9th c., already with the intention to integrate it into the Śivadharma corpus.

5. *Revisions of the Śivadharmaśāstra and the Munich manuscript*

The following discussion builds upon the findings in De Simini 2017: 517–528. It discussed substantial variants regarding the structure of the 12th chapter of the ŚDhŚ, In particularly, the position of the ten stanzas that list the five sets of eight Śaiva holy places (*pañcāṣṭaka*s) is at the centre of the discussion.[15] What makes the difference in the analysis of the material found in the manuscripts in this article, compared to the 2017 one, is that the Munich manuscript forms a group with another manuscript that, back then, might have simply seemed anomalous. The fact that the Munich manuscript apparently predates any known manuscripts of the ŚDhŚ and its 12th chapter, thus showing the same structure as the seemingly insignificant manuscript N^K_{12}, changes the narrative. What follows is a digested form of the information provided in De Simini 2017, but with some new information:

by Anil Kumar Acharya and that of the UUMS by Csaba Kiss. The identification of shared texts was done by a python script that uses a module enabling fuzzy search. The similarity between lines is judged using the levenshtein distance. The distance ratio beyond 70 generally is observed between lines that may be considered parallel by humans. The levenshtein distances ratio around 65 are observed between two *śloka* lines where only one *pāda* is shared. The table of shared lines between two texts is too large to be included in this article, but may be supplied upon request.

[15] For the *pañcāṣṭaka*, see Bisschop 2006: 27–34.

- In terms of arrangements of stanzas of ŚDhŚ 12, there are four groups of manuscripts and various manuscripts from South India. The groups are X, A, P, K.[16] The South Indian manuscripts that have been examined are: G_{42}^{Ch}, D_{72}^{P}, G_{40}^{L}, $G^{Ki}(D_{32}^{P})$.[17]

  - X: N_{12}^{K} and the Munich manuscript (both Nepalese).[18]

  - A: manuscripts in this group all are of Nepalese origin: e.g. N_{45}^{C}, N_{94}^{C}, N_{7}^{K}, N_{82}^{K}.[19]

  - P: N_{28}^{K}, N_{77}^{Ko} and N_{15}^{O} (all from Nepal).

  - K: Manuscripts from Kashmir, $Ś_{87}^{B}$ and $Ś_{67}^{S}$.

- The *text* transmitted in group A manuscripts receives the label 'version A.' In the following, if a stanza is referred to by a stanza number, then it will be in this version, specifically, in accordance to Appendix 3 in De Simini 2013. Note that in De Simini 2013 some stanzas consist of six *pāda*s rather than four, as is more common. The same numberings are used in De Simini 2017. In the 2017 article, a subscript 'A' was attached to a stanza number to indicate that the number was for this version.[20]

- The text of ŚDhŚ 12 can be divided into eight parts whose sequence differs in different versions.

- Following their appearance in version A:

  - Two major parts, 1 and 2, consisting of 12.1–52 and 12.53–109, respectively.

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[16] In the 2017 article, two South Indian manuscripts, G_{40}^{L} and DP32 were grouped together as representing the text 'version D.' However, probably they do not share a close ancestor. They are similar in that they have the ten stanzas on *pañcāṣṭaka* at the same place, but this is a consequence of the scribes of their ancestral manuscripts correctly interpreting the revision instruction. See below.

[17] There are several other South Indian manuscripts, but not all of them have been incorporated in this article.

[18] The 2017 article did not have this as a group of manuscripts, but it did mention N_{12}^{K} (p. 516). Now, however, with the knowledge of the Munich manuscript, we know that N_{12}^{K} was not a unique case regarding the δ stanzas and, for that reason, these two should form a group.

[19] Additionally, the Paris manuscript (N_{57}^{P}) belongs to this group.

[20] The stanzas that are not in the version A text were referred to with a number and an asterisk in De Simini 2017. They were unique to individual manuscripts. Therefore, if an additional stanza is found across different manuscripts, it could get a completely different number depending on the situation preceding the stanza. In this article, such stanzas not found in version A are not referred to with numbers.

- Part 1 is further divided into 3 parts:
  - 1a for 12.1–41.
  - 1b for 12.42–50.
  - and 1c for 12.51 and 52.
    - There are two variants of the first *pāda* of 12.51a: one that starts with *dānāny āvasatham* [1c(dā)][21] or *ārāmāvasatham* [1c(ā)].
- Part 2 is divided again into four parts:
  - 2a: 12.53–57.
  - 2b: 12.58–74.
  - 2c: 12.75–109.
  - After this, version A has ten stanzas on five sets of eight sacred places (δ) followed by 1c again.
  - 2d:12.122 and 123; the apparent conclusion of the chapter as well as the whole of ŚDhŚ itself.[22]
    - 2d1: The first line of the two stanzas:
    - 2d2: the rest.

These pieces appear in different versions in the following manner:

X	G^{Ch}_{42}	D^{P}_{72}	A	G^{L}_{40}	$G^{Ki}(D^{P}_{32})$	P	Kashmir
1a	1a	1a	1a	1a	1a	1a	1a'
						2b	2b"
1b	1b	1b	1b	1b	1b	1b	1b'
				δ	δ	δ	δ'
1c(dā)	1c(dā)	1c(ā)	1c(ā)	1c(ā)	1c(dā)	1c(dā)	1c(dā)
2a	2a	2a	2a	2a		2a'	2a"
2b	2b	2b	2b	2b	2(a–c)'		
2c	2c	2c	2c	2c		2c'	2c"
2d	2d	2d				2d	θ
	δ	δ	δ				
	1c(dā)	1c'	1c(dā)				
	2d1	2d1	2d	2d1	2d1		
	ζ	ζ		ζ	ζ		
	2d2	2d2		2d2	2d2		

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[21] Or minor variants such as *dānādyāvasatham, dānāny avasatham*, and so forth. I regard the reading *dānāny* as the original one.

[22] On the five kinds of Śivadharma (*pañcaprakāraḥ śivadharmaḥ*) mentioned in the first explicit stanza, see De Simini 2017.

See Appendixes 2 and 3 for the details on the Kashmiri transmissions and version P respectively. The above depicts the following:

- Version X is the shortest; it ends with 2d.
- G^{Ch}_{42}, D^P_{72}, and A practically contain the entire version X with the same structure.
    - G^{Ch}_{42} and D^P_{72} additionally have δ, followed by 1c (second time) and 2d (second time).
    - Version A does the same in that δ, 1c and 2d appear at the end.
    - But G^{Ch}_{42} and D^P_{72} and A are different in that 2d (an apparent conclusion of the ŚDhŚ) appears twice in G^{Ch}_{42} and D^P_{72} but only once in A.
    - Also, in G^{Ch}_{42} and D^P_{72} the two stanzas of 2d surround about three dozen stanzas (ζ).
        - This is common to all the manuscripts from South India examined so far.
    - G^{Ch}_{42} and D^P_{72} are different in that in the first occurrence of 1c, the first of the two stanza starts with *ārāmāvasatham* in D^P_{72} while in G^{Ch}_{42} it starts with *dānāny āvasatham*.
    - Also, in the second appearance of 1c, the first line reads something completely different in D^P_{72}.[23]
- In G^L_{40}, $G^{Ki}(D^P_{32})$, P, and K, δ interrupts 1b and 1c that are continuous in versions X, G^{Ch}_{42}, D^P_{72}, and A.
    - 1c appears twice, the second time following δ, in G^{Ch}_{42}, D^P_{72} and A.
    - In G^L_{40}, $G^{Ki}(D^P_{32})$, P, and K, 1c follows δ.
    - G^L_{40} and $G^{Ki}(D^P_{32})$ are similar except in one significant point: while 1c in G^{Ch}_{42} starts with *dānāny āvasatham*, that of D^P_{72} starts with *ārāmāvasatham*.
    - Version P is similar to G^L_{40} and $G^{Ki}(D^P_{32})$ structurally as far as δ and 1c are concerned; however, 2b is found in between segments 1a and 1b, which are contiguous in X, A, and all the Southern manuscripts.
    - Version K is similar to Version P but with many extra lines or expanded lines.
    - All the manuscripts from South India have essentially the

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[23] *puṇyāṣṭakam idaṃ jñeyaṃ śivasāyujyakāraṇam.*

same about three dozen extra stanzas (ζ) between the last two stanzas of X regardless of the preceding texts.

There are variations between the manuscripts in a group, but the members of each group share the general characteristics regarding the stanza arrangements shown in the above chart. So, what happened to the text to produce this situation? We can in fact form a relatively solid theory about how these versions emerged just based on the above chart.

We should first wonder what the different placements of δ mean: it can appear never (X), near the end (G_{42}^{Ch}, D_{72}^{P}, and A), or in the middle (G_{40}^{L}, $G^{Ki}(D_{32}^{P})$, P, and K). We should also consider why two stanzas (1c) that occur in the middle (in all versions) appear twice in the versions that have δ near the end, i.e., the second time after δ. We should also account for the fact that in two versions that have δ near the end, the apparent conclusion of the whole work (2d) appears twice.

The answer appears quite simple. The clue is that, when δ appears, regardless of its position, 1c follows it. This points to the following: δ was meant to be added to the text as a revision before 1c. If this sounds like a leap, then one should consider: 'How do you communicate a textual addition at a specific place?' We do it by providing a note that says: 'Replace this part with additional text x and itself.' In the case of Sanskrit manuscript traditions, a revision of this size (ten *śloka*s) was most likely initially communicated by means of a folio describing where to insert the additional ten stanzas (before 1c). Such an instruction will look like the additional stanzas followed by the two stanzas before which the ten stanzas was to be inserted. The versions that have δ, 1c and 2d at the end (G_{42}^{Ch}, D_{72}^{P}, and A) simply reproduced what was given without implementing the instructions. G_{42}^{Ch} and D_{72}^{P} best preserve the situation. Even before δ and 1c appears, the whole of the ŚDhŚ is concluded in the same manner as in version X. In the history of version A, perhaps someone felt odd that the 'ending' of the whole work occurred in the middle and got rid of the first occurrence of 2d. In the case of G_{42}^{Ch} and D_{72}^{P}, the conclusion to the whole of the ŚDhŚ prevalent in South India was further attached. However, we know of manuscripts where the revision instructions were properly applied: G_{40}^{L}, $G^{Ki}(D_{32}^{P})$, P and K. They have δ between 1b and 1c, the intended place (cf. De Simini 2017: 520).

Several recipients of the revision instructions did not follow the instructions, but many others did. This means that the place of δ is not an indication of a genealogical relationship. In other words, the manuscripts that have δ near the end (and hence 1c twice) are not necessarily descendants of a single manuscript that failed to follow the revision instructions. Similarly, not all the manuscripts that have δ at the intended position derive from a single manuscript that implemented the instructions as intended. This can be inferred from the readings of the beginning of 1c (*dānāny āvasatham* or *ārāmāvasatham*). There are four combinations when we look at the place of δ and the beginning of 1c: δ at the end and 1c(dā); δ at the end and 1c(ā); δ in the middle and 1c(dā); and δ in the middle and 1c(ā). The simplest condition for this to happen is that both readings for 1c existed prior to the distribution of the revision instructions. Clearly all possible outcomes happened. Besides, the creator of the revision presupposed the reading *dānāny*°. This is why A has *ārāmā*° when 1c appeared the first time and *dānāny*° when it appeared the second time. The latter is there because it was in the revision instructions.

There was another revision that took place, and we find the resulting texts in Nepal and Kashmir in the form of versions P and K (cf. De Simini 2017: 521 ff.). The revision consisted in moving 2b between 1a and 1b. This is more likely to have happened after the δ revision due to the paucity of the evidence otherwise. We know of no version that does not have δ, but where 2b is between 1a and 1b, while we know versions with δ where 2b is found between 2a and 2c. Although unlikely, it is not impossible that the movement of 2b occurred before the δ revision instructions were received, and the resulting text was transmitted to Nepal and Kashmir. Either way, the text underwent further revisions in Kashmir.

There is another revision that likely happened in South India. That was to add ζ, about three dozen stanzas, between the concluding two stanzas. It is significant that this modification was applied to all the possible combinations of the δ placement and two versions of 1c. Again, this 'revision' to the ending of ŚDhŚ was distributed independently of the main body and incorporated regardless of what version of ŚDhŚ 12 was in the main body. It appears that this development was confined to South India, but

there is no evidence to preclude that the change might have originated in another region.

Here is a summary of what probably happened to ŚDhŚ 12:

1   The oldest structure of ŚDhŚ 12 we can discern is in the Munich manuscript and N^K_{12}: there was no δ, the ten stanzas on the 40 holy places.[24]

2   The variant *ārāmāvasatham* at the beginning of 1c enters the transmission. This version might have reached Nepal and South India.

3   Someone somewhere decided that the names of holy places should be included in the text, and they proposed a revision, namely the insertion of ten stanzas between 1b and 1c. This was communicated in the form of an instruction, 'These two stanzas (1c) will become twelve stanzas (of which the last two are the same as the original),' most likely presented on one folio.

4   G^{Ch}_{42}, D^P_{72} from South India and manuscripts in group A from Nepal more or less reproduce the situation where the revision is represented by a) a complete text of the ŚDhŚ before revision, followed by b) an attached instruction—those were the cases (or rather descendants of the cases) where scribes failed to realize the proper place where the changes should occur. The revision was simply placed after the pre-revision text. During the transmission, some scribes occasionally noticed the incongruities caused by the additional text placed at the end (such as having a double conclusion) and tried to fix it with minimal effort. This happened more than once independently to witnesses carrying different versions of the ŚDhŚ.

5   In other cases, the revision was successfully incorporated. This, too, happened multiple times to manuscripts with different versions of the ŚDhŚ.

6   On yet another occasion, someone decided to move 2b between 1a and 1b. Version P from Nepal and Śāradā manuscripts reflect this revision.

7   There was one more revision to substantially expand the ending of the ŚDhŚ adding about three dozen stanzas. We have

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[24] Obviously 2b was between 2a and 2c because the presence of 2b between 1a and 1b presupposes the presence of δ.

evidence from South India. Significantly, this change was also applied regardless of the version of the text that preceded.

The above has implications for prospective editors of the ŚDhŚ. The evidence shows that changes to the text were proposed several times, that they were received by manuscripts with different versions of the text, and that in some cases, intended changes were not well communicated. This in turn suggests that changes could be communicated piece by piece, with the implication that there was at least one authority that could decide what changes were to be made to the ŚDhŚ. This implication raises a major methodological question about the text prospective editors wish to reconstruct. The ŚDhŚ is the sum of all these different versions from different times and places. In many ways the development of the ŚDhŚ was similar to modern-day software development projects (revisions, patches, forks, etc.). Those who were involved in the transmission were more interested in improving the text than preserving its most archaic form. Even if it were possible to establish the most archaic form of ŚDhŚ 12, we should ask whether it was the most significant version for the users of the text. Or was it even intelligible, coherent, or grammatically and metrically sound? (The answer could well be negative.) I think the decision is up to the editor. Whatever version is to be reconstructed as the constituted text, it would be important to allow researchers to have access to the whole of the revision and branch history.

There are other insights we gain from the above observations. One is that we cannot assume the existence of the Nepalese or a South Indian traditions of the ŚDhŚ. As the Table above shows, I had to treat each manuscript from South India individually.[25] This is because the same revision could affect two pre-existing versions in different manners. Some resulting texts look similar to some versions found in Nepal but those similarities arose independently, except that they were all caused by the same revision push. Nepal has preserved various ŚDhŚ versions resulting from different revisions applied to already variegated versions. Version X was probably the first they received. We find results of the same revi-

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[25] The diversity of the South Indian transmission of the ŚDhŚ is noted in De Simini 2017 and Bisschop, Kafle and Lubin 2021.

sion pushes that produced versions A and P in South India and Kashmir. Two versions were already in existence before the δ revision push. And traces of both are found in Nepal and South India. Neither region developed its own version of the ŚDhŚ from just one earlier version or the other. South India, too, has preserved various versions of the text (cf. De Simini 2017: 520). The combination of the two earlier versions—the one with 1c(dā) and the other with 1c(ā)—with successful or imperfect implementation of the δ revision produced four different versions. And these two conditions affected the Nepalese ŚDhŚ too. The same goes with the second revision push to move 2b from its original place to insert it between 1a and 1b. The results of that push are seen in Nepal and Kashmir. One thing is clear: those revision pushes worked horizontally, viz., they affected pre-existing texts. It could be that the revision instructions were distributed to different regions separately, or the versions produced by those revisions in one place had a wide distribution, or some other complex combination of these two scenarios. Either way, there was a network and a center or centers that had the authority to issue changes to pre-existing ŚDhŚ. One wonders whether the center was in Nepal or South India or Kashmir. While my inclination is to think that Nepal was always on the receiving end of innovations, perhaps we should keep an open mind. At any rate, the issue of who was responsible for producing and revising the ŚDhŚ or even the whole corpus remains an interesting and open area for research. We must also not forget the apparent existence of an authority in South India that again issued a revision horizontally over pre-existing versions, thus greatly expanding the end of the ŚDhŚ.

6. *Conclusion*

The above has been an illustration of what the discovery of one manuscript can bring to our understanding of a corpus. We also get the confirmation of the importance that the Śivadharma corpus held in Nepal. In addition to the already substantial number (more than 60) of known manuscripts, we now know the existence of three potential additional witnesses. We also know that by the 9th c., the corpus had grown to include the *Śivadharmaśāstra*, the *Śivadharmottara*, the *Śivadharmasaṃgraha*, the *Umāmaheśvara-saṃvāda*, and the *Śivopaniṣad*. Of these, we now know that the last

was added after the corpus was considered to consist of four parts. We have also become aware that new (intentional) revisions could affect earlier versions of the ŚDhŚ across a wide area (essentially the whole of the sub-continent).

Appendix 1
List of sigla and manuscripts

Here is a list of sigla and corresponding manuscripts used for this article. For a more thorough treatment of the manuscript traditions, especially in Nepal, see De Simini 2016. Similar lists of Śivadharma corpus manuscripts are found in Bisschop (2018: 52ff.), Bisschop, Kafle and Lubin (2021: 49ff.), De Simini and Kiss (2021: 311–312). In earlier publications one may find the sigla P^T_{72} for D^P_{72} and P^T_{32} for D^P_{32}. Here D^P_{72} and D^P_{32} are used to be consistent with the system employed for other manuscripts (the initial of the script name, followed by the first letter of the name of the place where the manuscript is kept and the last two digits of the accession number or shelf mark). In a few cases, the dates recorded in the manuscripts have been recalculated.

D^P_{72} A Devanagari transcript kept at the French Institute of Pondicherry, T. No. 72, of a manuscript in Telugu script, Adyar Library 66015.[26]

G^{Ch}_{42} A Grantha manuscript kept at the Madras Government Oriental Manuscript Library, R. 2442.

$G^{Ki}(D^P_{32})$ A Grantha manuscript owned by Nataraja Gurukal and its Devanagari transcript kept at the French Institute of Pondicherry, T. No. 32.

G^L_{40} A Grantha manuscript kept at the Leiden University Library, van Manen Collection, II.40.

N^C_{45} A Nepalese palm-leaf manuscript kept at the Cambridge University Library, Add. 1645, dated Monday 10 July 1139.

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[26] The transcript itself says it was copied from the Grantha manuscript Adyar 75429. However, this manuscript is not a copy of the *Śivadharmaśāstra* or the *Śivadharmottara.*

N_{94}^{C} A Nepalese palm-leaf manuscript kept at the Cambridge University Library, Add. 1694.

N_{3}^{K} A Nepalese palm-leaf manuscript kept at the National Archives Kathmandu, NAK 5–737, photographed by the Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project (NGMPP) as reel No. A 1/4–5 and A 3/3, dated Thursday, 4 Jan 1201.

N_{7}^{K} A Nepalese palm-leaf manuscript kept at the National Archives Kathmandu, NAK 1–1075, photographed by the NGMPP as reel No. B 7/3.

N_{107}^{K} A Nepalese paper manuscript, Kesar Library 537, photographed by the NGMPP as reel No. C–107/7, dated 1686 CE.

N_{11}^{K} A Nepalese palm-leaf manuscript kept at the National Archives Kathmandu, NAK 5-738, NGMPP A 11/3, recording two dates, Monday 22 May 1396 and Monday 4 Sept 1396.[27]

N_{12}^{K} A Nepalese palm-leaf manuscript kept at the National Archives Kathmandu, NAK 5-841, NGMPP B 12/4

N_{25}^{K} A Nepalese palm-leaf manuscript kept at the Kesar Library, Kathmandu, acc. No. 218, photographed by the NGMPP as reel No. C 25/1.

N_{28}^{K} A Nepalese palm-leaf manuscript kept at the National Archives Kathmandu, acc. No. NAK 6-7, photographed by the NGMPP as reel No. A 1028/4.

N_{52}^{K} A Nepalese paper manuscript kept at the National Archives Kathmandu, acc. No. NAK 4/1352, photographed by the NGMPP as reel Nos. B 218/6 to B 219/1.

N_{57}^{K} A Nepalese paper manuscript kept at the Kesar Library, Kathmandu, acc. No. 597, photographed by the NGMPP as reel No. C 57/5.

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[27] Cf. De Simini 2016: 257–258.

N^K_{82} A Nepalese palm-leaf manuscript kept at the National Archives Kathmandu, acc. No. NAK 3/393, photographed by the NGMPP as reel No. A 1082/3, dated Wednesday 24 June 1069.

N^{Ko}_{77} A Nepalese palm-leaf manuscript kept at the Asiatic Society Calcutta, acc. No. 4077, dated Wednesday 7 July 1036.

N^L_{16} A Nepalese paper manuscript kept at the Wellcome Library, shelf mark WI δ 16 (I–VIII).

N^O_{15} A Nepalese palm-leaf manuscript kept at the Bodleian Library, shelf mark Bodl. Or. B 125 Sansk. A15 (R), dated Saturday 13 June 1187 or 1 Aug 1330 (on the cover).

N^P_{57} A Nepalese palm-leaf manuscript kept at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Institut d'Études Indiennes (IEI), Collège de France, shelf mark Skt. 57-B 23.

$Ś^B_{87}$ A Śāradā paper manuscript kept at the Banaras Hindu University, shelf mark CN 1087, acc. No. 330487.

$Ś^S_{67}$ A Śāradā paper manuscript kept at the Oriental Research Library, University Campus, Srinagar, acc. No. 1467.

Appendix 2
Updated Content of ŚDhŚ 12 in Śāradā Manuscripts

The table below is an updated version of the one found in De Simini 2017: 525–526. It compares the contents of two Śāradā paper manuscripts ($Ś^B_{87}$ and $Ś^S_{67}$) in relation to the content of version A (De Simini 2017: 511) of *Śivadharmaśāstra* 12. The purpose of including this table is to clarify how similar the contents of the two Śāradā manuscripts are. In the original article, readers could miss the fact. Also, a few errors in the table in the 2017 article have been corrected. The following is a guideline explaining how to understand the table.

• In De Simini 2017 (525–526), there were two series of stanza numbers:

- They either have a subscript capital '$_A$' or an asterisk (*) at the end of the stanza number.
- The stanza numbers with the subscript capital A referred to the stanzas in version A (De Simini 2017: 511) of ŚDhŚ 12. See Appendix 1 for which manuscripts transmit the version. Readers should be aware that the numbers presuppose the edition in De Simini 2013. There, some stanzas consist of six *pāda*s rather than the regular four. This is why cases like 12.62–63cdA followed by 12.64–66abA occurs. In the 2013 edition 12.64 has an additional line (63ef). Thus, 12.62–63cdA followed by 12.64–66abA means that 63ef is not found in the Śāradā manuscripts.
- The table in De Simini 2017 (525–526) had another series of stanza numbers, marked by an asterisk after the figures. The nature of these stanza numbers was explained in n. 37 on p. 526. They reflect the place of the stanza in a given manuscript. Thus, 12.1* is the first stanza of the 12th chapter of the *Śivadharmaśāstra* in a manuscript.[28]
  - All the stanzas in the two Śāradā manuscripts thus inherently have a starred sequence number but a starred stanza numbers appear in the 2017 table only when the stanza was not in version A. When the same stanza or *śloka* line is found in version A, the stanza number in that version was used, with a subscript '$_A$' attached at the end. What the table showed was that some *śloka* lines that are not found in version A were in the Śāradā manuscripts.
  - On the other hand, one may find two different stanza numbers with an asterisk in two adjunct columns. This did not mean that the additional (in relation to version A) text was different in the two manuscripts. In fact, they are the same except in one instance where $Ś^S_{67}$ does not have two lines that exist in $Ś^B_{87}$.
- All the stanza numbers in the 2017 table must have either a subscript or an asterisk. No other types of number is expected. When one sees a number without either, then it is the first num-

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[28] Theoretically, even if the stanza was completely different from a stanza found in the same place in another manuscript, they both get the same 12.1*. However, there are no such cases.

ber in a range, the starting number. In the table, entries are generally in the form of a range: two stanza numbers or *śloka* line references connected with a dash '–.' When a starting number or line reference (67cd, etc.) has neither a subscript '$_A$' or an asterisk, the one attached to the ending number is assumed.

- In the table below, some modifications are made:
    - A range of stanzas in one manuscript and corresponding sequence in another manuscript are aligned in the same row.
    - All the numbers refer to those in version A. No subscript '$_A$' is attached.
    - The stanzas or lines that are not in version A do not get a number in order to avoid confusion.[29]
    - Instead, the texts not found in version A but found in the Śāradā manuscripts are indicated by the number of *śloka* lines. When they are in the same row, they are generally identical. When they are not, it is noted.
- Some corrections have been made but not all are noted. Interested readers are encouraged to consult the 2017 article.
- Finally, the right-hand column indicates stanza groups based on the order of stanzas that appear in version A. Those groups become the units that appear in different orders in different versions.

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[29] In the 2017 table, the same additional lines often get different asterisked numbers. Such discrepancies were caused by several factors: simple counting errors, whether to count two lines as one stanza or to take the intent into account (resulting in a six *pāda* stanza); or eye-skips. All these contributed to the same text having different stanza numbers.

	$Ś^B_{87}$	$Ś^S_{67}$	
	2 *śloka* lines (one stanza)		
1a	12.1–41		
	12.58-59ab		
	1 *śloka* line		
	12.60–61		
	8 *śloka* lines		
2b	12.62–63cd		note 1
	12.64–66ab		
	12.67cd–68		note 2
	12.66cd		
	12.69–71		note 3
	12,74	12.73–74	
	12.42–44		
1b	2 *śloka* lines/one stanza		note 4
	12.45–50		
δ+1c	12.110–114ab		note 5
	1 *śloka* line		
	12.114cd		
	12.117ab		
	12.115cd-116		
	2 *śloka* lines/one stanza		
	12.118–119		
	4 *śloka* lines/two stanzas		
	12.120–121(= 51–52)		
2a	12.53–57		
2c	12.75–79	12.75–83	note 6
	12.81cd–83		
	2 *śloka* lines/one stanza		
	12.84–90		
	3 *śloka* lines		
	12.91ab		
	1 *śloka* line		
	12.91cd–96ab		note 7
	12.96ef–97ab		
	1 *śloka* line		
	12.97cd–98		
	26 *śloka* lines	24 *śloka* lines	note 8
	12.101–106cd		note 9
	12.107–108		
θ	8 *śloka* lines		

1   In the 2013 edition, 63 consists of 6 *pāda*s; what the chart says is that last two *pāda*s of 63 are missing.

2   66cd and 67ab are missing but 66cd is found below.

3   $Ś^B_{87}$ does not have 72 and 73; $Ś^S_{67}$ does not have 72 but has 73; 72 and 73 of A have very similar a-*pāda* and identical c-*pāda*. Thus, in the case of $Ś^S_{67}$, the reading is most probably the result of an eye-skip.

4   The stanza (*śivabhaktāya śaivāya dattvā kanyāṃ svalaṃkṛtām| kulatrayaṃ samuddhṛtya svargaṃ prāpnoti sa dhruvam|*) is the same as found at the same place in manuscripts of group P. The same stanza also appears in the South Indian manuscript $G^{Ki}(D^P_{32})$.

5   For a transcript of this portion, see De Simini 2017: 526–527, n. 37. In order to produce the sequence of the Śāradā manuscripts, we need to do the following: 1) replace 114cd with another two *pāda*s, 2) move 117ab to the place of 115ab, 3) replace 117cd with a whole stanza, 4) replace 119ab with another line, 5) and after 119cd, insert two stanzas. 12.120 and 12.121 can be written as 12.51 and 12.52 respectively since 12.120 and 12.51, and 12.121 and 12.52 in A are the same. These two stanzas appear only once in $Ś^B_{87}$ and $Ś^S_{67}$.

6   $Ś^B_{87}$ does not have 12.80–81ab (a possible eye-skip caused by *bhavet*).

7   This means 12.96cd is not there; 96 consists of 6 *pāda*s in the 2013 edition; between 97ab and 97cd of the edition, there is another line in both $Ś^B_{87}$ and $Ś^S_{67}$.

8   $Ś^B_{87}$ has 26 lines or 13 stanzas that are not in version A here; $Ś^S_{67}$ 24 lines (12 stanzas). $Ś^S_{67}$ does not have the 14th and the 15th lines that are in $Ś^B_{87}$.

9   Neither has 106ef.

In essence, those two manuscripts share essentially the same text of ŚDhŚ 12. This Kashmiri version has a number of extra *śloka* lines as well as a few alternative lines around the extra lines. The latter statement may be paraphrased as 'additional *śloka* lines in addition to or in place of the text of version A.' The differences between the two manuscripts come down to five missing lines in $Ś^B_{87}$ (12.73, 80 and 81ab of version A) and two in $Ś^S_{67}$ (the 14th and the 15th lines of 26 extra lines of $Ś^B_{87}$ toward the end). Then it

should be comprehensible that the two Śāradā manuscripts derive from the same source that had 1a, 2b, 1b, δ+1c, 2a, 2c with some additions or expansions, i.e., one line in version A becoming completely different multiple lines.

Appendix 3
Updated contents of manuscripts belonging to group P

The table below is a rearranged verson of a table found in De Simini 2017: 522. Many of the notes regarding the different presentations for the table above (regarding the Śāradā manuscript) apply here as well. However, multiple sequences have been placed in the same cluster to illustrate differences rather than similarities. For example, on the first row that correspond to 1a (12.1–41 in version A) becomes 12.1–5, one line, 6cd, 7–41 for N^O_{15}. This means that 12.6ab of version A is something else in that manuscript.

Table

N^K_{28}	N^O_{15}	N^{Ko}_{77}	
12.1–41	12.1–5, one line, 6cd, 7–41	12.1–41	1a
12.58–63cd, 64–74	12.58–74	12.58–72, 74	2b
12.42–44, three lines, 45–50	12.42–43, 46ab, 44, one stanza, 45–50	12.42–44, one stanza, 45–50	1b
12.110–119	12.110–119	12.110–119	δ
12.120–121=51–52	12.120–121=51–52	12.120–121=51–52	1c(dā)
12.53–54, 56–57	12.53–54, 56–57	12.53–57	2a
12.75–106ab, 108cd–109	12.75–96cd, one line, 96ef–106cd, 107–109	12.75, 78–109	2c
12.122–123	12.122–123	12.122–123	2d

Notes

1a N^K_{28} and N^{Ko}_{77} have the same text as version A but N^O_{15} has another line where 12.6ab would be in version A.

2b N^K_{28} does not have 12.63ef (12.63 of version A is a six-*pāda* stanza in De Simini 2013); on this see n. 1 in Appendix 2 above; N^{Ko}_{77} has no 12.73.

1b N^K_{28} and N^{Ko}_{77} have one extra stanza between 12.44 and 45 of version A. This is the same stanza as found in Kashmirian manuscript as well as in one South Indian manuscript. See n. 4 on the table in Appendix 2. In N^O_{15}, 12.46ab appears twice, the first time between 12.43 and 12.44 and the second time in the same place as in other versions (as part of 12.46).

1c(dā)   manuscripts in this group read *dānāny āvasatham* for the beginning of 1c.

2a N^K_{28} and N^O_{15} do not have 12.55 of version A.

2c   Each manuscript omits different portions of the text in comparison to version A. None of the three was a direct ancestor of either of the rest. (N^K_{28} cannot produce N^O_{15} because the former does not have 12.107; the same applies to N^K_{28} and N^{Ko}_{77}; N^O_{15} is unlikely to be in the upstream [even as of the rest because it has an extra line; N^{Ko}_{77} cannot be an ancestor of the rest because it does not have 12.76 and 77].

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
Figure 1: a folio of the Munich manuscript, first part

Figure 2: another folio from the first part, close up

Figure 3: a Munich manuscript folio with the second hand

Figure 4: another folio from the second part of the Munich manuscript, close up

Vasiṣṭha's Ashram: A Translation of Sarga 1 of Kālidāsa's Raghuvaṃśa into English Verse

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Though the occasions on which I have had the pleasure of spending some time together with Raffaele Torella have been rather few, they left a strong impression on me. While I cannot claim to know him well, I am confident in saying that, though he is a rigorous philologist, a scholar's scholar, at the same time Raffaele is a man who appreciates much more than the rigorously scholarly alone. I venture therefore to offer here, hopeful that his broad interests may encompass even such a thing, an English verse translation of the first *sarga* of the *Raghuvaṃśa*, the great poem of Kālidāsa which has been read by, surely, nearly everyone in the last millenium and a half who truly entered into Sanskrit studies.[1]

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[1] The first half, roughly, of the translation presented here was made nearly a decade ago. It was improved at that time by suggestions by Csaba Dezső and Dominic Goodall, as well as a few by Vikram Seth which reached me via Dominic Goodall. I am indebted more generally as well to Csaba Dezső and Dominic Goodall, having benefited greatly from numerous discussions with them in the course of our joint efforts to edit and translate (into prose) the whole of the *Raghuvaṃśa* for a soon forthcoming volume of the Murty Classical Library of India. Comments from Riccardo Paccagnella stimulated me to produce better translations of a couple of verses, and I thank him for them. I also thank Dominik Tůma for pointing out some slips and infelicities.

One may ask perhaps what audience there could be (apart from, on this occasion, Raffaele Torella, hopefully) for a translation of the *Raghuvaṃśa*, or any such poem in Sanskrit, into English verse.[2] English poetry, and verse, are now perhaps of less importance—even for native speakers of English—than they have been at any time in the history of the language. The audience for this translation may therefore indeed be not very large, especially since the translator is far from being a skilled versifier, let alone a poet. Even so, I cannot help but believe that some people with an interest in Sanskrit poetry, whether they (already) read Sanskrit with some fluency or not, might sometimes prefer to consult a translation that gives at least a little of the feeling of poetry, with the use of metre[3] and some slight degree of elevation of tone of language.

The text of the *Raghuvaṃśa* must have been transmitted over the long period since its composition in a vast number of manuscripts (very likely amounting not to hundreds of thousands but to millions). More than fifty commentaries in Sanskrit survive, though most of them are as yet unpublished. The fact (as I think that it is) that the work, or at least some portion of it, was used in the early education of a very large proportion of Sanskrit students in the past millenium, if not longer, must also have played a role

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[2] In the case of works (in any language) which are of special significance to a religious community in which English is the main language, it is easier to understand that an English verse translation might have an audience: members of that community who may wish to chant it. A recent example of such a translation of a work of great importance to many Buddhist communities, today as in the past thousand years and longer, is this one by Ryan Conlon, with the assistance of Stefan Mang, of the *Nāmasaṃgīti*: https://www.lotsawahouse.org/words-of-the-buddha/chanting-names-of-manjushri (last visited August 6th, 2022). As is noted directly after the translation, this is 'based on the *Nāmasaṅgīti*'s Sanskrit text, for which we used as our main interpretative guides the ancient Tibetan translation (here printed alongside the English text), as well as commentaries by Vilāsavajra and Vimalamitra.' Conlon's translation strikes me as successful, conveying the sense of the Sanskrit accurately, and containing many lines which are excellent as English verse, though there are also quite a few lines which I find metrically not entirely satisfactory.

[3] Metre being arguably (though there are of course those who would rather argue a counter-position) the single most important, even defining, feature of verse in English, as it is, with in this case no counter-position being even conceivable to me, of Sanskrit verse.

in complicating the transmission. If there is a contribution here towards the gradual shedding of further light on that transmission, it is a very tiny one indeed.[4] The text I translate is for the most part that commented on by Vallabhadeva, the Kashmirian scholar whose *Raghupañcikā* is the earliest commentary that has come down to us. The verse numbering differs, nonetheless, from verse 52 onwards, for I have not included in the numbering a verse, clearly a variant on verse 51, that is numbered as 52 in our edition of Vallabhadeva's commentary.[5] Those who wish to consult the notes on the text in Goodall and Isaacson 2003 should therefore note the difference by one in numbering between this publication, from verse 52 onwards, and that one. In a few places I have preferred a reading other than Vallabhadeva's. This is not always because I believe the reading preferred to be more likely to be what Kālidāsa wrote; in some cases it is simply because I found it easier to render more or less smoothly into English under the metrical constraints which I had set myself.[6]

The text given here, following the translation, therefore makes no claim, in the slightest, to be a critical edition; rather than presenting a carefully reflected hypothesis as to some state of the text (for instance its earliest form), it simply shows which readings I have chosen to translate. But though the text is not a critical one, I have furnished it with an apparatus which I hope may be of use to students of the poem, giving information on the readings followed by six printed commentaries (all that have been published on this *sarga*) and one unedited one, and the variant readings (*pāṭhāḥ*) mentioned by the commentators in addition to the readings they comment on. The printed commentaries are those of

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[4] Some steps towards that goal have been made by Dominic Goodall and myself in our introduction to and notes on our edition of Vallabhadeva's commentary on the first six *sarga*s of the *Raghuvaṃśa*; several other contributions have been made in articles by Dominic Goodall, in particular Goodall 2001 and Goodall 2009.

[5] See n. 45 below, in which I also offer a translation of the variant.

[6] In a number of cases there are variants which give practically the same sense, so that my translation could be a rendering of either one. As a rule, in such cases I have printed in the Sanskrit the reading to which Vallabhadeva testifies. I have made at least one exception to this rule, in 1.15cd, where I currently prefer the reading of Aruṇagirinātha and Mallinātha to the synonymous one of Vallabhadeva and the other commentators.

Vallabhadeva (V), Aruṇagirinātha (A), Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita (N), Mallinātha (M), Sarvajñavanamuni (S),[7] and Jinasamudra (J).[8] The unpublished commentary is that of Śrīnātha (Ś).[9] Almost the same information on its readings is given in the notes on the text (not in the critical apparatus) in Goodall and Isaacson 2003; but this is the first time that the testimony of Śrīnātha's commentary is recorded in an apparatus of variants, and a few readings which had been overlooked and not recorded in that earlier publication have now been noted for the first time.[10]

A reader who wishes to study the textual problems and transmission of the *Raghuvaṃśa* seriously may wish or need to consult next

[7] Note that Sarvajñavanamuni's commentary has a lacuna (two folios being lost in the sole manuscript used for the edition), as a result of which his testimony is not available for 1.62cd–74c.

[8] The sequence is that of plausible chronology, with the exception that Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita has been placed directly after Aruṇagirinātha because he follows that earlier commentator extremely closely; chronologically, however, he is likely to be later than both Mallinātha and Sarvajñavanamuni—perhaps later than Jinasamudra as well, though that Jaina scholar's date is not securely established. For a little more on these commentators I refer to the introduction of Goodall and Isaacson 2003. Note that Hemādri's commentary on the first chapter appears to have been lost in all the manuscripts of that commentary. Vaidyaśrīgarbha's commentary is so minimalist that I have not included the few readings that can be inferred from it in the apparatus here; for them see the notes in Goodall and Isaacson 2003.

[9] For more on this commentary and on the manuscript of it which I have used I refer to the introduction of Goodall and Isaacson 2003, especially p. xli. Śrīnātha's readings have been inferred from a single manuscript of his commentary: National Archives, Kathmandu, MS 5–835, microfilmed on NGMPP Reel Nr. A 22/3. Although this manuscript, the oldest one of this commentary known to me (it is dated Lakṣmaṇa Saṃvat 354, i.e. 1473–4 CE; for a description of it see Goodall and Isaacson 2003: lxxvi–lxxvii), does not give the text of the verses in full, and has numerous scribal errors, it is usually possible to determine from it what reading the commentator is explaining.

[10] To give a few examples: firstly, the notes in Goodall and Isaacson 2003 omitted to record that Śrīnātha reads *mahībhr̥tām* in 1.11c (with Sarvajñavanamuni, alone among the other commentaries consulted), and that he reads *arthān* in 1.21c (with Vallabhadeva and Jinasamudra), a not insignificant fact since this support from a probably independent early witness from another geographical area may well be judged to increase the chance that this reading might be original/older. We also did not report that Śrīnātha reads not *dākṣiṇyarūḍhena* but *dākṣiṇyayuktena* in 1.31a; indeed that reading is not mentioned at all in Goodall and Isaacson 2003, although there are some other sources that have it, as can be seen from, for instance, the apparatus of the critical edition of the *Raghuvaṃśa* by Dwivedī.

to my apparatus also the apparatus and notes in Goodall and Isaacson 2003 (presenting the readings of a number of Kashmirian manuscripts of the *Raghuvaṃśa*, and with fuller information than I could conveniently give here about the wide range of variation concerning the order of the verses), and the apparatus of the editions by Dwivedī and Nandargikar, both of which report the readings of a number of other manuscripts, most of which are in Devanāgarī script. I may perhaps remind the reader that no critical apparatus should be accepted uncritically; in the case of my apparatus, it should particularly be pointed out that for the printed commentaries I have not myself used manuscript evidence but have relied on the published editions, none of which is very critical.[11]

The first *sarga* of the poem is written in *anuṣṭubh* with the exception of the concluding verse, in *praharṣiṇī*. The metrical form chosen for this attempt at an English verse rendering is four lines of pentameter per *anuṣṭubh*. The fourth line is occasionally catalectic (as in the rendering of verse 4) or hypercatalectic (as in the rendering of verse 5); there is no rhyme. The *praharṣiṇī* of the concluding verse has been rendered with four lines of alternating heptameter and octometer, rhyming *aabb*.

One thing I have observed while translating that may be worth mentioning, as it could be a difficulty which others who wish to try their own hand at an English verse translation of Sanskrit poetry might encounter, is that my chosen form for versifying *anuṣṭubh* is a little too long. To arrive at four lines of pentameter I have sometimes had to expand slightly on the sense directly conveyed by the Sanskrit. As far as possible I have attempted to do so only by the addition of what might be rather naturally supplied by a Sanskrit

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[11] Mallinātha's commentary is the one which has perhaps been edited with most care, by Nandargikar. But the transmission of that commentary may have been more complicated than Nandargikar realized; and even without examining manuscript evidence thoroughly, a careful perusal of his edition reveals some inconsistencies and other problems. See for a few remarks on these Goodall and Isaacson 2003: lxxviii. For my purposes here it is particularly relevant to note that different editions of Mallinātha's commentary sometimes have, and sometimes seem to support, different root-texts. Here, as in Goodall and Isaacson 2003, Nandargikar's edition has been adopted as a standard, and has alone been referred to.

commentator, for instance.[12] For example, in verse 54 *sabhāryāya*, a bahuvrīhi qualifying Dilīpa for which 'with his wife' would be a natural translation, has instead been rendered, to fill out the metre, 'with his most courteous wife.' This choice was made hoping that readers will understand this as an allusion to or reminder of the name of Dilīpa's wife, Sudakṣiṇā (a name which earlier, in the translation of 31, a verse which alludes to its meaning, had been translated 'Most Courteous'), and at the same time aiming, through the chime 'with his most courteous wife, / They courteous,' to imitate faintly the sound effect in the Sanskrit of *sabhyāḥ sabhāryāya.* Again, *vanyavṛttiḥ* in 86 could be adequately translated by, for instance, 'Living from forest food,' already using six syllables where the Sanskrit has four, but, needing still more, I have rendered 'Living from forest roots and fruits.' Vallabhadeva indeed glosses the first word of the compound, *vanya*, with *phala-mūlādikam* 'fruits, roots, and the like,' so my expansion echoes his explanation here.

In spite of having found it in several cases a struggle to remain, within this verse form, as close to the sense of the Sanskrit as I wished, for myself I still see no generally better solution for rendering *anuṣṭubh*s into English verse.[13] I expect, though, that a more expert versifier would be able to find a way to make a shorter form work consistently.

I have made matters slightly easier for myself by allowing Sanskrit words which end in short *a* to optionally appear without that vowel, 'saving' a syllable. Thus 'His height a Sāl tree's' in 13, but 'redolent / Of sap of Sāla trees' in 38. Likewise I allow both '*āśrama*,' as a three-syllable word, printed in italics, and 'ashram,' without italics, a two-syllable word which must be in nearly every English dictionary.[14]

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[12] Indeed some of my small additions are directly inspired by one or another of the commentaries that I have consulted; see for instance the second example given below.

[13] The occasional *anuṣṭubh* may lend itself relatively easily to a shorter form, such as tetrameter.

[14] I must plead guilty though to having used some words which will be found in few if any English dictionaries, notably 'śāstric' in the translation of 1.23.

In providing some annotation to the translation I have fallen between two stools. Some notes may be of interest only to the scholar or serious student of the poem, already versed in Sanskrit; others are likely to be of use or interest only to those—should this fall into their hands—who know as yet rather little of Sanskrit and Sanskritic culture.[15] All the notes, of both kinds, could be expanded greatly with further detail and with references; and similar notes could be written on each verse that now lacks them. The notes in Goodall and Isaacson 2003 supplement these to some extent.

I regret (as Goodall and I did twenty years ago)[16] the paucity, or near non-existence, of wide-ranging scholarly commentaries of high quality on works of classical Sanskrit literature.[17] It seems, however, now even much more certain than twenty years ago, that I will not be able to produce such a thing (for lack of learning and other necessary qualities even more than for lack of time), although it remains true, in my opinion, that such a commentary would be 'a marvellous thing to have and a pleasure to write' (Goodall and Isaacson 2003: lxxxv). If in the future such a commentary is ever published, written by a scholar (or group of scholars) with the requisite learning and energy, and if, in it, this paper should be found worth quoting once or twice, my labor might perhaps be said to have served a certain purpose. However I shall already be satisfied if it achieves its rather more realistic other aims: to be of some use, in one way or another, to a few individuals with an interest in Sanskrit poetry, and to entertain, or amuse, if only briefly, Raffaele Torella.

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[15] Some notes belonging to this latter group offer possible verse translations of variant readings or entire verses not accepted here in the text proper.

[16] See Goodall and Isaacson 2003: lxxxiv.

[17] Commentaries such as those which are common on so many classical Greek and Latin texts. What a fine thing it would be if we had for poems such as the *Raghuvaṃśa*, the *Kirātārjunīya*, and others, or even just for a few *sarga*s of them to start with, commentaries comparable with, for instance, those of Nicholas Horsfall on Books 2, 3, 6, 7, and 11 of the *Aeneid*! I should add that for the *ādi-kāvya*, the *Rāmāyaṇa*, we do now have in the annotation to the volumes of the Princeton translation something which, while not as detailed by far as such commentaries, is very helpful indeed to students, and no small achievement of scholarship.

The Lineage of the Raghus[18]

Like word and sense, forever intertwined,
For sake of mastery of word and sense
I venerate the Parents of the World:
The Mountain's Daughter and the Highest Lord.[19] (1)

How far apart the lineage of the Sun
And my poor mind, that has but little scope!
Delusion makes me wish to cross by raft
An ocean which can almost not be crossed. (2)

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[18] The title of the poem could also be interpreted as meaning 'The Lineage of Raghu,' Raghu being the second major king described, and the narrative that precedes his appearance being entirely directed towards his birth. Aruṇagirinātha's commentary, arguably the most insightful of the commentaries that have been published so far, explicitly analyses the title in this way, with a singular. Nonetheless here and in our forthcoming translation in the Murty Classical Library of India (see n. 1 above) a plural has been preferred, on the grounds that Kālidāsa's own *raghūṇām anvayaṃ vakṣye* in 1.9 strongly suggests such an analysis. Note that *anvaya* and *vaṃśa* are given as synonymous in many traditional *kośa*s, for instance the *Vaijayantī* (see *pātālakhaṇḍa*, 49cd, ed. Oppert p. 177).

[19] In the celebrated opening verse of the poem—a verse that I suspect even today must be known by heart by tens of thousands of people—I have kept approximately to the sequence of the Sanskrit, with the drawback that the translation could perhaps be misunderstood. To slightly reduce the chance of that, I have omitted the comma that might seem natural after the second line, so that it may be easier to understand that 'For sake of mastery of word and sense' is to be construed with 'I venerate …,' rather than with 'forever intertwined.'

This verse presupposes an old basic definition of *kāvya*: *śabdārthau sahitau kāvyam* (thus Bhāmaha, *Kāvyālaṃkāra* 1.16a; variants on and expansions of this definition can be found in numerous other works of *alaṃkāraśāstra*). Kālidāsa predates the treatises on poetics which survive, with the probable exception of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*; that work has a broader scope than drama alone, but it does not contain such a definition of *kāvya*. However it is likely, I think, that the definition was already known to and is alluded to here by Kālidāsa. To paraphrase and elaborate on the definition a little: poetry (or belles-lettres, to use a term which in its broader sense at least is closer to Sanskrit *kāvya*, since the latter includes also prose forms and forms with mixed verse and prose) is word and meaning perfectly connected, so that to change the words while communicating the sense is to lose the poem (a salutary warning to would-be translators). The 'mastery' (*pratipatti* could also be rendered with 'understanding,' for instance) 'of word and sense' that Kālidāsa prays for here can, then, naturally be understood to be the poetic mastery required for writing a long poem on so grand a theme as that of *The Lineage of the Raghus.*

A dullard wishing for a poet's fame,
I shall become the butt of mockery,
Just like a dwarf who stretches up his arms
Towards a fruit only the tall can reach. (3)

Or rather, in this lineage ancient seers
Have made a gate of Speech[20] and therefore I,
Like a soft string that enters in a pearl
Pierced by a diamond, can enter. (4)

I, here, shall sing the line of Raghu kings,
Although my power of speech is only slight,
Their virtues, which have reached unto my ears,
Impelling me to this audacity:[21] (9)

The Raghu kings, who from their birth were pure,
Who always acted till the fruit arose,
Who ruled the earth up to the oceans' shores,
Whose chariot-paths ascended to the heavens; (5)

Who sacrificed according to the rule,
Gave gifts according to the suppliant's wish,
Punished according to the crime committed,
And rose each day according to the time;[22] (6)

Collecting wealth–only to give it up,
Restrained in speech–to speak only the truth,
Wishing to conquer–only for fame's sake,
And taking wives–only for progeny; (7)

Studying the Śāstras deeply in their childhood,
Pursuing sensual pleasures in their youth,

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[20] The 'gate of Speech' that is meant is poetic compositions such as, above all, the *Rāmāyaṇa*, treating of the Lineage of the Raghus, the Solar Lineage, or of some part of it. The sages are poet-sages such as Vālmīki.

[21] Verses 5–9 form a single sentence. English syntax has forced me to change the sequence here. This verse of translation combines *so 'ham* of 5 with the entirety of 9. This is the core sentence, the rest of 5 and the entirety of 6–8 consisting of qualifiers of *raghūṇām*, '(the) Raghu kings.'

[22] Kings are obliged to rise early to fulfil their duties of protecting the people and the earth.

Living, when old, the life that sages lead,
Leaving their bodies at the end by yoga. (8)

May the good deign to listen to their story,
Those who can show us what is good or bad;
For it's in fire that one can truly see
If gold is pure—or after all is base. (10)

There was a king, born of the Sun, called Manu,
Deserving of respect from all the wise;
The first of kings among mankind he was,
As is of Vedic chants the Praṇava.[23] (11)

In that king's spotless lineage was born,
Even more pure, a very moon of kings,
Dilīpa, as they called him,—just as in
The Sea of Milk was born the Moon itself.[24] (12)

His chest was broad, his shoulders like a bull's,
His height a Sāl tree's, and his arms were mighty;
As if the Dharma of a warrior
Had taken fitting form to do its tasks. (13)

His body's strength was greater than all others',
Its radiance surpassed all other lights,
And being loftier than anyone's,
He stood over the earth with it, like Meru.[25] (14)

His wisdom matched precisely with his form,
His learning matched his wisdom perfectly,

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[23] The Praṇava is the sacred syllable Oṃ, with which it is normal to begin any Vedic recitation.

[24] When the Gods and Asuras churned the Sea of Milk at the beginning of creation, aiming to produce *amṛta*, the nectar of immortality, among many treasures that emerged before the *amṛta* did was the Moon.

[25] The adjectives describing Dilīpa's body can all also be applied to Mount Meru. In the case of the mountain, the 'lights' can be understood to be the heavenly ones, including the Sun and the Moon. Meru's radiance excels them, or theirs, since even they are held to be lower than the peak of Meru; or else the idea might be that, as the Golden Mountain, Meru's lustre surpasses even them. Both of these possibilities are mentioned by Vallabhadeva; yet other ways to understand the comparison can be found in other commentaries, but I must forgo a more detailed discussion.

His undertakings with his learning matched,
And his successes matched his undertakings. (15)

With a king's virtues, frightening and lovely, [26]
For those who lived by serving him he was
Inviolable yet to be approached,
As is the sea with monsters and with jewels. (16)

His people did not leave by one hair-breadth
The path he followed (as his forebears had
Since Manu's time); he was the charioteer
And they the chariot's wheels' revolving rims. [27] (17)

Only to give his people greater wealth
Did he draw revenue in tax from them.
Indeed the Sun draws waters up from earth
Only to pour them out a thousand-fold. (18)

An army was to him but ornament;
Solely two things were needed for his ends:
His mind, engaged in thinking on the Śāstras,
And the hemp bowstring strung upon his bow. (19)

He kept his counsel ever well-concealed
With careful guard over his face and gestures;

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[26] Two sets of qualities or virtues that a king should ideally have are meant: the frightening or awe-inspiring ones, such as his fierceness in battle, and the charming ones, such as his courtesy. The former are compared with the terrifying sea-creatures, because of which sailors or others fear the ocean, the latter with the jewels of which the sea is supposed to be a source, which attract divers, for instance. The precise virtues in each group are listed differently by different commentators.

[27] In this verse I read and translate *ā manor* (as read by Aruṇagirinātha, his follower Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita, and Mallinātha) where the early commentator Vallabhadeva reads *ātmano*. Vallabhadeva's reading is shared by the probably Eastern commentator Śrīnātha, and partly for that reason, it might well be a candidate for being Kālidāsa's original wording. Following it, one way that the translation might run is:

> His people did not leave by one hair-breadth
> The path laid down for each of them; he was
> The *chariot-driver* (or their *chastiser*),
> And they the chariot's wheels' revolving rims.

Men knew his actions only through their fruits,
As traces from a former life are known.[28] (20)

He practised self-protection without fear,
Was pious without sickness prompting him,[29]
Collected wealth without a trace of greed,
And savoured pleasure without clinging to it. (21)

With knowledge, silence; with his power, patience;
With giving, not a trace of boastfulness;
Each virtue, linked thus with another one,
Appeared therefore as if it had an offspring.[30] (22)

Never seduced by objects of the senses,
A master of each branch of śāstric lore,

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[28] Ethically non-neutral actions leave traces which the soul carries with it. At some point, usually in a subsequent life, these traces give rise to a karmic fruit. Since ordinary people cannot directly know the deeds done in previous lives, nor the karmic traces left by them, those traces (and those deeds) can at best be inferred by seeing their fruits when they arise.

[29] The implication, surely partly humorous or at least ironic, is that many ordinary men take to religion, doing good or pious deeds, only when they are suddenly, because of sickness, in fear of imminent death. Cf. the verse-quarter that Vallabhadeva quotes here: *ārtā narā dharmaparā bhavanti*, i.e. 'Sick men [suddenly] become intent on religion.' Incidentally, in Goodall and Isaacson 2003 we were unable to give a source or parallel for this verse-quarter; I can now cite the whole verse from several sources, of which the oldest is the 9th-c. Jaina author Jayasiṃhasūri's *Dharmopadeśamālāvivaraṇa*, in which it occurs on p. 187 and again on p. 225: *sukhī na jānāti parasya duḥkhaṃ na yauvanasthā gaṇayanti śīlam | āpadgatā nirgatayauvanāś ca ārtā narā dharmaparā bhavanti ||*. Note the non-application of sandhi between the third and fourth verse-quarters. It is likely, I think, that this *subhāṣita* is older yet; that the *Dharmopadeśamālāvivaraṇa* is not the source from which Vallabhadeva knew it; and that its origin may never be traced.

[30] The translation follows Vallabhadeva's interpretation, seeing silence, patience, and so on, as born, so to speak, from knowledge, power, and the others, so that the latter set appears to have the former as children. Other commentators, however—including Jinasamudra, who usually follows Vallabhadeva, even slavishly, and including also Śrīnātha (fol. 11r)—, see silence, patience, and so on, as brothers, rather than children, of knowledge, power and the others. Accordingly they interpret *saprasavāḥ* to mean not 'having offspring' but 'having the same birth,' i.e. 'brothers' (or conceivably even 'twin brothers'). The translation could be adapted to this interpretation for instance thus:

His virtues, linked each to another one,
Shone thus in pairs, like pairs of brother twins.

And loving Dharma—in this way he was
An 'elder,' free of any touch of age. (23)

Because he taught his subjects good behaviour,
Protected them, and nourished them as well,
He was their Father, while their fathers were
Only the men who chanced to cause their births. (24)

Punishing sinners to maintain due order,
Taking a wife to father progeny,
Even the aims of policy and pleasure,
Were simply Dharma for that wisest man.[31] (25)

He milked the earth for offerings to the gods,
While Indra milked the heavens for good crops;
By mutual exchange of welfare, thus,
Those two supported jointly the two worlds.[32] (26)

They say, and truly, that no other kings
Could emulate the fame of that protector;
For turning from the things that others own
It was in word alone that theft remained.[33] (27)

He valued even enemies, if learned,
Just as a sick man does a bitter pill;

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[31] The aims of man (*puruṣārtha*) were commonly listed as three: *dharma*, *artha*, and *kāma*. The latter two have been translated here with 'policy' and 'pleasure' respectively. As an aim of man *artha* may be taken to include the notion of 'wealth' or 'profit'; but more specifically it implies rulership, including the administration of justice, and it is this nexus of ideas that Kālidāsa here evidently associates with it.

[32] An ancient idea of a reciprocal relationship between men and gods is expressed here. Dilīpa 'milks' the earth, that is collects good things (foremost, perhaps, the Soma drink) from it, to sacrifice to the gods, supporting the heavenly world; Indra 'milks' the heavens, that is causes rain to fall from it in timely fashion, and thus supports the world of men.

[33] The final expression, the turn on which the verse hinges, is somewhat obscure. It would be natural enough to take it to mean no more than that only the word *taskaratā*, 'thievery/theft,' remained; there was no actual thieving. But commentators often squeeze further sense out of it, claiming the purport to be that the object of thieving was no longer the goods of other people, but was words such as 'thief'; in Dilīpa's reign not only was there no theft, but the very words denoting thieves and their deeds were 'stolen,' in as much as their sense was forgotten.

And cut off even one he loved, if bad,
Just like a finger bitten by a snake. (28)

Surely the Maker must have fashioned him
Absorbed, as when he made the Elements;[34]
For all his many qualities bore fruit
In just one thing: the benefit of others. (29)

He ruled the earth, whose coastline was its wall,
For which the seas were made into its moat,
Which none but he could ever hope to rule,
As if it were a single citadel. (30)

Sudakṣiṇā, 'Most Courteous,' was his wife
(Her name established by her courtesy),
Born of the royal line of Magadha,
As Dakṣiṇā is wife of Sacrifice.[35] (31)

Though many women graced his inner quarters
Only that proud one,[36] and the goddess Śrī,[37]
Made him, the ruler of the earth,[38] regard
Himself as having a true wedded wife. (32)

But eager as he was to see himself
Born, as a son, in her who matched him well,
He passed the time in fond imaginings
Fulfilment of which always was delayed. (33)

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[34] This expression is not entirely clear. Perhaps its most probable sense is that (as Vallabhadeva explains) in making the Elements, Brahmā entered a particular state of mental concentration; it is because of this that it is their nature to have qualities that benefit others. Hence, the same nature being found in Dilīpa's qualities, the fancy (*utprekṣā*) is that Brahmā must have created him when in the same state of absorption.

[35] Dakṣiṇā, the personification, more or less, of the *dakṣiṇā* (the fee or gift, in this case to the officiating priest or priests, rather than to a teacher), is the wife—though sometimes also the sister—of Yajña, the personification of the Vedic sacrifice.

[36] Sudakṣiṇā.

[37] Though the goddess Śrī, or Lakṣmī, is on the one hand the consort of Viṣṇu, as a personification of royal glory or fortune she is on the other hand also often spoken of as a sort of divine wife of the king.

[38] There is a hint here that in fact the Earth herself, often personified as a goddess, can also be regarded as a wife of his.

Just as Bhagīratha had done (to gain
Gaṅgā, who purified his ancestors),
He handed Kosalā (his capital),
Desiring offspring, to his ministers.[39] (34)

Then after worshipping the Demiurge,
Out of their wish to have a son, that pair,
Pure and intent, set out towards the ashram
Of sage Vasiṣṭha, guru of their clan. (35)

Mounted upon a single chariot,
The sound of which was smooth and yet profound,
They were like lightning and Airāvata
(The rainbow) riding on a monsoon cloud.[40] (36)

Lest there be too much trouble for the ashram,
They took with them but few companions;
With whom they looked as do a mighty pair
Of elephants with cubs from the same herd.[41] (37)

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[39] Bhagīratha, an earlier king of the Solar Lineage, had left the rule to his ministers while he performed austerities to please Śiva, with the goal of bringing Gaṅgā to earth, where she purified the ashes of his great grandfathers, the 60,000 sons of Sagara, incinerated by Kapila. As Vallabhadeva points out, the qualification *pūrveṣāṃ pāvanakṣamām* can be taken with *santatim* as well as with *gaṅgām*; the offspring that Dilīpa seeks is also something that should purify (and continue to make offerings of food and water to) his ancestors. This double sense has not been rendered here.

Apart from Vallabhadeva, all commentaries I have referred to for this contribution have a different (though corresponding, as far as the most basic narrative content is concerned) verse here. It might be translated:

Then, to perform a rite for sake of offspring,
The king set down the heavy burden of
The earth's protection from his own strong arm,
And gave it to his ministers for a while.

[40] There is disagreement among the commentators as to what or who Airāvata (later most commonly the name of Indra's elephant) is. Here I follow the second interpretation given by Vallabhadeva, preferring it mainly because of a parallel with *Meghadūta* 64. For a discussion of the different possible interpretations, and an attempt to evaluate them, see the note on this verse in Goodall and Isaacson 2003: 274–275.

[41] This translates the reading of Vallabhadeva; the other printed commentators, as well as the still unpublished commentaries of Śrīnātha and Vaidyaśrīgarbha, have a quite different second half (with a minor internal variant, hardly

Winds pleasant to the touch, and redolent
Of sap of Sāla trees, attended them,
Setting the groves they passed in gentle motion
And dusting them with pollen from the flowers. (38)

Because the wind blew favorably (a sign
That their desire would come to be fulfilled),
Dust struck up by the horses' hooves did not
Settle upon the couple's hair and clothes. (39)

They asked the elders of the cowherd villages,
Who came to them bringing as offering
The butter churned from milk of yesterday,
The names of forest trees seen on their path. (40)

Passing by lakes, they smelled the fragrance there
Of lotuses, cooled by the tossing waves;
And doing this, both of them found in it
An imitation of their spouse's breath. (41)

They listened to the cries, which pleased their hearts,
Of peafowl thrilling at the sound of wheels,
Agreeing with the tonic of the scale,
And, like that note, divided in two kinds.[42] (42)

And in the pairs of deer that left the path,
But not far off, and kept their gazes fixed
Upon the chariot, that couple saw
The image, each one, of the other's eyes. (43)

affecting the sense; for the details see the critical apparatus and notes on this verse in Goodall and Isaacson 2003), which might be rendered:

> But through their special power it appeared
> As if they were surrounded by an army.

Note that there are considerable variants in the sequence of verses in this part of the *sarga*; see the table in Goodall and Isaacson 2003: 276.

[42] Vallabhadeva and other commentators take the reason why the cries are 'divided in two kinds' to be that the peacocks and peahens produce slightly different notes (just as the tonic of the scale can have a pure and a modified form). We are to understand that the peafowl mistake the sound of the chariot-wheels for that of thunder, which would herald the approach of the rainy season in which they delight.

And at some places on the path the cranes—
Who, flying in a line, formed in the sky
A welcome garland needing no support,
And softly cried—made them raise up their heads. (44)

In villages which they themselves had given,
Marked by the sacrificers' sacred posts,
Those two accepted first the proffered water,
And, after that, blessings that could not fail.[43] (45)

Resplendent in their garments as they went,
A lustre indescribable was theirs;
Such as belongs to Citrā and the moon
When, free from frost at last, they meet in Spring.[44] (46)

That ruler of the earth, lovely to see,
Showed to his wife the sights along the road,
And did not see, though equal to a god,[45]
That the whole path already was traversed. (47)

His horses spent, as night began to fall,
That king, whose fame could not be reached, then reached,
With his beloved queen, the *āśrama*
Of the great sage, the ever self-restrained. (48)

[43] One may note the contrast between two kinds of villages: the cowherd settlements (*ghoṣa*) of verse 40 above, and the brahmin villages, royal donations/ foundations, of this verse. In Mallinātha's version, incidentally, the two verses are contiguous (*grāmeṣv ātmaviṣṛṣṭeṣu* … as verse 44, *haiyaṅgavīnam* … as verse 45). I find it striking that in the recension of Aruṇagirinātha and Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita, on the other hand, *grāmeṣv ātmaviṣṛṣṭeṣu* … (43) and *haiyaṅgavīnam* … (45) are separated by *sarasīṣv aravindānāṃ* … (44 = 41 here), as if to ensure, by a reference to the countryside traversed between them, that a reader does not mistakenly think that the cowherd elders inhabit the same village as the sacrificing brahmins.

[44] Citrā, corresponding to Spica (Alpha Virginis), is the 12th lunar asterism; the month of Caitra, when the full moon is in Citrā, is that which is regarded as *par excellence* Spring. The new year is commonly begun with the first day of the bright half of this month. Note that Spica lies almost on the ecliptic, and therefore is regularly occulted by the moon.

[45] Other interpretations of *budhopamaḥ* are possible, and are found in the commentaries. See for a brief overview the note on this verse in Goodall and Isaacson 2003: 277–278.

The *āśrama* was filling with ascetics,
Returning from the wood, with fuel and grass
Borne on their shoulders; they were rendered pure
By their own fires which came to welcome them.[46] (49)

In it the sages' daughters, having watered
The little trees, then went away from them,
So that the birds, which always used to drink
The water from their basins, did not fear. (50)

The deer were lying in the courtyards there
Of leaf-made huts, and as the sun departed,
The house-wives scattered handfuls of wild rice,
Which the deer ate, and slowly chewed their cud. (51)[47]

With smoke blown by the wind and redolent
With offerings (by which the fires were known
As consecrated ones), it purified
Arriving guests, eager to reach the ashram. (52)

Then King Dilīpa gave his charioteer
Command to let the steeds be given rest,
While he for his part helped his wife alight
And then himself leapt from the chariot. (53)

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[46] There is, as Vallabhadeva for instance remarks, an old belief that those who have kindled, and keep and offer into, the Vedic fires are welcomed by those fires, which come out (invisibly) to meet them when they return home.

[47] Vallabhadeva's recension includes another verse after this, included also in the text of Mallinātha but in a different place (as 50, following after the verse that here, and in both Vallabhadeva's and Mallinātha's text, is 49). Vallabhadeva shows himself aware, though, that the further verse is really a variation on verse 51. The extra verse, or variation, is wholly absent in the commentaries of Aruṇa-girinātha and Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita. Perhaps its existence is to be seen as an example of the phenomenon of 'imitative and interpolated verses,' insightfully discussed by Richard Salomon (2019). It might be translated thus:

The *āśrama* was filled also with deer
Crowding, like children, at the doors of huts
Where wives of sages handed out to them
Their customary shares of woodland rice.

The sages honoured him who well deserved it,
Who saw, as kings do, through his policy;
Guardian of men, with his most courteous wife,
They courteous, and guarding well their senses. (54)

He saw the sage, store of ascetic power,
After the evening rites, attended by
Arundhatī, his ever faithful wife,
Like Fire, Oblation-Eater, with Svāhā.[48] (55)

Dilīpa and his Queen, the Magadhan,
Honoured the feet of Vasiṣṭh and his wife;
And then the Guru and the Guru's wife
In turn with joy welcomed the royal pair. (56)

Ever hospitable, the sage removed
Travel fatigue by hospitality,
Then asked the king, sage of his kingdom's ashram,
If everything was well within his kingdom. (57)

Before the sage, storehouse of the Atharva,[49]
Dilīpa, lord of wealth and conqueror
Of all his enemies, best of speakers, then
Spoke a reply, replete with meaning, thus: (58)

'It is but natural that all is well
In each one of my kingdom's seven parts,[50]
Since it is you who ward off all disasters:
Those caused by heaven and those caused by men. (59)

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[48] As a god, Fire, the receiver (and consumer, 'eater'; also the conveyer to the other gods) of sacrificial oblations, has a goddess consort, Svāhā, the personification, to put it roughly, of the ancient utterance *svāhā* that accompanies the offering of oblations (most commonly with a 4th case—dative—form of the name of the deity for whom the offering is intended).

[49] The king's priest (*purohita*) was normally a brahmin specialized in the *Atharvaveda*, the Veda of magic spells. This is seen both in poetic-narrative literature (such as the *Raghuvaṃśa*) and in prescriptive texts; for references to the latter regarding this point see Sanderson 2007: 204, nn. 28–29.

[50] The seven parts, or components, of a kingdom are usually listed as the ruler, his ministers, his friends, the treasury, the territory of the kingdom, the fortresses, and the armed forces.

'Spell-maker, counsel-maker, by your spells,
And by your counsels,[51] from afar you quell
My enemies; and, as it were, reproach
My arrows that pierce only what I see. (60)

'The fire-offerings which you, offerer, make
Into the fires, following Vedic rules,
Turn into rains that bring relief to crops
If ever they are withering from draught. (61)

'That all my people live lives of full length
Free from disasters, free from every plague,
Of this the cause is nothing but your own
Refulgent Vedic knowledge and observance. (62)

'And since you, guru, son of the Creator,[52]
Are always thinking of me in this way,
How could my fortunes not continue ever
And be forever free of all disasters? (63)

'However since I yet am to behold
A fitting son, born from your daughter here,
The earth, though she, with all her continents,
Gives jewels richly, still contents me not. (64)

'The ancestors, thinking that after me
The offerings of water that I make
Will be most hard to come by, surely drink
That water made lukewarm by their own sighs.[53] (65)

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[51] The single word *mantra* is translated here twice, as 'spells' and 'counsels.'
In this I follow the commentator Aruṇagirinātha, who takes both meanings to be
intended. There are certainly other possibilities. The oldest commentator,
Vallabhadeva, understands that the word means, specifically, 'weapon-spells.'

[52] Vasiṣṭha is one of the sons of the Creator god, Brahmā. This is a reason of
his extraordinary longevity; he is the priest of all of the kings of the *Raghuvaṃśa*.

[53] A similar verse, but referring to the food offerings, rather than the water
offerings, to the ancestors, is included by some commentators before or after this
one. It might be translated:

> Most surely the forefathers of my line
> Seeing that after me the balls of rice
> Will be cut off, no longer eat their fill
> At rites, but hoard the offerings of food.

'So I, while pure by constant sacrifice,
Am yet diminished by my lack of child;
Illumined and in darkness, both at once,
Like world-dividing Lokāloka mountain.[54] (66)

'From *tapas* and from giving we derive
Merit; thence happiness in lives to come.
But offspring of pure lineage causes joy
Not only after death, but here as well. (67)

'My guide, how could you not grieve, seeing me
Devoid of offspring, like an ashram-sapling
Watered with your own hands, now grown into
A tree remaining ever without fruit? (68)

'Know, Bhagavan, that I am troubled sore,
Beyond endurance, by the final debt;[55]
Like a great elephant, for the first time fettered,
Pained deeply by the post that he is chained to. (69)

'Therefore, dear father, may you please arrange
So that I may at last be freed from debt.
In anything hard to achieve, indeed,
Th'Ikṣvāku[56] kings' success depends on you.' (70)

The sage's eyes, after the king had spoken,
Grew motionless in meditation.
For a short while he stayed within that state,
Like a still pool, in which the fishes sleep.[57] (71)

[54] A mountain range imagined as a boundary of the inhabitable world; the sun shines on one side of it (where we are) but not on the other.

[55] The debt to the fathers. Dilīpa has already paid off the other two debts that a twice born man is said to have already on beginning this life: that to the gods, repaid by sacrificing into fire, and that to the sages, repaid by Vedic study. Vallabhadeva, alone among the commentators consulted, has a different reading which does not refer to the debt as the final one.

[56] Ikṣvāku was an earlier king of the same Lineage of the Sun; usually he is said to be the son of the first king in this line, Manu Vaivasvata. Like Raghu, the son of Dilīpa, his name comes to be used in the plural to denote all the kings of the lineage.

[57] The most natural way to envisage this—though none of the commentaries I have consulted makes this explicit—seems to be to imagine the sage's calm face to be comparable to a still pond, and his eyes, fixed in meditation, to resemble two motionless fish within that pond.

And having meditated on his own true nature,
By power of contemplation he beheld
The cause that blocked the lineage of the king;
Then thus informed that ruler of the earth: (72)

'Before, when you returned again to earth
From serving Śakra, king of gods, in heaven,
Along your path Surabhi, heavenly cow,
Was resting in the Kalpataru's[58] shade. (73)

'But thinking of your queen, who then was in
Her fertile time, pure by her ritual bath,[59]
Hurrying, you failed to circumambulate
The cow, and thus infuriated her. (74)

'The heavenly cow pronounced this curse on you:
"Since you have treated me with such contempt,
You will therefore lack offspring till the time
That you have humbly served my progeny." (75)

'That curse, O king, was not heard at that time,
Neither by you nor by your charioteer,
Sky-flowing Gaṅgā's stream resounding loud
With elephants of the quarters frolicking.[60] (76)

[58] A heavenly tree, which can supply any wish of a suppliant. Surabhi herself can do the same; she is a *kāmadhenu*, 'wish-fulfilling cow.'

[59] At the end of her menstrual period, after the wife has bathed, her husband would be expected to approach her and have intercourse with the aim of producing offspring. Such intercourse is a duty; Vallabhadeva (whose reading is followed here) quotes the *Gautamadharmasūtra*'s rule on the subject (*r̥tāv upeyāt*, '[The husband] should approach [his wife for intercourse] in the fertile period,' *Gautamadharmasūtra* 1.5.1). It is noteworthy that in the variant reading of this verse which we find commented on by Aruṇagirinātha and Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita, though there is no explicit reference to the fertile period, Dilīpa is said to have hastened 'for fear of destruction/loss of Dharma' (*dharmalopabhayāt*), and the two Keralan commentaries make explicit that it is just the breaking of the rule prescribing that the husband should have intercourse with his wife at this time that is meant. Note the irony (as it seems to me that one may call it) that Dilīpa's transgression is caused precisely by his eagerness to follow this rule (and his eagerness to have offspring; but that too, we are I think supposed to accept, is primarily out of dharmic concerns, namely those he had expressed in stanzas 65ff).

[60] We may imagine that the great celestial elephants who are commonly said to support the world in the cardinal directions (and often the intermediate too)

'I know that since you disrespected her
Effort is needed to fulfil your wish;
Neglecting worship of those to be worshipped
Will block accomplishment of every good. (77)

'But now it is the underworld that she
Blesses with presence, to provide oblations
To Varuṇa, god of long sacrifices,
And Nāga snakes hold bolted fast the entrance. (78)

'Now you, together with your wife, should worship
My cow, the granddaughter of Surabhi, [61]
And loving mother of a calf, for she
Will surely give you two what you desire.' (79)

Just as that priest and Vedic sacrificer
Pronounced these sentences, his blameless cow
Called Nandinī, supplier, through her milk,
Of his oblations, came back from the wood. (80)

Her hue was copper, while upon her forehead
She bore a streak of white. Thus she resembled
The twilight juncture when connected with
The slender lovely moon of the first day. [62] (81)

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were taking a break from that labor and refreshing themselves by bathing and playing in the stream of the heavenly Gaṅgā. The Gaṅgā (Ganges) is said to have three streams, flowing in heaven, on the earth, and in the netherworld; Kālidāsa calls her *trimārgā*, she of three paths, in *Kumārasambhava* 1.27, for instance.

It is possible that verses 75–76 are a later addition to the text, as has been suggested for instance by T.K. Ramachandra Aiyar in his Preface to the edition of the commentaries of Aruṇagirinātha and Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita (p. iii). For some discussion of arguments for and against this possibility see Goodall and Isaacson 2003: 286–287. To the information given there I can now add that there is a testimonium for 1.75 (= 1.76 in the numbering in Goodall and Isaacson 2003) earlier than that of the *Durghaṭavṛtti* which is mentioned there; the verse is also quoted by the Jaina scholar Namisādhu in his commentary, which was completed in 1069 CE, on Rudraṭa's *Kāvyālaṃkāra* 1.8, p. 12.

[61] Thus Vallabhadeva's reading and interpretation; Śrīnātha is close to him in reading and identical in interpretation. The other commentaries consulted, however, all have readings in which Nandinī (as we will shortly learn that Vasiṣṭha's cow is called) is a daughter rather than a granddaughter of Surabhi.

[62] I.e. the waxing crescent moon on the first day of its visibility.

From vase-like udders she rained on the earth
Milk that began to flow, luke-warm, upon the sight
Of her young calf, and purified far more
Than does the water of the ritual bath. (82)

The specks of dust kicked up by the cow's hooves
Touched the king's body as she came near him,
Imparting the same purity that comes
From bathing at a place of pilgrimage. (83)

The sage, store of ascetic power, wise in omens,
Seeing the cow, whose sight brought purity,
Addressed again his sacrificial patron,
Whose wish he knew certain to be fulfilled: (84)

'O king, you well may reckon that you will
In no long time accomplish your desire,
Since this auspicious one just now approached
As soon as I had chanced to name her name. (85)

'Living from forest roots and fruits you must
Propitiate this cow by constantly
Attending her yourself, just as a man
Makes knowledge pure by constant repetition.[63] (86)

'When she sets forth, you must do so with her;
When she stands still, you too must make your halt;
When she sits down, you too must seat yourself;
And only when she drinks must you drink water. (87)

'And let your wife at dawn first worship her,
Then follow her up to the ashram border
When she sets out; and let her in the evening
Go out as far, now to receive her back. (88)

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[63] A single infinitive form, *prasādayitum*, has been translated here twice, once as 'propitiate' and once as 'makes pure.'

'In this way you must stay ever intent
On serving her, until you win her favor.
May nothing hinder you! Like your own father
May you be foremost among those with sons!' (89)

'So shall it be,' replied the king, his student,
One who knew always the right time and place;
Delighted, with his wife, he bowed before
The teacher, and accepted his commands. (90)

Then when night fell, the son of the Creator,
Whose words were always pleasing and yet true,
Who knew all faults, dismissed to his repose
That glorious king, the lord of all the people. (91)

Though his asceticism had borne full fruit,
The sage, knowing procedures, kept in mind
The king's observance, and prepared for him
Only arrangements suited for the forest.[64] (92)

Then with his wife, pure and restrained, the king at length
        [withdrew
To rest within the leafy hut the teacher had assigned the two;
Where, sleeping on a bed of grass, they passed in peace the night,
Its end made known when they could hear the students of the sage
         [recite.[65] (93)

[64] The implication is that because of the power of his asceticism the sage could have, if he had wished, produced lavish royal hospitality for the king; but since the king is commencing a strict observance, the hospitality was instead of the type that one would expect in a religious community of forest-dwellers.

[65] In his capital, or in royal camps when travelling, the king would usually be awakened before dawn by royal bards singing his praises in an aubade; a fine example, though addressed to Aja when he is *yuvarāja*, crown-prince sharing the burden of government with his father, before he becomes king, is found later in the *Raghuvaṃśa*, at the end of *sarga* 5. Here Dilīpa is instead awakened by the (Vedic) recitation of Vasiṣṭha's pupils. The metre changes to *praharṣiṇī*, with 13 syllables per verse-quarter.

रघुवंशे प्रथमः सर्गः

वागर्थाविव सम्पृक्तौ वागर्थप्रतिपत्तये।
जगतः पितरौ वन्दे पार्वतीपरमेश्वरौ॥१॥
क्व सूर्यप्रभवो वंशः क्व चाल्पविषया मतिः।
तितीर्षुर्दुस्तरं मोहादुडुपेनास्मि सागरम्॥२॥
मन्दः कवियशःप्रार्थी गमिष्याम्यवहास्यताम्।
प्रांशुलभ्ये फले लोभादुद्बाहुरिव वामनः॥३॥[1]
अथवा कृतवाग्द्वारे वंशे ऽस्मिन्पूर्वसूरिभिः।
मणौ वज्रसमुत्कीर्णे सूत्रस्येवास्ति मे गतिः॥४॥
सो ऽहमाजन्मशुद्धानामाफलोदयकर्मणाम्।
आसमुद्रक्षितीशानामानाकरथवर्त्मनाम्॥५॥
यथाविधिहुताग्नीनां यथाकामार्चितार्थिनाम्।
यथापराधदण्डानां यथाकालप्रबोधिनाम्॥६॥
त्यागाय सम्भृतार्थानां सत्याय मितभाषिणाम्।
यशसे विजिगीषूणां प्रजायै गृहमेधिनाम्॥ ७॥
शैशवे ऽभ्यस्तविद्यानां यौवने विषयैषिणाम्।
वार्द्धके मुनिवृत्तीनां योगेनान्ते तनुत्यजाम्॥८॥
रघूणामन्वयं वक्ष्ये तनुवाग्विभवो ऽपि सन्।

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[1] ॰यशःप्रार्थी] V A N M S J; ॰यशः प्रेप्सुर् Ś ◇ ॰म्यवहास्यताम्] V; ॰म्यपहास्यताम्
A(?) N S; ॰म्युपहास्यताम् M J Ś. ◇ ॰लभ्ये] V M J S; ॰लङ्घ्ये A N; ॰गम्ये Ś.

तद्द्रुणैः कर्णमागत्य चापलाय प्रतारितः॥९॥²
तं सन्तः श्रोतुमर्हन्ति सदसद्व्यक्तिहेतवः।
हेम्नः संलक्ष्यते ह्यग्नौ विशुद्धिः श्यामिकापि वा॥१०॥
वैवस्वतो मनुर्नाम माननीयो मनीषिणाम्।
आसीन्महीक्षितामाद्यः प्रणवश्छन्दसामिव॥११॥³
तदन्वये शुद्धिमति प्रसूतः शुद्धिमत्तरः।
दिलीप इति राजेन्दुरिन्दुः क्षीरनिधाविव॥१२॥
व्यूढोरस्को वृषस्कन्धः सालप्रांशुर्महाभुजः।
आत्मकर्मक्षमं देहं क्षात्रो धर्म इवाश्रितः॥१३॥
सर्वातिरिक्तसारेण सर्वतेजोभिभाविना।
स्थितः सर्वोन्नतेनोर्वीं क्रान्त्वा मेरुरिवात्मना॥१४॥
आकारसदृशप्रज्ञः प्रज्ञया सदृशागमः।
आगमैः सदृशारम्भ आरम्भसदृशोदयः॥१५॥⁴
भीमकान्तैर्नृपगुणैः स बभूवोपजीविनाम्।
अधृष्यश्चाभिगम्यश्च यादोरत्नैरिवार्णवः॥१६॥
रेखामात्रमपि क्षुण्णादा मनोर्वर्त्मनः परम्।
न व्यतीयुः प्रजास्तस्य नियन्तुर्नेमिवृत्तयः॥१७॥⁵
प्रजानामेव भूत्यर्थं स ताभ्यो बलिमग्रहीत्।
सहस्रगुणमुत्स्रष्टुमादत्ते हि रसं रविः॥१८॥
सेना परिच्छदस्तस्य द्वयमेवार्थसाधनम्।

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2   प्रतारितः] V A N S Ś; प्रणोदितः M (J uncertain).

3   आसीन्महीक्षिताम्] V A N M J; आसीन्महीभृताम् S Ś.

4   °रम्भ आरम्भ°] A M; °रम्भः प्रारम्भ° V N S J Ś.

5   क्षुण्णादा मनोर्] A N M S; क्षुण्णादात्मनो V J Ś.

शास्त्रे च व्यापृता बुद्धिर्मौर्वी धनुषि चातता॥१९॥[6]

तस्य संवृतमन्त्रस्य गूढाकारेङ्गितस्य च।

फलानुमेयाः प्रारम्भाः संस्काराः प्राक्तना इव॥२०॥[7]

जुगोपात्मानमत्रस्तो भेजे धर्ममनातुरः।

अगृध्नुराददे सो ऽर्थानसक्तः सुखमन्वभूत्॥२१॥[8]

ज्ञाने मौनं क्षमा शक्तौ त्यागे श्लाघाविपर्ययः।

गुणा गुणानुबन्धित्वात्तस्य सप्रसवा इव॥२२॥

अनाकृष्टस्य विषयैर्विद्यानां पारदृश्वनः।

तस्य धर्मरतेरासीद्दृढत्वं जरसा विना॥२३॥[9]

प्रजानां विनयाधानाद्रक्षणाद्भरणादपि।

स पिता पितरस्तासां केवलं जन्महेतवः॥ २४॥

स्थित्यै दण्डयतो दण्ड्यान्परिणेतुः प्रसूतये।

अप्यर्थकामौ तस्यास्तां धर्म एव मनीषिणः॥२५॥

दुदोह गां स यज्ञाय सस्याय मघवा दिवम्।

सम्पद्विनिमयेनोभौ दधतुर्भुवनद्वयम्॥२६॥

न किलानुययुस्तस्य राजानो रक्षितुर्यशः।

व्यावृत्ता यत्परस्वेभ्यः श्रुतौ तस्करता स्थिता॥२७॥

द्वेष्यो ऽपि सम्मतः शिष्टस्तस्यार्तस्य यथौषधम्।

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6   शास्त्रे च व्यापृता] V J; शास्त्रेषु व्यापृता A(?) N S(?); शास्त्रेष्वकुण्ठिता M; शास्त्रे चाव्याहता Ś.

7   संवृतमन्त्रस्य] V A N M S Ś; संभृतमन्त्रस्य J.

8   सो ऽर्थान्] V J Ś; सो ऽर्थम् A N M (S uncertain).

9   जरसा] V M S J Ś; जरया A(?) N.

त्याज्यो दुष्टः प्रियो ऽप्यासीदङ्गुलीवोरगक्षता॥२८॥[10]

तं वेधा विदधे नूनं महाभूतसमाधिना।
तथा हि सर्वे तस्यासन्परार्थैकफला गुणाः॥२९॥

स वेलावप्रवलयां परिखीकृतसागराम्।
अनन्यशासनामुर्वीं शशासैकपुरीमिव॥३०॥

तस्य दाक्षिण्यरूढेन नाम्ना मगधवंशजा।
पत्नी सुदक्षिणेत्यासीदध्वरस्येव दक्षिणा॥३१॥[11]

कलत्रवन्तमात्मानमवरोधे महत्यपि।
तया मेने मनस्विन्या लक्ष्म्या च वसुधाधिपः॥३२॥

तस्यामात्मानुरूपायामात्मजन्मसमुत्सुकः।
विलम्बितफलैः कालं स निनाय मनोरथैः॥३३॥[12]

गङ्गां भगीरथेनेव पूर्वेषां पावनक्षमाम्।
ईप्सता सन्ततिं न्यस्ता तेन मन्त्रिषु कोसला॥३४॥[13]

अथाभ्यर्च्य विधातारं प्रयतौ पुत्रकाम्यया।
तौ दम्पती वसिष्ठस्य गुरोर्जग्मतुराश्रमम्॥३५॥

स्निग्धगम्भीरनिर्घोषमेकं स्यन्दनमाश्रितौ।
प्रावृषेण्यं पयोवाहं विद्युदैरावताविव॥३६॥[14]

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10 ॰दङ्गुलीवोरगक्षता] A(?) N M Ś; ॰दृष्टे ऽङ्गुष्ठ इवाहिना V J (S uncertain).

11 ॰रूढेन] V A N M S J; ॰युक्तेन Ś. ◊ मगध॰] A N M S(?) J Ś; मागध॰ V.

12 ॰मात्मानुरूपायाम्] V A N M J Ś; ॰मात्मानुकूलायाम् S.

13 गङ्गां भगीरथेनेव पूर्वेषां पावनक्षमाम्। ईप्सता सन्ततिं न्यस्ता तेन मन्त्रिषु कोसला] V;
सन्तानार्थिय विधये स्वभुजादवतारिता। तेन धूर्जगतो गुर्वी सचिवेषु निचिक्षिपे A N M S Ś
(but reading the first quarter महते सुतलाभाय); J reads first this variant verse
and after that the verse known to V.

14 ॰मेकं स्यन्दन॰] V A N M S Ś, ॰मेकं स्यन्दन॰ J. ◊ ॰माश्रितौ] V; ॰मास्थितौ A(?) N
M S J Ś.

मा भूदाश्रमपीडेति परिमेयपुरःसरौ।

वशानागौ सगन्धाल्पकलभानुगताविव॥३७॥[15, 16]

सेव्यमानौ सुखस्पर्शैः सालनिर्यासगन्धिभिः।

पुष्परेणूत्किरैर्वातैराधूतवनराजिभिः॥३८॥

पवनस्यानुकूलत्वात्प्रार्थनासिद्धिशंसिनः।

रजोभिस्तुरगोत्कीर्णैरस्पृष्टालकवेष्टनौ॥३९॥

हैयङ्गवीनमादाय घोषवृद्धानुपागतान्।

नामधेयानि पृच्छन्तौ वन्यानां मार्गशाखिनाम्॥४०॥[17]

सरसीष्वरविन्दानां वीचिविक्षोभशीतलम्।

आमोदमुपजिघ्रन्तौ स्वनिःश्वासानुकारिणम्॥४१॥[18]

मनोभिरामाः शृण्वन्तौ रथनेमिस्वनोन्मुखैः।

षड्जसंवादिनीः केका द्विधा भिन्नाः शिखण्डिभिः॥४२॥

परस्पराक्षिसादृश्यमदूरोज्झितवर्त्मसु।

मृगद्वन्द्वेषु पश्यन्तौ स्यन्दनाबद्धदृष्टिषु॥४३॥

श्रेणिबन्धाद्वितन्वद्भिरस्तम्भां तोरणस्रजम्।

सारसैः कलनिर्ह्रादैः क्वचिदुन्नमिताननौ॥४४॥[19]

ग्रामेष्वात्मनिसृष्टेषु यूपचिह्नेषु यज्वनाम्।

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[15]   वशानागौ सगन्धाल्पकलभानुगताविव] V; अनुभावविशेषात्तु सेनापरिगताविव A N J Ś;
      अनुभावविशेषात्तु सेनापरिवृताविव M S.

[16]   After 1.37, the order of verses in the commentaries differs considerably;
      see for the main details the table in Goodall and Isaacson 2003: 276.

[17]   ॰नुपागतान्] V; ॰नुपस्थितान् A N M S J Ś.

[18]   ॰विक्षोभ॰] V A N M J; ॰विक्षेप॰ S Ś.   ◇   ॰नुकारिणम्] V M J Ś; ॰नुवादिनम् A(?)
      N S.

[19]   श्रेणिबन्धाद्] V; श्रेणीबन्धाद् M J Ś; श्रेणीबद्धां A(?) N S.

अमोघाः प्रतिगृह्णन्तावघ्र्यानुपदमाशिषः॥४५॥[20]

काप्यभिख्या तयोरासीद्द्रजतोः शुद्धवेशयोः।

हिमनिर्मुक्तयोर्योगे चित्राचन्द्रमसोरिव॥४६॥[21]

तत्तङ्क्ष्मिपतिः पत्न्यै दर्शयन्प्रियदर्शनः।

अपि लङ्घितमध्वानं बुबुधे न बुधोपमः॥४७॥[22]

स दुष्प्रापयशाः प्रापदाश्रमं श्रान्तवाहनः।

सायं संयमिनस्तस्य महर्षेर्महिषीसखः॥४८॥

वनान्तरादुपावृत्तैः स्कन्धासक्तसमित्कुशैः।

अग्निप्रत्युद्रमात्पूतैः पूर्यमाणं तपस्विभिः॥४९॥[23, 24]

सेकान्ते मुनिकन्याभिर्विविक्तीकृतवृक्षकम्।

आश्वासाय विहङ्गानामालवालाम्बुपायिनाम्॥५०॥[25, 26]

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[20] °निसृष्टेषु] V A(?) N S J; °विसृष्टेषु M Ś.

[21] शुद्धवेशयोः] V; शुद्धवेषयोः A N M S J Ś.

[22] अपि लङ्घितम्] V A N M J Ś; अतिलङ्घितम् S.

[23] °दुपावृत्तैः] V A(?) N M S J; °दपावृत्तैः Ś. ◇ स्कन्धासक्तसमित्कुशैः। अग्निप्रत्युद्रमात्पूतैः पूर्यमाणं तपस्विभिः] V J Ś; समित्कुशफलाहरैः । पूर्यमाणमदृश्याग्निप्रत्युद्यातैस्तपस्विभिः A N M S.

[24] After this verse Ś comments on another one, which must have arisen as a variant to it, reading:

आकीर्यमाणमासन्नविविधिभिः समिदाहरैः।
वैखानसैरदृश्याग्निप्रत्युद्रमनवृत्तिभिः॥.

[25] °विविक्तीकृतवृक्षकम्] V Ś, °स्तत्क्षणोज्झितवृक्षकम् A(?) N M S J. ◇ आश्वासाय] V; विश्वासाय A N M S J Ś.

[26] Note that the verse as printed with all the published commentaries except V reverses the sequence of *pāda*s 2 and 4; the text of the commentaries does not allow one to be certain, however, which sequence they knew.

आतपापायसङ्क्षिप्तनीवारासु निषादिभिः॥
मृगैर्वर्तितरोमन्थमुटजाङ्गनभूमिषु॥५१॥²⁷

अभ्युद्धृताग्निपिशुनैरतिथीनाश्रमोन्मुखान्।
पुनानं पवनोद्धूतैर्धूमैराहुतिगन्धिभिः॥५२॥²⁸

अथ यन्तारमादिश्य धुर्यान्विश्रमयेति सः।
तामवारोहयत्पत्नीं रथादवरुरोह च॥५३॥²⁹

तस्मै सभ्याः सभार्याय गोप्त्रे गुप्ततमेन्द्रियाः।
अर्हणामर्हते चक्रुर्मुनयो नयचक्षुषे॥५४॥

विधेः सायन्तनस्यान्ते स ददर्श तपोनिधिम्।
अन्वासितमरुन्धत्या स्वाहयेव हविर्भुजम्॥५५॥³⁰

तयोर्जगृहतुः पादौ राजा राज्ञी च मागधी।
तौ गुरुर्गुरुपत्नी च प्रीत्या प्रतिननन्दतुः॥५६॥³¹

आतिथेयस्तमातिथ्यविनीताध्वपरिश्रमम्।
पप्रच्छ कुशलं राज्ये राज्याश्रममुनिं मुनिः॥५७॥³²

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27 आतपापाय॰ (आतपात्यय॰ M J) ॰सङ्क्षिप्तनीवारासु निषादिभिः। मृगैर्वर्तितरोमन्थमुटजाङ्ग-
नभूमिषु॥] V A N M S J Ś; आकीर्णमृषिपत्नीनामुटजद्वाररोधिभिः। अपत्यैरिव नीवार-
भागधेयोचितैर्मृगैः॥ Vvl. M (as 50, after the verse numbered 50 here, begin-
ning सेकान्ते) Ś (after the verse of Vallabhadeva and the other commenta-
tors, not indicated as a variant thereof).

28 अभ्युद्धृता॰] V A N Ś; अभ्युत्थिता॰ M S; अभ्युद्धता॰ J.

29 धुर्यान्विश्रमयेति] V M; धुर्यान्विश्रामयेति A(?) N S J Ś. ◇ तामवारोहयत्] V;
तामवारोपयत् A N M S J; तां समारोहयत् Ś. ◇ रथादवरुरोह] V Ś; रथादवततार
A(?) N M S J.

30 अन्वासित॰] V A N M J Ś; अन्वासीन॰ S.

31 पादौ] V S; पादान् A(?) N M Svl J Ś.

32 आतिथेयस्तमातिथ्यविनीताध्वपरिश्रमम्] V Avl S J Ś; तमातिथ्यक्रियाशान्तरथक्षोभ-
परिश्रमम् A N M.

अथाथर्ववनिधेस्तस्य विजितारिपुरः पुरः।
अथ्यार्मिर्थपतिर्वाचमाददे वदतां वरः॥५८॥³³

उपपन्नं ननु शिवं सप्तस्वङ्गेषु यस्य मे।
दैवीनां मानुषीणां च प्रतिकर्ता त्वमापदाम्॥५९॥³⁴

तव मन्त्रकृतो मन्त्रैर्दूरात्संयमितारिभिः।
प्रत्यादिश्यन्त इव मे दृष्टलक्ष्यभिदः शराः॥६०॥³⁵

हविरावर्जितं होतस्त्वया विधिवदग्निषु।
वृष्टीभवति सस्यानामवग्रहविशोषिणाम्॥६१॥³⁶

पुरुषायुषजीविन्यो निरातङ्का निरीतयः।
यन्मदीयाः प्रजास्तत्र हेतुस्त्वद्ब्रह्मवर्चसम्॥६२॥³⁷, ³⁸

तदेवं चिन्त्यमानस्य गुरुणा ब्रह्मयोनिना।
सानुबन्धाः कथं न स्युः सम्पदो मे निरापदः॥६३॥³⁹

किं तु वध्वां तवैतस्यामदृष्टसदृशप्रजम्।

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33 अथाथर्ववनिधेस्तस्य] V A N M S; अथाथर्ववविदस्तस्य J Ś. ◇ विजितारिपुरः पुरः] V M S J; विजितारिपुरःसरः A N Ś.

34 प्रतिकर्ता] V A(?) N S; प्रतिहर्ता M; प्रतिहन्ता J Ś.

35 संयमितारिभिः] V Ś; संशमितारिभिः A N S J; प्रशमितारिभिः M. ◇ ॰लक्ष्य॰] V M; ॰लक्ष॰ A N S J Ś (though note that the MS used often does not distinguish क्ष and क्ष्य).

36 वृष्टीभवति] V; वृष्टिर्भवति A N M S; वृष्ट्यै भवति J Ś.

37 प्रजास्तत्र] V J(?) Ś; प्रजास्तस्य A(?) N M S(?).

38 S's testimony is lacking from 62cd to 74.

39 देवं] V A; त्वयैवं N M J Ś.

न मामवति सद्द्वीपा रत्नसूरपि मेदिनी॥ ६४॥[40]

मत्परं दुर्लभं मत्वा नूनमावर्जितं मया।

पयः पूर्वे स्वनिःश्वासकदुष्णमुपभुञ्जते॥ ६५॥[41]

सो ऽहमिज्याविशुद्धात्मा प्रजालोपनिमीलितः।

प्रकाशश्चान्धकारश्च लोकालोक इवाचलः॥ ६६॥[42]

लोकान्तरसुखं पुण्यं तपोदानसमुद्भवम्।

सन्ततिः शुद्धवंश्या तु परत्रेह च शर्मणे॥ ६७॥[43]

तया हीनं विनेता मां कथं पश्यन्न दूयते।

सिक्तं स्वयमिव स्नेहाद्रन्ध्यमाश्रमवृक्षकम्॥ ६८॥[44]

असह्यपीडं भगवन्नृणमन्त्यमवेहि मे।

अरुन्तुदमिवालानं नवबद्धस्य दन्तिनः॥ ६९॥[45]

तस्माद्यथा विमुच्येयं संविधातुं तथार्हसि।

इक्ष्वाकूणां दुरापे ऽर्थे त्वदधीना हि सिद्धयः॥ ७०॥[46]

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[40] After this verse A M J include the following verse:

नूनं मत्तः परं वंश्याः पिण्डविच्छेददर्शिनः ।

न प्रकामभुजः श्राद्धे स्वधासंग्रहतत्पराः॥

The same verse is included by N and Ś after 65.

[41] पूर्वे स्वनिःश्वासकदुष्णमुपभुञ्जते] V J; पूर्वे स्वनिःश्वासकवोष्णमुपभुञ्जते Ś; पूर्वैः स्वनिःश्वासकवोष्णमुपयुज्यते A(?) N; पूर्वैः स्वनिःश्वासकवोष्णमुपभुज्यते M.

[42] प्रकाशश्चान्धकारश्च] V J Ś; प्रकाशश्चाप्रकाशश्च A N M.

[43] लोकान्तर॰] V A N M Ś; लोकोत्तर॰ J(?). ◇ तु] V J; हि A(?) N M (Ś uncertain).

[44] विनेता] V; विनेतर् A N J Ś; विधातर् M. ◇ ॰वृक्षकम्] V A N M; ॰पादपम् J Ś.

[45] ॰मन्त्यमवेहि] A N M J Ś; ॰बन्धमवैहि V. ◇ नवबद्धस्य] V J Ś; अनिर्वाणस्य A N M.

[46] तस्माद्यथा विमुच्येयं] V J(?); तस्माद्यथा विमुच्ये ह्म् Ś; तस्मान्मुच्ये यथा तात A N M. ◇ तथार्हसि] V M J Ś; त्वमर्हसि A(?) N.

इति विज्ञापितो राज्ञा ध्यानस्तिमितलोचनः।
क्षणमात्रमृषिस्तस्थौ सुप्तमीन इव ह्रदः॥७१॥[47]

सो ऽपश्यत्प्रणिधानेन सन्ततिस्तम्भकारणम्।
भावितात्मा भुवो भर्तुरथैनं प्रत्यबोधयत्॥७२॥[48]

पुरा शक्रमुपस्थाय तवोर्वीं प्रतियास्यतः।
आसीत्कल्पतरुच्छायासेविनी सुरभिः पथि॥७३॥[49]

इमां देवीमृतुस्नातां स्मृत्वा सपदि सत्वरः।
प्रदक्षिणक्रियातीतस्तस्याः कोपमजीजनः॥७४॥[50]

अवजानासि मां यस्मादतस्ते न भविष्यति।
मत्प्रसूतिमनाराध्य प्रजेति त्वा शशाप सा॥७५॥[51, 52]

स शापो न त्वया राजन्न च सारथिना श्रुतः।
नदत्याकाशगङ्गायाः स्रोतस्युद्दामदिग्गजे॥७६॥

अवैमि तदपध्यानाद्यत्नापेक्षं मनोरथम्।

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47 विज्ञापितो] V N M J Ś; विज्ञापिते A. ◇ ॰मीन इव] V A(?) N M Ś; मीनो यथा J.

48 सन्तति॰] V A(?) N Ś; सन्ततेः M J.

49 ॰च्छायासेविनी] V; ॰च्छायामाश्रिता A(?) N M J Ś.

50 इमां देवीमृतुस्नातां स्मृत्वा सपदि सत्वरः। प्रदक्षिणक्रियातीतस्तस्याः कोपमजीजनः॥] V J
    Ś; धर्मलोपभयाद्राज्ञीमिमां संचिन्त्य सत्वरः। प्रदक्षिणक्रियार्हायां तस्यां त्वं साधु नाचर॥ A
    N; धर्मलोपभयाद्राज्ञीमृतुस्नातामिमां स्मरन् । प्रदक्षिणक्रियार्हायां तस्यां त्वं साधु नाचरः॥ M;
    S's reading cannot be determined with certainty, due to the lacuna, but it
    ended तस्यां त्वं साधु नाचरः, so it was not V's, but probably either that of A N
    or that of M.

51 Stanzas १.७५-७६ are omitted by A N.

52 त्वा] V; त्वां M J (Ś uncertain).

प्रतिबध्नाति हि श्रेयः पूज्यपूजाव्यतिक्रमः॥७७॥[53]

हविषे दीर्घसत्त्रस्य सा चेदानीं प्रचेतसः।

भुजङ्गपिहितद्वारं पातालमधितिष्ठति॥७८॥

स त्वमेकान्तरां तस्या मदीयां वत्समातरम्।

आराधय सपत्नीकः सा वां कामं प्रदास्यति॥७९॥[54]

इति वादिन एवास्य होतुराहुतिसाधनम्।

अनिन्द्या नन्दिनी नाम धेनुराववृते वनात्॥८०॥

ताम्रा ललाटजां राजिं बिभ्रती सासितेतराम्।

सन्ध्या प्रतिपदेनेव व्यतिभिन्ना हिमांशुना॥८१॥[55]

भुवं कोष्णेन कुण्डोध्नी मेध्येनावभृथादपि।

प्रस्नवेनाभिवर्षन्ती वत्सालोकप्रवर्तिना॥८२॥[56]

रजःकणैः खुरोद्धूतैः स्पृशद्भिर्गात्रमन्तिकात्।

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53   अवैमि तदपध्यानाद्यल्लापेक्षं मनोरथम्] V; अवेहि तदवज्ञानाद्यल्लापेक्षं मनोरथम्   Ś; ईप्सितं तदवज्ञानाद्विद्धि सार्गलमात्मनः M S; J appears to comment on words from both readings, including अवेहि.

54   स त्वमेकान्तरां तस्या मदीयां वत्समातरम्] V J Ś (but dividing वत्स मातरम्); सुतां मदीयां सुरभेः कृत्वा प्रतिनिधिं शुचिः A N S; सुतां तदीयां सुरभेः कृत्वा प्रतिनिधिं शुचिः M. ◇ सा वां कामं प्रदास्यति] V; सा वां कामं विधास्यति J Ś; प्रीता कामदुघा हि सा A(?) N M S.

55   ताम्रा ललाटजां राजिं बिभ्रती सासितेतराम् । सन्ध्या प्रतिपदेनेव व्यतिभिन्ना हिमांशुना॥] V; ताम्रा ललाटजां राजिं बिभ्रती । सन्ध्या प्रतिपदेनेव व्यतिभिन्ना हिमांशुना॥ Ś ; ललाटोदयमाभुग्नं पल्लवस्निग्धपाटला । बिभ्रती श्वेतरोमाङ्कं सन्ध्येव शशिनं नवम् ॥ A N M S J.

56   प्रस्नवेना॰] V A N S J; प्रस्नवेणा॰ M Ś.

तीर्थाभिषेकजां शुद्धिमादधाना महीक्षितः॥८३॥⁵⁷
तां पुण्यदर्शनां दृष्ट्वा निमित्तज्ञस्तपोधनः।
याज्यमाशंसितावन्ध्यप्रार्थनं पुनरब्रवीत्॥८४॥⁵⁸
अदूरवर्तिनीं सिद्धिं राजन्विगणयात्मनः।
उपस्थितेयं कल्याणी नाम्नि कीर्तित एव यत्॥८५॥
वन्यवृत्तिरिमां शश्वदात्मानुगमनेन गाम्।
विद्यामभ्यसनेनेव प्रसादयितुमर्हसि॥८६॥
प्रस्थितायां प्रतिष्ठेथाः स्थितायां स्थानमाचरेः।
निषण्णायां निषीदास्यां पीताम्भसि पिवेरप॥८७॥⁵⁹
वधूर्भक्तिमती चैनामर्चितामा तपोवनात्।
प्रयातां प्रातरन्वेतु सायं प्रत्युद्ब्रजेदपि॥८८॥⁶⁰
इत्या प्रसादादस्यास्त्वं परिचर्यापरो भव।
अविघ्नमस्तु ते स्थेयाः पितेव धुरि पुत्रिणाम्॥८९॥
तथेति प्रतिजग्राह प्रीतिमान्सपरिग्रहः।
आदेशं देशकालज्ञः शिष्यः शासितुरानतः॥९०॥
अथ प्रदोषे दोषज्ञः संवेशाय विशां पतिम्।
सूनुः सूनृतवाक्स्रष्टुर्विससर्जोर्जितश्रियम्॥९१॥
सत्यामपि तपःसिद्धौ नियमापेक्षया मुनिः।

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⁵⁷ खुरोद्धतैः] V A N M S J; पुरोद्धतैः S. ◇ तीर्थाभिषेकजां शुद्धिम्] V M J; तीर्थाभि-
षेकसंसिद्धिम् A N; तीर्थाभिषेकसंशुद्धिम् S Ś. ◇ महीक्षितः] V A(?) N M S; महीपतेः
S Ś.

⁵⁸ तपोधनः] V A(?) N Ś; तपोनिधिः M S J. ◇ याज्यम्] V A(?) N M S J; याच्यम्
Ś. ◇ °शंसितावन्ध्यप्रार्थनं] V A N M Svl J; °शंसितावन्ध्यं प्रार्थनं Avl S Ś(?).

⁵⁹ स्थानमाचरेः] V J Ś; स्थितिमाचरेः A(?) N M S(?).

⁶⁰ प्रयातां] V Ś ; प्रयता A(?) N M S J.

कल्पवित्कल्पयामास वन्यामेवास्य संविधाम्॥९२॥

निर्दिष्टां कुलपतिना स पर्णशालाम्
    अध्यास्य प्रयतपरिग्रहद्वितीयः।
तच्छिष्याध्ययननिवेदितावसानां
    संविष्टः कुशशयने निशां निनाय॥९३॥

इति रघुवंशे महाकाव्ये प्रथमः सर्गः॥

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